The Zones of Fragility: Outlaws and the Forms of Violence in the Ottoman Empire

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Abstract This study explores the relationship between violence and power through examining the archival documents about the outlaws in the Ottoman Empire from 1852 to 1876. I argue that the outlaws and the use of violence in the public sphere defied the power of the Ottoman Empire. Thereof, the present study agrees with the main thesis of Hannah Arendt about the destructive influence of violence on power. However, I take Hannah Arendt's argument on violence one step further by claiming that the form of violence -whether political or non-political- loses its significance when both public safety and state sovereignty are under great threats at the same time in the zones of fragility.

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Introduction: Rethinking Outlaws through Violence and Power

Violence in political and social life created formidable challenges both for the victimised subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the governing cadre of the state. These challenges fanned the flames of political tensions when some of the revolts rendered the central state power significantly impotent as it happened in the Ottoman Empire. The outlaws used political violence to target the state authorities to get their independence with the rise of nationalism in the long nineteenth century. On the other hand, there were also outlaws who victimised local people through using non-political violence without distinguishing their ethnic or religious identities. The amalgamation of nationalist sentiments and the power of religious authorities over the local communities aggravated political risks for the Sublime Porte[1] -the Porte hereafter- to control its diverse territories nobly and deftly from the imperial centre in Istanbul. Following the dreadful developments in the nineteenth century, the attacks of outlaws, the prevalence of violence, and finally religious and national concerns found a common sphere to defy the authority of the Porte. As a result, the increasing number of files and reports that were exchanged between the local administrative regions and the Porte shaped the multifaceted relationship between the centre and the periphery through the dynamics of violence and power.

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Yet it still remains an enigma when we question how the forms of violence and its influence on power create discontents both among the state and non-state forces. This is the reason that the present study aims to clarify this relationship between violence and power through analysing archival sources related to the outlaws in the Ottoman Empire. Centralising outlaws in this study while exploring the relationship between violence and power aims to open new gates to clarify the bewildering role of violence both in the social and political life. I will analyse a number of archival documents that I derived from the Ottoman Archives located in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri* (BOA), Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, Istanbul. I particularly consulted the Fonds of *Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Belgeleri* (Documents of Grand Vizier's Office), *Girid İrâdeleri* (Cretan Decrees), *Sadâret Âmedî Kalemi Defterleri* (Registers of Amedi Office), *Irade-Hariciye* (Imperial Decrees on Foreign Affairs), *Hariciye Nezareti Belgeleri Siyasi* (Ottoman Foreign Ministry Political Section Documents), *Taşra Bosna Müfettişliği Evrâkı* (Documents of Provincial Inspection of Bosnia), *Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Meclis-i Vala Evrakı* (Documents of Grand Vizier's Office related to the Legislative and Supreme Council), and finally *Sadâret Mektubî Kalemi Nezâret ve Devâir Evraki* (Documents of Grand Vizier's Office about Correspondence between Ministries and Offices). The present study is geographically limited to the Balkan region and Crete. These territories included numerous ethnic and religious communities so it offers a dynamic and diverse character to explore the relationship between violence and power. I also analysed the archival documents from the second half of the nineteenth century to the declaration of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876. The violence and its relationship with outlaws conflated in a more durable, politicized and resilient path starting from 1876 to the fall of the Ottoman Empire through secret committees and neatly organised attacks. Thereof, the illumination of the period before 1876 will open new ways in our thinking to understand the role of political and non-political violence. This is another reason that I analyse the archival sources in two main categories, which are "the zones of political fragility" and "the zones of social fragility". The political violence of outlaws was the ruling power in the particular areas of the Ottoman Empire so I presented this particularity through the zones of political fragility. In this context, the zones of political fragility signify particular areas where the violent conflict between the outlaws and the state authority surges because of political discontents such as ethnic, religious, and cultural concerns. Inversely, the non-political violence was also used by the outlaws so it created particular areas in which social conditions aggravated dramatically. I presented this particularity through the zones of social fragility. The zones of social fragility

indicates particular areas where the violent conflict between the outlaws and the state authority surges because of non-political violence, which increases the numbers of victims dramatically.

I raise two main arguments in this study. I argue that the relationship between violence and power in contentious societies are twofold. First, it can either revolve around the political or non-political concerns of certain communities. Second, violence in the public sphere is a destructive and ultimate force so much so that its political and non-political character can have the very similar influence on the dominant ruling power. My second argument hinges on *the zones of fragility* concept to define the relationship between violence and power. The employment of violence in the public space created the zones of fragility in which both the Ottoman state authority and the victims of violence emerged as vulnerable agencies when the outlaws and sometimes the state forces terrorised these zones. The political fragility comes to the fore with the increase of political conflict and the deployment of political violence. As a result, political violence in the public spaces creates the zones of political fragility. On the other hand, the non-political violence exacerbates the public safety in the zones of social fragility when the non-political violence rules the everyday life through the attacks of outlaws against the civilians. The remainder of the present article is organised into three sections. The first section deals with the historical background and the theoretical intervention concerning violence, power and outlaws through using mainly the insights and arguments of Hannah Arendt on violence. The second section examines the role of political violence in the zones of political fragility. The third section explores the role of non-political violence through the risk posed against public safety in the zones of social fragility. Finally, the conclusion part sums up the relationship between violence and power through the inclusiveness of the zones of fragility.

The Historical Background of Outlaws and the Theoretical Expansion of Violence-Power Nexus

Banditry is one of the most studied concepts in historical and political sociology. The fluid characters of outlaws make them significant figures both for the state and the marginalised segments of society. Eric Hobsbawm's social bandit theory was highly influential in different disciplines. However, it received critiques as well because the bandits remained highly controversial social agencies so it was hard to draw huge conclusions by limiting them into a narrowed theoretical boundary.[2] What is more, an outlaw had a complex dynamic character in the Ottoman Empire. Şaki -eşkiya in plural- is the key word that was used by the Ottoman authorities to indicate the

outlaws. Şaki etymologically signifies a desperate or miserable person; however, it gained a more negative connotation since it was mostly used for bandits and brigands who violated the rules of state authority and created dissent both in the peripheries and the governing centres. In addition to şaki, klephts demonstrated a traditional banditry character in the rural and mountainous areas of Ottoman Greece. "The klephts became a serious social problem even after Greece gained its full independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829. The klephts were mainly fugitives, debtors, outlaws, misfits, adventurers, victims of oppression, men not attached to the land by property or other obligations, who took to the hills and became brigands."[3] A significant number of thefts and raids of the klephts fostered discontentment in the Kingdom of Greece as well.[4] "Similar to the klepths, haiduks were also used as popular aspirations to point out the bandits both in the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe.[5] These multi-layered facets of outlaws made them a part of multidimensional and hard social problem. As a result, şaki, hajduk or klephts were the formidable figures of rural community that was connected to the certain social and political notions such as social injustice, public uncertainty, social isolation, political aims and the vacuum of authority from time to time. Unsurprisingly, power and violence are the key concepts both to understand the outlaws and the reaction of state.

The Ottoman Empire had to recognise the perilous power of outlaws in the periphery first time through Celali revolts in the sixteenth century that posed significant risks to the state authority.[6] The influence of outlaws reached a similar climax in the nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire was challenged utterly both from the internal conflicts inside its own territories and the external pressure in the war arenas. The extensive reforms during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) brought important changes in the administrative, fiscal and military area.[7] Indeed, this prudent and challenging era was the harbinger of a more organised and centralised reform period. The declaration of a binding document addressing the concerns of diverse communities of the Ottoman Empire, even including the Sultan himself, was inevitable in the first half of the nineteenth century to ameliorate the social and political decadence. The declaration of the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 was followed by a number of remarkable reform packages including the Imperial Rescript of 1856,[8] and finally reached its peak in 1876 with the announcement of the first Ottoman constitution. All these flawed but strenuous struggles to keep the Empire united and to surge its power again were marked by some of the fundamental values of equality and justice that resonated through numerous reforms in the nineteenth century. This transformation in the social, political,

administrative, legal and intellectual sphere, as a result, ushered a new phase in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, this tense era was not only consisted of state reforms because nationalism and the struggles among different ethnic communities opened new ways of uprising against the Ottoman Empire to create an independent political entity. All these reform struggles in this era were eventually called Tanzimat, in other words reorganisation. The Edict of 1839 and the Edict of 1856 were indisputably avant-garde and promising documents for both the Ottoman subjects and the state apparatus. This new political sagacity included rational dimensions to establish the rule of law and social justice by making significant, if not radical, changes in social life, legal rights, cultural institutions, public regulations and economic governance.[9]

Yet the gap between the ethical principles of Tanzimat and its applications in the vast lands of the Empire was devastatingly evident[10] that partially gave a strong foothold to the revolts, resistance and finally dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The disputes between the local governance and the local community made discernible that the central government was ineffective to coordinate the reforms harmoniously in the periphery. The revolts in Niš (1841) and Vidin (1850) were the alarming signals of the gaps between the centre and periphery.[11] The social injustice was the dominating reason of these two uprisings. However, the political character of numerous violent revolts was alarming particularly after the second half of the nineteenth century. The Cretan revolts in the second half of the 1860s, the insurgency in Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1875 and the April Uprising[12] in 1876 gained an international attention on the struggle of different ethnic communities to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire. The violence was employed both by the state authority and the outlaws at different degrees during these revolts and uprisings. In this context, violence and power dynamics of bandit-state-society nexus pose significant questions to unveil the multiple paradigms of a contentious society.

Hannah Arendt produced prominent works to uncover the role violence in polity. The perspectives of Hannah Arendt on violence take its point of departure from a critical reading of the arguments raised by Sorel, Fanon, Weber, Marx and Sartre about violence and power.[13] Arendt presented numerous cases from the contemporary social and political issues to clarify her original concepts and definitions. In doing so, Arendt produced one of the most significant and yet debatable texts about the role of violence in the political realm. The violence concept of Arendt includes some subversive dynamics particularly about the outcome of violent action. She says that "the distinction between violent and non-violent action is that the former is exclusively bent upon the destruction of the old and the latter

chiefly concerned with the establishment of something new."[14] Unsurprisingly, her critiques concerning the violence hinge on the destructive force of violence. This destruction resonates not only in the formidable ruling centres of the Powerful but also it shapes the entire public sphere where the violent action is performed. This is the reason that Arendt connected violence and power so neatly that both of the concepts disguised in different forms and influenced each other. Yet the character of violence has a more determining role over the future of power while remaining the most deliberate reverberation of power at the same time.[15] Thereof, Arendt draws attention to the broad consensus when the issue is the impact of violence as the most revealed constituent of power. She claims that "if we turn to the literature on the phenomenon of power, we soon find out that there exists an agreement among political theorists from Left to Right that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power."[16]

The violence-producing agencies need to burden the risk of being suppressed by the repressive political authorities and they wipe out in time.[17] Arendt is righteous that the rule of violence may have tragic outcomes and erode the power itself. However, it is equally important to consider the perpetuators of violence as well. Arendt noted that "in domestic affairs, violence functions indeed as the last resort of power against criminals or rebels—that is, against individuals who, as it were, refuse to be overpowered by the consensus of the majority."[18] The use of violence and the impotence of state force to prevent the attacks of outlaws against local people may delegitimize state authority in the periphery. The weakened state authority in the eyes of local people may also diminish the central power and enforce it to use more violence to restore its defied authority. From this point of view, we need to go one step further from the Arendt's perspective on violence to clarify the perplexing relationship between violence and power because the actor, who uses violence, is as important as the outcome of violence. The outlaws, therefore, are located somewhere between the illegitimate actors of the ruling political realm and violence-producing actors of everyday life. The form of this violence depends on the goals of perpetuators. The political violence can create great concerns for the state power as it may lose its ultimate power temporarily or permanently. However, the non-political violence in the public sphere -for instance the attacks of outlaws to get material benefits- may also create great dissents for the state authority when this violence is directed against the innocent people. The persistence of these attacks against the civilians, who are under the protection of state authority, demonstrates that the state is not able to guarantee the public safety at all times. As a result, both the political and non-political violence in the public

sphere create a fragile political authority in the centre of ruling power and a detrimental public life in the periphery of vulnerable social geographies respectively. Hence, the two forms of violence, either political or non-political, are equally perilous considering the relationship between the political and social actors. More importantly, the proliferation of violence increases fragility in the realms of polity and society.

The attacks of outlaws and the employment of violence in each incident in a particular space make that area a zone of fragility. It bears emphasis that the use of violence is a collective violence when the issue is outlaws. Charles Tilly argued in his landmark study that collective violence "is not simply individual aggression writ large. Social ties, structures and processes significantly affect its character."[19] The two zones of fragility, which are explored below through diverse cases, aim to clarify this perplexing relationship between violence and power. Centralizing outlaws to explore the complex dynamics of polity and society offers us new perspectives about the influence of different violence forms in the zones of fragility. This fragility takes its focal strength from the increasing number of victims and the state of vulnerability in the place of incident. The outlaws, who have a specific political concern, use political violence for the political determination and they resist against the dominant political authority, which is either a local or central state force. A political concern is not only related to the political issues. I use political concern as an inclusive term that includes the concerns about *identity* and *justice* so a political concern leads to a change or transformation in the ruling political power. The challenge against the ruling power fosters political conflict and broadens the scope of political fragility. Therefore, the political conflict aggravates public turmoil in the zones of political fragility. On the other hand, the attacks against the civilian people to extort them, seize their goods, and reap the benefits of organised raids create great dissents in the social life. These attacks have no political purpose. However, each attack creates the zones of social fragility with the diminishing public safety in the everyday life. Thus, these attacks are marked as the outcomes of non-political violence. What is more, the lack of sufficient state support to get protected against the outlaws defy the power of state authority in the eyes of local people in the periphery.

Following the surge of political and non-political violence, the state power weakens both in the zones of social and political fragility because the political violence directly targets the state authority for their political concerns. Additionally, the non-political violence renders the legitimacy of state authority vulnerable when the state forces are not able to guarantee the public safety. The application of violence and the political conflict make the zones of political

fragility more formidable. As a result, the outlaws in the zones of political fragility have certain politically oriented concerns, which constitute an important part of their identities while resisting against the state authority or its accomplices. However, the outlaws in the zones of social fragility are not primarily resorted to violence because of their politically oriented concerns. Conversely, the principal aim of outlaws in the zones of social fragility is to survive through theft, extortion or organising attacks to get material benefits so the identity of victim has not a significant impact on the decision to commit ordinary crimes.

The Zones of Political Fragility in the Prevalence of Political Violence

The Greek War of Independence, (1821-1829), brought independence to the majority of Greek communities that made the Greeks the first Balkan nation on the path of independence struggle against the Ottoman rule. Eventually, the Greek independence became a role model for the other Balkan nations of the Ottoman Empire.[20] Following the independence of Greece, different ethnic communities in the Ottoman Balkans strove to get independence from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. The religious concerns among the local religious authorities (particularly the influence of Orthodox Christianity) conflated with the ethnic concerns (dominantly pro-Slavic influence with the support of the Russian Empire). This formidable combination crystallised political dissents of the different communities in the Ottoman Empire. However, it is hard to claim that every uprising attempt contained only a nationalist character. Some uprisings, as it happened in the case of Niš (1841) and Vidin (1850) revolts, were consisted of both the fabrics of social injustice that were later fortified with the political dissents of the rebels. The Ottoman Empire was more reactionary when the direct target of outlaws was its political authority during these revolts. On the other hand, the Porte was more flexible to negotiate with the dissident communities about their social issues unless it posed a serious political challenge against the Ottoman rule. The sensitivity of the Porte against the political dissents created a fragile political context in which power competition between outlaws and the state authority created its own climax of violence. The documents, which are examined below, show that the Porte defined each actor of political uprising as an outlaw and marked each incident as a typical banditry or brigandage activity. The deep tensions in the political realm constituted violence as a highly valuable instrument both for the uprising communities and the state authority while each agency was striving to realise their own ideals. The commonality of using

violence for the antagonist forces rendered the political situation more fragile. The zones of political fragility, therefore, were the places where the political concerns of the uprising communities and the inclination of outlaws to use violence fostered the Ottoman state power to respond violently while suppressing these attacks and revolts.

One of the first significant initiatives was led by the ruling members of the House of Petrović-Njegoš of Montenegro and their soldiers in 1852 when they seized Žabljak castle. The Ottoman rule portrayed many of these attacks equivalent to the malevolent acts of outlaws. The Porte considered this intrusion of the Montenegrins as a typical banditry activity and a direct violation of social order and public safety. Hence, it was reported that the necessary steps must have been taken accordingly to hinder these harrowing attacks.[21] For this aim, the Porte employed Ömer Lutfi Pasha and surrounded Montenegro and Dalmatia from sea to break the siege of the Principality of Montenegro. The Porte took this difficult decision after receiving the letter from the local governors uttering that the increasing number of assailment of Montenegro was a perilous threat:

"We turned a blind eye to the banditry activities of Montenegrin rebels in the region heretofore. However, the invasion of towns and villages of the Ottoman Empire by Montenegro signifies a direct declaration of war against the Empire. The current situation is unacceptable under any condition, and that may defy dignity of the state while eventually resulting with the international independence of Montenegro".[22]

This letter verified the concerns of Osman Mazhar Pasha, who was *Mutasarrif*[23] of Shkodër at that time. The burden of the Porte turned to be more profound while the rumours regarding the independence of Montenegro were spreading out from one village to another in the region in the wake of these attacks.[24]

The early 1850s witnessed increasing resisting attempts of the Montenegrin and Serbian Ruling Houses. The reaction of the Porte against the collaboration of its subjects to rebel against its own authority was factionist, if not fundamentalist. Accordingly, the Porte framed these revolting places with particular phrases. For examples, Zupa, Şuma, Benan, Grahova, Piva and Derbenak were the small towns, which were notoriously called as "*Nevâhî-i Âsîyye*" -forbidden rebellions- by the Porte.[25] Bulgarians and Serbians constituted a considerable number of population in these resisting zones. Their religious and ethnic identity enmeshed with the encouragement to widen public disorder in these towns led by the authoritarian Prince of Montenegro, Danilo I who strenuously fought against the Ottoman Empire in the 1850s for the independence of Montenegro and its international recognition. The banditry activities in "*Nevâhî-i Âsîyye*"

and in the border towns close to Montenegro became infamous at the
Porte when the assets and properties of the Muslim population were
plundered in this region. Particularly, the Muslim residents of
Çerniçe were part of these victims who lost their properties and their
concerns about the public safety aggravated severely.[26] These rebel-
lious attempts of the outlaws, therefore, spurred different ethnic sub-
jects, particularly non-Muslims, to resist against the Ottoman rule.

Following the resistance of "*Nevâhî-i Âsîyye*", the Porte was in-
formed that Serbian outlaws distributed numerous weapons to the
Christians. This kind of logistic support was a challenging attempt
for the preparation of a new rebellion against the Ottoman authority.
A sensitive balance needed to determine the route of social control.
For this purpose, the public reaction of local people was taken seri-
ously by the Porte. This was not an easy task when we considered
the inherently frightening legacy of the Ottoman Empire through
its corrupt local officials and suppression of the rebels in the periph-
ery. A document dated on December 1, 1861 dictated the collection
of the distributed weapons; however, the same document accentu-
ated the importance of prevention provocative behaviours against
the Christian subjects because such a provocation would have
yielded to commotion while gathering those weapons from them.[27]

The national awakening resonated not only in coffee houses and
the streets of volatile Balkan towns. Numerous churches and
monasteries were frontiers of this struggle. The priests and other
religious authorities played a major role to encourage and support
outlaws that contributed to the independence movement of
Christian ethnic groups and defiance of the Ottoman rule. The
Muslims became open targets because of the combination of national
and religious sentiments that fostered these attacks against them.
The violence was not only an instrument in the hands of outlaws.
The Ottoman local governance also used violence as an instrument
to control the region and suppress the revolts. The religious and
cultural clash appeared deeply and strainably after the mid-1850s
when the cultural and religious division was aggravating in the entire
Balkans. The tiny towns of Bosnia were part of this ferocious
division. The records and proceedings of the assembly of *Nakşi*, a
province of Mostar, delineated this fact through the discourse of their
complaints. Their grievances marked the grim realities of the social
context when they remained in a state of constant vulnerability to
violence and aggression of the Christian outlaws of Montenegro.[28]
On the other hand, the Muslims were not only victims of ongoing
political conflict. The Christians suffered horrendously due to asym-
metric warfare, political clashes, socially chaotic atmosphere and
mobilisation of the Ottoman military force to prevent the resistance.
This duality of violence in the periphery was not always under the

control of the Porte that became clear when the Muslim armed groups violated the order of the Porte and united with certain zaptiehs[29] in Volos, a port town in Thessaly, and let the fire of violence and oppression over the Christian subjects.[30]

The foreign intervention and logistic support offered a vital opportunity to foster the struggle of many priests. However, this attempt was not sufficient to attain their ultimate goals. For instance, the civil servants of the Porte questioned those priests who were caught with weapons in Bosnia in order to provoke and mobilise local Christians for a new resistance. During the inquiry of civil servants, it was revealed that there was an implicit cooperation between the priests and the Austrian political elites. However, the Porte did not attempt to take a serious measure when the priests declared that they were in preparation to return to the Austrian Empire permanently. Nonetheless, the capacity of the Porte was limited to punish every resisting attempt and uprising for a short period of time. Thus, a serious verbal notification not to cross the Ottoman boarder was found sufficient to terminate the inquiry of the incident attempted by those priests.[31]

The outlaws and their political rebellions polarized religious division between Muslim and Christian subjects in Bosnia and unveiled the socio-cultural vulnerability in the region. The Ottoman Empire dully accepted many of the concerns of the Christian subjects in terms of religious practice with the Edict of 1856. The Christian subjects asked for respect and a complete tolerance to their religious symbols and rituals when they negotiated to put an end to those riots. After rebellious attempts in different parts of Bosnia –including Tuzla, Kladina and Bihać[32]- during the 1850s, the Porte recognised the requests of rebels. These symbolic requests comprised significant changes in terms of religious freedom and public regulations. These rights allowed the Christians in Bosnia to chime the church bells and organize their own ceremonies. What is more, they were able to elect their own local leaders to practise administrative duties such as tax collection. Accordingly, the land ownership right was recognized for Christians.[33]

The Porte did not distinguish the ethnic or religious identity of the outlaws when reacting to them as long as its authority was not threatened by those outlaws, secret committees, rebels or bandits. For instance, Hasan Ali and his two brothers from the village of Avcı Hasan, which means Hasan the hunter literally, were arrested in the mosque of their village while receiving religious training. After the investigations, it was found that they terrorised the region of Shumen, located in the north-eastern part of Bulgaria today.[34]

The document issued on December 3, 1860 ordered for the arrest of Priest Pereto because of his cooperation with outlaws in Serbia to

encourage Christian subjects in order to resist against the Ottoman authority.[35] Priest Pereto was not alone in his mission. Similarly, Priest Shenkiltorusye played an important role by cooperating with the rebels and bandits. However, he was deported to Bursa′, the former capital city of the Ottoman Empire in North-western Anatolia, after it was found that he supported and encouraged resistance in his hometown Bihać, a town in North-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina today. His arrest did not stop him to realise his ideals. He achieved to escape from Bursa to Serbia and started exporting guns and some gunpowder from Serbian towns to the resisting places in the inner Ottoman lands. Upon his second arrest, the Porte decided to exile him and his family to a remote place.[36] The next year Metropolitan bishop and six other high ranked commanders in Maleş, a town in Skopje, were blamed by local governors for hiding Eplo who was a notorious outlaw from Niš.[37] The activist priests in the uprising movement brought devastating political divisions with a sociocultural character in the places populated by the Christians. The Porte was informed that Priest Joseph from the village of Yanya in Prijepolje aimed at provoking peasants in the village in order to resist against the Ottoman rule. The Porte immediately declared the Priest Joseph a *şaki*, an outlaw, who organised attacks with the band of Višegrad. Hence, the verdict announced to punish Priest Joseph and his supporters who were framed as outlaws by the Porte as they strove to expand the political unrest in the region.[38]

The religious support did not only increase motivation of outlaws but also created new conflicts between the religious authorities of the Christian and Muslim governors. One of the most prominent examples of this conflict occurred in the Sanjak of Chania, which was the most important region in the Vilayet of Crete. The island had already become a notorious place for the Empire with its uprising attempts starting from the early 1820s. The resistance was repressed with bloody spasm attacks of the Ottomans. The pashas of Crete were appointed to Chania to control the island easily from this strategically located town. The priests were again in the stage as the leading figures to liberate the Greek populated regions from the Ottoman rule and to make them a part of the newly established Greek state. The two priests, Gomno and Partino of the Chania Gayniye Monastery, which was in close proximity to Chania, drew a furious attention of Mustafa Naili Pasha who had been in the island for more than three decades and suppressed previous Greek uprisings successfully as much as he did these suppressions violently. He blamed Gomno and Partino for harbouring the resisting rebels of the different bandit groups and encouraging those rebels vigorously. The official correspondence of Mustafa Nail Pasha to Istanbul uttered serious threats that were posed by the priests to the safety

and authority of the Ottoman rule in the island. Hence, he recommended the arrestment and punishment of these priests in their visits to Istanbul.[39] It is debatable whether the priests were punished in line with Mustafa Naili Pasha's request because the Ottoman governing elites in Istanbul were quite sensitive about giving final decisions regarding Crete whose Greek populated subjects' dissents took attention by the Great powers starting from the 1820s. However, Mustafa Naili Pasha was called to Istanbul and promoted to Grand Vizier after three years of this incident. The Porte decided to increase the number of the soldiers in Crete when the revolts erupted again in the island in 1866. The outlaws were again the principal actors in leading the political tumult and agitating the Greek community in Crete. Taking the support for the independence of Crete at the international level was an important policy for the organizers of resistance so much so that the support of Pope in Vatican was sought as well. The Porte was much aware of the anti-Ottomanist sentiments in the island that's why it decided to increase the military preparations and logistic support of the Ottoman army in the island after the majority of the troops left from Crete to the Khedivate of Egypt in 1867.[40]

On the other hand, it is hard to define the relationship between the Ottoman rule and ecclesiastic class as a constant, untransformed and hostile aggression during this period. There were numerous clerics and priests who cooperated harmoniously with the Porte in the prevention of outlaws and nationalist movements. Ziso was one of them who was a cleric from Almyros,[41] a town in the region of Thesally. He worked for the Empire and was responsible for the secretarial duties during the struggle of the Greek state that aimed to increase its territories by carving up the dissolving Ottoman Empire. The nationalist bandit groups uttered threats towards Ziso. The outcome of those threats was dramatic; the outlaws set on fire his house. However, the Porte did not leave him alone and helpless. The issued decree on October 1, 1858 aimed to compensate his damage by giving him two thousand kurush.[42] The use of violence was a strategic and sometimes a necessary decision in the course of political conflict. The identity-oriented uprisings demonstrated a political character and created the zones of political fragility with the contribution of outlaws and state force into this vehement ambiance of political violence.

Arendt's approach to violence is novel in terms of giving new meanings to the old concepts. However, her perspective is state-centred, which limits violence within the orbit of revolutions, state violence and political legitimacy. According to this perspective, violence takes its central position when the legitimacy of the power-holders is defied seriously. As a result, violence prevails as an expected outcome of the

decaying political legitimacy when we consider that "all political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them."[43] The social and political circumstances of a local setting can be determinative to understand the multifaceted relationship between violence and power. Additionally, there was a dialogic relation between the emerging nations, their supporters and the "Others"[44] as it happened in the nationalist movements of nineteenth century Ottoman political stratum. The increasing gap between the politically oriented outlaws and the Ottoman state authority signified the principal struggle of state formation in which an imagined and "civilised"[45] habitus could have been attained according to the perspective of outlaws. The huge network of bureaucracy within the state power is greater in number than the instruments of violence.[46] However, the outcome of violence can bring a definite failure to the complex and grandiose structures of state power as the zones of political fragility demonstrated in this section. The zones of political fragility, therefore, were the public places of prevailing political violence. Nevertheless, the everyday life was also shaped tragically by the attributions of non-political violence in the zones of social fragility, which will be explored in the next section.

The Zones of Social Fragility in the Prevalence of Non-Political Violence

The political violence examined in the previous section was perceived as a severe threat by the ruling political authority. On the other hand, the non-political character of violence has also an influence on the production of malevolent power. These dynamics of power resonated more vehemently in the public space where the Ottoman Empire was not able to protect the civilian people against the attacks of outlaws. These public places, therefore, were the zones of social fragility with the creation of a volatile social life and the increase of victims in each attack. The most important distinction between a violent outlaw group and a responsible state authority lies in the protection of rights, goods and lives of the people. The prestige of state authority, in other words the prestige of state power, surges with the prevention of public violence and guaranteeing public safety. The Ottoman Empire employed violence from time to time and defied its own power either through irresponsible soldiers, corrupt local officials or over-reactionary irregular soldiers. Yet there were also responsible and decisive governors and pashas who endeavoured to restore public safety and protect the vulnerable people. Derviş Pasha was one of them. The community of Zupče, a

town in Kosovo, attempted to revolt against the Ottoman rule in 1861. Derviş Pasha was appointed to lead the army to suppress the resistance. An order was declared for the soldiers who were sent to the town to suppress the uprising under his rule. The letter explicitly stated that "any attack against the churches, houses and assets of people as well as their lives are against the honour of a soldier and such a behaviour is against the values of humanity…Violation of this order is such a disgrace and the ones who even practice these prohibited acts will be punished severely."[47]

The most serious attacks of outlaws demonstrated radical aspirations of non-political violence in the zones of social fragility. The mutinous attacks were not limited to the reactions of local people as it happened in the case of *Nevâhî-i Âsîyye* noted above. Additionally, diverse bandit groups crossed the borders between the two confronting territories: The one that was directly controlled by the Ottoman governors and the other that was under the administration of Serbian or Montenegrin rulers. The risk of death or being a victim of public unsafety was not improbable in the daily lives of people residing in the border villages and towns between Serbia, Montenegro and the inner lands that were directly controlled by the Porte. The outlaws moved between the border regions with ease to commit crime with the aim of typical brigandage activities such as plundering, theft, and extortion. These outlaws committed the ordinary crime of which violence constituted an important outcome of these attacks. The crimes against the civilian people in the borders rendered chasing of outlaws more challenging for the Porte.

The criminal activities reached an unbearable level in the 1870s. Mehmed Ali Pasha, head of the navy squadron of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar telegraphed Istanbul about the incidents of outlaws. The discourse used in the telegraph demonstrated the horrendous and challenging threat posed by the outlaws to the social order of everyday life. He stated that the local bandit groups from Sjenica, Nova Varoš (Yenivaroş) and the other outlaws from Serbia torched the houses of two peasants around at 5:00 a.m in the morning and then fled to Serbia along with other outlaws from Lobova village in 1875.[48] Following this event, two persons, Camcının Suleyman and Sebalar Sherif from Visegrád, were assassinated in 1876 by the Serbian outlaws. After their assassinations, the bands crossed the Ottoman border again and returned to Serbia.[49] The peasants were victimised in these attacks when the Porte had certain administrative and geographical limits to protect the safety of its boarders. The next year, three brothers Zeynel, Selman and Suleyman and their neighbours Shakir and Reshid were added to the new victim list when they went far away from their villages and reached close to Sjenica to graze their cattle. They became the targets of around thirty

outlaws from Serbia. Zeynel was dead by the rifle bullets. They would have been fortunate if they were found by the security forces because Sjenica was a border town and there was a station of Serbia in which the police force resided and patrolled in the region regularly. However, Mehmed Ali Pasha reported to the Porte that Serbian zaptiehs saw the event, but they neither prevented the attacks of outlaws against the unarmed peasants nor attempted to chase them immediately after the incident happened.[50]

The vulnerability of peasants impelled them not to go even to the forests to fulfil their wood needs as the ill fame of outlaws and their attacks spread throughout each village. The traditional hideouts of outlaws were the mountains and forests as these unnoticeable places provided safe shelters for them. The letter, which was sent to the Tuna province, expressed that the increasing number of deaths in the boarder settlements would lead a more serious and ungovernable social clashes in the region.[51] The concerns of the Porte became more discernible when Ibrahim's body was found in the forest close to his home in Rizperebez village. He was killed by the Serbian outlaws.[52] Yet the Serbian authorities' disinterest in the prevention of banditry activities, which were ordinary crimes at the same time, sent the Porte into a state of hopelessness about the protection of peasants in the border towns and reestablishment of its already-damaged authority in the periphery.

The religious identities of victims were not important to the offenders. The Serbian outlaws who crossed into the Ottoman Empire from the Principality of Serbia could target the Serbian peasants in the boarder villages and towns. Brichte Todosve, who was from Rotosh, Nova Varoš (Yenivaroş), was one of these peasants. He was first beaten and then his thirthy-six goats were taken by the outlaws and brought to Serbia in 1874. Brichte was not the only victim in these banditry activities; his neighbours, Baiik and Ispeeyo were also targets of the same bandit group whose eight horses and nine bulls were stolen.[53] Christian subjects were suffered from similar banditry activities in 1875 and this time the Serbian bandits raid the house of Vasilya from Macik village of Nova Varoš (Yenivaroş) in the early morning. He was beaten seriously and his wife was sent to death by the bullets of outlaws who seized a big portion of the goods, cattle and money of other residents in the village. Around three hundredth bandits in Nova Varoš entered numerous villages in that year and had a low intense small war with the military forces of the Ottoman Empire. The roads, which were blocked by the Serbian outlaws, were opened and security in the region was restored by the Ottoman rule with a high cost; however, a few Serbian outlaws lost their lives in the armed conflicts between the Serbian outlaws and Ottoman forces. The others managed to flee.[54]

The outlaws created unsafe conditions not only for the Muslim communities, but also for the holy places of Christians like Athos,[55] which has been the home of prominent churches and monasteries since the early Christianity. Its holy status sustained when Salonika was captured by Murad II in 1430. On the other hand, the holy status of Athos, at least its cultural significance, did not discourage certain outlaws to attack the houses and monasteries in the mid-1850s. This part of the eastern Greece was a mountainous region and the scope of mobility was seriously challenging, if not impossible. This small and formidable rocky territory was not too far from urban places, considering that its eighty-mile distance from Salonika. The safety of religious communities in Athos was under profound risks so much so that Kesaryos, the monk of Filotios Monastery, had to flee from Athos like many other monks because of prevalent violence in the region. Nevertheless, the repression of outlaws and their elimination gave Kesaryos the required permission to return to his monastery in 1856.[56] After four years of Kesaryos' return, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church declared a document accusing the Porte by claiming that the Ottoman officials in the rural areas were not acted responsibly and their disinterest in the prevention of banditry activities made them liable in the expansion of outlaws in Serres, which was fifty-mile away from Salonika and hosted a considerable number of Orthodox Christians at that time.[57] After five years of incidents in Serres, this time a similar attack of outlaws into the Sanjak of Ohri enforced the Patriarch to take the same initiative by requesting the investigation of these attacks seriously as Christian subjects were the prominent groups who suffered desperately due to these attacks.[58]

Arendt's indications about violence mostly revolve around the power of governments, but she did not delve into the complex dynamics that set the violence of non-state forces through targeting both the local community and the state authority. Indeed, this form of violence created the zones of social fragility when the bandits, brigands and other forms of outlaws were delegitimized both by the state authority and the local community. The outlaws examined in this section dominated the public sphere through the ravages of violence. In so doing, they created great concerns both in the central state authority and the periphery where the local people were victimized by their attacks.

Conclusive Remarks: The Inclusiveness of Violence in the Zones of Fragility

The identity-oriented uprisings against the state power sparked political violence and constituted the principal motives of public

tension between the outlaws and the Ottoman state authority. These violent tensions were transformed into contested actions in the public spaces and created the zones of political fragility. Each political violence in the public space prevailed the socio-political ambiance of uncertainty particularly after the second half of the nineteenth century. Hence, violence played a strategic role in the surge of political conflict between the outlaws and the state authority. Thereof, the political conflict widened the scope of fragility within the political realm while challenging the state power at the same time. Yet the political violence in the zones of political fragility constituted only one part of this dramatic social life in the periphery. The other part was more perilous for the residents of that particular zone where the incidents occurred because the non-political violence grounded in an atmosphere of social fragility by targeting the civilians. The outlaws victimised the innocent people without considering their religious or ethnic identity. As a result, the Christians, Muslims and Jews were targeted by the outlaws in the Ottoman Balkans. This is the reason that the violence and conflicts were not the outcome of solely nationalist or religious dissent. In doing so, the non-political violence transformed the conditions of everyday life into the 'precarity' of vulnerable people. This violent transformation, there-fore, created the zones of social fragility in the public places where the non-political violence was rife. Thus, the relationship between violence –whether political violence or non-political violence- and power became an important part of decadence in public safety. Violence aggravated the risks to guarantee public order and chal-lenged the state sovereignty when the outlaws aimed at functioning as the most horrendous authority in the zones of fragility.

The zones of fragility demonstrated the impotence of state power to protect the safety of public domains under its rule. The absence of power creates a fertile social atmosphere to rule the public through violence by other non-state forces. Arendt puts forth that "power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course its end is the disappearance of power. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it."[59] The presented cases about the outlaws in the zones of social fragility confirm the argument of Arendt about power and violence. Violence in the zones of social fragility rendered the Ottoman state power weak and inca-pable. However, the public spaces in the zones of political fragility also severely remained under the perishing influence of violence. As a result, both political and non-political violence shaped the state power and determined its reaction in the cases presented above. This is the reason that the form of violence loses its significance when the violence itself in the public space functions as the most determining

factor over the future of society and the state. This landmark and deleterious influence of violence has an inclusive character considering its capacity when the issue is widening or narrowing the orbit of power. Even though the main hypothesis of Arendt is tested in this study, it bears emphasis that the arguments of Arendt are mostly based on the role of violence in the political sphere with the rise of totalitarian governance and glorified national sentiments of the state cadre.[60] Conversely, the Ottoman Empire implemented a number of reforms and imposed cosmopolitan Ottoman identity against the rise of nationalist sentiments among different communities in the nineteenth century. From this perspective, the future studies may fill an important gap if the arguments of Arendt are used for comparative case studies of different empires in the age of nationalism.

This study is limited to the role of outlaws in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. I endeavoured to explore the relationship between violence and power. This study agrees with the main argument about the pernicious force of violence in the realms of power. However, it negates that the form of violence -whether political or non-political- has a distinctive influence when both public safety and state sovereignty are under the great risks of violence. Thereof, either the political or non-political violence may produce similar threats against the ruling power in the zones of fragility. The historical sociology is at the crossroads of history and sociology so it has a significant responsibility both to be innovative in its approach to the historical subject and to ask hard questions about the validity of social theories. This article offers only a small contribution to understand the longing and challenging relationship between violence and power through focusing the role of outlaws in the Ottoman Empire. Yet the historical sociology can benefit greatly by the future studies that delve into the mysterious and factual cases in the archives of different social and cultural geographies to conceive the relationship between violence and power, centre and periphery, state and society, and finally public space and the zones of fragility.

Acknowledgements

Endnotes

[1] The Sublime Porte, *Bâb-ı Âli* in origin, is a metonym, which was used by the Ottoman state and European governments to signify the Ottoman central government in Istanbul.

[2] Eric J. Hobsbawm. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 1959). See also Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. (New York: The New Press, [1969], 2000). The banditry studies also dealt with certain issues through a socio-economic perspective. For example see Thomas Gallant, "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World-Systems Perspective", in J. Mc C. Heyman, *States and Illegal Practices* (Oxford and New York: Oxford Berg, 1999), p. 25-61. The social banditry concept was challanged in relation to the need of approaching bandits as a complex social and economic outcome rather than a romatic uprising attempt. See Paul Sant Cassia. Banditry, Myth and Terror in Cyprus and other Mediterranean Societies. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35(1993): 773-795. For another realist banditry explanation see John S. Koliopoulos. *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece* 1821-1912. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

[3] John S. Koliopoulos. Brigandage and Irredentism in Nineteenth-century Greece. *European History Quarterly*, 19(1989), pp. 195.

[4] John S. Koliopoulos. Brigands with a Cause, 1987.

[5] Aleksander Petrović. The Role of Banditry in the Creation of Nation States in the Central Balkans during the 19th Century. MA thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2003.

[6] Karen Barkey. *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). See Chapter I.

[7] Carter Vaughn Findley. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 140. See also Avigdor Levy. "The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II," *Asian and African Studies* 7(1971): 13-39. See Stanford J. Shaw. "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6(1975): 421-459.

[8] The Edict of 1856 in the era of Abdulmecid I was a progressive document based on the equality principle to create Ottomanism as an umbrella and inclusive term so much so that *vatandaş*, fellow-citizen, was used first-time in the Edict whıle referrıng to the Ottoman subjects. The fundamental rights of the non-Muslims were recognised and the Edict also enforced the conscription of non-Muslims into the army. From this point of view, it minimised, at least in principle, the social and legal differences among different religious communities to strengthen the cultural fabrics of Ottomanism. For a more systematic evaluation of the Tanzimat era, see Kemal Karpat. The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3(1972): 237-274.

[9] Donald Quataert. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 66.

[10] Köksal's work deftly shows that the weak local networks at the community level were failed to implement the Tanzimat reforms in line with state centralisation. On the other hand, the dense communal networks among the ethnic and religious communities created new barriers in state centralisation and Ottomanism. See Yonca Köksal. "Rethinking Nationalism. State Projects and Community Networks in 19th-Century Ottoman Empire," *American Behavioral Scientist* 51(2008): 1498-1515. See also Reşad Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy. The Nineteenth Century*. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 67.

[11] Halil Inalcık. Tanzimâtın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri. *Belleten* 28 (1964): 623-690. See also Mark Pinson. Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period – The Revolts in Niš (1841) and Vidin (1850). *Middle Eastern*

Studies 11(1975): 103-146. See Ahmet Uzun. *Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler. Niş Üzerine Ayrıntılı Bir İnceleme* (1841). (Istanbul: Eren, 2002).

¹² Maria Nikolaeva Todorova. *Imagining the Balkans.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), see Chapter IV.

¹³ Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. *The New York Review of Books*, 12 (4), February 27, 1969. After this article in New York Times, Hannah Arendt published a book the next deepening her theoretical intervention on violence. See Hannah Arendt. *On Violence.* (Orlando, Austin, New York, San Diego, London: Harvest Books, 1970).

¹⁴ Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.

¹⁵ Richard Bernstein also takes attention to the personal experiences of Hannah Arendt as she explained that thinking efforts are the reflections of personal experiences. Considering the biography of Hannah Arendt, it is not surprising to conceive that why violence had a central place in her writings and had a solid connection with the political realm. See Richard J. Bernstein. *Violence. Thinking without Banisters.* (London: Polity Press, 2013).

¹⁶ Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.

¹⁷ Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, Richard Tilly. *The Rebellious Century 1830–1930.* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons), 1975, p. 286.

¹⁸ Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.

¹⁹ Charles Tilly. *The Politics of Collective Violence.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2001, p. 4.

²⁰ Paschalis M. Kitromilides. 'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of National Question in the Balkans. *European History Quarterly* 19(1989): 149-194.

²¹ BOA. A.MKT.UM. 121/1, 1 R.Evvel 1269 – 13 December 1852. See also A.MKT.UM. 120/9, 24 R.Ahir 1269 – 4 February 1853,

²² BOA. A.AMD., 41/44, 9 Rebiülevvel 1269 - 21 December 1852.

²³ Mutasarrif was an administrative authority in a local region who was appointed by the Sultan to deal with the governing issues of the appointed region.

²⁴ BOA. I.HR., 89/4370, 5 Ramadan 1268 – 23 June 1852.

²⁵ Zafer Gölen, "1852-53 Karadağ Askerî Harekâtı ve Sonuçları" *History Studies*, V. 1/1 (2009), 220.

²⁶ Gölen, 2009, 220.

²⁷ BOA. A.MKT.UM. 528/62, 28 C.Evvel 1278 – 1 December 1861.

²⁸ BOA. A.MKT.UM. 327/90, 25 Safer 1275 – 4 October 1858.

²⁹ The police force.

³⁰ BOA. MVL. 991/93, 4 Muharrem 1281 – 9 June 1864.

³¹ BOA. HR.MKT. 320/51, 7 C.Evvel 1276 – 2 December 1859.

³² Bihke is the official name of the city in the Ottoman Empire.

³³ Gölen, 2009, pp. 127.

³⁴ BOA. A.MKT.NZD. 210/54, 22 C.Ahir 1273 – 17 February 1857.

³⁵ BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 123/79, 19 C.Evvel 1277 – 3 December 1860.

³⁶ BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 146/88, 25 Zilkade 1278 – 24 May 1862.

³⁷ BOA. BOA. A.MKT.UM. 505/67, 6 R.evvel 1278 – 11 September 1861.

³⁸ BOA. TŞRBNM. 16/20, 10 Şevval 1280 – 19 March 1864; see also TŞRBNM. 16/33, 12 Şevval 1280 – 21 March 1864.

³⁹ BOA. A.MKT.UM. 130/11, 19 C.Evvel 1266 – 2 April 1850.

⁴⁰ BOA. I.MTZ.GR. 34/1409, 17 C.rvvel 1284 – 16 September 1867.

⁴¹ Ermiye in Ottoman Turkish.

⁴² BOA. A.MKT.MVL. 111/17, 4 R.Evvel 1276 – 1 October 1859.

⁴³ Hannah Arendt. A Special Supplement: Reflections on Violence. 1969.

[44] Rodanthi Tzinelli. *Nation-Building and Identity in Europe. The Dialogics of Reciprocity.* (New York and London: Palgrave Millan, 2008). See particularly Chapter 1 and 2 for the bandits and identity.

[45] See the second volume of Norbert Elias. *State Formation and Civilization: The Second Volume of Civilizing Process.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

[46] Arendt defends the argument that the huge organization of state bureaucracy for social and political control can be influential. However, it is also vulnerable in the face of the subversive power that entails with violence. Malesevic also raised a similar argument, however he added that this huge structural bureaucracy also coupled with "a potent of legitimizing ideology". See Sinisa Malesevic. *The Sociology of War and Violence.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 4.

[47] Ergili Ahmed Hilmi Ibni Resul, Osmanli-Karadah Muhaberati Tarihcesi, varak:46a, cited in Gölen, 2009, pp. 127.

[48] BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-146, 10 Safer 1292 – 18 March 1875.

[49] BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-152, 19 Safer 1293 – 16 March 1876.

[50] BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-146, 27 R.evvel 1293 – 22 April 1876.

[51] BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-93, 9. R.evvel 1292 - 15 April 1875.

[52] BOA. HR.SYS. 250/1-93, 3 R.ahir 1293 – 29 April 1876.

[53] BOA. HR. SYS. 250/1-221, 29 Ramadan 1291 – 9 November 1874.

[54] BOA. HR.SYS. 250-1/96, 8 R.evvel 1292 – 14 April 1875.

[55] Aynoros in Ottoman Turkish.

[56] BOA. HR.MKT. 133/82, 14 C.ahir 1272 – 21 February 1856.

[57] BOA. MVL. 911/30, 27 Receb 1276 – 19 February 1860 and MVL. 911/66, 19 Şaban 1276 - 12 March 1860.

[58] BOA. MVL. 960/70, 29 Ramadan 1281 – 25 February 1865.

[59] Hannah Arendt. *On Violence.* (Orlando, Florida: Harcourbooks, 1970), pp. 56.

[60] Hannah Arendt. *On Revolution.* (New York: Viking Press, 1963).