

UNIVERSITY OF DERBY

MODELLING INSTITUTIONAL VALUES
TRANSMISSION THROUGH A
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
OF THREE SCHOOLS

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List of Contents

List of contents.....	ii
List of figures.....	vii
Abstract.....	viii
Acknowledgements.....	x
Key to source codes and abbreviations.....	xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Research Context.....	1
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Approaches.....	3
1.3 Research Questions.....	6
1.4 Overview of Chapters.....	7
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES.....	9
2.1 The Scope of this Chapter.....	9
2.2 Perspectives on the Nature of Values.....	10
2.3 Problematic Areas within the Philosophy of Value.....	11
2.3.1 Existence/non-existence.....	11
2.3.2 Subjectivity/objectivity.....	12
2.3.3 Singularity/plurality.....	14
2.3.4 Absoluteness/relativity.....	16
2.3.5 Interiority/exteriority.....	18
2.3.6 Values/disvalues.....	19
2.3.7 Provisional conclusions.....	20
2.4 A Phenomenological-Semiotic Theory of Values.....	20
2.4.1 The phenomenology of values.....	20
2.4.2 The semiotics of values.....	22
2.4.3 The appreciative system and the phenomenology of value.....	24
2.4.4 The evaluative system and the semiotics of value.....	24
2.4.5 The nature of values: unification of the appreciative and evaluative.....	25
2.4.6 The definition of values in this research.....	26
2.5 The Transmission of Values.....	31
2.5.1 The evolutionary basis of transmission.....	33
2.5.2 Parameters of transmission.....	34
2.5.3 Conditions of transmission.....	34
2.6 Modes and Aspects of Transmission.....	38
2.6.1 Social Capital.....	38
2.6.2 Hegemony.....	40
2.6.3 Resistance.....	41
2.6.4 Intersubjectivity.....	42
2.7 Models of Institutional Transmission.....	44

2.7.1	Parsons' model of socialisation.....	44
2.7.2	Bourdieu's theory of reproduction.....	46
2.7.3	Bernstein's theory of educational transmission.....	47
2.8	Structures of Formalised Values Education.....	50
2.8.1	The school system, governance and faith in the UK.....	50
2.8.2	Values in the Curriculum.....	54
2.8.3	Values and Character Education.....	57
2.8.4	Tradition and Values.....	60
2.8.5	Values and wellbeing.....	63
2.8.6	Emerging themes within the educational discourse.....	65
2.8.6.1	Sources of institutional values.....	65
2.8.6.2	Degree of autonomy/control over the curriculum.....	66
2.8.6.3	Rationale, reason or role of values education.....	66
2.8.6.4	Medium and implementation of values education.....	67
2.8.6.5	Dimensions of values education.....	67
2.8.6.6	Degree of integration – internal and external – of programmes.....	68
2.8.6.7	Conflicts, paradoxes and unresolved aspects of values education.....	69
2.9	Summary and Implications for Research Methodology.....	71
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY		73
3.1	Basic Challenges at the Design Stage.....	73
3.1.1	The research questions.....	74
3.1.2	The structural requirements of the research.....	75
3.2	The Structure of the Research.....	76
3.2.1	Core research.....	76
3.2.2	Derivative hypothesis evaluation.....	77
3.3	View of Social Reality.....	81
3.4	Methodological Approach and Considerations of the Field.....	84
3.4.1	Justification for case study research.....	84
3.4.2	Type of case study.....	85
3.4.3	Decision on the sample.....	86
3.5	Ethical Guidelines and Ethical Considerations.....	87
3.6	Validity and Reliability.....	90
3.6.1	Construct validity.....	91
3.6.2	Internal validity.....	92
3.6.3	External validity.....	92
3.6.4	Reliability.....	93
3.7	Data Collection Methods.....	93
3.7.1	Documentation.....	96
3.7.2	Interviews.....	97
3.7.3	Observation.....	98
3.7.4	Survey.....	99
3.7.5	Focus group.....	100
3.7.6	Field notes.....	101

3.8 Data Analysis	101
3.8.1 Minor in-case analyses.....	103
3.8.1.1 Documents.....	103
3.8.1.2 Interview.....	105
3.8.1.3 Observation.....	107
3.8.1.4 Survey.....	113
3.8.1.5 Other sources: focus group and field notes.....	114
3.8.2 Major in-case analyses.....	115
3.8.2.1 Institutional Focus Value Analysis.....	115
3.8.2.2 Whole Case Data Review.....	119
3.8.3 Cross-case analysis.....	120
3.9 Summary	121
CHAPTER 4 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS	123
4.1 Institutional Character	123
4.1.1 Type, governance and constituency.....	123
4.1.2 Setting, relationship to parents & local community.....	124
4.1.3 Ethos, educational philosophy, educational priority.....	124
4.1.4 Leadership style, institutional ‘cement’, communal structure/promoter.....	124
4.1.5 Institutional model, spatial categories, temporal (narrative logic) categories....	125
4.1.6. Institutional ontology.....	125
4.2 Institutional Values	127
4.2.1 Foundation documents.....	127
4.2.2 Institutional Focus Value Analysis.....	128
4.2.3 Student values and attitudes.....	129
4.2.4 Institutional ontology.....	131
4.3 Institutional Transmission	134
4.3.1 Description of observed classes.....	134
4.3.2 Approach and character of teaching.....	134
4.3.3 Invocation of values.....	135
4.3.4 Evocation of a moral community.....	135
4.3.5 Parameters of invocation and evocation.....	135
4.3.6 Parameters of control.....	135
4.3.7 Institutional ontology.....	136
4.4 Summary	140
CHAPTER 5 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS	142
5.1 Overview and Outline of Model for Institutional Value Transmission	142
5.2 Definition of Principal Categories	143
5.2.1 Categories of permeation.....	144
5.2.2 Categories of authority.....	145
5.2.3 Categories of resistance.....	146
5.2.4 Categories of transformation.....	147
5.3 Explanation of Evidential Basis for Categories	148
5.3.1 Categories of Permeation.....	148

5.3.1.1	Values.....	148
5.3.1.2	Disvalues.....	150
5.3.1.3	Strategy.....	151
5.3.1.4	Semiotic marker.....	152
5.3.1.5	Intentional state.....	153
5.3.2	Categories of Authority.....	154
5.3.2.1	Power distribution.....	155
5.3.2.2	Periodicity.....	156
5.3.2.3	Boundary.....	157
5.3.2.4	Symbolisation.....	159
5.3.3	Categories of Resistance.....	160
5.3.3.1	Moral autonomy.....	160
5.3.3.2	Intensity.....	161
5.3.3.3	Target.....	162
5.3.3.4	Negotiation.....	162
5.3.4	Categories of Transformation.....	163
5.3.4.1	Transformative experience.....	163
5.3.4.2	‘Trigger’ events.....	164
5.3.4.3	Turning inward.....	166
5.3.4.4	Replication.....	167
5.4	Conceptual Clustering.....	167
5.4.1	Key to analyses.....	168
5.4.2	Examples of conceptual clustering across the data field.....	168
5.4.2.1	St Augustine, Interview.....	168
5.4.2.2	Broughampton, Interview.....	171
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS		174
6.1	Partial Models.....	174
6.1.2	Input-output model.....	174
6.1.2	The value-economy model.....	175
6.1.3	Critical mass model.....	176
6.1.4	Transmission flow (inculcation) model.....	177
6.1.5	Spiritual journey (acquisition) model.....	179
6.1.6	The magic square (invocation-evocation) model.....	181
6.2	An Integrated Theory of Value Transmission.....	183
6.2.1	Recapitulation of the basic theory of value.....	183
6.2.2	The institutional permeation of values.....	186
6.2.3	Transmission and the institutional structure of authority.....	188
6.2.3.1	Invocation and evocation.....	188
6.2.3.2	Power and control.....	190
6.2.3.3	The institutional expression of authority structures.....	191
6.2.3.4	The value cycle.....	192
6.2.4	Resistance, moral autonomy and transformation.....	194
6.3	Further Thoughts.....	197

6.3.1	Comparison with models of values education and value transmission.....	197
6.3.2	The centrality of the human relationship to transmission.....	198
6.3.3	An evaluation and interpretation of the model.....	199
6.4	Summary.....	200
CHAPTER 7 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION		201
7.1	Evaluation of the Research	201
7.1.1	Validity and reliability in the core research.....	201
7.1.2	Review of derivative hypotheses.....	201
7.1.3	Assessment.....	213
7.2	The Location of the Research within the Academic Tradition.....	214
7.3	Generalisability of the Theory.....	215
7.4	Original Contributions to Knowledge.....	216
7.4.1	Contribution to axiology.....	216
7.4.2	Contribution to educational and social theory.....	217
7.4.3	Contribution to research methodology.....	218
7.4.4	Contribution to pedagogy.....	218
7.5	Implications and Recommendations.....	222
7.5.1	Implications for values education.....	222
7.5.2	Implications for schooling in general.....	224
7.5.3	Recommendations for educational policy.....	224
7.5.4	Recommendations for social policy.....	225
7.6	Limitations of Research.....	225
7.7	Suggestions for Further Research.....	226
7.8	Last Thoughts.....	227
REFERENCES		229

Appendix 1 Ethics

Interview and observation consent form (teachers).....	Appendix page	1
Research questionnaire consent form (pupils).....		2
Focus group consent form (pupils).....		3
Letter of thanks accompanying report to schools.....		4

Appendix 2 Data Collection

Approach letter.....		5
Document request list.....		6
Interview questionnaire template.....		7
Observation sheet.....		8
Survey questionnaire.....		10

Appendix 3 Data Analysis

Document Matrices (extract).....		14
Institutional Values Matrix (sample).....		15
Interview Matrix (extract).....		16
Observation Matrix (extract).....		17

List of Figures

Fig 01 Conceptual relationship between principal terms.....	4
Fig 02 A comparison of signs, symbols, concepts and values.....	25
Fig 03 The dual nature of values.....	26
Fig 04 Range of variables for types of school governance.....	51
Fig 05 Structure of the research.....	76
Fig 06 Parameters in design of methods mix in a multi-method case study.....	95
Fig 07 Structure of questions on the interview schedule.....	98
Fig 08 Overall analytical model.....	103
Fig 09 Morphology of observed class.....	110
Fig 10 Dynamics of observed class.....	111
Fig 11 Content of observed class.....	112
Fig 12 Scaled values in situational responses.....	114
Fig 13 Markers for successful transmission.....	117
Fig 14 Grouping categories for transmitted values.....	118
Fig 15 Recursive cross case analysis.....	121
Fig 16 Maximally distributed values as an index of permeation.....	132
Fig 17 Structural analysis of observed teaching events.....	138
Fig 18 Symbolic dramatic categories as forms of control and power.....	140
Fig 19 Outline of model for institutional values transmission.....	143
Fig 20 Implied strategy in observed class, school B.....	152
Fig 21 Analysis of authority: administrative & classroom levels.....	155
Fig 22 The ‘spiritual journey’ model of the transmission of values.....	179
Fig 23 The ‘magic square’ model of the transmission of values.....	182
Fig 24 The value cycle.....	193
Fig 25 Model of institutional value transmission: pedagogical.....	220

Note: Sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.5 (pp. 123-125), 4.2.1 - 4.2.3 (pp. 127-131) and 4.3.1 – 4.3.6 (pp. 134-136) consist entirely of the tabulated results of cross-case comparison, and, as such, are considered parts of a single entity and included in the main contents, so are not listed separately here, although figures that appear in the discussion (institutional ontology) that follows each section do.

Abstract

This thesis presents a model of institutional values transmission through cross-case analysis of values education undertaken in three UK secondary schools. Since the early 1980s a significant amount of research has been carried out on cultural transmission and the transmission of values, though it has focused on intergenerational transmission within families and the interaction between the school and the family in terms of converging and diverging values and worldviews. Very little work has been done on the *process* of transmission of values in schools or other organisations that is evidence-based. An increasing number of governments and organisations, as well as schools, are beginning to invest seriously in values education programmes, but whether the idea of values education is *theoretically coherent* is still disputed.

Through an evaluation of the philosophical, psychological and sociological literature on values and employing phenomenological and semiotic analyses, a theory of values as transmissible entities is developed, which is then extended to a general concept of values transmission using the twin terms *invocation* and *evocation*, to denote modes of bringing value concepts to the awareness of an audience and of generating group cohesion through a shared experience linked to particular values, respectively, these terms themselves emerging from the theory of values. Through data collection, analysis and modelling of values education in three schools – a state comprehensive, a faith school and an independent – a plausible mechanism for institutional values transmission is developed. This mechanism integrates two partial models: a *permeation-authority* inculcation model of transmission flow with a *resistance-transformation* model of moral autonomy. At its heart it envisages a systemically robust cycle of institutional values discourse, institutional cultural expectations and the generation of a sense of community shored up by individual commitment.

A two tier qualitative approach is used in this research, having both an inductive, theory generating phase of field research, data capture and analysis, and a deductive, hypothesis-led confirmatory phase. The inductive phase uses a case study format and cross-case analysis, providing data for analysis and for testing a set of hypotheses in the deductive phase. The development of a mechanism for institutional values transmission is carried out using an institutional model of the schools as a data collection and analytical instrument, based on three structural aspects: an authority hierarchy; an interiority/exteriority duality in the

institutional lived-experience; and a system hierarchy. Multiple data collection and analytic methods are employed in each case study, in order to build up a ‘three-dimensional’ picture of the transmission of values in each school. Both comparative and iterative cross-case analyses are carried out.

The findings emerging from the case studies suggest the following tentative conclusions: schools have varying degrees of awareness of the values that they impart, although all consider values education to be an important part of what they do and to impact on student performance and behaviour; while there is some explicit values-oriented pedagogy, most teaching of values is implicit; schools with greater ethnic diversity have more challenges to build a cohesive community, as this is at odds with the ‘spontaneous sociality’ of the pupils; there is a broad convergence on the same values found most widely distributed throughout schools across the widest range possible with respect to forms of governance, educational philosophy and demography.

The findings carry a number of pedagogical implications: general support is found for explicit values education programmes and the linking between behavioural standards and academic achievement; the importance of the development of a ‘moral community’ around the ethos of the school and the creation of opportunities for multiple belonging is highlighted; and resistance to institutional authority structures is explored for its significant potential for transformation to an acceptance of institutional values.

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Key to source codes and abbreviations

In Chapters 4-7 frequent reference is made to data from the case studies, from interviews, observations, documents and surveys, for example. References to this data, unlike literature citations, are given in square brackets; they consist of an institution code followed by a forward slash, then the source code followed by a dash and then the elapsed time or section number, e.g. [C/OBS-2315], which means the section of the observation in school C beginning at 23 minutes and 15 seconds (on the original recording). There are some exceptions.

Note: first references to names assigned, for the purposes of anonymity, to institutions and any distinguishing features, practices or activities, and to participants in the research, where they are not referred to by their job title or function, such as 'Headteacher', are marked by an asterisk*.

Institutional Codes:

A	St Augustine*
B	Broughampton*
C	Chelmswood High*

Primary Source Codes (Other than Documents):

INT	Interview	+ elapsed time (min) on recorder
OBS	Observation	+ elapsed time (min) on recorder
SUR	Survey	+ section number
FN	Field Notes	+ section number
FG	Focus Group	+ elapsed time (min) on recorder

Codes for Analyses and Syntheses:

SAN	Survey Analysis	+ section number
AN	Initial Survey Analysis (A)	+ section number
ASR	Analysis of Survey Results (B, C)	+ section number
QQ	Qualitative & Quantitative (A)	+ section number
IFVA	Institutional Focus Value Analysis	
WCDR	Whole Case Data Review	

Codes for Documentary Sources (by School):

School A

The following are policy documents:

BP	Behaviour Policy
CP	Citizenship Policy
CWP	Collective Worship Policy

RSE	Sex & Relationships Education Policy
H	Houses

The following are constituent parts of the policy documents:

AV	Attitudes & Values
BM	Behaviour Management
C	Curriculum
CC	Code of Conduct
CCP	Cross Curricular Provision
E	Ethos
INT	Interview (+ time elapsed-section)
LC	Liturgical Celebrations
MS	Mission Statement
MVF	Morals & Values Framework
Inc	Inclusion
P	Principles
Phil.	Philosophy and Purpose
Pro	Process
RS	Rewards & Sanctions
WSA	Whole School Approach

School B

The following are references to sections of the school rules, found in a rule book (BB):

ABS	Anti-bullying statement
Aims	Aims of the school
BI	Banned items
GE	General Expectations
JCR	JCR
LO	Leave out
LT	Leisure time
ML	Missing a lesson
PC	Personal computers
PS	Personal safety
S	Sanctions
Sport	Sport
T	Transport
VH	Visiting other houses

The following are references to policy documents:

P-ABS	Anti-Bullying Statement
P-AR	Academic rewards
P-AS	Academic sanctions
P-BM	Behaviour management
P-BPP	Boarding principles and practice
P-DSM	Drug and Substance Misuse

School C

ABP	Anti-Bullying Policy
Aims	Aims and Ethos
BDP	Behaviour and Discipline Policy
CCP	Community Cohesion Policy
Cit	Citizenship
CPSP	Child Protection and Safeguarding Policy
EOP	Equal Opportunities Policy
SEN	Special Educational Needs
SRE	Sex and Relationship Education

Other Abbreviations

NC	National Curriculum
ppi	public policy initiative
SMSC	Spiritual, Moral, Social & Cultural (education/development)
DEC/CES	Diocesan Education Service/Catholic Education Service
OFSTED	Office for Standards in Education

1.1 Research Context

Values – both allegiance to values and disagreement about values – have been and continue to be fundamental to society, culture and thought (Moor, 2004; Andrew, 1995; Werkmeister, 1970) yet, paradoxically, remain largely submerged in our individual and collective unconscious. It can, however, be reasonably asserted that conscious interest has quickened in recent years in response to a perceived ‘crisis of values’ within developed economies and modern cultures (Bindé, 2004). This quickening is felt most keenly in the political and educational establishments, where responsibility – both for the problem and the solution – is considered to lie most heavily (Giroux, 2011). A crisis in values is, in fact, not a peculiarity of our age; one only has to read almost any of the writings of antiquity to understand that laments about the waywardness of youth and the moral decline of social institutions are as old as recorded history. What is perhaps unique is the extent to which we have come to believe that schools are the key to arresting this downward spiral. For MacIntyre (1987, p.16), ‘Teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity’, suggesting both that they are the repository of a type of faith and that this faith is probably misplaced.

In the UK the current wave of interest in values and in values education can almost be pinpointed to a specific moment in time, and began, as these things often do, with a dramatic and tragic incident, in this case the murder of a head teacher outside the gates of his school (Davis, 2005; Taylor, 2000). Of course, there were antecedent incidents and there have been subsequent, regrettably frequent, incidents at schools that have all but erased the memory of this earlier outrage. A few years prior to this there had been an upheaval in education, with the passing of the Education Reform Act (UK, 1988), itself a reaction to perceived weaknesses in the quality of schooling. But this was perhaps the moment when vague feelings of disquiet about the state of the nation’s youth and of the inadequacy of our social institutions to deal with these problems spilled over into a determination to do something, which boosted the profile of the nascent values education movement and that led to calls for moral or values education in schools and a flurry of activity on the policy front (SCAA, 1996). These early government-led initiatives were never systematically implemented or

given statutory force (Hawkes, 2010), but stimulated the present oversight of spiritual and moral education provision in UK schools in Ofsted inspections (ibid), and resulted in some localised and networked approaches to teaching values (VbE, 2014; Lepkowska, 2012/08/06).

Against this contextual background I wish to make two points of a theoretical nature. The first is that, for all the positive resonance of the term ‘values’, the nature of values is contentious, both as to whether such things actually exist and, if they do, what form they take. The second flows from this; it is that values education, in the absence of an understanding of the nature of that which is supposedly being transmitted, must lack an adequate theoretical foundation. Like ‘education’ itself, the transmission of values is highly contextual and sensitive to the nature of the package; it is far more than mere logistics. To illustrate this point, a common definition of values that is used within the values education establishment is that of Halstead (1996, p.5):

[Values are] principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as reference points in decision making or the evaluation of beliefs or actions.

This, or something like this, may, indeed, be what most people would have in mind if they were called on to give a definition of values. But from a theoretical point of view its very inclusiveness is a weakness, as it offers no cohesive view of values that could be used in understanding the *process* that takes place when a value is acquired within an educational setting. This much is clear when looking at various definitions of values education. This is Taylor’s (1998, p.1) view:

[Values Education] is a relatively new umbrella term for a range of common curriculum experiences: spiritual, moral, social and cultural education; personal and social education; religious education; multicultural/antiracist education; cross-curricular themes, especially citizenship; environment and health; pastoral care; school ethos; extra-curricular activities; wider community links; collective worship/assembly; the life of the school as a learning community.

A definition of values education comprised entirely of exemplification helps in understanding the context within schools where it is taking place, but is also not of much help in understanding *what* takes place when values are acquired or what *ought* to take place in order that this activity can be deemed successful. Hawkes (2010, pp.233-234), in a similar descriptive vein, but adding a more practical edge, defines values education as:

a convenient term for a wide range of implicit and explicit activities devised to develop a values-base to the life...which are principles that guide behaviour. It explicitly develops an ethical

vocabulary based on value words... It encourages reflective learning through silent reflection...It looks for ways that values can be expressed through positive behaviour in the school and community.

Hawkes attempts through this definition to build a more cohesive sense of what values education is beyond the activities which make it up. It moves beyond being merely a collective noun for thematically related activities to something with a distinctive and positive praxis. Even here, though, it is unclear whether there is a coherent theoretical idea underpinning the project.

1.2 Aims, Objectives and Approaches

Though there has been considerable work on the philosophical aspect of values and of education, most of the literature on ‘values education’ deals with the practical pedagogy of teaching values (Lovat, 2010; Taylor, 1998; Selmes and Robb, 1993; Tomlinson and Quinton, 1986) and of the administrative resources required to bring it into the curriculum (Cooper et al., 2005; Pring, 1984). There has been far less research specifically focused on its theoretical coherence, although Merry (2005), Mclaughlin (1994) and Carr (2000) concern themselves with closely-related issues, and while metaethics deals with values-related matters at a philosophical level, it skirts around the actual issues here. Theorists have considered the broader social implication of education, such as ‘socialisation’ (Parsons, 1961), ‘reproduction’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) and ‘resistance’ (Apple, 1982); but a common thread running through these perspectives – the tension between the inculcation of values and the acquisition of values within schooling, and the question of whether they can be accommodated within a single educational model, rather than separately championed – is one that has not been systematically explored or adequately addressed at the theoretical level, although Kirschenbaum (1992), for example, advocates an *approach* to values education that combines aspects of values clarification with moral guidance.

This research has set out to address this issue. It does so by investigating, as the title makes clear, the nature of institutional values transmission, as that occurs in formal education in schools. To open up that idea a little, the diagram on page 4 sets out the conceptual relationship between the principal terms in the title in order to reveal the logic of this proposition: in order to understand what is happening in values education (d), it is necessary to explore the transmission of values (a), the modes of transmission within institutions (b) and the structures of formal (institutional) education (c). After defining the terms in the

diagram, a brief consideration of the three aspects, (a)-(c), will be given, with more in-depth treatment in chapter 2. These three areas, plus an exploration of the nature of values, outline broadly the principal areas of concern in researching and modelling institutional values transmission. They also roughly delineate the scope of the literature review.

Values

I will start with the definition given by Rokeach (1973, p.4): ‘A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence’, because it has a simple elegance, although I will have cause to arrive at a fundamentally different concept in chapter 2, after some consideration is given to problematic areas within value theory.




Fig 01 Conceptual relationship between principal terms

Transmission

‘Transmission’ is a term derived from information theory. I will argue that, from one perspective, values can be seen as just another form of information. As such, transmission is a more inclusive term than either ‘inculcation’, which emphasises the transmitter, or ‘acquisition’, which emphasises the recipient, and embraces both.

Institutions

According to Hodgson (2006, p.18), ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions’. This embeddedness means they are not autonomous, but are activated and maintained through human participation, so exist at the boundary between the objectively real and the subjectively imagined (ibid). Schools belong to a class of institutions called organisations, which are characterised by boundaries controlling membership, governance and a hierarchy of responsibilities (ibid).

Education

Since the focus is on schools and on the education of values, I will take the definition enshrined in the 1988 Education Reform Act, which requires schools to:

[promote] the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils...and [prepare them] for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life.

The first of these requirements lies at the root of most of the activism of the various movements for values education, is central to the underlying philosophy of the National Curriculum, is written into important policy documents in all schools, and forms part of the inspection regime of schools.

(a) The transmission of values

Since the 1980s considerable work has been carried out on the intergenerational transmission of values (Barni et al., 2011; Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988; Schönplflug, 2001a), particularly of cultural values within marginalised, ethnic and displaced groups, much of it based on the work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) on the evolutionary basis of cultural transmission. This has helped to improve understanding of the parameters of transmission within families, but has limited applicability to social institutions, although there are studies on the interaction – convergence or divergence – of school and family values for migrant groups (Hashimzade and Della Giusta, 2011).

(b) Modes of institutional transmission

Within the social sciences there are a number of different theories of relevance to transmission in social institutions. Parsons’ (1961) model of ‘socialisation’ is a view of the role of parents and the school in inculcating values, in which the needs of society are

considered paramount. Bourdieu and Passeron's (1977) theory of 'reproduction' considers the way in which class and privilege are maintained through the school system. Bernstein (1975) sets out a theory of 'educational transmission' based on the linguistic 'codes' of social classes and control over curriculum, syllabus and assessment. These theories, among others, contribute to an understanding of the social context of the transmission of values and of the part that power and control play in the process.

(c) Structures of formal education

Understanding the formal structures of education such as curriculum, syllabus, assessment, teacher training, practice and pedagogy, administration and management, are important to understanding the transmission of values, particularly the areas of curriculum and pedagogy on which most work relevant to values has been done (Haydon, 2010; Lovat, 2010; Aspin and Chapman, 2000; Bigger and Brown, 1999; Tomlinson and Quinton, 1986; Pring, 1984, 1986). This area gives insight into the actual constraints within which the communication of values takes place.

The approach taken in this research is to begin with a review of some of the problematic areas in values theory and to propose a concept of values in which transmissibility is inherent. Then working with data from three schools on the everyday contexts in which values are communicated, attempt to arrive at a theoretical model of value transmission within formal education that might have wider applicability.

In this research phenomenological and semiotic approaches will be employed, both at the level of theoretical development and in the analysis of data. My reading of these approaches leads me to believe they are not only highly complementary, but they have structural similarities at the deepest level. The difference, I would argue, is one of perspective: phenomenology looks from the perspective of the interiority of cognition and semiotics from the exteriority of cognition, a distinction that will be vital in the analysis of the meaning of values. The compatibility of these approaches has been noted, and the term 'phenomenological semiotics' utilised amongst others, by Kozin (2008), Hansen (2007) and Lanigan (1982). This idea is explored in more detail in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.6.

1.3 Research Questions

The research process is focused on answering the research question:

How are values transmitted in an institutional setting?

To which there are four subsidiary questions:

- 1) **What is the nature of values?**
- 2) **What might the implications be of a theory of values for understanding issues around the acquisition and inculcation of values?**
- 3) **How do schools approach values education?**
- 4) **What could constitute the theoretical basis of values education in formal education, taking into account the broader context of the social and political demands on schools?**

The principal question could be interpreted as asking rather mundanely what it is that schools do to instil their values into the young. The subsidiary questions, though, should make it clear that what is being set out is a strategy for a much more forensic examination of what takes place in schools, with a view to grasping the fundamental mechanism of this phenomenon. Subsidiary question 3, for example, embeds three further questions: what do they think of values education (as a strand of education); what do they think about values within the educational context; and how do they undertake it? These were included in questionnaires used in interviews. These subsidiary questions are tackled roughly in the order in which they are given over the course of the research. A brief overview of each chapter follows.

1.4 Overview of Chapters

Chapter 2, Theoretical Perspectives, undertakes an overview of the relevant literature of the field while developing the philosophical basis of the research. The chapter considers problematic areas in the philosophy of values and the rationale for a new approach to values as transmissible entities. It then looks at research in intergenerational transmission, various modes and aspects of transmission and evaluates three models of institutional transmission, that of Parsons, Bourdieu and Bernstein. The final part engages with the various debates over values education that have ranged over different aspects of schooling, such as the curriculum and student wellbeing, and concludes by looking at three perennial issues within values education: its implementation, its purpose and the divergent understandings of its nature.

Chapter 3, Methodology, considers first the basic challenges of designing research around the research question. After discussing issues related to the view of social reality a justification

for qualitative research is set out, involving a case study approach and mixed methods. I also argue for a hypothesis-led confirmatory approach within this research paradigm.

Chapter 4, Cross-Case Analysis, compares data from across three cases following the topical headings ‘Character and Ethos of the School’, ‘Institutional Values’ and ‘Values Education’. Each section concludes with a consideration of ‘institutional ontology’ in which common themes from the analysis are defined that furnish concepts for modelling values transmission.

Chapter 5 is the Presentation of Findings, in which a model of institutional values transmission that has been developed during the course of the research is examined and its constituent categories and concepts defined and audited in relation to samples of the raw data they were drawn from. The chapter concludes with two examples of conceptual clustering, using the concepts of the model in an analysis and interpretation of a text, demonstrating clustering around values.

Chapter 6 is the Discussion of Findings. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first several partial models, developed from the concepts emerging through the cross-case analysis are considered and compared with various theories of transmission covered in the literature. Then the model presented in chapter 5 is discussed in detail, analysing the dynamics and interrelationship of the parts, again in relation to the relevant literature.

Chapter 7, Evaluation and Conclusion, does two things. In the first part there is an evaluation of the research as a whole, including a brief summary of issues relating to validity and reliability in the core research methodology and a lengthier review of several theoretically derived hypotheses in light of data from the field. It concludes with a reflection upon some broad themes arising out of its findings, locating the research within the academic tradition, considering the broader application of the findings and their original contribution to knowledge, and any implications or recommendations that arise as a result of these findings. It also considers the limitations of the research and suggests avenues for further research.

2.1 The Scope of this Chapter

This chapter will lay out the basic theoretical framework for this research: the justification for its research question and approach to research, the underlying philosophical presuppositions and view of value, and the implications for the course of research to be carried out, and will review the literature of the field. The strategic aim in this chapter is to undertake a re-examination of the foundations of value as a precursor to the development of a theory of transmission. This research is carried out broadly within the philosophy and sociology of education, but the very specific focus of the research question – the institutional transmission of values – and the lack of a specific body of literature in regard to that topic, has meant that it has been necessary to range over the literature of a number of fields in order to assemble a corpus that covers this subject from all the possible perspectives outlined in the introduction. It has meant looking at some of the debates around various aspects of values education that have been pursued through the relevant journals, but it has also meant looking at fields as diverse as evolutionary psychology, social theory, economics, philosophy of value and moral philosophy, linguistics and anthropology; not extensively or deeply enough to do them real justice, but focusing on where they touched on issues of values or issues relevant to value transmission. So vast is the potential field and so rare are the truly illuminating texts that it is difficult to say that everything of importance has been noted, but I believe that a good deal of the important ground has been covered. There are literatures that it has not been possible within the scope of this research to explore beyond a rudimentary acknowledgement of their existence and their contribution to aspects of institutional value transmission, such as those concerning criminal justice, health administration, organisational theory, international relations and diplomacy and corporate business strategy.

This chapter has been divided into three parts. The first deals with various perspectives on values: philosophical, psychological, sociological, phenomenological and semiotic. The second looks at the interpersonal transmission of values and the broader aspects of social transmission theories. The third reviews some of the debates within the academic literature on

values education covering the structures of formal education. Finally, it considers briefly the implications of the issues raised in the literature for the research.

2.2 Perspectives on the Nature of Values

As I stated in the introduction, values cannot be considered a simple commodity for which the problem of transmission is simply one of logistics. For Schoenpflug (2001b, p.132) the nature of that which is transmitted culturally is particularly sensitive to the channel of transmission, which suggests that questions of ‘how?’ and ‘by whom?’ are going to feature. This in turn entails that the transmissibility of values is something that needs to be better understood. For Severn (2003) the transmission of values within a particular context requires a coherent ‘framework’, which includes aspects of ‘language, tradition and community’ (ibid, p.4), a position I agree with, but the relationship between values and these features of the educational context needs to be more fully explored. Fundamentally, the transmission of values cannot be adequately understood without inquiring into the nature of values themselves.

Values have been important conceptually within the social sciences, psychology and philosophy, although different disciplines tend to favour definitions according to their central interest. For example, while philosophy attempts to grasp the essential nature of values beyond the multiplicity of forms, sociology focuses on their function in human society and human interaction, and psychology their utility in integrating the personality and guiding meaningful and purposive action for the individual. What these disciplines all share in common, though, is a sense of the transcendental unity of the phenomenon of value beyond the particularity and multiplicity of its forms. In philosophy issues around values have been associated with the interpretation of human nature, in particular what was understood as the inner life, whether from a sacred or secular viewpoint. The reason for this is not difficult to grasp: values do not exist in the state of nature as physical phenomena, but are connected with the intricate nature of human interiority, intellectual reflectivity, and emotional immanence. At the same time values have a clear functionality at every level of human interaction, from the individual to all human groupings and institutions.

In the first part of this chapter (sections 2.3 and 2.4) the intention is to explore the nature of values, through looking at some of the problematic areas within the theory of value and suggesting a view of values that might address some of those issues, working towards a definition of values in which the transmissibility of values is integral.

2.3 Problematic areas within the philosophy of value

These can be reduced to a core of six, closely interlinked antinomies: existence/non-existence; subjectivity/objectivity; singularity/plurality; absoluteness/relativity; interiority/exteriority; and values/disvalues. Though they will be dealt with under different sections, there is a significant degree of overlap.

2.3.1 Existence/non-existence

The most fundamental problem in approaching the issue of the institutional transmission of values is the nature of values themselves, not only what they are, but whether, in fact, they have any meaningful existence. For empiricist scientists (whether hard, social or behavioural) and philosophers some major hurdles to their acceptance are their imperceptibility, their resistance to meaningful measurement, and the inability to predict behaviour from them (Hechter, 1993). While few, if any, state outright that there are no such things as values, they are ontologically downgraded by being cast as secondary, derivative phenomena, often not worthy of the attention of serious minds or serious research. Karl Popper (2005, pp.225-6) for example states:

[F]ew scientists, and few philosophers with scientific training, care to write about values. The reason is simply that so much of the talk about values is just hot air. So many of us fear that we too would only produce hot air or, if not that, something not easily distinguished from it.... I shall therefore say nothing more than that values emerge together with problems; that values could not exist without problems; and that neither values nor problems can be derived or otherwise obtained from facts, though they often pertain to facts or are connected with facts.

Popper repeats the dictum, common since first asserted by Hume, that values cannot be derived from facts (usually stated in the form ‘an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’’). This is an idea that has been challenged by, for example Rand (1964), MacIntyre (1981) and Searle (1995), though their reformulations of the problem have been shown to miss the point; they (mis)understood Hume to have declared that facts and values have nothing to do with each other. Popper, after Hume, is thinking of strict logical entailment, but he does state that values ‘often pertain to facts or are connected with facts’; in real life factual and value judgements are indiscriminately mixed.

For philosophers of a metaphysical bent, the issue of imperceptibility has been less problematic. Taking their cue from the Platonic tradition of positing a transcendent world of forms, philosophers such as Munsterberg (1909) and the Baden school of neo-Kantians, that included Rickert (1921), Windelband (1901) and Troeltsch (1931), were able to argue for the

existence of a realm of absolute values. For example, Rickert addressed the problematic dichotomy of subject and object, bequeathed by Cartesian dualism, by placing them both in the category of the 'the real' and then positing the category of 'the non-real' which 'when interpreted positively' was understood to include value, meaning and significance (Rickert, 1921, pp.102-3). Value is immanent in every cognition, but is ultimately as independent of mental processes as it is of the objects of cognition. Values cannot even be said to exist; instead, they have *validity* (Rickert, 1928, p.195), which is the only and absolute measure of all values.

I consider both the positivist and metaphysical views to be flawed. From a phenomenological perspective anything which consciousness *intends*, that is, anything of which we are aware, such as beliefs and values, has a mode of existence, to the extent that it can have a profound effect on an individual's life. That does not, of course, address the positivist/empiricist point Hechter (1993) makes concerning the intangibility of values, a point that I take seriously and will answer as this argument develops. Rickert, though, seems to be sidestepping the problematic issue of existence by making the same case for values that is frequently made for mathematics by mathematicians with platonic tendencies. However, in asserting that values do not exist but 'have' validity is surely a categorical mistake, as for anything to possess a quality in any meaningful sense it must be thought to be real. Moreover, it ignores the issue of transmissibility: just as mathematics, whatever its ontological status, is communicated through a semiotics, values are likewise communicated in daily life and the classroom through a range of actions, images and words.

2.3.2 Subjectivity/objectivity

Since Descartes re-oriented philosophy away from ontological to epistemological concerns, there has been, according to Kolakowski (1988), a dilemma at the heart of western thought: the incommensurability of subjectivity with objectivity. Though there have been attempts within philosophy to bridge that divide, schools of thought have tended to gravitate to one side or the other. That is no less true in the philosophy of value, where thinkers have tended to emphasise either the subjective or objective aspect.

As a field in its own right, the focus on issues of value, separate from ethics, aesthetics, theology, economy and sociology, only appeared towards the end of the nineteenth century in Germany, in the writings of Lotze, von Ehrenfels, Meinong and Brentano. These thinkers gave birth to the 'Psychological School' of value theory, so-called due to their attribution of

aspects of subjectivity to be the foundation of the experience of value: ‘right-loving’ and ‘right-hating’ in the case of Lotze; ‘right-desiring’ for von Ehrenfels and ‘right-feeling’ according to Meinong (Werkmeister, 1970). By the early part of the twentieth century different schools of value theory were emerging. Urban (1917) in the United States, and Scheler (1973) and Hartmann (1932) in Germany were developing theories that followed the platonic concept of values as objective features of a non-temporal realm. The neo-Kantian school, including Munsterberg, believed values to be objective universally valid judgements.

In the 1920s and 1930s, in an attempt to introduce some order into the profusion of approaches, and in the belief that a ‘scientific’ basis for value theory could be found, two American philosophers – Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey – attempted to develop a General Theory of Value. Perry, in particular, sought to correlate the subjective aspects of human psychology with objective reality with his notion of ‘interest’:

It is characteristic of living mind to be for some things and against others....It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name of ‘interest’....That which is an object of interest is eo ipse invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it. (Perry, 1926, pp.115-116)

For Perry the key concept was ‘value’, a property inhering in things themselves (sometimes referred to as a tertiary property), rather than ‘values’, which many philosophers and scientists of a positivistic bent continue to doubt really exist. This was a view shared by Dewey, whom Perry cites in support: ‘[T]he relation of judgement or reflection to things having value is as direct and integral as that of liking’ (Dewey, 1923, pp.617-8, cited in Perry, p.123). However Dewey’s basic category was ‘valuation’ rather than value as such. Rand (1967), in a similar vein, put forward a theory known as value objectivism, which stated that values arise from the interaction between our subjective desires and objective conditions; values are objective in the sense that they are rooted in the properties of the object valued, to be discovered and appreciated by the individual, and not in any belief held about the object. Rand’s view is more oriented to an economic view of value, though it is rooted in philosophical arguments. Perry, Dewey and Rand have developed theories in which a psychological response or relationship to an object allows an objective quality of ‘value’ to be discovered or created. Though this relates a universal experience of the valuable, whether economic or personal, such an experience is not something transmissible, and corresponds only to what I have termed the *appreciative* aspect of value (see 2.4.3).

There are, however, interpretations of the objectivity of value that go further than positing a quality that is uncovered in relation to consciousness. The notion of *intrinsic value* is shared among several ideological stances, notably those with Catholic leanings (derived from Thomistic theology) and the more radical environmentalists who advocate a pristine nature purged of human despoliation. Some philosophers, though not necessarily sharing the above-mentioned convictions, have argued for value as a *tertiary property* of objects not requiring the presence of consciousness. Rescher (2005, p.25), for example asks:

Does value demand an actual valuer? Does having value require being valued? By no means! Value requires an actual valuer no more than length requires an actual measurer... [Something] has value not because it is valued, but because it deserves to be valued – because rational beings who contemplate it...do so with appropriation and prioritive response. Such appreciators do not create that value but rather appreciate it. Subjectivity does not come into it.

I would point out the implicit contradiction in the concept of intrinsic value: in positing that the value of human being or the natural environment is objectively and indisputably inhering in the object, a value judgement has already been posited. There is no evidence that such a tertiary property of things exists. Belief in the existence of intrinsic value is just that, a belief; moreover, it is a belief that can under some circumstances justify intolerance, even the seemingly benign belief in the intrinsic value of human beings. I prefer a subjectivist account of values, as I largely share the view of the psychological school that values are characterised by their interiority; I differ, though, on the nature of that interiority and also would argue that values that are constituted solely by their interiority are incapable of transmission.

2.3.3 Singularity/plurality

One of the greatest sources of confusion in value theory has been the actual object of investigation, whether it is the singularity 'value' or the plurality 'values'. This has far-reaching consequences, for as discussed above it entails whether the phenomenon of value/valuing is one that inheres in the properties of objects or in the properties of minds. The reason for this confusion lies ultimately in the fact that there are two sources for value theory, economics and ethics. A theory of economic value is found in Aristotle's *Politics* which influenced the views of Aquinas' just price (Zuniga, 1997) and Marx's labour theory of value (Johnson, 1939). On the other hand, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* laid out the idea of the virtues, which also influenced and combined with ideas of Christian piety in Aquinas. While the genealogy of these influences is not entirely clear on the subsequent development of value

theory, its pioneers in the nineteenth century sought an underlying unity to the phenomenon of valuation which, until then, only economic theory had attained to any significant degree.

Brentano, for example, first proposed the idea of the intentionality of consciousness, that consciousness is always a consciousness of something, whether that be the perception of a physical object or of a mental image. He argued that just as awareness of the act of perception is itself part of the experience of perception, so an awareness of one's emotional response to something was also part of the emotional experience. Like Hume, whom he had read extensively (Werkmeister, 1970), Brentano believed the basis of valuation was the emotional responses of approval and disapproval. However, he went further than Hume in asserting that there was a correlate of this act of appreciation, which was whether the approval or disapproval was justified. He spoke of 'right loving' and 'right hating' as the basis of value. Ultimately, this rested on a view of humans as having a rational and spiritual nature and an animal nature, and of the desires emanating from those natures. Following Brentano, Meinong also took a psychological stance on the question of value. However, he diverged from Brentano in believing that all valuation is based on feeling, without regard to justification. Forestalling the obvious objection that such a 'value-feeling' would be entirely solipsistic, Meinong anchors this feeling in the experience of others' pleasures and pains and in reflection upon that experience. For both Brentano and Meinong desire was recognised as a factor in valuation but its significance was played down (Werkmeister, 1970). For von Ehrenfels, however, desire became foundational; the ascription of 'value (or disvalue) to a real or to a merely imagined object' is made 'insofar as the appropriate concrete and vivid presentation of its realization causes an enhancement (or diminution) of happiness as compared with the presentation of its non-realization' (von Ehrenfels, 1893, p.116), in which desire is equated with a form of 'presentation' in which relative degrees of happiness are experienced (Werkmeister, 1970, pp.87-88). Brentano, Meinong and von Ehrenfels all in their own way recognised the inherent danger of a concept of value based entirely upon an individual's experience of value, and attempted to introduce a more objective correlate to this experience. This is an important insight which has guided the development of a transmissible concept of value in this research.

Heyde made a fundamental distinction in value theory between 'value' as a property universal to all experiences of valuation and 'values' as a term for all those things that are valued. He referred to these as $value_1$ and $value_2$ respectively, and asserted that the former is foundational. Heyde did not claim that value in this sense is a property of things, but a

property of a relationship, that between things and consciousness (Werkmeister, 1970, p.140). However, he rejects the views of the psychological school that mental acts are the foundation of value and that we merely 'ascribe' value to objects; to value something, to have a value-feeling in connection with a particular object is to discover the value that it already has. Valuation, then, is a form of knowledge which rightfully forms part of epistemology, not psychology (ibid, pp.145-146).

I have carried out an extended analysis of the semantic and syntactic distinctions within the language of value, i.e. those words that constitute a 'family' around the base term 'value', which begins with and expands upon the distinction made by Heyde, which I summarise here. I would argue that there are four basic categories rather than two: two nouns forms, 'value' (uncountable) and 'value' (countable); and two verbal forms, 'value' (appreciate) and 'value' (evaluate) and their various syntactic variations. These form two subjective-objective pairings, which I term the *appreciative system* and the *evaluative system*. The appreciative system is similar to the perspective offered by forms of value objectivism in that we value what is valuable. By contrast, with the evaluative system we evaluate based on given values. Beyond this *reductio*, the argument can only proceed by exploring whether the two systems are capable of being harmonised within a single concept of value, which I maintain is possible and results in a concept of value that can be the basis for a theory of value transmission.

2.3.4 Absoluteness/relativity

In value theory theories of absolute values are attributed to Munsterberg and Rickert. Rickert's views have already been considered above. Munsterberg (1909) proceeded to absolute values through a three stage process. To begin with, he affirmed that the values that philosophy is concerned with are absolute values and not values based on desires, which are relative values. This even extends to values grounded in the common good, for they are part of the hierarchy of relative values and not transcendent of desires. Next, Munsterberg asserted that in contemplating the sense of 'obligation' in every sphere of life, absolute values appropriate to that form of life, such as truth, beauty and goodness, are encountered (1909, p.39). Finally, he declared, in order to bring coherence to the multiplicity of such values, there is one act that must be undertaken, which is 'the self-assertion of the world' (ibid, p.87). It is easy to denigrate this type of thinking as purely metaphysical, having no relationship to the real world. It is less easy to dismiss, however, the human hankering for

certainty which underlies the idea of absolute values. There is an unceasing tension between the knowledge of the contingency of our ideas and beliefs and the conviction with which we hold them that conspires to drive forward human social evolution while being, at the same time, elusive to satisfactory explanation.

By something of a paradox, then, Rickert's view of values as non-real absolutes found their way into the social sciences through the writings of one of the founders of sociology, Max Weber. Paradoxical, that is, because the social sciences are characterised by value objectivity or value neutrality, which is interpreted as meaning that they advocate value relativism. As values are considered as structural or functional aspects of the social system, there is a tendency to view values as interchangeable. Weber was particularly influenced by the neo-Kantian element of Rickert's theories that advocated 'value-freedom' (Brun, 2007, p.8), which was utilised as a basis for his methodological commitment to objectivity in the social sciences (Brun, 2007), in an attempt to bolster the prestige of the social sciences to a level comparable to that of the physical sciences. Weber, though, was probably not a relativist, ontologically speaking, as maintained by Strauss (1953, cited in Brun, 2007, p.18) and MacIntyre (1981); the commitment to scientific objectivity methodologically is compatible with a personal commitment to absolute values as 'goals' within Weber's view of sociology as the study of 'social action' (Brun, 2007, p.15).

Ciaffa (1998, pp.13-14) argues that the dispute over value-freedom is actually two logically distinct arguments: a 'methodological' argument that the social sciences should be objectively scientific and free of normative concerns, and a 'practical' argument that the social sciences not be used to bolster particular political or moral claims. Critical social theorists such as Habermas (1973) take issue with the concept of a value-free social science; they contend that social realities are essentially interpreted and value-laden unlike physical realities and that Weber is imposing a technical framework on society under the influence of a positivist ideology. This is slightly disingenuous; it does not follow, after all, from the observation that institutions are value-laden that, therefore, social theory must be.

The fact that there is a multiplicity of values would indicate that, at a methodological level at least, some form of relativism is reasonable. I advocate the position that for human existential values, with which the social sciences are concerned, there can be no *a priori* ranking or hierarchy, by which I mean that the essential nature and transmissibility of all values is identical. That is not the same as saying that all values are equally valid in a particular

professional context or for moral and social codes, which I do not believe; but these are, by contrast, *a posteriori* considerations. Despite their philosophical pedigree and exalted rhetoric, there is something curiously empty about absolute values. If absoluteness is to be sought, I will argue, it is in the interiority of values, in the immanence of the value experience.

2.3.5 Interiority/exteriority

The antinomy of interiority and exteriority is related to those of subjectivity/objectivity and absoluteness/relativity but is not the same. As far as I am aware, it is not even an issue within philosophy, but arises out of the problematic relationship of the social sciences with values, in which values have been fundamental but not easily understood (Hechter, 1993), and are treated as a theoretical *black box*: something which works well in an equation, a description of social structure or process, but whose properties are not well understood or even particularly important. In an early work, Parsons (1991), for example, for whom values are fundamental to the process of socialisation, links them explicitly with the unknowable, non-empirical elements of reality, and in one of his major works, *The Social System*, offers the following definition: ‘An element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation can be considered a value’ (Parsons, 1951, p.12). This is what I refer to as the exteriority of values: values as ‘an element of a...system’.

Even psychological approaches to values frequently see them as performing a function. Mandler (1993), for example, proposes that values shape the emotions cognitively. However, this does not address the interior nature of values as such. Kluckhohn (1951, p.399) even links the psychological and the social: values are concepts, he argues, that achieve the regulation of:

impulse satisfaction in accord with the whole array of hierarchical, enduring goals of the personality, the requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living.

However, this hardly begins to address the issue of what values look like from the inside. It is only in phenomenological approaches that what I refer to as the interiority of values begins to be addressed. Marx’s (1992, p.37) conception of the basis of a phenomenological ethics is of particular interest, when he states that it is ‘concerned with the possibility of a transformation of ethical comportment on the basis of an experience that arises out of an emotion and thus

plays a role in the formation of virtues, without, however, excluding reason in doing so'. The *conceptualisation of experience* in which the emotions are central will be fundamental to an understanding of what values are and how they are transmitted. Eliade (1957) in his phenomenological anthropology transcends even the psychological in locating the root of value in the experience of the numinous, the sacred. He maintains that even in the modern secular society we witness the retention of the sacred as a range of values in the sphere of private experience, the 'holy places' of a 'private universe' (ibid, p.24): 'Even the most desacralized existence still preserves traces of a religious valorization of the world' (ibid, p.23). For Eliade, this most atavistic of human experiences, for which he coins the term *hierophany* (the revelation of the sacred) is a universal phenomenon which underlies not only the foundation of all religions but the ontology of social living within an otherwise meaningless universe:

When the sacred manifests itself...there is not only a break in the homogeneity of space; there is also revelation of an absolute reality, opposed to the non-reality of the vast surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the world. In the homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible and hence no orientation can be established, the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a center...The discovery or projection of a fixed point – the center – is equivalent to the creation of the world (ibid, p.21).

I believe that while the language of values is the language of a secular frame of reference, and many values, particularly those in the technical sphere, are unremittingly desacralized, as Eliade has argued, when the interiority of values is interrogated there is an element of the sacred in the way they command our emotional as well as rational commitment and orient our lives in particular directions, leading us to accept particular worldviews and reject others.

2.3.6 Values/disvalues

One problem in dealing with values is what I term 'the surfeit of positive connotations'. By this I mean that it is near impossible to engage in a meta-discourse on values which is not itself value-laden. Rokeach (1973, p.3) specifically addresses this issue when he states that a 'fruitful' concept of values must be distinct from similar concepts, avoid circularity (self-definition), and take a value-free approach. I am uncertain whether Rokeach breaches his own criteria when he includes among the parameters of his definition, 'something that is personally or socially preferable' (ibid, p.5). The problem within the social sciences, related to that of relativity, discussed previously, is that values represent an assumed, unmediated and unmitigated good: good by definition. This causes some disquiet among moral

philosophers. MacIntyre (1981, p.26) claims ‘on values reason is silent; conflict between values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose’. I agree that if ‘rationally settled’ means that one value is proven and one disproven then conflict between values cannot be rationally settled; but it is quite incorrect that one must ‘just choose’. Both individually and as societies we accommodate and mitigate the outcome of conflicting values within an individual or social narrative. This is a practical application of reason. The psychological school, Lotze, von Ehrenfels and Meinong all posited a symmetry between values and disvalues, between ‘right loving’ and ‘right hating’ in the case of Lotze, applying a rational justification to the emotive response. I do not think that values and disvalues are exactly equivalent; values are more fundamental in terms of social organisation, but disvalues have a role in provoking a value response so can act as a reinforcement.

2.3.7 Provisional Conclusions

In the desire to establish a concept of value that can underlie a process of transmission, the inherently communicative nature of values is a fundamental premise. This rules out the concept of absolute values as given in the theories of Rickert and Munsterberg; their theories rely on the existence of a transcendental ego and a supreme willing of a lived-world. Their values may be absolute, but they are curiously empty. That is not to deny that there is something absolute about values, but their absoluteness lies in a particular quality of their ‘givenness’ in experience, not in their existence in an eternal world of forms. The concept of transmission entails communicative activity and the plurality of values, and therefore precludes the idea of intrinsic value; yet the relationship of values to the quality of ‘value’ needs to be explored. As several philosophers and psychologists have noted, values are profoundly connected to our feelings. Therefore, the concept of values is likely to be largely independent of, or at least supervenient on, the material world. Furthermore, a psychological trait as general and colourless as Perry’s ‘interest’ is unlikely to have much relevance. As Meinong asserted, though, this value feeling should be rooted in empathy for other’s feelings in social solidarity. If values are real, however, then the positivists charge must be addressed: values must leave some trace of their being.

2.4 A Phenomenological-Semiotic Theory of Values

2.4.1 The Phenomenology of Values

Phenomenology, as mentioned above, has its roots in the psychologist Brentano's concept of the intentionality of consciousness, the idea that consciousness must be a consciousness of something, rather than an empty abstraction. The main development of phenomenology, however, came through the work of Edmund Husserl. From the perspective of an understanding of values, the importance of phenomenology is in radicalising the notion of the object of consciousness. According to Husserl (1990, p.43 [italics original]), the phenomenon of cognition 'is not merely concerned with the genuinely immanent, but also with what is *immanent in the intentional sense*'. By this Husserl indicates that valid perception is not only the perception of physical objects, but of anything that we are conscious of. 'Cognitive mental processes (and this belongs to their essence) have an *intentio*, they refer to something, they are related in this or that way to an object. This activity of relating to an object belongs to them even if the object itself does not' (ibid). For Husserl, then, the nature of intentional consciousness is to encounter objectivity in perception even if there is no literal object there. This point is emphasised thus: 'What is objective can appear, can have a certain kind of givenness in appearance, even though it is at the same time neither genuinely within the cognitive phenomenon, nor does it exist in any other way as a *cogitatio*' (ibid). Values are clearly not objects in a physical sense, yet they are considered meaningful within several disciplines, previously referred to. Phenomenology, and particularly the idea of the intentionality of consciousness, provides a language and a conceptual framework within which their reality can be asserted and they can be meaningfully discussed.

Husserl's view of values, although he developed no systematic axiology, has certainly influenced the conception of values that I will propose, to a degree, particularly the idea of *double intentionality*. He considered the term 'values' to be equivalent to 'valued thing', the valuing of which implied 'an *intentional object in a double sense*' (Husserl, 1976, p.122 [italics original]), of both the object and the appreciation of it: 'not merely the *representing of the matter* in question, but also the *appreciating* which includes this representing, has the modus of actuality' (ibid). In the previous section (2.3) the relationship between values, in the sense they are understood within the social sciences, and valued objects was discussed at some length. The idea of double intentionality, though, will be referred to later in discussions of signs and symbols. It is clear that Husserl considered valuing a primary aspect of cognition, along with facticity, practicality and usefulness (ibid). It is from those who were influenced by the phenomenological approach, however, that a more concrete conception of values emerges. Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, took phenomenology in a radically

different direction, giving it both an ontological interpretation and, through an investigation of the ontology of human being (*Dasein*), an existentialist turn. So for Heidegger (1962, p.339), ‘the theory of value...has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a ‘metaphysic of morals’ – that is, an ontology of *Dasein* and existence’. Interpreting Heidegger, I would take this to mean that what we have to say about values is (or should be) rooted in a natural morality arising from human nature. That nature, *Dasein*, is fundamentally social as well as individual, so our conception of values arises from this sociality as well as personal reflection.

2.4.2 The Semiotics of Values

The appearance of a discipline dedicated to the study of signs is frequently attributed to the French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, though Charles Sanders Peirce in the US and Victoria Welby in the UK made significant contributions in the nineteenth century. However, in this research the main source of ideas on semiotics is taken from Charles Morris who attempted to consolidate semiotic thinking with a contribution to the International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science in 1938 and over the next decades developed semiotics as a theory of man as a ‘symbolic animal’ and as a common language for science, aesthetics and spirituality (Morris, 1971, pp.7-8). Saussure’s concept of the sign is rather simple and is confined to linguistic signification, comprising a binary system of *signifier*, meaning an utterance or written form and the *signified*, an abstract quality embodying the meaning (Saussure, 1959). Morris’ concept of the sign is more complex and consists of:

three (or four) factors: that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that affect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the sign vehicle, the designatum and the interpretant; the interpreter may be included as a fourth factor (Morris, 1971, p.19).

The introduction of the interpretant, which Morris took from Peirce and developed, introduces a level of sophistication over that of the simpler binary model of Saussure. Morris introduces the element of consciousness into the definition of a sign, which causes a reinterpretation of all the elements: only those elements of the sign (as commonly understood) which *signify* are a part of semiosis and the concern of semiotics. For example, the shape and colour of a notice are usually of no significance to the message being conveyed even though they delimit the extension of the notice as sign in space. In referring to the

semiotic function throughout this research, it is Morris's conception of the semiotic that is being referred to.

Symbols are related to signs (they are considered by most semioticians to be a subset of signs) but for Morris there is a crucial difference. He quotes the ethologist Robert Yorkes: 'Whereas the sign is an experience-act which implies and requires as its justification in terms of utility a succeeding experience-act, the symbol has no such implication and is an experience-act which represents or may function instead of whatever is represented' (cited in Morris, 1971, p.99), to which he adds '[A] symbol is a sign produced by its interpreter which acts as a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous' (ibid, p.100). For Morris then 'representation' is a form of substitution in which two sign vehicles have the same designatum (or closely linked designata) for the interpreter, a visual – or indeed a verbal – metaphor. While, representation is one aspect of symbols as a class, I will refer to another aspect, that of 'emotive evocation' (Schwaller de Lubicz, 1978, p.45), which seems perhaps more important for linguistic symbolism, when discussing the 'symbolic' function of values.

Morris is, in semiotics, concerned in a general way with matters pertaining to values, although there is no specific attempt to develop a value theory. It is clear though that he regards semiotics as vital to such a development, 'since the question as to the similarity and difference in the 'verifiability' of statements and *appraisals* demands a sharp formulation of [their] nature', for which a 'well-developed semiotic' is vital (Morris, 1971, p.202, [italics added]). In his later work Morris developed an interest in axiological topics and the place of values in human action. He identified three modalities of human behaviour in a 'value dimension': detachment, or the maintenance of autonomy and individuality; dominance, that is, control over others or situations; and dependence, or the need to be controlled by, guided by or protected by others and social systems (Morris, 1964). This seems an apposite expression of what could be called the contextual background to the process of values transmission, as this is investigated in this research.

As noted in the introduction, I will use both phenomenological and semiotic approaches in the development of a transmissive theory of value. Phenomenological approaches are appropriate to explore the interiority of values and semiotics their exteriority. This is not a matter of convenience or an arbitrary decision. My analysis of these systems leads me to believe they are not only highly complementary, but they have structural similarities at the deepest level. The interpretant in Morris' semiotics has a strong correlation with the

cogitatum in Husserlian phenomenology, that is, the object of intentional consciousness; moreover, Husserl's concept of double intentionality involved in evaluation expresses in different terminology an idea which is almost identical to the structure of symbolism in Morris' semiotics. The difference, I would argue, is one of perspective: phenomenology looks from the perspective of the interiority of cognition and semiotics from the exteriority of cognition, a distinction that will be vital in the analysis of the meaning of values. I have undertaken phenomenological and semiotic analyses of the appreciative and evaluative systems, respectively, (referred to in section 2.3.3) and offer a proposal for a concept of value which brings together both perspectives. Here only a summary of each section will be given and related to the previous discussion.

2.4.3 The Appreciative System and the Phenomenology of Value

This analysis begins by posing the question raised in the consideration of subjectivity/objectivity of the source of value. It argues that the value supposedly inhering in the object is nothing more than a reification of language, but accepts that the appreciation attaching itself to a particular object must have some relationship to that object. By a process of elimination I have concluded that what is appreciated/valued is the function of the object in evoking a particular experience – generally a positive emotional experience – that is unique. In other words, the value of the object bears no intrinsic relation to its qualities or dispositions, but only an arbitrary relationship to personal history. It is the quality of reflective consciousness to recall the emotive response both in the presence and absence of the object that constitutes the continuity of the value experience. This experience of value proper is contrasted with utility, where a 'tool' is valued less for its private meaning than for a publicly acknowledged good based on its particular characteristics or disposition.

2.4.4 The Evaluative System and the Semiotics of Value

At this point the analysis faces a dilemma. It is analysing a system based on values as the norms of judgement, but there is no more evidence for the existence of 'values' than there was for the quality of 'value' supposedly inhering in valued objects. Instead I propose that the sub-class of tools that are referred to as (technical) 'values', things like numbers, colours, etc., which exactly fits Parsons description as 'An element of a shared symbolic system', but which are not normally considered to be real values, are instead taken as paradigmatic for all values. Each value then can be seen to function as a sign within a system of signs. A semiotic analysis of such value systems turns up an interesting question: if the analogy holds, then

existential values, like technical values, must have an exteriority, that is, they must have a trace in the real world, which is something that has not been considered by either philosophers of a positivist or metaphysical inclination. If the exteriority of a sign is the sign vehicle, then the exteriority of a value is that which designates it, the word which names it. While this may seem a trivial observation, it has important consequences. It means that values can be compared directly with things to which they are similar – symbols, signs and concepts – and a different and clearer understanding of what values are can begin to emerge. The table below summarises the comparisons.

Fig 02 A comparison of signs, symbols, concepts and values

	Sign	Symbol	Concept	Value
Content of Consciousness	Idea or information	Shared experience	Idea or information	Shared experience
Physical trace	Material, graphic, verbal <i>(conventional)</i>	Material, graphic, verbal <i>(representational)</i>	Graphic, verbal <i>(conventional)</i>	Graphic, verbal <i>(conventional)</i>

2.4.5 The Nature of Values: Unification of the Appreciative and Evaluative

An interrogation of my own values reveals that they are things to which I am personally and emotionally attached, and it is fair to assume that this is universally so. This leads back to a consideration of the valued object undertaken in the analysis of the appreciative system. The conclusion in that analysis was that the relationship between the valued object and the valuing subject was purely arbitrary, in terms of the characteristics of the object. In the case of values, however, there is no object; instead there is an arbitrary linguistic reference to an experience with which the valuing subject can identify. There is a clear inference from this; it is that, since the linguistic reference is part of a shared language, that the value experience itself is a *shared experience*. This would seem to be broadly in agreement with Mandler’s and Marx’s views of value discussed above.

There is a further aspect to be considered. The above explanation indicates that valuing is essentially a communicative process, but it does not explain the context within which linguistic information becomes shared values. Referring to the table above, it can be seen that

values are structurally very similar to symbols in that their interiority is shared experience. The difference is that symbols can be physical objects and they are representational. Just as symbols tend to be localised to close communities, unlike signs which are universal, so also some values are privileged in particular social groups and occupations; which suggests that language in this case has a more symbolic function, that value terms are being invoked within a group and reciprocally are evoking a sense of a community of shared values.

By positing the linguistic exteriority of values, a model of values as transmissive entities begins to emerge. In this model values have a dual nature: as linguistic concepts, values flow through open communicative channels; as linguistic symbols, however, values function to bind communities of shared experience. Existing at the nexus of these two functions, under the conditions of a liberal social environment it is possible to adopt a wide range of values and experience multiple overlapping belonging. The diagram below illustrates this model.




Fig 03 The dual nature of values

2.4.6 The Definition of Values in this Research

It is now possible to advance a definition of values with inherent transmissibility. In this research a value is defined as the **conceptualisation of a culturally shared emotional experience**, although for brevity subsequently in the thesis this may be shortened to ‘shared experience’, ‘conceptualised shared experience’ or ‘the conceptualisation of experience’ (the

qualifications of the term ‘experience’ need to be borne in mind, however; it is delimited by a cultural referent, by being shared and by being of an emotive nature, so it does not include shared experiences of natural forces, which are not emotive, and states like sadness, which are *universal* emotional experiences, not culturally specific). In the subsequent paragraphs the philosophical basis of this definition and an explanation of the definition will be offered. A degree of overlap is inevitable as the phenomenon is approached from a number of perspectives and levels of (complexity of) explanation.

The definition above contains a primary dichotomy, between the terms ‘conceptualisation’ and ‘experience’, which are referred to as the exteriority and interiority of a value respectively (terms that will be defined below), based upon the semiotic and phenomenological perspectives on the mode of existence of values. From the review of the antinomies of value, carried out in section 2.3, it could be seen that a number of polarised views of values persist, such as whether the fundamental conception is of ‘values’ as discreet entities or ‘value’ as a property inhering in things. Through phenomenological analysis of the appreciative system, I have come to the conclusion that the ‘sense of value’ attaching to things does so on the basis of personal experience in which the object plays a role in personal history, rather than any ‘tertiary property’ (Rescher, 2004, p.16) of the object itself. Additionally, through a semiotic analysis of the evaluative system, in which technical values were compared with signs, I have concluded that for values to be considered real, including existential values, they must leave a ‘trace’ in the world, and that for existential values that trace is the value-term itself. The point of overlap and unification of the appreciative and the evaluative is at the point where the value-term becomes itself the focus of appreciation and the source of the sense of value in a system of values.

I now wish to place these ideas more firmly within the context of semiotic and phenomenological theory. For Morris (1971, p.19) the sign has a basic tripartite structure of *sign vehicle*, *designatum* (the meaning) and *interpretant* (the mind for which the sign is meaningful). This means that for all entities having a sign-like structure, which on the basis of Morris’ own interpretation includes every cultural and social artefact and phenomenon, consciousness is an integral aspect of their semiosis, i.e. their signifying. Morris (1971, p.202) indicates that semiotics is fundamental to valuing, though he does not himself set out a theory of value. Clearly, though, the tripartite structure of the sign lends itself readily to an understanding of the structure of values, as value-term, meaning and valuer/valuing mind. However, this corresponds only to the evaluative (valuing) aspect and, as argued above, the

nature of values must also incorporate the appreciative ‘sense of value’ or experience of value, which is particularly amenable to phenomenological analysis. The phenomenological notion of the intentionality of consciousness radicalises the object of consciousness, to include mental states as well as perceptions of the physical world. All such ‘intentional objects’ have a dual structure of *cogitans* (thinking aspect) and *cogitatum* (thought aspect). For Husserl (1976, p.122) in valuation there is a double intentionality, that of the object’s perception and its appreciation in which the perception is included (ibid). In the case of values understood as the unification of the evaluative and appreciative I believe there is a case for there being a triple intentionality, that of perception of the value-term, its meaning and of the experience of value; however, accepting as given the complex reflectivity of consciousness, I have sought to simplify this complexity through the concepts of *exteriority* and *interiority*, where exteriority is the trace in the phenomenal/physical world (equivalent to the sign vehicle in semiotics) and interiority is the aspects of consciousness, such as meaning (equivalent to the designatum) and experience (equivalent to the intentional object). All social and cultural artefacts have interiority and exteriority, though they vary in complexity. Values have a simple exteriority (the value-term) and a rather complex interiority.

All this is to say, at one level, in terms of exteriority, a value is just a word, an abstract noun or its lexical variations and, as such, is communicated through the channels of normal human discourse, where, if its meaning is pondered, it is considered something akin to a collectively determined good. This corresponds closely to Rokeach’s (1973) definition of a value as the idea of the preferable. At another level, however, in terms of interiority, the ‘sense of value’ inherent in acquiring, professing and promoting a value is a very personal, intense experience of identification with and attachment to the value, which is identical to that experienced before a valued object. This experience is, therefore, of an affective nature, even if this is linked to perceptual input of natural, social or cultural phenomena. This view is supported by recent research in the neurosciences (Zahn et al., 2009). This duality is not merely a matter of perspective; it is intrinsic to the nature of values themselves.

It is the value-term itself which is the bridge between the worlds of discourse and personal commitment (see fig 03, p.26), as a **conceptual element of discourse** and as the **object of emotional attachment**, respectively. The value-term carries a meaning that we have imbibed through culture, pointing to a generalised human concern or trait, critical in specific cases and situations, but one which we may or may not have a personal concern with. When there is a personal concern the value-term directs and makes coherent our emotional response to a

given situation, sometimes by cultural connotation, that can be called ‘an experience of the sense of value’. Where this personal concern is absent, however, the response may be limited to an assent to the culturally accepted meaning of the term. Although this value-term is constant, as an element of the language in which it is embedded, a change of context may cause it to change function, between the prosaic, descriptive function in which it acts conceptually, and something akin to what Austin (1962) referred to as a *performative* function, in which it acts symbolically.

By ‘performative’ Austin means things like when someone says ‘I promise’ or ‘I pronounce you man and wife’ or ‘I hereby declare this meeting open’; these are words that accomplish in their very utterance the state of affairs which they describe or, to put it more simply, words that describe actions that are achieved as they are said (an illocutionary act). I do not think this fully describes the operation of performative language, however. Three conditions need to be met. First, there must be a person with authority to perform. Secondly, the language must have a ritualistic element that taps into a cultural tradition, not simply a declarative one. Thirdly, there must be a receptive audience for whom the performative function is meaningful. Austin approaches these conditions in a different manner, though what he says is essentially covered by these three.

These three conditions apply to values in their ‘performative’ mode, but values’ central function is different to that of performative language as Austin identified it, as an illocutionary act. First, it names an **emotional experience** people have in response to identifiably similar dispositions in their perceived world. Secondly, through this and through the medium of a common language and common value-term, it creates the sense of a **shared experience**. Thirdly, it locates this shared experience in a **specific cultural entity** – Pring (1986) uses the term ‘form of life’, which I take to be a similar idea – marked by a boundary of inclusion and exclusion (Tajfel, 1974). A value in this mode functions like a cultural symbol for a particular cultural grouping, similar to the function of religious symbols for faith communities, flags for national identity, or even a pop idol for their fan base. In this mode the value-term is more likely to be ‘dis-embedded’ from its linguistic matrix, in order to throw it into greater prominence, where it may be displayed on signs or in documents or uttered ritualistically in order to reaffirm its importance to the identity of the cultural entity. In this research this display or utterance of the dis-embedded value is referred to by the term *invocation*.

The symbolism of a value structurally is not, however, identical to the symbolism of a symbol. Symbolic structure is generally accepted to involve the idea of *representation*, which means that in its physical form it is something like the meaning it has; in other words, the form of the symbol is non-arbitrary or, at least, not totally arbitrary. In this sense values are unlike symbols and more like concepts, as the value-term is purely arbitrary. Yet they function like symbols in the emotional force they exert, what Schwaller de Lubicz refers to as their ‘emotive evocation’ (1978, p.45) and, particularly in collective settings, through referencing something like a mythic history or sacred events (Eliade, 1957). It is this function that I have already referred to as a ‘shared experience’ which lies at the heart of the ‘sense of value’. Linguistically, then, values are distinct from both concepts and symbols, although they share traits of both. In their exteriority they are more like concepts and in their interiority they are more like symbols. The unity of values, ontologically, is achieved through the meaning of the value-term itself ‘pointing to’ the origins and perpetuation of the value (as a ‘symbol’) in shared experience. I suggest it is this bedrock of shared experience that underlies the consistent positive connotation of value-terms – due to their potential for generating social cohesion within cultural entities – even when they function within open discourse as abstract concepts.

Despite the essential unity of these two functions – the conceptual and the symbolic – within values, in the social world one or the other is typically dominant. The conditions that determine this dominance at any given moment are unclear at present, although it is a reasonable assumption that social context is important. In an open social context, in which social control is minimised and in which meaning is largely undetermined, the value-term will default to a more objective, conceptual mode in which the symbolic function is largely suppressed. By contrast, in closed social contexts, where social control is frequently heightened (for example, to preserve the rules of inclusion and exclusion) and meaning is more likely to be determined, a value-term appropriate to the social context will default to the more subjective mode in which it functions to augment the sense of group identity, through identification with a shared history and a shared experience. This use of values to invigorate the communal imagination is referred to in this research by the term *evocation*. I should point out, though, that in the theory of institutional transmission of values that is proposed and developed over the course of this research, both the conceptual and the symbolic functions have a role in the transmission of values, in widespread diffusion and individual acquisition, respectively.

The definition of a value as the conceptualisation of a culturally shared emotional experience has a number of corollaries. One is that while there can be individually held values, there are no truly private values; or if there are this is intrinsically unknowable, as in the sharing of an experience there must be recourse to a shared language and therefore the conceptualisation of the experience; alternatively, the creation of a neologistic value-term which must resonate with others' experience if it is to be acknowledged as a value. A further corollary is that, while there can be common values within cultures and across cultures, there can be no absolute values (unless an absolute value is taken as an empty formalism, as in Rickert and Munsterberg), as values bind cultural entities and are delimited by the boundaries of those entities; hence, from a perspective of rational universalism, values are always relative to the localised context and always valid within that context, though this is not the same as saying that all values are equal in terms of social outcomes, nor that we are incapable of making a rational choice of which values to prioritise on the basis of perceived outcomes. The absoluteness of values, as I have previously stated, is to be sought in the intensity of the value experience and also in the communal commitment to their local promotion. Finally, as a result of their cultural limitations, values underlie social conflicts as much as they underlie social cohesion, i.e. conflicts between different and competing values and value systems. Such conflicts are a necessary part of the process of social development, as societies determine which values are to be more central to their identity and which more peripheral.

2.5 The Transmission of Values

I want to turn now to determine, on the basis of the concept of value argued for here, the manner of transmission that is entailed, an argument which I summarise here. Returning to a consideration of the comparison between values, concepts, signs and symbols, values like symbols evoke a shared experience within a given community, and it is in this property of *evocation* that lies at the root of the power of both entities to bind communities together. While values do not generally provoke the same intensity of response as symbols (which can provoke the most extreme of human passions), they can act in lieu of symbols in denoting that which is 'sacred' to a community. They do this, though, not through *representation*, which is the mode by which symbols can be endlessly reproduced and disseminated, but by utterance within the bounds of the community, by repeated *invocation* at the core of the community.

The transmission of values, according to this argument, takes place through two related steps, the invocation of the values that lie at the heart of communal life for a given community, and through invocation of the values the evocation of the realm of shared experience encapsulated in those values that binds the community together. There is a further implication of this idea: it is that for values to be uttered and for the communal imagination to be so bounded, a charismatic authority must exist at the heart of the community that can counter the differentiating tendencies of the wider society in which the community is embedded. This is the role that in all institutional structures is filled by a charismatic figure that (ideally) combines characteristics of leadership, concern and wisdom. This figure protects the integrity of the community through teaching and exemplification in which the communal values are both explicit and implicit, and by the clear demarcation of the boundary between the community and the non-community.

This is only one aspect of transmission. In the previous section I argued that the exteriority of values as ordinary language terms means that their function is bifurcated, operating as symbols within closed communal structures, but also as ordinary concepts in discourse through open communicative channels, as shown in the figure on page 26. The circumstances that cause the change of function, beyond the change of context, is something not clear at this point, but this flexibility means that values can flow as easily as any other type of information. This mitigates the rather austere view of the closed community painted above, and suggests that values can be transmitted in open social contexts. However, the underlying logic of the view that values are shared experience means that transmission *can* only occur within a closed community. The way out of this impasse is to posit a multiplicity of values entailing a plurality of contexts in which belonging is real but only provisional, not absolute or exclusive.

This view of our individual life-worlds as being constituted by overlapping associations and our values fairly eclectic and not necessarily resolved to a single coherent worldview seems to me to be fundamentally true to the form of liberal information-driven society in which we increasingly live today. I am not entirely sure whether the unresolved incompatibility of many of our values is a strength or a weakness. What is clear is that within this framework there is a freedom to pursue greater participation – and hence commitment – in one or more areas according to our desire or circumstances. I imagine society is best served by having both individuals who are wedded to certainty and those who have questing, open minds.

The notion of transmission in the humanities, itself a loan term from communications theory, should strictly speaking be limited to the evaluation of inter-generational cultural continuity, where it began as a discussion within evolutionary psychology in the 1980s (Schoenpflug, 2001b). However, it is a term with potentially important philosophical implications, though not to my knowledge one with any current or historical, specifically philosophical denotation. In this research therefore its meaning is extended to cover any phenomenon in which information is passed from a transmitter to a receiver. Although the focus in this research is on institutional transmission, in this section the parameters of transmission in general will be considered, that is to say the structural and contextual aspects of transmission. Included here are concepts as they appear in the pertinent literatures, specifically psychology and the social sciences, that do not make any reference to the term ‘transmission’, yet which I will argue fall under that general description. I have, in addition, chosen to differentiate between theories that address an *aspect* of transmission, dealt with here and in section 2.6, and those that offer a more complete *model* of transmission, which will be dealt with in the section 2.7. In sociological terminology derived from Hirsch (2003), this section will deal with the *micro* aspects of transmission, that is, the interpersonal, while the next two sections will focus on the *macro* aspects, the broadly social. Section 2.8 will focus on the *meso* aspects, the institutions of schooling.

2.5.1 The evolutionary basis of transmission

Moving from a pure deductive theory to an empirically based theory of institutional value transmission requires a number of steps. The first is to look at the literature outside of philosophy. Beginning in the 1970s a considerable body of work has amassed on the evolutionary basis of cultural transmission. One of the most prominent hypotheses is known as the Dual Inheritance Theory, which claims that human nature and behaviour can best be understood as an amalgamation of genetic inheritance and cultural transmission (McElreath and Henrich, 2007). The main contributors to the field have been Lumsden and Wilson (1981), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) who all developed mathematical models of how genetic and cultural factors can reinforce each other. I will look at the theory of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman in some detail as it has features of interest in looking at institutional transmission. Slightly predating these, and far better known, Dawkins (1976) theory of memetic evolution (cultural transmission though ‘memes’, a cultural analogue of genes) is of less interest. Dawkins’ focus is on the evolutionary logic of the meme as universal replicator; there is little in the way of social or cultural context.

I have divided this section into two parts, parameters and conditions. Parameters are the basic components and structures of transmission; conditions are various other factors associated with transmission, particularly the requirements for transmission to take place successfully. The parameters were laid down fairly early on by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman and there has been little significant development since then. The subsequent research in the field has focused strongly on conditions.

2.5.2 Parameters of transmission

Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) develop the theory of cultural transmission based on an epidemiological model of viral diffusion. That model draws on four evolutionary factors (ibid, pp. 65-67) as the driving forces of evolutionary change, the two classical Darwinian notions of variation and selection and the later neo-Darwinian concepts of drift and migration. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman utilise the first two to create a basic typology of cultural change through the non-reproducibility of cultural knowledge, akin to genetic variation. As in epidemic spread, they identify three transmission routes (ibid, p. 54): vertical, from parent to offspring; horizontal, from peer to peer (non-related individuals of the same generation); and oblique, between non-related or distantly-related individuals of different generations, though Cavalli-Sforza (1993, p.312) later refines this concept of transmission routes adding ‘one to many’, typical of institutional structures such as schools, and ‘many to one’, referred to as ‘social group pressure’. He also differentiates (ibid) between vertical transmission between parent and child and other routes in terms of outcomes.

Schönplflug (2001b, p.132), clearly indebted to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, but adapting and developing the ideas into the social-psychological arena, identifies four significant parameters of cultural transmission: the carriers of transmission, or transmitters – the people involved in the process of transmission; the contents of transmission, that which is transmitted, which are particularly sensitive to the channel; the mechanism of transmission, which is thought to include two stages – awareness and acceptance (cf. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981, p.62); and developmental windows, which can be genetically-based (e.g. language acquisition) or socially-based (e.g. compulsory schooling).

2.5.3 Conditions of transmission

Within their model Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (ibid, pp.61-62) reckon there are four structural variables, 'factors in transmission rules': the relationship of teacher (transmitter) and taught (recipient); the age difference between transmitter and recipient (generation gap); the numerical relationship (ratio) of teacher to taught; and the degree of complexity of the society in which the transmission takes place. Schönflug (2001a, p.174) considers the conditions, which he terms 'transmission belts', which favour cultural transmission taking place in a particular socio-economic and cultural context. They are primarily the age and educational level of the transmitter and receiver ('personal characteristics') and the marital relationship of the parents and the parenting style of the parents ('family interaction variables'). Altogether ten conditions have been identified: degree of acceptance, quality of relationships, developmental windows, personal characteristics, perceptions, biases, common values, generation of values, numerical ratio, and social complexity. There is a degree of overlap, but they will be dealt with separately.

Degree of acceptance: According to Cavalli-Sforza (1993) vertical transmission is more likely to result in variation in terms of the intergenerational value systems, whereas other routes, particularly the institutional route of 'one to many', are more likely to result in homogeneity of values. Barni et al. (2011) argue that there is a moderate degree of willingness among adolescents to accept their parents' values. Also, after a period in which adolescents' values diverge from their parents', as they are asserting their identity, there is a tendency for the two generations' values to become more similar (ibid).

Quality of relationships: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) state that the relationship of teacher (transmitter) and taught (recipient) is a key condition of transmission, while Schoenflug (2001a) specifies the marital relationship of the parents and the parenting style of the parents. More effective cultural transmission takes place when there is a harmonious and constructive relationship between the parents (ibid), and less effective transmission in a dysfunctional relationship. Schönflug's research also suggests that empathetic parents are the most effective transmitters (ibid). Euler et al. (2001) add that two important related aspects of cultural transmission between generations are investment in the younger generation and emotional closeness between the generations. Barni et al. (2011) assert that acceptance is assisted when the parents themselves share the same values, and that there is a reciprocal relationship between closeness and acceptance of parental values; that is, this is not a relationship of simple causality, but a bi-directional relationship.

Developmental stage: According to Schönplflug (2001a, p.185) acquisition of values is differentiated according to age of the receiver/acquirer. Early adolescents are more open to collective values, but are less receptive as they reach later adolescence; however, in later adolescence they are more open (and more cognitively developed to receive) individualistic values, those that contribute to a 'stimulating life', a point that Barni et al. (2011) confirm.

Personal characteristics: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, and Schönplflug both assert the importance of personal characteristics; the former emphasise the age difference between transmitter and recipient (generation gap) and the latter adds the educational level of the transmitter and receiver.

Perceptions: In general, the values the parents wish to transmit are perceived by the younger generation to be more conservative, whereas the young are more open to new ideas (Barni et al., 2011).

Biases: Whitbeck and Gecas (1988) recognise that females have a slightly higher acceptance of parents values than males and that the mother-daughter bond in this respect is particularly strong, what they refer to as the 'female lineage' of value transmission.

Common values: According to Barni et al. (2011), some values seem to be almost universally shared between the generations, such as benevolence and independence of thought and action.

Generation of values: According to Grusec and Goodnow (1994) acquisition of values takes place through the assertion of moral autonomy; acceptance comes on the basis of self-generation. Barni et al. (2011) contest this view; they prefer the notion of self-other generation: the values we acquire are the result of our free choice, but this choice is not made in a vacuum; we tend to choose the values of those close to us in a familial setting.

The final two points are of particular relevance outside of the immediate family setting, in the broader social and institutional context:

Numerical ratio: The numerical relationship (ratio) of teacher to taught can also be a factor in how effective value transmission can be (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). It is unclear here what conclusion they might have reached about this. The assumption is that they consider a smaller teacher-pupil ratio to be more effective; however, this might contradict the

idea that ‘one to many’ transmission reproduces a more homogeneous set of values, referred to above.

Social complexity: The degree of complexity of the society in which the transmission takes place is considered to be a factor in value transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988); there is a recognition that multiple factors are at play in value socialisation, not only the parents, important as that influence is. Hashimzade and Della Giusta (2011) have modelled the relationship between the intergenerational values of immigrant families and the values of their schools, in order to determine the optimal outcomes. They have concluded that in a society of heterogeneous communities, better social outcomes are created when schools focus on inclusivity in order to avoid alienation. Attempts by schools to create homogeneity of values increases alienation and worsens social outcomes. If there is a gradual convergence of values between the immigrant community and the host society, there is a measured improvement in social and economic outcomes, initiated in part by higher educational outcomes.

I would expect that much of what has been studied in terms of intergenerational transmission of values would be of relevance to transmission in schools, particularly in terms of the key relationship between teacher and pupil, which while not commonly as close as that of parent and child, has some of the features of that relationship (Riley, 2010; Pianta, 1994; Bowlby, 1969). Clearly, though, on the basis of the research, transmission of values within a school is going to be dependent upon a number of variables such as age and gender, parental relationship and the quality of home life, level of education (both in terms of level achieved and receptivity), the ethnic makeup of the school catchment area, and even – apparently – which values are being transmitted. It is probably a mistake, though, to consider that these conditions are all equally important. There seems to be fairly robust agreement that in intergenerational transmission the quality of the relationships within the family are key, and it would not be unreasonable to expect that within a school the quality of the relationship between the teacher and the pupil in particular, but also that between colleagues and between management and staff, which are important in creating morale and a good learning environment, are also going to play a significant role.

There do seem to be two noticeable omissions. Although Schönflug mentions the mechanism of transmission, which he (after Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman) states has two stages – awareness and acceptance – there is no attempt to describe or model this mechanism.

The other is that values are not assigned any role in this process. My intuition is that these omissions are connected. As long as values are seen as a black box problem there is a limit to the extent that the transmission of values can be modelled.

Although the theories emerging from evolutionary psychology do provide relatively simple models of transmission, they are predominantly focused upon the interaction between transmitter and receiver and, therefore, in the larger social context they will be considered as part of the mechanism of transmission, i.e. an aspect of transmission rather than as full models of transmission. I want to turn now to several other theories which address aspects of transmission.

2.6 Modes and Aspects of Transmission

The four theories I want to look at – social capital, hegemony, resistance, and intersubjectivity – are not theories of transmission, but they look at aspects of the social world that are related to values transmission and resonate with certain aspects of the theory of value transmission that I have developed up to this point. After an overview of the main theoretical perspectives in each of these fields, I will comment on the relevance I feel it has to the development of the theoretical stance I am taking.

2.6.1 Social Capital

The idea of social capital, if not the terminology, has existed for as long as the social sciences (Portes, 1998). Though its use is widespread in the social sciences, the idea of social capital does not have a single definition, but should rather be viewed as a family of definitions (Paldam, 2000). Fundamentally, though, most definitions incorporate the idea that the interaction of members of a society creates a social ‘good’ that in some manner can be transformed into (or ‘spent’ on) other more tangible goods, particularly of an economic or a political nature. Croll (2004, p.398) describes social capital as arising from ‘social relationships and the personal networks which they create’, which then becomes ‘a resource which can be used to generate outcomes which are valued’. Human relationships therefore become a resource that have ‘productive capacity’ for society as a whole, not just for the individuals concerned (ibid). Bourdieu defines it as ‘The aggregate of the actual or potential

resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition' (cited in Portes, 2000, p. 45). An understanding of social capital may be very useful in understanding the dynamics within institutions and in their relationship to the wider society.

Stepping back and taking a broad view, Croll (2004) identifies three dimensions of the analysis of social capital, by which the various commentators on the phenomenon can be distinguished: the extent to which it is dependent on relationships inside the family or outside the family; the degree to which it is related by the theorist to other types of capital; and the extent to which it is seen as principally a resource for the individual or the broader society (ibid). Adler and Kwon (2002), though, make a distinction of more particular relevance to our thinking in this research. They categorise social capital theorists according to whether they focus on the building of communal links, such as Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1995), the building of external links, such as Bourdieu (1985) and Portes (2000), or incorporate both, such as Pennar (1997), Schiff (1992) and Woolcock (1998). In a similar vein Paldam (2000) claims that theories of social capital can be categorised according to whether the building of trust, the building of networks, or cooperation is considered to be the main feature of social relationships. Adler and Kwon conclude (2002, p.34) that the distinction between internal bonding and external linking is largely illusory as 'external ties at a given level of analysis become internal ties at the higher levels of analysis, and, conversely, internal ties become external at the lower levels'.

Most theorists see social capital as something that contributes to an 'excess' in society. However, Paldam (2000) warns against the potential for seduction by the positive aura attached to the notion of social capital. And Putnam points out that the distribution of benefit is not predetermined: 'Who benefits from these connections, norms and trust – the individual, the wider community or some faction within the community – must be determined empirically, not definitionally' (Putnam, 1995, pp.664-5). Bourdieu does not even accept the democratic nature of social capital. For him it is linked to other forms of capital, i.e. cultural, human and economic capital, and is one more means whereby those who benefit most transmit their advantage through society (Croll, 2004).

There is something compelling about the idea of social capital that reinforces the idea that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and also that value is somehow embedded in social relations. I have some reservations though. An idea for which there are so many definitions,

schools of thought, etc, suggests that it functions more as a metaphor for a number of connected features of society and a conceptual guideline for sociological research programmes than as a definable aspect of social reality. Portes (1998) believes that the heuristic value of the term itself loses viability if it is overextended. Adler and Kwon (op. cit.) have determined that social capital implies a hierarchy of communication networks. This, however, is simply an empirical fact of social being and does not entail the existence of social capital. These networks may be capitalised on by utilising them for financial or cultural transactions, but this requires the development of a particular range of entrepreneurial and managerial skills. Underlying these networks are personal relations built upon a range of values. Many of these values are not amenable to the exploitation of relationships for financial or other outcomes. However, Fukuyama (1995), identifies trust as one such value which is so convertible, capable of being scaled up and potentially self-replenishing.

2.6.2 Hegemony

The term 'hegemony', or 'cultural hegemony' to be more precise, as a theoretical idea in the social sciences has its origins in Marx but its first clear expression in Gramsci and Althusser. At one level it means ideological domination, but, more subtly, a wilful blindness to the state of dominion, such is its all-pervasive nature. However, even this does not completely capture its sense. According to Strinati (1995, pp.165-6) the existence of a hegemonic domination is in part due to a 'spontaneous consensus' of the ruled who find in its rules and values a potential for realising their own self-interest. Apple (1979, p. 18) locates this paradox in the dual senses of ideology:

Functionally, ideology has been evaluated historically as a form of false consciousness which distorts one's picture of social reality and serves the interests of the dominant classes in a society. However, it has also been treated, as Geertz puts it, as 'systems of interacting symbols' that provide the primary ways of making 'otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful.'

Apple finds the resolution of these two views of ideology in the concept of hegemony. Hegemony, therefore, should not be viewed essentially as just a negative imposition, but a prevailing aspect of social reality, which enables us to function, however imperfectly, within society. Within education, Apple sees that:

The idea that ideological saturation permeates our lived experience enables one to see how people can employ frameworks which both assist them in organizing their world and enable them to believe they are neutral participants in the neutral instrumentation of schooling,...while at the same time, these frameworks serve particular economic and ideological interests which are hidden from them (ibid, p.22).

There are interesting insights in the notion of hegemony, but essentially it seems to be the conflation of two empirical observations. The first is the commonplace that any believing, as any belonging, is the source of both individual orientation and of self-limitation. The second is that all societies function through differentiation of authority, role and status. In hegemony the rhetoric of Marxist class conflict has appropriated an allegorical interpretation of social differentiation as 'ideology', an ideology to which – it is claimed – we are all in thrall and in which we find both our orientation (false consciousness) and limitation (domination). That said, at its core there is an insight, which I find persuasive, that individually, and to some degree collectively, we accept worldviews and their attendant values that are pervasive to the degree that we cannot conceive of the world being otherwise; that is to say we are imprisoned within the perspective of our own perception. Apple's use of the verb 'permeate' is particularly striking in this context and I will use this, in its noun form 'permeation' later in this research to describe the degree of institutional penetration of values.

2.6.3 Resistance

Resistance is a very broad term which includes many different theoretical and ideological persuasions. They are united by the sense that there is a dislocation between the role an individual is expected to play within a social system and the sense that this role in some manner compromises their intrinsic worth, leading to a state of rebellion, which can range from passive non-compliance to aggressive challenge. Two examples will be considered, in the work of Parsons and Willis.

In a classic paper in which he discusses the socialising function of the school class, discussed in the next section, Parsons (1961) also develops an example of what has come to be known as (anomic) strain theory. In a culture (the example is specific to the US, though not limited to that case) in which achievement at school has become a defining standard of progress towards adulthood and therefore of the socialisation of the individual, this sets a bar, which for some becomes a barrier, differentiating the accomplished and therefore successfully socialised from the unaccomplished and, therefore in some manner, socially delinquent. For this reason, Parsons argues (ibid, pp.98-99) much of youth culture, particularly the

disaffected youth, reflects an anti-intellectual stance, and pointedly states that this is not the result 'of a *general* failure of the educational process'; rather:

Both the general upgrading process and the pressure to enhanced independence should be expected to increase strain on the lower, most marginal groups...those for whom adaptation to educational expectations at any level is difficult. As the acceptable minimum of educational qualification rises, persons near and below the margin will tend to be pushed into an attitude of repudiation of these expectations. Truancy and delinquency are ways of expressing this repudiation. Thus the very improvement of educational standards in the society at large may well be a major factor in the failure of the educational process for a growing number at the lower end of the status and ability distribution (ibid).

Parsons parallels at this point a principle within education known as differentiation-polarisation (Hargreaves, 1967; Lacey, 1970), which states that raising academic achievement, for example within a school, can only be bought at the price of alienating an increasing number of underperforming students, though Parsons applies his principle on a society-wide scale.

What Parsons has to say is of particular interest because he grounds educational attainment in the widespread acceptance of the value of 'achievement', at least in its intellectual context, but possibly also more widely. The corollary of that would be that resistance to academic achievement at school may also be reflected in the rejection of social achievement in general. Parsons' perspective was overwhelmingly deductive. However, such a phenomenon was observed by Paul Willis in his research into disaffected youth in a school in the 1970s (Willis, 1977). Willis followed the progress of a group of youths (the 'lads') from working class backgrounds during the last two years of their schooling. They had consciously rejected the ethos of the school, of 'middle-class' attainment through academic achievement, and had accepted that their future was to be employed in doing physical labour or some menial job. There is a caveat to this, though; the lads had not necessarily rejected the values associated with success as such, but with the middle-class version of success which entailed working hard academically, accepting the discipline of school and the authority of teachers, in preparation for a life of mental work. Instead, they had chosen values which were concomitant with entering the workforce as manual workers, such as male solidarity, anti-intellectualism, freedom from authority and practical skills.

Resistance is a psychological process that, logically, must occur between the 'awareness and acceptance' (Schoenpflug, 2001b) aspects of transmission, discussed above, as negation (or

indirect route to acceptance) of transmission. It is connected with moral autonomy and the self-generation of values (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994), as is apparent from Willis' research, and will form an important part of the understanding of the process of values transmission.

2.6.4 Intersubjectivity

Since Descartes formulation of the basis of knowledge, *cogito ergo sum*, Western philosophy has been saddled with an epistemological dilemma (Kolakowski, 1988): if thinking (*res cogitans*) and being (*res extens*) are incommensurable, as Descartes maintained, what is it that the subject actually knows, and how can what we believe or claim we know be definitively authenticated? The tradition of Western philosophy since can be understood in large part as an attempt to breach this impasse. While solipsism is intuitively rejected by most people, it is inescapably entailed by the logic of the Cartesian dichotomy. In the twentieth century there were three attempts to provide an intersubjective solution to this problem. By intersubjectivity is meant a shared realm of subjectivity, but the extent and means by which this was supposedly realised was given a different proposed solution in these three attempts, undertaken by Husserl, Heidegger and Habermas.

Husserl proposed a solution by returning to Descartes and recasting his idea. Descartes had characterised subjectivity as thinking substance; Husserl, drawing on Brentano's concept of the intentionality of consciousness, proposed instead the formulation *ego-cogito-cogitatum*, the self is not merely thinking but has an object of thought (Husserl, 1931). In this manner, Husserl sought to dissolve the distinction between subject and object and bring them together as experience, and establish the experienced phenomena as the proper realm of scientific and philosophical inquiry. He believed that by establishing that we experience the world, including the social world, directly, rather than through theoretical structures, this was a sufficient basis to claim that experience was intersubjective (Thompson, 2005).

The phenomenological approach developed by Husserl dissolved the rigidity of the Cartesian polarisation of thinking and opened the way for a range of experience that had not hitherto been considered the proper subject of philosophical inquiry – such as social, religious and aesthetic experience – to now be taken into consideration. Indeed, the phenomenology of values has constituted an important part of the development of a theoretical stance in this chapter. Nevertheless, even Husserl's supporters conceded that he had not resolved the epistemological dilemma of how to break out of the solipsistic subject, he had merely posited that experience was inherently intersubjective and not subjective (Thompson, 2005).

Heidegger took the radical step of recasting phenomenology from an ontological, rather than an epistemological, viewpoint. For Heidegger the proper realm of study was Being – existence – not consciousness, particularly the being of human being (*Dasein*), which was understood to be intrinsically social, *being-in-the-world* (Heidegger, 1962), from which we derive our sense of individuality only through a process of reflection after the fact (Thompson, 2005), a process the outcome of which determines whether we come to live our lives authentically or inauthentically. Accepting the fact that we are, perhaps primarily, social beings, does not entail intersubjectivity, however. The case for *sociality* being the outcome of reflective practice is more compelling, I think, than that for individuality.

Based on the theories of George Herbert Mead, Habermas (1984) developed a theory of intersubjectivity based neither on consciousness nor being, but on language. According to Habermas (ibid, p.390), ‘Mead elevated symbolically mediated interaction to the new paradigm of reason and based reason on the communicative relation between subjects, which is rooted in the mimetic act of role-taking, that is, in ego’s making his own the expectations that alter directs to him’, which is to say that reason (hence subjectivity) emerges from the sharing of and response to signs and sign acts. There have been a number of critiques of Habermas’ idea of intersubjectivity. Frie (1997) delivers what I think must be a fatal blow when he claims that recognition of the signs others make presupposes subjectivity; it is not the basis of subjectivity.

The idea of intersubjectivity is of interest because of the notion of ‘shared experience’ that underlies the concept of value that I have outlined. That does not mean shared in any sense of mystical transfer, but in the ordinary sense of establishing similarity of experience through the medium of discourse and empathetic identification. I suspect that intersubjectivity is a philosophical cul-de-sac; moreover, I believe it violates the principle of moral autonomy which is fundamental to the acquisition of values.

2.7 Models of institutional transmission

2.7.1 Parsons’ model of Socialisation

Parsons looks at the school class as an agency of socialisation and selection. He looks at this rather than the whole school because ‘it is recognised both by the school system and by the individual pupil as the place where the ‘business’ of formal education actually takes place’ (Parsons, 1961, p. 85). He considers the school class to be ‘an agency through which

individual personalities are trained to be motivationally and technically adequate to the performance of adult roles' (ibid), though not the only such agency: others include the family, churches, training courses and clubs. Essentially, Parsons has identified 'closed' groups or communities as agents of socialisation, which corresponds to the understanding developed here that values transmission occurs in closed social contexts.

As well as socialisation, the school class also performs the function of selection. Parsons considers that the process already begins in the elementary school and occurs along 'a single main axis of *achievement*' (ibid, p.87). There are considered to be two components of this achievement. The first is the mastery of the academic, the learning of the skills needed to take up a role within the adult world, such as reading, writing and numeracy. The second is what Parsons characterises as 'responsible citizenship' of the school community, including '[s]uch things as respect for the teacher, consideration and co-operativeness in relation to fellow-pupils and 'good work-habits'...leading on to capacity for 'leadership' and 'initiative'' (ibid, p. 91).

In this process the role of the teacher is vital. Firstly the teacher is a representative of the adult world into which the young are being socialised, but not just a representative but also an 'agent' of that world catalysing the process through imposing the expectations of achievement on the class (ibid, p. 91). Primary identification of the student with the teacher is almost invariably an indicator of progress on to college, while stronger identification with the peer group correlates strongly with failure to so progress:

The bifurcation of the class on the basis of identification with teacher or peer group so strikingly corresponds with the bifurcation into college-goers and non-college-goers that it would be hard to avoid the hypothesis that this structural dichotomization in the school system is the primary source of the selective dichotomization (ibid, p. 94).

Parsons summarises the process occurring within the school class in four points:

1. An emancipation of the child from primary emotional attachment to the family.
2. An internalisation of a level of societal values and norms that is a step higher than those he can learn from his family alone.
3. A differentiation of the school class in terms both of actual achievement and of differential valuation of achievement.

4. A selection and allocation of [society's] human resources relative to the adult role system.

He sees as integral to this process:

the sharing of common values by the two adult agencies involved – the family and the school, in this case the core of the shared valuation of achievement. It includes, above all, recognition that it is fair to give differential rewards for different levels of achievement, so long as there has been fair access to opportunity...[T]he elementary school class is an embodiment of the fundamental American value of equality of opportunity, and...it places value both on initial equality and on differential achievement (ibid, p. 96).

Parsons model of socialisation I would evaluate as a fairly complete model of institutional transmission. First, it differentiates between the transmission that occurs at school and that which occurs in the family. Then, although it is centred on the classroom, it deals with the micro and macro aspects of transmission. At the micro level the relationship between the teacher and pupil, roles and authority are all considered. It also tackles the issue of resistance and embeds that within the model. Furthermore, it looks beyond the school to the relationship between the teacher and parents and the wider societal norms and expectations. Parsons' model works well with the single value of achievement. However, schools are expected to transmit a range of values that prepare pupils for adult life, so the model as a general model for values transmission is inadequate as it stands. Also, I think the model too readily legitimises failure within the system; a model for general value transmission must have more flexibility and adaptability built into it.

2.7.2 Bourdieu's theory of Reproduction

According to Apple (1979, p.1):

[E]ducation is not a neutral enterprise, ...by the very nature of the institution, the educator [is] involved, whether he or she [is] conscious of it or not, in a political act...[I]n the last analysis educators [can] not fully separate their educational activity from the unequally responsive institutional arrangements and the forms of consciousness that dominate advanced industrial economies like our own.

This leads to the phenomenon known as reproduction, in which education, perhaps unwittingly, participates in the perpetuation of macroscopic socio-cultural structural features of the society of which it is a part. Apple contrasts two theoretical stances on this. In one education is seen as a neutral mediator between individual consciousness and the larger society, in which the norms and conventions of a culture are 'filtered down from the macro level of economic and political structures to the individual via work experience, educational

processes and family socialization' (MacDonald, 1977, in Apple, 1979, p.33). There is, though, a far more critical tradition of reproduction theories for which 'schools latently recreate cultural and economic disparities, though this is certainly not what most school people intend at all' (Apple, 1979, pp.33-34). It is this latter tradition to which Pierre Bourdieu belongs.

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) advance the notion that education 'reproduces' the unequal distribution of privilege in society through the exercise of an arbitrary power in schools, derived from and mirroring the power of the state in society. He terms this power a 'cultural arbitrary' – arbitrary in two senses: first in that it hides its true nature under the guise of pedagogic language; secondly, that it claims a legitimacy for which the justification is non-existent. The wielding of this arbitrary power results in 'symbolic violence', a concept which 'belongs to a general theory of violence and legitimate violence, as is directly attested to by the homology between the school system's monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence and the State's monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence' (ibid, p. xi-xii). They (ibid, p.6) suggests that teaching ('pedagogic action') is a form of this symbolic violence as it acts arbitrarily (in the senses given above) to perpetuate the inequalities of society:

Every institutionalised educational system owes the specific characteristics of its structure and functioning to the fact that, by the means proper to the institution, it has to produce and reproduce the institutional conditions whose existence and persistence (self-reproduction of the system) are necessary both to the exercise of its essential function of inculcation and to the fulfilment of its function of reproducing a cultural arbitrary which it does not produce (cultural reproduction), the reproduction of which contributes to the reproduction of the relations between the groups or classes (social reproduction) (ibid, p. 54).

At the classroom level this takes place through 'pedagogic work, a process of inculcation which must last long enough to produce a durable training, i.e. a habitus, the product of the principle of internalisation of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after pedagogic action has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalised arbitrary' (ibid, p.67). Teachers are the agents of cultural reproduction at the frontline of education, inculcating practices in their students which perpetuate the inequalities of the social system.

Parsons and Bourdieu both accept the central role of schools in transmitting the values of society and reproducing the inequalities of that society, although they judge the nature of this inequality differently and also evaluate it differently. Bourdieu provides an analysis of the

power structures of schools as resting on the authority of the state and the legitimation of coercion. An interpretation of authority has yet to be built into the model of value transmission advocated here, something that will be necessary, as some form of coercive power, or at least the possibility of coercion, lies at the basis of all education, including, one supposes, the education of values. But the evidence from transmission studies, in section 2.5.2, indicates that it is the quality of the relationship between transmitter and recipient that lies at the base of successful transmission.

2.7.3 Bernstein's theory of educational transmission

Working in an independent tradition, but influenced by Bourdieu's notion of cultural reproduction, Basil Bernstein (1975) sets out the basis of a theory of educational transmission. Bernstein declares himself to be influenced by the Durkheimian tradition of sociology in which social class plays a major part, and the distinction between the 'mechanical' and 'organic' forms of society is a recurrent motif. Bernstein's theory of transmission is built around a series of 'codes', derived from empirical social observations, from which a deductive model of transmission is derived. Bernstein's theory has two major aspects, which represent different phases of his academic trajectory; the first is in linguistic theory, the second in the sociology of education.

Bernstein's sociology of education is based on his work in linguistics, particularly on the rules of meaning that he referred to as 'codes'. He distinguishes two types of codes, restricted and elaborated. Restricted codes are 'in-group' language, based on common experience, closed off to outsiders. Restricted codes can express deeper meaning with fewer words, because of the familiarity of context. By contrast, elaborated codes contain more extended explanations in which meaning is made explicit. It is, by contrast with restricted code, open and universal; there is no insider dimension to it. Bernstein reckoned that restricted codes are intrinsic to industrial work, because of the specialised and limited nature of the work, and characterised by deep knowledge of a particular area of economic activity, which by its very nature is not conducive to elaborated codes. However, the 'symbolic labour' of the middle classes employs both restricted codes and elaborated codes. Children brought up in working class and middle-class families are socialised into these respective codes. Schooling operates largely on elaborated codes, being an open and expressive medium for the transmission of universal knowledge. It is, by its nature, therefore, biased in favour of middle-class children.

Thus, through the idea of codes, Bernstein made a connection between language and social reproduction.

Bernstein's concept of educational transmission is built around a second pair of 'codes', referred to as 'collection' and 'integrated' and how these interact with two other significant ideas, *classification* and *frame*. Classification applies to the type of curriculum operating in a school, but not the contents of the curriculum but the 'degree of boundary maintenance between contents' (ibid, p.87) in the curriculum, that is, the extent to which the various subjects are insulated from each other. Where these boundaries are strong Bernstein refers to a 'collection code', where weak, an 'integrated code'. In a similar manner, 'frame' 'refers to the strength of the boundary between what may be transmitted and what may not be transmitted in the pedagogical relationship' (ibid, p.88). Where this boundary is strong and 'sharp', this constitutes a collection code, where weak and 'blurred' an integrated code (ibid).

Based on these structural definitions, Bernstein undertakes an interpretation of power distribution and control within educational institutions. Within curriculum he distinguishes between the more hierarchical relationships in collection codes, where knowledge is specialised and access is controlled and mediated through the expert, knowledge is treated as 'esoteric' and access to its 'deep structure' is only gained over many years, and integrated codes in which pupils have 'increased discretion' over the curriculum and pedagogy and access to the deep structure of knowledge from the beginning (ibid, pp. 101-102). Paradoxically, Bernstein claims that integrated codes require greater ideological conformity among the staff members, which can have an effect on recruitment. Moreover, integrated codes demand more of the pupil in terms of their expression of thoughts, feelings and values and this can instigate rebellion against open learning contexts just as occur with closed learning contexts (ibid, pp. 107-109).

There are clear structural motifs that run through Bernstein's theories, and an analogy between the open and closed formats in language and education. Nevertheless, despite these motifs, I fail to see any deep connection between the linguistic theory and the educational theory. There are points of contact as where Bernstein states, 'Educational knowledge is uncommonsense knowledge' (ibid, p. 99), which suggests a link between elaborated codes and curriculum collection codes, as restricted codes are the commonsense knowledge of the 'uneducated' industrial classes. But there is also an underlying inconsistency; collection codes are the bounded forms of specialised insider knowledge handed down from experts to

novices who have passed through a rite of passage; my sense is that this is morphologically closer to the restricted code than to the elaborated code with which it is identified.

Bernstein's concept of closed and open boundary maintenance has some resonance with that of open and closed worlds in the theory of value outlined in section 2.4. There is one further aspect of Bernstein's theories which is of particular interest. He distinguishes between an *instrumental order* through which the transmission of 'facts, procedures and judgments' occurs and an *expressive order* 'which controls the transmission of the beliefs and the moral system' (ibid, pp. 54-55). The expressive order is that aspect of the school dealing with its 'shared values', that which gives the institution its cohesion. The expressive order is maintained through a high degree of *ritualization*. Ritualization itself takes two forms: *consensual* and *differentiating*. Consensual ritualization is that which applies equally to everyone, at least to all pupils and consists of things like school uniform and other school symbolism, traditions, assemblies and the systems of reward and punishment. Bernstein sees its essential function as shaping identity in relation to one of society's dominant groups. Differentiating ritualization, by contrast is concerned with deepening respect. There are four aspects of differentiation: age differentiation or life stages which are expressed through various rites of passage; age relationship between junior and senior, between generations, expressed through respect; sex differentiation expressed through gender roles; and house differentiation expressed through loyalty (ibid, pp. 55-58). Bernstein here approaches what I would term a structural semiotics of the institution, through which important values – in this case, respect and loyalty – are transmitted through the school.

2.8 Structures of Formalised Values Education

Up to this point, the focus has been on issues of theoretical concern. The third part of this chapter turns to those matters related to the teaching of values in formal education and their analysis in laying the groundwork for a model of institutional values transmission. First, some consideration is given to forms of governance in schools in the United Kingdom, as this has relevance to the institutions which will constitute the field and from which the research sample must be chosen, and the sometimes vexed issue of faith schooling is reviewed. This is followed by a series of discourses that have occurred over the past three decades on aspects of values education on issues of values in the curriculum, values and character education, tradition and values and values and wellbeing, which are both of relevance to the development of the theory and of relevance to preparation for immersion in the field.

2.8.1 The school system, governance and faith in the UK (England, Wales and N. Ireland)

As issues of authority enter into an understanding of the context in which values education in formal schooling is taking place, it is necessary to consider issues of governance. The school system in the UK is fairly complex with a number of variables; besides issues of governance, there is the question of funding, whether a school has to follow the National Curriculum (NC), whether pupil selection is allowed and whether the school is a faith school or not, all of which can be independent of each other. The table on page 51 summarises the range of these variables for the most common types of school (Source: Gov.UK, 2013).

Within the school system one of the most contentious issues is that of faith schools. Most types of schools can be faith schools, except for community schools. Since the 1944 Education Act faith groups have been able to establish schools with a religious charter within the state school system, where a need has been established. In the same act two forms of state maintenance were established: Voluntary Control (VC), in which the state provided all maintenance costs, and Voluntary Aided (VA) in which 50% of costs were provided, the rest being made up by the foundation from fees and donations, which affords them a greater degree of autonomy. Anglican foundations are predominantly VC and Catholic VA. There are presently (in 2010) about 20,000 maintained schools in England and of these about 7000 are faith schools (Allen and West, 2011), which are defined as schools that have ‘a faith-based ethos that is written into the school’s Instrument of Government’ (DfE, 2012). Of these 68% are Church of England and 30% are Roman Catholic; just 2% represent other faiths (Allen and West, 2011; Gov.UK, 2012), including other Christian denominations, although this is the sector which has seen the most growth (Walford, 2008).

Fig 04 Range of variables for types of school governance

Type of school	Source of Funding	Day-to-day Control	Follows NC	Selection allowed	Faith school
Community	Local Authority	Local Authority	Y	N	N
State Grammar	Local Authority	Local Authority	Y	Y	N
Academy	Government	Board	Y/N	N	Y/N
Free	Government	Various organisations	N	N	Y/N
VC	Local Authority	Local Authority	Y	N	Y

VA	Board/LA	Board	Y	N	Y
Independent	Fees/bequests	Board	N	Y	Y/N

Despite the historic association of schooling with religion and the longstanding presence of faith schools within the educational landscape of the UK, in an increasingly secular society they have become controversial, both within the educational establishment and among the public. Resistance from within the educational establishment is particularly strong on account of the support given to the establishment of faith schools as part of a drive to introduce greater selection in the choice of schools under the Blair Labour government, a policy which the present Conservative-led coalition government has continued. Opposition to faith schools is strong within the teaching unions, and the general public are more critical of the involvement of religious organisation in the establishment of schools (30%) than any other potential stakeholders, such as businesses, charities or universities (Clements, 2010, p.958). The religiously observant of all faiths, unsurprisingly, are more supportive of such involvement, as are Catholics in general regardless of observance (ibid, p.969). The controversy largely centres around two perspectives: the rights of parents to educate their children in their faith tradition or to seek an educational environment in which they believe their children will prosper academically and morally on one side; on the other, the perception that faith schools are socially divisive and lead to segregation.

Walford (2008, p. 690) states that religious parents of all faiths would prefer their children to attend a religious school, even of a different religion. While the growth of secularism and multiculturalism has resulted in less emphasis on Christian worship in schools, Anglican schools, in particular, have been accepting children of different faiths and making room for their religious needs, within a general Christian ethos (ibid). Among these families, though, there is evidence that children from higher-income religious families are more likely to attend a faith school than the children of a lower-income religious family (Allen and West, 2011, pp. 707-708) and that there is stronger religious self-identification among higher social status families (ibid, p. 708). Ward (2008, pp. 321-322) contends that faith schools are a throwback to the educational models of the medieval period and that education in the twenty-first century should be based on inclusive schools that attain the high academic and moral standards of faith schools. He concurs with the opponents of faith schools that the current educational arrangements encourage division, although thinks it is unrealistic to expect that they will be changed soon. A further related issue is whether faith schools allow selection by

the back door. I view this as a matter of perspective: whether faith schools are 'selective' on the basis of religion, or whether they are serving the needs of particular communities. All schools are selective to some degree, although using different criteria, for example academic ability, ability to pay, religious faith, or school catchment areas. All make exceptions to these criteria, for example through bursaries in the case of independents, and all faith schools are required by law to admit children of whatever faith 'if they apply and the school is undersubscribed' (DfE, 2014, p.82). I would argue that selection becomes an issue mainly when access to a good education is in question. The relative rigidity of state school selection means that some children are denied entry to a good school solely on the basis of where they live – frequently poorer areas – and this has a tendency to perpetuate intergenerational underachievement. Faith schools, by contrast, are not necessarily limited by these considerations. Catholic schools, in particular, have a traditional role in educating the poor, and while maintaining a key role in existing Catholic communities, are increasingly hosting immigrant communities, including non-Christian ones (Interview, school A). CE schools are similarly increasingly multicultural while maintaining their Christian ethos (Walford, 2008).

Though the arguments of both sides within the academic debate centre on evidence in favour of or against, it seems inconclusive. While the majority support the view that faith schools are divisive, there are those that hold that faith schools promote integration and academic achievement (Clements, 2010). According to Godfrey and Morris (2008, p. 220), large-scale research shows that on average pupils attending faith schools score higher academically and, although the margins are small, it depicts a real effect. Admittedly, much of this can be explained by the fact that many pupils at these schools take RE as an additional GCSE, thus boosting the schools in the points system, but this does not account for all the difference (ibid, p. 221). Macmullen (2004, p. 603) develops an argument that religious elementary (primary) schooling underlies the development of personal ethical autonomy; he argues that the 'cultural coherence' that a religious upbringing in conjunction with a religious education provides is necessary for the development of an 'ethical autonomy'. It is vital, though, that this cooperative effort is marked by 'rational authority' rather than dogmatic authoritarianism (ibid, p.613). The benefit for religious parents, while implying the risk that their children may decide on an alternative lifestyle is that if they do continue in the tradition it is more likely to be a freely chosen and reasoned decision.

Solutions to resolve the social dilemma that faith schools pose, between greater freedom of choice and greater social harmony, tend to take the form of either excluding religious practice

from schools altogether or favouring a more inclusive religious ethos. Ward (2008), as noted above, recognises the academic achievement and higher moral standards of faith schools generally as something that should be aspirational for all schools, but considers religious practice to be divisive and that observance should be excluded from school life (ibid, p.322). Pupils should be taught about religions, but the focus should be on truth and reason (ibid). Halstead (2007, p.841), by contrast, insists that the policies of integration in existing common schools jar with the values of religious pupils that they are taught at home and that the attempt at assimilation is leading to increased alienation. He suggests, as an alternative, multi-faith schools in which a religious ethos would support individual faith identity within a commitment to the British cultural values of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and respect.

Religion is still, even in this secular society, a source of explicit values for many people, and even more so, I would argue, the source of many of our implicit values as a society. In a faith school the religious foundation will be an obvious source of the values that are expected to be transmitted by the teacher to the pupils. There are other, less tangible sources of values, such as historic traditions, and government policy is another source that may have to be considered. These factors will have some influence on the decision about the research sample. I want to turn now to the academic discourse relating to values.

2.8.2 Values in the Curriculum

Whether and to what extent values should form an explicit and distinct part of the school curriculum is something that has formed an integral part of the discourse on values education. In examining the philosophical, political and sociological dimensions of implementing values education into the school curriculum, Pring (1986, p.181) declares that it is inescapable that ‘the *educational* activities promoted by any society are intimately connected to what that society believes to be a valuable form of life...[T]he particular values embodied in what is designated educational will be about the kind of *persons* that the society wishes its young people to grow up into.’ However, he believes that these values will not yield to ‘philosophical analysis’. Instead he argues that values are local and historically conditioned, and cites in favour of this view the controversies and arguments over values even within our own society and its educational system. To educate someone ‘entail[s] the introduction to a valued form of life but ...what [that is] is essentially a matter for moral debate’ (ibid, p.182).

Awareness of the dangers of educating young people in a critical tradition that can result in the radical transformation of culture has meant that politics has always exercised some form of control over what schools teach and this has manifest itself in recent times in the call for schools to be involved in the education of values (ibid, p.182-183). Recognising this, Pring turns his attention to the substantive values that he believes can and should be transmitted ‘through the content of the curriculum but also through the methods of teaching and through the general ethos of the school’:

- The respect for rule-governed behaviour, and for the authorities.
- The respect for persons, whether oneself or others.
- Respect for the truth.
- Trusting and unselfish relationships.
- A sense of justice and fairness.

He argues, though, that:

it would be wrong to translate the general concern for personal and social development, and for developing in particular a set of defensible values, into the content of specific subjects...For that could be but a distraction from the more important questions that a school should be asking about the impact of the curriculum as a whole upon the values of individual pupils (ibid, p.189).

Pring then draws on the evidence of a survey of twelve schools, which correlated outcomes in terms of exam results, behaviour and attendance with the general school ethos. By ‘ethos’ what is meant are ‘the various stable procedures through which business is conducted towards individuals and their work, towards the community as a whole, and towards those outside the school’ (ibid, p.190).

Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) consider the role of values education to be that of humanising the curriculum, in directing it towards ‘educating for excellence in the life of virtue’. They see this as including moral, political and personal values.

[V]alues exist [and] are found in and embodied across the whole curriculum. Values are not definable as though they were an autonomous element in the curriculum, as being in some way a separate subject, with its own body of theory, cognitive content, typical activities, disciplinary procedures or criteria for success. Values permeate everything that we do in the curriculum – including the naming, defining and inter-relating of all its parts. And that is because of the point made above, that description and evaluation are inextricably entwined activities (ibid, p.136).

What seems clear from these readings is that values are not to be considered as something apart from the information and activities that constitute the normal life of the school. That is not to say that values is an area that can safely be ignored; it is, rather, an area that requires particular attention, but one that should be integrated into the processes and procedures of the school. Such considerations have also informed the debate on the implementation of Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) education. Within the context of the provisions of the National Curriculum and the 1988 ERA, it is obvious that provision should be made within schools for the implementation of SMSC policy. The philosophical *raison d'être* has been variously expressed, as in this rather flowery statement: 'Just as such biological development requires appropriate conditions – to do with such things as climate and soil in the case of plants – so, the (Ofsted) report claims, the personal development of pupils demands a favourable 'climate and soil'...provided and promoted by the school' (White 1994, p. 370, cited in Dillon and Maguire, 1997).

There are probably two areas from which strong support and push for the implementation of this policy derives. The first is among the general public, and particularly the parents of school pupils, perceiving an apparent decline in 'moral standards, particularly among young people' (SCAA, 1996, p.8). This perception has, over the past two decades, filtered through to government policy and local initiatives. The other comes from the opposite end of the process, in the Ofsted inspections to which schools are periodically subjected and which has kept the pressure on schools for the incremental implementation of SMSC policy. Left to themselves, most schools would probably have quietly dropped this provision of the National Curriculum due to the burden of the existing administrative and teaching loads. As it is, according to Dillon and Maguire (1997, p.184), 'Many schools are choosing to write a policy statement on SMSC. When developing the policy, three key issues are paramount. These are the need to consult, the provision of a rationale to support the proposed framework and a strategy to put the policy into practice'.

There are naturally difficulties to a successful implementation of any policy on this scale. Pring details five areas of difficulty in relation to Personal and Social development, which would be equally valid in the case of SMSC: conceptual, political, ethical, empirical and organisational (Pring, 1984, pp.4-7). Some of the tensions involved in setting out on a policy like SMSC were recognised by the government in the 1970s:

The educational system is charged [firstly] with equipping young people to take their place as citizens and workers...Secondly there is responsibility for educating the 'autonomous citizen', a person able to resist exploitation, to innovate and...[defend] liberty. These two functions do not always sit easily together (DES, 1977, quoted in Pring, 1984).

Several strategies have been proposed for the implementation of spiritual and moral education. Downey and Kelly (1978) propose four possible strategies for the implementation of moral education in schools: a specific, timetabled, subject 'Moral Education'; through broadening the scope of the existing curriculum to include a moral dimension; through pastoral care supplementary to the existing curriculum; and through the school community. In considering the teaching of spiritual values Plunkett (1990) outlines a similar range of strategies and draws up the advantages and disadvantages of each. Discussing the use of the curriculum for teaching spirituality, for example, he states:

...a pupil will often learn thinking skills, aesthetic standards, religious values, healthcare, interpersonal qualities, and so forth, not from a specific subject but from the pervasiveness of multiple and often uncoordinated inputs into the total programme...The curriculum has become an instrument of economic and social policy when it should be just as much a spiritual celebration of humanity's inner and outer beauty (Plunkett, 1990, pp.128-9)

As Dillon and Maguire have pointed out, most schools pursuing the implementation of SMSC have done so through the writing of a policy statement (1997, op. cit.). The hope is that this is in some way incorporated into the 'ethos' of the school, a factor of agreed significance by all interested parties (SCAA, 1996, p.11). Citizenship education and PSE(PSHE) is also seen by many as playing potentially significant roles in the implementation of this policy (SCAA, 1996, pp.14-16), though some of the recommendations have already been implemented with as yet inconclusive results.

One issue that has been discussed in relation to values is the 'hidden curriculum'. Carr and Landon (1999) discuss the various senses in which values are thought to be hidden in the hidden curriculum, such as being a part of unofficial knowledge, being implicit, spontaneously emerging or being deliberately concealed (ibid). In order to understand their role in the hidden curriculum they develop a concept of values as 'principled dispositions or preferences conducive to the promotion of defensible goals or individual and social flourishing' (ibid, p.24). It is this practical nature of values that makes their concealment possible; they are hidden in practices which do not require that they be made explicit verbally (except, ironically, when those same practices are brought into question), which also makes their deliberate concealment possible by those who do not want the practices of the institution

to be too closely scrutinised (ibid). They disparage both conservative and liberal views on the values of the hidden curriculum based on a ‘weak consensus’ and call for a more robust commitment to inquiring into the ‘*objective* truth’ of judgements made on the basis of these values (ibid, pp.26-27).

2.8.3 Values and Character Education

Peters (1981) examines the apparent paradox that exists between following rules and traditions in order to arrive at a rational moral position. He draws finally on Aristotle’s dictum (Nicomachean Ethics, book II, chapter 3-4) that ‘the virtues we get by first exercising them...we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts’. In the context of educating children in morality, Peters claims that ‘it is only if habits are developed in a certain kind of way that the paradox of moral education can be avoided in practice’ (ibid, 1981, p.60). What this way is, is beyond the scope of philosophy, but empirical evidence from psychology suggests that the existence of a loving and trusting relationship between parents and children is an important factor (ibid, p.54).

For some, the role that it was hoped that values education would play within the life of schools has largely been filled by citizenship education. There have been a number of critiques of citizenship education, but Kristjansson (2002) advances a critique from the perspective of a style of character education known as ‘non-expansive character education’, one which he maintains the proponents of that style have not themselves thought through or taken advantage of. Kristjansson’s first charge (ibid, p.209) is that the concept of democracy implied in citizenship education is a particularly Western and liberal one.

McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) introduced a distinction into values education between ‘non-expansive character education’ and ‘expansive character education’. Kristjansson (2002) refined those definitions, showing that while both employ *methodological substantivism* – basically a mixture of teaching methods – non-expansive character education takes an approach that he terms *moral cosmopolitanism*, the teaching of ‘transcultural values and ‘moral basics’’, whereas expansive character education takes an approach which he calls *moral perspectivism*, the teaching of a highly selective range of values (ibid, pp.209-10). Citizenship education, according to Kristjansson, ‘constitutes a quintessential programme of expansive character education’. The values with which Citizenship is concerned are those of ‘democracy’, but not only with the transmission of facts about these values but the inculcation of these values through ‘an extensive programme of character moulding’ (ibid).

Kristjansson then raises his major objection to Citizenship education which is that it ‘politicises values education beyond good reason, by assuming that political literacy and specific (democratic) social skills, rather than the transcultural ‘moral basics’, are the primary values to be transmitted’ (ibid, p.212). There is a danger implicit in the programme of citizenship in that ‘the emphasis on this new foundation subject runs the risk of overshadowing and sidelining the necessary core of all values teaching, including justice teaching, namely, the inter-human psychological capabilities and moral virtues that lay the basis for social and political skills. To put it bluntly, the danger is that the cart will be put before the horse’ (ibid, p.212).

Kristjansson (2002, pp.214-216) moves on to detail three specific areas of disagreement between citizenship education and non-expansive character education. First, citizenship privileges the ‘right’ over the ‘good’, employing a more deontologically based concept of justice, in which moral goodness is subservient to social institutions and particularly the notion of ‘rights’. Non-expansive character education, on the other hand, asserts that justice and other values are fundamentally ‘personal virtues’ before they come to have social and institutional significance for the individual. Secondly, non-expansive character education is pluralist to a wider range of political settlements than the narrower democratic, rights-based view of citizenship, but is less accepting of a plurality of lifestyles. The value of tolerance is not given primacy to the extent that it is in citizenship, but non-expansive character education can countenance the idea of personal and communal justice existing even under conditions of unjust government, the corollary being that social justice can exist only where just individuals hold sway. The third disagreement is over the relationship between morality and politics. Kristjansson (ibid) perceives the danger of citizenship education is that primacy is given to the political over the moral, the latter becoming in some way derivative. He believes this would overturn almost the entire philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle who considered the morality of the individual logically anterior to the social virtues.

Darom considers another distinction, or tension, that arises in implementing the education of values in school. He begins (Darom, 2000, p.16) by contrasting the often conflicting views of humanistic education and values education. He states that humanistic education ‘focuses on the individual whose growth and development, needs and aspirations are considered paramount in all educational processes’. By contrast, values education ‘emphasises involvement with others – individuals, communities, society – commitment and social action’

(ibid). Darom sees his task as integrating these two perspectives within a common humanistic values education.

Darom (2000) looks at the interdependence of four aspects of education, the cognitive, affective, values and behaviour. 'Education can thus be considered a system having four sub-systems, every one of which plays an equally decisive part in the system as a whole. If any one of them is neglected, the whole educational process is incomplete...By striving for the fullest possible integration of these four domains...education has a chance of truly touching young people, of sowing seeds of intellectual and moral honesty and personal commitment' (ibid, p.20). In particular, an individual's value system has three components: personal, interpersonal and social values. 'These three are an indivisible whole; a structure whose stability – whose very existence – depends on their more or less successful blending' (ibid).

There seems a relative consensus that values education should take a holistic approach to educating the whole person, addressing the various dimensions of human life such as the social, spiritual, economic and political spheres, the academic, physical and cultural skills, and the individual, interpersonal and collective levels. On that basis Darom's distinction between humanistic education and values education seems superficially redundant; however, it alludes to an issue already discussed, in 2.8.2, that of the dichotomous purpose of education: whether it is preparation for a critical evaluation of, or for participation within, the existing social and economic order. This research does not seek to answer that question, except inasmuch as it bears upon the related issue of the balance between the desire of agencies within society to inculcate their values and the desire of individuals to freely acquiesce in the values that seem in their own – hopefully enlightened – interest.

2.8.4 Tradition and Values

In the first of the Richards Peters lectures in 1985, Alasdair MacIntyre sounded a pessimistic note about the future of education. 'Teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity' (MacIntyre, 1987, p.16), he opined, meaning that they are both at the forefront of the effort to maintain that culture and that their efforts are destined to fail. MacIntyre believes that the task which we have set for teachers is impossible to accomplish 'because the two major purposes which teachers are required to serve are, under the conditions of Western modernity, mutually incompatible' (ibid). These purposes are, first, to educate a young person to take up a role in social and economic life, a role pre-determined by that society;

and, secondly, to educate the young how to think and to gain intellectual autonomy. However,

[T]hese two purposes can be combined only if the kind of social roles and occupation for which a given educational system is training the young are such that their exercise requires, or is at least compatible with, the possession of a general culture, mastery of which will enable each young person to think for him or herself (ibid, p.16).

The coexistence of these two requirements can only occur, MacIntyre is arguing, only where there exists what he terms an 'educated public'. There have been times in history when such an educated public has existed, for example in France, England and America, and the case he cites is the Scotland of the eighteenth century enlightenment. But 'as a matter of contingent fact specifically modern post-enlightenment societies and cultures now exclude the conditions which make this coexistence possible' (ibid, p.17). MacIntyre locates the conditions for the existence of an educated public in the contingent existence of a consensus on procedures and institutions for the conduct of rational debate, marked by an 'agreement to participate in a particular ongoing debate, [where] allegiance to the purposes of the debate would have to be as important to the participants as their allegiance to their own point of view' (ibid, p.33). It is the existence of these particular conditions that MacIntyre considers to have vanished with the advent of modernity. One of the causes of that dissolution is the sweeping of intellectual discourse from the broader society into the realm of 'professionalized and specialized academic discipline[s]' (ibid):

[T]he possibility of thinking for oneself, other than as a professional specialist, only opens up in the context of a certain type of community and that ... kind of community is no longer available, indeed has not been generally available to post-Enlightenment culture for quite some time (ibid, p.34).

He considers the one possibility of returning to such a culture is an education in which the reading of the Greek political and philosophical texts is central.

The return to an intellectual tradition is one of the ongoing dialogues in the philosophy of education. This dialogue which began in Britain really with the publication of MacIntyre's book *After Virtue* (1981) has been paralleled in America with cultural critiques such as T. S. Eliot's *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* (1962) and Alan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* (1987). Commenting on MacIntyre's Richard Peters lecture, Haydon considers that:

It has sometimes seemed that either education, in transmitting values, will merely be an agency by which the domination of one cultural tradition over others is sustained; or that, in attempting to avoid that outcome, it will leave the way open to a scepticism about whether moral values and ethical life have any meaning at all it may be that [there is] an understanding of the ethical life that allows us to make realistic sense of a third possibility: that it is indeed part of the business of education to sustain the ethical life, but in a way that can embrace pluralism within the ethical life. If this is not a possibility, perhaps MacIntyre's pessimism will be justified after all (Haydon, 1987, p.12).

There are those, naturally, for whom the fragmentation of tradition is seen as both a natural and a positive development. Mendus traces the arguments of MacIntyre, Bloom and Eliot back to a 'myth of the fall' and a golden age when traditions were intact. She rejects this view, partly because it was a myth, and rejects the call for a return to the past because of 'a belief that the past is not as good as it is said to be, and ... the belief that such a return is, where not possible, intellectually disreputable' (Mendus, 1992, p.182). She claims that the return to such a mythical golden age requires 'an innocence that we no longer have and which we can only 'regain' by intellectual deception' (ibid). Mendus locates the source of this inauthenticity in the idea that the solutions to the problems of our age and, necessarily the problems of education, lie in a transcendental realm. Her own view is that modernity is characterised by 'reflective consciousness' and that education should be fostering that capacity in the young, not cultivating an inordinate respect for tradition. Education 'must, of course, appeal to the past. But it must also remember that we possess the past; the past does not possess us, and our task now is not to return to a lost world, but to seek and create a new one' (ibid).

Responding to Mendus, Jonathan questions whether the crisis in education brought about by the fragmentation of value resulting from the relentless assault of critical rationality can really be solved by more of the same (Jonathan, 1993, p.171). While accepting that the supposed homogeneity of the pre-modern world is frequently exaggerated, she argues that one of the consequences of relentless criticism is a 'quantitative and exponential increase in the rate of cultural fragmentation [that] has resulted in a qualitative change both in the social world and for the developing individual' (ibid, p.173). While Jonathan does not suggest that the solution to this crisis is a return to tradition as such, she warns that the predicament that is already engulfing modernity cannot be resolved by continuing the same emphasis within liberal education (ibid, p174); otherwise, the result will be a social relativism in which the individual good is only that which the individual chooses and the social good reduced to that which allows the individual such latitude (ibid, p176).

Mendus' stance that a return to a more innocent, traditional view of the world is 'intellectually disreputable' I understand but find overstated. Ricoeur (1967), for example, maintains that while fully cognisant of the facticity of the historical origins of founding myths, indeed because we are so aware, we are, nevertheless, able to enter into a state of '*second naivety*' that is as profound as the 'first naivety' but richer because it is based on knowledge and conscious decision, rather than ignorance and uncritical acceptance. Moreover, Gadamer (1994, p.298) argues that it is the *temporal distance* between the events in mythic time to which a text refers and the present that creates the possibility for the discovery of truth, through a fusion of the *horizon* of the present with the horizon of the text. The culture of modernity, if it anywhere exists outside of university departments, is characterised by a lack of a socially cohesive worldview. But on the very grounds of rationalistic critique, such a worldview cannot exist, except perhaps in the reductive caricature that Jonathan outlines, where we are all thrown into a state of moral solipsism. Yet, both intellectually and intuitively we accept the existence of society, which means we uncritically accept a type of myth. Within all social institutions, including educational institutions, a plurality of myths are fostered, *many of which embody the core values of the institution*. Many of those are held in a state of 'second naivety' in which they are half-believed but fully endorsed; in many of the most enduring and adaptable institutions these myths are reinterpreted into new and shifting contexts without dissolving the integrity of their mythic core.

2.8.5 Values and wellbeing

The issue of student wellbeing and its relationship to values education has emerged as a focus for educators in the early twenty first century. Much of this development has been focused in Australia where the government has been promoting a programme of values education based on a set of 9 common Australian values that define citizenship in the nation and in a global community, a programme that each state and territory education board is following, although the actual policies and methodologies are being left to each area, and even each school, to define, mixing cross-curriculum and stand-alone approaches (Lovat, 2010, pp.3-7). The intellectual paradigm that supports this programme is the 'double helix effect', which asserts, based on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, that the goals of 'learning implied in quality teaching (intellectual depth, communicative competence, empathetic character, self-

reflection) [are] more readily and easily achieved in the learning ambience created by values education' (Lovat, *ibid*, p.7). The programme thus sets out to achieve benefits in two spheres: that of individual wellbeing and a reinvigorated sense of citizenship and, presumably, national engagement.

Although the model of values education is openly declared to be one of inculcation at the classroom level (*ibid*), which has its critics and detractors, the organisation is locally based and proceeds with full student involvement. In schools which are operating these programmes there are four main components: a common language of values and shared expectations about personal and interpersonal behaviour that lie at the core of the school's values education programme; a positive dynamic in the teacher-pupil interaction; the modelling of appropriate and expected behaviour by teachers; and the incorporation into the programme of an external service project that provides an opportunity for pupils to be involved in a public good (Toomey, 2010). Through this, in addition to the 'double helix effect', there is also a 'troika effect' emerging from the relationship 'between values education, quality teaching and service learning' (*ibid*, p.20). Students are involved in the establishment of this structure at an early stage through Student Action Teams that identify a need in the local community and plan a strategy and action programme of engagement (*ibid*). Toomey asserts that this is pedagogically sound and evidence-based as it has been shown to provide a sense of empowerment through taking initiative, social bonding through teamwork, and a sense of self-worth through giving to others.

By contrast with the Australian experience with values education, which seems to be affirmative, progressive, incremental and joined up, balancing political will with local initiative, and based on cumulative evidence from pilot schemes and scientific evidence, the experience with values education in the UK seems to be an object lesson in how not to approach it (Haydon, 2010). As in Australia, it was a perception that values relativism was an underlying problem of social ills that prompted attempts to discover shared values that could be taught in schools. In 1996 the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) convened the National Forum on Values in Education and the Community, bringing together some 150 people from organisations representing all sectors of society. Their brief was to arrive at a consensus of values that were shared across British society. They came up with a Statement of Values that is now appended to the National Curriculum (National Forum on Values in Education and the Community, 1997). However, its recommendations, and that of subsequent policy initiatives in this area, were never given statutory force, and uptake has

been left almost entirely to individual schools (Haydon, 2010; Hawkes, 2010). Instead, values education in the UK has followed the twin paths of PSHE and Citizenship Education, which Haydon (2010) argues has compartmentalised wellbeing and personal responsibility, unlike the programme of values education in Australia, which has integrated these two functions effectively.

Being based on a consensus model, the values the NFVEC's Statement contains have a tendency to be generalised expression of values-based intent rather than very specific named values as in the case of the Australian government's National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). My own view is that this different approach may have resulted from different perceptions of where the problem of value relativism lay. During the twentieth century Australian schooling abandoned its original charter to teach values and became values-neutral (Lovat, 2010), effectively removing standards against which pupil behaviour could be judged. The move to values education is thus a recovery of its original intent. By contrast, British schools have largely maintained a tradition of values education through RE and more recently through PSE/PSHE, although the 1988 Education Reform Act clearly intended to enshrine this function in law (Great Britain, 1988). The problem of value relativism, therefore, is more likely to have been located in society as a whole rather than in education in particular, and for this reason the response more diffuse and ambivalent.

2.8.6 Emerging themes within the educational discourse

Having reviewed the literature around values education and the formal education system in the UK, a number of themes have begun to emerge, prominent among which are: the source of values; the degree of autonomy/control over the curriculum; the rationale, reason or role of values education; the medium for values education and the strategy for implementation of a values education programme; the dimensions of values education; the degree of integration, both internal and external, of programmes; and conflicts, antimonies and unresolved aspects of values education. Each of these themes will be considered, synthesising information from the literature considered.

2.8.6.1 Sources of institutional values

Religion and faith communities: Macmullen (2006, p. 603) argues that religious education and religious upbringing together provide the basis for an ‘ethical autonomy’ although this needs to be conducted within the context of rationality rather than dogmatic faith. While rejecting the aspect of religious observance in schools as divisive, Ward (2008) recognises the higher moral standards of faith schools as something that should be aspirational. Like Macmullen (2006) he believes that pupils should be taught about religions within a framework of rational inquiry. Halstead (2007) has a radically different perspective. Schools, he proposes, should support the religious observance and identity of the home and faith community through an inter-faith ethos built on the foundation of the British cultural values of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and respect.

Traditions: Traditions are longstanding institutionalised behaviours, in which values – often implicit – are embedded, that are passed to succeeding generations. Clearly, religious beliefs and practices are an important source of values and traditions for many institutions, including schools, though McIntyre (1987), Eliot (1962) and Bloom (1987) all refer to an intellectual tradition in which the reading of the classics is fundamental.

Government initiatives: Government has always had a measure of interest in the moral as well as the academic education of children (Arthur, n.d.), but it was only with the Education Reform Act (1988) that it started to play a more active role in promoting values within education. Apart from Religious Education, provision of which is mandatory for all schoolchildren up to 16, most schools, including independents, have some form of Personal, Health and Social Education (PSHE), although the contents are not mandated, and Citizenship, which is (until 2014) a part of the NC.

Local communities: Pring (1986, p.182) argues that values, rather than being absolute or universal, the result of a rational analysis, are rooted in the particular view of a society and the moral decisions it makes, and in the local, historically conditioned communities that engender and introduce the rising generation into a ‘valued form of life’.

2.8.6.2 Degree of autonomy/control over the curriculum

There are a number of parameters through which the degree of autonomy or control over the curriculum, including the provision for values education, can be ascertained, though they tend to converge upon particular modes – what might be referred to as models – of governance. For example funding, status with regard to the National Curriculum and ability to select are

parameters of control which are, in theory, independent of each other, yet tend to be highly ideological markers of the to-and-fro of policy-making. State schools, including both community schools and VC and VA faith schools, follow the National Curriculum, have local government oversight and funding and, apart from the few remaining state grammar schools, are non-selective. Independent schools are self-governing and financing, are not required to follow the NC, although many opt to teach some parts of it, and are completely selective.

Specifically regarding values education, as this is not included in the NC and the only requirement of Ofsted is that the spiritual needs of pupils are being met, this gives schools a relatively free hand in how and to what degree they meet this requirement. Clearly, faith schools of all types are committed to giving a religious education, both doctrinal and experiential, to their pupils. There are also a small but growing number of ‘values schools’ (part of a movement for values education rather than an officially-recognised designation), whose syllabus, pedagogy and daily routines are built around a set of core values (VbE, 2014).

2.8.6.3 Rationale, reason or role of values education

Rationale, reason and role are not identical, but they bear a close relationship, rationale being closer to an explicit justification – often requiring documentation, such as a policy statement (Dillon and Maguire, 1997) – and role more of an implicit, understood purpose or function. The reasons given for values education are advanced more philosophically and address the moral requirements of society. For Pring (1986, p.182) that is the creation and perpetuation of the ‘form[s] of life’ that society considers ‘valuable’; for Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) it is to promote ‘excellence in the life of virtue’. The SCAA cites a more pragmatic and pressing reason: to address parents’ perception of apparent decline in the ‘moral standards...among young people’ (SCAA, 1996, p.8).

2.8.6.4 Medium and implementation of values education

The process of implementation of values education begins with an impetus and that seems to derive mostly from the public, represented particularly by those who are most directly involved, that is, the parents of children within school (SCAA, 1996). But a secondary driving force is also the inspection regime initiated in conjunction with the National Curriculum, Ofsted, which as part of its responsibilities checks for the provision of Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural education; but while it can recommend, there is no statutory

requirement for schools to have a policy in place (Hawkes, 2010). Implementation of a values education policy has three steps: a period of consultation; a rationale for the policy; and an implementation strategy (Dillon and Maguire, 1997). There are three basic strategies to implement a values education programme: through the curriculum, through pastoral care and through the whole community (Downey and Kelly, 1978); moreover, there is a decision whether to have a separate timetabled subject within the school curriculum or to adapt the existing curriculum. Bigger and Brown (1999) advocate a cross-curricular implementation of values education, but many schools favour a whole school approach of embedded values. The experience from Australia shows both approaches can work (Lovat, 2010). Pring (1984), though, doubts the cross-curricular approach and favours more the transmission of a core of values through the general ethos of the school and ways of teaching. Increasingly, there is also recognition that non-curricular and non-directive aspects of school life, the so-called ‘hidden curriculum’, also play a part in the education of values (Carr and Landon, 1999).

2.8.6.5 Dimensions of values education

There is near universal agreement that values education is a complex phenomenon, interwoven into all strands of the educational process, which needs to address the multi-dimensionality of human life as well as that of the social institutions of schooling. Darom (2000) attempts to encapsulate this within four educational sub-systems, that of the cognitive, affective, behavioural and values, the latter which is itself comprised of personal, interpersonal and social values. This, though, is a predominantly psychological reading of the issue. A differing interpretation, although I prefer to see it as complementary, is that offered from a socio-cultural perspective, that of the ‘ends’ of education – individual wellbeing and the public good – and the ‘means’ of education – the infrastructure, materials and processes necessary to promote the values within the cultural spheres of the political, economic, moral and spiritual (Plunkett, 1990; Dillon and Maguire, 1997; Aspin and Chapman, 2000; Darom, 2000; Kristjansson, 2002; Haydon, 2010).

2.8.6.6 Degree of integration – internal and external – of programmes

To speak of a programme being integrated means that the various aspects such as the rationale for implementing the programme, the medium or means for delivering it, the people and agencies bringing their various skills to the programme, and means of assessing the outcomes, are part of a strategic oversight, both within an institution and in relation to the wider society. By this measure, the development of values education within state education in

the UK has to be considered to be poorly integrated. There has never been a fully developed strategic view, and even when the prospects for one seemed at their highest in the late 1990s, the proposals were watered-down and eventually led to a series of recommendations and a fairly weak assessment regime (Hawkes, 2010). The approach has rather been piecemeal, perhaps reflecting a national unease about ideologically-driven or inculcatory approaches to values. Values education in the past would have been delivered through Religious Education or some form of Moral Education, but the moral content of RE at least has been somewhat attenuated through the focus upon appreciating cultural difference and the differing cultural experience (Barnes, 2011). There has been an attempt to introduce values education and character education through PSHE and Citizenship (Arthur, n.d.), but Haydon (2010) has argued that this approach has effectively compartmentalised well-being and personal responsibility. Moreover, Kristjansson (2002) criticises Citizenship for giving precedence to political values over moral ones. By contrast, ‘values schools’ and others that have implemented explicit values education policies have tended to have integrated approaches consisting of such things as core values and a values language promoted throughout the school, common behavioural expectations and reflective practice (Hawkes, 2010). In Australia, the government has taken the initiative in promoting ‘Australian values’ through various state sponsored programmes. Although the specifics of the programmes are decided at regional and even school level they have common features: they are based on psychological and neuroscientific evidence that the combination of quality teaching and values education promotes good learning and personal outcomes (Lovat, 2010); and they consist of four essential elements of a language of values and expectations, positive relations between teachers and pupils, appropriate modelling of behaviour by teachers and the incorporation of an external service project (Toomey, 2010).

2.8.6.7 Conflicts, paradoxes and unresolved aspects of values education

Actual programmes of values education often fall short of the complex multidimensionality outlined in section 2.865, being too limited, too tentative or too partial. However, these are problems essentially of implementation. There are also unresolved theoretical issues, though some arise out of ideological differences or simply lack of empirical data.

A number of commentators have pointed out various paradoxes in the overall moral purpose of education today. MacIntyre (1987, p.16), echoing a cautionary note sounded by the DES in 1977 (cited in Pring, 1984), sees a fundamental contradiction between education as

preparation for working in the economy and education for intellectual autonomy. The Australian experiment with values education programmes, though it is young, seems to be confounding such pessimistic views and showing that all aspects of pupils' lives can be enhanced. Perhaps values education does, as Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) argue, 'humanise the curriculum', meaning that it allows all dimensions of human experience to be integrated through practices. Not everyone is convinced of this. Foster (2001), for example, maintains that the openly inculcatory practices of many programmes such as those in Australia undermine some fundamental democratic assumptions.

Implicit in this discourse is the fundamental pedagogical conflict over whether education, and specifically values education, should be achieved through a process of inculcation, in which weight is given to the educator of a given set of values – political, religious or traditional – or through a process of acquisition, in which weight is given to the acquirer of values, probably by some form of self-realisation. My starting assumption would be that inculcation and acquisition both play some role in the transmission of values, and this research will test that assumption in the process of identifying a mechanism for transmission.

Both Mendus (1992) and Jonathan (1993) see the incommensurability of critical rationalism with the existence of a tradition, though they evaluate this conflict differently, the former a more strident rationalist and the latter a more concerned rationalist. Certainly to my satisfaction, though, tradition and reason seem to find a resolution within the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1994) and Ricoeur (1967), in Gadamer's idea of the fusion of the horizon of the past with the horizon of the present, and Ricoeur's concept of the re-mythologised 'second naivety'.

In this context it is worth mentioning the clash between faith and reason, which seems to be one of the recurrent motifs within education with direct relevance to values education, as discussed in section 2.81. There seems to be a default assumption that reason prevail, a position that I have strong sympathy with; yet, the dangers of over-rationalisation have been made clear, by Jonathan (1993) amongst others. Faith has played, and continues to play in my estimation, an important role in the cultural life of societies; it should be shaped and controlled by reason, but not consumed in a firestorm of reason. All values, including faith and reason, should be self-replenishing in stable, balanced and dynamic societies. However, our institutions should be multi-valued, not mono-valued, whether that be faith or reason or some other, although there is a good case, I believe, for institutions to be disposed to holding

to particular *sets* of values, and these differently-valued institutions competing in the social arena.

Peters (1981) brings attention to a fundamental antinomy in moral education between following rules and a rational morality and locates its possible resolution in parental upbringing (ibid), something that finds empirical support in the research on intergenerational transmission of values (Schoepflug, 2001a; Euler et al., 2001; Barni et al., 2011). It boils down to, as Brighouse (2006, cited in Haydon, 2010, p.198) says, living it ‘from the inside’.

Finally, Pring (1986) raises again the thorny issue, considered also in 2.3.4, of the paradox that the social values that are considered fundamental to social life – and in that sense absolute – are, nonetheless, locally and historically conditioned. In an interview that I conducted with him on 11th September 2009, Pring reiterated much the same view, which is that the development of a person’s values is contingent upon the nature of the community or communities in which they are raised, and this issue cuts to the question of the nature of community that schools should embody in order to transmit the appropriate values to the next generation. Pring seems to believe that the resolution of this implicit relativism, which particularly troubles moral philosophers such as MacIntyre (1981), lies somewhere between reasoned debate, an appeal to the intrinsic worth of human life and the requirement of social continuity: ‘You’ve got to create the kind of communities in which the values which are humanly important to provide social cohesion...are somehow embodied and these young people are introduced to them’. I hold essentially the same position as Pring on this, although I suspect that the conflict of values plays a more significant role than he allows and perhaps reasoned debate less than we would like (citation from interview used with approval of interviewee).

2.9 Summary and Implications for Research Methodology

The theory chapter is concerned with both a review of the relevant literatures of the fields denoted in the introduction and the development of the theoretical underpinnings of the entire research project. It is divided into three parts. The first part considers the limitations of the debate within the philosophy of value in terms of six ‘antinomies’ and attempts to resolve some of those difficulties through a concept of values derived from phenomenological and semiotic perspectives. In the second part various theories of interpersonal transmission, social transmission and institutional transmission are evaluated, in order to understand the important parameters of transmission that are likely to play a part in the formation of a theory of

institutional values transmission. The third part considers major themes that have emerged in the academic debates on and around values education during the last fifty years, such as governance, curriculum, character, tradition and wellbeing and pedagogy, both for theoretical relevance and strategic planning and preparation for the field research phase.

Important themes have started to emerge from a consideration of the literature. The first is the importance of a joint phenomenological and semiotic approach to values, which suggests the equally important role this approach is likely to play in attempting to model institutional values transmission, and important concepts such as interiority and exteriority and invocation and evocation. The second, through a consideration of the literature of transmission, is the importance of authority and power at the institutional level, and interpersonal relationships. A number of themes were considered in the last section, on the educational discourse around values, notably the sources of values to be found in schools, the degree of autonomy a school has in determining its values education programme, the rationale for implementing a programme of values education or the role that it is considered to have in school life, the medium by which desired values are transmitted, and the psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of values education, all of which will be helpful in orienting research in the field and may contribute to an understanding of the mechanism of values transmission within schools.

Any theory which hopes to deepen understanding of institutional values transmission will need not only to address the issues raised in this chapter, such as value transmission at the interpersonal level, the broader social dimensions of transmission and the institutional arrangements of schools in dealing with values education, but to demonstrate that they are interconnected. To be valid in more than just a parochial setting it must be shown to be robust across a number of cases and have features that are generalisable across a broader range of organisations. In chapter 3 I will look at the methodological considerations that had to be taken into account in undertaking such this research, some of the methodological challenges in the field and the decisions that were taken.

In this chapter the methodological considerations brought to bear in this research are reviewed, drawing on the relevant literature, and the parameters for this research set out. It covers its philosophical justification, the strategy, and the methodological decisions taken in the course of the research. The topics covered in this chapter are: basic challenges at the design stage; the structure of the research process; view of social reality; methodological approach and considerations of the field: the case for case studies; validity and reliability; data collection methods; data analysis; ethical guidance and ethical considerations. In designing this research Maxwell's (1996, pp.4-6) interactive model of research design, an 'interconnected and flexible' structure incorporating an ongoing dialectic between an 'external' programme consisting of the research question(s), purpose and conceptual context, and an 'internal' consisting of the research question(s), methods and validity was a particularly useful starting point.

3.1 Basic challenges at the design stage

Probably the central problematic of this entire period of study was to design a research process that was methodologically coherent, appropriate for the area and subject of concern, and could deliver reliable and valid findings. Two major factors had to be taken into consideration:

- 1) That there was a single overarching research question, but incorporating a number of interrelated secondary questions, each of which should be answered in the overall research.
- 2) That the structure of the research would need to incorporate both the evaluation of the plausibility of a philosophical proposition and the development of that proposition into a generalisable theory of social systems.

Before considering these factors in greater detail one other feature of the research should be addressed. In social research values are typically a given of the social systems being investigated. In this case values are the central focus of research, which renders it potentially foundational but also particularly vulnerable to self-fulfilling arguments and selective

evidence gathering. Therefore, it is of importance to lay out my personal motivation on entering the research field.

While values have always been central to philosophy, certain features of modernity have, in my opinion, made the critical reflection on values of utmost importance in a social context. This has less to do with the periodic crises that wrack our contemporary world, particularly in the Western (and westernised) societies, but more to do with a cumulative sense that the Enlightenment project has stripped away, and in the guise of postmodernism is continuing to strip away, all our former certainties: religious belief for sure, and with it much of the justification for moral imperatives and social virtues and that elusive quality referred to as the intrinsic worth of human being; but also in the supreme act of self immolation, the very foundations of emancipatory history itself: reason, the integrity of the human subject and the assumption of free will. This reduced metaphysics, while perhaps self-validating within the current scientific paradigms, not only impoverishes us spiritually and culturally, but also makes us more susceptible to economic and political manipulation. A commitment to placing values at the centre of social theory may help restore the human perspective which has been lost while remaining true to the liberating aspects of the Enlightenment.

Having made this stance, I recognise that there is a very strong motivation for verifying research demonstrating the reality and significance of values in social systems and that this constitutes a potential threat to validity. Therefore, all measures should be taken in the construction of the research to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings.

3.1.1 The research questions

To reiterate, the primary research question is:

How are values transmitted in an institutional setting?

and the four subsidiary questions:

- 1) **What is the nature of values?**
- 2) **What implications might a theory of values have on the understanding of issues of the acquisition and inculcation of values?**
- 3) **How do schools approach values education?**

4) What could constitute the theoretical basis of values education in formal education taking into account the broader context of the social and political demands on schools?

Chapter 2 focussed largely on the first and second of these subsidiary questions; this chapter is built more around answering, or setting up the conditions in order to answer, the third and fourth. Question 3 centres around the issue of gaining the right kind of data from the schools while question 4 is about the analytic tools that can lead from raw data to well-founded theoretical findings. This leads on to looking at the structural requirements and the actual structure of the research.

3.1.2 The structural requirements of the research

The research as a whole has attempted to introduce more philosophical insight into the concept of values within the social sciences and then to develop and investigate the plausibility of this conceptualisation in real-world contexts. Therefore, **the overall research structure is theory testing as well as theory generating**, having both deductive and inductive phases, locating itself somewhere between the positivist and social constructivist perspectives (Patton, 2002). There are reservations about such hybrid programmes and the methodological choices they imply (Guba and Lincoln, 1988), but Patton (2002) argues that any research programme is located along a deductive/inductive continuum and that human reason is sufficiently flexible to accommodate data from different sources and make reasoned arguments from it; moreover, the prejudice belies the fact that as methods transcend their origins and enter the mainstream of social research practice, they are as intrinsically adaptable as any other tool.

In what sense is the research process intended to be theory testing? In the hard sciences the criterion for testing has ranged between verifiability (the logical positivists, for example) and falsifiability (Popper, 1959), but both positions are premised on the notion that the observable parameters are small in number and can be constrained under experimental conditions. This is not realistic in the social sciences, as the observed phenomena are inherently complex; nor can they be sufficiently isolated. There is also the issue of *reflexivity*, in which the observer is inextricably bound up in the phenomena being observed. Therefore, strict criteria of verifiability or falsifiability are not appropriate. **What is appropriate is the conceptual plausibility of a theory supported by observational evidence within a methodological framework that is transparent and processes that are reliable**, a stance not very different to the paradigmatic concept of scientific research (Kuhn, 1962).

From the philosophical analysis of value, summarised in chapter 2, the concepts of *invocation* and *evocation* emerged as foundational in a deductive model of value transmission and thus as ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer, 1954) in the shaping and establishment of the research programme. In order to apprehend the reality of values transmission, though, and hence test the concept of transmission based on invocation and evocation for plausibility, within this quasi-experimental framework the methodological approach needed to be able to model real world institutions and capture their inner world. In doing so, the framework also became theory-generating. The process was, therefore, one of refinement, as the concept of value transmission was translated from a ‘thin’ philosophical proposition to a ‘thick’ social theory (Geertz, 1973).

3.2 The Structure of the Research

Based on the points discussed above, the need to both test theory and to generate theory, and also to build robust triangulation into the research methodology, I proposed a two tier approach, consisting of a core research aspect, which was be the main focus throughout, and a derivative hypothesis evaluation aspect, which played a supporting evaluative role in the overall research. The structure of the research is outlined in the following diagram.




Fig 05 Structure of the research

3.2.1 The Core Research

The core research was an inductive approach of data gathering from a sample of schools and through analysis of the data the formulation of theory from the emerging themes. This was guided by the concepts of invocation and evocation as sensitising concepts, as discussed above, which means, based on the idea of invocation, that I looked in particular at *the way in which values were communicated* throughout the school and from the school to the pupils, in the classroom but also in a more distributed way though the school as a whole. I was also

looking, based on the idea of evocation, at the ways in which the communication of values was linked with the idea of community and *the promotion of a communal ethos in the school*.

3.2.2 Derivative Hypothesis Evaluation

There is considerable controversy over whether hypotheses are allowable within qualitative analysis, as they are normally the preserve of quantitative analysis. However, Guest et al. (2012, p.7) describe a ‘confirmatory (hypothesis-driven)’ approach to qualitative data analysis. They argue that some exploratory qualitative approaches generate theory and grounded theory explicitly builds theoretical models, which are then tested; the implication is that these are points on a continuum. Confirmatory approaches tend to use existing data (ibid); in this case the data will be that generated by the core research.

The derivative hypothesis research consisted of ten hypotheses derived from the core concepts of invocation and evocation or from the arguments leading up to their derivation, concerning the nature of values. These hypotheses made predictions, based on the theoretical stance, about possible cognitive, behavioural and social consequences that should arise were the theory to be essentially correct. They were connected to the subsidiary research questions 1 and 2 with implications for question 3. Some of them, in principal, were thought to be empirically testable, although that was outside of the scope of this research; their plausibility, or otherwise, was evaluated in the data from the field, along with any themes emerging from the main research, though theoretical sampling. It was thought that this should result in a fairly straightforward indication of the likely validity of the theoretical assumptions, though neither this nor the core research would be able to demonstrate more than the plausibility of the mechanism for transmission that I intended to develop through this.

Each of the hypotheses is stated, and then its source in the theory located and any further explanation given. Hypotheses 1-5 proceed from the theory to address the more general philosophical implications of the theory; hypotheses 6-10 address the specific context of values education in schools based on the ontology of values outlined.

Hypothesis 1: Values do not precede social or moral behaviours. Rather they emerge in individual consciousness through the growing socialisation of the individual, through reflection upon experience in the context of a culturally transmitted narrative.

This is based on the idea of values as shared experience. Values as concepts can, of course, precede the practice of the virtuous behaviours that they name for any individual, but a value

as an acquired value is the conceptualisation of an experience shared with others in a professing community. This experience is only likely as the culmination of a process of acculturation into the norms and expectations of a given community, although the demands and initiation rites of social groupings vary considerably in terms of stringency, duration and formality, and hence of the commitment required. To profess a value is to accept the moral requirements of the value as requirements of oneself. To do otherwise is a logical contradiction.

Hypothesis 2: Once established, **values justify various behaviours, moral codes and worldviews**, though they do so most readily in a collective setting.

This is based on the idea that appropriated values coexist with closed social groups. Although values are acquired on the basis of the acceptance of particular social and moral norms, once acquired they become the ‘anchor points’ by which individuals justify the existence and maintenance of those very norms; this is true both for individuals and for groups. That to which one is both emotionally and conceptually wedded, which, as argued, is the nature of value acquisition, and additionally something in which one is socially participant, is an extremely stable stance psychologically and one from which it is very difficult to detach oneself. Even counter-factual evidence is likely to be interpreted in a favourable light to one’s communal stance.

Hypothesis 3: **There is no *a priori* hierarchy of values. A value is generated only by the naming of a shared experience.** While a value will be considered a good of a particular community, group or institution, there is no Archimedean standpoint from which to declare that one value is superior to another. The near universality of certain values and the marginalisation of others represents an *a posteriori* distributive outcome of a selection process, by which over time we have found that some values have proved a better fit to human society than others.

This is based on the ontological equality of values as conceptualised shared experience. It is not an argument that there is no priority of values as such, as experience strongly suggests there is, and even reason may dictate that, given the parameters of human nature and sociality, some values might be more probable than others; it is that this priority can really only be established empirically and that all values are potentially viable. While this introduces an element of relativism, it is more of a methodological relativism in determining the approach to the multiplicity of values that exists within social institutions in reality; its

position is more one of value pluralism, but one which posits an underlying convergence of all values in promoting the socialisation of the individual.

Hypothesis 4: **Knowledge of a value, or discussion about values, are different to their acquisition**, though the two things are always in an equilibrium of sorts. Knowledge and discussion take place in an open communicative system in which the function of language is conceptual, whereas acquisition takes place in a closed system, with a strong awareness of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in which the function of language is symbolic and performative.

This is based on the dual aspects of value, as concept-like and symbol-like. It reiterates the main points made in hypothesis 1, with a different emphasis. The stress is less on the acquisition of value and more on its ontological structure as language at the boundary between symbolisation (evocation through invocation) and information flow (through discourse). This makes possible both the commitment to values particular to specific contexts and the objectification of knowledge about those or other symbolic discourses through rational discourse.

Hypothesis 5: **All values** theoretically exist in a state of tension, as they **underlie fundamentally incompatible worldviews, or groups and institutions with competing or conflicting interests**. Paradoxically though, the stability of large and complex societies lies in maintaining and even strengthening a dynamic equilibrium between different outlooks on life based on different values that may be exclusive and incompatible.

This hypothesis makes a deduction from the ontology of values as shared experience within a closed communal structure, namely that commitment to a particular value (or set of values) is grounds for the dismissal of other values on the basis simply that they are not shared by the group in question, for example faith and reason. The paradox is that though this is the logic of values, the coexistence of incompatible values promotes value plurality under generally tolerant social circumstances and hence greater social integration. It also, from an evolutionary perspective, provides for greater adaptability of the society to change as a result of environmental stress.

Hypothesis 6: My analysis suggests that, **as reflection upon experience, values are likely to be a chronologically late mental acquisition**. Discussion of values or values clarification at this stage can mitigate the closed worldviews in which values are generated, by teaching us how to live in a multi-valued world. We learn to do this by negotiating an internal

compromise between values which are largely incompatible. **It is questionable whether it would be wise to expose young minds too early to the process of discussion of values or ‘values clarification’. It may in fact be counterproductive.**

This is based on the idea of values as conceptualised shared experience. On the basis of hypothesis 1, getting children to engage in values clarification is tantamount to asking them to decide on their own moral norms. The responsibility of any teacher is to transmit what they understand to be the best that their culture and society has to offer in terms of moral and behavioural standards, to model their own behaviour on that and to expect their students to meet those standards. Young people can be expected to encounter a number of alternative views of life, to apply rational discernment and to arrive at their own unique life-world. This process should not be short-circuited by asking them to decide based on very limited experience.

Hypothesis 7: The acquisition of values coincides with the mastery of a type of knowledge and the development of an internal reflective capability, such as moral or aesthetic sensibility. If this is so then **values education in its most general sense is only the application of the standards of good teaching across the curriculum, and does not entail a specific requirement that knowledge of values be taught.**

This is really a development of hypothesis 6. It does not preclude that values are taught, even explicitly. However, values should always be integrated into a practice, a practice which can generate the experience from which the acquisition of specific values can emerge. In other words young people can be taught values, but it would be a mistake to teach them *about* values in a decontextualised setting. There should be a place, though, for a sympathetic and empathetic comparison of the values of different cultures.

Hypothesis 8: **With regard to values education in the more specific sense of moral education**, there seems to me also no requirement that a timetabled subject with a curriculum entitled ‘moral education’ is needed. **What is needed above all is the assertion of standards of behaviour to which students should be required to conform.** This seems to me the basic requirement of any community, whether that be a school, or any other social grouping. The fact that, from a historical perspective, most standards of right and wrong that have been asserted can be seen to be relative is not very pertinent, for **the function of standards is always socialisation** leading to the acquisition of values. **The normative**

content of moral education must be to lead the individual away from a preoccupation with the self to others and the wider community.

This is based on the idea of value as shared experience within a closed community. This hypothesis really only reiterates what has been stated in hypotheses 3 and 7. The underlying ontology of all values is that of shared experience, leading the individual towards a more socially-oriented worldview. It is one of the important functions of schools that they create the circumstances in which their pupils experience participation in a communal framework that draws out broadminded and altruistic attitudes and a more socially-oriented mindset.

Hypothesis 9: For values to be acquired they must permeate the institution at all levels

This is again based on the idea of value as shared experience within a closed community. An institution is usually a complex social entity, being at the nexus of competing social forces and agendas, and having a stratified internal structure consisting of a number of levels and departments. Each level/department may have its own priorities and values unique to its specialisation. Some of those may be transmissible values, but some will be purely operational (instrumental). Values that the institution as a whole considers important and worth transmitting should be found at every level, from the most senior administrator/leader to the intended recipients: being mentioned, acted upon, signed, discussed and reflected upon.

Hypothesis 10: For values to be acquired they must be exemplified by those in authority

The notion of invocation, as previously discussed, implies the idea of charismatic authority. This authority is constituted in part by sign-acts that embody particular virtues, which contribute to the evocation of shared experience within a communal structure.

These ten hypotheses will not feature in the main research or in the findings which come out of it. They will be reserved for discussion in the evaluation of the research undertaken in the final chapter.

3.3 View of Social Reality

Since research must be carried out in the real world and data collection made in a defined field, the decision on a practical course of social research depends not only on the topic of research and the research questions but also on the philosophical perspective of social reality. Cohen and Manion (1989) outline four aspects of the view of social reality that the researcher has to settle before being able to decide upon a course of social research: the ontological

conception of social reality; the epistemological question of the source of knowledge about society; the nature and role of human consciousness; and, based on the aforementioned, the methods pursued in gaining data for social research. A similar set of requirements has been set out by Morgan and Smircich (1980) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). I will briefly discuss some of the views expressed in these areas before locating my views.

Social ontology has traditionally veered towards emphasising either social structure or social agency having primacy. A realistic stance would be that structure and agency both play a part, a view reflected in the work of most modern theorists, such as Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Giddens (1984). Searle (1995) asserts that social reality consists of both ‘observer independent facts’, such as matter and the forces of nature, and ‘observer related facts’ and describes social institutions as bearing ‘deontologies’, such as laws and obligations. According to Hodgson (2006, p.18), ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions’. Morgan and Smircich (1980) describe a continuum of assumptions about social reality, stretching from extreme subjectivist, where reality is a ‘projection of the imagination’, to extreme objectivist, in which reality is comprised of ‘concrete structures’. It seems a reasonable point to be located somewhere between these extremes. As Searle (1995) points out, social being is living among people and things, but it is also to be bound to and to interact with people and things in non-physical ways. However, I would locate myself slightly closer to the subjectivist side. In the same way that a sign, *qua* sign, is defined by its semiosis, not by the material substrate, so social institutions are more properly defined by their deontologies than by the ‘bricks and mortar’ or ‘flesh and blood’ in which they are housed. In terms of the development of values, the theoretical considerations undertaken in chapter 2 imply a philosophical primacy of human narrative interaction, but that the group structure arising through that interaction comes to take on a semi-autonomous existence, creating the social space in which the next ‘generation’ of agents interact, underlying the tendency of institutions both to persist and to change.

Just as there is a range of ontological stances on social reality, there is a range of corresponding epistemological stances on the source of knowledge about social reality that stretches from positivist through to anti-positivist. Positivism is the view that the only valid source of knowledge is the scientific method. In sociological terms this would imply an empirical approach to social research and a reliance on quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. Few sociologists would accept a purely positivist approach today, as many aspects of social reality are understood as constructed in the interaction between social

agents. Anti-positivism or subjectivism views social realities as entirely mentally constructed with no contribution from external, physical realities. This is the stance taken in post-structuralist, postmodern views of society (Crotty, 1998). For subjectivism meaning is individual and localised, so in terms of data gathering the preference is for qualitative methods like ethnomethodology (Stebbins, 1975). Between objectivism and subjectivism lie various forms of constructivism, which accepts that social reality is both generated and understood in terms of the interaction between the subject and the object, including other subjects. I would put myself largely in the symbolic interactionist camp, as that has been defined by Blumer (1986) in terms of three premises: ‘that human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them’; meaning [arises] ‘in the process of interaction between people’; and ‘the use of meanings by an actor occurs through *a process of interpretation*’ (ibid, pp.2-4, [italics original]). Symbolic interactionism has a strong correspondence with the view of value as arising through the conceptualisation of shared experience that I outlined in chapter 2 and the phenomenological and semiotic standpoint (Adler and Adler, 1994; Denzin, 1987) that I have declared.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) present four ‘paradigms’ of understanding social reality through organisational structure: the functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist. The radical paradigms are concerned with issues of social alienation, which lie outside the scope of this research, the focus of which is to develop an understanding of social process, in this case the transmission of values. The functionalist and radical structuralist paradigms share a structuralist ontology and positivist epistemology, but diverge in methodological orientation, functionalism being concerned with theory testing and radical structuralism with social critique. The interpretive paradigm, which seeks to understand the social world through the meanings arising through human interaction, is far more conducive to the research I am proposing.

From where I had located myself among the various alternatives, **the clear methodological choice was to design research in which qualitative research methods predominate** (Crotty, 1998). This choice needed to be justified, however, against a background in which there is a long-established tradition of quantitative research into values, for example that of Rokeach (1973) and the American Values Survey, and similar programmes that it has inspired. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, there was an element of theory testing proposed, through the secondary derivative hypotheses. I will respond briefly to those two points. First, as values are understood as being communicative (in a transitive sense) and

inherently transmissible, to understand the transmission of values it was necessary to investigate the structures of meaning that people employ in institutional interactions, and indeed this researchers own reflexivity on entering the field. This strongly biased the research towards a qualitative research methodology. Secondly, the criterion of testability in this research was neither verifiability nor falsifiability (Popper, 1959), but the weaker plausibility. If no evidence is found that specifically contradicts a statement, there is circumstantial support, and the statement falls within the parameters of generally agreed knowledge, then it can be considered plausible (Hill, 1965). Qualitative methods of data collection are sufficient to supply data adequate to establish plausibility.

3.4 Methodological approach and considerations of the field

3.4.1 Justification for Case Study Research

Although the case for qualitative research was clear, there were a number of options for the actual research approach. Qualitative research is a very broad term that covers a number of distinct methodological approaches and strategies which have in common a period of field work, an attempt to grasp a holistic picture of the phenomenon of interest, and a focus on the perceptions of the actors within the field of the phenomenon under investigation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Some were not deemed appropriate to the purpose of this research, for example action research and ethnomethodology, as the focus of this research was to locate structural constants in an educational process and a generalisable institutional theory. Some were more appropriate to the research, such as ethnography, mixed methods research and purely phenomenological and semiotic approaches. In the end I chose a case study approach because I felt it offered the best opportunity to model the institutions investigated as systems for value transmission and incorporate a mixed methods approach, including both phenomenological and semiotic analytic methods.

Because the case study can be regarded as a closed system (Bassegy, 1999), in which ‘The distinguishing feature...is the belief that human systems develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity and are not simply a loose collection of traits’ (Sturman, 1994, pp.61-6), this is consistent with the aim of modelling the institutions studied. There is also considerable flexibility in the format of case studies: a case can be an individual, group, an organisation or any other conceivable social unit; they can be for singular or for multiple cases; they are frequently longitudinal studies, but they can also be used for snapshots at a point in time (Rose, 1991). Case studies typically employ multiple methods as a means of triangulating

data and avoiding bias. They are also used as the basis for cross case analysis, which can proceed by replicating the format of a single in-depth study and seeking identical emergent features (Yin, 2009) or by comparison of a diverse range of cases. Case studies, unlike ethnographic approaches, also allow the incorporation of theory at the outset (Yin, 2009), rather than beginning with a presuppositionless collection of data. Given that the model of institutional values transmission should be robust across a range of variability, this suggested that the format of the research should be a number of case studies together with a cross case analysis.

Yin (2009, p.8) recommends case studies when the research aims are formulated as ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions, where no control is required over ‘behavioural events’ and the focus is on ‘contemporary events’. As the main research question concerned *how* values are transmitted institutionally, and the other research questions were subsumed within this, this made the case study approach a strong contender. Moreover, there was no requirement for behavioural control; rather, the purpose was to observe what was happening institutionally in order to understand the processes occurring and the structured meaning established through institutional interaction. The focus was also on contemporary events; some history may add interest or depth, but was of no relevance to the question of how values are transmitted institutionally. Therefore, case studies were an appropriate format for this research.

3.4.2 Type of Case Study

In the literature on case studies, there are a number of options as to the type of case study. For example Stake (1995) describes two possible formats: intrinsic and instrumental case studies. Merriam (1988) suggests descriptive, interpretive and evaluative forms. Yin (2009) also defines three basic types: explanatory, descriptive and exploratory. The best option for this research was the explanatory case study, which was appropriate to uncovering causal links in a process that might not have been accessible to other research methods (Yin, *ibid*). It could also have been considered an instrumental case study because it was being studied for a particular reason, to understand the nature of values transmission, rather than just for its intrinsic interest (Stake, 1995).

Other factors determined the nature of the case study to be constructed. One was the limitations imposed on the research in terms of time availability, which ruled out a longitudinal study in favour of a ‘snapshot’ view of the institution (Rose, 1991). Additionally, a longitudinal study would have thrown more light on the question of whether value

transmission had been successful than the mechanism by which it was occurring. Another factor was the nature of the sample. Dealing with separate schools entailed a multiple-case design rather than a single case. Yin (2009, pp.54-55) lays down a strict criterion for such multiple-case studies: the individual cases should be *replicating* each other, in order that commonalities in emergent features can be considered robust and that significant differences are accounted for within the design framework. In this research the individual schools, which constituted the cases, were all approached in the same manner: identical data collection methods were used (where variation was employed, rather than occurring in a few minor instances for reasons beyond control, it was strategic and used to test the robustness of findings) and the data were analysed by identical methods; any adjustments/correctives to the design made during the course of the fieldwork or analysis were subsequently incorporated into each case, following the linear-iterative process outlined by Yin (2009).

3.4.3 Decision on the Sample

The fourth of the research questions - **What could constitute the theoretical basis of values education in formal education taking into account the broader context of the social and political demands on schools?** – makes explicit that a sample of schools would constitute the field. But, what of the parameters of the sample: type of school, composition of student body and number? Silverman (2000) distinguishes between two types of sampling: purposive and theoretical. Purposive sampling means having a reason and certain criteria for choosing the sample, rather than random sampling. Theoretical sampling is similar, but the reasoning arises from theoretical considerations. In this research there were both purposive and theoretical aspects to the sampling decision. Formality was a constraint, which means that the schools should be publicly recognised educational institutions that fall within the purview of the government's educational oversight. The last part of the research question, however, refers to social and political demands as a context for variability, meaning that the sample should represent a range in terms of governance and constituency, as any model of institutional values transmission must be shown to be robust in the face of such variables. Examples of types of school and the factors relevant to governance were considered in chapter 2 (2.8.1). This opened up the range of schools considerably: state comprehensive, grammar, independent, faith, academy, specialist (such as Steiner), and now free schools. This had to be balanced against limitations of time and resources. Moreover, the specific requirements of the research did not indicate that a numerically large sample was called for, but rather a smaller sample of fairly in-depth studies. It was decided to limit the field to three

types of school: one faith school, one independent and one state comprehensive, in which a range of the variables related to governance, shown in the table on page 51, were present.

Regarding the composition of the student body, one of the implications arising from the theoretical arguments is that values are a relatively late stage development, emerging with the capacity for reflective consciousness. Therefore, the age range of the student body should be the same and the focus should be on secondary schools rather than on primary schools. Since the research question is neutral towards gender, ability/disability, sexuality and ethnicity, the decision was that the schools should be as inclusive as possible: mixed gender and reasonably representative of the youth population as a whole; partly because inclusion is a statutory requirement of all schools, but, more importantly, in order to throw the focus on those areas of autonomy of potentially particular relevance to any policy on the acquisition of preferred values, such as a religious worldview or a particular tradition. There was an expectation that sampling within the case should be representative of the case as a whole. The decisions of who would participate in the research was essentially taken out of my hands and decided by the schools. Across the participant schools, though, the sample was fairly representative.

3.5 Ethical guidelines and ethical considerations

The research followed the appropriate guidelines established by the British Educational Research Association (BERA, 2004) and the Code of Research Ethics for Derby University (2011), to the overall aims of non-maleficence and beneficence, particularly relating to the areas of informed consent, legal requirements in working with schoolchildren, bureaucratic burden, anonymity, privacy and confidentiality, respondent validation and data protection. It was felt that these would be the issues that would impact on the research as it is constituted. Examples of consent forms are in Appendix 1

Informed consent

All participants were aware of the nature of the research, at least their part in it and frequently the broader perspective. Interviewees explicitly gave their consent to be recorded. In regard to work in schools, it was the decision of the school whether in their judgement the parents of participating pupils needed to be informed. No coercion was applied to any participant or potential participant during any part of the research. Due to the theoretical nature of the analysis to which the data would be put, there was a limit to how informed participants were, but there were no issues of deception involved and no issues over which disclosure of the

general nature of the research compromised the research process. All participants and all participating institutions were informed of their right to withdraw from participation in the research process.

Protection of participants/ Legal requirements in working with schoolchildren

According to the guidelines, the research should pose no physical, psychological or emotional threat beyond that encountered in daily life. The research imposed no such dangers, being a series of interviews and observations in the schools in question. Surveys were carried out by the pupils' own teachers.

The legal requirement is that all people working with children over extended periods must have Criminal Record Board clearance. Whether the degree of contact in each case was covered by this requirement was decided by the schools in question, as was the decision on informing the parents of any children participating in the research. I informed the schools that I was CRB-checked and the schools made any arrangements with parents that they felt they needed to.

Bureaucratic burden

Clearly, any research introduces some burden onto a participating institution, but the research was designed not to impinge excessively on already busy schedules. The following is taken from a sample letter to a school.

The research is designed to be minimally intrusive and to disrupt the normal life and schedule of the school as little as possible. The important findings will hopefully emerge from the overlapping perspectives of the data generated.

The terms of research were discussed and negotiated with the school at the start of the process, and in each case a principal contact was appointed. Any changes and all stages of the research process were negotiated through that contact.

Anonymity, Privacy and confidentiality

All participants were ensured that their contribution to this research would be anonymous, all references to their institution and its location removed, and that casual references to objects, practices and structures, which could be easily traced through an internet search, would be suitably disguised as far as possible without distorting the data from the field.

School documents not in the public sphere and information communicated personally to the researcher by any of the respondents concerning the school, particular members of staff or pupils, are covered by the rules of privacy and confidentiality, and were only be used to the extent that they have a bearing on the research, whereupon they were covered by the rule of anonymity. Sensitive information brought to the attention of the researcher was not used unless it was integral to the research purposes, or if a request for non-inclusion was made by a participant.

Respondent validation and debriefing

Participants were informed at particular points in the processing of information in which they participated, such as the completion of transcription of interviews, and had an opportunity to view, comment and correct any errors or mistakenly identified views. Participants also had the opportunity to comment on analyses of data to which they had contributed. Feedback on the progress of the research was built into some of the research activities in the school. A final report was also submitted to the Head of the school for further distribution at their discretion.

Data Protection

All data sources were stored in at least one format. Original documents, photocopies of documents, field notes such as those recorded on interview questionnaires and observation sheets, and completed questionnaires were filed and shelved. Ring binders and box files were clearly labelled. The relevant data from these documents was collated into Word documents, stored in computer files. Cassette tapes made of the original interviews were stored in a box and shelved. Their contents were transcribed to Word documents. Later interviews were carried out using a digital recorder and directly transferred to MP3 audio files.

Many Word files, and all transcriptions, were backed up by a hard copy, filed as described above. All computer files relating to the research were backed up on a USB stick and a CD. In addition to the home computer disc drive, all the files relating to the research were duplicated on the researcher's personal computer at work, which was backed up daily on the company server. Particularly important information was emailed between the home and work addresses as an additional back up.

Although governed by conditions of anonymity and confidentiality, the nature of the research was not particularly sensitive, so no special security measures applied beyond the basic and

reasonable ones to protect loss of data. All computer and hard files at home were easily accessible by other members of the family, but reasonably secure otherwise. At work the computer on which the files were stored is password protected, so inaccessible to all but me. The USB and CD on which the files are backed up were kept in a safe place. A separate USB was used to move files between home and office, but only those files being actively worked on.

3.6 Validity and Reliability

The dual issues of validity and reliability are central to all research, in whatever field. Validity is fundamentally to do with the logical flow from premises to conclusions, that there is a line of reasoning and arguments connecting the initial hypotheses, data in the field and eventual findings in which no invalid steps are made. For empirical research, such as grounded theory based research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), the rooting of concepts and categories, leading up to theory, in the field data is of paramount importance for validity. Brindberg and McGrath (1985) argue that the meaning of validity undergoes a subtle shift at every stage of the research process; in research design it denotes the *coherence* of the various elements of the programme; in the process of empirical research it is the *correspondence* between the real world systems and conceptual development; and in interpretation and explanation it is the *robustness* and *generalisability* of the findings. Hammersley (1992, p.131) points out that the validity of research is established inter-communicatively rather than individualistically due to the role of the academic community in ‘checking the results of particular studies, and the fact that it deploys, or should deploy, a more sceptical form of assessment than is typical elsewhere’.

Reliability has to do with the robustness of the findings of a research programme. In the sciences the criterion of repeatability is the measure of the robustness of findings, whether an independent observer following the same process would arrive at the same conclusion. While the requirements of qualitative social science are not as stringent, there is a reasonable expectation that an independent researcher entering the field with the same methodology would be led to similar findings. A tradition of research has established a paradigm for research, within which reliable research is carried out. Kirk and Miller (1986) outline four stages in the development of any qualitative research programme: design, discovery, interpretation and explanation. Perfect validity can never be realised, but reliability, which is the basis of the validity of the research programme, can be established through the four

stages, each of which must be present in that order. In qualitative research there is great importance attached to field notes, not only as a record of the procedures which the research utilised, but also the greater context in which it took place, particularly the assumptions, prejudices, values, behaviour and experiences of the observer, which are considered part of the relevant 'theories' in play, in addition to the purely academic theories to which the observer claims allegiance (Kirk and Miller,1986).

For this case study based research I drew on the definitions of validity and reliability given by Yin (2009), as they are systematic, clear, detailed and specific; moreover they are allied to 'tactics' (ibid, pp.40-41) which are demonstrable and checkable. Yin describes four criteria for the production of high quality case study: *construct validity*, *internal validity*, *external validity* and *reliability* (ibid). I will consider each of these in turn and explain how these criteria were met within this research.

3.6.1 Construct Validity

Construct validity means establishing the proper procedures within the research programme to enable the aims and objectives of the research to be met, that is the research questions to be answered. Yin (2009) suggests three tactics: the use of 'multiple sources of evidence'; establishing 'a chain of evidence'; and allowing participants in the research to review drafts of the study. In this research a mix of data collection methods was employed (discussed in section 3.7), leading to the creation of evidence from multiple data sources. In the Findings chapter the audit trail leading from raw data to the emergent concepts and categories is shown and the arguments for each decision evaluated. Transcriptions of interviews and observations, primary analyses of interviews and observations, syntheses of institutional data, and examples of 'conceptual clustering' were all shared with the appropriate participant. In addition, some aspects of documentary analysis were shared in each of the interviews. Some researchers raise questions about the limits of these tactics. Silverman (2000), for example doubts whether the different philosophical perspectives underlying different methodologies in mixed methods approaches can be so easily accommodated to create a singular perspective that is inherently superior to that derived from a single method used well. Moreover, he questions the validity of respondent validation, particularly if that account is granted a 'privileged status' above that of the researcher's own judgement (ibid, p.177). While accepting Silverman's reservations about mixed methods, I would argue that within a case study format even methods that are philosophically incompatible contribute to building up a

multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival model of the case, and cross-case analysis allows for the emergence of entirely new features.

3.6.2 Internal Validity

For case study research internal validity is to do with checking inferences, that is establishing that any connection made between a particular phenomenon and its purported cause is a valid one (Yin, 2009). Yin offers a number of tactics for establishing internal validity, but only two were of relevance to this research: 'pattern matching' and 'cross-case synthesis' (ibid, pp.42-43). Pattern matching involves comparing patterns emerging from empirical data with those predicted from a theoretical position (ibid). If a match is found this strengthens the internal validity of the case (ibid). The corollary of this is that if threats to validity have been identified, such as evidence that would falsify a theory, but no evidence matching this has been found, then this also strengthens internal validity. Silverman (2000, p.178) raises the 'principle of refutability' based on Popper's (1959) concept of 'falsifiability', which regards it as the hallmark of good research that attempts are made to 'test' emerging ideas. Such methods include 'constant comparison' and analysing 'deviant cases'. This research, as described under 'The Structure of the Research', specifically had two routes built into it in order to cross check the findings. One was comprised of a set of hypotheses deduced from the fundamental theory. In chapter 7 the evidence from the data is compared to each of these hypotheses; not only positive confirmation, but also negative confirmation and evidence of disconfirmation. The research process, as a multi-case study, had also built cross-case analysis into it, in which corresponding sets of data were compared, allowing further theoretical inferences to be drawn.

3.6.3 External Validity

External validity deals with the concept of the generalisability of the results from a case study. Yin (2009, p.43) is careful to make a distinction between 'statistical generalisation', which is the projection of patterns emerging in a sufficiently robust sample to the wider society, and 'analytic generalisation', which is argument from a specific case to a more general social theory. Stake (1995) takes the radically different view; for Stake the principal focus is the intrinsic case study, something studied because of its intrinsic interest, and the issue here is not generalisability but particularisation. The final chapter looks at the broader implications of the findings and the degree to which the mechanism for values transmission suggested is scalable and transferable to other contexts.

3.6.4 Reliability

As already discussed, reliability is concerned most fundamentally with the repeatability of the research leading to the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009; Silverman, 2000). While a few social researchers argue that the nature of the social world as a constructed reality makes issues of reliability redundant (Marshall and Rossman, 1989), for the majority such a stance renders any form of meaningful research impossible. Yin makes two suggestions for tasks that can establish the reliability of case study research: the creation of a ‘case study protocol’ and a ‘case study database’ (Yin, 2009). The case study protocol is a scheme – somewhat like a recipe – for the recreation of the case that could be followed by a subsequent researcher and would lead to the reproduction of the findings of the research programme. The case study database consists of the raw data from the research programme. Yin (ibid) draws a distinction between this data and the subsequent reports or articles which are based on it, as this distinction is not always observed in case study research. To assist in the process of analysis I created a data bank comprised of the raw data from all the data sources in all the schools in the field sample: recordings of interviews, focus groups and observations, together with transcriptions of those recordings; compiled results from the surveys; and primary analyses and syntheses. Together with the survey returns and notes from the observations this constituted the database for this research.

3.7 Data collection methods

Six methods were chosen in all, all qualitative methods except a small-scale survey. While six is rather a large number for a small piece of research, it is justified in this case. As discussed earlier, the research approach was to explore the complex interactions and meanings in relation to values within each school, which required a multi-dimensional approach. This also contributed to the validity and reliability of the research process, discussed separately above. There is a corollary of this multi-method mix: within the constraints of the field it meant that, with some slight exceptions, each method could only be deployed once in each school. Given more time, more data could have been collected. However, there was a reason for not doing so and a reason it was considered unnecessary. First, the entry into each school required a negotiation in which access was granted on the basis of an initial flexible and limited approach so as to minimise the ‘bureaucratic burden’ on the school (discussed under Ethics, above), and each additional method required separate negotiation with the principal contact at the school. Second, the multi-dimensional approach

to the research question of how values are transmitted within the institution did not require multiple data instances from each source; instead, each source was an instance in a process of cross-method and cross-case analysis, from which the findings emerged.

The six methods can be divided into three groups of two, each of which supplied a different perspective on the school. Documents and interviews gave the top-down ‘official’ perspective of the Head, senior management group, local authority/trustees and governors; observations and field notes provided the side-on ‘chalk face’ perspective of the teaching staff; and the surveys and focus groups gave an insight into the bottom-up ‘recipient’ perspective of the pupils. Each pair of methods provided a contrast itself. Three (documents, observation and survey) were more collective and more objective in data focus; the other three (interview, field notes and focus group) were more individual and more subjective in data focus. The various perspectives on the methods chosen are summarised in the table on page 95, which offers an overview of the particular methods mix involved in the case study design as a multi-dimensional exploration of the schools investigated.

In each school the data collection was carried out in the order in which the methods are listed in the table. While in principle the ordering of these methods could have been different, there seemed a strong pragmatic reason for this particular order. Before fully entering the field, learning as much as possible about the educational traditions, philosophy and priorities of the school was paramount. Document reading was also a low-impact and unobtrusive way of becoming acquainted with the school and building a relationship with key staff for the research process. The documents formed the basis for questions to be put in the interview and, conversely, the interview to pursue questions arising from the reading of the documents. While the interview was conducted with a single person, the Head or a representative, the observation was moving to the heart of the school, the classroom, to further insights gained through the interview. The survey was, of the four, the most sensitive, as it required the pupils to express their opinions (albeit anonymously) about the school, but outside the influence of the school. Beyond these four, the focus group required that a certain trust be already established between the school and the researcher, who would be taking charge of a small group of pupils unsupervised on the school premises and within the school timetable.

Fig 06: Parameters in Design of Methods Mix in a Multi-Method Case Study

Order	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Data Source	Documents	Interview	Observation	Survey	Focus Group	Field Notes
Data type	Qualitative/ Quantitative	Qualitative	Qualitative	Quantitative/ Qualitative	Qualitative	Qualitative
Data point	Variable	Individual	Collective	Multiple	Multiple	Individual
Interpretive setting	Static	Dynamic	Dynamic	Static	Dynamic	Dynamic
Interpretive standpoint	Subjective	Objective/ interactive	Objective	Subjective	Objective/ interactive	Mixed
Perspective (stakeholders, participants)	School, governing body, local authorities, government	Principal, head teacher, senior management	Teacher, pupils	Pupils	Pupils	Teacher
Perspective (level)	Official, management (strategic)	Official, management (strategic)	Classroom (administrative, transmission)	Pupil (recipient)	Pupil (recipient)	Classroom (administrative, transmission)
Perspective (hierarchy)	Top down	Top down	Sideways on	Bottom up	Bottom up	Sideways on

Having looked at the overall design of the case study, I will now turn to a consideration of the individual methods.

3.7.1 Documentation

Documents are an initial window on understanding the nature of the institution to be investigated. Documents are considered a special genre of text (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004) which audit both the internal decisions of the institution and requirements imposed from without. They are also involved, according to Hodder (2000, p.704), in the 'legitimation of power' within the institution. For these reasons they can be a rich source of information about both the present constitution of the institution and also the history leading up to the present. There are also disadvantages to documents, or certainly aspects to be aware of in handling them; Yin (2009) lists several considerations: they can be difficult to gain access to if not publicly available (for example on a website); a limited or partial (biased) view of the institute can be gained if the documentary evidence is incomplete; bias in the presentation of information, representing the particular views of an author or for the purpose of presenting a particular image of the institution; and access can be denied, especially if they cover confidential or sensitive matters. They also suffer from being an almost immediately 'fossilised' form of knowledge, though for some the act of recording policies, strategies, processes and institutional structures creates a 'distance' between the author(s) of a document and the reader that allows space for the reader to interpret the document (Hodder, 2000; Gadamer, 1994, p.298). For these reasons documents should never be relied on as the sole source of data, but only to corroborate data from, or prepare for other data collection methods.

The documents I requested from the schools in the sample all related to the values of the school or the provision for values or values-related education at the school, including the school rules, mission statement, school policies, provision for pastoral care and the ethos of the school, and any material distributed to prospective parents. The list appears in Appendix 2. Much of this material would have been available to the public, but there were a few more internal items, some of them passed to me once a certain relationship had been built up. Access to all the required documentation required some negotiation, but the issues dealt with in my research would not have been considered sensitive, so there was no reason for denial of access. Beyond the list I considered the school to be the expert on the documentation that covered this area, so I left it to their judgement; I wanted to create the feeling that this was a

cooperative venture, which I felt would be the best way to gain further access and to be able to view the inner workings of the school, particularly the web of relationships and meanings generated through this. I did look at some secondary sources, such as Ofsted reports, for verifiability purposes, and the local press, for any issues related to the schools.

3.7.2 Interviews

Interviews are a central feature of any case study. They enable a researcher to hone in on a topic of significant interest and can provide real insight, if not necessarily of reality as such, of the reality as that is perceived by the person being interviewed (Yin, 2009; Miller and Glassner, 2004). There are two paradigmatic forms of the interview, the structured and the unstructured. The structured interview aims for objectivity and rationality, through an inflexible schedule, minimising interaction and excluding emotional responses, whereas the unstructured is flexible, interactive and seeks specifically an understanding of how people experience the social world in terms of their own categories (Fontana and Frey, 2000). There is also an intermediate form, known as the semi-structured interview, in which there is an interview schedule. For Silverman (2001, p.87) the purpose of all forms of interview is to 'generate data which give an authentic insight into people's experiences'. Semi-structured and unstructured are the most common interview forms in case study research, which often take the form of 'focus interviews' and 'in-depth interviews', respectively (Yin, 2009, p.107). There are drawbacks to the qualitative interview, which need to be taken into account: inaccuracies in the data gathered, due either to poor questioning technique or poor recording on the part of the researcher, is one; bias due to the respondent withholding vital information or tailoring their responses to fit the interviewers expectations is another (ibid).

In this research both semi-structured and unstructured (or largely unstructured) forms were used, as they were appropriate to gaining an insight into the internal world of the school. Across all the schools a semi-structured interview was used to conduct an interview with the Head or, in one case, an appointed representative. This interview was conducted using a schedule based on a common template of 16 questions, which appears in Appendix 2, with a number of questions added based on information gathered from a reading of the school documents. The interview with the teacher, who was also the principal contact at the school, occurred at the end of the data-gathering process for that school and was based on a synthesis of data taken from all sources across the school. It had two purposes: ostensibly, it was to report and discuss some of the findings from the research and fill in some of the gaps in data,

which was guided by the synthesis; but, it was also a chance to get a teacher's view of the ways in which they felt the school transmitted its values, ways they felt they contributed to the education in values of the pupils and what they thought these important values were. Being largely unstructured, it moved freely between these two purposes. Although considered here as an unstructured interview, because of its discursive nature it has been categorised as part of the Field Notes, considered below. All interviews were recorded with the respondent's permission.

The questions in the semi-structured interview followed a narrative course, starting with some personal questions, moving on to the school, and on to topics relating to values education, before concluding on a more personal note about what they felt they had contributed or planned to achieve at the school in the future. There was, though, another structure implicit in the interview schedule, which was to build up a more 'intentional' picture of the interiority of the school life through involving the interviewee, usually the Head, in a more reflective exercise, asking more speculative question or asking them to confront issues of conflict within the school or between the school and other agencies. A breakdown of question types and some examples are given in the table below.

Fig 07 Structure of Questions on the Interview Schedule

Type of question	Question no.	Example
Personal	1, 13, 15, 16	What do you think has been your main contribution to the school?
Internal	2, 3, 7, 8	Do you see any of what you do here as being to do with values education?
External	9, 10, 14	Do you think that the state has a role in legislating what schools should do in this area of values education?
Evaluation	4, 11, 12, 13	Are you aware of or do you experience in any sense a clash of values in the school?
Speculation	5, 6	Do you see values education as being something similar to or distinct from moral education?

3.7.3 Observation

Within the school the classroom is the place where the business of educational transmission takes place (Bernstein, 1975). The transmission of values is a more diffuse affair (Taylor, 1998), but the class is a social microcosm (Parsons, 1961) and the observation of a class in action is an opportunity to gauge the extent to which teachers, whether explicitly, implicitly

or even unconsciously, engage in the education of their pupils in values and to potentially observe the mode of transmission. For Yin (2009, p.102) observation is the chance to immerse oneself in the 'context' of the case in the 'natural setting' (ibid, p.109) of the case.

However, observation is not a straightforward matter. Any observer has to take a critical stance to his or her presence in the classroom. Ackroyd and Hughes (1992) note that there are four basic stances that should be part of the researcher's self-awareness and a vital aspect of strategic decision-making to be taken beforehand: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant and complete observer. The issue is one of reflexivity; the presence of an observer potentially changes the nature of that which is being observed (Yin, 2009). Since the observer as pure observer, as a totally neutral presence, is an impossible ideal, there are varying degrees of compromise. Complete participation, the temporary suspension of the observer's role and total immersion in the field and identification with the concerns of the 'observed' in the case study, is possible in some circumstances, but requires extensive periods of open-ended time and also raises its own – sometimes serious – ethical issues (ibid). Lincoln and Guba (1985) raise two threats to validity arising in qualitative research in general, but particularly with reference to observations, that of reactivity, changes in behaviour due to awareness of being observed, and interaction with the observer.

In the schools I visited for this research I made a request to observe a class in which activity related to values education was taking place. Although the activity, group size, content and environment were different in each case, they were all related to the PSHE/Citizenship curriculum. In each case the visit took place within a limited time frame and the only option was as an observer with a limited scope for incidental participation. For the observation I used an observation sheet that allowed the recording of information about the participants and their interactions, activities, routines and ritualistic elements, social organisation, and communal narratives. The sheet had to take account of the temporal element, classroom layout and leave room for interpretations (Adler and Adler, 1994). Observational notes were made in a column divided into 5-minute blocks. A sample is shown in Appendix 2. Additionally, the classes were audio-recorded with the school's and teacher's permission.

3.7.4 Survey

Surveys are not usually included in a case study, because of their association with quantitative research methods. For this research, looking at the transmission of values, I felt it would be appropriate, because of the need to sample the potential recipients of values

education, something that was not possible with the class observation alone, and to contribute a vital aspect to the multi-perspective model of the institution. The questionnaire was built around a series of questions I wanted answered, but which were too abstract to address directly to the pupils, so a series of exercises was developed with the help of a colleague with secondary school experience, to resemble the sort of task/activity sheet that the pupils might be familiar with, introducing enough variety to sustain their interest and varying the response mode sufficiently to prevent rote responses. The questionnaire can be found in appendix 2. Shying away from the format of quantitative analyses, I avoided answers involving Likert scales. Activities included choosing from a list of options, ordering a list in terms of importance, responding to imaginary scenarios, and one totally open question in which they were asked to write about things they learned in school outside of the classroom, exploring the 'hidden curriculum'. Thus the questionnaire was designed to elicit, as much as possible, information of a qualitative nature. There were other constraints. In each school the survey was administered by a teacher, who incorporated it into their classroom activity as part of sociology or citizenship classes. Therefore, it had to be answerable well within the normal time period for a class. It also had to be as clear and explicit as possible, as I would not be on hand to offer explanations.

3.7.5 Focus group

A focus group is a discussion group set up for the purpose of discussing a particular topic and generating research data through the group interaction (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999). One of the advantages of this format is that it can produce a large volume of information within a limited time frame (Morgan, 1988). However, focus groups operate in 'fundamentally unnatural social settings' (ibid). The challenge of the focus group is that it is a choreographed event around a topic that is determined by, and of interest to, the researcher, but must simulate the spontaneity of a conversation among friends or colleagues discussing topics of common interest. Its success, therefore, relies on a combination of the eloquence and biddability of the participants with the skill of the researcher in fostering a group dynamic in which data of significance to the research is elicited. For Kitzinger and Barbour (1999, p.5) focus groups generate a social network which provides the best context in which to explore 'people's experiences, opinions, wishes and concerns'. A survey can provide information about how many people hold a particular opinion, but 'focus groups are better for exploring how points of view are constituted and expressed' (ibid, p.5).

Whereas the survey used in the case studies was able to give some indication of the range of opinion of the student body, the degree of perception of issues relating to values, awareness of values education within a school, and values-based responses to moral dilemmas, there was little sense of how this reflected values transmission within the school. The focus group provided the opportunity to explore that issue in more depth. A request was made to each school to provide a small group of pupils, preferable of mixed sex, preferably of volunteers and preferably those who had taken part in the survey, to form a focus group. Each school was able to provide such a group for one school period. The ideal was to have an open discussion; that happened to a limited extent, where a good group dynamic emerged, but there was a tendency for the pupils to address me and for me to lead the conversation. Nevertheless, some very interesting insights emerged from these sessions. The discussions were recorded with all the participants' agreement.

3.7.6 Field Notes

Field notes have traditionally been an important part of anthropological and ethnographic research. The advent of modern recording and communication technologies has obviated some of the necessity of keeping written notes, but it still has a part to play in recording events, observations and experiences perhaps incidental to the main research, but which, nevertheless, forms some of the context of the case. I have used the term rather liberally here to encompass anything which is not included within another category but which is relevant to the research. As mentioned in the section on interviews, the feedback discussions with the teachers form an important part of the field notes. The category also includes correspondence (letters and emails) with the schools, notes on impressions from meeting with participants, reports and updates to my supervisors, a research journal kept during the course of the research recording the challenges and rewards of the research process, and analytic memos created during the course of data analysis. No additional ethical issues were raised by the field notes. Teacher feedback was recorded with permission and a transcript was made available for validation. Notes made of any discussion of procedural matters relating to the conduct of the research were fed back to the discussant as a brief report by mutual agreement, but did not anyway form part of the research data.

3.8 Data Analysis

For this research I was guided in particular by Strauss and Corbin's (1998) guide to grounded theory and Miles and Huberman's (1994) guide to data analysis, particularly the development

of matrices for analysing data. I also made use of a variation of content analysis, which I will describe in detail. Then there were a number of analytic techniques that were applied only to particular data sources. Some critical textual analysis was applied to the school documents at an early stage to discover whether there was any evidence of intra-institutional conflicts. However, this sort of analysis was not central to the purposes of the research. More importantly, phenomenologically and semiotically-based analyses were applied to the observations in each school in order to uncover structure, strategy, roles, relationships and power play within the unfolding events in class, and were also applied in synthesising data from across the dataset for each case. There was a small amount of survey-specific analysis, which will be described, but there was no attempt to undertake any complex quantitative analysis; as explained in the Methods section, the purpose of the survey was to gain a wider spread of qualitative data.

According to Yin (2009) there is no substitute for having a clear strategy for data analysis from the beginning of the research. Admittedly, this seems sensible; however, apart from the overall strategic aim of modelling the transmission of values in each of the schools, how this might be accomplished was a realisation that only evolved as I became more familiar with the various analytic tools and the data from the schools. Returning to the theoretical roots of the research I conceived that the core of the analysis had to be a model of the institute in which values were central. To model the institute required recognising the complexity of the institutional structure, as that was also acknowledged in the justification for the methods mix, shown in the table on page 95, exhibiting three levels: the official, the teacher-classroom and the pupils. The process of analysis, while not mirroring this structure, had to exhibit a complexity that reflected the interconnectedness, process and logic in the institutional structure. That turned out to be, not three strata within the school, but the hierarchy of part, whole and context (micro, meso and macro). In terms of methodology this corresponds to *minor in-cases analyses*, *major in-case analyses* and *cross-case analysis*. The entire analytical model is shown in the table on page 103, which will be the basis for the explanation of the analytical methods.

One technique that was used in the analytic process for all data sources and at all stages was that of writing *memos*. A memo can be anything from a note of a few lines to a short essay, but as envisioned by grounded theorists in particular, it represents a hiatus from the sometimes rote processes of analysis to re-order thoughts, record new insights and to theorise more abstractly and creatively (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The memos I wrote were dated

and sometimes titled (if they dealt with a single issue). They sometimes became the basis for new directions in analysis and later findings. A few have been incorporated into or quoted in the relevant sections.

Fig 08 Overall Analytical Model

TYPE	DATA SOURCE	PRODUCT	CONTRIBUTION
Minor in-case analyses	Interview transcripts, documents, survey results	Analytic reports, matrices	Concepts, categories
Major in-case analyses	Data from all sources	Syntheses (IFVA, WCDR)	Partial theories
Cross-case analysis	Partial theories	Saturated model	Integrated theory

3.8.1 Minor in-case analyses

These analyses were initial analyses carried out on individual sources, which resulted in analytic products like critical summaries and matrices. Despite analysis, they remained very close to the source material, so had the sort of richness, colour and depth which made them ideal for the descriptive aspects of the case study reports. Although they were not very conceptually sophisticated, they had suggestive insights which contributed to the next level. I will describe the analyses of the four primary data sources (documents, interview, observation and survey) in some detail.

3.8.1.1 Documents

Documents are a valuable source of information about how the institution sees itself, by what they say and how they say it, and what they do not say. Taken collectively, they embody the most important values of that institution, and are likely to give an insight into the goals and ambitions of the institution, its priorities and strategies, and some of the challenges faced in achieving those things. Even in public documents some idea of the external forces operating on an institution can be gleaned; for schools these are typically central and local government, though there may be input at some schools from church organisations or parents groups. Maybe also present, but less obvious, could be tensions and conflicts within the school. Although the central concern of this research was to understand the transmission of values,

the nature of that transmission may not be separable from the nature of the institution in which it is taking place, so it was felt that some account of these factors should be given.

Initial analysis of the documents was based on a simple form of literary criticism (Gillespie, 2010). It began with a summary of each document, its main content, its purpose, its principal guiding ideas, goals and pedagogical strategies. This was looking at the document from the viewpoint of the school itself and the overt ideology of the school. A second level looked at the structure of each document, considering the rhetorical devices at work and whether, for example, the document was a compilation of other documents. This gave some idea of the processes in the school and responses to external factors. A final level involved a more critical reading of the text, examining how the language used may reveal less obvious aspects of the life of the institution, at the internal dynamics, such as hidden undercurrents of dissatisfaction. Reading each document at these three levels was not always possible, for two reasons. One was that there was comparatively little to see beyond a summary of its main contents; it may have been simple, transparent and single-authored. The other is that there was too much to see, and that the analysis risked becoming a major diversion. A balance had to be drawn between the summary being too superficial and being too extensive. The right balance was felt to be a reasonably short account embodying a perceptive insight into the school in question. These analyses became the basis for some of the questions added to the interview template.

Subsequently, the documents were subject to content analysis. Content analysis is usually considered a form of quantitative analysis, involving counting the number of instances of selected words in the document (Holsti, 1969); however, it can also be used in qualitative analysis, in order to understand the categories, in this case, of the participant institutions (Silverman, 2001). I have taken a middle line, noting the incidence of all values in the texts (though not the number of times it appears) together with any strategy for disseminating the value mentioned in the text. I found that although few documents overtly discuss values, values are firmly embedded in the texts, whenever an idea of the 'preferable' (Rokeach, 1973, p.5) is expressed, even indirectly or unconsciously. The purpose of the analysis was to extract the values from the matrix of ordinary language, to de-contextualise them. To do this it was first necessary to go back an axiom established in chapter 2 (2.4.4), that values' linguistic form is always that of abstract nouns (occasionally noun phrases). However, it was not as simple as isolating all the value nouns, as not all values are explicit; some are implicit in other linguistic forms, such as verbs, adjectives and adverbs; others are hidden, but

strongly suggested by the context. These latter two forms can be converted and recorded as explicit value forms. There is, in this, also an element of interpretation and some judgement is called for; not every value word actually denotes a value if the context is rightly read. The range (rather than the number) of values recorded for each document (and for all the documents collectively) should give some indication of the richness of the life-world of the institution.

To begin with, the values – as defined above – in each document were highlighted (with a note if implicit or hidden) and then listed as a group on a ‘table of documents’ for the school under a column ‘values’ for that particular document. Also added was the strategy for dissemination, which might have been no more than the document itself, or there might have been reference to a particular transmission route for the content of the document, for example a poster with the school rules displayed. The table was then ‘inverted’, a form of transformation encouraged by Miles and Huberman (1994), by taking the values group in the values column and listing each separately in alphabetical order together with a document reference and the transmission strategy. As the same value often appeared on several documents, this meant that entries were amalgamated, displaying the range of dissemination strategies for each value. An example (extract) of a table of documents and an inversion are shown in Appendix 3. This list of values became an important basis for the synthesis Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA).

3.8.1.2 Interview

The interview provided an opportunity to engage with an official representative of each school, not just as part of the management team, but someone versed in the educational philosophy of the school. The intention of the interview and the analytic process that followed was to delve more deeply into the nature of the institution revealed by the documents, to uncover its particular worldview and its sense of purpose.

The interviews were recorded on a digital recorder and the recordings uploaded to MP3 files. Some notes were taken during the interview, and afterwards any impressions noted. The recordings were transcribed and when completed to my satisfaction lightly edited and despatched to the interviewee for validation and/or correction. Some analyses begin with the recorded version if, for example, the researcher is interested in aspects of non-lexical interaction such as hesitations and interrupted sentences. However, for the purposes of this research the overwhelming interest was in the content of what was said, transcending the

circumlocutions of actual human communication. To the extent that a pause or a thought changing in mid-sentence might be significantly revealing, they were captured in the transcript anyway, and it was the validated and corrected transcript with which this analysis began.

After reading the transcript through several times an extended memo was written in which initial impressions of the interviewee's responses to the research questions were recorded. This had three purposes. One is that it shaped analytic familiarity with the text in question and fore-shaped themes that were later to emerge in the more focused analysis. This process also allowed me to explore aspects of my own worldview in relationship to one being encountered for the first time. Finally, it allowed aspects of the interviewee's stance to be recorded which could be missed in the later closer analysis, a case of sometimes not seeing the wood for the trees.

The next stage was analysing the text of the interview following the route recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998). This initially involved three steps: coding, categorising and re-organising.

Coding

In order to code, the transcription was read line by line and significant ideas at the level of individual words or more commonly phrases or sentences were extracted, copied to a new document and given a reference (based on the timings of each section of the interview). Some codes could be taken word for word from the transcription, when the interviewee had framed a concept in a way that could, not be bettered, an '*in vivo* code'. Coding usually involves some change in linguistic style, often changing the verb to a gerund, creating an 'action code' (Charmaz, 2006, p.7). Codes can also be created for sections, but I preferred to do this in the second step of the analysis. Naturally, few if any of the interviewer's utterances were coded, but if an idea was well expressed and the interviewee gave it full assent it was entered as if part of the response.

Categorising

When the whole transcript had been examined the product was a list of codes arranged in the same chronological order as the transcription. It was important now to see if there was an embedded institutional narrative in the discourse, one elicited by, rather than guided by, the questioning. I found that reading through the codes certain ideas began to cluster. I began to

create sections around these clusters, introducing breaks between them. Eventually, one code emerged as the dominant category for that section. I preferred to use an extant code if possible; if not, I created one.

Re-organising

The process of categorising does not proceed far before another technique comes into play, that of reorganising the material. As a cluster forms, some codes in the proximity do not fit; in fact an insight into where a stray code fit often arose and it could be moved there. For the first time the codes moved out of chronological order and into an order determined by the narrative, but carrying with them the reference to their source. Sometimes a new category was created for ideas that did not fit anywhere else or existing categories split or merged. This re-organisation was not driven by any pre-determined framework. While it would be futile to deny that the researcher comes to the interpretive task with preconceptions, I tried to allow the data to dictate what the final shape of the narrative would be, to be surprised by the result. Sometimes an even higher order structure suggested itself, groupings of groups. The process finished when all codes had been included in a cluster and when there were no more to move.

The reorganised codes subsequently became the basis for the third stage in the analysis of the interview data, that of creating a *matrix* to explore the lived worlds of the schools in the research field. To a greater degree than any of the other analytic processes, this analysis developed itself. According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p.239), 'It requires you to make full analyses, ignoring no relevant information; and it focuses and organizes your information coherently'. Matrix building proved a good way of laying out the data spatially and being able to see hitherto unseen relationships, and forcing a return to the data to fill the gaps created. The parameters along both the vertical and the horizontal axes were derived from the analysed data, but few of them were predicted. In the end what emerged for each analysis was a narrative about the worldview of the school as much as its principal representative. An example of (part of) a matrix of an interview is included in appendix 3.

3.8.1.3 Observation

Two types of data were collected in the observations of the classes: audio recordings and notes made on an observation sheet. Prior to analysis it was necessary to begin with a reconstruction of the classroom event, which amalgamated a transcription of the audio

recording of the class with the timed notes made on the observation sheet. Then, in a similar manner to the interview, a lengthy analytic summary was written first. This differed from the memo of the interview, though, in that it was constrained by pre-established analytic criteria, that of morphology, dynamics, cohesion and content, which are described below.

The classroom is the primary interface between the school and the pupils and the principal locus of transmission, not only of academic knowledge but also of values. But the classroom is also a stage upon which a dramatic performance is acted out in every lesson. It cannot be understood as simply an occasion for passing information, but grasped as a complex linking of emotional undercurrents, sign acts and symbolic structures. The totality of the event, then, can only be approached through phenomenological and semiotic analyses of the whole and constituent parts of the class. Each of the methods used will be described in terms of its relation to the concept of values outlined in chapter 2, and the aspects of invocation and evocation as fundamental to values transmission, as described earlier in this chapter. In order to offer some context to this assertion, I have included the following account of an important breakthrough insight as a researcher, taken from my research journal.

It would be fair to say that placing the concept of invocation at the heart of the research, as the posited transmission mechanism for values represented one of the significant turning points in the whole research project, for it enabled a viable connection to be made between early philosophical speculation on the nature of values and field research into values education and became the turning point upon which the research began to take its present form. Until then, invocation represented a terminus in a line of speculation, but not one that I had considered particularly significant. The insight came, as these things often do, quite incidentally. I had been listening to a colleague reporting on a conference he had attended, and with great interest to his account of a panel on the anthropology of dance. I was struck by a thought that the performative power of dance could be likened to the rhetorical power of a charismatic figure, like a religious or political leader or even a great teacher, and that evening set out to deduce the characteristics of invocation through a phenomenology of the imagined invocatory context. The original notes have been lost, but some time later found a fuller expression in the interpretation of an observed class and a brief commentary.

[The observed class] provided an example of the principle of invocation in values transmission. Clearly there was an *institutional setting* in the established vertical tutor groups and the organisation of [tutor] time in the school calendar. There was the invocation of the *traditions* of [tutor] time: ‘First of all, tell us, what is [tutor] time about...What do you do at [tutor] time? Thank you. Have contact with people you otherwise wouldn’t have any contact with. Anything else? [indistinct] socialise....Thank you.’ Then there was the

ritual of the pairing, in this case by using randomly chosen cards, greeting appropriately, cooperating, etc., which fell within the *rules* of the activity: ‘The ground rules are...focus on me , please...the ground rules are you must show respect for whoever it is you are paired with.’ There is also the *taboo* behaviour and its objects, alluded to in the passage just quoted, distraction and anything which causes distraction. There is no explicit *text* referred to, though the story in which the moral dilemma is embedded effectively functions in its place. Discussing and suggesting solutions to the dilemma (moral reasoning) formed the *task* the pupils were engaged in. The speaker acted as the *exemplar*, modelling the required behaviour as well as directing the activity. The speaker also invoked the *values* central to the whole activity.

Clearly there are strong parallels to religious forms here. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the areas of values is imbued with the sacred; by its very structure and nature a value has something of the sacred about it, even when it is entirely secular or technical; it embodies a distillation of the good as that is perceived by the attending observer and is limned by a transgressive boundary. Secondly, religions have been one of the key institutions in every culture, especially in the pre-modern world, and one of the most well developed, and exemplified the characteristics of a value-transmitting life form which has been [thoroughly described in the theory chapter]. Thirdly, as a result of the other two points, religions have come to define much of the language in which we can speak of value-related matters.

[Appendix to Observation Analysis, School A, May 2011]

Aspects of the deductive model (given in italics) were added to slightly in subsequent interpretations of observed classes, but remained largely stable. The model suggests that invocation requires basically three things: a sacred context, a rhetoric of core values and an exemplary actor.

Morphology

The first analysis was to perceive the overall shape of the lesson through the duration of the class. It was, in other words, an attempt to understand the structuring of a performance. All lessons have a structure; that is part of the training of a teacher: to bring order and coherence to the delivery of information and, therefore to the teaching and learning situation. The structure of interest here, though, was of a different order, something of which even the teacher themselves might have been unaware, such as a hidden symmetry or pattern in the delivery, arising from an underlying rhetorical or ritualistic aspect of performance, but connected to an overall intention or strategy for the class. Silverman (2001, p.124) refers to these as ‘narrative structures’, but they are also related to the rhetorical structures of the performance. An example is given at 5.3.1.3, ii).

After that I turned to the details of the observation reconstruction and broke it down into discrete elements, each of which was a specific event. To each event I gave an interpretation

based on a ritualistic semiotics suggested in the memo just quoted, which connects the dramatic context to the sense of the sacred at the heart of the value experience (Eliade, 1957), which was discussed in chapter 2 and which embody the concepts of invocation and evocation. This ritualistic semiotics is consonant with that anthropological tradition that undertakes a ‘mythic’ interpretation of culture, in the sense of relating to a ‘sacred tradition, primordial revelation, exemplary model’ (Eliade, 1963, p.1). A sample of this analysis from the observation at school A (St Augustine) is given in the following table.

Fig 09 Morphology of observed class

Assertion of authority	03.55 T: Turn around please 05.33 T: OK, listen up please 06.02 S: Focus on me 07.45 S: The ground rules are...focus on me , please... 09.25 S: Listen up please. Focus on me
Taboo	06.02 S: ... Put anything that’s going to distract you down out of the way, make sure it doesn’t distract you 06.55 S: OK. Can you make sure what is distracting you is put away...make sure what is distracting you is put away
Tradition	06.02 S: ... First of all, tell us, what is Augment time about...What do you do at Augment time? Thank you. Have contact with people you otherwise wouldn’t have any contact with. Anything else? [indistinct] socialise....Thank you
Rules	07.45 S:...the ground rules are you must show respect for whoever it is you are paired with 22.00 S:.....just think of a simple thing....thank you for being my partner, or could be more complicated ‘Thank you for sharing your views with me...22.50 S: So each of you say thank you to your partner, now please
Ritual	08.00 S: ... The using of names is very important...saying ‘good morning’ is perfectly polite. If I say ‘good morning Mr Trubshaw’ that is immensely more powerful 12- Gives out cards. Asks pupils to hold up their cards and then find their partner who has the matching card (notes) 09.40 S: You see...your choice....sit next to the person who has the same card as you. I’ll give you ten seconds to find your partner 11.25 S: Face your partner, please. Say good morning and use their name...there are people who are embarrassed, but try not to show it. Even if it’s a false grin, try and give them some sort of [unclear]

Dynamics

To explore the concept of invocation further an analysis of the roles in the class, the relations and the distribution of power was required. The hierarchy of power in a school accounts - not totally, but in part - for the authority of the teacher in class and the possibility of formal

education in groups, including values education. But the dynamics of power may have a much more direct influence on the transmission of values, not only the exertion of power, but also the withholding of coercive force and the empowering of the individual. This analysis regards the class as a system in which roles, power dynamics and information flows need to be examined and described. The following example is from the observation at school B (Broughampton). In this class five significant relationships were identified in terms of the three roles – Teacher (T), Student (S) and Observer (O) – and two modalities – formal (f) and informal (i) and the relative empowerment/disempowerment in each relationship.

Fig 10 Dynamics of observed class

Relationship	Teacher	Student	Observer
TS_f	empowered	disempowered	neutral
TS_i	empowered	empowered	neutral
SS	neutral	empowered	neutral
TO	empowered	neutral	disempowered
SO	neutral	disempowered	neutral

Content

The classes being observed were ostensibly those dealing with values education, and were in any case being examined from the perspective of values transmission. Therefore, the moral content of the class was under special consideration. While ‘values’ is generally accepted as a term with a broader connotation than morality, and includes such areas as the technical and professional, there can be no doubt that ‘values education’ as such is primarily concerned with moral and ethical issues. Moral content has several parameters, at least one of which must be present. There is the presentation and/or discussion of moral and ethical issues; there is the explicit or implicit invocation of certain values; there is the scope for the exercise of moral imagination; finally, consideration should be made of whether they are taught and encouraged to behave morally and, allied to that, whether they are shown an example of the behaviour which they are encouraged to emulate. To be a moral person should mean to be reflectively moral as well as inhabiting a culture’s moral rules (Peters, 1981) and to have the language, means and examples to accomplish that; therefore, moral education should

encompass all these aspects, though, naturally, not necessarily in a single lesson. The following is an example from the observation at school C (Chelmswood High).

Fig 11 Content of observed class

a) Evidence of moral discourse and moral reasoning being engaged in during the class

While there is little evidence of overt moral discourse or moral reasoning during the class, there is something of a narrative of good and evil in a number of interpolations made by the teacher into pupil responses. Here is an example, bolded italics added for emphasis:

TEACHER: we were talking particularly to match with anti-bullying week, weren't we, about a particular use of the word 'gay' in a particular way. And what was that, can someone remember?
Yes

STUDENT: It's saying about something that it's gay.

TEACHER: Saying something's gay. So what might people mean by that?

STUDENT: That it's weird.

TEACHER: So ***why should it not be used in that way*** then, do you think? Is that what we were talking about?

STUDENT: Yeah, because people are gay [indistinct] weird if they're gay.

TEACHER: So ***it's a derogatory use of the word***, saying something is weird or rubbish or not very good. Therefore you're saying that somebody who's gay is not very good. Is that what you were going to say?

Group Cohesion

As explained in the theory chapter, the invocation of values is accompanied by the *evocation* of the moral community, as values are not private and must be exercised in a communal setting. A government advisory paper on the spiritual and moral development of young people (SCAA, 1996, p.9) reminds us that in addition to knowledge of standards and the ability to reason morally (which are essentially covered in the previous section), morality requires 'a sense of responsibility' and 'a willingness to act responsibly'. Both of these require a social context to be meaningful. Therefore, it would be expected that the teaching of values would include instructions, efforts, exhortations, narratives and behavioural modelling to create a bond among the members of the group or class, that is, to encourage participation in the moral community. The example is taken from the observation at school B.

The layout of the room contributed to the cohesion of the group. As mentioned, the location of the screen meant that all the girls had to move into a group when the teacher wanted to demonstrate a point. There was already a strong bonding among the group, and the teacher mentioned that they usually conduct their tutorials in a different place under more informal conditions. There is a reference to the nested hierarchy of belonging: ‘...what’s been going on within the year group, but actually the wider community, it’s not just within [___ House]; there have been other issues within this school and there are wider implications’ [OBS-0425/9], but mostly the teacher seems to be appealing to the enlightened self-interest of the pupils.

Matrix

At the conclusion of the previous analyses the data was transferred to a more detailed and graphic time flow matrix. An extract from a matrix is shown in appendix 3. The vertical represents time flowing from top to bottom and the significant events are listed in one column in chronological order. To the left of this column two more columns show the structure of the class, aligned with the events. One is a straightforward interpretation of the major stages of the lesson, the categories into which the individual events can be grouped. The other is the overarching morphology of the lesson. To the right of the events column is another in which the events listed are translated into dramatic-symbolic categories. Next are two columns which trace the changing formality/informality dynamic in the class and the empowerment-disempowerment dynamic. Finally, the matrix concludes with a column which assesses the participation of the pupils in a moral ‘universe’. The matrix exhibits a weak causality in the horizontal axis, from left to right.

3.8.1.4 Survey

The survey was significantly different to the other methods used in the research as it introduced an element of quantitative research into the mix. The extent of this should not be exaggerated, however. The sample in each school was relatively small (the average was around 30) and the main focus was on the qualitative data it could generate. In the pre-analysis stage the data were simply collated under the categories of the survey questions, which were based on research questions for which data was desired, as outlined in the methods section above. Several approaches to analysis were tried, before settling on a fairly simple, minimalist approach. The data was processed in a way that enabled it to illustrate some fairly straightforward statements about the character of the institution in question, awareness of values and the teaching of values. The information of real theoretical interest emerged in the cross-case analysis.

The one question where some analysis was carried out was on a question concerning situational responses to imaginary scenarios. The intention was to allow students to express their moral reasoning when placed in a moral dilemma. After collating the responses I saw there was also a possibility of generating some quantitative data, by grading the responses on a scale of 1 to 5 representing the intensity (*i*) of or degree of assimilation of the measured value implied in the imagined situation. There was, of necessity, a degree of subjective interpretation of the responses, but the range of responses was fairly limited and the same criteria were applied across the cases and checked for unintentional bias. This provided some data for comparative purposes. The example below is taken from school B.

Fig 12 Scaled Values in Situational Responses

1. Your friend has left their lunch money at home (measure of Generosity)

<i>i</i>	Aggregate	Response (number)
5	9	Give/share yours, pay for theirs (7) Give them some money (2)
4	0	
3	6	Lend them some money (6)
2	2	Lend them enough for one thing (1) Reprimand and offer to buy (1)
1	3	(inappropriate/humorous response) (3)

The analytical methods so far discussed are all classified as ‘minor’ for two reasons. One is that they are only applied to a single data source. Then, probably as a result of the first point, they did not lead on to the highest levels of abstraction necessary for theory generation, but remained wedded to the particular and the local. This gave them a certain resonance, which made them suitable for the case study reports, but represented something of an analytical *cul de sac*. Having said this, they were a necessary first step. They gave rise to insights and to conceptual narratives that shaped the developments at the higher level. The content analysis used on the documents also became an important analytical tool for the major in-case analysis ‘Institutional Focus Value Analysis’.

3.8.1.5 Other sources: focus group and field notes

The purpose of the focus group and the report/discussion meeting with the teacher were not originally treated as primary data sources but as sources of feedback for purposes of filling in

gaps in the data, so they were not subject to the first round of analysis (minor in-case analyses). This does not mean they were unimportant sources of information. Indeed, this omission from primary analysis is one point for methodological reflection. Like all the data from the field, though, these sources were fully utilised in the next round of analysis, the major in-case analyses.

3.8.2 Major in-case analyses

The major in-case analyses differ from the minor in that they draw on the entire database of the case, data, that is, from all six sources (documents, interview, observation, survey, focus group and field notes) in each case. The two major in-case analyses, the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) and the Whole Case Data Review (WCDR), also referred to as 'syntheses' in the research, deal with the same material in different ways. The IFVA subjects the dataset to content analysis and the WCDR to coding (or re-coding) and categorisation. A second difference is that the IFVA is the end product of an analytic process and is already a partial theoretical model as it is highly conceptualised; by contrast, the WCDR is an iterative process for generating high level concepts for theory building.

3.8.2.1 Institutional Focus Value Analysis

The Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) did not emerge fully formed through a single analytic process but through a number of steps each of which took the analysis of data to more refined and abstracted levels, but also ultimately turned it into a vivid, if selective, description of the life of the schools under consideration. The IFVA formed a central part of the case study report for each school. Three steps in its development should be considered.

The first step began with the list of values developed from the analysis of documents. This list was then expanded by performing content analysis, as described above, on all the other texts produced during data collection at one school, including all transcriptions, some analyses and the collated survey results, and adding them to the list, including references to sources and to transmission strategies – if any – associated with the value. Since all possible values, explicit, implicit and hidden, embedded in the texts had been included in the list, the decision was made, before proceeding to the second step, to focus on certain values and to ignore others, effectively eliminating them from any further enquiry. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the sheer scale of the task of giving attention to every value mentioned would have made the project untenable. More importantly, some values were obviously incidental to

the value discourse of the institution, so it was more a case of deciding about which values it was meaningful to consider. These values were then highlighted on the list. A second decision then had to be made, about grouping certain values together which it was felt belonged together because of a 'family' relationship among them. This criterion had to be balanced against the availability of data; for some values there was a wealth of data, others a paucity, so a degree of parsimony guided the decision.

Having decided the grouping of values, the second step was to look at the distribution of the value or value group across the whole institution. A two-dimensional grid for each value or value group was created for this purpose: one dimension represented the three perspectives of the school: the official, the classroom/teacher and the pupils'; the second dimension represented the semiotic and phenomenological perspectives on values, that were used initially to determine the nature of values, that of *semiotic structure* and *intentional world*. Each grid had four columns and two rows. The three perspectives went into the first three columns from the left, which were each divided into a top half and a bottom half. Into the top half was placed data related to semiotic structure and into the bottom the intentional world of the value. A grid was filled in for each of the values or value groups decided in step one, by taking information from the list of values and, when necessary, the original data sources. This meant that for each sector of the school there was information relating to the (semiotic) structures through which values are transmitted and information relating to the (intentional) experience of that particular value or value group. An example of a completed grid is shown in Appendix 3.

Inevitably there were gaps in the data and another set of decisions had to be made. Could this be solved by further amalgamation, if the distinctions between values were fine enough? In many cases this was not possible so two classes were created, one of relatively well-populated grids to which more attention should be given and the other of poorly-populated grids, inevitably less. This was a fluid boundary, as I felt that some values for which there was little data were, nevertheless, important or particular to the school's identity.

The fourth column on the right was not divided and was used for comments, followed by a short assessment of the extent to which it was felt the particular value or group of values had been acquired by pupils, and thus transmitted, based on the existing data. In a memo written during the stage of development of this format some guidance notes to help with this assessment were developed:

Fig 13 Markers for successful transmission

Markers for Successful Transmission:

- Recognition of important values by name
- Some comprehension/conceptualisation of the term 'values'
- Awareness of values education (not necessarily the term)
- Acceptance of transmitted values as virtues (good)
- Practice of virtues under peer/authority pressure
- Willing and justified practice
- Fully reflective practice

The above could be said to constitute a hierarchy representing personal growth, although this view would need to be more firmly anchored and evidence-based.

Although not consciously so at the time, such a hierarchy is reminiscent of Laurence Kohlberg's (1981) stages of moral education. It was, though, simply an attempt to rationalise a range of responses evident in the data. In fact the hierarchy is discontinuous; there are at least two hierarchies: a cognitive one and an ethical one. However, the point was not to be systematic as such, but create categories for assessment through which a meaningful comparison of the value/value groups could be undertaken. Clearly, assessments based on a few fragments of data are susceptible to challenge. The point, though, for this research is not whether a particular pupil has acquired a certain value or not, nor even whether the school as a whole is successful in transmitting its values; the purpose is to generate as much analytical and conceptual data as possible, which may point to clues about the nature of institutional value transmission itself.

One more point should be noted. An arbitrary decision was taken that the grid should not extend beyond a single page. The main reason was aesthetic. The grids did not represent the final synthesis, but collectively were more of a sampler; it was more appealing and more useful to be able to place pages side by side and compare them, a factor that was important when the grids were used in the feedback discussions with the principal contact. These occasions were also an opportunity to fill in some of the remaining gaps, as a result of which

some values could be promoted to the first tier. Finally, I ended up with about 20-30 grids for each school. Although there were subjective decisions made in the process of compiling the grids, I could be reasonably confident that they represented the most important values recognised across the schools.

The third step was the actual creation of an IFVA for each school. These were based on both the grids created in step two and the expanded list of values created in step one, which contained key information about transmission strategies not contained in the grids. On the grids values were analysed individually or grouped due to similarity, e.g. accomplishment and attainment. For the synthesis, however, I regrouped them into six categories: social, moral, spiritual, (academic) achievement, political and welfare. The basis of this categorisation was the five aspects of education mandated in the 1988 Education Reform Act, to which much of subsequent discussion or practice of values education in the UK has hearkened back, namely academic, social, moral, spiritual and physical, to which I added the political category, as Citizenship has had a significant impact on the values taught in schools. However, as I struggled to decide where to place certain values, I realised that an auxiliary narrative was needed. This resulted in the creation of a set of working definitions for the categories based on the sources and lived-experience of the values more relevant to the context of schools, although perhaps different to how they are typically defined. They are:

Fig 14 Grouping categories for transmitted values

Social group:	structural values (i.e. those important in structuring social groupings)
Moral group:	rules-based values, particularly distinguishing right and wrong
Spiritual group:	spontaneous values, unpremeditated situational responses
Achievement:	those values based on desire
Political group:	values derived from social policy
Welfare group:	values judged good for individual flourishing

In the IFVA each value group was considered from the viewpoint of strategy, semiotic structure and intentional world, followed by an assessment. This document was written as a continuous report, using the grids and lists but drawing on the original data sources and their analyses as well. In this way a three-dimensional theoretical model of the school as an

institutional transmitter of values was created, which formed a basis for cross case comparison in the later stages of the research.

3.8.2.2 Whole Case Data Review

Applying a theoretical model in analysis carries a risk that any findings that emerge through the research process might reflect inbuilt theoretical assumptions rather than the evidence in the data. For this reason I built in checks to this possibility in order to strengthen the validity of the research process. The Whole Case Data Review (WCDR) was one such check. The WCDR instituted a review and analysis of all the raw data collected at a school. This meant that none of the analyses carried out on the data hitherto had any part to play in this analysis, which is to say that it started again ‘from scratch’ using the data sources for each case: school documents, interview and discussion transcripts (Head, principal contact, teachers and pupils) and audio recordings (of the same), survey questionnaires and summaries and field notes. The purpose of the analysis was twofold:

- 1) To allow a totally fresh approach to the data, putting all the material on an equal basis and blurring the distinction between the sources of information, in order to build a whole case analysis from the ground upwards, consisting only and entirely of the perspectives of the school.
- 2) Following the principles of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), viewing the material from a (ideally) presuppositionless perspective, to allow new concepts to emerge overlooked in the previous analyses that need to be integrated into the overall picture of the school, thus deepening and enriching the model of the institution.

An early version of this process was carried out with the data from the first school. However, it only consisted of the documents, interview and focus group transcription. Nevertheless, the process itself was revealing of the effectiveness of the method. At first I printed off all these sources in a continuous text which I bound together using a document tie. I carried this around, reading sections of it when travelling or waiting, underlining passages of interest and pencilling in comments, attempting to derive some codes. After about two weeks of this rather tedious pursuit, the first hint of a category that applied across the material appeared. Thereafter, in a short period of time, seven other categories appeared. The next task was to provide some justification for these categories. A table was drawn up with the category and examples of text from each source that provided a measure of justification for the naming of a category. The final step was to build a model that assimilated all the categories into a single

‘narrative’. Although the resulting ‘partial’ model only indirectly addressed the central research questions of transmission, it was satisfying and both provided categories for further research and for posing questions that needed to be answered. After this, the scope of the WCDR was expanded to cover the materials listed above and became the basis for a type of cross-case analysis, as described below.

3.8.3 Cross-case analysis

Cross-case analysis is the highest level of analysis. There is a need, however, to distinguish between two forms of cross case analysis. The first type consists of the comparison of the institutional models of values education as those have taken shape through the various levels of analysis of the raw data, and are presented in the case studies, of which only extracts are given in this chapter and in Appendix 3. In the process described under ‘Data Analysis’ data from the various sources was analysed and these analyses, together with the synthesis IFVA, constituted the individual cases, that is an analytic picture of the schools as systems in which values education was taking place. This was insufficient, though, to establish a clear picture of value transmission within each school. That began to emerge in a comparison of these cases, with the similarities and differences pointing towards features of an ‘institutional ontology’. This comparative cross-case analysis is described in chapter 4.

There is another, less obvious form of cross-case analysis, which is an extension of the Whole Case Data Review (WCDR) carried out within each case, extended to one between all the cases and employed in theory generation across all cases. This process had two stages. In the first, the categories from the partial theories at one case level were applied to the data of a second case and evidence sought to support, broaden or even challenge and dissolve the categorisation. This is also referred to as exploring the ‘range of variability’ of the category (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.143). In the second stage, which could occur as a by-product of the first, or be carried out independently, the categories of the first case were effectively ‘suspended’ while a WCDR was carried out on the data of the second case. Any new categories emerging from the second case were added to those of the first and then the whole applied to a third case and the process repeated. This process effectively continued, circulating between the cases until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached, the point at which there was no further development of the categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.143; Charmaz, 2006, pp.113-114; Hammersley, 1989, p.175). This is shown for a three-case

model, such as the one in this research, in the figure below. The results of this recursive process are shown and discussed in chapter 5.




Fig 15 Recursive cross case analysis

The two types of cross-case analysis identified were ultimately connected, because they were working with the same data for the same ends. Chapter 6 integrates the findings of these two approaches into a dynamic model of institutional value transmission. Throughout, this process was guided by two constraints: first, it had to account for all the data available (Yin, 2009), given that a significant anomaly could have nudged the development in an unforeseen direction; then there was the integrity of the emerging model itself: incompleteness would have been indicative of the need for further theoretical development.

3.9 Summary

The chapter has laid out the justification for a methodological approach that seeks to capture the occurrence of value transmission in three schools differentiated by governance, ideology and demography, which constitute the chosen field. That approach was a cross-case comparison of identical theoretical institutional models of the schools built on phenomenological and semiotic perspectives and employing a range of data collection and data analysis methods compatible with those perspectives. Data collection occurred on three levels – the official, the classroom/teacher, and the recipient – with two methods employed at each level, and data analysis passes through three stages – minor in-case analyses, major in-case analyses (syntheses), and cross-case analyses.

Three schools were chosen that spanned the range of parameters required to establish a representative field, namely an urban faith (Catholic VA) school, a rural independent school

and a suburban state community school. The schools were visited during a three year period of field work, during which time several interviews, a class observation and a survey were carried out in each. Compilation and analysis of the data collected at each school allowed the creation of identical case studies that became the material for cross-case analysis.

The relative complexity of the methodology is justified both by the invisible, sporadic and ephemeral nature of the phenomenon under study – that of the transmission of values – and by the practical limitation of gaining a snapshot view of the schools under study during a handful of visits to each. The methodology allowed the creation of a sophisticated qualitative data collection instrument, essentially a theoretical model of the institutions studied, and an analytical process that sought a mechanism for the transmission of values at different levels, through coding, matrix-building, synthesising, comparing and re-analysing.

Comparison of the three schools is carried out under three headings: institutional character, institutional values and institutional transmission. These are the main headings in which data was presented in the case studies. The sub-divisions of these sections are based on a typological reading of the case study data (Denzin, 1989, cited in Khan and VanWynsberge, 2008) and the presentation based on the ‘stacking’ method of Miles and Huberman (1994). Institutional character compares some of the qualitative differences between the schools and summarises in notational form points discussed in more depth in the case studies. Institutional values compares some of the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in the surveys; all figures are given in percentages to facilitate this comparison; actual figures are given in the case studies. Institutional transmission compares the values pedagogy observed in a sample class at each school and consists of data taken from the observations and analyses of the observation in notational form. Each of these sections concludes with a consideration of ‘institutional ontology’, that is, generalised concepts about the nature of institutions, from the perspective of values in particular, that arise from the foregoing comparisons. These concepts are marked in the passages in bold. They are important concepts that are used in building up a model of institutions as places where value transmission takes place.

4.1 Institutional Character

4.1.1 Type, Governance and Constituency

St Augustine Voluntary aided Roman Catholic secondary state school. Under the joint authority of the local council and the regional diocesan council. Catholic communities city-wide and others on selective basis, including those from poorest wards. High proportion of immigrant and ESL pupils.

Broughampton Independent mixed secondary school, Church of England foundation. Board of governors. Selection by Common Entrance Exam. Predominantly middle class, white, Christian background. Wealthy clients.

Chelmswood State secondary school. Local authority. Local catchment area. Majority lower middle class white UK and Asian. Ethnically and racially mixed

4.1.2 Setting, Relationship to Parents and Local Community

St Augustine Suburban middle class. Poor parental attendance at school events due to geographical dispersion, lack of support for disciplinary measures. Some historic conflicts over land access.

Broughampton Rural village. Sometimes tense relationship to parents due to high expectations from both sides. Well-attended high profile events. Occasional communal problems though some events/facilities open to villagers.

Chelmswood Suburban middle class. Strong support from parents and good attendance at events. Pupils live locally. Unaware of any communal issues.

4.1.3 Ethos, Educational Philosophy, Educational Priority

St Augustine Acquisition of humanistic Christian virtues. Social liberalism, moral conservatism and Catholic spirituality. Intellectual empowerment, broad-based education for life.

Broughampton Nurturing of individual talents. Liberal Anglicanism, conservative traditionalism. Well-rounded individuals, strong sporting tradition

Chelmswood High academic and behavioural expectations. Multiculturalism, institutional self-belief, moral pragmatism. Academic excellence.

4.1.4 Leadership style, Institutional 'Cement', Communal Structure/Promoter

St Augustine Delegation, empowering. Implicit trust. House system, vertical tutor groups, Mass, communal worship.

Broughampton Hierarchical. 'Shared success'. Live-in house system, chapel worship, bounds and special privileges, insider talk.

Chelmswood Managerial, cooperative. Individual care. Whole-school assembly, year groups, pride and recognition, strong support of parents.

4.1.5 Institutional Model, Spatial Categories, Temporal (narrative logic) Categories

St Augustine Humanistic-constituency. School (place, people, purpose, principle), Church (chaplain, Catholic community), World ('the poor', 'the middle classes'), Government, Other (RC) schools. Controlling idea, strategic concept/value, pedagogical strategy, reported consequences.

Broughampton Organic-hierarchical. Core (chapel), Ethos, Character, Ethics (values), Community (houses), Boundary (walls), Buffer (village), Environment (world), Competitors (other independents), Outlier (sister school). Narrative idea, evaluation, strategy, resistance, resolution, consequences.

Chelmswood Systemic-cooperative. Whole school, ethos and values, senior management, staff, pupils, tutor/year groups, the minority, parents, local community, national/local government. Principles (aspiration, cooperation, autonomy), Practices (normal circumstances, difficult circumstances), Outcomes (stability, achievement).

4.1.6. Institutional Ontology

There are many ways in which the information gathered from the field could be dissected, but the focus of the research is the transmission of values, so the analysis will seek to understand the institutions studied from that point of view. Looking at the institutional character is a window into understanding the source of the values that are important for the institute and the resources available to undertake transmission and also the reasons for undertaking transmission. Though it is a contention that all institutions transmit values, they do not do so absent of a justification for doing so.

The first thing to say is that all institutions have a **source of authority**. For schools this is wholly or partly the state. Of the three schools only Chelmswood comes entirely under the jurisdiction of the state, although that authority is in part delegated to local government. St Augustine has a second source in the regional diocesan council of the Catholic Church, but even this is not entirely independent of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. Broughampton, meanwhile, is a charitable foundation. The relationship to the source of authority can sometimes be difficult as there is a natural tension between dependence and the

desire for autonomy. Although it may be self-evident, it is worth stating that authority is important to the transmission of values in order to maintain the institutional architecture of transmission and the right to educate formally those to whom the values are to be transmitted.

All institutions have a **constituency** from which they populate themselves, and each of these schools draws upon rather different (though sufficiently diverse that they would overlap) constituencies. Chelmswood derives its intake from the local catchment area contiguous to the school, while St Augustine mainly from the dispersed Catholic communities and Broughampton predominantly from among well-to-do families. From the transmission perspective the constituency not only supplies the young people who are the **input** that schools, being processing systems, continually need; there is also something of a **value economy** in the relationship between the constituency and the school, a sort of supply and demand: in each of these cases there is a demand from the parents for what the school supplies in terms of its fundamental values to their children, be that academic or more spiritual and moral; reciprocally, the school needs a demand for what it has to offer.

The ethos of any institution is its **repository of values**. This may be explicit, as in the case of St Augustine, or it may be largely implicit in an understood tradition, as in the case of Broughampton, or partly written partly implicit in processes as it is at Chelmswood. Even where a document exists, this will only express a fraction of the total, for every ethos represents something like the collective moral consciousness of the institution, something beyond simple embodiment. The philosophy of education is the educational narrative in which the **discourse of values** is embedded and the focus of education is the schools' attempt to answer the question of what an educated person is, that is, the product of **value acquisition** within the institution.

In order to promote and transmit its values every institution must create a **sense of community**; as discussed in the previous section, as well as in the theory chapter, values represent shared experience and can only be acquired in a communal context. Schools do this partly by creating a common identity, through things like a school uniform, badges, and mottos – what might be called **communal markers** – and partly by creating **communal structures**, typically micro-communities within the larger body. Both Broughampton and St Augustine have house systems that intensify the in-group/out-group distinction. Part of this is also establishing a **boundary**, which is partly geographical, but more significantly where the writ of the institution begins and ends.

The next section of this cross case analysis will look at institutional values to see what patterns of commonality and difference appear in the data from these three schools.

4.2 Institutional Values

Looking at the values espoused by and manifested throughout the three schools is one way of understanding their institutional character, both in terms of what they share in common and also what significant differences there are between them. For each school three sources of data on the institution's values are drawn on: a 'foundation' document - a 'mission statement' or some other document which states the aims and/or ethos of the school; the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) for each school, based on a matrix of all the values across the school; and the results of the survey carried out among pupils in the school. The three sources overlap as the IFVA drew on all data collected at each school to create an overall understanding of the incidence of values at that school. However, that was a very generalised picture; the foundation document states the principal values to which the institute is committed; the survey allows a more quantitative comparison of the attitudes of the pupils at the different schools.

4.2.1 Foundation Documents

	DOCUMENT	VALUES
St Augustine	Mission Statement, Ethos	MS: love, community, potential, excellence, harmony, dignity (respect), justice (fairness); Ethos: consideration, thoughtfulness, courtesy, helpfulness, cooperation, friendliness, diligence, honesty, trust, fairness, openness.
Broughampton	Aims section of the school rule book	Responsibility, uniqueness, potential, achievement, order, community, inspiration, (moral and spiritual) awareness, self-esteem, confidence, respect, enjoyment.
Chelmswood	'Aims and Ethos' document	Order, purpose, care, support, community, equality, opportunity, potential, balance, relevance, accessibility, punctuality, SMSC values, responsibility, opportunity, independence, determination, self-esteem

4.2.2 Institutional Focus Value Analysis

	SOCIAL	MORAL	SPIRITUAL
St Augustine	Belonging, cooperation, family,		Altruism, care, generosity,

	trust, respect, fairness, responsibility		compassion, intrinsic value
Broughampton	Community, cooperation, respect, freedom, responsibility, tolerance, privilege, compromise, fairness	Honesty, impartiality, self-control, chasteness, attendance, punctuality, self-discipline	Altruism, generosity, compassion, empathy, spirituality, self-understanding, awareness
Chelmswood	Cooperation, cohesion, order, community, organisation, trust, respect, fairness, openness, friendliness, amicability	Courtesy, honesty, appropriateness, tidiness, cleanliness, punctuality	Empathy, generosity, care, compassion, helpfulness

	POLITICAL	ACCOMPLISHMENT	WELL-BEING
St Augustine		Achievement, attainment, knowledge, pride	Autonomy, identity, independence
Broughampton	equality	Achievement, ambition, pride, determination, diligence, self-esteem, confidence	Health, welfare, well-being, safety, protection, commonsense, judgement
Chelmswood	Diversity, multiculturalism	Determination, commitment, learning, success, understanding, achievement, attainment	Safety, independence, difference, variety, balance, commonsense

4.2.3 Student Values and Attitudes (all figures are given in percentages)

i. Important Personal Values

	Values	Comments
St Augustine	trust (68), respect (44), loyalty (36), determination (28), ambition (28), confidence (20)	The values question on the survey was not open; respondents had to choose from a list of about 20; nevertheless, the

Broughampton	ambition (44), respect, (39), trust (33), honesty (33), confidence (33)	convergence is significant. Responses were ignored below 20%, leaving 5-6 values; of these, 3 – ambition, respect and trust – are common and 3 more – confidence, determination and honesty – feature in two schools each.
Chelmswood	trust (46), respect (39), determination (25), honesty (23), ambition (20)	

ii. Measured Values in Situational Responses

	A	B	C	Comments
Generosity i=5,4 i=3 i=2,1	40.5 53 7.5	45 30 25	46.5 46 7.5	For all values in situational responses, pupils at school B have lower positive responses, that is, according to their recorded responses they appear less generous overall, less honest, less compassionate and less diligent than pupils at schools A and C. Comparing these latter two schools, pupils at school C are slightly more generous and honest, while pupils at school A are slightly more compassionate and diligent. For B the most generous proportion is only fractionally smaller than that of C, and higher than that of A, but for other situations the most positive proportion is significantly smaller than those for A and C and its most negative proportion significantly larger than those for A and C.
Honesty i=5,4 i=3 i=2,1	75 11 14	40 35 25	78 14.5 7.5	
Concern/ Compassion i=5,4 i=3 i=2,1	85.5 3.5 10.5	50 20 30	65.5 19.5 14.5	
Diligence i=5,4 i=3 i=2,1	60 4 36	35 5 60	50 7.5 42.5	

iii. Perception of taught attitudes

	A	B	C	Comments
<u>Similarities</u>				Many of these results would be expected; where there are differences, for example in the emphasis on getting good grades, it is not thought to be statistically significant. The perception that students do not generally think they are being taught to contribute to society should perhaps be noted.
Work hard	96	100	100	
Get good grades	96	84	90	
Be the best you can	93	89.5	92.5	
Be responsible/ mature	82	89.5	88	
Be independent	75	79	80.5	
Help strugglers	64	63	63.5	
Contribute to society	43	42	41.5	

<u>Differences</u>				
Learn from others	68	47	51	Perhaps because school A is slightly less competitive academically, there may be more emphasis on group work; however, the implementation of thinking skills may have encourage pupils there to take a more active interest in their learning. B is clearly a highly competitive environment, but as a hierarchically structured establishment, respect for older pupils is expected.
Be decisive	50	52.5	39	
Obeys the teacher	82	73.5	92.5	
Be inquisitive	82	73.5	68	
Take interest in study	78.5	63	66	
Respect older pupils	50	89.5	31.5	
Be better than others	28.5	42	2.5	
Get along with others	85.5	100	80.5	

iv. Attitude to School Rules

Response/Reason	A	B	C	Comments
<u>Generally keep</u>				Attitudes to the school rules are fairly consistent across the schools with no statistically significant differences. Clearly, most students want to think of themselves as autonomous moral beings, generally staying on the right side of the rules, but serving their own interests where this conflicts with a rule and the rule is perceived to be unfair, thus preserving the 'moral high ground'.
Commonsense	18.5	15.5	14	
Not worth disobeying	18.5	15.5	16	
Right to obey	15	5	11	
Fear of breaking	7.5	5	7	
<u>Keep/Break</u>				
Depends on fairness	37	42	37	
Depends on feeling	3.5	15.5	7	

v. Positively impressed by:

	A	B	C	Comments
<u>Similarities</u>				Roughly 2/3 of students enjoy school for the opportunity to socialise with their friends and classmates and around 1/3 have a good experience because of their teacher or teachers. The other results for B are anomalous, almost certainly due to the very favourable environment; possibly, this has caused pupils there to downplay the significance of particular subjects.
Opportunity to socialise	63	65	67	
Particular teacher(s)	37	29	23	
<u>Differences</u>				
Particular subject(s)	85	29	63	
Being part of a community	11	47	16	
The sense of security	-	23	14	
The building or facilities	4	35	9	

4.2.4 Institutional Ontology

There is a great deal of information compressed in the tables given in this section, and I wish to draw out some plausible inferences from the data comparison about the values of the schools and how these reflect their institutional character and structure. Any conclusions are tentative, though, and dependent on confirmation from a larger sample. It is worth reiterating that such quantitative analysis is a minor part of this research and any patterns suggested by the data are evaluated against analyses arrived at qualitatively.

First, across the three schools it is possible to see emerging a picture of the values which are considered most important. This picture is built up of a number of perspectives, none of which should be taken as definitive, but which together create a fairly strong case. There is the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) which has mapped the incidence of values across each school in the data from the various sources to gauge the extent of **permeation** of values through the institutional structure. Then there are the foundation documents which state the principal values of the school, both **operational values** – those which are of primary importance in running the organisation – and **transmission values**, which it is of importance to the school to communicate to the pupils, the values and attitudes perceived as important to the school by the pupils and the values considered important by the pupils themselves. A comparison of these could give something like a crude idea of the **transmission flow** in the institute, the extent to which target values had permeated. When summed up across the three schools this is the list:

Fig 16 Maximally distributed values as an index of permeation

SOCIAL: Cooperation, Respect, Fairness, Trust

MORAL: Honesty, Responsibility, Appropriateness

SPIRITUAL: Care, Compassion, Generosity

ACCOMPLISHMENT: Achievement, Ambition

These are the values that are most distributed across the three schools and which are also present, to a large extent, at the beginning and end of the process. None of the values meet all the criteria across all the schools, but some do in at least one school and all come close.

A second point is that the data, particularly the response to the school rules, shows that there is a strong sense of **moral autonomy** guided by a positive value, fairness. Pupils want to follow the rules for the most part, because they are rational and understand the need for rules

or perhaps they do not see the need for rules because they believe in following their commonsense, but do not want to get into trouble. However, if a rule is perceived as unfair they feel no compunction about breaking it, perhaps not openly, flagrantly, but quietly so as not to draw attention. What is perceived as unfair depends somewhat on context, but seems frequently to do with their growing awareness of their sexuality. For example, at all schools girls thought that not being allowed to wear jewellery or makeup was unfair, while a girl at Broughampton complained specifically about the rule forbidding any romantic liaisons. A senior teacher at the same school recognised that in general there was a problem in the lack of privileges granted to senior pupils in this respect. A related issue also came up in Broughampton regarding the tension between the consistency of the rules and the autonomy of the houses, and in general part of the institutional architecture is going to be **systemic tension** between autonomy and collective responsibility leading to **resistance**, whether that be individual resistance to a rule or the school's resistance to the interference of government.

Thirdly, there is a different type of tension which arises, not as a manifestation of a hierarchically-structured resistance to authority, but between the **spontaneous sociality** of the student body and the sense of belonging to a community. There is a discrepancy between socialising and being part of a community despite their being part of the same thing: 'I think at school you're not going to get on with everybody, sometimes it's hard to feel part of the community and if you feel a bit you don't fit in sometimes, then you might enjoy more socialising with a select few people' [A/QQ-7/FG-18]. As the data across the schools indicates fully two-thirds of students value their school as a place for socialising, but the pupils' response to the idea of community at St Augustine and Chelmswood is not encouraging, despite the concept being made much of in the official versions of the schools as 'communities'. It may be worth exploring why this is so, and what makes such a difference at Broughampton, where almost half view the idea of belonging to a community positively. There are several possible reasons. At Broughampton the social mix is less heterogeneous and although the pupil body is international, the ethnic proportion is relatively low and easily integrated. Significantly, every respondent in the survey at Broughampton believed that they are taught to get along with others and the senior tutor said that students of differing social and ethnic backgrounds are put together in studies [B/FN-1108]. In both St Augustine and Chelmswood there is a high ethnic mix, and particularly at St Augustine a very high proportion of immigrant children with English as a second language. Participants in the focus group at Chelmswood mentioned that the Asian pupils stick together, not due to racism but

just because these were the people they knew best [C/FG-2314]. The Head of Chelmswood used the concept of the **critical mass** to speak about the spontaneous socialising of the ‘disaffected’ minority and the need to prevent it from developing and disrupting the learning of the school [C/INT-5023]. However, this term can be applied more generally. At Broughampton it is the existence of a critical mass of culturally homogeneous students that, together with a culture of tolerance and acceptance of difference [B/FN-1108], allows the **integration** of the ‘other’, where spontaneous sociality coincides with the communal mix. At St Augustine and Chelmswood, where critical masses of spontaneously socialising ‘others’ coexist, an ‘ordered community’ can be imposed, but the sense of community will not be as strong. It seems that the lack of the sense of community arises not from resistance to the imposition of order but from the lack of a critical mass of integrated members of the organisation.

The final point that arises from the data is that a strongly ideological ethos seems to lead to a stronger positive response to imaginary scenarios. At St Augustine there is a strong Catholic ethos, and despite the superficial appearance of religion being downplayed in the responses of the students, there is little doubt that they are influenced by those values [A/FG-9]. At Chelmswood, a strong secularist ideology is prevalent throughout the school, which emphasises diversity, equality and a multicultural perspective. There is little evidence of resistance to those values, and they seem to be espoused as much by the students as the staff. In the responses to the survey question asking what they would do in a range of situations, students at St Augustine and at Chelmswood had strong positive indices ($i=1-2$) of generosity, honesty, compassion and diligence and mostly weak negative indices ($i=4-5$), apart from diligence. By contrast, Broughampton, which has little in the way of institutional ideology, except that of encouraging individual talent, the positive indices, apart from generosity, are weaker and the neutral ($i=3$) and negative indices are stronger. This does not necessarily mean that pupils at Broughampton are less generous, honest, etc. overall, as these are only imaginary scenarios, but it does suggest that a strongly ideological ethos functions as a **sensitising force** in priming the minds of pupils to respond in an institutionally expected manner.

4.3 Institutional Transmission

The final part of this cross-case analysis looks at the transmission strategies used in an observed class at each school. The class settings, size and composition, content and approach

were sufficiently varied that the validity of any structural commonalities inferred from the data is likely to be strong.

4.3.1 Description of Observed Classes

St Augustine Vertical tutor group (years 7-13), 25 students (M+F). Moral/Citizenship Education (connected to Respect Agenda) + thinking skills. Responding to a moral dilemma in random pairs; working together, discussing and feeding back; treating partner with respect. 25 min.

Broughampton Tutor group (year 11), 12 F students. PSHE/ Citizenship Education. Use and abuse of social networking, consequences for employment prospects. Tutor presentations and individual internet searches. 20 min of 40 min class.

Chelmswood Citizenship class (year 8), 30 students (50/50 M/F). Assessed Citizenship programme. Diversity: benefits and problems. Teacher presentations and pupil responses. 60 min.

4.3.2 Approach and Character of Teaching

St Augustine Eliciting moral reasoning; role-playing respectful behaviours. Behavioural modification (practice).

Broughampton Warning, awareness-raising; self-education about dangers (practice). Behavioural modification (intent).

Chelmswood Eliciting responses to a hypothetical situation; eliciting pupils' experiences and knowledge of events; note-taking. Attitudinal modification (practice), behavioural modification (intent)

4.3.3 Invocation of Values

St Augustine Yes: respect, politeness, cooperation, gratitude

Broughampton Yes: community, privacy; implied: dignity, safety

Chelmswood Yes: diversity, equality, acceptance; implied: tolerance, multiculturalism

4.3.4 Evocation of a Moral Community

St Augustine Extrinsic through moral dilemma posed; intrinsic through role-playing respect

Broughampton Extrinsic, through reference to moral judgements of potential employers; possibly intrinsic through reference to their (implied) responsibility to the school community

Chelmswood Intrinsic, through reflection upon the issues of difference as those apply with particular reference to the school community

4.3.5 Parameters of Invocation and Evocation

St Augustine	Broughampton	Chelmswood
Structure	Structure	Structure
Events	Events	Events
Symbolic-dramatic categories	Symbolic-dramatic categories	Symbolic-dramatic categories
Empowering/disempowering	Empowering/disempowering	Empowering/disempowering
Formal/informal	Formal/informal	Formal/informal
Participation in moral universe	Participation in moral universe	Participation in moral universe

4.3.6 Parameters of Control

St Augustine Authority, shared experience, taboo, tradition, exemplar, instruction, rules, ritual, text, task, interpretation, teaching

Broughampton Authority, custom, disclosure, warning (prediction), task, text, resistance and assertion of power, narrative, interpretation, teaching

Chelmswood Authority, teaching, foretelling, ritual, image, recollection, probing, announcement, instruction, explanation, text, encouragement, narrative, acceptance, summarising, example, discussion, advice, distinction, indication, recitation, elicitation, disputation, clarification, reassurance

4.3.7 Institutional Ontology

The **invocation of values** is a concept which emerged in the philosophical reflection on the nature of values in chapter 2. It means more than simply the utterance of a value term, more like the unveiling of its symbolic power at the heart of a life form, a theoretically closed

group. Values, then, are not merely conceptual but correlate with a particular experience shared among the group. In the real, messy social world values rarely attain such singular prominence, partly because groups are always permeable and they are multi-valued as are the individuals who make them up. Yet all institutions, schools included, attempt to strengthen cohesion and loyalty by promoting in-group/ out-group distinctions and by defining key values, sometime unintentionally, by embedding them in important (foundation) documents. Tutor groups, which are often the primary pastoral context, are ideal places to observe the invocation of values, sometime being small and being brought together for the purpose of values education. However, because invocation cannot be merely a **discourse** in which values are embedded, such occasions must be suffused with attempts to establish the dominance of the value and deconstruct, or conceptually ‘unpack’, its meaning for the group, for example getting a group to think about the meaning of a term and provide examples of it, as was done in the class at Chelmswood with the ideas of sameness and difference used to explore diversity [C/OBS-0343/3-1449/12].

Along with invocation of values comes its counterpart, the **evocation of a moral community**. As stated above, values, particularly in the sense of the acquisition of values, has to be understood as a collective phenomenon. To acquire a value, therefore, it is necessary to experience the collectivity in which the value functions. In the observed class at St Augustine the students are required to role-play respect, politeness, cooperation and gratitude by expressing the appropriate expressions and actions ‘even if it’s...false’ [A/OBS-1125/14]. Evocation is experiential in another sense; to acquire the value is more than to pass through the deconstruction of the concept in a collective setting, it is also to experience the moral force of the value, its ‘oughtness’ or moral imperative (Kant). Clearly this cannot be observed, but anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of this approach in reducing conflict and bullying was supplied by the speaker [A/FN(3)]. This experiential aspect of a value is referred to as **participation**, as in ‘participation in the moral community’ or ‘participation in the moral universe of the value’. The example from St Augustine is an example of the most important kind of evocation, known as **intrinsic evocation**, meaning that the community that is being invoked is the very one which is constituted by the addressees *and in which they are participating*. At Broughampton another kind of evocation is encountered, **extrinsic evocation**, where the moral community that is evoked, that of the world of potential employers, is hypothetical, in that it is not that of the addressed group and it is evoked more for consideration than for participation. At Broughampton there is also a more ambivalent

case for intrinsic evocation. The tutor reminds the pupils of the possible consequences of their actions, and the actions of others, on the whole school community [B/OBS-0425/9]. It could be argued that, by invoking the disvalues of shame and threats (to the reputation of the school) and then experiencing the consequences of similar actions vicariously through accounts of others' experiences, the tutor is evoking a participant moral community in their midst.

In each case study a critical analysis of the class observation was carried out, using various analytical methods such a structural analysis, systems analysis and content analysis. The results were then tabulated in a matrix with two temporal dimensions. An example is shown in appendix 3. The vertical axis was built around a straightforward chronology of the main events that occurred during the class, suitably separated out or bundled as appropriate. In the column(s) to the left of the events the categories of the structural analysis were matched to the main events. To the right of the events the categories of the systems analysis and the content analysis, respectively, were placed and matched to the chronology of the events. To the immediate right of the events, between the events column and that given to the systems analysis, a new column was inserted in which each event was interpreted (in semiotic terms) as categories of symbolic-dramatic power (the basis and reasons for this are discussed fully in the methodology chapter, section 3.8.1.3, pages 107-113). The horizontal axis now consists of a set of categories – those given in section e., Parameters of Invocation and Evocation, above – which constitute a relationship of causality, which can be simplified into four categories: **strategy**, **sign**, **power** and **participation**. The table below sets out the steps from analysis to simplification of categories.

Fig 17 Structural analysis of observed teaching events

Type of Analysis	Categories	Simplified Categories
Morphological	Sections	Strategy
	Phases/cycles/circles	
Chronological	Events (separated/bundled)	Sign
Semiotic	Symbolic-dramatic categories	
Systems	Empowering/disempowering	Power
	Active/passive	
	Formal/informal	

Content	Participation in moral universe	Participation
	In/out	

The process of structural analysis has allowed the inference *post facto* of the tutor's strategy in each lesson - to paraphrase Schleiermacher - better than they knew it themselves. While this might be an exaggeration, in each case the critical analysis was presented to the relevant tutor; none raised any objection to the analysis and one in particular was impressed 'that you could find so much in there' (email correspondence).

Events, reinterpreted in symbolic-dramatic terms are collectively signs. They are, however, signs understood as markers of transmission. A blank sheet of paper in front of a student is a sign that the student may be disengaged, but it is also a sign that the teacher may not have engaged the student sufficiently for transmission to be taking place. The principal interest is on the teacher as sign-bearer and the signs as forms of **control** over the environment in which acquisition can take place. These signs can be overt, as when a verbal or written instruction is given or when a standard gesture is used, or implied in more subtle forms of 'charismatic' control through linguistic use, described below.

Section 4.3.6 'Parameters of Control' gives examples of the different symbolic-dramatic categories, or signs as forms of control, employed during the observed classes at the three schools. These categories can be analysed and grouped into three basic categories. A consideration of the data, guided by the ideas of control in educational transmission in Bernstein (1975), has led to the conclusion that there are three aspects of control: that achieved through the manipulation and patterning of space, time and image, referred to, respectively, as **boundary**, **periodicity** and **symbolisation**. Larger-scale versions of these categories will be referred to in the next section; what is being considered here is a practice of charismatic control through the medium of language and its effect on an audience. Boundary (to be more grammatically consistent it should be referred to as 'bounding' or 'boundary creation') is the act of dividing the semantic space of a listener by imposing a boundary between different qualities, for example dividing behaviour into 'right' and 'wrong' or answers to questions into 'correct' and 'incorrect'. Such divisions have a profound effect on listener perception. Periodicity can be dividing up time linearly into successive periods, such as past, present and future, giving a sense of temporal depth to a discourse in the present, or

looped as it is in certain rhetorical devices such as the rule of three and repeated motifs. By symbolisation I am thinking primarily of things like analogy and metaphor, which can shape understanding or alter ways of thinking. Nevertheless, the linguistic is only one level of manifestation of these categories of control; even in the classroom they will have extra-linguistic applications, for example dividing the class into groups, imposing a deadline for work or using visuals to reinforce learning. The table on page 140 shows how the combined symbolic dramatic categories fit into the basic categories.

Some forms of control do not fit into a single basic category. For example, tradition can be a way of looking to the past, but it can also function as a standard for present behaviour; ritual involves the periodic repetition of a set of actions, but also usually is heavy with symbolism. Some of the symbolic-dramatic categories did not fall into these categories of control, but into another aspect of authority, power distribution. Power distribution is less about the charisma of the teacher but derives from the role and the power that is the mark of office. Its categories are more straightforwardly informational but also indicate the shifting balance of power in the to and fro of interaction.

Control is differentiated from, though related to, power in this theory of transmission. Control and power together constitute the authority of the teacher. The main distinction is that while control originates in the charismatic quality of the teacher to mitigate distraction and stimulate learning in the students, power is a conferred status that a teacher has by dint of the role they occupy and the qualification they have to stand in that role. The distinction runs deeper than that, however, particularly in regards the role of the teacher in value transmission.

Fig 18 Symbolic dramatic categories as forms of control and power

Symbolic-dramatic categories	Basic categories of control	Sorted forms of control
Authority, shared experience, taboo, tradition, exemplar, instruction, rules, ritual, text, task, interpretation, teaching, custom, disclosure, warning (prediction), resistance and assertion of power, narrative, foretelling, image, recollection,	Boundary	taboo, tradition, rules, probing, disclosure distinction, custom
	Periodicity	shared experience, tradition, warning (prediction), ritual, custom, foretelling, recollection, narrative
	Symbolisation	exemplar, ritual, interpretation, image, example, indication, text

probing, announcement, explanation, encouragement, acceptance, summarising, example, discussion, advice, distinction, indication, recitation, elicitation, disputation, clarification, reassurance	Power distribution	Instruction, teaching, assertion of power/authority, advice, probing, announcement, explanation, encouragement, acceptance, summarising, discussion, recitation, elicitation, disputation, clarification, reassurance
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Control being charismatic, is unique to the individual; it can be natural or learned, but everyone has it to varying degrees along a spectrum; more importantly, it cannot be conferred or shared. Power is different. Power is derived and shared hierarchically and rests ultimately in the power of the state to determine who can teach. More importantly, the granting of power confers with it the right to distribute power (the extent of this will be considered in the next section), which as the consideration of empowerment and disempowerment in the classroom demonstrated, is vital to the process of acquisition.

4.4 Summary

Data from the case studies is compared under three sections. These sections are the same categories as those employed for categorising information in the case studies themselves, namely Institutional Character, Institutional Values and Institutional Transmission. Within each category analysed data from all relevant sources has been ordered according to sub-categories, grouping concepts that have largely been developed during the course of the analysis (although some are *in vivo* concepts) and which have an affinity for each other. Data has been simplified and standardised by reducing written data to notational form or single terms and numerical data to percentages, to facilitate easier comparison between cases, and placed in tables and frames with the data arranged either vertically or horizontally. Some datasets, particularly for the surveys, have comments written alongside offering observations and interpretations of patterns that seem to be emerging. The main analytical discourse, though, is contained in each section following the cross-case comparison. Entitled ‘Institutional Ontology’, it attempts from the data to make inferences from the patterns of similarity across the dataset about the nature of those schools as institutions in the transmission of values, as a preliminary stage in the development of a mechanism for institutional value transmission.

Important patterns began to emerge, first concerning the value infrastructure of the schools, such as having a depository of values and a discourse of values, a sense of community and communal markers and boundaries, and a value economy defined largely by the constituency served. Then, despite the disparate models of governance and sources of values that the schools exhibited, a broad convergence on the most significant values across the three schools could be seen, as well as important theoretical concepts such as moral autonomy, resistance to authority and spontaneous sociality. Finally, there was evidence in support of the initial concepts of invocation and evocation, and some refinement of their scope, as well as differentiation of the concept of authority into power and control, and differentiation of control into boundary, periodicity and symbolisation. This comparative cross-case analysis was developed alongside an iterative cross-case analysis, in which the dataset across an entire case was reanalysed and then emerging concepts ‘fed into’ another, as described in chapter 3.

In summary, at this point in the theoretical development, some important aspects of institutional transmission of values are understood to be strategy (strategic thinking and planning), signs (of control), power (to empower and disempower) and participation (the experiential aspect of value). How these are linked to the ideas of invocation and evocation, as well as the other aspects of institutional ontology outlined here will be discussed in chapter 6, after the structural aspects of the entire mechanism have been outlined in the next chapter.

In this chapter I present the overall conceptual framework of the model for institutional values transmission, as that has emerged through the process of iterative cross-case analysis, and then break it down into its constituent categories and concepts, providing definitions and examples of each (and, if applicable, sub-types), and a rationale for deciding on each concept or category. The chapter concludes with a demonstration of conceptual clustering in texts chosen from across the dataset.

5.1 Overview and Outline of Model for Institutional Value Transmission

On the basis of the analyses of data obtained at the three schools covered in the Case Studies and the synthesis of this analysed data in the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) and Whole case Data Review (WCDR), an overview of the model for institutional value transmission in four stages can be outlined, shown in the table on the following page. Sub-categories/concepts in bold are constitutive *aspects* of the principal categories/concepts in the left-hand column; non-bolded ones are typically *examples* of the sub-categories/concepts or ‘scaffold’ terms that have been important at various stages in the construction of the model.

This model can be thought of as a development of and an extension of the basic model of invocation and evocation derived from the analysis of value in the chapter 2. The terms ‘invocation’ and ‘evocation’, however, do not appear in the model as it stands. The reasons are twofold: the lesser of these is that invocation and evocation are deductive principles which have guided the research process, whereas the model below is inductively based, containing categories and concepts which have emerged from the data during the course of the research; the more important is that the model below is a static representation of the components of the model. In the next chapter, Discussion of Findings, the dynamics of the model will be explained more fully, and that is where invocation and evocation will be seen to play their part.

Fig 19 Outline of model for institutional values transmission

CATEGORY/CONCEPT	SUB-CATEGORIES/CONCEPTS	EXPLANATION
Permeation	Value/disvalue, strategy, semiotic marker, intentional state; official perspective (top down), classroom-teacher perspective (sideways on), pupil perspective (bottom up)	The linguistic, conceptual and symbolic diffusion and re-appearance of values throughout all levels of the institution
Authority	Periodicity, boundary creation, symbolisation, power distribution; authority, boundary, structure, routine, operational value, transmission value, personal value, empowerment, disempowerment	The extent and limitation of the powers by which control is exerted for maintenance and production at all levels of the institution
Resistance	Moral autonomy, intensity, target, negotiation; Rebellion, defiance, criticism, questioning	The ways in which externally imposed and internally generated force (power) is countered at all levels of the institution
Transformation	Transformative experience, trigger, turning inward/reflectivity, replication; Intrinsic value, beyond controlling, taking responsibility, unspoken tradition, letting the mask slip, the spiritual core, catching the moment	The ways in which resistance is bypassed, averted or overcome, throughout the institution

5.2 Definition of Principal Categories and Sub-Categories

This section will provide a definition of all the main categories and concepts in the model, the principals in the first column and those bolded in the second column of the table above.

5.2.1 Categories of Permeation

Permeation is the state of conceptual saturation of the life-world of an institution, specifically by value concepts. This arises through the normal routes of institutional communication in schools: policies, meetings, notices, discourses, colleague dialogue, books and films, classroom pedagogy and more informal exchanges, peer conversations, and so on. As well as the specifically linguistic, it can also include extra-linguistic communication, such as pictures, symbolic acts and behavioural modelling.

Value

A value is any term, or a description of a state of affairs, that has the connotation of a good in a particular frame of reference, and can influence how individuals feel and behave in certain circumstances. Here, it includes specifically social, moral, spiritual, individual and achievement values. Using a variation of content analysis, values are designated by abstract nouns being assigned to sections of text that match the noun in meaning, either through being identical, transformed (e.g. syntactically) or synonymous.

Disvalue

Disvalues, as they are interpreted in this research, are negative states that reinforce a good or invoke a positive reaction, so are found in clusters either with or without values.

Strategy

A strategy is an action, intention to act or action plan with a pedagogical aim, specifically (though not exclusively) to facilitate the teaching of a particular value or set of values.

Semiotic marker

A semiotic marker is a word or phrase that designates an object or event, either real or imaginary, which has some pedagogical significance, particularly, though not exclusively, in the teaching of values.

Intentional state

The term is taken from the phenomenological literature, from the ‘intentionality of consciousness’, used first by Brentano (1973) and then by Husserl (1970), meaning that consciousness is not a pure abstraction but is always consciousness of something, that

something being either indiscriminately the perception of an object in the external world, the awareness of an emotional state, a belief, etc. In this research analysis ‘intentional state’ is used to denote particularly expressions of experiences in the context of a value or set of values.

5.2.2 Categories of Authority

Authority is understood to consist of power and control. Power is hierarchical and distributive and this distributive aspect is reproduced throughout all levels of the institution. Control, by contrast, is individual and charismatic, and limited only to a particular arena. Power and control are not themselves represented at the analytic level, but power by ‘power distribution’ and control by ‘periodicity’, ‘boundary’ and ‘symbolisation’.

Power distribution

Includes any references to the power structure, the giving (empowering) or the removal (disempowering) of power: within the class, within the school, or from outside with reference to the school.

The following three categories denote techniques for exerting control within the school environment, that arise from individual or collective autonomy, initiative and creativity, outside of the hierarchy of power. They include physical manipulation of the environment, but more specifically the manipulation of language. At the administrative level this latter is more likely to be written; at the pedagogical level it is more often spoken.

Periodicity

Periodicity refers to the action of patterning language with respect to time. That could include placing things in a chronological order, or even creating a time reference for a single event. It also includes introducing cycles into language through various rhetorical devices, such as rhyme, rhythm, repetition, group of three, etc, and also grammatical regularities such as parallel clauses, linking and reference, and phonological aspects such as intonation and stress. In all cases examples should be immanent in the text rather than a secondary reference.

Boundary

Boundary refers to the action of using language to pattern space, of dividing space – in the widest sense, including physical and all forms of imaginary space – up and thereby bounding

sections of it. Examples would be dividing the class into groups, prohibiting or promoting certain actions (dividing moral space, creating regions of ‘allowed’ and ‘not allowed’). The language tends to be imperative, but the bounding transcends the language and is ‘felt’ in the realm of meaning.

Symbolisation

Symbolisation can include the use of visual images, but refers specifically to the manipulation of language to create images in the mind of the reader or listener. Includes, metaphor, metonymy and simile, onomatopoeia and alliteration, etc, which are immanent in the language, but also various transcendent narrative and anecdotal devices. The use of visual images, particularly used pedagogically, would probably be classed under ‘semiotic marker’.

5.2.3 Categories of Resistance

The natural reaction to change, particularly when that change is perceived (rightly or wrongly) to impact negatively on the relative freedom, power, status, wellbeing or economic circumstances of an individual or of an individual to act on behalf of an institution. In the context of this research the definition is more narrowly focused on the struggle between the relatively empowered and disempowered over the question of the good.

Moral autonomy

The desire of each person to be able to decide the good for themselves, irrespective of whether that good might be fundamentally selfish, self-denying or public-minded. It is the encroachment of power into the area of moral autonomy that is the basis of resistance.

Intensity

Every reaction to the usurpation of moral autonomy is a form of resistance, but its manifestation can vary widely, particularly in regards to intensity. Stages of intensity of resistance identified from the least intense are questioning, criticism, distraction, defiance and rebellion.

Target

The target of resistance is that authority which is perceived as encroaching on moral authority. The identification of this source with the real situation depends entirely on the correctness of this perception.

Negotiation

We all negotiate a compromise between various goods, for example between freedom and security or leisure time and income. Sometimes this is more subtle and more fundamental. The acceptance of a value requires the sacrifice of a degree of moral autonomy. Often this proceeds through an internal dialogue; sometimes the bargaining is in the open but the nature of the process is not acknowledged, as when a teacher convinces a pupil to work hard for an exam. The institutional transmission of values in a school requires a particular type of negotiation: the school must offer something in return for the pupils' moral autonomy. That is a place in the moral community. That is clearly not an offer that every person feels obliged to take up. The 'lads' in Willis' (1977) study were clearly not willing to sacrifice their moral autonomy to accommodate academic study, despite this condemning them to a life of industrial labour. Children who truant are rebelling against the authority of the school and placing themselves outside the moral community. These are the more extreme cases, but as a measure of negotiation takes place within all individuals, there must be something that both makes the moral community an attractive proposition and assists in the negotiation with moral autonomy.

5.2.4 Categories of Transformation

Transformative experience

As the experience of a shared feeling constitutes the interiority of value, the acquisition of a value should logically be accompanied by a type of 'experience' that allows and enables the experiencing of that shared feeling. Though these two meanings of experience used here are distinct, they are connected at a very fundamental level, as I have argued in the theory chapter.

Trigger

The change from a state of non-acquisition of a value, particularly in the case of active resistance though not limited to this, to a state of acquisition requires an event in the individual's personal or social environment that triggers the change. This can be something dramatic or something quite mundane, but it leads to a transformative experience.

Turning inward/reflectivity

The exteriority of a value is its linguistic conceptualisation. Therefore, the acceptance of a value, particularly as this is explicitly recognised, should engender a more reflective attitude towards life. Though values are relative and underpin very different life-worlds or ‘forms of life’ (Pring, 1986), all values require something of an inward turn.

Replication

Values are intrinsically shared. Moreover, they are inherently *transmissive*, meaning they require being transmitted. On acquiring a value, at the expense of a degree of moral autonomy, there is a need not only to reinforce the decision through invocation of the value but also to extend the moral community of the value.

5.3 Explanation of Evidential Basis for Categories

This section deals with the evidential basis for the terms and audits the decision process in arriving at that particular concept from the raw data. This will be done using a limited range of data; the full data supporting the conceptual scheme can be found in the supplementary material.

5.3.1 Categories of Permeation

The concept of permeation lies implicitly in the literature of hegemonistic saturation (Apple, 1979, p.22), though it is not used explicitly and certainly not in the sense used here, that of the institutional diffusion of values. Evidence for permeation itself was not sought directly in the raw data of the primary sources; it was considered an organising idea primarily. As explained elsewhere, it would require longitudinal studies of some sophistication to establish the extent to which permeation of values was a result of transmission flow alone. However, indirect evidence arose with the discovery of ‘clustering’ of the categories of permeation in the data, and that will be dealt with in the final section.

5.3.1.1 Values

The concept of values proposed in this research, and explained in the theory chapter, means that values as linguistic structures are diffused through normal routes of communication and are therefore embedded in normal, pedagogical and reflective discourses. In Methodology, the process of isolating values embedded in texts was explained in full, but simply put is a variation on content analysis, whereby explicit or implicit values are extracted by reduction to

abstract noun forms. Four types of embedding can be distinguished: explicit, explicit (lexical variation), implicit (synonym/metaphor) and implicit (interpretation). Each of these will be demonstrated.

i) explicit value

What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school? [pause] ‘Ahm, Care for each other, ahm, and a recognition that everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has intrinsic value’. [A/INT-29.00] (**care**)

‘The core of chapel life [is] a celebration of the community that’s here...we have 667 students living at close quarters with each other and it becomes vital, I think, to promote empathy, ehm self-understanding, ehm a sense of altruism towards others and those skills are manifested in adventures beyond the school, active charity events...’ [B/INT-6.55] (**empathy, altruism**)

‘The ordered community is...I mean, this school is, has a very good community feel and I think everybody feels part of a team. I’ve been in lots of schools and taught in lots of schools and this is probably the only one where it feels that you’ve got that community spirit in the same way as we’ve got here [C/FN-2324]; I think you could ask any pupil in the school and they would say they feel part of a real community here and a valued part of this community’. [C/FN-2557] (**community**)

ii) explicit (syntactic variation) value

Becky: ‘Some teachers are more lenient, but sometimes I think people get away with stuff that they shouldn’t like being disrespectful or not paying full attention’ [A/FG-2]; *Gavin*: ‘without respect nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don’t respect your teacher they’re probably not going to respect you, and when no one’s respecting each other nothing works properly’. [A/FG-8] (**respect**)

‘The School prides itself on the positive relationships between pupils and staff’. [B/P-BM, 2.1] (**pride**)

To deliver a balanced and broad curriculum which is relevant and accessible to all pupils [C/Aims-2] (**balance**)

iii) implicit (synonym/metaphor) value

[Initially] ‘I didn’t see how we could generate that locality loyalty within a building on a site’. [A/INT-16.00] (**belonging, cooperation**)

‘there’s a lot of village people who know our Bramtonians and talk to them and are a lookout post’ [B/INT-39.55] (**welfare, safety, protection**)

‘Even if I don’t like a subject I always still try hard; I learn a lot if I put the effort in; When I’m off I realise how much I miss school, so I try to make the most of my education’. [C/SUR-8] (**determination, commitment**)

iv) implicit (interpretation) value

Amanda: ‘Overall I feel you get a good education at the end of the day. In year 11 it’s the target year and they always make sure you do well’. [A/FG-3] (**accomplishment, achievement, attainment**)

‘If you were to go to [house name] and [Airey Pierce*] is the housemaster there, he would be one of the best exponents of this, because you can ask him about any boy in his house and he’ll tell you the parents, the parents’ names, where they’re from, he’ll even tell you what particular crisps they like: the detail, it amazes me the details the housemasters amass on their charges, and that to me is...there’s a lovely moment on a Friday night and a Saturday night and Airey is in the foyer of the house and the boys come, sometimes in their rugby kits or their sports kits and they’ve got late teas or been to the chippy or something and they sit around him and they just talk. And when I have a problem or when teachers have a problem in the academic environment, as there’s one particular issue going on at the moment with a girl, you talk to the matron and the matrons really do know their boys and their girls... They have the most intimate conversations with their students, I marvel at their nature’. [B/I-51.10] (**care**)

Teacher: ‘What’s this poem all about, [the one] Benjamin Zephaniah’s written. Yes?’ Student: ‘*It’s about all religions and where you’re from, they’re all equal. It doesn’t matter if you’re different*’. [C/OBS-34/3233] (**diversity, multiculturalism**)

5.3.1.2 Disvalues

The ontological status of disvalues was discussed in the theory chapter. They are transmitted like values and function to reinforce or provoke values, so even where they stand alone they imply values. They are much less common in the sources than values; however, this could be a result of a line of questioning rather than anything intrinsic. Although this has not been considered systematically, there seem to be several distinct types of disvalues: ideological competitors to certain values, negative emotional states, and abstract antonyms. Disvalues in the following examples are underlined and the implied value(s) are bolded.

All will be expected to adhere to the school’s Equal Opportunities Policy. All forms of racism, sexism and discrimination of any kind will not be tolerated. Incidents of unacceptable behaviours will be recorded [A/BP-P, p2] (**equality, diversity**)

Racism and sexism, are among an expanding number of identified behaviours that are characterised as discriminatory and trigger a strategy of non-tolerance across a broad range of public and, increasingly, private institutions. As non-tolerance of discriminatory behaviour is linked to the values of equality and diversity, such discrimination can be considered a disvalue.

‘be magnanimous when the success happens or when the failure happens’. [B/INT-3211] (**magnanimity**)

Failure is mentioned in the context of magnanimity, where it has a particular resonance, as learning to be a ‘good loser’ is a sign of emotional maturity; however, it could provoke other value experiences such as determination or humility.

‘we are pushed sometimes into doing things we wouldn’t ideally want to do: either perhaps running a particular course which students can pass and get some points and push us up the league tables, which might not be the best course that we actually want them to do, but we can’t risk results dropping. And so it’s very cautious in that way [than] perhaps introducing new things that might be better. There are new course available that students could do that might be better GCSEs. The science course we do at the moment might educationally be better, might be more interesting, more motivating for the pupils, but we would be very wary of changing when we’ve got an established course which students are doing very well on’. [C/INT-2940] (**stability, achievement**)

Caution and wariness underlie an innate conservativeness in the school (Chelmswood), which promotes stability in an institution which already has an excellent academic reputation and feels no need to take risks to improve matters.

5.3.1.3 Strategy

Strategy refers predominantly to pedagogical strategy but can also refer to learning strategy. From the research perspective strategies fall into two types: reported strategies, which, as the term implies, are when people – even unconsciously – refer to the strategies they employ to teach (or to learn), and live strategies which are immanent in the description of a teaching event or in the transcription of the teacher’s (pupil’s) verbal delivery. The former are recovered from the transcriptions through line by line analysis; the latter are postulated on the basis of a morphological analysis of the entire observed lesson, a variety of structural phenomenology. Examples are taken from across sources and cases. Where a specific part of the extract is of particular significance, it is underlined. Stated or implied values, where appropriate, that are being promoted are given in brackets and bolded after the reference.

i) Reported strategies

‘We operate distributed leadership and project management here, which means that a lot of the power resides in a broad number of people who don’t have to run back to me to check things. Because we use project management it means the most junior member of staff can have an idea, can be allowed to run with it, develop it and produce an outcome, which their peers then say “Yeah, that sounds good, we’ll do it”’. [A/INT-1600] (**responsibility, freedom**)

The intention behind two interlinked concepts, ‘distributed leadership’ and ‘project management’ is indicated by the link ‘which means...’ which in this case does not introduce a definition but a purpose and an intention to empower members of staff.

‘We make a feature of pluralism... I think the very plurality and the very fact that it’s very clear to all pupils here that they do live in a society where there are people from many different faith backgrounds and cultural backgrounds, I think that’s very important to people here’. [C/INT-1912] (**pluralism, diversity**)

The intention is evident in the words ‘We make a feature...’ and the fact that this has been linked to an identified desire of the target group, which in this case is the student body.

ii) Implied strategies through morphological analysis

From Case Study School B

Though superficially straightforward, the structure is not really a linear one, but rather cyclical. Though complex in detail and not uniform in execution the basic cycle can be represented thus:

Fig 20 Implied strategy in observed class, school B

<u>Disclosure</u>	
Warning	Consequence
	<u>Evidence</u>
Education	Question/Comment
	<u>Response</u>

First the teacher reveals something that the pupils may not have known, such as the ease with which it is possible to gain access to someone’s site. Then she gives a warning to the students about the appropriateness of their behaviour online, the possible consequences, such as losing or failure to secure employment and provides evidence for this through publicised examples. The cycle is complete when the teacher responds to questions or comments from the pupils, developing and deepening the point, before moving to the next disclosure.

[Case Study B/Critical analysis of observed class-I]

The teacher has a clear strategy in this analysis: to change behaviour through a double shock, that of unmasking illicit behaviour and then pointing out the potential long-term consequences of that behaviour.

5.3.1.4 Semiotic Marker

A semiotic marker is anything in the texts that indicates a sign (ignoring in this instance the notion that words themselves are signs). Signs could be categorised in a number of ways, for example by whether they are immanent or reported, or by type, such as message, act, object or event; but, for the purposes of this exposition these distinctions do not seem as relevant as showing that there are a multiplicity of media that sign, and that this process is instrumental in transmitting values. The only stipulation is – and this may seem obvious – only real, tangible things count (even if they have imaginary content, such as stories). In the following examples the semiotic markers are underlined and any values implied are bolded.

Rules will be prominently displayed throughout the school so that they can be referred to regularly and applied consistently [A/BP-CC, p4] (**appropriateness, safety**)

In this case the rules are printed onto a sign or poster through which the message is broadcast.

To teach the rules adults will model appropriate behaviour at all times [A/BP-CC, p5] (**appropriateness**)

Actions consistent with messages delivered verbally send a strong message in themselves.

The Chapel is regularly used to focus the thoughts of the community at times of crisis, collective grief or rejoicing [B/P-WRE-2.7]

‘The Chapel’ is really an example of metonymy, in which the building itself stands in for a whole edifice of belief, ritual, guidance and pastoral care, which extends throughout the school, but which finds its centre in the building itself.

‘Pupils are **polite** and **respectful** and teachers **respect** the pupils. I’ve never been in a school where you walk down the corridors and pupils always, always say “hello miss, how are you, did you have a good weekend?” and the teachers the same to the children: “Ah, morning Steven, how are you?” You come in and they’re opening doors for you, “can I help you with that, miss?”” [C/FN-2324]

Here, ritual greetings and actions are used to convey feelings of respect and friendliness.

5.3.1.5 Intentional State

An intentional state is simply a state of consciousness of something, but I have used it in a more restricted sense of an awareness of a particular disposition: a feeling, an opinion, a cherished belief, a judgement, which is being articulated. Intentional states are experiential, but in the cases quoted here are experiences, however tangentially, of values or, in some cases, disvalues. Values or implied values are bolded; disvalues are, additionally, italicised.

Amanda: Well me, I lend money. I don't expect it back but they say they'll pay me back anyway so I take it when they give it back. *Becky:* It's about trust I suppose. I have this weird thing about money, especially, I don't know why, it might be because of the way I was brought up, I don't know, but I don't like giving money away. I'd rather give my food away than trust somebody to give me back something. I don't know why. *Gavin:* I think if you give some money they may start taking advantage and expect you to give money more often so people would rather just give them their food. And plus if you got lunch it's likely that your parents have given it to you and you've not actually paid for it yourself so you're more willing to give it away than give your own money away. [A/FG-17] (**generosity**)

The discussion was in response to a question regarding generosity, but the conversation seems to focus on trust as much as on generosity, or not trusting people, and ranges over self-analysis, reminiscence and prediction.

Becky: A lot of the time you can get into more trouble for not having your uniform done properly than that people might do for disrupting everyone's **learning** in the class. [A/FG-2]

Becky expresses her resentment at what she perceives as an injustice or unfairness based on the value she attaches to learning.

‘... everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has **intrinsic value**; so no matter how naughty, no matter how deprived, no matter how socially excluded you may be or, on the other hand, no matter how wealthy or fortunate you may be, that within each person is, there’s going to be something of real value that needs to be nurtured and grown and developed.’ [A/INT-29.00]

The teacher uses his belief in intrinsic value as a great equaliser in terms of class, advantage, status and behaviour. The poor, who are disproportionately likely to display inappropriate behaviour, nonetheless have potential. Those from more advantaged backgrounds, while enjoying many privileges, may implicitly lack certain qualities which they need to discover.

‘I would see it as a very successful day at school when I haven’t had to lay down the law but have managed to improve pupils’ **behaviour** in other ways’. [C/INT-1225]

The Head reveals that he find happiness in being able to bring about change through education and persuasion rather than by the threat of sanctions.

5.3.2 Categories of Authority

The relationship between prior and later categories

From the Whole Case Data Review of School A, ten categories were derived from the data, which were authority, boundary, structure, routine, operational value, transmission value, personal value, empowerment, disempowerment and resistance, which were built into an initial model. From the WCDRs of schools B and C, and the concepts and categories emerging out those analyses, that theoretical framework developed considerably. Eight of those ten prior categories were then integrated into four higher-order categories: periodicity, boundary creation, symbolisation and power distribution; and one, authority was promoted to an overarching category. This left one, resistance, which had not been subsumed into the new ordering. This process of integration was not been done arbitrarily, nor was it a case of the new superseding the old; the prior had been integrated into the later because of a developmental shift in theoretical perspective which allowed the reorientation and the emergence of a higher-order and more complete theoretical model. These relationships are shown in the table on the following page.

Fig 21 Analysis of authority: administrative & classroom levels

CAUSAL-ACTIVE-MANAGERIAL			CONSEQUENTIAL	
			WHOLE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION	CLASSROOM PEDAGOGY
Authority	Control	Periodicity	Routines	Rhetoric
		Boundary creation	Structures, rules, boundaries	Divisions, limits
		Symbolisation	Signage, symbolic structures	Images, metaphors
	Power distribution	Empowerment, disempowerment	Empowerment and disempowerment	

Based on the WCDR of School A, a model was built up of an individual's 'spiritual journey' as they entered the orbit of the school. This model was able to delineate the large-scale value-oriented features of the institution. Most of the essential features of that model have now been incorporated into the table above, which is focused instead on the causal, active and managerial attributes of actors within the institution.

5.3.2.1 Power Distribution

Power distribution concerns issues of empowerment and disempowerment, who is empowered or disempowered, and the circumstances under which this balance changes.

'Here I can [give advice based on Catholic principles]. So, that's not so much a clash, I think that's actually empowering.' [A/INT-3405-3534]

Working formerly in a non-Catholic school, this teacher felt disempowered by the rules which prevented him offering advice to a pupil who was asking for some, to their mutual frustration. At St Augustine he was free to do so, and experienced no clash between the values of his Catholic faith and the values of his profession.

'The sixth form are leading the discussion. I'm there with another member of staff just facilitating discussion and making notes, but they're leading it'. [A/FN(2)-34.28]

A situation of role reversal (sort of) where pupils determine the agenda and teachers take a backseat. It should be noted that the framework has been created by and is maintained by the school, so this is a case of the pupils being empowered by the school rather than spontaneous empowerment.

'they have the freedom to challenge and that they'll have the expectation that that'll create an academic discourse over the topic we're looking at'. [B/INT-1220]

This concerns lessons in ethics. Pupils are encouraged and expected to have their own ideas and to argue for their perspectives and not simply to accept the ideas put to them.

‘we have a creeping mandate from, a creeping influence from the state, not – indoctrinate is too strong a word, but to politicise people in a certain way. And I do worry about political involvement that dictates, you know, some of the values that might be beneficial to politicians to be inculcated in schools’. [B/INT-2425]

This expresses a concern widely felt in all schools, of whatever type, of a sense of disempowerment, or a threat of disempowerment, in regards to their autonomy in deciding how to conduct the values education of pupils and what values to educate them in. Broughampton is an independent school but seems not to be immune to this threat.

all staff have a part in the decision making processes [C/AE-7]

The senior management group sees the advantage of empowering the general staff, creating a sense of collective responsibility and reducing the likelihood of resentment and the development of an ‘us and them’ mentality.

Bullying involves the illegitimate use of power [C/ABP-Definition]

Bullies seize power over others and maintain it through force, intimidation and other coercive means, thus disempowering their victims in perpetuity. Two things in particular distinguish this from legitimate forms of power. First, legitimate power is distributed within an established order in which power is conferred according to merit and the sanction for this power lies ultimately with the State which itself, constitutionally, represents the will of the people. Secondly, the bully asserts power and disempowers others only to suit his/her own desires. Legitimate power, such as that exercised within schools, comes with responsibility to both empower and disempower according to desert and for the good of the individual and the common good. Bullying is, therefore, a threat not only to the self-esteem of the victim but to the moral order of the institution in which it occurs.

5.3.2.2 Periodicity

Periodicity concerns the shaping of time as an aspect of control. Time can be divided into two types, circular or repeating time and linear time. Similarly there are two types of periodicity, that which aims to control through repetition and that which does so through creating a historical context.

‘Listen to the text I’m going to read to you. It’s about a situation that I want you to talk about. This concerns a character called Matt. I want you to listen to this story’. [A/OBS-1125-1215]

A good example of rhetorical control of a class through repeated and motifs and linear progression, contained in four short, simple sentences. Note the repetition of ‘Listen...listen’ and ‘want...want’, and the progressions in task ‘listen...read...talk’ and semiotic structures ‘text...situation...character ...story’.

‘Yeah, I suppose it does give that, coming to school, kind of like that family feeling, your friends, but I don't really feel that school is number one. Outside of school is outside of school. I don't take school with me when I go home. It's not always there; when I'm here, yeah, I do belong here; it is the place to be’. [A/FG-3]

This student, Gavin*, had a natural rhetorical flair which made his contributions some of the most interesting. When the content is analysed it reduces to a set of truisms or tautologies and a paradox. Nevertheless, its rhythmic pulse makes for arresting reading.

‘the Christian ethos and the Christian core of the school...we’re built on the site of a Benedictine monastery’. [B/INT-1520]

Within this sentence are encapsulated both types of periodicity, the rhetorical repetition of ‘Christian’ and the historical contextualisation of the site and the tradition.

‘[We] were the young bucks who were going to change the world who went round systematically [taking issue] with the old farts who wanted no change [and saying] we’ll never get to that table but now I feel the irresistible draw of that table’. [B/INT-1817]

Again both forms of periodicity are on display: the repetition of ‘change’ and ‘table’ and the collision between reminiscence and reality in the progression from ‘young buck’ to ‘old fart’ and ‘change’ to ‘no change’.

‘we’ve managed to build on the big improvements that were made say twenty years ago, fifteen years ago there was a step change, there was much more effective focus on academic achievement and on pupil behaviour and values’. [C/INT-3503]

Here the present achievements are contextualised in terms of historic decisions and the changes that flowed from them.

5.3.2.3 Boundary

‘And there are a whole range of value related things where we have a stands, position ... there’s a benchmark, and so it gives, um, it gives some sort of baseline, a benchmark valid to the discussion around a particular topic.’ [A/INT-3439-3612]

‘Stand’, ‘position’, ‘benchmark’, ‘baseline’: all terms, despite the inconsistency of the metaphors, that indicate the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible.

‘[Mobile phones] are a distraction, but sixth formers are allowed to carry them’. [A/FG-1]

Indicates the existence of a double boundary – between acceptability and non-acceptability, and between sixth formers and the lower years – to which the pupils I interviewed, none of whom was a sixth former, evinced an ambiguous response: part accepting and part accusatory in the face of an implicit hypocrisy.

‘We’re not aiming to be a Winchester; we’re not aiming to be an academic hothouse’. [B/INT-0354]

Setting out a clear demarcation between independents that focus on academic excellence and those such as Broughampton that have a broader concern with ‘character’ in general.

‘far better to have them drink under a supervised, safe environment rather than not drinking where it becomes a craving and therefore something they’ll try to get to by jumping in a taxi late at night’. [B/INT-4425]

Boarding schools frequently have to make compromises. At Broughampton sixth formers are allowed to drink on site under strict conditions. This is tolerated behaviour rather than encouraged. The alternative of going off-site is not tolerated, is in fact prohibited.

‘They respect we’re always going to be there, but we respect that it’s their village...’ [B/FG-9.1e]

This illustrates the idea that clear boundaries make for better cooperation, based on recognising and respecting the territory and rights of the other.

‘I think the state’s got as role in setting the boundaries’. [C/INT-2338]

The idea of the State as a guardian of minimum standards, setting the boundary between the acceptable and the unacceptable but otherwise keeping its distance.

‘so the groups are as we want them, rather than being friendship groups’. [C/INT-5812]

The boundary here is not as immediately clear as it superficially appears, as two incongruous – rather than contrasting – perceptions are juxtaposed: a notion of acceptability with an objective sociological label. What is actually being contrasted are a formally constituted group for pedagogical purposes and an informal friendship group in which learning is secondary to interpersonal relationships.

5.3.2.4 Symbolisation

Symbolisation, the ability to create and use symbols, overlaps strongly with the category ‘semiotic marker’; they can be thought of as cause and effect. Three types of symbolisation have been considered: institutional, pedagogical and linguistic. In this research most institutional and pedagogical symbolisation is categorised under ‘semiotic marker’. However, there is a paradox at work. What is mostly known about these forms of symbolism is itself conveyed through linguistic symbolism; so I decided to divide up the examples of linguistic symbolism into those three types. Institutional symbolisation is that which is pertinent to a structural aspect of the schools; pedagogical symbolisation to an aspect of the classroom; and linguistic symbolisation, which is by far the majority of the examples, generally figures of speech that give shape and interest to language.

i) Institutional Symbolisation (structural)

‘This school is a microcosm of real life in all its diversities’. [A/FN(2)-45.58]

The teacher seems to be referring to the diversity of the student body in terms of gender, ethnicity (race, religion and language), socio-economic background, ability. He could also be referring to the intergenerational nature of the school. However, in many respects a school is a highly artificial social environment.

‘...seeing beyond the school walls and not to build up school walls that isolate us from others’. [B/INT-5758]

The choice of ‘walls’ is not a mere figure of speech in this case, although its function is more symbolic than literal. The Chaplain is concerned that pupils at Broughampton are interested in and feel compassion for those in the wider society who are less privileged. For a more detailed analysis of the symbolism of the walls, see the critical summary of the interview with the Chaplain in Case Study B.

ii) Pedagogical Symbolisation (overlaps with semiotic marker)

‘Face your partner, please. Say good morning and use their name ...there are people who are embarrassed, but try not to show it. Even if it’s a false grin’. [A/OBS-11.25]

The speaker here is operating on the assumption that what is sometimes referred to as ‘going through the motions’ actually has an effect on perceptions, emotions and behaviour.

‘By speaking to me in a, not polite but, like your mum would speak to you like...if I’m being bad then don’t patronise me; you know, firm but fair’. [A/FG-8]

For this pupil the mother is a symbol of an acceptable authority figure.

iii) Linguistic Symbolisation (metaphor and other figures of speech)

‘They just see it as ways to learning, as a toolbox really’. [A/INT-1422]

This refers to ‘thinking skills’ which are taught at St Augustine. A toolbox contains a number of tools for different purposes. In a like manner the different skills can be applied as appropriate to a particular problem.

‘...getting my hands dirty’. [C/INT-5812]

The Head spent several years in administrative roles at former schools which didn’t bring him into contact with pupils much. He now sees it as one of his main responsibilities to be out and about as much as possible, talking to pupils, dealing with behavioural issues and generally setting an example for the staff of the importance of being a visible presence, with the implication that this is what real Head teaching is.

5.3.3 Categories of Resistance

The concept of resistance was first encountered in the literature (Apple, 1979), and appeared in the interview data from school B and in the WCDR of school A. At first it was treated as a homogeneous term, then level of intensity became apparent, and then other constitutive aspects. The aspects are moral autonomy, intensity, target and negotiation. Whenever a threat to autonomy or an obstacle to the exercise of power is encountered, whether personal, departmental or institutional, the phenomenon of ‘resistance’ occurs. It varies in intensity, from questioning, criticism, non-compliance, defiance to outright rebellion. This is often seen as negative, and it can have destructive consequences. Resistance here, though, is seen as something essential to the process of change and development, allowing the possibility for spiritual, moral or ideological change. As I will discuss in the examples, resistance includes the idea of negotiation; otherwise, change could only happen through the escalation of resistance to violent reaction against threats to autonomy.

5.3.3.1 Moral autonomy

‘...“I worked hard, I was happy with my results and I wanted a life”’. [A/INT-30.15]

The Head of St Augustine related the story of how he had been trying to convince a group of students to aim for the highest GCSE grades. In the end some of them got good but not

excellent grades. This was the response of one student when asked why she hadn't tried for the highest. He was sympathetic to the reasoning as he has himself declared that there is more to life than academic achievement.

'As soon as you instruct people to do something or you're imparting something to them there is a natural resistance to it'. [B/INT-1220]

A very good summary of the dilemma at the heart of moral education and many attempts to transmit values. People would much rather arrive at an understanding of the right and good through their own reasoning and experience than be told what they should think.

'I think we've been quite resistant to externally imposed change'. [C/INT-3503]

Institutions as well as individuals can exert moral autonomy, at least those who represent institutions can do so on behalf of the institution.

5.3.3.2 Intensity

S: 'Focus on me. Put anything that's going to distract you down out of the way, make sure it doesn't distract you...OK. Can you make sure what is distracting you is put away...make sure what is distracting you is put away...Thank you for putting your stuff away. That's excellent behaviour, well done...Listen up please. Focus on me.' [A/OBS-9/06.02]

Being distracted, inattentive, engaging in private pursuits or displaying boredom is often a low-level form of resistance to authority. The teacher in this observation repeatedly undermined the self-empowerment of the group interaction by bringing to attention poor focus and the causes of it as well as praising compliance.

'...I don't see why, they're in lessons like we are in lessons. I mean, if I want check my phone for something why can't I?' [A/FG-1]

The sense of injustice over sixth-formers being allowed mobile phones underlies the tone of grievance, although the reasoning has almost no merit in a pedagogical context. This reinforces the fact that although all forms of resistance originate out of sense of moral autonomy, the reasons for asserting this in many cases are not legitimate; moreover, the intensity of feeling has no bearing on the legitimacy of the grievance.

'I know we're not allowed to go into Facebook, but we don't expect teachers to [unclear]. Then again we shouldn't get into trouble through Facebook [unclear] writing [it's private] shouldn't be able to see, you know' [B/OBS-15/1133] (teacher's comment during post-observational discussion: 'Sophie* was mad, she was cross, she was cross with me because we found out some stuff on Facebook pasted on somebody else's wall that I happened to be...')

In this case the student probably does have a limited case for their grievance, similar to the case that could be made if the teacher had read their private diary. Two points should be made in mitigation. First, Facebook, although restricted, is not private as the information is freely shared. Secondly, as the teacher's concern was with the well-being of the students in their care, there is some justification (plus, there had been an outbreak of cyber-bullying which it was in the interests of the whole community to curtail).

5.3.3.3 Target

'...there's the stuff in relation to citizenship...although I'm very suspicious...and the PSHE stuff...again I'm suspicious; putting things in boxes like that, I'm really not sure that it's the right way forward and it becomes, it gets looked at as a subject instead of being something that's part of...'
[A/INT-25.34]

The target of suspicion is the government's approach to education of values.

'I think they've got some of their priorities wrong because they're more bothered about uniform sometimes than how people behave' [A/FG-2]

In this case it is the teachers' hierarchy of values that seems amiss.

'I don't carry around a ruler or anything. It's so annoying. When you go to uni or anything you're going to have relationships so I don't see the point of it'. [B/FG-13.1b]

The target here is a rule that seeks to prevent the development of romantic liaisons by prohibiting boys and girls from being closer than six inches to each other.

'I wouldn't say that it's always been exercised in a good way, the State's role in this'. [C/INT-2338]
The government again.

5.3.3.4 Negotiation

'...it was some younger members of staff and a couple of assistant head teachers got drawn into this project group. They said could they go with it. They knew I was not in fa.... I was very open about it; I said why I wasn't in favour.' [A/INT-16.00]

Having empowered his staff to work on projects, the Head found himself in the paradoxical position of being the one resistant to change initiated by those he has authority over. Obviously, he was convinced to give the project an opportunity and is now proud of the outcome and those who initiated it and saw it through.

Gavin: 'without respect nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don't respect your teacher they're probably not going to respect you, and when no one's respecting each other nothing works properly' [A/FG-8]

Gavin has given an insight into a fairly subtle internal negotiation whereby he justifies his adherence to the norms of the school culture while not seeming to compromise his moral autonomy.

‘There was an issue in recent years, the city council in order to reduce teenage pregnancy has been promoting the idea we would give out condoms, make condoms available through the school nurse, and we’ve always resisted doing that; not because, obviously it’s very important to avoid teenage pregnancy but we feel that would cause a breakdown in trust between the school and the parents on which we very much rely, and the idea that the children would have access to the contraceptive services without any reference to the parents would worry a lot of our parents, particularly those with a religious background, but not only. So we avoided the clash by saying ‘no actually we’ll do things our way and we’ll educate them about contraception, where they can go outside the school to access these services if necessary independently of their parents’. But we wouldn’t actually do that ourselves within school because of a potential clash with parents which might damage our other relationships with them’. [C/INT-2758]

It is unclear whether the negotiation took place in the real world or whether it was simply a response to an initiative; the language suggests that the policy did not have statutory force.

5.3.4 Categories of Transformation

5.3.4.1 Transformative experience

‘I’ll never forget, [at] a school in P_____ a child asked me for advice; if I was asked here I could have given it because we’re a Catholic school, we’re based on Catholic principles, I could have given an answer within that context and made it very clear that was how I was answering, and then it was, it would be for the child to take that or not. The school I was in, I was asked this question by one of the girls and I said “I’m so sorry, I can’t answer it”. She asked why, and I tried to explain, and she absolutely lost it; she said “that’s the trouble with you adults these days; it’s all political correctness. I don’t want political correctness, I want somebody to say something to me, so I can either kick against it and say ‘that’s rubbish, you’re talking out of your hat’” – she didn’t use the word ‘hat’ – “or I can say ‘that’s really interesting, I’ll think about that’. That’s what I want.” And I had to say “I’m really sorry; I may well agree with those sentiments but I’m still not allowed to...to talk to you about it”. Here I can. So, that’s not so much a clash, I think that’s actually empowering.’ [A/INT-3405]

The experience of the clash between the disempowerment of his moral autonomy in the secular school and the sense of empowerment at St Augustine has undoubtedly strengthened the Head’s conviction in the rightness of the principles and values of his faith.

Things you learn at school:

How to get along with people you don’t like and how to be in a community.

Making the right decisions, supporting others and being able to make good friends, real friends.

Without hard work you won’t get anywhere.

How to communicate well with people.

[C/SUR-8]

These comments at the end of the survey, in response to the question ‘What do you learn at school apart from the subjects you study in class?’ are not reports of transformative experiences in themselves, but they exhibit a level of cognitive and moral development that indicates that some form of transformative experience must have taken place.

5.3.4.2 ‘Trigger’ events

i. Taking a risk

‘I send my deputy to meetings, I don’t go to certain meetings because if they’re the best person why do I go and have to come back and say “Right, this is what I learned at the meeting”, go through it all and say “what do you think?”. Why don’t they go, make the decision? That makes my head teacher colleagues very uncomfortable, very uncomfortable, and they’ve had to learn to come to terms with it. And when I did my presentation they understood it a lot better. They asked lots and lots of questions. And then one of the Heads said “I think you’re very brave. I’m not sure” - how did he phrase that – “I’m not sure I would have the courage to do that”. Because it needs trust which comes back to values again. I have to, I have to demonstrate absolute trust in my colleagues and sometimes they’ll get it wrong, as we all do.’ [A/INT-1939]

St Augustine seems to have a number of innovative approaches to how it organises itself and its teaching schedules. The ability to take risks, to allow the development and implementation of new measures opens the possibility of new experiences and new possibilities for transmitting values, as the House system seems to have done.

‘I mean sometimes the most rewarding lessons are completely off syllabus, off specification, and I don’t think that I’m unusual in that a lot of kids speak quite frankly, quite openly, and they will ask quite personal questions. So sometimes one is put on the spot in the classroom: “Have you heard about so-and-so; what’s your view? Have you ever taken drugs?” you know, those types of questions. So one deals with those as best as one can and I always try to be completely honest. Unfortunately, sometimes the questions become too embarrassing, too probing, but also sometimes the subject will lend itself to moral questions, moral speculations’. [B/FN-1838]

The risk for a teacher involved in one opening oneself up to interrogation and potential embarrassment is also the possibility of addressing genuine moral issues that might arise for pupils.

ii. Letting the mask slip

‘the number of times I go into Chapel and there’s somebody sat on their own in there; and I think in a busy, highly competitive, sometimes go-getting culture that public schools can be, I think the Chapel offers that space and that oasis and I think that is recognised, particularly at peak times like exam times where they go; and then finally, however rich you are, however secular you are, you don’t escape those existential moments: a family member dying or a family member being ill or Dad’s business going under’. [B/INT-3615]

If we wear a mask to the world, life can cause the mask to slip and, in the right place and at the right time, openness to an understanding and values beyond what we normally aspire to can be the trigger for a transformative experience.

‘if you were to go to _____ House and Airey Pierce* is the housemaster there, he would be one of the best exponents of this, because you can ask him about any boy in his house and he’ll tell you the parents, the parents’ names, where they’re from, he’ll even tell you what particular crisps they like: the detail, it amazes me the details the housemasters amass on their charges, and that to me is...there’s a lovely moment on a Friday night and a Saturday night and Airey is in the foyer of the house and the boys come, sometimes in their rugby kits or their sports kits and they’ve got late teas or been to the chippy or something and they sit around him and they just talk. And when I have a problem or when teachers have a problem in the academic environment, as there’s one particular issue going on at the moment with a girl, you talk to the matron and the matrons really do know their boys and their girls, because they’re the one the student might say: “you know I might be pregnant” or, you know, “I think I’ve dabbled in this; do I need to see a doctor”? They have the most intimate conversations with their students; I marvel at their nature.’ [B/INT-5110]

The type of ‘deep knowledge’ displayed in this anecdote is the foundation of ‘care’, which as Heidegger (1962, p243) reminds us is ‘that to which human [Being] belongs “for its lifetime”’. It counters the image of Broughampton as hierarchical and authoritarian. The experience of care is foundational to the acquisition of some of the most fundamental social values, such as trust and respect, dissolving resistance within institutional structures and facilitating the transmission of values.

Clarice: I remember in year 7 spending an entire break with [the former Head] sharing a bag of crisps and talking about TV and stuff.

Justin: He had a snowball fight when it snowed once as well.
[C/FG-2458-2506]

Teachers and particularly Head teachers must wear the mask of authority, which is expected, in both senses: that of exhibiting leadership skills and of maintaining a certain distance. But sometimes the display of the human side, the adult enjoying a moment with young people or displaying their ordinariness, can be deeply affecting, because of its unexpected nature and its dissonance with the official role.

iii. Catching the moment

‘In terms of [teaching] Broughampton’s values, I think that isn’t explicitly alluded to unless they ask a question about something that’s going on in the school, or unless I’d become aware of a problem’ [B/FN-1838]

Unless the mind is in some ways prepared, and is caught at that moment of openness, the instruction of values is likely to be met by resistance, as the Chaplain stated, above.

‘Our first chaplain was very much a John the Baptist character who...who challenged everything that we did and she drove us spare, she really did, and there were some aspects of her that we...we couldn’t cope with [*I hope she didn’t end up with her head on the plate*] – well not so far off sometimes, I tell you – but she was, she was uncompromising in her challenge and she’d make you really uncomfortable, because there was no hiding place; and it was great, it was just what we needed at the time’. [A/INT-4435]

The denouement of this passage is totally unexpected, as was perhaps the outcome of the difficult relationship, which was formative of the identity of the school as it is today.

5.343 Turning inward

i. Intrinsic value

What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school? [pause] ‘Ahm, Care for each other, ahm, and a recognition that everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has intrinsic value’ [A/INT-29.00]

We believe that all individuals are of value and worthy of respect [B/ABS, p1]

These two passages from different schools illustrate the idea of there being an intrinsic worth to human life, whoever and wherever. Such an idea cannot be readily grasped if we think of human life in terms of physical attributes, skills and accomplishments, status or economic value. It requires a more reflective, inward turn.

ii. Spirituality

‘The core of the chapel life...[is] a celebration of the community that’s here’. [B/INT-0655]

The core of the school is the chapel, and the core of the chapel is the community at worship. There is something almost paradoxical, until it is realised that it is another reality, supervening on the mundane, that is being spoken of.

iii. Tradition

There’s always scope for the failure of a document like [a mission statement] to fully embrace what it is that we do [B/INT-1520]

‘There’s some things that go unsaid and don’t need to be said’. [B/INT-1817]

These two passages relate to the tradition of the school. Its essence cannot be really encapsulated in words; it is something felt in the stones of the place, a *genius loci*.

iv. Taking responsibility

‘You have this education...and with that comes a responsibility to be a voice for the voiceless’ [B/INT-0850]

The life of the typical Bramtonian is one of privilege. The Chaplain's exhortation is that for that life to be meaningful it must be lived for more than the propagation of that privilege, but be of benefit, in some way, to the less fortunate.

Becky: in my form we will talk to different years. We all get on; I think it's good because you get to talk to people of all different ages. You get different opinions. Because I'm a prefect in form, if any of the younger students have any problems they can all come and talk to me because I'm an anti-bullying councillor as well. So then it's just good they can come and talk [A/FG-6]

In taking on various responsibilities, Becky has become a mediating figure in the school community, binding the communities of the tutor group and the House more closely together.

5.3.4.4 Replication

Out of 41 respondents to a question in the survey measuring 'inclusion' through a situational response, 28 were judged at $i=5$, 5 each at $i=4$ and 3 and 3 at $i=2$. There were none at $i=1$. This strongly suggests that the value of inclusion has become self-reinforcing and self-replicating in the student body [C/ASR-6]

5.4 Conceptual Clustering

It is one thing to derive the above-detailed concepts and categories from disparate parts of the data; it is another to demonstrate that these concepts and categories belong together in a way that reflects events in the real-world. A first step to doing this is to demonstrate that 'conceptual clustering' is occurring, that is, that these concepts and categories are found in meaningful patterns in proximity to one another, in particular clustering around values. In the following, examples from texts across the dataset are examined for conceptual clustering in a four stage process: 1) analysis of the text by the key categories; 2) interpretation and/or explanation of the choices made in the analysis; 3) synthesis of the categories into a coherent narrative demonstrating causal or other links; 4) evaluation of the narrative in terms of demonstrating conceptual clustering.

5.4.1 Key to analyses

- 1 Value
- 2 Disvalue
- 3 Strategy
- 4 Semiotic marker
- 5 Intentional state

- 6 Power distribution
- 7 Periodicity
- 8 Boundary
- 9 Symbolisation
- 10 Resistance

5.4.2 Examples of Conceptual Clustering across the Data field

5.4.2.1 St Augustine, Interview

1) Analysis

I've had opportunities to move on. But I do consider it to be my school. I'm a Catholic and I went through Catholic schooling myself as a young person and I do feel that it's my school. And as I said earlier I do feel it's more real life than some schools. So, yeah, I'm intensely loyal¹ to it and want to see it be successful¹. And I think we are successful, but we're caught up in this need ever to drive up standards. I said to the youngsters, I said to my year 11, 'I expect you to get the best results ever at GCSE; the last year got the best results ever, the year before did'⁷. We're flogging this⁹; the interventions we put in place³; we've got to compete in some way. The league tables do say something⁴, but the accountability I think – and I know much public funding does go on education – but the accountability has gone way over the top^{10, 8}. Instead of just letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion that our professional status as teachers is going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a profession in the future, it might be considered a career⁶, is shocking^{10, 2}. We are the experts; at times I wish people would just let us get on with doing what is right¹⁰ and I think we do a good job as teachers generally, not just in this school. So I'm immensely loyal here and I know it's a good school and I know we've got a lot of good children and good staff⁵.

[A/FN-2038]

2) Interpretation

1. Two values are embedded in the text, *loyalty* and *success*, of which success is the more prominent for this analysis.

2. *Anger*, as a disvalue, is expressed in the extract ‘the accountability...is shocking’. This anger arises from a perceived injustice, from a sense of being slighted professionally, and from a feeling of disempowerment. It is not fundamentally negative, though, as the overwhelming desire is to ‘just... get on with doing what is right’, which the current system is preventing.

3. Strategy is marked by ‘the interventions we put in place’ to achieve success.

4. There is a concession that ‘the league tables do say something’, that is, they have some significance for educational performance, and are interpreted as such by teachers and parents, as well as politicians.

5. The whole passage is an expression of overlapping intentional states: reminiscence, affirmation, determination, resentment and re-affirmation.

6. There is reference to disempowerment by the arbitrary power of the State: ‘Instead of just letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion [is] that our professional status as teachers is going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a profession in the future, it might be considered a career’.

7. There is a double sense of periodicity in the extract, ‘I expect you to get the best results ever at GCSE; the last year got the best results ever, the year before did’: both rhetorical effect through repetition and also establishing a temporal perspective.

8. ‘The league tables do say something, but the accountability I think – and I know much public funding does go on education – but the accountability has gone way over the top’. A boundary is drawn by differentiating the rights and wrongs of government measures.

9. ‘We’re flogging this’. Colloquial metaphor/cliché, a form of symbolism.

10. Mild resistance, in the form of criticism, is expressed throughout the second half of the extract, directed clearly against the government: ‘the accountability has gone way over the top. Instead of just letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion that our professional status as teachers is going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a profession in the future, it might be considered a career, is shocking. We are the experts; at times I wish people would just let us get on with doing what is right’

3) Synthesis

There are two values embedded in this extract, success and loyalty; success is the primary value focus here. A strategy for success, 'the interventions we put in place', is referred to. The primary driver seems to be the league tables, which have a semiotic function in 'say[ing] something', that is, providing an incentive to work for success. Additionally, there is indirect reference to teacher classroom control through recalled periodicity in the delivery of student encouragement: "I expect you to get the best results ever at GCSE; the last year got the best results ever, the year before did" . However teachers' autonomy – 'get[ting] on with doing what is right' - is not being respected in this process, and the sense of disempowerment shown by government not 'letting us get on and do our job' is giving rise to the disvalue of anger/resentment. This underlies an element of resistance, clearly limited to criticism. The whole is framed and made cohesive by the intentional world of overlapping dispositional states and structured by the formulation of a boundary between the positive and negative aspects of State policy.

4) Evaluation

In this extract there is evidence of quite strong clustering around the value of success, not only for the categories of permeation, but also for the categories of authority. Even resistance, which has no necessary connection to value, is quite strongly aligned with the issue of success in this case. Unusually, all the analytic categories were deployed, although the value 'loyalty' and symbolisation were not found to be relevant to the core cluster.

5.4.2.2 Broughampton, Interview

1) Analysis

Well, the core of the chapel life, and I love to see chapel service not as the hard sell 'God Slot' but as a celebration of the community¹ that's here⁴, really, a celebration of the community that's here; so I would describe this place as intrinsically linked with those of the community⁵. By that I mean we have 667 students living at close quarters with each other and it becomes vital, I think, to promote empathy¹, em self-understanding¹, ehm a sense of altruism¹ towards others⁵ and those skills are manifested in adventures beyond the school, active charity events; and we've just made a link with an urban priority area in N____. So we take busloads of Bramtonians* to an area of S____ that is quite deprived: high crime, high instances of social problems³ and this is another world for them⁸. And we've tried to do it delicately, that one doesn't feel patronised² by the other set of people, but that mutual

interaction⁸, seeing people with a whole set of different agendas to those in a cosy little village school like Broughampton is, I think, try to translate the values we inculcate in the boarding houses⁶ to extend over the school wall⁹ to people outside³. [B/INT-0655]

2) Interpretation

1. Four values are embedded in the text: community, empathy, self-understanding and altruism.

2. A 'patronising' attitude can be considered a disvalue to the extent that awareness of the possibility is likely to make someone more sensitive to the social consequences of their actions.

3. Organising charity activities in order to promote the development of empathy and altruism, and also to promote the school's values beyond the school.

4. 'The school walls' is an example of institutional semiosis; they act as a metaphor for the limits and bounds of the school's writ, and in this case the school community.

5. Strong sense that the Chapel acts as the spiritual centre of the school community. Belief that spiritual values must be cultivated in order to preserve the communal sensibility

6. 'Inculcation' bespeaks a culture of staff empowerment and pupil disempowerment

7. No data on periodicity

8. The boundary between two worlds, that of privilege and the underprivileged, becomes a creative interface for the exchange of life experiences and mutual growth

9. The Chaplain makes reference to the symbolic function of the chapel service.

10. No indication of resistance

3) Synthesis

There are two sets of connected values here, connected at least in the mind of the chaplain, which are 'community' on one hand and 'empathy', 'self-understanding' and 'altruism' on the other; so the strategy to enhance these, latter, spiritual qualities is also a strategy to maintain the community. That strategy is to involve the pupils in some form of charitable exercise with the inhabitants of a deprived area in a nearby town, though the chaplain is

aware of the dangers of the inhabitants feeling patronised by the presence of such privileged young people. These things for the chaplain – charity (as an inner compulsion to love and give), charitable acts and community – are all intimately connected with the chapel as the core of the school life and the services are the ‘celebration of [that] community’, where all those things are ‘intrinsically linked’ and made manifest. There is a secondary layer of interpretation of the motivation for these activities, however, although it is less obvious. There is implied an almost evangelical sense in which the values of Broughampton are first ‘inculcated’ into the pupils and then taken out into the broader society. The ‘school walls’, while they actually exist, are not the sort of ramparts with which many schools surround themselves today; the use of the term here is more a metaphor of the community which protects its values from the destructive forces outside and then feels a calling to export those values. Perhaps the chaplain is also sensitive to the perception of this way of thinking as implying moral superiority, for he also expresses the idea of the schools walls as a boundary between two worlds which facilitates ‘interaction’, to mutual benefit.

4) Evaluation

There is reasonably strong clustering around a group of closely linked values, among which ‘community’ is the most prominent. There was no information on two of the analytical categories, periodicity and resistance. The other eight categories were employed, although they were integrated through the use of parallel narratives of the ‘core’ and ‘boundary’ rather than a single narrative.

5.5 Summary

The structural aspects of the mechanism for institutional values transmission, as that has emerged from the iterative process of cross-case development, comparison and improvement of provisional models, are set out. First, definitions of the major components of the model and the constitutive aspects of those components are given. Next, in the longest section of the chapter, a range of the evidence supporting the conceptualisation of the various components and aspects of the model is adduced, creating an audit trail for the findings. The range is selected to represent as fairly as possible the distribution of views across the cases, but also to explore the cohesiveness and variability across each concept, i.e. whether further sub-categories were involved. Finally, a limited testing of the model, termed ‘conceptual clustering’, is carried out. Two selected texts taken from interviews from different cases are

subject to analysis for evidence that the categories and sub-categories of the model are found in proximity to values.

The model of institutional value transmission has four major components: permeation, authority, resistance and transformation, each of which has a number of aspects. It brings together two models, a permeation-authority model of inculcation and a resistance-transformation model of acquisition. The model has strong evidential support from the data collected from the schools, and has reasonably strong interpretive power when applied to selected texts.

This chapter has explained the detailed structure of the model. Chapter 6 will explain the genesis of the model and its internal dynamics.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, several partial theories will be considered. Four of these are simple models (though of increasing complexity) derived from the concepts contained in the ‘institutional ontology’ section that follows each part of the cross case analysis in chapter 4. They illustrate aspects of modelling values transmission, which, though they are limited, I would argue, sometimes become the basis for widely accepted ideas about the role of values education in society. Also included are two attempts to create integrated theories that emerged during the analysis. They have been included because they demonstrate important insights *en route*, even if in retrospect they appear flawed. Despite the limitations of these partial theories, they contain perspectives that should be integrated into the completed model and derivable from it as limited cases. The second section discusses in detail the model of institutional values transmission outlined in Chapter 5. Whereas the outline explained the components of the model and traced their emergence from the raw data, here the dynamics of the model are considered; also considered is how the simple model of invocation and evocation, first developed in chapter 2, has been incorporated into an institutional model of transmission. Throughout, the findings will be discussed in relation to relevant theories and perspectives encountered in the literature review, and the chapter will conclude with a section comparing this model with other models or perspectives on values education and values transmission.

6.1 Partial Models

Building a model of institutional values transmission entails many levels of complexity, with both central concepts and those which are more peripheral. The approach will be to start with four relatively simple models, with concepts derived from the cross-case analysis, and gradually build more complexity into each.

6.1.1 Input-output model

The simplest model of institutional value transmission that can be posited is a basic input-output model. Pupils enter into the school in year 7 (assuming it is a secondary school, as investigated in the research sample) and emerge 5-7 years later – the window of opportunity

for transmission (Schoenpflug, 2001b, p.132) – and, if having acquired values a, b and c, we can say, in the characterisation of Haydon (1999, p.28), that values transmission has taken place. In this model the school functions essentially as a ‘black box’, something that has a boundary, demarking it as an entity, and functionality, but the inner mechanism of which is impenetrable. Two problems with this model immediately spring to mind. No relationship of causality has been established. Students may have entered the school with the values a, b and c, or they may have acquired them outside the school. Additionally, the mechanism by which they acquired them, even if they acquired them at school, has not been established. This simple model, then, illustrates the two main problems in assessing pupils’ values education in formal contexts, which renders problematic the question of whether it could be improved. It is probably such a simplistic model that critics of any attempts at the assessment of values or values education have in their sights. The Chaplain at Broughampton [B/INT-3022] held that while development in this area can be assessed qualitatively to some extent, any attempt to make it ‘targetable’ would be disastrous. Much the same complaint, though with perhaps greater urgency, has been levelled by Foster (2001) at the assessment of values education outcomes in schools in New South Wales, which he finds problematic, undemocratic and inconsistent; he asserts the inseparability of values from cognitive and behavioural development and favours a formative, whole-school approach where assessment feeds back to inform general pedagogy. In this context, the view of Hechter (1993), that one of the problematic issues with values for the cognitive sciences are their resistance to meaningful measurement, is worth noting.

6.1.2 The value-economy model

The first piece of, admittedly circumstantial, evidence that pupils acquire some of their values at school is the existence of a constituency for each of the schools, meaning not only those families that send their children to the school, but those who actively seek to send their children there, not only because of, and even not necessarily because of, the academic standards of the school, but because they find the ethos, tradition or moral standards congenial, and this gives rise to a value economy, a simple model of supply and demand, which is no different essentially than the economy in goods and services, that is, one based on a subjective appreciation of the properties of the object (in this case a values-based educational structure) being offered (Rand, 1967). For example, St Augustine draws its intake predominantly from Catholic families who want to see their children educated in the Catholic religious and moral tradition, whereas Broughampton’s constituency is predominantly among

the wealthy who appreciate the all-round educational philosophy of the school, and Chelmswood is oversubscribed because of its reputation for academic and behavioural excellence.

This value economy would not have sprung into existence instantaneously, but a symbiosis would have developed over time where the parents' expectation of a particular values regime (be that humanistic, liberal, or religious) would be matched, at least to a sufficient degree, by the values programme that the school offered and, conversely, what the school offered would be tailored to some extent by the expectations of the constituency. The match is never going to be perfect, as it often is not in the real economy also; however, over time, in a society which offers a range of options concerning schooling, such a relationship is going to emerge. In such a scenario both parents and the school believe that the school ethos embodies values that they wish the children to acquire, and may have some evidence, probably of an anecdotal nature, that such values are acquired in the school.

6.1.3 Critical mass model

The second argument supporting the acquisition of values in school is based on an idea, that of a 'critical mass', highlighted by the Head teacher of Chelmswood [C/INT-5023]. In any organisation individuals spontaneously associate and form social groupings, which in a school can be linked to at least one aspect of the hidden curriculum (Carr and Landon, 1999). However, a tension can arise between the spontaneous sociality of pupils and the requirement of the school to impose an ordered community so that effective learning can take place, and if a group within that school has goals which are antithetical to academic and value-based goals of the school and it reaches a 'critical mass' the school is in trouble. The 'sense of community' [A/INT-1022] only emerges when the spontaneous sociality of the individuals within an organisation coincides with an integrated community, i.e. the critical mass represents an integrated community. What frequently happens when organisations are composed of individuals who are very culturally diverse, is the emergence of several 'sub-culture' critical masses, which may not be in-themselves antithetical to the goals of the organisation, but naturally prevent the emergence of an integrated community, and therefore the sense of belonging to a community, rather than just being in a place to socialise. In the cross-case analysis, it was striking that for the pupils at Broughampton, the sense of community was cited as a positive feature to a significantly higher degree than at the other schools. Because the integrated community can only exist where such values as trust,

respect, cooperation and compassion are experienced by the whole body, then *this requires a continuous value input*. Hashimzade and Della Giusta (2011) discuss this phenomenon in relation to potential clashes between the transmitted values of immigrant communities in the UK and the values of the school they attend, and conclude based on mathematical modelling that in a society of heterogeneous communities, better social outcomes are created when schools focus on inclusivity. Halstead (2007), essentially concurs with this view, and believes that schools need to foster an ethos which supports individual faith identity within a commitment to the British cultural values of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and respect.

6.1.4 Transmission flow (inculcation) model

Turning now to the mechanism by which values are transmitted, the simplest model is a variation and development of the input-output model, emerging from the cross-case analysis, which I call the transmission flow model. In this development the black box of the simple model begins to take on some definition. In its simplest form the institutional structure can be depicted as one of three levels, as it was for the analyses: the official, in which the Head is the key figure; the classroom, in which the teacher is the key figure; and the intake, in which the individual pupil is the key figure. Between these three levels there are two relationships: between the Head and the teacher, and between the teacher and the pupil. The Head drawing on the documentary resources, parental expectations and traditions of the school, sets the values agenda for the school which is then through the general ethos communicated through meetings, guidelines and memos communicated to the teaching staff. In the classroom, through the moral content and tone of the syllabus delivered in the class, and by the demeanour of the teacher in front of the class, those values are transmitted to the pupils. Therefore, as well as an input-output axis, this model also contains within it a flow axis, which runs hierarchically from higher potential to lower potential. This flow occurs not only in the school, but its source lies higher, for example in government policy or, for some, in something like religious doctrine, and there is, correspondingly, something like a trickle down into the general population. In this model there is a distinction between two types of values, operational and transmissible. Operational values are those whose function is principally to aid the cohesion and efficiency of the institutional structure and processes, and transmissible values are those, clearly, which the school wants to be transmitted to the pupils.

I want to discuss this model in relation to Bourdieu and Passeron's (1977) theory of cultural reproduction through the education system, to which there are a number of similarities. For Bourdieu ideological commitment to the principle of the state perpetuating the inequalities of privilege in society through 'pedagogic action' (ibid, p6) in schools, whatever the virtue of his critique, means he is wedded to a form of social determinism. Secondly, there is in the idea of transmission flow an implication that the greater the distance from the source, the more dilute the effect will be, based on the assumption that the source is pristine or absolute. This seems to be based on an analogy with power flow which does diminish down the hierarchy, each level down being relatively disempowered relative to the one above; so for Bourdieu and Passeron (ibid) the school can only coerce through 'symbolic violence' whereas the state has the legitimate monopoly on physical violence. In different terminology Bourdieu also expresses the idea of operational and transmissible values, in the notion of 'self-reproduction' in order to fulfil the function of 'inculcation' (ibid, p.54).

Although there is a tendency to a more deterministic structural approach to value transmission by some of the theorists than I think is warranted, almost all impose some structural conditions on the relationship between transmitter and recipient, such as numerical ratio and age difference (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981) and age (Schönpflug, 2001a; Barni et al., 2011), sex (Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988) and educational level (Schönpflug, 2001a) of the recipient. There is an obvious rebuttal to the idea that values become increasingly diluted with distance down the chain. Values are coherent in their conception and personal in their intensity; by that I mean that, on the one hand, linguistically, as abstract nouns, values cannot be quantified, and on the other, in terms of their personal intensity, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that this is other than arbitrarily distributed throughout the population, those in positions of authority no more or less likely to be trustworthy, compassionate, helpful, and so on. In Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's viral diffusion model of transmission there is no vertical hierarchy; each recipient becomes a new potential transmitter.

Despite these weaknesses, it is something like this model of transmission that people most readily reach for when, for example, they heap expectation on schools to deal with social problems. It was the underlying assumption of much of the literature on values education in the late 1990s during an outbreak of 'moral panic' following the murder of a head teacher outside his school (SCAA, 1996). It is equally such a view that MacIntyre (1987) disparages when he dismisses the prospect for a moral community in society.

6.1.5 Spiritual journey (acquisition) model

A ‘spiritual journey’ was the term used at Broughampton for a pupil’s passage through the school [B/INT-3348], although the model was developed based on the analysis of data gathered at St Augustine. In the spiritual journey model the emphasis is on the recipient as the acquirer of values rather than the school as the transmitter of values; it sees the structured school environment as the opportunity for values acquisition rather than a necessary outcome. It was the first time that the concept of ‘resistance’ was incorporated into the value-acquisition process, though no mechanism was suggested by which resistance could be overcome. The following is an extract from the research journal.

Based upon the categories outlined in the section above a tentative model for the transmission of values in school A can be attempted. The model is shown in the figure below, which is then explained in detail.

Fig 22 The ‘spiritual journey’ model of the transmission of values




Figure 1 represents a model of an institution (school A) in which the route by which an individual (pupil) acquires a target value (TV) is mapped out. The categories indicated by the capitalised abbreviations are derived from the analysis of data collected in school A through school policy documents, interview, observation and focus group discussion.

An institution only exists through the authority (AUT) by which it is constituted. In the case of a school that would be with the support of the Local Authority under the powers granted by central government. Its standing as an educational institution is also established on the basis of the qualification and experience of its staff. Schools like school A have an additional requirement in being faith schools that they are empowered and recognised by the Archdiocese for the region. Considered from the perspective of a system for the transmission of values, an institution becomes the embodiment of two distinct types of values: operational values (OV), which are the values that govern the running of the institution, and target values (TV), which are the values that the institution hopes to instil in its members, or in this case its students.

An institution has three main elements: it has an internal structure (STR) which determines the nature of the relationships that exist within the institution and the types of activities which are carried out; the routines (RTN) which carry the structures forward in time and make it a living entity rather than just an idea and enable it to serve the social milieu in which it exists; and a boundary (BDY) which delineates the region in which the writ of the school run and that where it does not.

In the figure, which is a simplified theoretical model, structure, routine and boundary are all incorporated into the central square that represents the institution. Boundary should run all the way round, but to avoid cluttering the diagram the dimension of structure running vertically and the dimension of routine running horizontally double as the continuation of the boundary. This leaves the central space for the representation of the process of values transmission within the institution. Time dependent events run from left to right in the diagram.

Within this setting the pupil, who has their own personal values (PV) acquired through experiences and in institutions other than school, is disempowered (DIS) by the structures and routines of the school. This is, in fact, the reason for the existence of school as an institution: it does not exist fundamentally to reinforce the values of the wider society, but to inculcate a specific set of values which serve the higher order requirements of the economy and the social good. To do so it must first break the unconscious attachment pupils have to their own worldviews (however imperfectly formed) and values, at least while the pupil remains on the school premises. Schools do this in various ways: by routines that accustom the pupils to ways of behaviour in which disciplines and values are implicit – punctuality, preparedness, effort, and so on – by rewards and by punishments.

What happens at this point is still unclear. According to the analysis of the class observation carried out in school A, the students are empowered (EMP) by being given the freedom to engage in moral speculation within a controlled environment in which they are resolving their own moral dilemma by having to relate to an unfamiliar person correctly. This is reported as having had a marked and lasting effect on the social environment of schools in which this programme has been carried out, thus presumably resulting in the internalisation of target values (TV) such as respect. The question remains, though, how the boundary conditions that were the source of disempowerment now become a critical factor in empowerment.

The situation is complicated further by the fact that the experience of disempowerment can result in a reaction. Coming into contact with the boundary induces a resistance (RES). The individual pushes against the boundary and tries to flee the institution, or like-minded individuals band together to form a cabal within the institution with their own set of values, very much as described by Willis (1977). Resistance does not have to manifest itself as such open defiance. At school A

there were several examples of resistance on display, such as pupil disagreement with some of the rules, staff developing their own versions of the mission statement, and the Head railing against some of the edicts of the state. A second question remains to be answered: is there a route from resistance to empowerment?

The critical area for the theoretical model, then, is that indicated in figure 1 by the triangle formed by the line marked RES between DIS and BDY, the dotted line from DIS to EMP, and the dotted line from the point of RES to EMP. It concerns two possible routes from disempowerment to empowerment. As yet no explanation exists as to what takes place on these routes or even whether both routes are viable, although there is some speculation in the memos that follow this section.

The importance of this tentative model was that it raised the critical issue of the ‘gap’, not made explicit in other transmission models, between awareness and acceptance. It also raises the possibility of three outcomes: immediate acceptance; terminal resistance, and acceptance after a stage of resistance.

6.1.6 The magic square (invocation-evocation) model


Values cannot be acquired by private contemplation, but only in a ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998). The integrated community requires authority plus a value discourse (continuous narrative of invocation and control) and the evocation of the moral community (the communal context in which values are lived). These ideas emerged in a clearer form in an attempt to build an integrated model of the concepts that were emerging, but influenced by the experience of undertaking research at Broughampton (School B). The following account is taken from a memo included in the research journal. It proposes a model for self-propagating values transmission that in hindsight seems too optimistic. However, it represented a critical stage in the research and in the development of theory.

I am now in a position to propose some of the initial theoretical findings of this research. The figure below demonstrates the interrelationship among the various concepts in the nature of values. I sometimes refer to this as ‘the magic square’ for reasons that should be apparent.

There are some unresolved issues and some aspects that I am not entirely happy with. For example, it is not clear at the moment whether passive interpretation and active interpretation can be categorised together, and the same could be said for active invocation and passive invocation (decoding), or does one lead on to the other through a ‘virtuous circle’ mechanism. In addition, the terms ‘interpretation’, ‘invocation’, ‘evocation’ and ‘assimilation’ have not yet been formally defined or their limits explored (to express it in terms of grounded theory, they are not yet

‘saturated’). However, there are some very positive points. The first is that, although arrived at through the route of analysis of empirical data, the ‘magic square’ still bears a strong resemblance to the original theory of the nature of value, and in fact can be seen as a development of the ideas contained in it. What is new is the idea of the strategic dimension of values. This has transformed it from a purely philosophical idea into social theory by embedding it within social institutions.

Fig 23 The ‘magic square’ model of the transmission of values



Secondly, it collapses the distinction between values, value transmission and the core nature of institutions, by suggesting that values inherently exhibit transmissibility, that values and institutions coexist and must be defined in terms of each other and that the principle function of an institution is to transmit its values.

There are two contextual points to make. The first is that each of the components of the ‘magic square’ is an entire field in itself, and institutions, whether schools or any other type, can be viewed from different perspectives according to very practical objectives which have seemingly very little to do with values. However, we are concerned with where these aspects overlap, which is the place where their core values exist and where their fundamental identity is found. The second point concerns the role of power. The concepts of power and authority do not appear in the final expression of the theory, even though they played a significant part on the road. This exclusion can be justified in the following way. Power and authority are the basis of institutions, the thing that at a certain level holds them together. However, they are not the reason why institutions exist; that is for the transmission of values. Therefore, they are an important part of institutions in their establishment and running, but they are not the purpose. If an institution neglects its core values it cannot be held together by power and authority and will start to wither.

While the magic square brought together many of the elements involved in this research, sifting the data showed that at the detailed level it began to exhibit some flaws. It pointed to the intimate relationship among the various categories that it had drawn together, but had not supplied a completely logical causal mechanism. Also, vitally, it downplayed something that became more apparent as the research progressed: any value in order to be transmitted requires the power structure of the institution. The model outlined below attempts to address the limitations and defects of the models discussed in this section; at the same time, as partial models their insights need to be integrated, even in a modified form, in the final theory. In other words, the central insights of the partial models should all be capable of being derived from the final model.

6.2 An Integrated Theory of Value Transmission

The integrated theory of value transmission brings together several components and several partly-synthesised theoretical ideas. In any consideration of values transmission in schools the central relationship has to be between teacher and pupil, which is the institutional nexus between the generations in terms of behavioural modelling, socialisation and enculturation, as well as the more mundane and well-understood conduit of information transmission (Parsons, 1961). (The two aspects are not different at one level, as values are, as explained previously and recapitulated briefly below, in some respects just another form of information). As this theory deals with institutional transmission, rather just interpersonal transmission, though, on one side it must deal with the power relationships within the school, and even beyond the school in the influence of national policy-making and local authority implementation, whereby the values agenda – if, indeed, there is such a coherent entity – is set, and on the other the moral agency and developing moral cognition of the individual pupil subject to any attempts at values education. Several theoretical ideas will be used to explain, to the extent that the concepts, hypotheses and data discussed in this research allow, the process that takes place when values are institutionally transmitted centred on this central nexus of teacher and pupil: the nature of values from a philosophical perspective; the permeation of values through the institution; the concepts of ‘invocation’ and ‘evocation’; the institutional power structure and the power-control dichotomy; resistance and the transformative experience.

6.2.1 Recapitulation of the basic theory of value

The beginning of this research lies in questions outside the actual concern of this actual research. Such questions include: ‘In a world of such rapid social transformation, what

remains unchanging that enables individual lives and societies to find and maintain a core of stability?’ and this one: ‘In a society in which there are so many competing and conflicting demands on our credibility and interest – even embodying different epistemologies – is there a common conceptual language in which we can speak of them equally meaningfully?’ The answer, for me at least, is human values, because all values are human, whether the value discourse concerns divinity, technology or society.

In the theory chapter a philosophical analysis of the concept of value from first principles was undertaken, in light of perceived problems both within axiology and the everyday usage of the term. The analysis included the conclusion that, contrary to the mainstream of academic philosophy, values were real and their nature and properties describable. The most significant finding was that values were semiotically related to symbols in having a dual nature and phenomenologically related to treasured personal items. Outwardly, values are linguistic signs denoting abstract concepts, while inwardly they are experienced as deep emotional attachment. As part of normal language, value concepts pepper our everyday discourse and communication, either in their primary nominalised form or in lexical variations (verbs, adjectives, etc) and are able to pass throughout society along the normal linguistic pathways of communication. Experientially, however, like symbols, values are only truly meaningful within a (theoretically) closed social groups for whom the value attains utmost significance, for example faith within a religious group, justice for a campaigning group, safety for a military reconnaissance unit or accuracy for a scientific project team. This idea has resonance with, but is not derived from, Tajfel’s (1974) concept of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ as categories of identity through inclusion and exclusion. From either aspect values are inherently social, and this lead to one of the most surprising conclusions: that *there are no private values*. Values are just words on one level, but at the experiential level they are social and communal, that is they denote a shared experience, not a private experience. I can create a word for an intensely personal experience, but it could only become a value by being shared and finding an appropriate social context in which it can function. The idea of values as shared experience is not the same as, it is the exact opposite of, the idea of intersubjectivity, as that was conceived of by Habermas (1984). For Habermas individual subjectivity emerged from a collective recognition of signs; shared experience presupposes individual subjectivity as the basis for empathetic recognition of others’ interior worlds.

The next consideration, then, is the function of values. This was not specifically addressed in the original theory, which focused on the ontological question of the nature of values;

however, the main line of an answer is fairly clear. If values acquire their significance in a communal setting, then a primary focus is to bind social groups together. The primary institution for human lives is the family and though the family must be considered the cradle for our basic values, it is also an institution which is bound together by common values. Society is a multiplicity of social groupings – familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, professional, vocational, economic, political, leisure and interest, etc – and all of them can be understood as defined by shared values. It is this aspect of values which in some respect renders them problematic. Values not only define the core of the group, they also define the boundary of the group, where the group becomes the non-group because of non-adherence to the particular values of the group (Tajfel, 1974). Values, therefore, are not only a cohesive force in society; many, possibly all, conflicts in society can be understood in terms of competing values. In complex modern societies the quest for common values, embodied in social institutions, is paramount. A second function of values is to embody the essential attributes and goals of the group. Values are not the same as attributes or goals, but they are clearly related. For example, values underlie goals; goals are more specific to a particular event or situation, but values transcend the particular event or situation to give continuity to the group beyond the immediate attainment of goals (Rokeach, 1973). A third function of values is to structure and give purpose to individual lives (Mandler, 1993; Barth, 1993). In modern societies in particular it is common to be multi-valued as a result of multiple belonging, the overlapping of different interests, commitments and loyalties. It is paradoxically both a condition and an outcome of open societies that such multiple belonging occurs; it is one of the guarantees that society does not fracture along narrow monocultural lines, defined by religion or ethnicity (Huntington, 1993, 1996).

The third aspect of values is their transmission. This is based on the ideas of *invocation* and *evocation* as a way of understanding the mode of existence of values in a closed community and of the propagation of the community. Invocation, based on the idea of value as a symbolic type of entity, is the ritualistic utterance of the value sacred to the group, with the purpose of reinforcing their commitment to both. While this may seem too overtly couched in religious terminology, the contention is that values actually take on aspects of the sacred (Eliade, 1957), which is most explicitly demonstrated in religion, but is actually part of all aspects of human life and accessible to everyone. Evocation can be thought of as the effect that invocation has on the listener, that of opening up a realm of experience associated with the value, referred to as the moral universe of the value, but that moral universe most readily

conflated with the immanent community and its obligations; for this reason ‘evocation of the moral universe of the value’ and ‘evocation of the moral community’ are essentially identical. Participation in the moral universe of the value is a grounded existential certainty and sense of belonging that Eliade (1957, p.21) refers to as the experience of the sacred, as ‘a fixed point, a centre...equivalent to the creation of the world’.

The theory outlined here is a deductive argument derived from a consideration of the meaning of value as that has been analysed in terms of phenomenological and semiotic categories. It originates in an attempt to understand the nature of values which goes beyond the limitations of the epistemological impasse in Descartes’ characterisation of subject and object, and portray a philosophically coherent view of values which is commensurate with their usage in the social sciences. Its extension into a consideration of the function of values, and particularly the transmission of values, is only partly developed. In particular, its understanding of social institutions is extremely minimal. The understanding throughout has been that this deductive theory will not be perfectly mirrored in events of the real social world, but that if it contains genuine insights these should re-emerge through the theoretical insights derived inductively through data processing and analysis of data from the field, and these will provide the basis for a fuller theory of value transmission in social institutions.

6.2.2 The institutional permeation of values

Permeation as the name implies is the extent to which a particular value has been identified within the three main levels of the school: the official, the pedagogical and the learner as represented by data from documents and interview (Head), classroom observation and field notes (teacher report/feedback sessions), and pupil survey and focus group, respectively. Permeation, it is important to be aware, is not the same as transmission. First, it would be impossible to establish causality of any sort without a longitudinal study far beyond the scope of this research. Secondly, institutions like schools are highly permeable to multiple influences and the presence of a value does not indicate that its acquisition has been achieved within its confines. What the analysis has attempted to discover is the degree of commonality of experience within the lived world of the institution, the recognition of common semiotic structures which carry the value meanings, and the link between these semiotic structures and the strategies for values education (Downey and Kelly, 1978; Plunkett, 1990) that exist at the official level, however informally those are formulated. Through the cross-case analysis, a core of values that seem to permeate the institutions investigated has been established. This is

only indicative of a snapshot view of the schools, though it has been verified in principle in the report/feedback sessions. The point is not to argue for absolute veracity of detail, but for theoretical plausibility on the basis of methodological reliability.

Permeation can then be thought of as a conceptual field in which, however tenuously, there is common awareness of the preferred values of the school transmitted either directly through verbal indication or indirectly through suggestion. As outlined in the theory section this communication of value concepts is not the transmission of values in the sense of acquisition but only the possibility for conceptual grasp, that is, the ‘awareness stage’ of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Schönplflug’s (2001b) two-stage process of ‘awareness’ and ‘acceptance’.

In a consideration of the hegemony of ideology in society and schooling in particular, Apple (1979, p.22) makes use of the term ‘permeate’ (in a somewhat pleonastic manner) to describe a state of ‘saturation’. The concept of permeation has been taken up to describe the extent of transmission flow through the institute, the extent to which values are transmitted through the institutional structure and acquired by the recipients of values education. That such a flow occurs seems to be taken for granted by the schools: ‘In our mission statement we talk about everyone being treated with dignity and respect...that everyone should be treated as of equal worth...Saying it and doing it at times is difficult...But I think it does permeate through’ [A/FN2-3032]. In this theory permeation is an aspect of transmission, but, as mentioned above, is not its equivalent. Therefore the sense in which the teacher used the term in the extract quoted above, where he meant acceptance, is, strictly speaking, not the same as it is being used here. The data collated from the schools into the Institutional Focus Value Analyses (IFVA) gives a snapshot of the state of permeation; as mentioned earlier, it would take a longitudinal study of each institution in order to quantify the extent of permeation to any degree – even if it was possible in principle. The IFVA does establish that common values are found at all levels of the schools. Moreover the surveys establish that there are significant levels of pupil awareness of the schools’ attempts to teach certain values and attitudes.

In this context, it is necessary to evaluate the two-stage process of ‘awareness’ and ‘acceptance’. First, these have to be considered stages in transmission and not a mechanism for transmission, certainly not in the sense that I would understand ‘mechanism’, to mean a causal explanation. Secondly, Schoenplflug’s two stages are of limited utility; they are

appropriate in interpersonal transmission, but within an institution even if acceptance of a certain value can be shown, unless it can also be shown that inculcation, awareness and acceptance form a causal line within the institution, to speak of institutional transmission is not permissible. Establishing permeation is easier: indications of student awareness of being taught and of staff awareness of the ethos, both of which are evidenced in all schools [A/B/C/SUR-4], are enough. Permeation means simply that there is a value discourse occurring in every sector of the institute, in this case at every one of the three levels of the schools. But while there might be institutional awareness, it requires something more to create the conditions for acceptance, or ‘acquisition’, the preferred term here.

6.2.3 Transmission and the institutional structure of authority

Permeation, as just noted, takes place as easily as people communicate, either informally through casual interaction, or formally as in the teacher – pupil interaction or in official documents and publications circulated through the school. Values are embedded in such modes of communication either consciously or unconsciously and therefore reach to every part of the school. However, to move to the stage of acquisition requires a very different process (taking a cue from the viral analogy of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), the relationship between permeation and transmission can be likened to that between diffusion and infection). This process involves the authority structure of the school.

To understand why this is so, it is necessary to go back to the basic theory outlined above, in which value has a dual structure. One is its external aspect of simply being a conceptual word, easily communicated and assimilated. However, this is not the whole or the essential nature of a value, which lies in its internal aspect of being a shared experience of the moral force of the value. For this aspect of the value to be acquired three things must happen: a communal context must exist; the value explained or modelled in some way; and the intended recipient as a moral agent in their own right move to acceptance. Each of these will be dealt with separately; this section will deal with the first two.

6.2.3.1 Invocation and evocation

According to the theory outlined here, as shared experience values have a communal aspect. Elsewhere this has been referred to by the concept ‘evocation of the moral community’ and two types of evocation were distinguished, intrinsic and extrinsic; they could be called simply the moral community here and now and the moral community somewhere else. Both types of

evocation were witnessed in the class observations. Intrinsic evocation identifies the moral community with the community defined by the class itself [A/OBS]; they become, as it were, the experimental laboratory for the practice of the value. Extrinsic evocation is more an exercise in remote empathy, where the class experience vicariously, communally the circumstances of others [B/OBS]. Logically, evocation must follow invocation, but the precursor for both within an institution is that the actual physical group must exist in which inculcation of the value can occur. For that the authority of the school over the moral autonomy of the individual must be brought into play. It is, of course, entirely possible for someone to accept a value outside a communal setting, for example by being convinced by an argument read in a book and this point will be looked at when considering the generalisability of the theory.

On the path from a general understanding of the meaning of a concept to acceptance of the concept as a value, there needs to be a qualitative change in the recipient's relationship with the value-term. Within the classroom that is going to be supplied by the teacher's use of a value-term in a meaningful context (Hawkes, 2010), perhaps supplying examples, in this way, more than just by definitional precision or extension, deepening the understanding of the term, and hopefully by being an example of that value and modelling that value in the behaviour they demonstrate to the pupils in the class and others. This is in accordance with the theoretical concept of invocation. According to the definition of that concept given above, invocation is the ritualistic utterance of the value sacred to the group, with the purpose of reinforcing their commitment to both. Where there is clearly some gap between the theory and the reality, both evocation and invocation can be thought of as principles for action, or activation principles, rather than as straightforward descriptions of what happens; I will return to this idea when talking about the strategic dimension of transmission. Evocation requires the group to be transformed into the moral community, but it is not yet the moral community. In a similar manner, invocation requires the as-if modelling of invocation, even though the value has not yet been acquired by the group. The relationship is actually closer still: by supplying a meaningful context and by deepening the students' understanding of a value, I would argue that something mysterious and even sacred is happening [Eliade, 1957]. Like evocation, invocation is also challenging the moral autonomy of the individual student and placing a demand upon his or her attention and interest, which requires the authoritative presence of the teacher in the class.

In both the cases of evocation and invocation the issue of authority arises: the authority of the school to organise young people into classes for the purpose of learning and specifically for the transmission of values; and the authority of the teacher to stand in front of a class of morally autonomous individuals and hold the attention of the class and undertake pedagogy in order that they can acquire a particular value or values. What links these two instances of authority and what differentiates them needs to be considered. In order to do that the concept of institutional authority needs to be thoroughly examined. In this theory a distinction is made between the concepts of authority, power and control, authority being defined as a combination of power and control, as illustrated in the diagram on page 155. The concepts of power and control will be explained in turn.

6.2.3.2 Power and control

The importance of power and control in educational transmission was something I began to appreciate through reading Bernstein (1975). While the definitions that I have arrived at through analysing the data from the schools differ ultimately from those Bernstein employed, his use of ‘classification’ for a spatial boundary between curriculum subjects and ‘framework’ for the temporal rhythm of the syllabus, shaped my thinking on this. Power has a number of manifestations, but in this model of value transmission, only two functions which are of importance: one is to create *roles* that function to distribute power; the other is to licence control. It is in the first of these functions of the role that power reveals its capacity to give rise to a self-replicating hierarchy, though one of vertically diminishing power, as discussed in the partial ‘transmission flow’ model . All power is symbolic and the appointment of someone to a role is a secular anointing accompanied by the symbolic trappings, the certificate, the office, the desk, for example. In developed economies appointments to important or professional posts – such as a teacher – are made on the basis of having met certain formal requirements that demonstrate sufficient skill to carry out the role. Once conferred, a role then gives the appointee the right in turn to confer power. A role, though, does more than just confer power; it also limits it through regulation (legal and ethical). Power takes two forms, that of empowerment and disempowerment. The role both empowers and disempowers (although, it can be seen in context that the role only disempowers by empowering in the first place, therefore empowerment and disempowerment are relative) and by empowerment confers the power to empower and disempower in turn, though the nature of the conferred empowerment and disempowerment may be curtailed by the limitations of the role. Whether and to what extent limited, however, the power to employ

empowering and disempowering methods, known collectively as '*power distribution*', to alter the dynamics of a system such as a classroom, is fundamental to a role and one of the four areas of control conceded to a role, in particular (though not limited to) the role of a teacher. It seems that this power – the power to distribute power – is reproduced throughout the hierarchy, and is not a form of control which is a feature of personal charisma. Power distribution is not a creative shaping force as control is; it is essentially a reproduction of the forms of power being transmitted through the hierarchy, embodied in the assigned role. As discussed above, the role empowers through a certain space for action – a space in which charismatic control can be exercised – but also disempowers by placing limits on that space and curtailing the freedom to act by imposing mandatory requirements and responsibilities, prohibitions and taboos. Although the exercise of power distribution may appear to be undertaken spontaneously at each level, in reality the freedoms and limits, say, employed by a teacher in a classroom, are determined higher up the hierarchy and manifest in the legal and bureaucratic burdens that accompany the role.

The exact relationship between power and control is complex, because control also involves the use of coercive force, if not physical force in these times at least some form of 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Foucault, 1979). Happily, such considerations lie outside the scope of this theory; in regards to the transmission of values, coercive force would be entirely unproductive. The forms of control that are of interest lie in a form of authority that transcends the role, which could be referred to as 'character', 'personal magnetism' or 'charisma', and for which the role is either unnecessary or necessary but not sufficient. The latter seems intrinsically more realistic; even if an individual has personal magnetism, unless they have the authority to stand in a role they cannot exercise this control in a formal setting. Power creates the context in which control can be exercised and, in that sense, unleashes it, but it is not the origin. Unlike power, which is conferred and hierarchical, control is either innate or learned and is unique to the individual.

6.2.3.3 The institutional expression of authority structures

At the whole school level there is an axis of authority (the authority for the school to exist, authorisation to administer education and recruit teachers, and mandatory requirement for the running of a modern school including the contents of education and pedagogies) which acts as the basis for three areas of local control relevant to values transmission: the internal structuring of the school, both in terms of its architecture and its management structures, and

the limits of the school's writ, which collectively are referred to as *the bounding of space*; the organisation of the syllabus into a timetabled curriculum, and the other aspects of school life into a set of routines, called collectively *the periodisation of time*; and overseeing a system for the permeation of values throughout the school, including strategic planning, signing, signposting and signage (semiotic marking), broadcasting and the cultivation of the school ethos, collectively known as *the symbolisation of value concepts*.

At the classroom level the axis of authority is manifested in the *role* of the teacher, which reproduces the mandated power distribution of the higher authority. So, for example, the teacher has the authority to empower and disempower students but only within the parameters mandated by the school board (or increasingly by the government). The role is the basis of the teacher's *control* that they are able to exercise in the class, but only in the sense that it legitimises their position; it does not constitute it, however. Control is a manifestation of the *personal charisma* of the teacher, which can be either innate or learned. While this charisma (as the name suggests) may in some sense be an ineffable quality, it has tangible dimensions through which control is exerted: as the shaping and structuring of *space* (physical, social and behavioural) through *creating boundaries*; as the rhythmic structuring of *time* (through rhetorical devices, lesson planning and the continuity of contact with the student body) referred to as *periodicity*; and as the shaping and manipulation of *images* through the spoken and written word and through performative acts, known as *symbolisation*. The relationships between these concepts are summarised in the table on page 155.

At the level of abstraction given above, the structural similarities between the two levels (whole school and classroom) and their point for point correspondence become clear. Evidence was gathered in the case studies that these attributes of power and control are ubiquitous throughout the institutional hierarchy; power distribution, though, is reproduced directly and hierarchically, whereas the other aspects of control - boundary, periodicity and symbolism - are spontaneously emergent. The nexus between the two levels of transmission occurs (potentially) at several points: a direct link, as mentioned, in terms of authoritative axis and role, although this plays no decisive part in transmission but rather ensures the stability and continuity of the institutional structure; the critical nexus occurs in the symbolic cycles, as teachers participate in and build on the institutional strategy for their own classroom strategy, appropriate the institutional semiosis, suitably adapted for their own classroom pedagogy, and both draw upon and contribute to the school ethos.

6.2.3.4 The value cycle

So far permeation and control have been discussed in isolation, as if these processes or states were unrelated to each other. On the route to value acquisition, though, they are intimately related. As discussed above, control manifests itself through the persuasive manipulation of language, patterning time (periodicity), space (boundary) and image (symbolisation), in effect to create a state of altered consciousness in which individuals can be empowered or disempowered. In the cross-case analysis of observational data a causal relationship was identified that was simplified to four categories: strategy, sign, power and participation. *This represents the interface between the structure of institutional permeation and the structure of institutional authority.* Teacher classroom strategy in the transmission of values, as previously mentioned, draws upon the institutional repository of the ethos and other sources of values and projects the message in a semiotic display in the classroom combining signs for control and embedded signs for a value, *this pathway from strategy to sign being the process of invocation.* The signs now permeate the consciousness of the pupils empowered and tasked to participate in the moral universe of the value. *This pathway from sign to participation is the process of evocation.* Participation in the moral universe of the value is also, for reasons already discussed at length, participation in the moral community, where the ‘sense of community’ is experienced. This leads naturally to an intensification of participation through value-based strategic action and semiosis at every level of the institution. *The completion of the cycle from participation back to strategy equates to acquisition.* At each stage of this cycle charismatic control is exercised; through the distribution of power pupils can exercise a measure of control over themselves and one another in maintaining a stable, value centred community. This process is shown in the following figure, where P = power, R = role, CC = charismatic control, St = strategy, in = invocation, Si = sign, ev = evocation, Pa = participation and ac = acquisition.




Fig 24 The value cycle

6.2.4 Resistance, moral autonomy and transformation

There is in all this up to now, though, something outstanding. The explanation outlined offers a hegemonistic and deterministic view of value transmission, in terms of permeation and authority. It describes the mechanism of value transmission from the perspective of the institution and the teacher, but has not considered the recipient, the pupils, as autonomous moral agents (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994; Barni et al., 2011). To the extent that it has considered them, they have been viewed as blank canvases and as output, albeit the output from a rather more sophisticated process than that considered in the partial theories. What has not been explained is the *trigger* to value acquisition; for inculcation, or the attempt to inculcate, is often met by *resistance* [B/INT-1220] and for those cases something must ameliorate that resistance. This final part of the outline of a model of institutional values transmission will look at the nature of resistance and the transformation that needs to take place for values to be acquired within an institutional setting.

Resistance takes on different forms varying in *intensity*, from questioning to outright rebellion. Cases of the latter were only encountered in the literature (e.g. Willis, 1977); the cases from the research field were limited to a range between questioning [A/FG-1] and robust criticism [B/OBS-15/1133]. It would be wrong to think, though, that resistance is either limited to students or necessarily an expression of antisocial tendencies. The data exhibits examples of resistance across the institutional structure and towards varying *targets*: criticism of government policies by head teachers [C/INT-2338], criticism of teachers [A/FG-

2] and head teachers [C/FG-2524-2555] by pupils, some criticism of teachers by other teachers [A/FN2-3032], implied conflicts over policies, criticism of local authorities [C/INT-2758], other schools and other [A/INT-6503] by head teachers, and criticisms of sixth formers.

In the partial model ‘A Spiritual Journey’, described in the previous section, it was suggested metaphorically that when the individual collides with the boundary of the institution, resistance occurs. Translated into a realistic context, when individuals encounter the boundaries established by rules and regulations and limitations on their freedom they usually resist to some degree, either actively or passively (Brehm, 1966). In this state of resistance it is impossible to acquire the values promulgated by the institution, which raises a dilemma for the institution: it cannot relinquish the principles that bound the form of life (Pring, 1986) that the institution embodies, for in this case the institution would lose its identity and its *raison d’être*; neither can it simply reaffirm its principles, nor affirm them more vociferously, for this is only likely to strengthen the resistance. In order to seek the resolution of this dilemma it is first necessary to understand the nature of resistance in greater depth.

What is common to the examples of resistance given above is the reaction of moral agency to the perception that authority is encroaching on the space in which it exercises *moral autonomy* [B/INT-1220]. What can overcome that resistance is the calculation that a benefit is to be had by trading a degree of moral autonomy for something that authority has to offer; that is the moral community [A/FG-8], discussed under section 6.2.3.1 ‘invocation and evocation’. Therefore, resistance should not be viewed as something pathological, but as an intrinsic psychic mechanism for the protection of moral integrity, which is, nevertheless, at the same time, *negotiable*. From the perspective of authority the process of transmitter inculcation/recipient acquisition can only be completed through overcoming this resistance [C/INT-5023]; from the individual acquirer’s perspective resistance is an asset which creates the possibility of testing the integrity of the moral community before acquiescing to the merging of their moral identity with the collective. In our complex and relatively open social world individuals rarely become identified with a single form of life, but enjoy multiple identification and belonging. But for each belonging there is a concession of moral autonomy. Objectively, from a neutral perspective, we can speak of the necessity for a *transformative experience*. Many things can trigger that transformative experience, but to be meaningful to the idea of institutional transmission they should be institutionally contextualised, i.e. things that occur or are witnessed within the school.

In the theory chapter the nature of value was analysed and exposed as a conceptualised shared experience. It seems logical, therefore, that a transformative experience within an institutional context must underlie the *transformation* from resistance to the acquisition of a value or values. The evidence from schools and the data collected in this research is circumstantial but suggestive (for example, [A/INT-3405] and [C/SUR-8]). The acquisition of values is also accompanied by a *turning inward*. The conceptual aspect of values again logically requires that acquisition should be accompanied by a more reflective attitude. To return to the partial model ‘A Spiritual Journey’, the analogy of collision with the boundary suggests that one way of ameliorating the implacability of the boundary is to turn away and move away, moving inward. I have already discussed above that this inward turn is accomplished through a process of negotiation between moral autonomy and belonging to the moral community. It is ultimately to find in the community something sufficiently compelling and attractive that the boundary, the encroachment of authority on moral autonomy, becomes invisible or irrelevant. It could be something explicitly inward, such as spirituality [A/INT-29.00; B/INT-0655], but also a pride in the school [C/INT-1912] or the tradition of the school [B/INT-1817], or learning to take responsibility for others [A/FG-6; B/INT-0850].

These things describe the nature of transformation, but not ultimately why it occurs, what triggers the transformation that allows the acquisition of values within an institution such as a school. The reasons may ultimately be ineffable and idiosyncratic, yet a common phenomenon appears in the anecdotes of two of the schools in the field. It is difficult to name it exactly, but I have referred to it as ‘the slipping of the mask’. The pupils in my focus group at Chelmswood told me, almost in hushed tones, of their admiration for the former Head, who had spent an entire break time with one of them, ‘sharing a bag of crisps and talking about TV and stuff’ and on another occasion had participated in a snowball fight [C/FG-2458-2506]. What is not significant here are the actions themselves, which are mundane, but the dissonance between the mask of authority and the humanity beneath. A similar dissonance, on an institutional as well as a personal level, occurred between the hierarchical, tradition-bound structures of Broughampton and the glimpses of warm communal life that could coexist. In a part of the interview quoted at length in the case study, the Chaplain related his amazement at the care shown by a housemaster to his charges, deeply grounded in intimate and detailed knowledge of their likes, dislikes and background [B/INT-5110], something that will probably have as lasting an impression on those pupils as it obviously has had on the

Chaplain. As Heidegger (1962, p.243), quoting an ancient Roman fable, reminds us, ‘Care’ is ‘that to which human [Being] belongs ‘for its lifetime’.

There is one final aspect of transformation that needs to be explored, which is *replication*. The essence of values is in a shared experience. Therefore, to acquire a value is to acquire the desire to share the value, both as a way to reinforce the negotiated decision involved in transformation and to extend the moral community. The basis of this concept is deductive reasoning from the nature of value and the symmetry of the model of permeation-authority, outlined in the previous section and illustrated in the diagram on page 193, which requires a new cycle of strategy, sign and participation. However, evidence from Chelmswood, in which pupils spontaneously affirmed values of inclusion [C/ASR-6; C/FG-2314] permeating through the institution structure from the official levels to classroom pedagogy, supports this contention. Replication links the phenomena of resistance and transformation to those of permeation and authority, by completing the link between participation and strategy. Participation is not itself part of the model for transmission. Participation is the end result of the process of transmission; therefore, logically, it cannot be part of the process. However, it can stand at the head of a new transmission event.

6.3 Further thoughts

6.3.1 Comparison with models of values education and models of value transmission

Because the model I have presented takes a holistic and integrative view of values transmission, it bears similarities to other holistic views in the literature. For example, Downey and Kelly (1978) and Plunkett (1990, pp.128-9) put forward similar ideas of values education being approached from one of four possible avenues: through a specialised curriculum, through a broadening of the existing curriculum, through pastoral care or through the school community. Hawkes (2010) has effectively taken all those approaches and combined them in pedagogy of values education. Hawkes, even more explicitly recommends the creation of a vocabulary of value terms to structure pedagogy, an approach essentially undertaken on a national level in Australia which has a list of desired values (Toomey, 2010), around which participating schools can design their curricular and pedagogic approaches. Seeing values education less from a curricular and more from a psychological perspective, Darom (2000) discerns four distinct aspects of education, the cognitive, affective, values and behaviour, which he believes should be integrated for education to have ‘a chance of truly touching young people’ (ibid, p.20). The model of values transmission touches on all those

points but explores their theoretical connections, not only as interconnected parts of institutional structure but as aspects of a coherent mechanism.

That mechanism, which I have presented here, I would argue, builds upon, incorporates and goes beyond the mechanism put forward by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Schoenpflug (2001a), a two-stage process of awareness and acceptance. Looking at transmission from an institutional perspective, it has had to take into account issues of authority and control which are constitutive of the deontology of institutions, aspects not made explicit in their theories even if assumed, which make formal education possible and, as I have described, have a central role to play at the stage of awareness. Between awareness and acceptance there is also a hiatus, which they have not clearly addressed, that of resistance and transformation. This theory has provided a theoretical framework that bridges that gap. In some sense the theory of transmission explained here could also be said to extend Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's viral transmission model by incorporating the idea of the dual conceptual and symbolic functions of values, allowing them to switch from 'diffusion' mode to 'infection' mode.

6.3.2 The centrality of the human relationship to transmission

If there is any consensus over the frequently disputed area of values and values education it is the centrality of the human relationship and the quality of that relationship in the transmission of values. As Schönplflug reminds us (2001b, p.132), the contents of transmission are 'particularly sensitive to the channel' of transmission, which I interpret to mean that for the recipient of any form of information, and particularly with the case of values, which also need to be activated in the recipient, who the transmitter is, in terms of the perception of the transmitter by the recipient, is vitally important. From a negative perspective, in cases from the schools studied where teachers were not held in high regard, this had a negative impact on academic performance (A/FG-8; C/FG-1100, 1215, 1247); and in all these cases the cause of the complaint was not their competence as teachers, which in all but a small minority would be taken as given, but their lack of warmth, remoteness or unpredictability. Research invariably backs this observation up. There is a broad area of agreement with various psychological and philosophical views that the quality of relationships is central to the idea of transmission. For Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) the relationship between the teacher (transmitter) and the taught (recipient) is a key condition of transmission. Although the focus of studies on values transmission has been on the parent child relationship, shifted into an

institutional context, all of that which has been predicated of relationships in intergenerational transmission is equally true of the teacher-pupil relationship. For Schönflug it is (2001a) that is ‘an empathetic style’; for Euler et al. (2001) it is ‘emotional closeness between the generations’; for Barni et al. (2011) it is the ‘relationship’ among the parents and the ‘consistency’ of the value message that is received, as well as the ‘closeness’ of the relationship. These all fit into a pattern of successful parenting, which most now agree is *authoritative* (Steinberg, et al., 1989), rather than authoritarian or permissive. This also seems a fitting description of the relationship that ought to exist between teachers and their pupils in the context of education in general, but specifically in the context of transmitting values. An ‘authoritative style’ seems a fitting description of the combination of authority and humanity of key figures that I discovered in the data from the schools and characterised as ‘the slipping of the mask’, which I concluded was fundamental to a contextual transformative experience *en route* to the acceptance of institutional values.

6.3.3 An evaluation and interpretation of the model

Through this research the aetiology of value transmission has been traced, from the nature of values having a dual role as concept-like and symbol-like, through the institutional permeation of value concepts throughout the institution, to their invocation through the medium of pedagogical control of the value concepts and their re-symbolisation for the student audience. In doing so this theoretical perspective has developed an understanding of the school as an institutional structure for value transmission, incorporating and offering a reinterpretation of its power hierarchies, and its administrative and pedagogical functions. Moreover, it has demonstrated that the definitionally problematic notion of ethos has a tangible meaning in the context of value transmission. The abstract notion of value has been shown not only to be real but implicated into and – importantly – co-defined with its institutional context, incorporating aspects of space, time, authority, strategy and dramatic play. In short values, value transmission and institutions are co-existent and inter-related conceptually (Rokeach, 1975).

It has also considered what many theorists of values education and values transmission have not, that of the role of resistance to values inculcation and its incorporation into a more inclusive theoretical model of transmission that embraces both inculcation and acquisition perspectives, through the negotiation of moral autonomy for belonging under acceptable conditions. Parsons (1961) did recognise the phenomenon of resistance to schooling, but saw

that as a structural reaction to raising levels of achievement. Values education is much more than a one-dimensional race towards academic or vocational achievement, although research on longer term programmes of values education (Lovat et al., 2010; Toomey, 2010; Hawkes, 2010) suggest that it can impact considerably on those outcomes; it is about humanising the curriculum (Aspin and Chapman, 2000) and creating the opportunity for education to touch the lives of young people (Darom, 2000) based on ‘the kind of *persons* that [as a society we wish them] to grow up into’ (Pring, 1986, p.181). For this to happen, values education, as all good education, requires a transformative experience in the life of the recipient, one which can mitigate or even prevent resistance to transmission.

The emerging picture of transmission of values within an institution is both simple and complex. It can be understood at the level of an individual journey through the institution, a negotiation with and reconciliation to the demands placed by institutional belonging. But it can also be understood at the institutional level, as the workings of a complex system of interlocking hierarchies, in the cases considered here the relationship between the teacher in the classroom, the administration, management and ethos of the school, and the influence of outside forces, notably religions, local communities or constituency, and local and national governments. But at its core it is about a very small space, the classroom, in which the relationship between the teacher and the pupil flourishes or withers. A school is an intricate web of control, dependence and autonomy (Morris, 1964) at every level and a consideration of the transmission of values highlights this very clearly.

6.4 Summary

This chapter effectively concludes the analytical process by integrating the findings of the cross-case comparison (chapter 4) with the product of the cross-case iteration (chapter 5), the mechanism for institutional values transmission. It also functions as a revue of the stages in the development of the model, including partial, limited and flawed models which, nonetheless, contributed to the final outcome. In doing so it draws comparisons with other models of values and transmission considered in the literature review and argues for the superiority of the present model.

The core of the chapter is the two sections ‘the value cycle’ and ‘resistance, moral autonomy and transformation’. In the first the inner dynamics of the inculcation pole of transmission is worked out, which involves detailing the interrelationship between the semiotic permeation of the institution by value information with the pedagogic authority of the teacher in a

classroom leading to the incipient ‘moral community’ of the student body. The second section explores the acquisition pole of transmission, drawing on examples from the case studies to give a more narrative account of the psychology of the individual that leads from a natural resistance to authority and testing of the moral integrity of the institutional collectivity, to acceptance of its values and the ‘sense of community’.

The final chapter attempts to evaluate the entire research process and to place its findings, including the model of institutional value transmission described here, within the context of existing knowledge, including an assessment of its contribution to the pedagogy of values.

This final chapter does two things. In the first part there is an evaluation of the two-tier research process as a whole, including a brief summary of issues relating to validity and reliability in the core research and a lengthier review of the derivative hypotheses. I conclude with a reflection upon some broad themes arising out of this research, such as placing the research within the academic tradition, considering the broader application of the findings and their original contribution to knowledge, and any implications or recommendations that arise as a result of these findings. I also consider the limitations of this research and suggest avenues for further research. Finally, I will share some personal reflections on the research process.

7.1 Evaluation of the Research

7.1.1 Validity and Reliability in the Core Research

This is a review of points that were covered in detail in the methodology chapter. Yin (2009) analysed validity in case study research to three types – construct, internal and external – and recommended a series of tactics to ensure that the requirements of each were met. For construct validity there should be the use of multiple sources, a chain of evidence and the use of respondent validation. Internal validation requires a means of matching emergent patterns with that predicted by theory and also the use of cross-case analysis. External validity means the findings are capable of being generalised across a broader range of cases. Reliability means the repeatability of the research process; for this the creation of a research protocol and research database are recommended. All of these requirements have been met. The concepts of invocation and evocation derived from the fundamental theory of values predicted that in value transmission verbal and symbolic forms of communication of value concepts and the creation of communal structures would be evident, which was found to be the case and the evidence for that is outlined in the case studies.

7.1.2 Review of Derivative Hypotheses

Of the ten hypotheses, the first five concerned the nature of values, the next three concerned the nature of values education and the final two features of values educational institutions.

Evidence for (both positive and negative) and evidence against was amassed during the process of analysing the data from the three schools chosen for the field research. In each case transcripts were examined for statements and positions or policies that might either strengthen or weaken the case for a particular hypothesis. The stance taken here was that the fundamental theory, derived deductively from basic axioms, must be considered testable against data arrived at more empirically. While not applying strict criteria of falsifiability, theory must be sufficiently supported and not indisputably disproven by the data available and, at the same time, capable of development and improvement.

1. Values do not precede social or moral behaviours

This hypothesis is stating something that arises from the fundamental approach to the nature of values, namely that we do not assimilate a value culturally and then start behaving in a manner which is governed by that value, but that we are taught the appropriate behaviour usually in the context of value-laden instruction and that we gradually assimilate the meaning to the acquisition of the appropriate skills. A clear distinction is being made between the conceptual knowledge of a value term, which may precede the associated social or moral behaviour, and the *acquisition* of a value, which the hypothesis states cannot.

Positive support for this hypothesis is provided from St Augustine. The school, in fact each house, carries out charity projects, to which the children generously devote time and money [A/FN2-2342]. The purpose, though, is not merely to help others in greater need but in order to ‘educate them as human beings to have a certain humility to other human beings [and to challenge] the philosophy of looking after number one’ [A/FN2-2342]. Implicit in this view is the belief that left to their own devices humans have a tendency to pursue selfish and small-minded concerns. To manifest generosity, humility and concern for others these values must be acquired through a process of ‘conceptualised activity’, in this case charitable giving. At Chelmswood High the Head conceives of values education as taking place most importantly in ‘the daily interactions we have within school’ [C/INT-0700], by which he means the interaction between the staff and pupils, particularly in:

having to deal with people who have transgressed the rules and where things have gone wrong, [and] people have not behaved as they should have. I suppose in every single interaction to do with these issues it's the values underlying it: how do we want people to be in the school, taking account of the needs of others in this school community [C/INT-0700].

One pupil also notes, 'Behaviour depends on who you hang around with' [C/SUR-8]. Both these scenarios assume, though not explicitly, that the acquisition of values follows behavioural patterns. A more transient and less structured example comes from Chelmswood High. In this exchange one student is describing to the teacher how, following a lesson on diversity and inclusion, he corrected his brother who was using a derogatory term: Teacher: 'And what did you say to him?' *'I said he shouldn't say it'*. 'And did you explain why?' *'Mm, yeah'*. 'And what did he say?' *'He said 'Oh, alright''* [C/OBS-0343/4 (3)]. As simple as this exchange sounds, it embodies the principle that values are acquired by a directed activity (in this case an instruction to change linguistic behaviour) with a conceptualised reason (in this case unclear, but probably some version of what the pupil learned in the lesson).

The view that social and moral behaviours precede value acquisition could be charged with promoting a traditional view of social and moral behaviour that passes unchanged from generation to generation, as it does in the orthodox religious families, or that Bourdieu (1977) claims is accomplished through the reproduction of the institutions of privilege in capitalist schooling. While there are examples of cultural transmission that remain intact, it is not the position taken here either that this is to be lauded or assumed to be normative. Societies and moral codes evolve over time, and while there may be natural limits to what is acceptable in human society (which will be discussed below) the social and moral norms referred to here are what is acceptable either to society in general or to particular parts of society or groups within society at any time, without distinction, and the research is concerned with the *mechanism* of value transmission rather than which values are transmitted or whether these are the 'right' ones.

A more serious challenge to this view is contained in the belief, promoted in St Augustine, but also found to a lesser degree at Broughampton [B/ABS-1.1] and Chelmswood [C/INT-0829], that there is an 'intrinsic value' to human beings. In discussion the principal contact stated:

everybody, no matter who you are or where you're from, has intrinsic value [pause], so no matter how naughty, no matter how deprived, no matter how socially excluded you may be or, on the other hand, no matter how wealthy or fortunate you may be, that within each person is, there's going to be something of real value that needs to be nurtured and grown and developed [A/INT-2900]

The concept of intrinsic value is inherent in Catholic theology derived from Aristotelian philosophy, but is deeply embedded in Western thought generally, even finding expression in the Marxist labour theory of value. In the theory chapter a version of this idea was considered, the idea that value constitutes a tertiary property of things. In the subsequent discussion the existence of this idea of value was discounted as a reification of the process of valuing, for which an alternative explanation was offered. The concept of intrinsic value remains one of the triumphs of the philosophical and moral imagination, which would undoubtedly benefit society if more widely promoted, but it is a belief (rather than a fact) whose transmission conforms to the principles being sought, and the hypothesis under discussion. The sense of the intrinsic value of human life cannot be acquired apart from the concept and some confirmatory experience, preferably the modelling of behaviour based on that belief. Presumably based on this concept, at St Augustine difficult pupils ‘will be given unconditional positive acceptance, making clear to them that it is their behaviour that is unacceptable, not their person’ [A/BM-P].

2. Values *justify* various behaviours, moral codes and worldviews

Though, according to hypothesis 1, values (value acquisition) do not precede social or moral behaviours, once acquired values justify particularly ways of behaving, particular rules that are followed and particular views that one might hold about all sorts of things within the social world. Values act as a shorthand or code for a larger bundle of views and the actions that flow from them. This means that values then become the basis for action, not only in daily life but also by extension into larger areas of sociality, such as work and vocation. In the schools that formed the field for this research this hypothesis is of particular relevance to the mission statements or documents that embed the fundamental values of the institution. The Head at St Augustine stated, regarding the values of the Ethos document, that ‘we have our position and then it’s applying that position to everyday life’ [A/INT-5400], attempting to work out the implications of idealistic principles in the hard and messy reality of a large school. At Broughampton, where there is less dependence on, indeed a suspicion of, written documents [B/INT-1520], ‘there is a strong emphasis on general moral development and the individual’s journey of faith, and the School promotes the values of personal integrity, tolerance and respect for others, and a sense of responsibility for the more vulnerable within their community’ [B/EO-3]. At Chelmswood High, ‘while things go along reasonably plain sailing we tend to...you are protected to a certain sense by just going by your established procedures: ‘how would we normally deal with this?’’ [C/INT-1516]. However, ‘in some

adverse circumstances where things became more difficult we would be...we would fall back more onto written policies and statements and things, where you would have to check 'is what we are doing appropriate, is this right?'" [C/INT-1516]. A student at St Augustine also gives an example of how things can go wrong if values are not integral to interaction: 'Without respect nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don't respect your teacher their probably not going to respect you, and when no one's respecting each other nothing works properly' [A/FG-8].

3. There is no *a priori* hierarchy of values

This hypothesis follows as a logical implication of the theory of values described in the theory chapter, which states that values name a shared experience or, to put that in more philosophical terms, a value is a conceptual linguistic marker, derived from discourse within a bounded social group, that encapsulates a common feeling or experience within that group. On this definition all values are ontologically equivalent. This does not preclude that some values, *a posteriori*, might be found to be more fitting to human society; this would converge with the general evolutionary outlook which this research has declared in the introduction. However, it takes issue with the platonic view that a realm of values exists independently of human endeavour and that these values can be ordered into the greater and the lesser.

Nevertheless, the evidence from the field, scant as it is, does not generally support this hypothesis, but rather the contrary view, that there *is* a hierarchy of values. Even when proclaiming openness, there is often an underlying supposition of certainty. As the principal contact at St Augustine, in giving his view on the Catholic perspective at the school, noted, 'We do feel duty bound to say, 'but other views are this, this and this' and try and lead youngsters to some sort of reasoned conclusions themselves about where their views stand' [A/FN2-1055]. Implicit in this view is the assumption that with the application of reason the correct view will emerge. Some of the pupils there are more forthright: 'I think if you aspire to be famous or wealthy I think you're lucky if you do get that in your life, but I don't think it's that important. I think as long as you're happy and you've got everything you need in life, like have a family or whatever, I think you'll be fine, you don't need anything' [A/FG-10]; 'I think overall if we're talking about morals and would I change if I was famous or if I was wealthy then no, I think being famous should never overshadow morals or what you truly believe. Nothing should really change because you've got a lot of money' [A/FG-10]. For

these young people moral values and fundamental values like family and happiness trump evanescent values like fame and wealth.

These views, though popular opinion would probably be largely in accordance, are just opinion. There is evidence of a more empirical sort to be had in the data from the field. Across the three schools the same values appear, both as choices for important personal values in the surveys and as values permeating all aspects of the institutions: these include social values like cooperation, respect, fairness and trust; moral values like honesty and appropriateness; and spiritual values like care, compassion and generosity [A/B/C/SUR-2], [A/B/C/IFVA]. Even though these institutions are all schools with a common mission to educate the young, and all are expected to educate the spiritual moral and social components of knowledge, such a convergence is still surprising and suggests that values are differentiated in terms of their importance.

The data assembled against the hypothesis, though circumstantial, is formidable; and it should not be underestimated how damaging a successful challenge to this single hypothesis could be for the entire theoretical edifice. One strategy would be to sidestep the issue by taking refuge in claiming that *a posteriori* ranking is not the same as *a priori* ranking. However, I think the issue needs to be considered and addressed more seriously than such a gambit would permit. There is, in fact, evidence that there is a natural ordering of values, that is to say, there is a natural basis for some of the most fundamental values. Take trust, for example. Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust lies at the basis of our ideas of social capital. I would add that wherever social institutions are analysed reductively the trust between individuals is the only thing that is socially irreducible. Trust is probably the most tangible social force. At basis, it is the sense that the other intends no harm and no harm will result from dealings with the other; the absence of this sense would make human association, and hence human society, impossible, and its presence is, therefore, requisite. In a critique of Fukuyama's thesis, Hoogvelt (1998) argues that while trust was an important component of early stage capitalism, it has become less so with each technological advance and modern internet connectivity virtually obviates the need for bonds of trust in commerce. If this is so, then biological rootedness does not imply logical priority. I would say that a distinction needs to be made between the biological roots of values, on the basis of which a case for natural ordering can be made, and the functioning of values in the complex cultures which we inhabit today, in which all values have to be considered intrinsically plausible.

4. Knowledge of a value, or discussion about values, is different to their acquisition

This is the corollary of the point made in hypothesis 1, that values do not precede social or moral behaviours. To be said to have acquired a value is to have consolidated a pattern of behaviour or practice and to have conceptualised that behaviour or practice. The Head of Chelmswood High came very close to this definition when he stated,

I would understand [values education] as being to do with, I suppose, partly to do with [the] study of ethical standards and moral values that guide our conduct but also partly, I suppose, people internalising those and actually behaving in a proper way in school and beyond, as a guide to one's own actions [C/INT-0525].

Merely grasping the meaning of a value term and the ability to use the term in meaningful discourse are insufficient. Acquiring a value is about confirmatory experience, to some extent proclamation, but more importantly actualising some potentialities while closing off others. In the theory chapter the acquisition of a value was characterised as occurring within a closed group due to its essential collectivity. However, real-world groupings are hardly ever closed, and those that are are typically pathological. Some degree of awareness of in-group and out-group is necessary, though, for identity maintenance and such groupings are necessary for the development of collective experience which is at the root of value formation. Schools are a typical case. All schools are semi-closed institutions in which social bonds between staff members, pupils and teachers and between classmates develop largely out of the public eye. Visitors are permitted only on special occasions or with special permission. Moreover, good schools typically foster exclusivity as a strategy to bind the in-group more tightly.

The problematic issue for schools, to the extent that they are aware of it as an issue, is that they can provide the necessary information or guidance, but they have no influence over acquisition, or often knowledge of what the conditions and triggers of acquisition are. As the Assistant Head of St Augustine observed, ‘Ultimately all we can do is give the Catholic Church’s view and then it’s youngsters [who] make their decision’ [A/FN2-1055]. In a similar vein the Drugs Policy document at Broughampton states that it recognises that it has a duty to deliver education concerning drugs to its pupils throughout their time at the school ‘in the hopes that they will be able to make informed decisions when faced with the temptation to experiment with drugs’ [DSM-1.2].

5. All values theoretically exist in a state of tension, as they **underlie fundamentally incompatible worldviews, or groups and institution with competing or conflicting interests**

It is not only politicians who intone the word ‘values’ as if it were a balm to heal all manner of social ills; philosophers also sometimes succumb to the surfeit of positivity associated with the contemplation of a field which manages to be simultaneously highly abstract theoretically but with implications for every facet of human life. In reality, values are paradoxically the source of social cohesion, where they are shared, and the source of social conflict, where they are not shared. The theory chapter explains clearly the cause of this paradox. First, our values are very close to an essential definition of who we are as individuals, rooted as they are in experience, and as such something to which we have an emotional attachment and in which we have an emotional investment. Secondly, the nature of values as shared experience means that values are not only acquired within a communal setting but are also a source of self-definition for the group. These two ideas taken together explain why, when groups with differing values that underlie different worldviews and agendas are competing for social space or economic resources, passions can run high and lead to open conflict.

This hypothesis is the one which is most clearly attested by the data. There are numerous examples of conflicts of values, between individuals, between groups, between teachers and pupils and between outside agencies and the school. Interestingly, most of them are not personal conflicts, but between differing ‘cultures’ and expectations. For schools, one of the perennial sources of conflict is the imposition of targets by central government. The Assistant Head of St Augustine strongly disagrees ‘that exam tables are the only measure of an effective school. They’re very narrow to be perfectly honest, and what we pride ourselves on in a Catholic school – and I’m sure many non-faith schools do as well – is that school should be about educating the whole person’ [A/FN2-1553]. According to the Head the school also ‘take[s] a very inclusive attitude to students; which means we don’t do very well in league tables [A/INT-0724]...the whole targets culture creates a clash’ [A/INT-3015]. From a very different vantage point, that of a successfully performing school, the Head of Chelmswood High explains how the target culture results in both unnecessary conservatism and unnecessary innovation [C/INT-3210, 3327]. He cites the example of another, underperforming school that replaced Science GCSEs with an alternative, easier qualification that would boost the school’s standing in the league tables, but at the cost of closing off the pupils’ prospects of a career in the sciences [C/INT-3327] and notes drily that ‘the problem is

not so much the measurement of performance but the very high stakes of the outcome which are then publicised' [C/INT-2940].

There are culture clashes within the school. According to the Head of Chelmswood, 'in all large organisations with many different people there are bound to be times when people's needs and rights and interests conflict' [C/INT-1006]. At least one of the (female) students in each focus group complained about what they considered to be petty rules concerning jewellery, nail varnish, etc. A more serious complaint was in regards to the inconsistency in the punishments for different infractions: 'A lot of the time you can get into more trouble for not having your uniform done properly than that people might do for disrupting everyone's learning in the class' [A/FG-2]. From the teacher's perspective, though, 'quite often ... younger people focus on rights and not on responsibilities' [A/FN1-0335].

6. Values are likely to be a chronologically late mental acquisition

As this is a hypothesis about something which is potentially measurable, and is properly the brief of a field like developmental psychology, the sort of data provided by the research methods employed here are likely to be, at best, circumstantial. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate projection from the theory, by way of hypotheses 1 and 4, and could be a decisive, make or break prediction. The reasoning is straightforward. If value acquisition is dependent upon a level of cognitive development sufficient to entertain abstract thinking and a life in which sufficient experience has been amassed, then it is likely to emerge in late childhood or early adolescence. In this respect the comment of the Assistant Head at St Augustine is telling: 'It's interesting as you see them develop; I've seen many come through the school from year 7 to 6th form and they grow up and then they get to 6th form and they're adults, they're mini-adults and you can see that they're starting to take on the values that we've tried to instil in them' [A/FN2-3428]. Looking at the results from the surveys it is clear that given the right prompt pupils grasped the contextual nature of values, though limiting their choice of personal values to those used in the questionnaire suggests that conceptualisation is limited, which inhibits exploration of wider examples [A/QQ-3/RAN-6]. The median age of the surveyed groups was 15, range 1 (15-16) [A/QQ-1] but could occasionally exhibit sophistication in their perceptions, indicative of a high level of cognitive development, e.g.: 'I think that being famous and being successful is totally different because you could be famous because you killed someone or you could be famous because you saved someone' [A/QQ-1/FG-10].

7. Values education in its most general sense is only the application of the standards of good teaching across the curriculum, and does not entail a specific requirement that knowledge of values be taught

Some years ago there was a spate of interest in an approach to teaching values known as ‘values clarification’, the assumption being that all children were bearers of their own values in potential and it was the teachers job merely to assist them in realising them in actuality; moreover, it was not the job, and wrong in principle, for the teacher to impose their own values or to inculcate the values of the society or institution. This approach has largely fallen into disfavour, at least in the UK, since the 1990s and the common assumption now is that there are common values shared across a wide swath of the population (DfES/QCA, 1999, 2004) the teaching of which should form part of the curriculum, although there is no statutory requirement as long as there is provision for the ‘spiritual and moral’ education of pupils. The hypothesis as it stands needs some clarification and perhaps amendment. Where it states that there is no requirement that knowledge of values be taught, it had in mind the type of approach typified by values clarification or that of advocates of values education as a timetabled subject; it did not mean that there should be no discourse of values, but assumed that this discourse is naturally a part of good teaching in every subject. As the Head of Chelmswood says, in explaining that there is no specific general approach, ‘[values education] is more intrinsic in what we do anyway’ [C/INT-0829]

Since these views were stated, I have changed my position on this slightly, partly as a result of the data coming from the schools, but partly because I believe that the hypothesis as stated does not follow from the theory of values discussed previously in hypotheses 1-5. The theory of the invocation of values within the closed community clearly implies a discourse of values, through which the experience of the members of the community is conceptually shaped. Ideally, that discourse should be a part of what good teaching is, but that is not necessarily what is understood to be good teaching in even the best schools. A comparison of the culture at the three schools investigated in this research reveals some interesting differences. Superficially all three schools claim to pursue good academic standards and a focus on individual students. However, the detail shows that these are understood and prioritised differently. At St Augustine the focus is on ‘educating the whole child and assisting them with skills and values that will help them with life, just outside the world of work and academic achievement’ [A/FN2-1553], in other words the priority is on a broad-based education in which (specifically, but not exclusively, Christian) values are central, even to the

detriment, to some extent, of academic performance [A/INT-3015]. At Broughampton, although there is a similar commitment to a broad-based education, creating the ‘all-rounder’ [B/INT-0315] is more a case of nurturing individual talents within a fairly pressurised and competitive environment. At Chelmswood High the focus is on ‘academic excellence and the response to individual needs’ [C/INT-0317], yet behavioural expectations are not seen so much as an end in themselves but as a prerequisite for creating a good learning environment [C/INT-5434]

8. With regard to values education in the more specific sense of moral education, what is needed above all is the assertion of standards of behaviour to which students should be required to conform; the function of standards is always socialisation leading to the acquisition of values; the normative content of moral education must be to lead the individual away from a preoccupation with the self to others and the wider community.

If we examine the function of values, particularly moral values, by which I mean specifically those values the acquisition of which generally requires a code of conduct or a set of rules (although this is a definition that I have adopted to distinguish the moral realm from say the spiritual that may not be agreeable to everyone), we see that their role in social groupings is to direct the individual to greater participation in the community and away from self-centred concerns and activities. This arises from values being generated or acquired in a communal setting. This principal can be taken to the next level in which individual groups can be viewed as isolated self-interested entities and underlies the search for common values in society, without which societies become enclaves of misunderstanding and potential conflict. A core of common values allows groups to compete in the shared social space productively.

Recognising that we are caught in the dilemma of being – in Kant’s phrase – in a state of ‘asocial sociality’ (Kant, 1784), moving from a self-centred to a community-centred perspective is about both ‘pull’ and ‘push’. According to the principal contact at St Augustine, ‘Catholic Schools are about community, they’re about people helping each other, working together; it’s not just about being narrow-minded and individualistic, look after number one, that philosophy. Looking after number one is not a particularly healthy philosophy really’ [A/FN2-1553]. Different things bring a sense of community. For the Head of Chelmswood High it is ‘pride that they do go to this school... that helps to bind people together’ [C/INT-1912], while at Broughampton ‘The Chapel is regularly used to focus the thoughts of the community at times of crisis, collective grief or rejoicing’ [WRE-2.5]

However, the sense of belonging, does not always come naturally or easily initially; much of community-building has to do with enforcing rules that benefit the community while challenging individuals to confront their selfish tendencies. As one teacher observes, values education is ‘the expectations, the high expectations, we try to get the children to follow’ [A/FN1-0335]; it is about things like ‘getting a class ready to come into a classroom, meeting and greeting them, ensuring that their uniform is correct – because there’s a big thing about uniform; we say you need to be smart, it’s a sort of precondition that you’re organised and you’re ready to work – and then inviting them into the classroom’ [A/FN1-1010]. It can also be about things like learning how to think about the needs of others [C/INT-0700] or ‘how to get along with people you don’t like’ [C/SUR-8] that make it possible to exist as a community.

9. For values to be transmitted they must permeate the institution at all levels

This is, as should be apparent from the previous chapter, one of the main theoretical ideas that has emerged during the course of the research. At one level this can be considered a tautology, for in some sense we cannot speak of transmission without permeation. It would be possible to acquire values without permeation, but they would not, therefore, be transmitted values. The point is that in order to be transmitted a value must suffuse the ethos of a school to an extent that it becomes infectious (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). Evidence has been presented through the case studies that in each school there were values that had permeated the entire institutional structure, represented by the three levels of official, classroom and pupil perspectives, and that, moreover, through the cross-case analysis, some of these values were common and likely to be universal across at least educational establishments and probably beyond.

Direct evidence from the raw data is circumstantial. At St Augustine the school makes considerable effort to create an ambience in which the spiritual forms an integral part of the pupils’ experience of life at the school, on both a daily basis, but also cycling through the religious year, with prayer, Masses, RE and religious retreats and other activities [A/FN1-1410]. While the evidence points to some indifference towards the outward manifestation of this religiosity, there seems no doubt that the values of Catholicism are recognised and accepted by and large. At Chelmswood there was a commitment to diversity and inclusion, and a non-tolerance of stereotyping, which was manifest at the official level, within the classroom environment and in the responses of children themselves, which gave a strong

indication that these values had been successfully transmitted through institutional permeation.

10. For values to be acquired they must be exemplified by those in authority

This can be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition for value acquisition to occur in an institutional setting. To demonstrate this, the counterfactual need only be considered. We often admire those who manifest certain virtues without necessarily feeling the need to acquire them personally. Nonetheless, in the absence of good examples of behaviour, the practice of values, it is very difficult for young people in particular to acquire them. From the data from the schools it is apparent that this principle is held to by those setting out the policies [A/BM-P; B/BM-1.2] as well as all teachers. Teachers see their responsibilities as including being a role model [A/FN2-3032], of setting an example in attitudes towards pupils but expecting reciprocation [A/FN2-3428] and by setting an example preparing the young for adulthood [A/H]. But the responsibility to be a role model extends upwards, to the senior management of schools, who see their role as not just setting an example to pupils but also to the staff under them [C/INT-1516, 3730; A/INT-1939].

The data from the pupils' perspective was not so forthcoming on this issue until I asked the question directly to the focus group at Chelmswood: 'Do you look at your teacher as a role model?' [YES][Yeah] [C/FG-1413]; [the teacher is] 'like an adult role model' [C/FG-1530]. The things pupils seem to admire in their teachers is friendliness and approachability, and they also appreciate senior staff who are a visible presence around the school, someone 'you can go to if you're in trouble' [C/FG-2530]. There was no evidence of value acquisition by this route, but as Schönflug (2001a, p.176) indicated in his theory of transmission belts, transmission is more likely to occur where there is a 'a harmonious and constructive relationship' and according to Euler et al. (2001, p.147) where a close bond between the generations exists, which though predicated of the parent child relationship are no less likely to be true of any inter-generational relationship in which authority plays a part.

7.1.3 Assessment

The plausibility of this theory of institutional values transmission has been tested at each stage, through philosophical argument, through the development of an appropriate methodology and course of field research, through the development of methods for the analysis and synthesis of data, and through attempting to anchor conclusions firmly in the

data. Furthermore, within the limits of the research and methodology, a claim for both forensic and predictive capacities of the theory can be made; the strengthening of this claim could be accomplished only through the use of more quantitative methods and longitudinal studies. Clearly, plausibility, not proof, is being claimed here. The snapshot view of the schools in the study meant that connections had to be inferred on the basis of the available data and institutional causality could not always be established.

After reviewing the hypotheses individually, discussing their implications in light of the research that has been carried out since they were first formulated and considering the evidence for and against each one, the overwhelming sense is that they have been tested and have proved to be robust. Hypothesis 3, which asserts that there is no a priori hierarchy of values, was the most exposed and the objections to it were stated in their strongest form, but found to be inconclusive. Hypothesis 6 which claims that value acquisition is likely to occur late chronologically in individual development, has strayed from pure theory into empirical territory and could only be backed up anecdotally and observationally, but remains plausible considering the alternatives. Most found ready confirmation in the data coming from the schools. There was very little in the way of counter-evidence and that was mostly ambiguous.

7.2 The location of the research within the academic tradition

This research was carried out broadly within the fields of the philosophy and sociology of education, but skirts the borders of philosophy, evolutionary psychology and sociology. But if its exact location is hard to define, its subject was very clearly focused: that was to understand how values are transmitted in the context of formal education through developing a model of institutional value transmission. Values education is a relatively new field, though it has precursors that stretch back decades and even hundreds of years if religious instruction is included; and ultimately the education of values is something that happens and has happened in all cultures at all times. But the twin characteristics of the ubiquity and invisibility of the process mean that its study has been sporadic, frequently arcane and usually characterised by vagueness. The model proposed here clarifies the understanding of what values are. It accepts the functional objectivity, and even relativity, of values at one level, but has demonstrated that the interiority of values functions precisely in binding social groups through their linguistic and symbolic functions of conceptualising shared experience as a localised absolute. Through the idea of permeation, the model of institutional value transmission has essentially taken a model of cultural transmission, such as Cavalli-Sforza

and Feldman's analogy of viral diffusion and applied it to a broader, institutional context, particularly their category of 'oblique' transmission, that is, non-genetic intergenerational transmission. Bernstein's theory of educational transmission was influential in conceptualising the relationship of power and control to the educative context, although ultimately the understanding of power and control developed was significantly different. Again Bourdieu's theory of reproduction was initially helpful in navigating the relationship between power and institutional structure, though ultimately I would repudiate his underlying determinism. Findings in transmission studies repeatedly emphasise the importance of moral autonomy in the acquisition of values. The other finding, which again reinforces those of studies in intergenerational transmission and in the psychology and phenomenology of value, is of the importance of an intimate and warm human bond. The data strongly suggested that leavening (but not replacing) the authoritative role with openness, friendliness and care was a key to removing resistance and drawing pupils into the moral community of the school. I have a keen sympathy for the Parsonian model of socialisation through inculcation. I think society and schools have a duty to teach those values which are understood to correlate with better social and personal outcomes and are broadly shared but which are frequently neglected in the upbringing of the young. Yet, the route of inculcation is specifically associated with increased alienation (something also recognised in Bernstein's view of 'collective codes', i.e. closed 'esoteric' bodies of knowledge); indeed for Bourdieu and Apple the social and educational systems are 'locked into' class modalities of inculcation and resistance. The model emerging through this research, however, suggests that this is one possible outcome, but certainly not the only one possible. Values, in a sense, can only be acquired, but they cannot be acquired in the absence of a determination to transmit them. Nevertheless, the interiority of values as shared experience means that values cannot actually be acquired outside a collective context, and that entails forging collective bonds of personal closeness and warmth. To educate values thus requires pedagogical authority, personal integrity, a degree of innate or acquired charisma and an ability to be at least strategically open and friendly.

7.3 Generalisability of the Theory

Within the determination of the integrated model in the final part of the Findings chapter, the scalability of the model was alluded to, in that what occurred at the classroom level was also applicable at the whole school level, the aspect of the 'value cycle' essentially being a hierarchically reproducible mechanism. This strongly suggests that the model as a whole can

be applied more widely outside the context of formal education. Potentially, it could be applied to a wide range of institutional settings. The caveat would be that schools are social institutions that are specifically set up for the purpose of educational transmission, including the transmission of values. Other organisations, such as businesses, policy units and local governments are not. Even universities, which clearly have an educative function, do not normally consider themselves responsible to engage in the education of values. Perhaps, though, this is too narrow a view of the matter. Values are at the heart of every social grouping; they are determinative of the purpose for which the group exists in the first place. Therefore, the transmission of values must be part of what happens in order to induct new members and to reinforce continuing allegiance among the existing membership. In all organisations issues of resistance to authority arise, which if not managed can be destructive, firstly of the harmony and morale of the group, and then progressively of the cohesion, efficiency and functionality of the group. The analysis of the dilemma of resistance, as a trade off of moral autonomy for collective belonging on one side, and of the responsibility of those with authority for generating the desire for belonging on the other, would seem to be universally applicable. I am quite happy for others to read into this a system for good management. My purpose here is rather to establish the point that values are constitutive of all social organisations, and partly determinative of institutional structure. Values are also inherently strategic and transmissive, but their acquisition within a social context can only be assured by the cultivation of greater reflectivity.

7.4 Original contributions to knowledge

There are four areas in which this research has made original contributions: in axiology or the philosophy of value, educational and social theory, methodology and pedagogy.

7.4.1 Contribution to axiology

The theory chapter propounds a view of value based on the unification of a phenomenological view of the interiority of the value experience with a semiotic view of the exteriority of value, and identifies this exteriority with its linguistic marker. This linguistic aspect endows values with two features that work symbiotically: conceptual flow through normal communication routes and symbolic profundity. It argues that while values are individually held, they are communally generated and sustained and that the essence of any value is a shared experience. Within the closed confines of the lived-world of a particular value the value has a binding effect and a regulating effect on action. This defines the

interiority of value. On the other hand, through its exteriority a value becomes a part of normal discourse within open social structures. This duality allows the individual to inhabit a plurality of value-worlds with overlapping and differing degrees of commitment. Values then can be spoken of as participatory, transmissive and strategic.

Since the birth of modern philosophy with Descartes' epistemological turn, a dilemma of subjectivity and its relation to the phenomenal world has only become more acute. Debates within value theory have also been conducted within this Cartesian framework of subjectivity and objectivity. A view of value which is communicative but also communal, which is implicit in social structures, and in which 'experience' rather than 'subjectivity' is constitutive, essentially sidesteps this whole issue.

7.4.2 Contribution to educational and social theory

The theory of institutional value transmission put forward makes a number of contributions to social and educational theory. It provides a clear mechanism for the transmission of values within institutional settings, which, though it may be intuitively grasped by those who work in the field of values education, is never made explicit. It also builds theoretically on the work of evolutionary psychologists, such as Cavalli-Sforza, who offered a theoretical framework for inter-generational transmission, by generalising the problem to the level of transmission within formal education (schooling) between teacher and pupils. Moreover, building on the foundations of Bernstein's theory of educational transmission, particularly the relationship of open and bounded forms of knowledge to power and authority, the model took the issue of values transmission to the level of the whole school perspective, implicitly even incorporating those forces external to the school with power over the curriculum, such as local and national government.

Through the development of this theory of institutional value transmission a number of subsidiary points were illuminated. The first was the importance of values to institutional structure or, more properly, the coexistent interrelationship between values and institutional structure, to the extent that they can be considered partly inter-definable. Secondly, through the model terms such as 'ethos' and 'community' were reinterpreted and conceptualised and their educational significance within schools given a clearer theoretical foundation. These points open up the possibility that the model can be applied more widely to a range of institutions and organisations beyond schools.

7.4.3 Contribution to research methodology

Though I would not claim to have any significant contribution in this area, the nature of the research itself has raised questions about the appropriate methodology and forced me to make certain adaptations. Hopefully, future researchers in this field will work to develop and improve on these methodological procedures.

Based on the philosophical approaches to understanding the nature of values that was utilised in chapter 2, that of phenomenology and semiotics, a joint phenomenological-semiotic approach to the field and the analysis of data was developed. In order to build up a picture of each school, from both the aspect of the interior states of a sample of representative participants, as well as the institutional structures and pedagogy and the messages conveyed through them, I chose a suite of six data capture methods, and applied several analytical and synthetic methods to each data source to allow the fundamental categories to emerge that would go into making up the final theoretical model of values transmission.

Working from a philosophical theory to the field and a methodology based on the structure of the philosophical theory, then the development of theory combining the deductive philosophical approach and the empirical data of the field, I was concerned that the final model, despite the triangulation built into the methodological mix, might be no more than an artefact of the research process. Therefore, a second route to check the outcomes of the analytic process was incorporated into the research process. This involved the development of ten hypotheses directly from the philosophical theory, which in the final stages of the analytical part of the research were subject to an evaluation process drawing on evidence from the raw data from the field. I believe this dual route method has strengthened the plausibility of the final model.

7.4.4 Contribution to pedagogy

The model of values transmission should prove useful for teachers, managers and administrators within schools concerned with the pedagogy of values. Derived independently from purely theoretical concerns with a more or less theoretical purpose, its conclusions converge significantly with the empirically-based views and conclusions of educators who take a more proactive approach to values education and add a theoretical underpinning to their programmes and curricula. As detailed in 6.2 it remains, though, a highly conceptual and abstract model, so I will attempt to draw out its relevance to pedagogical practice.


The model of institutional values transmission addresses a number of issues that have been discussed in the academic literature on values education and also issues that are recognised by teachers generally, such as the role of ethos and school culture, implicit and explicit forms of values education, pupil resistance to authority, issues of student empowerment, the school as a community as well as part of the community, school discipline, rules and regulations, friendship groups, gangs and bullying, ethnic or class tensions, and the risk of increasing alienation through raised standards, although its primary contribution is in promoting values as fundamental to all educational development and a balanced view of values education as being a process of both inculcation and acquisition.

The diagram on page 220 shows a pupil 'journey' through the institute towards the acquisition of its values. According to this model, simply stated, the necessary stages on this journey are the transition from self-empowerment (i.e. self-directed freedom and desire) to disempowerment under the authority of the institution, where they are inducted in the values, culture and structures of the institute, to empowerment (or re-empowerment) under the authority of the institution, where they have the opportunity to rationalise the choice of these values as their own. The necessary steps in this process are indicated in the diagram by solid arrows, but it should be noted that these are *additional* steps and not transformations; the acceptance of institutional values does not negate moral autonomy (or responsibility) or the capacity for self-empowerment, but rather fashions them in the particular institutional context.

One conclusion of this research, based on an understanding of the nature of values, is that values can only be *acquired*, and only acquired in any meaningful sense by an experience of the moral demand that they place upon us ('moral' being understood in a broad sense of 'requiring commitment to a set of behaviours'), but that they are rarely, if ever, acquired in the absence of an intention to teach them.

None of the schools I studied had a specific values education policy or programme, although all of them considered values to be an important concern of the school and the education of values in general to be a part of what they did. The schools were different in the degree to which they were able to identify specific values which they considered important, though my research indicated that all of them had policy statements in which values were prominent, though perhaps subsidiary to the overall purpose of the texts. Again, I observed examples of PSHE classes in all the schools, and of good practice in each, but, except in one case, the

Fig 25 Model of Institutional Values Transmission: Pedagogical



education of values was not an explicit aim of the class. The implicit education of values has an important function, in reinforcing a particular message or desired behaviour, but evidence from the research on values education indicates that an institutional discourse of values in which specific and explicit values are a pedagogical focus is more effective in terms of behavioural outcomes – and academic performance as a result. This is perhaps unsurprising, as conceptual clarity with effective practice is invariably a potent combination.

Another conclusion of this research, based on an understanding of the nature of values, is that the acquisition of a value is never merely a private experience, but through acquiescence to a shared meaning and a shared commitment to its moral demand, is bound up with belonging in a moral community (one that shares that commitment) and a shared experience. This means that schools in order to transmit values not only have to acquaint students with the meaning of value terms, make clear the expectations in terms of attitudes and behaviours, and ensure that their staff are setting an appropriate example, but also create the communal structures that both reflect and elicit that sense of belonging.

Schools face two challenges to accomplishing this. The first of these is what I have come to call ‘spontaneous sociality’. By that I mean simply the natural tendency of humans to form social groupings, not necessarily those deemed by authority to be in the interests of the common good. My research indicated that where the student body is highly heterogeneous in terms of cultural background student perception of the school as a ‘community’ is lower than where it is more homogeneous, despite this being an important focus of the official policy, and that the primary commitment of pupils is to the community of their cultural background, class, ethnicity or friendship group. While all pupils enjoy the opportunity to socialise that schools provide, they do so largely with people of the same background. This is not necessarily a problem as such – although it can lead to factionalism and be the precursor of bullying – but it tends to weaken that sense of belonging to the school community that schools clearly wish to foster, and hence commitment to its institutional values, and replace it with a sort of co-presence. This may have implications for the definition of what we mean by ‘inclusion’.

The second challenge is resistance to institutional authority. ‘Resistance’ is a broad category that ranges from boredom and disengagement, through criticism and disobedience to outright rebellion and non-attendance, including truanting. Although resistance creates problems for teachers and schools, it should not, except in its most extreme forms, be taken to be

something essentially negative, but as an expression of moral autonomy and, as such, a precondition for the acquisition of values. Also, resistance is by no means limited to pupils. In my research I came across instances of resistance to institutional authority from Heads, teachers and pupils, though the targets were variable and appropriate to their standing. Resistance is in some sense always legitimate, as it is a testing of the moral integrity of the institutional authority to which the individual is subject. Institutional values can only be acquired, though, when resistance is mitigated through a negotiated compromise and the surrender of a degree of moral autonomy in exchange for belonging, which in turn requires some form of personal ‘transformation’. As the diagram illustrates, this transformation is not solely something internal to the individual; the institutional culture and structure play a vitally important role in creating the context in which this can happen.

7.5 Implications and recommendations

7.5.1 Implications for values education

Data from the literature (Hawkes, 2010) and from the field both indicate that expectations of appropriate and good behaviour, and the organisation of the structures within the school to promote that, and to minimise poor behaviour, while a worthy end in themselves in promoting young people who aspire to play a positive role in society, are also fundamental to creating the atmosphere, ethos and culture in which academic attainment can be optimised. A school culture in which there are strict boundaries and clear sanctions for transgression, but one in which the inward pull of community is strong, a strong institutional pride and identity is fostered, but also one in which a balance between authority and humanity is maintained, is clearly fundamental to this effort. At the same time, the concept of invocation, which has largely been vindicated through this research, implies that the explicit voicing, explication and modelling of values is more important than is generally practiced within schools, and this view is strongly backed by evidence from programmes of explicit values education (Lovat, 2010). Evidence from the field in all the schools studied shows, though, that even implicit or ‘intrinsic’ approaches bear fruit in the permeation of fundamental and strongly-held values, whether those are moral, individual attainment or socio-political, into the student body.

The model of institutional values transmission described in 7.4.4 has a number of implications for pedagogical practice and organisation in schools.

1. Schools should develop an integrated and specific set of values which reflect the character of the school, reinforce the community of the school, further their commitment to creating educated persons in the broadest possible sense, and develop their place in and service of the local and wider communities of which they are a part.
2. These values should be taught explicitly and integrated into all aspects of the school culture, particularly attitudinal and behavioural expectations. They should also be taught implicitly, by the example set by the management and staff of the school. The model does not specify that these values should be integrated into the curriculum as such, but that knowledge/skills and values should be ‘twin pillars’ of the institution, though some subjects may be naturally appropriate vehicles for the broader educational contextualisation and discussion of values.
3. The specific values, or their origin, are less important than that these are assented to by the entire staff and reinforced on a continual basis. The expectation is that there would be a convergence on a core of common and widely shared values, though variation at the institutional level is probably socially beneficial.
4. Although the excesses of resistance to authority, as described above, should be controlled, critical evaluation of authority and institutional values should be accepted as a natural phenomenon of cognitive development and the assertion of moral autonomy, and pupils should be encouraged to exercise their moral imagination in different scenarios, at an age-appropriate level. The inner nature of values as shared experience entails that any form of coercion is counter-productive; explanation and dialogue are the required methods to achieve acquiescence to the institutional values and their behavioural requirements.
5. Schools should be structured in such a way as to maximise opportunities for belonging under the auspices of the school that ‘cut across’ and thus mitigate spontaneous sociality based on class, ethnicity or friendship group and primary commitments to those values (which weaken the communal integrity of the school). Evidence seems to suggest that a culture of belonging to such sub- and micro- school communities (diffused belonging) actually reinforces a sense of belonging within the greater school community. Two of the schools I studied employed a house system to good effect, but there are numerous ways to achieve this diffusion: clubs, boards, groups, teams, and projects, both internal and external.

6. The acquisition of institutional values requires some element of personal transformation that occurs within the specific institutional context. Although in the research the manifestation of that transformation was found to be different, such as a growing academic interest, a spiritual crisis and its resolution or the assumption of greater communal responsibility, the institutional trigger was invariably the relationship between a member of staff and a pupil. Pupils look to their teachers and senior staff as role models and appreciate those who are open, friendly and helpful and who make themselves present and available, while maintaining their authority and setting clear boundaries, and clearly these are qualities that need to be sought, emphasised, nurtured and developed. Indeed, a striking finding was that it is the *dissonance* between the ‘mask of authority’ and the underlying humanity that plays a key role in triggering transformation.

7.5.2 Implications for schooling in general

Schools already provide, and are required to provide, a measure of education in values for their pupils, whether it is explicit or, more usually, implicit. As discussed above, I believe, and the evidence tends to support this viewpoint, that the more explicit the education the more pronounced are the outcomes. There is one thing to add: fundamental to values and to values education is the development of reflectivity, a higher-order and late-developmental cognitive skill, which as a technology-driven and highly pressurised culture we do not provide sufficient context for young people to develop. While I make no specific recommendations in this regard, I believe that we do our young people a disservice if we model our schools on too narrow a view of success as the success of the marketplace, and bias learning and means of knowledge acquisition too strongly towards the technocratic at the expense of the traditional, creative and reflective.

7.5.3 Recommendations for educational policy

1. There should be national standards for developing and overseeing values education programmes. At the moment Ofsted oversee the provision of moral and spiritual education in English and Welsh schools, but there is no requirement for schools specifically to have a values education policy.
2. While national oversight is important, an approach that allows schools freedom in determining their own policies of values education would be preferable, following the

example of Australia, which has a nationally determined policy, but allows schools to determine their own values strategy (Lovat, 2010).

3. The pedagogy of values should be integral to all teacher-training programmes, and an element of school and teacher evaluation.

7.5.4 Recommendations for social policy

Social cohesion should be seen as being as important as economic development, and the more deliberate promotion of a range of national values, especially in schools, is a viable route to achieve that end, as has been done in Australia for example. While it is questionable whether social cohesion is the basis of economic wealth, as in one strand of social capital theory, the two should be seen as equally important in terms of social policy and that the common good is being served by the invigoration of civil society and the amelioration of the most egregious inequalities as well as the development of a highly-educated workforce and promoting entrepreneurship.

7.6 Limitations of research

One challenge for researching this topic has been to decide and define the appropriate literature. There is no body of literature dealing with the institutional transmission of values. Instead this had to be assembled from many disparate sources, which required having to read the literature of many fields with only the most tenuous connection to educational concerns in the hope of drawing out the vital threads to construct a theoretical justification for the research question. Moreover, the subject of values seems to come in and out of fashion in different disciplines, meaning that chronological searches in a discipline are not necessarily fruitful. While this wide dispersal of relevant literature has increased the possibility of making an original contribution in a poorly defined field, it has increased the chance of missing some perhaps important research of relevance.

There were also some limitations to the sample for the research. Although I was very fortunate in being able to secure the participation of schools that fell within the parameters I had set, i.e. mixed secondary schools of different types – a faith school, an independent and a local community school – there was less choice with the sampling within the schools. I had to take more or less what I was given. In each case the survey was carried by the teacher, in one school on a voluntary basis, which meant that there was a high incidence of incomplete questionnaires; fortunately, the omissions tended to be in one part of the questionnaire, so it

only marginally reduced the usefulness of the data. Inevitably, there were cases of people answering a different question to the one I had asked or responses that were not as enlightening as I had hoped for. Yet, in the analyses some very interesting things generally emerged, even from such unpromising material.

Inevitably there were limitations of time, opportunity and resources. Being neither in a position to conduct longitudinal research nor able to carry out extensive research within the schools, the impression of the schools has only been a fleeting one and therefore inferences about values education and the transmission of values has had to be made on the basis of limited information. This is where triangulation proved a particularly useful corrective. Not only was there the chance to cross reference respondent views and observations from other perspectives, but there were opportunities to fill in gaps in knowledge or to take up and explore some issue more deeply. Inevitably, though, it has not been as possible to develop as intimate a feel for the cases 'from the inside' as I think would be desirable.

One area that I am acutely aware that this research did not address, nor the theory model, is the dimension of inter-institutional relations. It focused on the vertical dimension of transmission through the hierarchy of authority, but had virtually nothing to say about the often very fruitful relations and cooperation between other agencies and the schools. Future theoretical development needs to take into account that in successful values education programmes, such as those implemented in Australia, participation in local service projects is an integral part of the programme (Toomey, 2010).

7.7 Suggestions for further research

Some of these suggestions come out of what I perceive to have been the limitations of this research. I think more work should be done on the relevant literature: philosophical, sociological, educational, psychological, and anthropological. There is also important work being done on the neural basis of social values (Zahn et al., 2009). Allied to this, the concept of values as tangible and transmissible developed here needs to be developed further, through psychological and scientific research.

I do not think that any real gains could be made by working with a larger sample of schools. However, a legitimate avenue for research would be to pursue a single case in greater depth, expanding the number of participants, having larger samples and a more intimate knowledge and feel for the institution. As mentioned earlier, the theory set out in this research could be

made more empirical through longitudinal research, perhaps tracking a single cohort as they progressed through the school. The extension of the theory to cover inter-institutional cooperation, as discussed in 7.6, is a particular area of theoretical development, as is a deeper understanding of the relationship between values, transmission and institutional structure pointed out in 7.3. The primary focus in this research was on the teacher-pupil relationship; this could also be broadened to investigate the larger institutional picture.

There are more specifically educational areas where this theory suggests that research might be productive. One is the area of underachievement in schools and its relationship to values, specifically on how the values promoted in schools may impact on alienation of some individuals and some groups from the school ethos and the school community, with particular reference to ethnic minorities and those from the lower socio-economic groups. Much work has already been done on the value curriculum and a growing amount on value pedagogy. Despite resistance to the idea, it is inevitable that the assessment of pupils' values will sooner or later be mooted. The theory proposed here may go some way towards mitigating the instrumentality in any such proposals, particularly through consideration of the aspects of resistance and transformation developed in the model.

7.8 Last Thoughts

Education has always been as much about conveying the desired values of the school, community or society as it has been about the teaching and learning of facts and skills. Perhaps the pluralism of our modern societies and the increasing fragmentation of unitary worldviews, both religious and secular, has made us as a society embarrassed by that to some degree, but it has certainly brought the issue of values more to the fore, from a sense of a 'crisis of values' to the call for 'British values' to be entrenched in education. This research demonstrated that the link between the imparting of specifically moral values and good educational outcomes - both conceptually and in reality - remains unbroken in educational good practice; however, this seems to be largely implicit and intuitive. The challenge is to place this link on more secure theoretical foundations so that it gains greater currency in education policy and education practice. The implications, though, are wider than improved learning outcomes. The mechanism for institutional values transmission postulated as a result of this research demonstrates the ontological grounding of values in communal structure and the dependence of transmission on a sense of belonging, acceptance and the humanisation of authority structures. The teaching and acquisition of values is not simply another type of

knowledge; it is a fundamental generator of society itself. There exists a strong convergence on the values which are fundamental to a good society, even allowing for a measure of disagreement and dissent. Explicit values education should, therefore, be central to all forms of institutional schooling and a required part of teacher training. Perhaps then, rather than being the 'forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity' (MacIntyre, 1987, p.16), teachers would come to play a key role in something we could agree was real social progress.

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Information Sheet and Consent Form:
Interviews and Observations
(For teachers)

My name is Don Trubshaw and I'm an educational research student at Derby University, studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is values education, in particular how schools function as institutions in which the transmission of values takes place.

This interview/observation is being carried as part of data collection within the school. The results will form part of my research into how schools teach values and will be used in a comparative assessment of government legislation, school policies and teaching methods. So the participation of the school is important and greatly appreciated.

All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, drawn up by the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules relevant to the research taking place here are:

Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You and the school also have the right to withdraw from this research up to the time the results of the research are published.

Anonymity: The anonymity of all participants and all participant schools are guaranteed. Where necessary, appropriate pseudonyms will be used and identifying features of participants and institutions will be altered.

Confidentiality: In the course of data collection, the researcher may be privy to information not in the public domain and personally held views. No use of this information will be made beyond that agreed for research purposes. All data will be securely kept until the research is finished and then destroyed. The consent slip (below) is stored separately from the data to preserve anonymity.

Consent Slip

Please sign to say you have read the information and agree to take part in the interview / agree for the observation to take place

Signed _____

Consent given for the interview/observation to be recorded: Yes / No

Explanation about the Research Questionnaire

(For pupils)

Hello

My name is Don Trubshaw and I'm an educational research student at Derby University, studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is what is called values education, which is about how we learn things like 'right' and 'wrong' and the contribution school makes to us learning those things.

This survey is being carried with small groups in several schools to sample students' views. The results will form part of my research into how schools teach values and will be used in a comparative assessment of government legislation, school policies and teaching methods. So your contribution is important and greatly appreciated.

All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, which are drawn up by a body called the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules relevant to this survey are:

Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You also have the right to withdraw from this research up to the time the results of the survey are analysed.

Anonymity: This means that no names will be used in the research, not yours, not your teachers' and not your school's, so no one outside this classroom will ever know who took part in the survey.

Confidentiality: The questionnaire asks you about your views on certain things about school life that you might not want other people to know. I am the only person who will ever see the questionnaires, and I don't know who you are; the school will only ever see some statistical information. The questionnaires will be securely kept until the research is finished and then destroyed. The consent slip (below) is stored separately from the questionnaire to preserve anonymity.

Consent Slip

Please sign to say you have read the explanation and agree to take part in the survey

Signed _____

Explanation about the Focus Group

(For pupils)

Hello

My name is Don Trubshaw and I'm an educational research student at Derby University, studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is what is called values education, which is about how we learn things like 'right' and 'wrong' and the contribution school makes to us learning those things.

The focus group you are participating in is to follow up on some of the results of the survey you may have taken part in recently, but also more generally to gain a deeper insight into students' views about these matters. The results will form part of my research into how schools transmit values and will contribute to a comparative assessment of government legislation, school policies and teaching methods. So your participation is important and greatly appreciated.

All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, which are drawn up by a body called the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules relevant to this survey are:

Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You also have the right to withdraw from this research up to the time of completion.

Anonymity: This means that no names will be used in the research: not yours, not your teachers' and not your school's.

Confidentiality: The purpose of the focus group is to understand the student perspective, so you should feel free to express your views honestly and openly. Although the discussions will be recorded for research purposes, no one outside the participants will know what was said and nothing will be attributable in any feedback given to the school.

Consent Slip

Please sign to say you have read the explanation and agree to take part in the focus group and that you agree for the proceedings to be recorded.

Signed _____

Letter of thanks accompanying report to schools: School A

Don Trubshaw, BSc, MRE, PGCE

Tel: [REDACTED] Mob: [REDACTED]
E-mail: dontrubshaw@hotmail.com

[REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]

Between 2009 and 2011 I carried out interviews, observations and a small-scale survey at [REDACTED] as part of my doctoral research into values education. That data has now been analysed, along with data from two other schools, and the findings submitted for examination. I now feel able to share some of the findings, particularly those parts which are likely to be of greater interest to the participating schools: the implications for pedagogical practice in relation to the core values of the school.

I mention in the report, but just to clarify; it was neither the intention nor an outcome of the research to evaluate the effectiveness of values education in the participating schools. The implications – effectively suggestions – for pedagogical practice are the outcomes of a particular theoretical model of value transmission, developed as a result of the research. They are offered in the hope that they might be of interest and of potential use in reflecting upon existing practice.

It remains for me to thank you for allowing your school to be used for the collection of data, despite the inconvenience which it inevitably entailed, and the valuable time of the staff members and pupils who participated, without whom, of course, no research would have been possible. I should mention, in particular [REDACTED], who provided valuable assistance and guidance during my times there.

Since the research process has now effectively concluded, feel free to disseminate the report to the extent that you think appropriate. I would also be happy to give a presentation and answer questions on aspects of the research to interested members of staff/pupils at a mutually convenient date, if you feel that would be worthwhile.

Again, many thanks and best wishes

Approach Letter: School C

Don Trubshaw, BSc, MRE, PGCE

[REDACTED]; dontrubshaw@hotmail.com

[REDACTED]

10th November 2010

Dear [REDACTED]

I am a part-time doctoral research student based at Derby University, in the department of education doing research on values education in secondary schools. I am currently looking for a school that would be willing to help me with my research.

The focus of my research is on the interaction between school policies on values education, the school ethos and communal aspect of school life, class interaction, and teacher and pupil perceptions of issues relating to values. My intention is to do a comparative study in three secondary schools, one faith school, one independent school and one mainstream state school.

I have already undertaken research in a local faith school and an independent school and am now looking for a state/community school in order to make a comparative assessment and to make my findings more robust. There are, of course, many schools in this region that falls into this category. However, I am particularly interested in [REDACTED] School for a number of reasons:

- 1) The excellent reputation of the school, not only in terms of its academic results but also the behaviour of its pupils and their involvement in the local community, make it a significant and interesting subject for investigation, particularly with respect to its ethos, leadership, communal structure and behaviour management.
- 2) It draws on the broad mix of the local community, regardless of socio-economic background or ethnicity, and has no specific religious affiliation, which is very useful in drawing comparisons with schools rooted in either a specific faith community or a broad geographical catchment based on ability to pay.
- 3) Its full integration into the national curriculum and successive government policies and initiatives, and its successful attainment of beacon school status and science, maths and language school status facilitate a consideration of the successful implementation of national educational policy into local and school-based initiatives.
- 4) There are practical considerations; for example, being nearby is an advantage. I work full time, so require permission to take half day 'study leave' and am therefore limited in the amount of travelling I can do.

In regard to the nature of the research I would want to undertake at [REDACTED], I can say that it is small-scale and designed to be minimally intrusive in the life of the school. It would involve an interview with you or, if not possible, another person well-versed in the educational outlook of the school, and an observation. But beyond that I am flexible and would like the opportunity to meet and discuss what you think would be possible and appropriate.

I appreciate you are very busy; if you would like to suggest a member of staff with whom I could pursue this matter, I would be most happy to discuss this with them.

Best wishes

Yours sincerely

Request for Access to school documents

As part of my research into values education I would like to requested access to the school records pertinent to this topic. These would include such things as

The school rules

Codes of conduct

The school motto and mission statement

Documents relevant to the school ethos and the communal aspects of the school

The school charter, in particular anything that specifically mandates values education or moral education

The school's own policy on faith education

Guidance on pastoral care

Guidance for the delivery of Religious Education, Sex Education, Citizenship and PHSE

And they might also include

An SMCS (Spiritual, Moral, Cultural and Social) policy document

A 'values across the curriculum' statement

Or anything else that might be considered relevant, such as certain school records.

Information contained in the documents will only be used in accordance with the principle that guarantees the anonymity of institutions participating in research. I understand that any documents not in the public domain may be subject to agreements of confidentiality.

Interview Questionnaire Template

1. Could you tell me a little about your professional and academic background?
2. Could you give me a brief outline of the history of the school?
3. What is the basic philosophy of education here?
4. Are you familiar with the term 'values education'?
5. What do you understand by the term?
6. Do you see values education as being something similar to or distinct from moral education?
7. Do you see any of what you do here as being to do with values education?
8. Does the school have a policy on values education? Does it have a strategy?
9. Are you aware of any policies in the area of values education that successive governments have brought in over the past 10-15 years?
10. Do you think that the state has a role in legislating what schools should do in this area of values education?
11. What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school?
12. Are you aware of or do you experience in any sense a clash of values in the school?
13. How do you view the end product of the education process, or in other words, what is an educated person?
14. Do you see target culture, league tables and so on as antithetical to a good education or as a possible stimulus to schools?
15. What do you think has been your main contribution to the school?
16. Final question: what is your vision for the school?

OBSERVATION SHEET

Day/Date/Time _____	Aims _____
Lesson _____	Style _____
Teacher _____	Resources _____
Class/Group _____	Duration _____

Time (min)	Description	Categories
1 2 3 4 5		<u>Setting</u> layout <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 100px; width: 100%;"></div>
6 7 8 9 10		Furnishings _____ () _____ () Equipment _____ () _____ () People _____ () _____ ()
11 12 13 14 15		Features _____ _____ <u>Organisation</u>
16 17 18 19 20		

APPENDIX 2 DATA COLLECTION

21		<u>Routines</u>
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		<u>Rituals/Invocations</u>
27		
28		
29		
30		
31		<u>Communal Narratives</u>
32		
33		
34		
35		
36		<u>Interpretations</u>
37		
38		
39		
40		

Notes

Institutional Code _____

Research Questionnaire on Values Education

Thank you for taking part in this research project. Your contribution is under conditions of anonymity, so do not write your name anywhere on this paper. The results are also subject to confidentiality, so no one but the researcher will see what is written here. The school will only see statistical averages in feedback from any report. Therefore do not hesitate to answer these questions as accurately and honestly as possible. Your response is most useful if you answer all the questions, including the open questions.

Background information

Sex [circle] M F Age _____

State your parents' occupations (optional)

Father _____ Mother _____

The Questions1. Write down **three** values*, from the box below, which you think are important in

a) Human relationships : _____, _____, _____

b) Playing a sport: _____, _____, _____

c) Professing a religious conviction: _____, _____, _____

d) Keeping and 'getting on' in a job: _____, _____, _____

e) Doing well at school: _____, _____, _____

*You can use a word more than once if you need to

Compassion, intelligence, cooperation, sincerity, respect, curiosity, diligence, honesty, faith, loyalty, trust, patience, tolerance, humility, confidence, fairness, determination, ambition, fitness, discipline, generosity.

2. Write down three values - from those mentioned above, or any others - which are important to you?

_____, _____, _____

APPENDIX 2 DATA COLLECTION

3. The following people may have an influence on your life. **Number them from 1 to 10** (1 = most important, 10 = least important)

- ___ Parent(s)
- ___ Brother(s) or sister(s)
- ___ Friend(s)
- ___ Classmate(s)
- ___ Someone in your club, neighbourhood or community
- ___ Other relative(s)
- ___ Teacher(s)
- ___ Famous personality (author, musician, actor, athlete, artist)
- ___ Religious figure or deity
- ___ Someone you know through the internet

4. Which of the following attitudes do you think are taught at your school? [Put **Y** (yes), **N** (no) or **U** (unsure) next to each statement. Then in each section put a **tick** next to the one which is given the most importance at your school]

(Attitude to teacher)

- To obey the teacher
- To listen to the teacher
- To respect the teacher
- To question the teacher

(Attitude to other students)

- To care for younger pupils/those with special needs
- To strive to be better than others
- To respect older pupils
- To help those who are struggling

(Attitude to your own abilities)

- To work hard
- To learn from others
- To be responsible and mature
- To be decisive

(Attitude to education)

- To pay attention in class
- To be inquisitive and ask questions
- To concentrate on getting good grades
- To be interested in what you study

(Attitude to life)

- To get along with people
- To be independent
- To be the best you can be
- To be someone who can do things for others

APPENDIX 2 DATA COLLECTION

5. Which statement best describes your attitude to the school rules? [circle **one**]
- a) You have a total disregard for all rules
 - b) You keep the rules for fear of the consequences
 - c) You disagree with rules, but think it's not worth the effort to go against them
 - d) You don't think much about them and keep or break them as you feel like it
 - e) You keep them because they seem commonsense and what you would do anyway
 - f) You keep them because you think it is right to obey rules
 - g) You keep the rules because you think they serve the interests of the whole school
 - h) You follow or break rules depending on whether you feel they are fair

6. Respond to the following situations. What would you do?

Your friend has left his/her lunch/lunch money at home

You find a valuable item in the playground

A member of your class rarely speaks and is always alone

A fight breaks out between two younger pupils

Someone swears at you for no particular reason

A teacher sets some homework which you know isn't going to be marked

7. Choose and circle **two** things that make a particular positive impression on you at your school?
- a) A subject/subjects that you like
 - b) Individual teachers
 - c) The feeling of security the school provides
 - d) The opportunity to socialise
 - e) The school buildings and facilities
 - f) The feeling of being part of a community

8. Apart from the subjects you study, what do you think you learn by being at school?

APPENDIX 3 DATA ANALYSIS

EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT MATRIX (A) AND INVERSION MATRIX (B); [FOR DIFFERENT SCHOOLS]

A. Documentary sources for values and transmission strategies (Broughampton)

DOCUMENT/CONSTITUENT (SOURCES/AUTHOR)	STATED OR IMPLIED PURPOSE	NARRATIVE STRUCTURE	TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES	EMBEDDED VALUES
Aims of the school (Head teacher)	To set out the pedagogical aims of the school and its main priorities [red* book]	Aim to realise the potential of each individual pupil The values that are emphasised by the school	Displayed on first page of red book	Fulfilment, responsibility, uniqueness, achievement, order, community, instruction, encouragement, inspiration, academic rigour, moral and spiritual awareness, high personal standards, good manners, self-esteem, confidence.

B. Values and transmission strategies (Chelmswood High)

VALUE	REFERENCE	TRANSMISSION STRATEGY
ability	EOP, SEN	non-tolerance of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, correct English, Inclusion Policy, staff, differentiated curriculum
acceptance	BDP	code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative systems
accessibility	BDP, EOP, Aims	code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative systems, non-tolerance of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, correct English
achievement	BDP, Cit, EOP, SEN, SRE	code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative systems, curriculum, events & activities, booklets & videos, School Council, question box, non-tolerance of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, correct English, Inclusion Policy, staff, differentiated curriculum, classes, leaflets and books, role play & video, nurse, ground rules

MATRIX: VALUES ACROSS THE INSTITUTION (BROUGHAMPTON)

VALUE GROUP: Spirituality, Self-Understanding, Awareness

	OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE	CLASSROOM (TEACHER) PERSPECTIVE	PUPIL PERSPECTIVE	ASSESSMENT
Semiotic Structure	1.Aims-Red Book 2.Ethos	1. Chapel 2. Personal circumstances	1.Chapel 2. traditions	There is some correlation between the official stance on spirituality, the chaplain’s views and some comments of the students. What is not understood exactly is what the school means by ‘moral and spiritual awareness’ for it seems not to be identified by the majority of pupils as being religious or believing in a god. Terms like this are notoriously difficult to pin down and, as the chaplain states, are not targetable or subject to well understood criteria as other subjects are. That is not to say it is meaningless; it clearly reflects a deeply felt need for continuity, for something ‘core’ and something transcendent to our institutions and our lives. Recognition of the value as a good and of the sign structure as significant in the institution, but only a limited conceptualisation, indeed an element of resistance to the conceptual superstructure.
Intentional World	Moral and spiritual awareness, high personal standards and good manners are cultivated [Aims-BB] I think spirituality has a unique kind of position in school and I don’t think it’s targetable in the way that other things are [I-30.22] The Christian ethos and the Christian core of the school [15.20]; <i>There are some things that go unsaid and don’t need to be said</i> [18.17]	We try to make it as all-encompassing as we can where students are encouraged to take an active part, to convey to their peers that the issues are important to them and where they feel they are on their spiritual journey. [I-33.28] I think the Chapel offers that space and that oasis and I think that is recognised, particularly at peak times like exam times where they go; and then finally, however rich you are, however secular you are, you don’t escape those existential moments: a family member dying or a family member being ill or Dad’s business going under. [I-36.15]	The students surveyed put the influence of a religious figure or deity at 8 th place out of 10 [SA] It’s a quiet place to just go and think about things ...it’s what Broughampton’s centred around. That was the start of it all, having the chapel there... I don’t think it is a religious school ... Nothing’s pushed on you, it’s just here. There are people, voluntary communion people go to, but I don’t think it’s very strong... I think it’s a good opportunity for us to get to know our culture and stuff... I don’t think there are that many people who are actually Christians, even believe in God, I don’t know. When we had RS lessons not that many people believed in God, I’d say 1 in 4 or something... I think it’s only there because [of] it being a school tradition. [FG-11]	

EXTRACT FROM MATRIX OF INTERVIEW WITH HEAD OF CHELMSWOOD HIGH

System components	PRINCIPLES (System axioms)			PRACTICES (System responses)		OUTCOMES (System products)	
	Aspiration	Cooperation	Autonomy	Normal circumstances	Difficult circumstances	Stability	Achievement
Whole school	Emphasis on academic excellence [0317] [School is] a place for learning [0317]; Learning at the centre of everything [0317]	Seeing ourselves as different and as special [3503]; Diversity in itself gives a certain identity [1912]; The multicultural nature of the school [0829]	Interpreting things very much in our own way [2545]; The strength to say 'No' [3503]; [not promoting]religious views at the expense of more widely shared secular values [2338]	we run the school in a way that we have sufficient discretion and flexibility to deal with children as individuals, while as a large organisation we still have to have rules and procedures [INT-0317]	*Attempt to deal with more serious issues very much within the community [6149]	Spending a length of time in one place [0155]; Stability [0155] 'Success breeds success' [3503]; A step-change [3503]; Making a feature of pluralism [1912]	Increasing/ed reputation [0155]; OFSTED graded as 'outstanding'
Ethos and values	The tradition of the school itself is to believe in the school [As?] as an excellent school [1912]	Slow and steady development on the basis of consensus [3503]	Not setting things out explicitly [0829]	we've always prided ourselves on the care and the individual attention we can give to students [INT-0317]	Resolv[ing] conflicts amicably as far as possible rather than by enforcing <i>hard power</i> on people[INT-1006]	Education of values is intrinsic in what we do [0829]; General underlying theme of values education throughout all our interactions [0700]	Internalising ethical standards and moral values [0525] Behaving in a proper way in school and beyond [0525]
Senior management	Tendency to avoid big, overarching visions [6331]; <i>Aspiration for academic excellence ...at the core of everything</i> [6331]	Creating credibility with the staff [3730] Staff don't feel there's that distance from senior management [40.48]; [The former] Headmaster's door was literally always open [40.48]	Interpreting things very much in our own way [2545]	Setting the tone [1516] Other staff seeing how we respond to children [1516]; Leaving deputies to deal with most day-to-day issues [1516]; Going by your established procedures [1516]	Falling back more onto written policies [1516] Looking again [1516] Suddenly starting to talk together more [1516]	Slow and steady development on the basis of consensus [3503]; Not damaging the well-established good practice that's gone on [5812]; Managing this process of slow and steady reform rather than revolution [5812]	Making the necessary changes to the curriculum that had to happen for various external reasons [5812]
Staff	Positive and healthy relationships with children [1006] Greater demand on teachers [1006]; Insisting on very high standards of behaviour [1225]	Consensus at a senior staff level [1740]; we're all in it together and we support each other and help each other [INT-4048]	Scope and flexibility to individualise [4325]; People's conflicting needs and rights and interests [1006]	Dealing with things without unpleasantness, conflict or aggression [1006]; Not acting in an aggressive or hectoring manner with pupils [1006]	Focus on where things have gone badly wrong [1006]	the staff here generally feel looked after in a way that isn't always the case in some of the schools [INT-4048]	[A]ll staff have a part in the decision making processes of the school and have the opportunity for professional development [AE-7].

EXTRACT FROM MATRIX OF OBSERVED CLASS AT CHELMSWOOD HIGH

STRUCTURE		EVENTS [Time elapsed]	SYMBOLIC-DRAMATIC CATEGORIES	POWER/(ACTIVITY) STATUS [formality of relationship]		PARTICIPATION
STAGE	TOPIC [Cycles]					
	Introduction	Pupils entering; teacher comments on noise [0130/0]	Assertion of authority	Empowered (active)	SSi	OUT
		questions why pupils are late/pupils respond[0130/0]	Assertion of authority	Disempowered (passive)	TSf	TRANSFORMING
		Explains importance of punctuality[0130/0]	Teaching value			
		Announces register[0130/0]	Foretelling			
		Introduces observer[0130/0]	Outsider			
		Pupil asks to open a window /request declined [0130/0]	Assertion of authority/taboo			
		Register called [0130/1]	Ritual			
Stage 1 1 st cyclic	Recap of previous lesson [11 cycles]	Shows slide on screen [0343/2]	Image			
		Reviewing last lesson [0343/3]	Recalling Past			
		Question about the derogatory use of the term 'gay' [0343/4]	Recalling Past			
		Probing whether students have changed practice/student shares experience [0343/4]	Probing	Empowered (active)		
Stage 2 1 st inter-cyclic	Assessment preparation	Announces focus on different beliefs and cultures [0625/6]	Announcement	Disempowered (passive)		IN
		Asks pupils to look at assessment sheets in books[0625/6]	Instruction	Empowered (passive)		
		Explaining assessment levels in Citizenship[0625/6]	Explanation	Disempowered (passive)		