



International Conference on Diplomacy and International Relations

Diplomacy and the Politics of fear:

The 21st Century Challenges to the
Theory and Practice of Diplomacy
and International Relations

Proceedings

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MESSAGE FROM VICE CHANCELLOR

PROFESSOR KATHERINE MITCHELL



As the Vice Chancellor and Chief Executive of the University of Derby, it's a great pleasure and honour for me to welcome you all to the International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations (ICDIR) at the University of Derby hosted by the College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences.

The political events in the UK in the run up to and during the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union and the growing uncertainties surrounding the outcome ever since, coupled with the growing social unrest, mass migration and fear of the rise of violent extremism, amongst many other world issues, make the theme of this conference - Diplomacy and the Politics of Fear - not only relevant but timely.

Given the many intra-national and international armed conflicts around the world, political unrests, the rise of global terrorism and violent extremism by non-state actors, and other global issues threatening the peace, security and stability of the world in the 21st century, diplomacy and international relations have become more relevant and essential now than at any other time in human history.

At a time of fear, mistrust, political uncertainty and weakening ties amongst peoples and nations, diplomacy remains an effective tool in bring people together, healing a fractured world and binding up broken communities. The current political situation in the UK and around the world, makes a conference such as ICDIR particularly important.

From the keynote addresses and academic papers scheduled for presentation and discussion, this conference will engage with contemporary world issues and promote public understanding of diplomacy and international relations through academic debate and exchanges.

We are delighted to have, here at Derby today, a seasoned politician the RT Hon, Dame Margaret Beckett – Honourable Member of Parliament for Derby South, who will be sharing her wealth of understanding with us about the current state of politics in the UK and beyond.

Mrs Beckett was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and held junior positions in the governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. She lost her seat in 1979 but returned to the House of Commons in 1983 and became a senior member of the Labour Party. She was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party in 1992 and was briefly its leader in 1994 following the premature death of John Smith. Mrs Beckett is the first woman to serve as the Deputy and Leader of a major political party in the UK. After Labour's victory in the 1997 general election, Mrs Beckett became a member of Tony Blair's Cabinet. Initially the President of the Board of Trade, she was later the Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

In 2006, Mrs Beckett was appointed British Foreign Secretary, making her the first woman to hold the position, and, after Margaret Thatcher, the second woman to hold one of the Great Offices of State in British politics. Margaret Beckett is currently a member of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

We also have today His Excellency Mr. Euripides L Evriviades the High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus in our midst. Before assuming his current post, Mr Evriviades was Deputy Permanent Secretary/Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jan., 2012–Nov., 2013) serving intermittently as Acting Permanent

Secretary. Prior to that, he served as Ambassador / Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe (Nov., 2008–Jan., 2012), having also chaired its Rapporteur Group on External Relations (2011).

Previously, Mr. Evriviades was Political Director of the Ministry of foreign Affairs (2006-2008), having concurrent accreditation to the State of Kuwait. He was Cyprus' Ambassador to the United States of America and non-resident High Commissioner to Canada, serving concomitantly as: the Permanent Representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Permanent Observer to the Organization of American States; and Representative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2003- 2006).

He also served as Ambassador to the Netherlands (2000-2003) and to Israel (1997-2000). Earlier in his career, he held positions at Cypriot embassies in Bonn, Germany (1986-1988); Moscow, USSR/Russia (1988-1993); and Tripoli, Libya (1995).

On 20 April 2015 Mr. Evriviades was voted by his peers in London as Diplomat of Year. The Award for International Service was bestowed upon him by the Committee on the International Salute to the Life and Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Man for All Nations.

Mr. Evriviades was honored in The Hague as the "Ambassador of the Year" by the Stichting Vrienden van Saur ("Friends of Saur") Foundation, a Dutch social and philanthropic society (October 2003). His other awards include the Great Commander of the Order of the Orthodox Knights of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Jerusalem, February 2000); and the Order of Merit (First Class) of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, March 1989).

Speaking to us later this afternoon at this conference is another distinguished guest, His Excellency, Ivan Romero-Martinez the Honduran Ambassador who will be sharing his experience with us on the role of diplomacy in global peace and security. Prior to his current appointment, Mr. Romero-Martinez, was posted as Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. He is a career diplomat since 1971, having served as his country's Ambassador to many countries, including Spain, Egypt, Morocco, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Colombia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Ireland. He also represented his country at the ambassadorial level at the United Nations in Switzerland and at the European Union.

Other assignments in Mr. Romero-Martinez's diplomatic service include the post of Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS). He also held several positions at Honduras' Embassy in the United States, including that of Counsellor, and at Honduras' Embassy in Canada, where he served as Counsellor, Minister Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires.

In his native home in Honduras, Mr. Romero-Martinez served as Special Adviser to the President with the rank of Secretary of State. Ambassador Romero-Martinez has been honoured with many awards by the governments of Brazil, Spain, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Holy See, Panama and Taiwan.

I am also delighted to welcome Professor Zafiris Tzannatos, a senior International Consultant for Development Strategy and Social Policy with considerable experience in the Middle East Politics. Professor Tzannatos will be joining the High Commissioner, the Ambassador and Rt. Honourable Margaret Beckett in setting the national and international policy context for the conference today.

Professor Tzannatos is an economist living in Lebanon where he was previously Professor and Chair of the Economics Department at the American University of

Beirut. He has served as Advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank where he was also Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region as well as Leader of the Global Child Labour Programme that he initiated.

More recently, Professor Tzannatos was Senior Advisor for all Arab States at the ILO office in Beirut and, before that, for governments in the Middle East and the GCC including Lebanon (Ministry of Social Affairs), Qatar (Planning Council), and the UAE (Abu Dhabi Executive Council). He has held senior academic and research appointments in the UK and the rest of Europe, visited more than 65 countries and worked with regional and international organisations as well as governments.

The University of Derby, as a vibrant institution that promotes scholarship and knowledge in the field of diplomacy and international relations warmly welcomes all the distinguished, guests, students, academic staff and members of the diplomatic community and academics from other institutions who have gathered here today to take part in this conference.

I wish you all a successful and resourceful conference as you engage in debates and academic exchanges of ideas on how to deal with some of the challenges facing society in the 21st Century. I hope, through the ICDIR conference, our students here at Derby will be able to engage with all our guests to gain essential knowledge and insights into the work of career politicians, diplomats, ambassadors, members of the diplomatic community and other academics and policy makers who work in this important field of diplomacy and international relations.

I am delighted to see the effort being made by the Department of Law, Criminology and Social Sciences in promoting research and scholarship activities amongst staff and students at the College. Academic meeting such as the ICDIR conference provides a great opportunity and forum for exchanges of ideas with colleagues from other Universities and members of the diplomatic community in the UK and wider society at large.

With keynote addresses from four distinguished guest speakers together with 13 papers scheduled for presentation and discussion over three sessions running concurrently this afternoon, (don't worry we will have regular break intervals in between keynote addresses and paper presentations), today's event promises to be a resourceful gathering that will enrich our understanding of diplomacy and international relations.

It is a great pleasure, therefore, for me and my institution to host the ICDIR conference 2016 that focuses on current issues of local, regional and global political and diplomatic significance. Given the wide range of issues that will be discussed at this conference today, ranging from reconnecting people with politics, counter terrorism, security of the Balkans, the role of religion and the practice of diplomacy, human trafficking, amongst many other issues, there is something for everyone at this conference.

Thank you and enjoy the sessions and the discussions.

Professor Kathryn Mitchell

12 September 2016

➤ MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. EURIPIDES L EVRIVIADES

HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

“Diplomacy and the Politics of Fear: The 21st Century Challenges to the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations” - Reflections from a Practitioner



Sir Henry Wotton was an English author and a diplomat. He served as Ambassador to Venice in the 17th century. He is known for his much used and abused maxim: *“An ambassador is an honest gentleman sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”* What is forgotten is that the same Sir Henry also said: *“Tell the truth and so puzzle and confound your adversaries.”* And this, I believe encapsulates, in many ways, modern diplomacy.

Another anecdotal definition of a diplomat is: *“When a diplomat says ‘yes’, he means ‘perhaps’. When he says ‘perhaps’ he means ‘no’. When he says ‘no’, he is no diplomat.”*

And my favourite which describes exactly how I feel ever since I assumed duties in London in November 2013: *“An Ambassador [in the case of Commonwealth countries a High Commissioner; it is one and the same] is like a swan: poised and graceful above water and underneath pedalling like hell.”*

I especially appreciate the wisdom inherent in Bosnian scholar and diplomat Drazen Pehar's definition of diplomacy as "*primarily words that prevent us from reaching for our swords*". This best reflects my philosophy.

The life of a diplomat is indeed a peripatetic one. It is a life's voyage. It is a long one; full of adventure; full of discovery; full of knowledge; analogous to the one mused by Constantine P. Cavafy in his classic poem Ithaca.

And my journey has not been any different. A combination of contradictory emotions, recalling images and memories from an eventful span of more than 40 years in the service and in the mission of my country, floods over me as I recall my diplomatic postings in New York, Germany (Bonn), USSR/Russia, Libya, Israel, The Netherlands, Washington DC, Strasbourg (Council of Europe) and now as High Commissioner to the UK.

What has my journey taught me? That diplomacy is by definition an art, a practice and a skill. It is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of foreign relations. The diplomat must inject his/her public persona into the foreign policy promotion of the country he/she represents. Diplomacy requires a thorough knowledge of both the country the diplomat is serving, and the country the diplomat is serving in. But a fine balance is required. Too much diplomacy with not enough knowledge may be dangerous; too much knowledge with too little diplomacy may be disastrous. I will be one of the first to admit that diplomacy is not for the timid or for the weak. The sheer toll and tax on the diplomat is both physically and spiritually daunting. Yet despite frustrations, shortcomings and personal costs, the rewards and enrichment are immense and life transformative.

One of the most pressing demands on the diplomat nowadays is the imperative to keep pace with the dynamics of change, including information technology and the 24 hour news cycle. Just as the world around us is changing rapidly in scale and scope, so too is diplomacy. Long gone are the days when President Jefferson (1801-1809) famously instructed his secretary of state: "*We have heard nothing from our*

ambassador in Spain for two years. If we do not hear from him this year, let us write him a letter.”

Some of the more profound developments in diplomacy stem from such global change. All tools in the diplomatic tool box, including social media, must be used in concert. Whether we call it iDiplomacy or digital diplomacy, this does not mean that traditional forms of diplomacy are replaced. We cannot and should not throw out the baby together with the bath water. In some ways the more things change the more they remain the same.

I would refer interested readers to read an article I recently penned on: “#Shakespeare400: To tweet or not to tweet? Is this the question?” published in the latest issue of the July/ August issue of DIPLOMAT magazine (est 1947).

<http://www.diplomatmagazine.com/issues/2016/july-august/1086-shakespeare400.html>

Thus, modern diplomacy goes far beyond the traditional confines of relations between states, governments and international organisations. These are no longer the sole actors on the world stage. Diplomacy, for a number of years now, has increasingly been involving and incorporating the taxpayer and civil society. The citizen is no longer a mere spectator; he/she is a stakeholder. A plethora of international events have shown this vividly. Indicatively, one mentions the tumultuous events in Georgia, in Ukraine and, of course, the Arab spring.

One of the key issues that modern diplomacy needs to address is also the politics of fear which is the theme of this year’s ICDIR 2016 Derby conference.

A general sense of fear, anxiety and uneasiness, exists between a number of countries and within societies, caused by poly-parametric and entwined situations, including many exogenous factors.

Wars; climate change; terrorism; immigration; refugees; the haves and the have nots; bigotry; xenophobia; intolerance; ignorance; and economic disparities, to mention but a few, are constantly changing the matrix within which diplomats operate. Brexit has brought about a tectonic shift not only for the UK but for EU too.

The nature of relations between peoples, communities, cultures, nation states and regions are in a constant state of flux. New economic and social divides between nations and within countries and communities lead to political dissatisfaction. They often lead to extremism; interracial violence; disconnect and schism of the citizen with the elite; and apathy. These weaken the trust between states and citizens, threaten international peace, security, and development and pose herculean challenges to diplomats.

As globalisation and interconnectivity are forging new and more rapid networks of global communication and interaction, some of them very negative too, diplomats and diplomacy are trying to adapt and adopt new ways to address them. While the avenues for diplomacy have widened, the vehicles for diplomacy must keep apace as well.

Within the above context, diplomats have a central role in alleviating the politics of fear through their actions and narratives by turning policies into praxis. In the wise words of Franklin D. Roosevelt: *“So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance ...”*

Mr. Euripides L Evriviades

12 September 2016

➤ MESSAGE FROM PROFESSOR ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIST AND POLICY CONSULTANT; FELLOW, LEBANESE CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES

The Failure of Diplomacy is the Failure of Economics



Excellencies: Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Beckett, Ambassadors of the Republic of Cyprus and Honduras,
Distinguished guests,
Colleagues from universities and speakers and participants in the sessions that follow,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I first of all would like to express my deepest thanks for the invitation to participate in this important conference and also for the warmest welcome I have had from the organizers, in particular Dr Francis Jegede, Dr Philip Hodgson and Dr Sung-Hee Lee.

It is great pleasure being today at Derby not only for the obvious reason but also for having the opportunity to come back to such an important policy relevant academic event in the UK where I studied and taught for nearly two decades before I left in 1992 to first go to America, then Asia and now Africa.

I have limited time and perhaps this is not a bad thing as I am sure you do not want to be subjected to my accent for much longer. I have now realized that I am fully understood only by one person, my daughter, who I think was tempted to add Greeklish in her cv as yet another language she speaks. Once she asked me “dad, how come you speak like that, after you have been speaking and teaching in English for forty years”. To which I responded “on one hand, socially the Brits are too polite to correct someone and, on the other hand, professionally I failed all the students who did not say what I taught them”.

I mentioned this as my accent somehow relates to one of the two things I will cover today, that is, people moving from one place to another. On this, that is moving around, I would like to say two things.

- First, in practical terms, had it not being for humans moving around, the world would have been very different today and perhaps we, humans, would have been already extinct as species long time ago. To make the point in extremis, I invite you to think what would happen to those who are starving if they cannot become economic migrants, or what would happen to those who are about to be slaughtered if they cannot become refugees
- And second, in research and academic terms that are quite relevant to our conference, we know that evolution, human or not, does not take place quickly. Living species take long time to adapt. One case in point relates to our ancestors. Our best knowledge on this does not come from static fossils but from the Laetoli footprints in Tanzania that were discovered by British paleoanthropologist Mary Leakey. It was the foot prints that settled the debate as to which developed first in the human evolutionary time line and when: a larger brain or bipedalism? We now know that the Laetoli hominins were fully bipedal more than one million years before the earliest known stone tools were made. On the side, the footprints suggest whoever left the prints was burdened on one side and was possibly a female carrying an infant on her hip. Having said that I will refrain from saying that Eve was created before Adam.

The other topic I will cover relates to economics. To cut this introduction short, let me just say that what we ask of politics and diplomacy to do today is to correct the failures of economics, in particular those related to globalization.

Let me clarify that I fully support globalization but not quite the kind of globalization that was developed by one of the most influential persons of our times, Mrs Thatcher, who said “there’s no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families ... people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours.” This, then untested ideological position based on a false dilemma, as if individuals could live outside a society (something that had been already dismissed as early as in 4th century BC by Aristotle), showed its effects in 2008 when the concept of self-regulating markets collapsed spectacularly overnight. What followed the crisis was, ironically, the banking sector and private sector failures were “socialized” – that is, they were passed on to ordinary citizens as public debt, that is, as a liability to be paid by taxing you and me. And we have yet to recover and a long time before we fully pay back the neoliberal exuberance that governed us from the 1980s till the crisis. And we now have to live with those who have embraced a logic that there can be more economic integration but less human integration.

Let me address this issue by saying a few words on migration, refugees and the euro crisis.

Economic Migrants

I was playing a game with my 7 year old grandson, in particular a card game that had the footballers and national teams of the Euro Cup 2016. Needless to say that, having split the number of cards equally at first, in no time he ended up getting all the cards though I almost scored some points half way through. For example, I knew that Zlatan Ibrahimović plays for Manchester United. It transpired I knew little more about him. In the good old days, when life was simple and easy, I would have assumed he was Yugoslav. In the more complicated present, his father turned out to be from Bosnia and his mother from Croatia. To make things even more complicated, his father is Muslim and his mother Catholic. And guess what: he plays for Sweden – being a Swedish national!

From my own experience living in the Middle East, it took me time to find out that Ibrahim is a name given also to Christian boys. Moreover, when I was Chair of the Economics Department at the American University of Beirut I hired somebody whose name was Jihad. I realized he was Christian only after he got married in a Maronite Church. Of course, the Greek Orthodox in that part of the world refer to God as Allah—though the Malaysians want to ban other religions using that name for God. All in all, since I mentioned Ibrahimović and I am Greek, let me conclude the world is as diverse as a “Macedonian salad”. And I will not dwell on whether there is one Macedonia or two.

I was thinking, what would Nicolas Sarkozy be doing today if such a mix up deprived him of being French. He is the son of a Hungarian and a grandson of a Greek Jew. That he is the husband of an Italian lady makes no difference unless they have children – try to define nationality they could legitimately claim if Madame Le Pen were to write the rules.

By the way, Nicolas can apply for a Greek passport anytime as the Greek constitution clearly prescribes that, if any of your ancestors no matter how many generations ago, were Greek, you are Greek. For example, Prince George and Princess Charlotte and all their descendants are eligible to get the Greek nationality, if they wanted, because their father, the Duke to Cambridge is the son of the Prince of Wales who is the son of the Duke of Edinburg, Prince Philip who is Greek. In fact, possessing a Greek passport may prove handy for these members of the Royal Family if the Brexit comes with some restrictions on mobility and they do not want to use their official passport when they travels abroad.

This mix up goes on. I wonder how much British and how much German the children of Nigel Farage are. And what would London be like and, more importantly, what would the UK be like in terms of in- or out- of the EU, if the Caucasian, Turkish and French ancestry of Boris did not make him sufficiently British and he was disqualified from public office.

And talking of London, I wonder what kind of job would Sadiq Khan be doing this days? And how many Olympic medals some national teams would have won if foreign born athletes were excluded. And how many nurses would have been around, if Ghana and Philippines and many other countries had asked for proper compensation for the brain drain they are subjected to through the high demand by the National Health Service systems of advanced countries?

Let me conclude with two questions. First, isn't the economic immigration into Europe today the mirror image of the economic emigration of Europeans to their colonies?

Second, with reference this map reflecting the situation last year, who would ever imagine that in Austria, which is such a leader of the anti-migration movement in Europe, most of its foreign born persons are Germans? This is also the case in Switzerland with the frequent referendums on the issue – including the one that banned minarets by a popular vote of 60 percent – though this was not the case in French speaking cantons that proved to be the Scots of Switzerland.



Refugees

While economic migration comes practically under the exclusive jurisdiction of individual governments, this is not so in the case of refugees at least since 1951 when the United Nations passed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to the convention, and the internationally accepted definition, a refugee is someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

We, in Europe, have very much adhered to the Convention and until recently we have claimed the high moral ground and in many cases we are still giving lectures to others regarding human rights. But things have changed recently. Why has our attitude to refugees changed? For two reasons, first the increasing numbers of refugees and, second, their alleged impact on citizens.

With respect to the refugee numbers, a politician in North Italy labelled their flow into his country “a biblical exodus” and called upon his country to give up the illusion of being able to manage it. As a side note, the “exodus” via the Mediterranean the year he referred to (in 2014) totaled 220,000 people, or less than 0.4 of 1 percent of that country’s, not Europe’s, population. In terms of EU’s population of 500 million people, if the number of refugees in Europe were to reach the share of refugees in the national population in Jordan, they would total some 50 million. And if they were to reach the share of refugees in the national population in Lebanon, they should reach 130 million people. This leaving aside that neither does Jordan nor does Lebanon have the institutions and means needed to handle sudden and complex situations. This includes providing shelter, food distribution, medical aid and child protection, as well as addressing issues such as trafficking and gender violence.

With respect to their impact, refugees are a contentious issue even in our part of the world where Christian values are touted often and loudly. This is due to concerns (justified or not) of electorates that receiving refugees will lead to high unemployment and low wages. There is also displeasure with the possibility that foreigners may receive welfare benefits that are funded by taxing the hard-earned incomes of citizens. I would not attempt to summarize the empirical literature on the eventual impact of refugees in host countries and will only say that things can go both ways depending on whether we treated them as productive fellow humans or, I am tempted to say, scavengers and also on how we measure things.

For example, who earned most medals in the Rio Olympics? Some say the US with 121 medals with Britain coming second with 67. Others say the winners were the EU with 258 medals – excluding the British. And others say the British Empire that collectively got 396 medals.

In any case, all boils down to whether the refugees drain the economy or not. This in turn depends on the employment rights of refugees. The international legal position on this is pretty clear. Those who *live* lawfully in a refuge country (that is, they have been admitted, have lodged their claim and await determination of their refugee status) have the right to self-employment. Those who *stay* lawfully in a country (that is, they have been declared refugees in a country of refuge and can stay or be resettled in another state at a later stage) are considered to have the same rights to wage employment as those accorded to the “most favorable nationals” of a foreign country who are permanent residents and in the same circumstances. And refugees who have resided in the asylum country for at least three years should face no more restrictions on their employment for the sake of protecting the national labor market of the country of refuge. Nor should restrictions be applied to refugees whose spouse or child is a national of the country of refuge. Finally, a refugee with a legalized status should receive the same treatment in terms of public relief and social security as citizens of the country providing refuge.

Ladies and gentlemen: The case is clear, either we adhere to the Convention on Refugees or not. There is no middle ground. We should not have double standards. It was us who to a large extent wrote the Convention. Did we do so because we initially felt we will not be called to act upon it?



Or was the 1951 Convention a hidden weapon at the onset of the cold war and we wanted to pass the message to those on the other side of the iron curtain that whoever defects he or she will be welcome and have the full protection and privileges as our own citizens? If we wanted to show how bad the others were, and they were, now is

the time to show how good we are. It is unacceptable for us to pay less for luxury than what the refugees pay to save the lives of their children.

Diplomacy, bail out and bail in

Having mentioned the price of life, let me conclude with how politics and diplomacy combine more directly with economics. The case in point is the euro crisis with reference to the two Greek speaking countries in the world, Greece and Cyprus.

Put it simply in the case of Greece, populist and corrupt politicians borrowed and borrowed and borrowed and created an Olympic debt that the country could no longer serve. However, when one borrows, someone else lends. And those who lent money to Greece were not Mafiosos but reputable institutions from reputable countries: the German banks and the French banks. When Greece became insolvent in 2009 it became clear that Greece was too big to fail and, worse, Italy that at the time was next in line, was too big to rescue. Under such circumstances, economics, politics and diplomacy combined in what constitutes the biggest fraudulent conveyance in history.

Fraudulent conveyance means avoiding debt by transferring money to another person or company. It arises in debtor/creditor relations with reference to insolvent debtors. In the case of Greece, the banks that lent to the Greek government should have lost their money. This is the rule of the market system that was created across the globe after Mrs Thatcher's initially successful experiment on the back of the British hoi polloi. This experiment proved to be a failure.

As Alan Greenspan, the Fed Chair, said when the global financial crisis of 2008 broke out "I was shocked when the system broke down: I made a mistake in presuming that lenders themselves were more capable than regulators of protecting their finances. My ideology and model that I always believed in proved me wrong".

So the lenders were wrong and the Greek crisis had to be addressed. European politicians acted through diplomacy, not through sending a gun boat. The European diplomacy was met with eager Greek politicians who were willing to sign anything as long as they felt they would stay in power a bit longer or hoped to be the next ones to get into power. In other words, those who created the crisis in Greece were those who were entrusted by the international community to solve it! And they did. How did they do it? The IMF and the EU gave loans to Greece. The loans were used against all rules to pay the French and German banks and other, albeit minor, creditors and the debt was passed on to ordinary Greek citizens. Moreover, while the old Greek debt was then under Greek laws, which means it could have been written off as Greece was insolvent (and the IMF has said *mea culpa* but only now), the Greek politicians agreed the new debt came under English law, thus giving up – if you believe it - sovereignty. It seems in globalized times treason has been replaced by the more benign term “socialization of the debt”. And if I am not wrong, the public debt in Britain has been socialized from 44 percent before the crisis in 2007 to almost 90 percent today.

Of course, there are always two sides to the same coin and the EU says it acted to save the euro, the Eurozone, the EU and – it has to be said – the world economy: The Greek crisis was bigger than that of Lehman Brothers that triggered the 2008 global financial crisis.

While the Greek case was based on bailing out banks, the Cypriot case was based on bail in. Bail-outs refer to the rescue of a financial institutions by external parties (such as public tax payers' moneys or, in the case of Greece, the IMF and the EU).

Bail-ins force the borrower's creditors to bear some of the burden by having part of the debt they are owed written off. This is what the Government of Cyprus resorted to in 2013 and people with deposits larger than €100,000 lost almost half of their deposits (and in the case of the second largest Bank, Laiki, depositors lost everything as the bank failed).


I would say that both in the Greek and Cypriot cases something had to be done for creditors not to lose everything and to avoid systemic shocks in the countries and at

EU level. The issue is who would bear the costs. Kudos to diplomacy that arrived at a solution without a war. But is this the kind of diplomatic outcomes that one would like to have? If I take my car to a friend's house because I go abroad for a while and do not want to leave it in the street, and when I return she tells me "sorry I had to sell the car because my investment decisions and entrepreneurial risks I took proved to be lemons and you will have pay instead of me" how would you rate that act – other than theft?

Conclusions

What can diplomacy do in cases like economic migration, refugees or insolvency, like in Greece and Cyprus?

I would say the first thing for diplomats to do is, of course, to be patriotic and never forget that their first duty is towards serving the interests of their countries. But instead of being hard "colorless bureaucrats" and "yes men", they can make their job a two-way street by sensitizing their bosses to what is going at the other end of the road. To give flesh to this proposition let me site George Horton (1859–1942) who was the U.S. Consul General in a Middle Eastern country and witnessed one of the first systematic ethnic cleansing in modern times.



He resigned just after the massacres of Christians peaked that included the public torture and mutilation of religious leaders before they died. He raised his voice and used his pen to argue that the Allied Powers of the time (equivalent to the West in our days), shamefully ignored the plight of the beleaguered Christian populations "without even a word of protest by any civilized government".

And he pointed out that pious western Christians were deluded in thinking they were making missionary headway in the Muslim world. We all remember President Bush's

reference to a "crusade" against terrorism, which passed almost unnoticed by Americans, rang alarm bells in Europe. The then French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine commented "We have to avoid a clash of civilizations at all costs". And the cafeteria in the US congress stop serving French fries. Instead it started selling Freedom fries.

Second, diplomats, politicians and all of us should recognize that all is about a never ending struggle for more "bread" – from food to things and moneys. From the Laetoli chaps to the financial crisis and the Greek bail-out and Cypriot bail-in, the rich rely on power and fraud, and the weak on running away from trouble – let it be through economic migration or seeking refuge.

Third, and finally, let us be honest. Let us just implement what we have and do so honestly. The 1951 Convention on the Refugees is one starting point. And let us, the small fish, apply what the big fish does: For example, the EU and the US have now legislation that restricts the use of government bail-outs.

The sentiment against the "socialization of debt" is that citizens should not have to pay for entrepreneurial mistakes and rescuing the banks by losing their jobs, homes and incomes. The trillions we have paid to avoid the consequences of the liberalization of the global market that started in Britain in the 1980s would have been more than enough to avoid what is looming in terms of local conflict becoming generalized and economic deprivation becoming universalized.

If diplomacy is defined as "the first inexact science that remains the last of the fine arts" let's keep it like that but on the basis of trust, honesty and universal human rights. Let's stop embracing the logic of "it would be better to be alone": The world is now globalized *economically* which means that it *is globalized* no matter if we like it or not – punto.

All in all: Let's avoid creating new words ending in "xit", like ... Grexit. Instead let's fixit.

Thank you.

Professor Zafiris Tzannatos

12 September 2016

➤ ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 1

RT. HON. DAME MARGARET BECKETT

HONOURABLE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR DERBY SOUTH



Margaret Beckett MP is a British Labour Party politician who is the Member of Parliament for the constituency of Derby South. Mrs Beckett was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and held junior positions in the governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. She lost her seat in 1979 but returned to the House of Commons in 1983 and became a senior member of the Labour Party.

She was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party in 1992 and was briefly its leader in 1994 following the premature death of John Smith, the first woman to occupy either role.

After Labour's victory in the 1997 general election, Mrs Beckett became a member of Tony Blair's Cabinet. Initially the President of the Board of Trade, she was later the Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

In 2006, Mrs Beckett was appointed British Foreign Secretary, making her the first woman to hold the position, and, after Margaret Thatcher, the second woman to hold one of the Great Offices of State.

Margaret Beckett is currently a member of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

➤ ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 2

HIS EXCELLENCY MR. EURIPIDES L EVRIVIADES

HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS



Euripides L Evriviades is the current High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Before assuming this post, he was Deputy Permanent Secretary/Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jan., 2012–Nov., 2013) serving intermittently as Ag. Permanent Secretary. Prior, he served as Ambassador / Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe (Nov., 2008–Jan., 2012), having also chaired its Rapporteur Group on External Relations (2011). Previously, he was Political Director of the Ministry (2006-2008), having concurrent accreditation to the State of Kuwait, pro tem Nicosia.

Mr Evriviades was Ambassador to the United States of America and non-resident High Commissioner to Canada, serving concomitantly as: the Permanent Representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Permanent Observer to the Organization of American States; and Representative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2003-2006). He also served as Ambassador to the Netherlands (2000-2003) and to Israel (1997-2000). Earlier in his career, he held positions at Cypriot embassies in Bonn, Germany (1986-1988); Moscow, USSR/Russia (1988-1993); and Tripoli, Libya (1995).

On 20 April 2015 he was voted by his peers in London as Diplomat of Year from Europe, an award of The Diplomat Magazine (est. 1947). On 15 January 2006, he received in Washington, DC, the King Legacy Award for International Service, bestowed upon him by the Committee on the International Salute to the Life and Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Man for All Nations. He was honored in The Hague as the "Ambassador of the Year" by the Stichting Vrienden van Saur ("Friends of Saur") Foundation, a Dutch social and philanthropic society (October 2003).

Other decorations include the Great Commander of the Order of the Orthodox Knights of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Jerusalem, February 2000); and the Order of Merit (First Class) of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, March 1989).

High Commissioner Evriviades holds a Master's degree in Public Administration (MPA-policy area of concentration: International Affairs and Security) from the John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1984) which he attended as a Fulbright Fellow. He graduated (cum laude, 1976) with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of New Hampshire.

He received a Doctor of Laws, Honoris Causa, from his alma mater, the University of New Hampshire (21 May 2005). He was born in Larnaca, Cyprus, on 6 August 1954. He is married to Anastasia Iacovidou-Evriviades, an attorney-at-law. He has an avid interest in the arts, especially music, as well as in antiquities, cartography and motorcycling.

ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 3

PROFESSOR ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIST AND POLICY CONSULTANT; FELLOW, LEBANESE CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES



Zafiris Tzannatos is an economist living in Lebanon where he was previously Professor and Chair of the Economics Department at the American University of Beirut. He has served as Advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank where he was also Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region as well as Leader of the Global Child Labour Programme that he initiated.

More recently, he was Senior Advisor for all Arab States at the ILO office in Beirut and, before that, for governments in the Middle East and the GCC including Lebanon (Ministry of Social Affairs), Qatar (Planning Council), and the UAE (Abu Dhabi Executive Council). He received his First Degree from the University of Athens, Doctorate from the University of London and Executive Education from Harvard/INSEAD/Stanford and the Kennedy School of Government.

He has held senior academic and research appointments in the UK and the rest of Europe, visited more than 65 countries and worked with regional and international organisations as well as governments of industrialised, transition, emerging and developing economies across all continents.

His publications include 14 books and monographs, and more than 200 reports and papers in the areas of development strategy, labour economics, education, gender,

child labour and broader social policy. His current research is on the euro-crisis and the post-2010 developments in the Arab region.

ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 4

HIS EXCELLENCY, IVAN ROMERO-MARTINEZ

HONDURAN AMBASSADOR



Prior to his new appointment, Mr. Romero-Martinez, was posted as Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. He is a career diplomat since 1971, having served as his country's Ambassador to many countries, including Spain, Egypt, Morocco, Dominican

Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Colombia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Ireland. He also represented his country at the ambassadorial level at the United Nations in Switzerland and at the European Union.

Other assignments in his country's diplomatic service include the post of Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS). Mr. Romero-Martinez also held several positions at Honduras' Embassy in the United States, including that of Counsellor, and at Honduras' Embassy in Canada, where he served as Counsellor, Minister Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires.

At home, Mr. Romero-Martinez served as Special Adviser to the President of Honduras with the rank of Secretary of State.

Mr. Romero-Martinez received a degree in law and social sciences from the National University of Honduras. He went on to earn a Ph.D. in international relations from the Catholic University of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. His other areas of study include international law and integration politics at John Hopkins University in the United States; international commerce at the Centre of Compared Studies in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and studies on European integration at the University of Brussels in Belgium.

Ambassador Romero-Martinez has been honoured by being bestowed with condecorations among others by the governments of Brazil, Spain, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Holy See, Panama and Taiwan.

Ambassador Romero-Martinez has published many works of which some are: *Strikes in Honduran Legislation*; *Honduras and International Treaties*; *Cultural Aspects of Olanchito*; *Honduras is Another Thing*; *General Maximo Gomez in Honduras*; *Precedents and Perspectives of the Central American Common Market* and various studies and articles in national and international newspapers and magazines.

Born on 1 August 1949 in Olanchito, Honduras, Mr. Romero-Martinez is married with two children.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

MONDAY 12TH SEPTEMBER 2016

9:00am	Registration - Reception
9:30am	Welcome & Opening Address with Professor Kath Mitchell
10am	Keynote Address 1 – Room FG101 The Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Beckett Honourable Member of Parliament for Derby South
11am	Keynote Address 2 – Room FG101 Professor Zafiris Tzannatos Senior International Consultant for Development Strategy and Social Policy
12pm	Refreshments
12:15pm	Keynote Address 3 – Room FG101 His Excellency Mr. Euripides L Evriviades High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus
1:15pm – 2pm	Lunch
2pm	Keynote Address 4 – Room FG101 His Excellency, Ivan Romero-Martinez Honduran Ambassador



CONCURRENT PAPER PRESENTATION SESSIONS

Session 1: 3pm – 4.30 p.m. Chair: Prof. Zafiris Tzannatos Venue: Room FG202	Session 2: 3pm – 4.30 p.m. Chair: Dr. David Patton Venue: Court Room	Session 3: 3pm – 4.30 p.m. Chair: Prof. Alexander Nunn Venue: Room FG204
<p><u>Paper 1:</u></p> <p>Reconnecting People with Politics: Social Media & Changing Interaction Between Government and the Governed</p> <p>Presenters: Dr. Paul G. Nixon & Professor Rajash Rawal</p> <p>Head of Research (RESCU), Principal Lecturer in European Studies, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands</p>	<p><u>Paper 2</u></p> <p>An Assessment of the Prevent Strategy within UK Counter Terrorism & The Implications for Policy Makers, Communities and Law Enforcement</p> <p>Presenter: Dr. Phil Henry</p> <p>Director of Multi-Faith Centre and Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Derby</p>	<p><u>Paper 3</u></p> <p>Current Security Implications in the Balkans, with a Focus on Macedonia</p> <p>Presenter: Prof. Robert Hudson</p> <p>Professor of European History and Cultural Politics, University of Derby</p>
<p><u>Paper 4</u></p> <p>The Politics of Fear: Religion(s), Conflict and Diplomacy</p> <p>Presenter: Prof. Paul Weller:</p> <p>(Fractional) Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University; Emeritus Professor, University of Derby; and (Non-Stipendiary) Research Fellow in Religion and Society, Regent's Park College, University of Oxford.</p>	<p><u>Paper 5</u></p> <p>The Dimensions of Rural Unrest: The Mediterranean Region in the 19th Century</p> <p>Presenter: Dr. Baris Cayli:</p> <p>Research Fellow in Criminology College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby</p>	<p><u>Paper 6</u></p> <p>Perceptions of Psychological Coercion and Human Trafficking in England: Beginning to Know the Unknown</p> <p>Presenters: Dr David Walsh, (Dando, C., & Brierley, R.):</p> <p>Acting Head of College Research, College of Law Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Derby</p>
<p><u>Paper 7</u></p> <p>Gender Mainstreaming in South Korea – a Critical Analysis Through Discursive Institutionalism Around the Issue of Childcare</p> <p>Presenter: Dr Sung-Hee Lee</p> <p>Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy, University of Derby</p>	<p><u>Paper 8</u></p> <p>The Efforts and Level of Success Achieved in Establishing international uniformity in Standards, Related to The Role of Company Auditors & Maintenance of Their Independent Position</p> <p>Presenter: Larry Mead</p> <p>Lecturer, College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences</p>	<p><u>Paper 9</u></p> <p>Financial Crime and Financial Investigation: The ISIL Model of Terrorist Financing & Opportunities to Target Hidden Economy</p> <p>Presenters: Dr David Hicks,</p> <p>Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of Derby</p> <p>Mr Craig Hughes (PhD Candidate) University of Derby</p>

		<p>Mr Nir Tolkovsky (PhD Candidate) University of Derby</p>
<p>Paper 10 Political Discontent and the 21st Century's Threats to Global Peace, Security and Human Progress</p> <p>Presenter: Dr Francis Jegede Senior Lecturer and Programme Leader for International Relations & Diplomacy, College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby</p>	<p>Paper 11 The Need for New Emotionally Intelligent Criminal justice & Criminological Approaches to Help End the 'War on Terror'</p> <p>Presenter: Dr David Patton Positive Criminologist and Senior Lecturer, Learning, Teaching & Quality lead for Law, Criminology and Social and Political Sciences, University of Derby</p>	<p>Paper 12 Children, Humanitarianism and Diplomacy in a Digital Age</p> <p>Presenter: Dr Helen Brocklehurst Senior Lecturer in International Relations, College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby</p>
<p>Paper 13 Evolution of The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Case of Diplomacy in International Human Rights Adjudication?</p> <p>Presenter: Mrs Rachael Ita Lecturer in Law, College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby</p>		

4.30pm – 4.45pm

Refreshments



CONFERENCE PANEL SESSION:

TOPIC: DIPLOMACY, RELIGION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM & THE POLITICS OF FEAR

4.45 pm – 5.30pm **JOINT – SPECIAL CONFERENCE PANEL SESSION (FG101)**

Chair: Prof Paul Weller, Professor of Inter-Religious Relations

Panel Member/Speaker:

Professor Kevin Bampton

Director, Police Institute, Derby Law School, University of Derby

Prof. Zafiris Tzannatos

Senior International Consultant for Development Strategy and Social Policy

Prof Alexander Nunn

Professor of International Political Economy, Leeds Beckett University

Dr Phil Henry

Director of Multi-Faith Centre, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Derby

Prof Robert Hudson

Professor of European History and Cultural Politics

Dr Helen Brocklehurst

Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Derby

Mr Joel Klaff

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Derby

5.30 pm

Closing Speech

Prof Malcolm Todd

Dean College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences

 **PAPER 1: DISCUSSION PAPER**

**RECONNECTING PEOPLE WITH
POLITICS: SOCIAL MEDIA & CHANGING
INTERACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
THE GOVERNED**

Dr. Paul G. Nixon
Head of Research (RESCU), Principal Lecturer in
European Studies, The Hague University of Applied
Sciences, Netherlands

&

Professor Rajash Rawal
Professor of European Studies and Faculty Director, The
Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands

 **PAPER 2:****AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREVENT STRATEGY WITHIN UK COUNTER TERRORISM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT**

Dr Philip Henry
Director of the Multi-Faith Centre and Sociologist,
University of Derby

Abstract

Prevent – the strategy – has become embedded in counter terrorism policy in the UK since 2007. It was reviewed and re-written in 2011 and has taken on even greater significance at the level of addressing questions of how to challenge and prevent ‘radicalisation’ in the context of managing security in the nation? This paper examines the tensions associated with the Prevent strategy and its legacy in the UK since 2007. It will explore the juxtaposition of policy making, which on one hand sees the means-ends solutions of avoiding further instances of terrorism at all costs, set against a potential community-based and local authority engagement model that foregrounds safeguarding against radicalisation and extremism in all its forms as a priority

when working with communities across the country. There are apparent tensions in the emphasis of implementation and deliver of this strategy, which continue to challenge perceptions against the growing strengthening of fears associated with the erosion of civil liberties. The paper argues for a significant change in awareness of the behaviours and attitudes associated with ‘radicalisation’ and suggests policy could better reflect practice as we move through the second decade of the century.

Keywords: Prevent; terrorism; radicalisation; safeguarding; policy; identity; education.

Introduction

'Prevent', as one area of four within the UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2003)¹ has been criticised, misconceived, misunderstood, often times communicated without clarity of purpose beyond the reading of the physical strategy document (Home Office, 2007, 2011) and open to a range of interpretations. Since 2007 it has been criticised by academics, the media and press, policy makers and members of civil society, not least by significant figures in Muslim communities (see House of Commons CLG Committee (2010) and Home Affairs Select Committee (2012) reports). Such criticism, ironically, has also been levelled at the first version of the Prevent Strategy (2007) (Prevent 1) by the former Home Secretary (and now Prime Minister) Theresa May in the Forward to Prevent 2 (2011) in which she states:

The *Prevent* programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that *Prevent* should have been confronting.

This paper seeks to bring the context, background and implementation of Prevent and the ever-shifting landscape of counter-terrorism in the UK into focus in 2016². The current response academically has seen various iterations of academic attention since the pilot years of 2006 until 2014. In the last two years however, there has been less direct academic engagement with Prevent with a few exceptions: (O'Toole *et al* 2016; Quartermaine, 2014; Saeed & Johnson, 2016; Thomas, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016,).

¹ CONTEST includes four strategic elements: Pursue (Policing and state Intelligence Services MI5, MI6, with potential criminal justice outcomes), Prevent (counter terrorism options to stop or prevent individuals, being drawn into radicalisation/ extremism outside the criminal justice system), Protect (directed at infrastructure protection across the nation, includes transport, power, borders - ports and airports, and contingencies in towns and cities

to reduce risks of terrorist attacks) and Prepare (in the event of terrorist incidents that cannot be stopped; mitigating potential harmful fallout, in cost to human life and minimise damage to infrastructure).

² The limitations of space in the production of this paper will result in an overview of the historic legacy of the Prevent Strategy, the detail of which can be seen in the articles cited, but only presented here in summary.

There is no logical explanation for fewer articles on the subject, suffice to think because of the rise of Islamic State it has shifted attention in many social science disciplines and it is still early in academic terms to see the results of recent manifestation from Syria and Iraq. The other issue of major significance (in counter-terrorism terms) that directly impacts on the Prevent Strategy, is the ‘Statutory Duty’ enacted in 2015, which does, like Islamic State, require our attention.

The paper will argue that, in line with Cantle and Thomas (2015) and Thomas (2015, 2016) broader education in the classroom that involves non-stigmatising values led citizenship and anti-extremism educational projects through which teachers are empowered and have confidence to deliver difficult topic areas is not insurmountable, and is preferable in support of youth engagement with the Prevent strategy. However, unlike Thomas (2014, 2015, 2016) and Ragazzi (2014) the author would like to suggest that the flaws of Prevent 1 (responsible for most of the critique of the strategy) are being put behind us at policy level and being

recognised by the current government, who appear to be seeking a greater collaborative approach and potentially more meaningful partnership with Muslim communities and other stakeholders (see Middle East Eye [online] - Home Affairs Select Committee Report Aug, 2016) compared with early years manifestations. This may not however necessarily change some areas of public opinion, especially if rebranding not reconceptualising the strategy is the outcome?

This study draws on a review of academic literature between 2006 and 2016, spanning ten years from pilot programmes addressing the ‘Prevention of Violent Extremism’ to date. The study works by summarising the impact and shift in policy and strategy in the UK in relation to Prevent 1, and 2 and in the context of Islamic State’s emergence and its interpretation of religiously-inspired radical forms of Islam. It considers the impact of Islamic State on Prevent 2 in the UK. Within the review of academic studies are significant empirical works (Kundnani, 2009, 2012; Millings, 2013; Mythen, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton,

2009; O’Toole *et al* 2013, 2016; Thomas, 2014) that help in consideration of how evidence at grass roots level connects with the thesis that academically, many authors are grounding their work in past flaws of early Prevent 1? It asks if too little attention is being given to the details of the shift towards widening professionalization post the 2015 implementation of the duty on Prevent. This includes how best to grapple with problematic concepts like ‘radicalisation’, both at the level of accumulating important knowledge that could impact on the safeguarding of individuals (under the duty) and at the level of dispelling myths that Muslim communities are both ‘risky and at risk’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013) in a prior homogenisation of collective religious and cultural identities which has occurred in unhelpful ways.

Tensions, Academic and Societal?

Broadly and in summary, the main critiques of Prevent between 2007 and its review by the former coalition government in 2010; what Thomas, (2014) calls Prevent 1, and its re-writing in 2011(Prevent 2), fall into four areas:

- 1) An over emphasis on Muslim communities and individuals creating a ‘suspect community’, including allegations of ‘spying’ or using Prevent as an intelligence gathering tool and/or form of discipline curtailing Muslim social and cultural capital (Birt, 2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Thomas, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Here the levels of scrutiny were described as disproportionate to the level of threat and ignoring other forms of extremism including a resurgent far-right;
- 2) specifically targeted funding for Muslim communities creating ‘resource envy’ (DCLG Committee, 2010) from other communities of minority and majority ethnicities;
- 3) much of the community development work within Muslim communities (between 2007-2010) appears to have been associated with Prevent 1 (counter-terrorism funding). Funding was provided to mainly conservative, or traditional Muslim leaders/groups which reinforced generational tensions and created divisions in communities;
- and 4) local authorities and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) responsible for the funding at

that time (2007-2010) appear to have conflated community cohesion on one hand with counter terrorism on the other³, which resulted in confusion both within and across Muslim communities, civil society broadly and within state agencies (police, local authorities and government departments).

In 2011 the revised version of Prevent (Prevent 2) redefined both its content and the government department taking control of the agenda; now hosted by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office. As a result there were some significant shifts in emphasis and Prevent 2 attempted to implement solutions to earlier criticism (outlined above). What followed was the adoption of many (if not all) of the recommendations of the coalition government's 2011 review, which was based on evidence to earlier Parliamentary committees, which had examined the value and efficacy of Prevent between 2009 and 2011 and root causes for violent radicalisation between 2010 and 2012.

Criticism of Prevent 2 however shifted emphasis with that of the strategy. In other words, concerns about the securitisation and policy contradiction of the cohesion agenda (Ragazzi, 2012, 2014; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016) was shaped around a discourse that saw funds reduced for Prevent work and a tightening of access to resources, which had until that point been provided with little monitoring or accountability. In addition, Thomas (2016) claims the Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015 increased the securitisation threat through its unnecessary influence in the state education sector (Thomas, 2016), broadly impacting on Schools, Colleges and Higher Education Institutions (Thomas, 2015, 2016; Saeed & Johnson, 2016). References continued to 'suspect communities' under Prevent 2, through a so-called essentialising approach to Muslims in the nation. This idea has its origins in Hillyard's early thesis, (1993) and is reflected in Pantazis and Pemberton's (2009) comparison of former Irish dissidents

³ The conflation of these apparently opposed ideas (community cohesion and counter terrorism) will be discussed later in the paper.

being the ‘old suspects’, and Muslims under Prevent, being the ‘new suspects’ that replaced the Irish. In addition Heath-Kelly suggests that Muslims are seen as both ‘risky and at risk’ (2013). Greer’s (2010) rebuttal of the ‘suspect community thesis’ however, adds to a rich debate about how and to what extent is the empirical evidence both sufficient and specifically evidencing serious questions of generalising ‘Muslims as suspects’. He also critiques the idea of Muslim ‘material discrimination’ – influencing extremism, and as a consequence, challenges the credibility of the idea that Muslims are the subject of wholesale ‘securitisation’. This raises a question we will address later - is the evidence sufficiently robust, is it representative, has it the validity in sample terms and what can we legitimately claim about responses from research populations?

To add to the already vexed debates about securitisation of Muslim communities, in 2013/14 we saw the rise of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. This was foreseen by security and intelligence services, but its impact domestically came much later. As

Hewitt (2007) points out the security and intelligence services were playing catch up, as had been the case in the late 1990s when the emphasis moved from the IRA to international terrorism by the early 2000s. According to Hewitt that ‘was no easy matter’ (2007:94), nor was the shift from Al Qa’eda (AQ) to IS in Iraq and the subsequent concern it created among security officials and government. The tensions in Iraq played out between Sunni and Shia militants under Abu Musab al Zarqawi (forming Islamic State in Iraq) from 2003, and affiliating with AQ in October 2004 (Stern and Berger, 2015) was a sign of things to come.

In so far as translating the impact of IS to UK domestic life is concerned, specifically, challenging western liberal democratic values and importing transnational terror to UK shores, little was known at the level of policing about IS. Even less was known about its potential draw to many young people and families prepared to leave the UK to travel to Syria and/or Iraq. The reinforcing of a traditional historic model of Muslim civil society through the historic Caliphate, despite how it was set up and the implications of IS

taking violence to an extreme level, did not deter those who saw an opportunity they could not foresee, by staying at home. As a consequence the Prevent 2 legislative upgrading of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS - bringing about the Statutory Duty) was hastened along on the back of significant numbers travelling to Syria and Iraq between 2014-2016 - reported by the BBC as 850 travellers to date (BBC News database, 12th Aug, 2016). Of those approximately half have returned to the UK, while more than 200 have died, been convicted or remain in Syria or Iraq. Known deaths are currently at 66, convictions 64 and believed to still be in Iraq or Syria 81.

The 'Digital Caliphate' as it became known (Atwan, 2015) created a new and pervasive threat to national security under Prevent 2. The threat manifest in untold numbers of people having access to IS recruitment through social media platforms in everyday use, like for example: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and one-to-one digitally encrypted platforms like Whats App, Ask fm, kick it etc. The threat from IS and the Caliphate ideal created a significant shift in attention for Prevent

Police Case Management (PCM) and Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) officers, which for a time almost eclipsed concerns about AQ and continues to be the persistent threat according to the state. This additional complexity only added to even greater tensions in relation to civil liberties, as now the surveillance question on social media outlets, web-based services and one-to-one messaging was firmly in the spotlight.

What Does Prevent 2 ask us to consider?

Prevent 2 in 2011 explicitly states in 'Guiding Principles; a Framework for Prevent': that it addresses all forms of terrorism, prioritising against the greatest level of threat; it will not spy on or condone spying on anyone in community, stating:

“Prevent must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in Prevent must be improved” (Prevent, 20116 [3.15]).

It will not fund extremists; it will protect freedoms of speech, but requires appropriate challenge to extremists (including non-violent extremists), and on the question of integration has this to say:

Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet *Prevent* objectives. And *Prevent* must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects, which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past (*Prevent*, 2011:6 [3.14]).

Prevent 2 objectives state:

Within this overall framework the new *Prevent* strategy will specifically: [1] respond to the **ideological challenge** of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; [2] **prevent people from being drawn into terrorism** and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and [3] work with **sectors and institutions** where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

On the face of things and based on the explicit response addressed above to previous criticism, Prevent 2 would appear to be making good (in large part and on paper) its previous misgivings, which are challenged and criticised by a number of academics cited in this paper (see list above). This making good does not however exonerate overzealous policing or the inappropriate use of power or influence

in addressing the objectives or guiding principles. The strategy as written is extant and has not been altered since 2011. In addition to the previous Prevent 1 version, Prevent 2 makes three fundamental changes in face of its critics: 1) It explicitly draws a line in the sand on secrecy, stating it will only work to intervene or offer advice and support overtly, transparently and with the knowledge and consent of the individual's it works with; 2) It will only work in the non-criminal space, that is, in order to prevent criminalisation though the criminal justice system (CJS). For this to work individuals must cooperate by agreeing to work with either formal or informal intervention providers (subject to the Channel multi-agency referral process, or informally outside it). Prevent will, through counselling and other support seek to work with individuals to keep them out of the CJS; and 3) emphasises local authority Prevent co-ordinators (many of whom are taking a lead) and multi-agency function, both in relation to Channel referrals and local level community engagement.

Prevent's 2007-2010 legacy however, seems to carry the weight of academic

and other research participants critical opinions beyond the early period and to date. This raises the question, how widespread are these reported early misgivings in relation to the strategy and its implementation and are they being substantiated by the later Prevent 2 version of the strategy? Prevent 2, as presented above, has documented its intention to change, learning from the previous mistakes. We will come back to this question and the representation issue that flows from it later, but first let us consider the one substantive change to Prevent 2 - the implementation of the Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015.

There are significant changes brought about in the move that saw Prevent take on a statutory function relative to the implementation of the Statutory Duty for Prevent under new legislation (The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, 2015). Prevent Duty Guidance (2015) states:

Our *Prevent* work is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, and Al Qa'ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety

and security (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015:6).

The guidance under the new duty sets out where the threats are likely to come from and takes a 'risk-based approach' in addressing the sector specific requirements for the 'specified authorities', which includes: Local Authorities, Police, Prisons and Probation, Schools, Further and Higher Education and Health. There are seven broad areas covered by the duty, which include, 1) Leadership, 2) productive cooperation, 3) staff understanding radicalisation and training in relation to risk/vulnerability, referral (into Channel or other programmes), 4) differentiating extremism from terrorism, 5) obtaining support, knowledge of challenge, 6) ICT safety and 7) monitoring and inspection, described as follows:

[Under the heading of 'leadership'] establish or use existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation; ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it; communicate and promote the importance of the duty; and ensure staff implement the duty effectively.

Demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation, in particular with local *Prevent* co-

ordinators, the police and local authorities, and co-ordination through existing multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships.

Frontline staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism.

Staff need to know what measures are available to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influences.

All specified authorities subject to the duty will need to ensure they provide appropriate training for staff involved in the implementation of this duty. Such training is now widely available (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015: 6-8)

Additionally, statutory workers need to know about Information sharing protocols monitoring and inspection by a sector specific inspector, for example, OFSTED in schools-based education, or HEFCE in the higher education sector.

In principle much of what is required for compliance under the ‘duty’ appears to build on existing mechanisms within sectors, but assumes some prior knowledge, which is not always present in relation to Prevent more broadly. The need to risk assess and action plan and create some sense of partnership working (productive cooperation) with local Prevent coordinators (steering groups) or local authority equivalents in Community Safety, should not be too onerous a demand against existing safeguarding risk assessments. However, there are some ‘specified authorities’ under the ‘duty’, for example, schools, where an implicit response by the Department for Education (DfE 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) includes advice/guidance on safeguarding and Prevent and how to connect British Values with the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development of children and young people (SMSC). In so doing foregrounding SMSC defined by British values against the definition of extremism in the statutory duty (and in Prevent 2).

The definition of extremism is defined as:

vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Including calls for the death of members of the armed forces at home or overseas (Counter-Terrorism & Security Act, 2015).

The definition is too vague, requires a largely subjective test, and presents an unacceptable conclusion – that active or vocal opposition to democracy, rules of law, individual liberty or tolerance etc., equals extremism? This removes any context or consequence for exactly what constitutes vocal or active opposition, and in that sense appears unhelpfully arbitrary. In practical terms, it is unworkable for educationalists that cannot be expected to make judgements based on the definition above, and it will undoubtedly receive legal challenge at some future point in time.

However, in so far as developing experiential learning experiences around democracy, rules, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs

is concerned, and setting aside the extremism question for a moment, this definition does inculcate democratic and cohesive elements within it, given its universal potential to be applied to all. From the perspective of a fourfold model around which to develop SMSC this would, under any other circumstances provide a useful starting point for teachers in thinking about the background to citizenship teaching and learning experiences, using the principles of spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. The author would like to suggest in principle, that it could also form the basis for some of the more difficult and necessary debates that need to take place among educators and pupils in relation to radicalisation, its causes and concerns for all in schools and communities.

There are however other issues reflected in what the Prevent Duty requires of professionals in ‘specified authorities’ including schools. From the perspective of managing risk, identifying best practice and under the duty of care to those under eighteen years in school, it presents a safeguarding dilemma. If the inference is that to make a decision about a pupils

physical and/or psychological well being is premised on ‘who is in vocal or active opposition to fundamental British Values’ – *vis-à-vis* the four elements of the definition above, is this something that teachers (including their designated safeguarding leads) can make a call on? Do they have the knowledge, skills and judgement to address these, now safeguarding aspects under the duty, relating to questions of radicalisation/extremism or moving into or out of terrorism? Having delivered a bespoke form of Prevent training to more than 1000 teachers in Derby and Derbyshire schools in the last three years, the author would say not.

Thomas (2016) raises very important issues in relation to education and the need for a wider level of open citizenship-based engagement with what he describes as ‘anti-extremism education’, using a human rights-based model in which more open debates without fear of sanction can take place. He states:

Only through such citizenship education, with a human rights framework at its core, will young people be equipped with the individual and peer group

resilience to examine and reject ideologies that promote hatred and violence (Thomas, 2016:184).

The author supports this idea, together with wider teacher training. Thomas (2014) also criticises Prevent 1, for attempting then failing to address the needs in education. It should be recognised that the statutory duty has changed the landscape irrevocably (subject to Parliamentary intervention), and the call for safeguarding training to be delivered with a national footprint put out by the Department For Education in the summer of 2016, is an indication (a year on from the advent of the Statutory Duty) of the lack of planning and foresight, by government to manage the teacher training aspects. Too few teachers have the knowledge, or confidence to develop open debates and ‘anti-extremism education’ and we should acknowledge (in line with Thomas, 2016) that by not learning the lessons of previous ‘white racist’ issues in our schools, allowed them to be driven underground. It would equally be an error not to correct the lack of educational engagement with the difficulties presented by extremism regardless of how unpalatable such

views might be (Phillips, Tse & Johnson, 2011).

Implications for Policy Makers Communities and Law Enforcement

The criticisms and questions raised by many academics, some policy makers, law enforcement and members of the public reflects the on going discussion about the efficacy and practicality of a forward thinking counter-terrorism policy framework in which Prevent, as pointed out by Pantucci (when talking about counter-terrorism strategies) raises the security versus civil liberties question, stating:

Unlike dictatorships or other authoritarian regimes, democracies are inherently fluid and must be responsive to their public's demands, meaning that the parameters of the debate on where we draw the line between civil liberties and public protection is also likely to be a fluid one (Pantucci, 2010: 265).

Critiques of the operationalisation of Prevent 2, as opposed to its policy position on paper, appear to be raising further questions, many of which are addressed in the literature covered in this paper, but often not incontrovertibly. For those who suggest

Prevent is unworkable and needs a strategy change as the only solution, what does the alternative look like? Is then Prevent 2 a bridge too far for post-industrial UK liberal democracy or has it been misconceived, confused with Pursue (in counter-terrorism terms) and associated with legislative tightening of government policy to impact terrorist threats (in the criminal justice context) to its detriment?

The only substantial material change to Prevent 2, cannot be played down and the implications of the enactment of the duty under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS) will continue to raise debate about its implementation, and as discussed above specifically, in how it impacts on education. There are similar conversations to be had about the duty's impact on the other 'specified authorities' - health, local authorities, prisons and the police themselves. Prevent 2 has seen no updating or rewriting since 2011. In reviewing the critique presented earlier in relation to Prevent, the *Prevent 2 Guiding Framework* apparently addresses these criticisms directly, e.g. securitisation, spying and cohesion (described as integration). The

strategy's claims are however disputed by Cantle and Thomas (2015), Cockburn (2007), Davies (2008), Kundnani (2009) and Thomas, (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016). This raises other important policy related questions - is Prevent driving community cohesion out of local authority agendas (Cantle and Thomas, 2015; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016), or has that idea been arrested and reverted in the current landscape? Thomas (2016) suggests multiculturalism is alive and well and cohesion is a new form of multiculturalism and not its death. If that is the case, given the current community development agenda at local authority level it would appear to embrace social cohesion, regardless of central government's steer on this.

The author also contends that the impacts on multi-culturalism of Prevent 2, are today, less of a 'policed multiculturalism' (Ragazzi, 2014) on the basis that Police Prevent Case Management (PCM) within regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) has seen significant tightening of budgets and refocusing of strategy. In many cases officers have been removed almost completely from educative

awareness raising (East Midlands Regional PCM), and even supporting Home Office core deliverables - WRAP 3 (Workshop for Raising Awareness of Prevent). This seeming withdrawal is mainly associated with a shift in emphasis from Chief Police Officers Council due to the Islamic State risk and threat that has seen PCM resources increasingly used for collating and assessing Channel referrals (within a multi-agency context) and/or for disruption purposes.

While being far from a perfect solution Prevent 2, may, as Thomas (2014) suggests be seeing an 'end in sight' finding a new trajectory in 2016, with calls for a review in Parliament (as yet unpublished Home Affairs Select Committee report, Aug 2016) stopping short of removing the statutory duty, but taking account of a wider professionalization and subsequent rationalisation of the earlier debates, flaws and problems. The emphasis would be to focus on a broader public need to understand 'radicalisation' despite its academic ambivalence and training and counselling in more targeted ways being a possibility (Middle East Eye [online] Aug, 2016).

The evidence of a necessity to better train professionals can be seen in the potential impacts of the Prevent Duty on Local Authorities, Health, Education, the Police, Prisons and Probation Services. The Multi-Faith Centre at the University of Derby led a bespoke multi-agency training programme in the East Midlands for the last three years, called 'Bringing Prevent to the Public Space'. The Centre worked with frontline staff across the sectors described above. That training reveals evidence from participants of professional needs to better understand the concepts associated with terrorism in all its forms and specifically far right extremism (a feature in the locality); to examine pathways towards terrorism, which is reflected in the *lingua franca* of 'radicalisation' and to better understand the mundane nature of everyday experience that influences individuals. Peter Neumann (2012 [online]) describes "the three common denominators that we know about [describing] how people radicalise [using] – grievances, ideology and mobilisation" and where each is influenced and influences the other. To deal with these influences requires a

situational response from professionals; a response that by necessity, requires a deeper knowledge than can be provided by WRAP 3 training. Many of these professionals will be expected to support individuals and they may be called upon to make decisions based on their knowledge of safeguarding against radicalisation. In addition the community and voluntary sector are also raising questions about the significance of cohesion and how it fits with the implementation of Prevent?

These everyday and often mundane aspects of life create and shape our thinking, development and connectivity/interaction, with those to whom we feel we belong at a personal and collective level and with those we oppose and many layers of acceptance, tolerance and indifference along life's journey. They include racism/discrimination, ideologies of politics/ religion and belief, secularising society, disillusionment, disassociation, disadvantage, exclusion, belongingness identity and the vexed topic of radicalisation.

The idea of radicalisation is often challenged (Thomas, 2014, 2015, 2016). It may be seen as muddying the water between understanding terrorism and the pathways leading to and from terrorism. The topic of radicalisation is not made any easier as terrorism itself has over one hundred definitions and remains one of the most contested topics in the study of political violence. However, if you seek to remove radicalisation conceptually from the language that describes the process over time (short or long) the author can only describe that which does not clearly breach the Terrorism legislation as 'non-terrorism'. This appears unhelpful if you are trying to make sense of any pre-emptive preventative model to avoid the 'non-terrorist' becoming the terrorist. As a complex process radicalisation is just as likely to be manifest in everyday conversation with your friend in the gym, as it is through social media, hate preachers or speakers on You Tube and elsewhere. Radicalisation assumes and can consume those who see grievance/injustice, ideology and a way to mobilise (Neumann, 2012) how they feel. Unfortunately, like the baking of a cake, unless you have made one

before you may be unaware (as are the state it seems) of what order the ingredients are mixed in, and whether the outcome is a so-called 'radicalised individual', as there are no parameters outside the legal tests by which to make the judgement. Radicalisation in the UK and Europe is associated with norms and values, and is subject specific, socially charged and difficult to articulate. It is often framed in Europe as the "rejection of key dimensions of modern democratic culture that are at the centre of the European value system" (Rabasa and Benard, 2015:3). This definition is not far from the UK version in Prevent 2, and associated ideas of democracy, rules, liberty and tolerance.

Conclusion

The paper has examined the critical contemporary conversation, which frames civil liberties against the background of national security. More questions than answers are ever likely to be the case in exploring an emotive and sensitive area like the implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy that has no parallel or equivalent, and has only been in place for ten years (including the pilot phase).

It was developed as the risk and threat unfolded and there is no denying it is fraught with mistakes, many of which however were identified in the early period of Prevent 1. Unfortunately, in the context of accuracy and on the face of the academic evidence examined here, authors of that literature are still citing the issues from the period 2007-2011 as emblematic of Prevent 2, (2011-to date). Is there a reason for this? Perhaps media stories, and the mainly Muslim public's concerns of the earlier period (well documented by academics and Parliamentary Committees and Reviews) continue to reinforce Prevent in the public perception as 'a tainted brand' as Thomas (2014) suggests?

It seems Prevent 2 is unlikely to be treated any differently to Prevent 1 by its critics, even though there appears to be limited evidence, outside of the qualitative studies of relatively small numbers of participants reinforcing some of the specific community concerns. The media impact however cannot be underestimated and changing perceptions of a tainted brand is not easy to do. The impact of Prevent on individuals is likely to be based on

the way people feel as a consequence of perceptions created by a number of influencing factors, including collective memory. It could be argued that based on wider perceptions of Prevent as securitised by the state, and the influence of negative messaging that it is unlikely to change the way people appear to feel about it, particularly in Muslim communities. That is not to say that the criticisms of Prevent are unfounded, rather the opposite is likely to be the case, given the weight of potential evidence. However it would certainly help in assessing Prevent today, for a wider study to assist with quantifying and qualifying the critique and concerns by bringing together the literature with a national survey of communities and professionals in a wider study of public opinion.

The significance of such a study has only one precedent, in a weighted random sample study of Muslim public opinion, commissioned by Channel 4 for a documentary "What British Muslims Really Think?" in April 2016, (presented by Trevor Phillips - former Equality and Human Rights Commission chair). The programme was seen as controversial by some

(see Plunkett in *The Guardian*, 21st April 2016) but not by others (Dellingpole, *The Spectator*, 14th April 2016). The programme was premised on a survey that reflects as close a form of Muslim representation as any recent study has been able to undertake, and has more detail than many others (ICM, [online] 2015). ICM Unlimited carried out the survey face-to-face, using Muslim researchers, polling during two periods in 2015. The results were more about integration than being security specific, but implicitly provided a more contented position for those British Muslims surveyed than much of the academic literature reviewed here attests too (see ‘*What British Muslims Really Think*’ Channel 4, 10pm Wednesday 13th April 2016 and ICM Unlimited [online] ‘*C4/Juniper Survey of Muslims*’ 2015). Methodologically the survey focused on a sampling frame that adopted areas where 20% of the population were Muslim and sought a representative random sample of 1008 participants, described thus:

ICM[s] analysis shows that there are 2,014 LSOAs [Lower Super Output Areas ⁴] with a

⁴ Lower Super Output Areas are geographical areas covering between 400 and 1,200 households.

penetration of at least 20% Muslim residents, and that these areas cover c.1.4 million Muslims – or 51% of Britain’s Muslim population.

Results can be seen in greater detail at ICM Unlimited [online]. The headlines however, reflected in *The Guardian*, (Perraudin, 2016 [online]) suggest British Muslims are more likely to feel a stronger connection to Britain than the population at large (86% said this); and 91% who took part said they felt a strong sense of belonging in their local area; additionally 88% of those surveyed said Britain was a good place for Muslims to live. On this basis the call for a more detailed community-focused attitudinal survey that addresses integration, security (including Prevent) and discrimination should be a future aspiration for amore nuanced understanding of who is speaking for who, when it comes to reporting Muslim opinions.

We should ask ourselves, is Prevent today (in 2016), different to how it was conceived and delivered in its early years (2007-2011), and what a

democratic society might expect of governance at the political and executive levels given the context of the current global position and the UK's relationship to transnational and domestic terrorism, including domestic aggressive forms of nationalism (and occasional violence) that play out in far-right rhetoric? Should a policy that sits as one part of a four part counter-terrorism strategy address, or seek to address, the overlapping and intertwined societal issues associated with and inclusive of many everyday aspects of life, that impact on the life choices of individuals (outlined above), or are there better ideas out there?

We should not however shy away from the challenge to accurately assess public and professional feeling, beyond where we are currently and we should certainly find more opportunities for open debate in formal and informal education for both children/young people and adults, in what Thomas and Cattle (2015) and Thomas (2015, 2016) refer to as “non-stigmatising values led citizenship and anti-extremism educational projects”.

There are a number of areas that should be examined in more depth in future papers, not least - impacts in Health, Education - including the FE and HE sectors, and what position do Local Authorities currently find themselves in, when considering the tension between Prevent and local community cohesion. Where too are the Police in this conversation and what are they planning in the context of managing Prevent 2; are they about to withdraw or reduce their involvement or increase their response? Finally, how do Muslims in 2016 feel about Prevent, what personal experiences do they have of the strategy or wider counter-terrorism policy, how do they know what they know about Prevent, and what influences their thinking about it?

By assessing in detail these specific areas where Prevent is currently functioning we may draw closer to a policy implementation that might more closely resemble the realities on the ground. Research can seek to influence government to better understand that set of realities and consider how policy can better shape life for future generations, where openness and difficult discussions in all forms of

educative experience (formal, informal and public) are the norm.

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PAPER 3:

CURRENT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS IN THE BALKANS, WITH A FOCUS ON MACEDONIA

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Abstract

A Macedonian friend in Skopje recently observed that his grandmother had lived in five different states without ever moving house!

Macedonia is the smallest state in South Eastern Europe with a population of only two million inhabitants. Blighted by its economic geography, Macedonia is a land-locked state with poor infrastructure, scarce natural resources, and small market potential. The country was hit by the 2007 Euro crisis and the effects of high youth unemployment at 52 per cent continue to linger. There have been internal rifts, resulting in armed conflict between Albanian separatists and the Macedonian Army in 2001. Macedonia has also been deeply affected by migration. There were 90,000 from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992-95; then, in the spring of 2001 a further 360,000 refugees crossed over

the borders from Kosovo, the equivalent of 17 per cent of Macedonia's population, raising inter-ethnic tensions with the possibility of a permanent change to the ethnic balance of the country and stretching institutional capacities to their limits (Pendarovski, 2011) and Macedonia continues to be affected by the current European refugee crisis that grew exponentially throughout 2015 and 2016.

Macedonia is defined by its Foreign relations. It has problems with all five of its immediate neighbours. It has had a long dispute with Bulgaria, which denies the existence of the Macedonian nation and does not recognise the Macedonian language. Since independence in 1991, there has been a long-running naming dispute with Greece, which has delayed Macedonian entry into the European Union and NATO. Albania frequently raises concerns over the rights of the large ethnic Albanian community in

Macedonian which make up twenty per cent of the country's population, added to which there have been security spill overs from Kosovo, dating from NATO's conflict over Kosovo in 1999 and the conflict in the north-west of Macedonia with the Albanian National Liberation Army in 2001. Meanwhile, Serbia, once the pivot state in the region, denies the autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Twenty-five years into its political transition, Macedonia's future is essential to the future European security architecture (Liotta and Jebb, 2001, p.50). Yet, Macedonia's problems are unique and quite different to those of all the other so-called Yugoslav successor states. This paper will set out to explain how this seemingly benighted European state is actually a poorly understood success.

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 **PAPER 4:****THE POLITICS OF FEAR: RELIGION(S),
CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY****Paul Weller****Emeritus Professor, University of Derby and Research
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University of Oxford****Introduction**

As historical phenomena, religions (as well as ideologies) have played varied and often ambiguous roles in the context of international relations, violent conflicts, peace-making and diplomacy (Ferguson, 1977; Haynes, 1988), and especially so at the interface between civilisations informed by Christianity and those informed by Islam (Armstrong, 1988; Partner, 1997). This paper focuses on aspects of those roles as the context for these has changed over the past half a century within the context of a broader setting shaped by what has come to be known as the “politics of fear” (Furedi, 2006), originally shaped by the threat of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction

and now by the threat of global terror attacks.

In the earlier part of the 20th century, state parties had constituted the principal arenas for, and provided the key actors in, diplomacy as classically understood. But at the same time, and especially in the light of the development of international human rights law and mechanisms that followed the end of the Second World War, non-state actors from civil society groups, movements and organisations (including also those of a religious character or having a religious inspiration) came to play an increasingly important role alongside

the classical forms of diplomacy undertaken by state representatives.

This occurred in parallel with the emergence of new challenges that faced traditional inter-state diplomacy and that came to the fore with the development of armed liberation movements to achieve national independence in the context of an overall decolonization process, the legitimacy of which had broad international recognition. In these developments, matters of “internal” conflict increasingly came into interaction with external relations as can variously be seen in the examples of the African National Congress’ (ANC) struggle against the apartheid state of the Republic of South Africa; the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union’s (ZAPU) struggle against the illegal 1965 unilateral declaration of independence of the former Southern Rhodesia colonial government; the South-West African People’s Organisation’s (SWAPO) struggle against the colonial inheritance and South African rule of South-West Africa; and the Palestinian Liberation

Organisation’s (PLO) struggle against Israeli occupation.

In these instances the movements either themselves achieved some degree of international recognition and/or international collective action in relation to at least the root causes of their struggles that involved violent action, often characterised by others as being “terrorist” in nature. Thus, in 1962, the United Nations Organisation’s (UNO) General Assembly called for sanctions against the Republic of South Africa and established a Special Committee Against Apartheid (Reddy, 2012); in 1966, UNO Security Council sanctions were invoked against Rhodesia and in 1972 SWAPO was recognized by the UNO General Assembly as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Namibia’s people (Nyangongi, 1985); and the PLO was recognized by the UNO General Assembly as “representative of the Palestinian people”, and the status of a UNO “non-member observer entity” (Gresh, 1988).

In the same period, revolutionary guerilla movements in South and Central America posed even further

questions and challenges to classical inter-state diplomatic practice such as Fidel Castro's 26th July Movement, which eventually came to power in Cuba 1959; and in Nicaragua, where the Sandinista National Liberation Front formed part of a Junta of National Reconstruction in 1979, and then consolidated power on its own from 1981 onwards; while in El Salvador the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front was locked in an ongoing war with the military and government of the country. In contrast to the case of the African liberation movements, the struggles of these movements did not take place within the more broadly recognized framework of direct and formal decolonization. However, in the case of El Salvador, the UNO became involved in peace negotiations in 1990 and, on January 16, 1992, the *Chapultepec Peace Agreement* was signed in Mexico City, formally ending the conflict.

Both the African liberation movements and the revolutionary movements of

Central and Latin America, of course, emerged within the broader context of the so-called "Cold War" conducted between the international social, political, economic and military forces of what was popularly called "Communism"⁵ and those of "Capitalism". The former were aligned particularly with the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and its allies or with the People's Republic of China, while the latter were aligned with the United States of America (USA) and its allies. To a large extent, this broader alignment of forces shaped the parameters of the individual violent conflicts even where these had origins that were primarily internal – although the role of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement⁶ in this period should also not be overlooked (Köchler, 1988).

During the Cold War, and given its roots in Europe, in relation to the Christian Churches in particular there were, on the one hand, attempts from within the capitalist world to enlist believers into what was a broad anti-Communist

⁵ Albeit this should more properly be described as "really existing socialism", since Communism was the ideal to which those states aspired while building their understanding of socialism.

⁶ Which was the more commonly used name for the formally called Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries founded in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961.

(Milliband, Saville and Liebmann, 1984) front. This was on the basis of such figures as the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, arguing that the states of “really existing socialism” were expressions of “godless terrorism” or, as it was more generally expressed, as part of the forces of atheistic materialism ranged against what was often called “Christian civilisation”, involving the destruction of Christendom culture, the appropriation of Church property, and at least restrictions on religious freedom if not in at least some settings and periods, the outright persecution of them. Thus Dulles, who also played a significant role in the World Council of Churches’ (WCC), Churches Commission on International Affairs (Hudson, 1969) tried, albeit without success, at its 1948 Amsterdam Assembly to enlist the (at that point largely Protestant) WCC into a Christian anti-Communism (Kuem, 2016: 120).

At the same time, there were also Christians and Marxists who had shared experiences in the resistance against Nazism (see Kreck, 1988). And there were also theologians such as Josef Hromádka (see Salajka, 1985;

Opočenský, 1990) of the Church of Czech Brethren who refused to accept co-option into the anti-Communist discourse which figures such as Dulles sought to promote, arguing instead that believers living in both socialist and capitalist societies faced challenges to their Christian faithfulness and integrity. Indeed, it was following an intervention from Hromádka at the WCC Amsterdam Assembly, and which offered a biblically-informed critique of capitalist society, that the Assembly declined to take up an anti-Communist position, choosing instead to articulate a Christian vision of a “responsible society” as being of relevance to a state with any social system.

At the same time, among Communists and other supporters of “really existing socialism”, while there were some such as the Czech political philosopher, Milan Machovec (1976) who were ready to engage in Marxist-Christian dialogue, there were others who saw the Christian Churches as being aligned with the inheritance of ruling powers from the old aristocratic, monarchical and/or bourgeois capitalist social orders. Indeed, many of the leaders of the states of “really existing

socialism” feared that organized religions could potentially act as destabilizing fifth-columnists, and this was especially so in relation to the Roman Catholic Church, given its international structure and its relationship with the Vatican state (see Luxmoore and Babiuch, 1999).

But despite these challenges coming from both sides of the Cold War divide, and notwithstanding the internal contradictions within the Christian community, even the fact of the existence of ecclesial bodies in the same Christian tradition, but on different sides of the Iron Curtain (Chadwick, 1993), and of related supra-national organisational networks such as the European Baptist Federation (Green, 1999), helped to facilitate a sense of wider Christian and also European community. And in the context of what was an otherwise quite sharply divided continent where many of the supra-national forms of professional associations, trade unions and similar bodies were organised on a basis that reflected the political, economic and military lines of difference, supra-national ecumenical bodies such the World Council of

Churches, the Conference of European Churches and the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (Wirth, 1988) had Protestant and Orthodox Church memberships that straddled the political and military blocs. Although this community thereby reflected and sustained was inevitably limited and constrained, it was something not entirely determined by the political, economic and military divisions of the continent. At the very least, it enabled communications across the blocs and in many ways contributed to the building of bridges and channels for wider diplomatic and societal confidence-building.

In addition, the facilitation of the possibility of mutual challenge also became possible, not least because the Churches and ecumenical bodies had contributed to the non-state initiatives that helped to lay the groundwork for the development and implementation of the stabilising framework for international relations that eventually became known as the *Helsinki Final Act* (Auswärtiges Amt, 1984) of 1975, within which the states parties concerned also signed up to a common commitment towards, and framework for, dealing

with matters of human rights, within which the Governments, civil society organisations and Churches were able to raise and pursue specific issues and cases of human rights. Although criticised by some for reifying overall spheres of influence and thus for de jure as well as de facto recognition of “Communist” rule in the countries of the East and Central Europe, by recognising state borders (a number of which had, for some countries, remained in question since the Second World War) Helsinki helped to facilitate a more stable environment for the further development of East-West diplomacy that, in due course, reduced the threat of nuclear escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction.

At the same time, this stabilization did not address other important (often internal) conflicts in Europe and in other parts of the world in relation to which, however, international level religious and religiously-inspired groups were often active, either within traditional diplomacy, alongside it, or as an alternative to it. Just as the existence of the Christian Churches on either side of the Iron Curtain created an opening for wider European diplomacy, so also in

global terms, religious communities, groups and their international networks and organisations stand at the intersection between the global and the local in a world that is both increasingly globalising and localising. They are simultaneously part of transnational communities of (often alternative) information and solidarity, while being rooted firmly within their wider local communities and civic societies of the state of which they are citizens. Among other things, the channels of communication that they open up between co-religionists in rich and powerful and poor and relatively powerless countries help those in the relatively rich and powerful countries to come to some understanding of why it is that, in the title of the book by Meic Pearse (2003), *Why The Rest Hates the West*.

In the earlier part of the period under review, the World Council of Churches offered such through its radical Programme to Combat Racism, which provided channels of information, communication and practical support relating to African liberation movements (Adler, 1974), as did also the development of the movement known

as liberation theology (Bonino, 1976). Also on an international level, but operating on a multi- and inter-religious basis, has been the activities of the organisations that is now called Religions for Peace, but which was originally known as the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP) (see Jack, 1993), a body that has consultative status in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as with UNESCO and UNICEF.

As reflected in its name, Religions for Peace focuses on the contribution that religions can make to establishing, preserving and developing peace in the world, including through interreligious dialogue aimed at overcoming conflicts that are rooted in religious differences. Following its first meeting in Kyoto in 1970, it agreed to forward the impetus of its initiating conference through four key programmes that, since then, have continued to form the broad parameters for its work. This included: to create a climate for the peaceful resolution of disputes among and within nations without violence by initiating interreligious seminars and conferences at all levels; to develop an

interreligious presence at the United Nations and other international agencies and events, through which the influence of religion could be directly exerted to resolve conflicts; to encourage the further development of the science of interreligious dialogue for peace; and to encourage the establishment of national and regional committees for peace.

Today Religions for Peace holds a global Assembly every five years and has an extensive network of national affiliates and a number of regional bodies. A European Committee of the WCRP (now known as Religions for Peace, Europe) and a UK and Ireland Chapter (later separating out into a distinct UK Chapter and an Irish Chapter and today known as Religions for Peace, UK) were formed in 1975. Significantly, some of its most active, creative and productive work in relation to violent conflict has been precisely in relation to those “internal” contexts with implications for wider regions that traditional, state representative based diplomacy has found it most difficult to make progress. Thus, for example, Religions for Peace was very active in working towards the peace settlement

in Sierra Leone's brutal civil and regional war, and undertook notable initiatives in the context of the Balkan wars (Merdjanova and Brodeur, 2009).

As earlier noted, in the Two Thirds World, some of these "internal" conflicts became full scale wars, while within Europe others remained more of the nature of what the UK Army Brigadier Frank Kitson (1971) characterized as "low intensity" wars. One such example was the period of political violence known in the north of Ireland as "The Troubles" (Kelly, 1982) where, of course, religion itself was implicated due to sectarian communalisms espousing Christian traditions being woven into what is, however, more fundamentally a conflict between divergent national identities (Liechty and Clegg, eds., 2001). In this, Catholic and nationalist aspirations have been broadly aligned, while many northern Protestants tended towards unionism and some towards types of Loyalism that were informed by a strong anti-Catholicism. At the same time, as in the setting of the wider Cold War, in this context of this "hot" but "low intensity" war, the continuation of all-Irish ecclesial structures across the political

borders of Ireland's partition into the Irish Free State (and later the Republic of Ireland) and the UK province of Northern Ireland, also contributed to facilitating the back channels that eventually led to the Good Friday Peace agreement.

The majority of these "low intensity" wars, both in Europe and beyond, also entailed the use of terror (Guelke, 2006; Hoffman, 2006) tactics by one or more parties to the conflict that, for example, included the bombing of civilian infrastructure and of civilians. Especially among Palestinian armed groups the tools of hijack, kidnap and ransom, were common. In the Lebanon, following what had previously been a full scale civil war accompanied by the intervention of external powers, kidnap and ransom was frequently deployed by the various militias. In this context one of the most well-known of religiously based diplomatic interventions took place via the work of Terry Waite (1993). Waite was originally the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury's emissary to the Middle East who, after successfully working to free a number of hostages, himself eventually became a victim of kidnap

and was held as a hostage for several years. In illustration of just how complex and challenging for the religions and religious people themselves such religiously-based interventions can be and become, following his release Waite later found himself caught up in allegations of complicity, or at least of maintaining insufficient distance, from US interlocutors in relation to the role in the Middle East of Colonel Oliver North and the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. Similarly, the Christian Peace Conference had earlier found its religiously-based activities on behalf of peace and justice (Bassarak, 1972) being identified by the US Department of State (1985) as an example of “Soviet active measures”.

At the start of the 21st century, although there have been exceptions, the vast majority of terror actions have been associated with individuals and groups who have sought to justify their actions with reference to the religion of Islam. As the veteran British socialist politician, Tony Benn, put it at the start of the *The Satanic Verses* controversy which highlighted that, following the end of the Cold War an important

paradigm-shift for international conflict was underway:

“Now all of a sudden, arguments which had almost disappeared into the mists of time have come into sharp focus and are hotly contested across the world, involving diplomatic relations, trade arrangements and stretching into the heart of religious communities where people of different religious convictions have to live side by side.” (Benn, in *The Guardian*, 7.4.89)

With the disappearance of the ‘enemy others’ of Communism and Capitalism, a number of commentators began to debate new potential enemies on a global scale. Particularly influential in this was Samuel Huntington’s so-called “Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The thesis as Huntington first published it appeared in an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* under the title “The Clash of Civilizations?” (Huntington, 1993). That was followed up by the book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of Global Order* (Huntington, 1997) in which the question mark of the original title had disappeared. Thus what had begun as set of questions had

evolved into a sharper thesis, which was taken up by many Neocons around the US government of the time (see Bonney, 2014), in particular in terms of its argument throughout that “Islam has bloody borders” (Huntington, 1993, 35), and later providing a communicable frame for US foreign policy and military interventions.

Over time, the groups appealing to Islam in their undertaking of violent actions have been variably called ‘radicals’ ‘Islamists’ and/or ‘Jihadists’. Initially emerging from US support for such groups in the campaign to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the most prominent among these was Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeeda which, following US military intervention in the Gulf, later went on to plan and carry out the spectacular 9/11 attack on the USA in 2001, while claiming at least inspirational linkages of various sorts with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 (7/7) London bombings. More recently this form of terror violence has become associated with IS (Islamic State)/ISIS (Islamic State in Syria)/ISL (Islamic State in the Levant) – also known in Arabic by those who oppose it, as Daesh. The terror actions that Daesh

has conducted beyond its geographical heartlands in Iraq and Syria have ranged from bombings in Beirut, through the Paris shootings at the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices and the Bataclan concert venue, to the lorry attack on Bastille Day celebrants in Nice, France and the killing of a Roman Catholic priest and congregants in northern France.

The direct parties involved in such actions are neither generally recognized states nor (in contrast with earlier African and Palestinian movements, groups that have achieved some form of recognition within the international system of the UNO. However, just as during the Cold War, many states are indirectly involved with such groups and in their conflicts in terms of providing financial, logistical and other support, either openly, covertly, and/or through tolerating such support from private sources within their states. Thus, within the Syrian civil war, some groups have been proxies for either Saudi Arabia or Turkey, while other state parties – including the Syrian state itself, the USA and Russia, have all been variously directly involved in asymmetrical military engagement

alongside or against non-state groups such as the Free Syrian Army, various Kurish groups, Daeesh and others.

In the Cold War period the aims of militant groups generally focused on one or both the goals of national and/or socio-political change in relation to specific territorial boundaries. Today this is also the case with Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, while at its beginning, Al-Qeeda itself was also more defensively and reactively oriented to the military presence in Saudi Arabia of the USA and its allies, with the principal aim of Bin Laden's *Declaration of War* against America being to oust the USA from the territory of two of Islam's most holy places (Wright, 2006). But there are also important differences with earlier conflicts and groups. For example, while ready if necessary to pay the price of the loss of their lives in pursuit of their causes, the militants of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or the German Bader Meinhof Group, while ready to deploy their individual lives to achieve political goals through the use of hunger strikes, did not generally undertake terror attacks on others in a deliberately planned way intended to

incorporate the giving up of their own lives.

However, just as post-9/11 there were those who argued that the world had changed and that something qualitatively different had emerged (see Lincoln, 2003), so also in relation to Daeesh there are many many who react to its barbarity by interpreting it as being more or less nihilistic and beyond the scope of diplomacy. Because of this it is important, as far as possible, to try to gain an understanding how the group sees itself (Saltman and Winter, 2014) because "nihilism" – which as a political concept had its origin among certain Russian groups of the mid-19th century - is not really an appropriate descriptor for groups that are actually far from being politically or morally nihilistic in terms of their having both a set of proximate temporal goals and also a very clearly articulated value system that informs their actions.

Thus, when in his "Message to America" that accompanied Daeesh's first hostage killing in the beheading of the American journalist James Foley, the so-called "Jihadi John" (Mohammed Emwazi) said: "You are no longer

fighting an insurgency. We are an Islamic army and a state” (quoted in Maher, 2015: 27), he was articulating that, in contrast to Al-Qaeda, Daesh understands itself as having a territory to defend and extend. Indeed, critical to Daesh’s self-understanding is its aspiration and claim to have recreated the Sunni Muslim ideal of the Caliphate, which it believes to be the only environment within which Muslims can lead fully Islamic lives. This is why Daesh is very much against Muslim refugees fleeing from territories that it is seeking to incorporate into its Caliphate and, by contrast, wants to encourage the *hijrah* (migration) of Muslims living in *darul-kufr* (the land of disbelief) to its Caliphate, understood as *darul-Islam* (the land of Islam). And it is precisely this invitation and opportunity to find personal and historic significance in contributing to the building of the Caliphate that can make Daesh’s message so attractive to young Muslims.

What is often described as ‘radicalisation’ has no single cause. For Muslims (and especially young Muslims) in Western societies who experience at least some degree of discrimination and disadvantage

(Weller, Purdam, Ghanea, and Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2013) and who see injustice in majority Muslim parts of the world, some reactive factors may be at work (Hussain, 2007). There are, of course, important and legitimate critiques that both can and should be made about the status quo in the world. But potentially more powerful and seductive is the idea that it might be possible to make an important and historic contribution to the creation of a completely new society (Keles and Sezgin, 2015). In combination with personal or immediate community experiences of discrimination and disadvantage, and/or awareness of that in relation to other co-religionists, a “nexus of vulnerability” can develop within which:

“individuals who are targeted for recruitment by ISIS and similar groups can start off by apparently discovering new forms of personal, social and religious significance in an unjust world. But through the use of psychological grooming, these ideals can be manipulated and channelled into what ends up as a readiness to justify, support and then commit to violent extremism and terror that appeals

to a religious justification.” (Harris, Bisset and Weller, 2015: 26)

Daeesh’s commitment to creating a Caliphate might be taken as an indication that, contrary to what many think, it could in principle be possible – albeit with great difficulty - to conduct negotiations with it on a rational self-interest basis just as it was possible to some extent to do with Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan. However, it is critically important to understand that Daeesh *also* operates within a broader and more apocalyptic frame of reference in which the contingent and the eternal coincide not just in terms of a conviction about the absolute rightness of its cause, but also about its absolute significance within what it interprets to be an “end times” struggle between *haqq* (truth) and *batil* (falsehood) (see El-Badaway, Cromerford and Welby, 2015). Thus, when following the execution of 21 soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army, Daeesh went on to execute Abdul-Rahman (originally Peter) Kassig as its fifth western hostage, Jihadi John’s speech on that occasion took the opportunity to highlight that the

execution was taking place in the north-western Syrian town of Dabiq.

“To Obama, the dog of Rome, today we’re slaughtering the soldiers of Bashar and tomorrow we’ll be slaughtering your soldiers....We will break this last and final crusade....and here we are burying the first of your crusader army in Dabiq” (quoted in Maher, 2015: 29).

As noted by Maher (2015: 29), soon after Russia entered the conflict, a Dutch fighter called Yilmaz highlighted the eschatological prophecies concerning Greater Syria/the Levant by stating, “Read the many hadith regarding Bilad al Sham and the battles that are going to be fought on these grounds”. And in the light of this Maher (2015: 29) argues:

“Herein lies the power of Islamic State’s reasoning – its fighters, and the movement as a whole, draw huge succour from the religious importance of the sites around which they are fighting. It serves to convince them of the

righteousness of their cause and the nobility of their endeavours.”

It is because Daeesh ultimately operates within an apocalyptic framework that it is currently not possible to deal with it in terms of classical state representative diplomacy. But neither would it be wise statecraft to argue to leave Daeesh alone in its heartlands as primarily a problem for the Middle East. Leaving aside humanitarian concern for people living in Daeesh’s territory who do not fit its particular vision of Islam, and apart from the dangers it poses to world peace in terms further igniting and spreading conflict in its immediate region, in its English language magazine *Dabiq* it articulates a global strategic aim to remove what it calls the “grey-zone”. The aim of this is, through terror violence committed outside its geographical heartlands and the anticipated reaction to it of the authorities, security services and peoples of the countries concerned, that the Muslims of the world will be forced to make a binary choice between migrating to live in the Land of Islam or staying to live in the Land of Disbelief. As the Malian-French Amedy Coulibaly

(quoted in Maher 2015: 29) put it in a video explaining his participation in the Charlie Hebdo attacks on IS’s behalf, “The time had come for another event – magnified by the presence of the Caliphate on the global stage – to further bring division to the world and destroy the grayzone everywhere”. Thus as Maher (2015: 29) argues, for Daeesh, eschatology is an “important motivating principle” that “underwrites its remarkable self-assurance and certainty and at the same time fuels its barbarism.”

In some regards this echoes ‘end time’ narratives that one can find among Fundamentalist Christian circles inspired by the teaching and publications of the very widely sold book *The Late, Great Planet Earth*, by Hal Lindsey (1971). In this, via a Christian Zionism focus on Israel and its place in the ‘end times’, and with reference to imagery found in the biblical *Book of Revelation*, aspects of the Cold War situation of the 1970s were interpreted in terms of a predicted (and later adjusted to the 1980s and beyond) coming earthly and cosmic apocalyptic battle of “Armageddon” (Lindsey, 1980). And just as Daeesh

have identified Dabiq in Syria as a location for such a ‘last battle’ by reference to strands of Islamic interpretation of the Qur’an, so those influenced by the work of Hal Lindsey and others have also anticipated that a final conflict will take place in the Middle East, albeit within their understanding, to take place at Megiddo in Israel.

These resonances are potentially instructive for understanding the moral and epistemological orientations that shape current global terror actions of these kinds. At the same time, there is at least one important difference between those whose worldview has been shaped by Christian “dispensationalism”⁷ (see Halsell, 1999) of the kind promoted by Lindsey, and the vision held by followers of Daeesh. This is that, by and large, and as distinct from some earlier Christian millenarian groups (such as in Munster in the 16th century) who did seek to establish an earthly theocracy, by and large the 20th and 21st century Christians who have held an apocalyptic vision of a coming

Armageddon have not understood themselves to be under any particular obligation to initiate violent action towards it in their identity as Christians.

The resonance between Christian dispensationalism and Daeesh style apocalyptic brings into focus the possibility that, in contrast to Huntington’s thesis that there is a clash between civilizational blocs, one might more accurately argue that while there are civilizational, cultural and religious spheres of interest or spheres of influence, *within* each of these there is a much more complex, fluid situation and contested situation than any more solidified notion of a bloc. And this is arguably even more the case in the 21st century case of conflicts involving religions and cultures than in was in relation to the blocs of the Cold War, given that Christian Palestinians and Christian Arabs are an integral part of Middle Eastern history and reality, and that there are now millions of Muslims in the ‘West’, not least in the European Union and in the USA. Therefore, as argued by the German political

⁷ Dispensationalism teaches that a number of stages of history must occur before the Second Coming of Jesus. It is linked with the 19th century Plymouth Brother John

Darby and was popularised through the so-called Schofield Bible, which contained notes supporting the dispensationalist hermeneutic.

philosopher, Dieter Senghaas (2002) in his book *The Clash Within Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts*, the main cultural and religious fault-lines that *do* exist actually run *through*, between and *within* geopolitical and cultural groupings rather than *between* them.

If this is the case, and if it also the case that the religious roots and the eschatological orientation of Daesh are critical to understanding its activities, then this has profound implications for how the current wave of global terror should be tackled. In the first instance, it is difficult for classical diplomacy to be conducted (and especially from the ‘West’) in a way that would not lead to the charge of Islamophobic (Allen, 2010) orientations and actions. Secondly, the classical forms of diplomatic argument, negotiation and compromise that appeal to self-interest are, in this instance, unlikely to be successful because there are those at least within Daesh who at present see the Caliphate as being within compressed time frame leading into the coming future cosmic ‘end times’ battle with the Crusader armies. Such visions of the

world and their implications will not be defeated either by calls to self-interest alone, since that will be viewed as a betrayal of ultimate convictions. Also brute force and naked power alone will not be successful, as that will only reinforce the self-righteousness of those who experience it. But if it might be the case that little or nothing is likely to be achieved by classical state representative diplomacy, the question moves into focus of what might be possible to progress from within Islam and between Muslims themselves. Indeed, the present author argued in a previous book chapter on “Conspiracy Theories and the Incitement of Hatred” that: “On a governmental and societal level, preventative and remedial actions are important in combating conspiracy theories and incitement to hatred. Statements, guidelines, codes of practice and initiatives in inter-faith dialogue are also important. However, in the end, it is *also* crucial to engage with these issues from *within* each particular religious and ethnic group.” (Weller, 2007: 194-195)

It is argued again here that this is critical to understanding the origins and responses, and hence how to

challenge, the ideas of those who are attracted to the kind of vision of the world being projected by Daeesh and other groups. In other words, that where it may not be possible for engagement to take place through secular reasoning and the instruments of international law, there might be a possibility for engagement to be developed in articulation with the logic and the grammar of the religion concerned. And this is important, because there can be at least perceived to a tension between the secular registers in which human rights discourse international law operates and the values found in authentically religious perspectives (see Weller, 2006).

Within this it is also important to understand that the public shape of Islam is not the shape that Christianity has, by and large, taken in the modern world. Thus, while Islam contains many distinct and often competing traditions, movements and groups, it does not have the equivalent of Church organisations. And this is closely related to the question of religious leadership in the Muslim world which is not, generally speaking, of the hierarchical or bureaucratic kinds that

can more readily be found in Christianity. These two facts have a significant impact on expectations of how faith-based diplomacy can function when conducted from within the Muslim ummah or community, meaning that faith-based interventions based on Muslim religious identity are likely to be more informal and less official in character than if expected with reference to a Christian paradigm. Thus one should not expect so much in the way of, for example, agreed statements, organised initiatives, or authorised individuals acting on behalf of wider groups. Rather, the relevant initiatives that can offer religiously authentic, creative and corrective resources that can help contemporary Muslims to live in faithful, committed and peaceful ways in a religiously diverse world are likely to be much more informal and decentralised.

One example is of the vision of Islam offered by the Hizmet movement, inspired by the teaching and example of the Turkish Muslim classical scholar and peace activist Fehullah Gülen. In his op-ed in *Le Monde* following the Bataclan atrocities in France, and entitled “Muslims, we have to critically

review our understanding of Islam”, Fethullah Gülen (2015) argued that “We Muslims have a special responsibility to ...join hands with fellow human beings to save our world from the scourge of terrorism” as well as “to repair the tarnished image of our faith”. Gülen’s vision of Islam offers clear challenge as to why the appeals of Daeesh and other similar groups to Islam are a distortion. It also comes out of an experience of dialogical engagement both with, and within, the secular modernity as it impinged upon Turkish society, and also engagement with broader “Western” society as a whole. But at the same time, and of critical import, it is informed by a deep and authentic Islamic tradition, practice and vision. As Gülen’s *Le Monde* piece said, what is called for is not “a rupture from the cumulative Islamic tradition”, but rather, “an intelligent questioning” in which Muslims are called to “critically review our understanding and practice of Islam, in the light of the conditions and requirements of our age and the clarifications provided by our collective historic experiences” and in so doing to be engaged in “discrediting and marginalising the extremist interpretations of religious sources.”

Alternative narratives (Capan, 2004) of similar kinds, and the kind of actions necessary to implement them (Kalymanu, 2008) are in fact being created among Muslims throughout the world (Boase, 2005) who are also determined to make clear that the actions of violent terror perpetrated by some are done ‘not in our name’, including in those parts where Muslims are in a majority and societies are often in fundamental transition, of a very unstable and sometimes quite dangerous kind for all, including for Muslims themselves (Barton, Weller, and Yilmaz, eds. 2013).

Reflecting such approaches are a series of publications produced by the London-based Dialogue Society and which are aimed at challenging the particular development of Islamic thinking and ideology that undergirds the attractiveness of Daeesh to Muslims who have a strong sense of the wrongness of the present world order. Examples of this include *Deradicalisation by Default: The ‘Dialogue’ Approach to Rooting out Violent Extremism* (Dialogue Society, 2009) that argues for the importance of tackling the ideology of violent

extremism from within an Islamic frame of reference; *Dialogue in Islam: Qu’ran, Sunnah, History* (Dialogue Society, 2011) that engages with the challenge of some of the verses of the Qu’ran that are widely cited to justify violent extremism; while the related Centre for Hizmet Studies published Keles and Sezgin’s (2015) *A Hizmet Approach to Rooting out Violent Extremism*, which more explicitly and directly articulates an approach as informed by the teaching and example of Fethullah Gülen,⁸ and translated into action by the so-called Hizmet (or service) movement inspired by his teaching and life.

There are no easy answers here. But there are some actions which are both important and worthwhile to support and to try to facilitate. The difficulty with this is that this is not something that in itself is likely to facilitate dialogue with, or change among, those who are already committed to a Daeesh view of the world. Rather it is a ‘preventative’

activity that might be capable of ‘heading off’ the intellectual and emotional seductions of Daeesh and similar groups, and in this way to contribute to an attrition of Daeesh’s traction in the wider Muslim world. It is possible that this is the best that can realistically be hoped for in terms of any kind of diplomatic practice, whether faith-based or not, since it may not be without significance that the former Pakistani political figure Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, when asked about the kind of violence that later played a part in her own death, ventured the opinion that it could not be defeated, but only contained, and that it might in time, die out.

There are perhaps here some historical resonances here with the past of Christianity as it struggled to emerge from the bloody legacy of the European Wars of Religion and the use of the sword of the magistrate to try to enforce religious conformity (Ellerbe, 1995). So also, what might ultimately defeat this

⁸ Especially following the recent attempted coup in Turkey it needs to be acknowledged that Fethullah Gülen is a controversial figure whom, indeed, the current Turkish President and government accuse of being behind the recent coup attempt. Having acknowledged this, however, this is not

the place to go into this in detail, except to say that, from the perspective of the present author, such claims are not compatible with what is observable about the Fethullah Gülen himself, and the Hizmet movement inspired by him, in terms of public speech and act.

form of Islam may be a combination of weariness among the faithful, combined with the impact and influence of those co-religionists whose religious vision is one that affirms the dignity of the human above and beyond all interpretations of the Islamic. As argued by Gülen in *Le Monde*: “We must categorically condemn the ideology that terrorists propagate and instead promote a pluralistic mindset with clarity and confidence” in which “before our ethnic, national or religious identity comes our common humanity, which suffers a setback each time a barbaric act is committed.” And if the outworking of the apocalyptic vision of those who are already committed to it can, in the meantime, be sufficiently contained, it is historically observable that if millennial visions of this kind do not come to pass within a reasonable timescale, they can often lose their hold on the faithful and/or become reinterpreted to take account of the ‘end’ not having happened, thus potentially opening up the ground for more classical forms of diplomacy to make some future inroads.

Putting all of this within a wider context, as argued for by the present author (Weller,

2009: 205-206) originally in reflecting on the two decades on “The Other Side of Terror/War on Terror” following the inception of paradigm-shifting *The Satanic Verses* controversy, “six “points of challenge” were identified that I would also argue remain relevant:

1. Governments must learn from history that to combat terror with methods that undermine human rights will only strengthen those forces that use terror as a means of advancing their cause.
2. To ignore or deny the reasons that those who use terror to advance their cause give for their actions is unlikely to lead to a resolution of the problems caused by terror.
3. Terror in the name of religion is particularly dangerous both to the wider politic and to religions themselves, because it harnesses ultimate convictions and in its destructive service.
4. Attempts by the ‘powers that be’ artificially and externally to create a ‘liberal’ or ‘moderate’ Islam (or

indeed any any other religion) are likely to prove ineffective and may also backfire

5. Muslims (and indeed people of other religions) have to accept a greater responsibility for combating the dissemination and propagation of ‘enemy images’ among their faithful.

6. For multiculturalism to continue to have a future, governments and societies must acknowledge and tackle Islamophobia, and indeed all other forms of hatred and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief.

The arguments of academics can be dismissed as setting too much store by the importance discourse and of narrative in a world that seems ultimately to be determined more by power and violence. But, as argued from a hard-nosed perspective one of the agencies charged with ensuring security and combatting terror actions, in its publication *Words Make Worlds: Terrorism and Language*, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police makes the case that it really is the case that “words make worlds” in the sense that from a policing and security perspective

in relation to (at the time it was written) Al-Quaeda type extremism - and therefore now by extension also to Daeesh:

The most effective long-term strategy against Al-Qai’da-type extremism, whether domestic or global, may be rooted in the construction of ‘alternative narratives’ designed to subvert extremist messaging (Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 2007, 3).

While not providing a quick fix in terms of results, in the long run such internal pre-diplomacy is likely to contribute to laying foundations for the most productive and long lasting potential for positive change.

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 **PAPER 5:**

**THE DIMENSIONS OF RURAL UNREST: THE
MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY**

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Abstract

The multi-ethnic and fertile territories of the Mediterranean region created its own socio-cultural orbit that has lured the local agencies into vying for power since the nineteenth century. Crime, violence and social exploitation were the constant variables that embedded in the daily lives of peasants during the process of state restoration and foundation in the long nineteenth century in the Ottoman and Italian rural social life. The rural unrest in the nineteenth century cannot be conceived entirely if we neglect the role of banditry and brigandage. Reading the codes of the notorious existence of bandits and brigands in the Mediterranean region also requires the consideration of historical, social, economic and cultural context of the region. This study provides the principal political and social dynamics to understand the rural crime in the Mediterranean region in the nineteenth century. Illuminating the power of the bandits and brigands, who were the formidable social agencies both in the Ottoman and Italian socio-political life, the paper aims to shed new light on our understanding of the common milieu of rural unrest and criminalization of rural communities.



PAPER 6:

PERCEPTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL COERCION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN ENGLAND: BEGINNING TO KNOW THE UNKNOWN

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Abstract

Modern slavery is less overt than historical state-sanctioned slavery because psychological abuse is typically used to recruit and then control victims. The recent UK Draft Modern Slavery Act, and current UK government anti-slavery strategy relies heavily on a shared understanding and public cooperation to tackle this crime. Yet, UK research investigating public understanding of modern slavery is elusive. We report a community survey data from 682 residents of the Midlands of England, where modern slavery is known to occur, concerning their understanding of nonphysical coercion and human trafficking (one particular form of modern slavery). Analysis of quantitative data and themed categorization of qualitative data revealed a mismatch between theoretical frameworks and understanding of psychological coercion, and misconceptions concerning the nature of human trafficking. Many respondents did not understand psychological coercion, believed that human trafficking did not affect them,

and confused trafficking with immigration. The public are one of the most influential interest groups, but only if well informed and motivated towards positive action. Our findings suggest the need for strategically targeted public knowledge exchange concerning this crime.



PAPER 7:

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN SOUTH KOREA - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS THROUGH DISCURSIVE INSTITUTIONALISM AROUND THE ISSUE OF CHILDCARE

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Abstract

The paper aims to reflect critically on the impact of the gender mainstreaming movement upon the issue of childcare in South Korea. To achieve this, I build on data generated from in-depth interviews with key policy actors who participated in relevant policy implementations as well as policy documents collected and analysed through a discursive institutionalism approach. The paper explores two aspects of gender mainstreaming discourse in South Korea and is especially related to the transfer of childcare duty from the Ministry of Welfare and Health to the Ministry of Gender Equality; how it was interpreted in front of politics (*'discourse as content'*) and formulated at the back of it (*'discourse as process'*). I argue that the discourse of gender mainstreaming around the transfer decision was variously approached by different policy interests and constrained by the dominant gender role regarding childcare (rhetoric policy dependency).

Key words: gender mainstreaming movement, discursive institutionalism, South Korea, childcare

Introduction

The paper aims to reflect critically on the impact of the gender mainstreaming movement especially with consideration of the limitations remaining around the issue of childcare in South Korea. Gender mainstreaming movement is a strategy to bring gender sensitive perspectives into the policy decision making processes in order to pursue gender awareness and, as a result, advance gender equality in all policy agendas (Daly 2005; Squires 2007; Walby 2005). This ambitious and rather ambiguous sounding intent has been challenged by questions regarding how to adopt this transnational policy discourse into each nation's domestic policy decision making processes (Kim

and Ma 2005). Although there have been a number of methodological tools and operational frames introduced to apply the concept into policy implementation processes, such as gender analysis, gender based assessment and gender budgeting, challenges have revolved around the initial understanding of what exactly is meant by 'gender mainstreaming' in politics. Nonetheless, significantly, the gender mainstreaming movement has brought a new policy discourse to many East Asian countries including South Korea (Kim and Ma 2005; Y-R Park 2005; T-H Kim 2011).

In South Korea, with the political democratisation of the late 1980s and earlier, attention to gender related issues and the commitment to gender equality became incrementally high profile. Women's issues, such as: the economic and political empowerment of women, women's health, and violence against women were addressed in all presidential elections as primary national tasks that needed addressing. Among these, the issue of childcare was significant, with particular attention being paid to the matter of the position of women in the labour market (Huh

2005; Ma 2005). President Roh (Feb 2003 - Feb 2008) was convinced (The Presidential Counsel of Policy Planning Committee, 2007) that the matter of childcare needed to be considered as a women's issue and decided to transfer the duty of childcare away from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (henceforth 'MHW') to the Ministry of Gender and Equality (henceforth 'MGE'). This transfer of childcare between these two ministries can be seen as the first step in initiating the reform of childcare policy during the Roh administration. It might be seen as a critical juncture bringing about a shift to the government perceiving the demand for childcare as being directly tied to women's issues. However, it can be also argued that the issue of childcare was still only being considered as a women's issue when the decision to make the transfer was made.

It might be true that assumptions about doing childcare in South Korea could not change very much after having been influenced by the gender mainstreaming movement. In fact, the gendered role of childcare responsibility in South Korea has been

attributed to traditional Confucian ideas which are likely to lead to women having the unconditional obligation to take on the roles of housewives and/or caregivers in the family, rather than to become active workers in the labour market (Won and Pascall 2004; Sung 2003; Palley and Gelb 1994). The traditional idea of Confucianism has been pointed to when explaining the gendered welfare provision in South Korea, which rests on a 'strong male breadwinner' (Lewis 1992) wherein women have been regarded as having dependant status within the family as wives and mothers. Indeed, this is supported by An's (2008) survey of time spent on paid and unpaid care work which revealed that married women's mean participation (measured in time) in housekeeping was significantly longer compared to that of married men and single women. The notion of gender equality carried with the gender mainstreaming movement can be contrasted with this Confucian-oriented assumption regarding women's roles.

The paper assesses the discourse development of gender mainstreaming movement upon the policy discourse change regarding the issue of childcare

in South Korea. There are two concerns in this paper, firstly how did the gender mainstreaming movement bring the issue of childcare into the Korean politics to be raised as a main policy agenda? Secondly, how was the discourse formulated while the Korean government responded to it? In order to address these questions, I draw on discursive institutionalism (Grube 2016; Schmidt 2010) which will be followed by two aspects of the discourse development; firstly how it was interpreted in front of the politics (discourse as content) and, secondly how it was formulated at the back of it (discourse as process). This is because discursive institutionalism is a useful approach to explain how a policy discourse can lead policy actors to respond to new ideas in order to overcome entrenched policy interests, institutional obstacles and cultural impediments to change (Radaelli and Schmidt 2004). However it does not mean that a new policy discourse can change policy actors and institutions but it is hardly reverse due to earlier policy choices (Schmidt 2010; Finlayson 2007). I address not only how the discourse of gender mainstreaming was interpreted and formulated but also

the constraints which obstructed the initial purpose of the gender mainstreaming movement in South Korea.

In the following section, in order to build an analytical framework, I discuss how women's issues especially care and gender have been omitted from main stream political studies, which then leads to a discussion of how the gender mainstreaming movement can offer an insight regarding bringing the issue of care and gender into politics. However, it is also important to address that how the issue of gender can be embraced to explain the change in institutions (Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014). In order to highlight this, discursive institutionalism is adopted as it gives deeper attention to ideas and interactive processes of conveying ideas (Schmidt 2008) compared to other approaches such as historical and rational choice forms of institutionalism.

After presenting my research methods, the ways in which the discourse of gender mainstreaming was interpreted and formulated are discussed. I posit that the discourse of gender

mainstreaming was constrained by the different policy interests between the MGE and MHW and the dominant gender assumption regarding childcare in South Korea.

Gender and politics dimension

Early feminists claimed that mainstream political theory often excluded women's issues and underestimated the value of women's caring work (Lovenduski 1981; Pateman 1989). Indeed, during the so-called Golden Age after 1945, welfare regimes in many European developed countries had clear gendering effects that followed as a direct consequence of relying on the male breadwinner as the citizenship norm (Hernes 1988).

This perspective was underpinned by the acceptance that a welfare state should be based on the assumption of gender differences between men and women. For example, women should be given the responsibility of caring for their family, whereas men were to hold the rights of the family that were subject to public and rational assessment, which resulted in a heterosexual family with a male-breadwinner and female-

housewife (Pateman, 1988). Lovenduski (1981) claimed that the dominant conception of political studies at the time was bound to exclude women, since the assumption was that women usually were not disposed to public power, did not belong to political elites nor hold influential positions in government institutions. Similarly, Pateman (1989) pointed out that for the vast majority, women's issues were outside the proper concerns of political study, as their private matters had been systematically excluded from general theorising by the patriarchal constructions of the time. This perspective leads to the conclusion that mainstream political theory has been masculinised and women's issues have been undermined, thus largely ignoring the gender and politics dimension.

In general, the dimension of gender and politics could be found in the theoretical analysis of the relationship between 'gender' and 'state', called 'state feminism'. This, as Howell (1988) explained, referred to the activists and policies of structures within the state, which were set up officially for the purpose of promoting women's interests and rights. However, Carver

(1999) contended that this should be broadly conceptualised as 'gender politics' and co-defined with other concepts for example, class, race, ethnicity and localised cultures. In fact, during the 1990s, gender politics came to the fore over the issue of care, and was intensely debated in Western European welfare states. With the increasing recognition of care and gender, it became a norm to integrate care and gender into politics (Siim 2000; Squires 2000).

In all Western democracies, the various feminist movements put gender equality with respect to care on the political agenda, challenging the divisions between public and private, paid work and care and between equality and difference.

These new movements emerged as supranational forums, involving transnational NGOs, international forums and networks, shaping the discursive resources and various types of claim into new social movements.

For example, the gender mainstreaming movement emerged after the 1995 United Nations conference in Beijing, followed by the

United Nation's World Conference on Women held in Mexico City in 1975. The gender mainstreaming movement is primarily focused on its ability to facilitate women's substantive representation by introducing a gender perspective into the policy making process (Squires 2007). It remains extremely hard to assess the impact of gender mainstreaming on women's substantive representation by relying on information derived from data such as sex disaggregated statistics. Nonetheless, gender mainstreaming represents a platform which can pursue and/or promote distinctive 'women's issues' within the relevant policy context for its aim is to advance gender equality to become an integral part of all public policy-making process (McCrudden 2001:75 cited in Squires 2007).

Gender politics and political opportunity structure

Shifts of gender mainstreaming into the main political arena were explained by Sperling (1983) as 'gender politics' using the 'political opportunity structure' for women's movement organisations in Moscow after the beginning of perestroika (Sperling 1998; 143).

Sperling (1998) defined political opportunity structure as a multi-dimensional concept enabling the analysis of some of the reasons for a social movement's success or failure, by drawing on work by McAdam (1996:27). This author's work included four elements; 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system, 2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, 3) the presence or absence of elite allies, 4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996 cited in Sperling 1998: 144).

Gender politics, accordingly, could be defined as presenting the relationship between women and the state as a mutual engagement or interrogation, in which, to a certain extent, women have power or influence circulate (Waylen 1998). More practically, Squires (2007) identified three key strategies (quotas, policy agencies and mainstreaming) that have come to represent the increasingly widespread commitment to gender equality within the political sphere, being concerned with parity of political equality of women. In general, these three strategies focus on

presence, voice and process, respectively (Squires 2007; 12). Even though these are clearly different, they have generally been advocated as mutually reinforcing ways of securing greater political equality between women and men and they represent a distinctive approach towards gender equality (Squires 2000).

Orloff and Palier (2009) extended this perspective by setting out to identify the ideal dynamics in policy development so as to provide a deeper understanding of the policy-making processes that had previously illuminated by interest- and institutional-based analysis. Regarding this, these authors contended that intellectual processes, in particular, the role of knowledge in politics, are important for influencing change in the policy paradigm. Padamsee (2009) and Beland (2009) also posited that the current change within welfare systems are of a paradigmatic nature, and therefore it is important to include how new policy ideas and discourses are understood and reflected when analysing policy changes and advancements. Feminist approaches for analysing social policy have tended

to focus on women in one of two institutional sites: the national parliament or women's policy agencies, defined as 'institutional arrangements inside democratic states devoted to women's policy questions' (Stetson & Mazur, 1995 cited by Annesley 2010; 51).

It is certainly important to put women's political activity in the context of the institutional configuration of a particular political system. This is especially demonstrated by Estévez-Abe and Kim (2014)'s study which questioned why South Korea responded to childcare needs much more vigorously than Japan. They argued that Korea has relatively an open political opportunity structure compared to Japan so that presidents in Korea can reverse policies more easily whereas it is hard to contain the strong bureaucratic resistance found in Japan. It is true when the duty of childcare was transferred from the MHW to MGE there was not much bureaucratic resistance within the government although there were civic organisations that were against the decision, but the Roh government was still able to pursue the decision.

Discursive institutionalism and rhetorical path dependency

The political opportunity structure is not sufficient to explain how a certain policy discourse cannot change existing institutions and policy actors' behaviours. Traditional institutionalism theories including historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism do explain how institutions are changed and/or are unlikely get changed by focusing on historical structure and policy agencies (Pierson 1994; Katzenlson 1997). This institutionalism approach to policy development might be able to examine policy interests and/or as the result institutional performances, yet it still does not explain fully how a certain policy idea can affect the policy interests and institution changes. In particular, in order to bring gender perspective into the traditional institutionalism approach, it is difficult to explore how a policy idea (gender mainstreaming in this study) has impacted on policy interest change as well as institutional changes. A policy idea can be subjective as a policy discourse (Bacchi and Rönnblom

2014), it does produce by itself policy interest and can even formulate policy actors' decision making. In order to explain policy dependency and even policy deviation, the approach should move from stressing the structure of historical legacy ('history matters') to how the ideas formulates policy interests and policy actors' decisions ('ideas matter').

This approach of 'ideas matter' is well argued by Grubes (2016) who explained how certain policy rhetoric can become sticker ('rhetoric policy dependency') by existing political features. More specifically, he argues that policy rhetoric which is more central to the concerns of voters is likely to have a higher policy dependency than policy rhetoric with lower political saliency. This means that a new policy idea that is not attractive for a citizen's vote is very unlikely to be chosen. He also added that the more specific the policy rhetoric the more likely it is to attract path-dependant effects but it is less likely sticker when a general commitment was made. Due to this, policy ideas and a rhetoric which is close to an election promise can become more sticker as an election

promise. This election promise is important not only to the politicians but also the electorate who are the most engaged in paying attention to the rhetoric of political leaders. Under doctrines of relevant ministries' responsibility, leaders seek to frame their actions in certain ways to minimise blame but maintain their authority.

Therefore, politicians can legitimately change path in response to changing circumstances without being stuck with their earlier rhetorical commitments. In fact, this rhetoric policy dependency reveals that a policy idea can be subjective itself but also could be formulated by policy interests and policy actors' decision through 'interactive communication process' (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016).

In this sense, the key aspects that I highlight in this paper as my analytical framework were demonstrated by Schmidt. She argued that there are two political spheres which need to work together to shape and change institutions, firstly how things are and should be ('discourse as content') and the front of mind capacity to communicate those ideas by framing

them in a particular fashion ('discourse as process') (Schmidt 2014: 4, cited in Grube 2016). As Schmidt put it, the approach to discursive institutionalism demonstrates how 'discursive interactions enable actors to overcome constraints which explanations in terms of interests, path dependence, and/or culture present as overwhelming impediments to action' (Schmidt 2010:4). This explanatory approach can be very useful to explain how policy actors reshape ideas in order to change institutions and even why they are often limited by their capacity to make a compelling case when advocating for change.

With respect to the case of gender mainstreaming in South Korea, the discursive institutionalism approach enables me understand how institutions (the government and the MGE in this paper) were primarily concerned with the idea of gender mainstreaming, in order to pursue their interests, values and institutional performance especially regarding the issue of childcare. Also it will allow me to explore the dynamic of how the idea of gender mainstreaming was drawn to the issue of women's caring work within the relevance of

social, political and historical context in South Korea. Lastly it provides me with the insight of how the idea of gender mainstreaming was communicated within an interactive political process which conveys to the existing ideas around the gender role in childcare (rhetoric policy dependency).

I set out an analytical framework which gives two aspects of the policy discourse of gender mainstreaming, discourse as content and discourse as process, with specific discussion points for each, as shown below in Table 1.

Table 1 The analytical framework for the study

Discourse as content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What did the policy discourse initially aim for? • How did the policy discourse become a main policy agenda? • What factors were influencing? • What was the most relevant issue and why?
Discourse as process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the relevant policy initiatives proposed? • Who proposed it and what were the policy interests? • How did the policy options reinforce or challenge exiting ideas?

The following section explains how I gathered the data in order to apply the

discursive institutionalism approach to the gender mainstreaming movement. Then I move to explore how the gender mainstreaming discourse was formulated in South Korea and as the result how it impacted on the issue of childcare in Korean childcare policy.

Research methods

As with institutional approaches, including Schmidt (2010), I take a constructionist view of the social world, that is, my epistemological perspective considers social phenomena to be constructed by people or their actions. This also relates to my research method approach as an epistemological basis; how concept and/or theory are generated to interpret social phenomena and there are extensive debates as to whether a researcher can be objective and produce objectivity in a study (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). With respect to this, the studies that engage in qualitative investigations more usually involve an inductive stance.

This differs from undertaking that are from the quantitative paradigm in that these start with a theory or proposition

which is relied on to shape loosely the subsequent data collection (Silverman 2011). The qualitative epistemological approach tends to allow theory to emerge from the data that has been gathered. Proponents of constructionism look to external social structures and institutions and consider the ways in which these shape social reality as they contend that the world is socially constructed through different forms of knowledge (Goodman 1978, cited in Flick 2009).

Thus given my adopted epistemological foundation of constructivism, which largely lies within the qualitative paradigm, qualitative tools are appropriate as they allow me to capture the actions and interpretations of people during their social interactions (Flick 2009; Silverman 2011). Because of the nature of the study, qualitative research tools can capture individual policy actors' emotions and other subjective aspects associated with the evolving lives of policy interests as well as policy groups (Becker 2004; Berg 2007). In particular Nelson (1990) delineated that in-depth interviews are the best way to gather information that is somewhat sensitive and subjective.

These advantages prompted me to employ in-depth interviews as a technique with the aim of exploring the policy discourse change around the issue of care while the duty of childcare was transferred from the MHW to MGE. In Table 2 below, I present details regarding the sixteen interviewees recruited through purposive sampling with whom I held in-depth interviews and who responded to semi-structured questionnaires. Each interviewee played an important role as a key policy actor during the period of interest. Over time, many of them held different positions within the policy making arena and hence, were deemed well equipped to provide insights regarding the focal interest, i.e. the transfer of the duty of childcare from MHW to MGW.

Table 2 Background information on the selected interviewees

Interviewees	Position and role	Main activities
1	Political appointee	A chairperson in a presidential advisory body in the Blue House ¹
2	Governmental researcher	A senior researcher on childcare and family in the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
3	Academic consultant / Professor	A main actor who worked on the revision of the Childcare Act in 2004 and a professor in a department of Social Welfare
4	Women's group organisation leader	A secretary general in the Korean

		Women's Association United
5	Parents' group organisation leader	A secretary general of the parental corporation association
6	The first minister of the Ministry of Gender and Equality	Previously the representative of the Korean Women's Association United
7	Senior civil servant	A head of department of childcare in the Ministry of Gender and Equality
8	Governmental researcher	A senior researcher in the Korea Institute of Child Care and Education under the Prime Minister
9	Parliamentary member	The Director of the Bureau of Women in Democratic Party
10	Academic consultant / NGO group leader / Professor	The leader on the issue of childcare in the Committee of Social Welfare in the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
11	Political appointee	A public official in special services in social policy in the Blue House
12	Senior civil servant	A leader of the planning team on childcare in the City Hall of Seoul
13	Academic consultant / Professor	A professor in a department of Economics and currently the President of the Korean Association of Public Finance
14	The second minister of the Ministry of Gender and Equality	Previously a professor in a department of Sociology and previously the director in the Korean Women's Development Institute
15	Academic consultant / Professor	A professor in a department of Children and Family
16	Governmental researcher	A senior researcher on childcare and family in the research department in the City Hall of Seoul

Note: 1. The Blue House is the Korean presidential residence and is called 'Cheongwadae'

In addition, documentary analysis was undertaken in order to establish the policy environment and to provide the context to the in-depth interviews. Yanow (2000) claimed that document analysis can provide background information for conversational interviews with key actors. Thus, the matters covered in the relevant policy documents could supply me with background information for the interviews with the selected key policy actors (Scott 1990). The relevant policy documents were deemed to serve as the principal artefacts from which I could understand how, according to the documentary records, a policy issue was conceptualised and evaluated (Freeman & Maybin 2011).

Before employing the qualitative data in the analytical framework, the following section introduces the background of the gender mainstreaming movement in South Korea, especially focused on the Kim (Feb 1998 – Feb 2003) and Roh (Feb 2003 – Feb 2008) governments, which were politically committed to bringing gender equality into politics.

Gender mainstreaming movement in the Korean governments; the Kim and Roh administrations

The gender mainstreaming movement in South Korea was accepted as a key strategy for achieving women's empowerment followed by the United Nations issuing their statement on gender mainstreaming in the Platform for Action at the fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Huh 2005; Ma 2005). This transnational policy discourse had brought substantial awareness in policy decision making process to South Korea.

For example, a gender sensitive policy-making process was pursued in order to recognise different policy impacts on gender. Moreover, the Korean government passed the 'Basic Act on Women's Development' at the end of 1995 as one of the most noticeable efforts was to realise a gender equal society. In fact the awareness of gender was assisted by the creation of the Presidential Commission on Women's

Affairs in 1995, subsequently made into the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001 under President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003). In fact, this initiation of the MGE had been long awaited by women's associations such as the Korean National Council of Women (KNCW) and the Korean Women's Association United (KWAU). Under initiatives of the lead agency, the MGE especially from 2001 to 2006, there were great number of technical tools which had been developed to enhance awareness of gender, such as gender impact assessment, gender sensitive budgeting and gender awareness training as the key ingredients of gender mainstreaming. The Roh government which was in the power at the time embraced the notion of gender mainstreaming as a new tool which could be used to transform the whole policy making process.

Given such institutional developments in progressing gender equality promoted by these global movements during this period, the Korean government already had fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of further action on promoting equality of opportunity (Y-h Kim 2001; C-B Park

2005). This opening up of the Korean political arena towards equal opportunities may have been significant in providing space for bringing gender issues into politics and assisted in setting up structures for promoting women's interests and rights (Siim 2000; Sperling 1998; Squires 2000).

Gender mainstreaming discourse as content

There is no doubt that this gender mainstreaming movement was radically driven through the two governments of Kim and Roh. Especially President Roh, who was the successor of Kim reshuffled his cabinet with a fair number of female politicians. This was a completely new departure from previous governments even from the Kim. To being with, President Roh appointed Mrs Myeong-Sook Han as Prime Minister. The appointment of Mrs Han as Prime Minister could be a critical point which the Korean government actively started to appoint femocrats within the government. Mrs Han previously had worked for

women's empowerment and rights, especially for marginalised women, in feminist activist groups such as the 'Korean Women-link' and 'Korean Women Association United' (KWAU). Following her, Mrs Gum-Sil Kang was elected as the minister in the Ministry of Justice. She had worked as an NGO lawyer protecting basic human rights and for social justice for minority groups. Most daily newspapers, at that time, reported her appointment as being 'sensational and a ground-breaking initiation' with comments⁹ that remarked on the fact that she was the first female minister in the Ministry of Justice and the youngest to date. Under Minister Mrs Hwa-jung Kim in the MHW, there were a number of female chairpersons of committees appointed, including Professor Hye-kyoung Lee to the Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion, one of the presidential advisory bodies. In fact, the increasing place of women's representation in politics is one of key strategies which the gender mainstreaming discourse presents (Squires 2007).

⁹ The article is available from <http://www.sisapress.com/journal/article/132238> [accessed 13rd August 2016]

I propose that these increased number of female politicians within the cabinet truly helped the government to be relatively more open-minded towards gender matters as compared to the situation under previous administrations. An interview I held with the former minister in the MGE demonstrates that the higher numbers of female politicians had contributed to the active public discussion of diverse gender issues, and in so doing, they helped to bring these to register at the centre of the policy agenda.

I was quite lucky to be with other female politicians in my ministerial period. For example, the Prime Minister, Mrs Han, the two ministers, Mrs Kang in Justice and Mrs Kim in the Ministry of Health and Welfare and some female bureaucrats as well. Surprisingly, there were some female members in the Cabinet as well, who had feminist perspectives. That was not all. In the National Assembly too, you know. I reckon there were a fair number of female members in the Congress. I think these environments worked with me very well, especially to bring the issue of caring work into the public arena. They were actually willing to discuss this and never asked why it was important, which is a surprise, as male politicians often do. (Interviewee 6, the first minister of MGE)

Within this gender friendly landscape forming the policy making environment, it can be said that the decision to transfer the duty of childcare from the

MHW to the MGE was not a casual decision. That is, the decision to take this responsibility away from the MHW can be termed ‘a critical point’ which the government started taking the issue of childcare with the perspective of gender equality as the name of MGE represented. Indeed, the Presidential Counsel of Policy Planning Committee within the Blue House clarified the key decision underlying that ‘the view of caring work, especially that for children, needed to be approached by taking into account the woman’s perspective, women being the main carers in the home’ (The Presidential Counsel of Policy Planning Committee, 2007).

Study indicates that in fact the decision was driven by President Roh and his strong commitment to childcare can be found as one of his election pledges, declaring that ‘Once you give a birth, the Government will strongly support all childcare’ (Congratulatory address given in the Women’s Week Celebration, 4th July 2003). This presidential promise was also directly connected to addressing the policy agenda of childcare being considered to be a national undertaking and demonstrates the intention to share responsibility for childcare between the

family and the state. Moreover, this address emphasised how determined President Roh was to achieve transfer of the matter to the MGW, as revealed in the interview with a senior civil servant within the MGE:

*I had doubt saying that the transfer was achieved by the President's strong will. As long as the President kept saying that the duty should be transferred to the MGE, who could have been against him?
(Interviewee 7, senior civil servant)*

This decision to transfer responsibility for childcare was also actively driven by appraisals criticising that while it had been within the MHW it had been administered without any specific gender perspectives. One interviewee (interviewee 3, academic consultant / professor) confirmed that there had been little discussion of why the issue of gender mattered to childcare and how to improve the service quality. Moreover, the proportion of the total budget available for the ministry to allocate to childcare had historically been fairly small compared to its other welfare spending allocations. Further, childcare provision was only available to low income families without sufficient

resources to look after their own children whilst the parents were working (H-J Yoo 2002). The service was, therefore, not universal and it is little wonder that the matter of childcare was not taken as a priority within the MHW, according to interviewee 4, they also had to manage major social security systems such as those for national pensions, health insurance and employment. Similarly, interviewee 7, a senior civil servant who had worked for the department of childcare in the MHW summed up the lowly status of the work:

*The task of childcare used to be regarded as a very trivial business within the MHW, and it was not popular at all. No one wanted to have this job in their role, because of the fairly small budget and even smaller political kudos it attracted. All the documents relating to this job were always put at the bottom of the pile in their in-tray.
(Interviewee 7, senior civil servant)*

From such developments, it appears that President Roh strongly believed that the issue of childcare should be resolved in ways that considered both women's career demands and their responsibilities as carers. One

respondent, a senior civil servant, gave testimony that Mr Roh studied the diverse debates around care and gender, and another the minister said he had been willing to take on board the arguments made by feminists and advocates of change located in the progressive camp (interviewees 7 and 6). Likewise, one of the senior governmental researchers revealed in the interview that ‘President Roh strongly convinced himself that the issue of childcare needed to be categorised as a women’s issue’. This appreciation of the relation between caring work and women’s issues appears to have prompted the President’s decision to transfer childcare between the MHW and MGE, as soon as he came into power. He publicly announced that childcare should be a more urgent and significant issue for working mums than any other matter (The Presidential Counsel of Policy Committee, 2007).

Thus, with President Roh’s strong commitment to gender and childcare, the achievement of the transfer can be the critical point which emphasised the issue of women as vital in relation to the business of childcare. The next section more specifically focuses on what were

the relevant policy initiatives proposed, who proposed them and what were the policy interests and how did the policy options reinforce or challenge exiting ideas.

Gender mainstreaming discourse as process

If so, who were deeply involved with this transfer process? The following brings forward two dynamics of policy interest; one it between the Korea Women’s Association United (henceforth ‘KWAU’) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (henceforth ‘PSPD’), the other is between The Korea Edu-Care Association (KECA) and the Korean Private Nursery Education Association (KPNEA).

Policy interest between KWAU and PSPD

Facilitating the decision to the transfer the responsibility for childcare to the MGE was arduous owing to bitter opposition from social welfare professions which included practitioners in social welfare and scholars from the academic community who reacted strongly against this

decision. Together they organized protests in front of the national assembly to object to the transfer of childcare responsibility from the MHW to the MGE (interviewees 7 and 10, a senior civil servant and an NGO group leader, respectively). One of these informants, a senior civil servant, described the situation at that time as their 'being surrounded by enemies on all sides'. In fact, their response was not so surprising considering that up until that time, the main work of social welfare professionals, including childcare professionals, had been handled by the MHW and they did not want it to be handed over to the MGE.

The social welfare interest group plausibly claimed that childcare policy needed to be approached with children's well-being and development as the priority rather than women and gender matters being put to the fore (interviewee 10, NGO group leader). He added that 'there was no matter of gender in understanding childcare, even in the civil organisation PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) that was representing the professionals at that time'.

The issue of the transfer of childcare away from the MHW was a concern to one particular civil organisation, the PSPD. The insistence that child wellbeing should be prioritised was shared by this civil group. To date, they have been working on promoting people's participation in governmental decision making processes and socio economic reforms, as well as on strengthening social security and securing minimum living standards. This civil organisation apparently could not help but take up the role of advocating on behalf of the social welfare professionals and the scholars who were opposed to the transfer (interviewee 10, NGO group leader). It transpired that the PSPD's subcommittee which dealt with general affairs of social welfare, their 'Social Welfare Committee', had been working in support of social workers in the field and most of the committee members were professors in relevant university departments.

It might therefore be taken for granted that this civil organisation would take up the fight on behalf of social welfare workers and scholars, given the PSPD's background and its

membership, but it appears that, in the end, regarding the transfer, its position was rather unclear. On the wider matter of childcare, the PSPD had been working with the KWAU which was in favour of the governmental decision on the transfer. Often, both these organisations tended to share opinions regarding childcare policy directions, announcing similar statements. However, at around the time of the governmental decision, when statements by the KWAU which advocated for the transfer were made public, the group leader of PSPD admitted that ‘the name of the PSPD was dropped from the list of its supporters’.

The KWAU is a long standing representative NGOs for women’s rights and empowerment in South Korea. They have been very active in monitoring and developing progressive childcare policy and have constantly argued that the issue of childcare should not be separated from issues of the family and the nature of caring work as this is mainly undertaken by women in the home (interviewee 4, women’s group organisation leader). The interviewee from the women’s group

explained that ‘the KWAU aims to stand for women’s working rights so that the socialisation of care could not be more important than from this point of view’. With regard to the transfer of childcare out of the remit of the MHW, they had argued that the duty of childcare had to be given to the MGE when this was first established under Kim’s government in 2001. When the issue of the transfer became a public debate, they reiterated how the policy setting for childcare matters was closely related to women’s situations in the labour market and the improvement of gender equality. With this perspective on childcare issues, the KWAU was a significant critic of the ways in which the MHW had dealt with childcare policy. In fact, one of their main points of contention was that the MHW focused only on the suppliers providing childcare services in the market place whereas they argued that the services should, in fact, be centred on the needs of service users (Namyoon 2005).

As mentioned above, the PSPD and KWAU tended to share similar opinions over government actions especially those on childcare issues. That is, the PSPD had been inclined to be on the

side of the KWAU. However, regarding this issue of the transfer, the PSPD had struggled with finding their own voice. The interviewee from the PSPD revealed that they decided to have their name dropped from the KWAU statement on the issue of transfer and then, instead, they complained that the decision had been taken by the government unilaterally. They expressed their anger at this unilateral action, and even with the minister of the MHW who carried it out. The statement by the PSPD shows their anger:

We are unclear about what the transfer of the childcare duty from the MHW to the MGE will contribute to the current affairs on the childcare issue we have at this time. We also must ask the government why the decision had to be taken unilaterally without enough discussion to gather social consensus. (Statements by the PSPD, 1st Apr 2003)

The understanding of children's well-being and comprehension of child development were considered as the main principle among the social welfare groups, whilst concerns about parents' work-life balance and the extant imbalance in gender relations in caring

work were strongly voiced by women's groups, particularly the KWAU at this time. These conflicting focuses placed on childcare policy eventually drove a split between the two groups, i.e. the group advocating for social welfare profession and their counterparts representing women. This divide was even felt in academia between the disciplines of social welfare and women's studies. Within this situation, the PSPD's position appears to be ambiguous regarding whether they were on the side of either the social welfare or the women's groups. In fact, the concern that they finally chose to voice in public statements was based on the argument that the decision for the transfer should have been through a full democratic procedure involving different opinions collected from many relevant parties.

Policy interest between KECA and KPNEA

On the other hand, the governmental trial to test run the idea of the transfer of the duty for childcare from the MHW to the MGE resulted in serious conflict emerging between these two associations. Previously, when the duty was managed by the MHW, the KECA

members (i.e. public sector providers) were supported by central and local governmental subsidies which were used to cover their operational costs, including paying for care workers' salaries. In contrast, there had been little money for the KPNEA members (i.e. private sector providers), since the MHW had followed a certain policy that prohibited this, thus illustrating central governmental support was only for public and national facilities (MHW, 2004).

However, the MHW did announce that in special circumstances, they would support some private day-care centres but only when the private centres accommodated children from families that were below a minimal income threshold (MHW, 2004). This served to cut the waiting lists of poorer families who were often left waiting, trying to register their children at the more popular public facilities. Obviously, this additional clause did not provide any comfort to those private owners who remained excluded from receiving governmental aid. Moreover, children from low income families were prioritised when applying to attend public facilities and in fact these

families, as well as many others not classified as being on low income, preferred their children to attend publicly run provision as it offered a better quality of service with lower service cost (MOGEF, 2006).

As indicated by one of the interviewees, resolving this unequal treatment by the government regarding the subsidy, meant the KPNEA was very keen on being placed under the MGE, when the transfer was up for discussion within the government (interviewee 7, senior civil servant). She explained the reason for this was because 'the KPNEA was poorly treated by the MHW while they were under the MHW'. Then she described the conflict between the KPNEA and the MHW during the period when it was responsible for childcare:

The private association (KPNEA) must have been upset about what MHW had done for them so far. At the beginning, when the government needed to build childcare facilities in the late 1980s, the government encouraged them to build and the government borrowed the money from the National Pension Fund. Then the number of childcare facilities dramatically increased and they (the private providers) were over the moon, imagining that they

would get golden eggs within a short time. However, they must have felt that they were then abandoned by the MHW and must have been quite upset about the governmental unfairness in the way they were treated. (Interviewee 7, senior civil servant)

In contrast, the public association, the Korea Edu-Care Association (KECA) was against the decision regarding the transfer proposed by the Roh government. Another comment from this senior servant shows that they were truly worried that the subsidy for public childcare centres which they obtained from the government could be reduced and their preferential treatment by the government might be lost (interviewee 7, senior civil servant). She simply explained the reason for this, ‘Of course they cannot be happy about this, because the size of the pie they get to share from the MHW will be reduced. Won’t it?’

The governmental decision to transfer the duty therefore brought about conflict between the KECA and the government, and possibly worsened the relation between the KECA and the private association KPNEA. According

to the interview comments from her, these two childcare facilities associations could be described as the ‘prominent range of mountains in the Korean care market, being staked out against each other as competitors wanting to have more children registered. The root cause of this competitive relationship started from the differentiated governmental subsidy which was only given to the public ones’.

The rhetoric policy dependency

Apart from these different policy interests between different policy agencies, it should be also noted that from the beginning, the discourse of gender mainstreaming itself was merely political rhetoric with an ambiguous meaning (Y Kim & Ma 2004). That is, following the Beijing World Conference on Women (1995), the terminologies of gender and gender mainstreaming had been used without any exact explanation. In fact, these terms were widely used among civil servants and lawmakers without ever being defined, even by governmental

researchers (Han, Jang, Kim & Huh 2008; E-S Kim 2008; Ma 2007). Moreover, during my interviews it transpired that, in the opinion of one governmental researcher, the notion of gender mainstreaming was not fully embedded among civil servants and politicians.

We could make the foundations for the discourse of gender equality in our society through the gender mainstream movement. However, it is doubtful whether we reached compliance with the discourse in the policy making process. It might have been too early to have those gender perspectives in our society, particularly when some male governmental bureaucrats were still not aware of gender sensitive policies. (Interviewee 2, governmental researcher)

For instance, this dominant idea of gender role can be seen in the several changes of the name of the Ministry of Gender and Equality. Regarding the name, it changed four times after the department was first established in 2001 with the name of the Ministry of Gender Equality, which was simply called, in Korean, the Ministry of Women (see Table 2 below).

Table 2 The name changes of the Ministry of Gender and Equality

	English	Korean
Jan 2001	Ministry of Gender Equality Planning and complication of women's policies, prevention and relief of gender discrimination	Ministry of Women 여성부 (Yeosungboo)
June 2005	Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Dealing with women, family and infant care duties	Ministry of Women and Family 여성가족부 (Yeosunggajokboo)
Feb 2008	Ministry of Gender Equality Planning and complication of women's empowerment and status improvement	Ministry of Women 여성부 (Yeosungboo)
March 2010 - present	Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Dealing with women, young people and family	Ministry of Women and Family 여성가족부 (Yeosunggajokboo)

Source: The website of the Ministry, which is available from http://www.mogef.go.kr/korea/view/intro/intro01_03.jsp [accessed 11th August 2016]

The name was changed to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2005, but was again actually called, in Korean, the Ministry of Women and Family, with the duties of family and childcare having been transferred to it in June 2004 from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). Next, it was entitled the Ministry of Gender Equality

in 2008 and once again¹⁰ was changed to be called the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2010.

There can be several reasons advanced for why these changes were made, but the key point is the instability regarding the Ministry's name. With respect to the Korean terminology of the phrase 'gender equality', this may not have been a comfortable phrase, even for policy makers to use and so the term 'women's policy' may have been adopted as being more acceptable. Also, the terminology surrounding the matter of gender equality in Korean politics shows that the issue of gender equality might have only been understood as women issues rather than understanding gender driven differences in opportunities between men and women. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the idea of childcare still remaining a women's role followed the traditional Confucian path.

Conclusion and discussion

¹⁰ The change in February 2008 happened with the new administration under President Lee who came into power after President Roh. With this change in the name, the Lee government handed the duty of childcare back to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. My interview with one

So, what did we learn from the gender mainstreaming movement and what did we miss out? Through the lens of discursive institutionalism, it is apparent that the initial idea of the gender mainstreaming movement was sufficiently strong to bring an awareness of gender into the politics.

As a result, a number of technical tools such as gender assessment and gender budgeting was made feasible and implemented. Moreover it inspired the President to appoint femocrats within the Korean political system and the interview data revealed that the political environment had become more gender friendly. Within this political arena, it must have been relatively open to the idea of gender with and finally, the decision to make a transfer of the duty of childcare from the MHW to the MGE was made which was consistent with President Roh's strong commitment to gender and care.

political appointee/academic consultant commented on this transfer saying that 'the concern about gender issues in caring work was reduced after this transfer under the Lee government'.

However, in this paper, I highlight two limitations of this state-oriented gender mainstreaming discourse in South Korea. Firstly, the discourse of the gender mainstreaming movement has largely remained as just political rhetoric with an ambiguous meaning rather than being absorbed into Korean politics as a fully-fledged direction of travel (Han, Jang, Kim & Huh 2008; Huh, 2005; T.-H Kim 2011, Ma 2005; C.-B Park 2005). Real political efforts were made to bring gender awareness into the policy making process especially in the area of childcare, but the interview data collected for this paper have shown that the terminologies of 'gender' and 'gender mainstreaming movement' were often used without any exact explanation even among civil servants and governmental researchers. The name changes of the Ministry of Gender and Equality (MGE) indicate that the term 'gender equality' still had a long way to go in order to be absorbed seamlessly into the name of the ministry in the Korean language. Moreover, regarding the transfer of the duty of childcare from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) to the Ministry of Gender and Equality (MGE), it may have been that

the social expectation of a woman assuming the traditional role as the main carer within a family was still dominant throughout the decision making over the transfer. Notwithstanding this, I argue strongly that the event of the transfer should be considered as a turning point when concern was being expressed about childcare along with women's issues in politics. At the same time, the transfer also shed light on the prevailing limited understanding of care and gender. Thus, moving the duty of childcare to the 'Ministry of Women' is consistent with the stereotyped view regarding the role of women as carers, which further underlines what the role of women was expected to be at the time of the decision to make the transfer.

Secondly, despite considerable political endeavour to bring gender issues into politics, a lack of maturity in understanding the relations between care and gender has been clearly revealed. The understanding of 'gender' in respect to undertaking caring work, does not only refer to the issue of women's roles as a caregiver, but also needs to include comprehension of the different

structural limitations that men and women experience in employing care services in the care market as well as when they are participating in the labour market (Millar 2006). As long as women's position in the labour market is marginalised they will often have a dual role, and their roles are principally defined as those of caregivers at home, unlike men's (Huh, 2005; Y. Kim & Ma 2004; Ma 2005, Peng, 2009).

More specifically these dissimilar conditions might bring about different impacts on decision making between men and women, particularly regarding whether to employ childcare services or to do the childcare work themselves, as well as whether a woman should take part time or full time employment, or not work at all (Connelly, 1992; Joshi, 1995; Joshi et al, 1999). Such potentially negative impacts on women should have been considered within the policy discourse context but the data in this study show very little evidence of an awareness of the dissimilar conditions between men and women with regards structural limitations.

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PAPER 8:

THE EFFORTS AND LEVEL OF SUCCESS ACHIEVED IN ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN STANDARDS, RELATED TO THE ROLE OF COMPANY AUDITORS AND MAINTENANCE OF THEIR INDEPENDENT POSITION

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ABSTRACT

The independence of auditors is a vital factor in maintaining respect for and reliance upon the audit report produced. How protection of this independence is sought, with emphasis on the desired global uniformity, will be examined. Numerous factors can be seen as serving to encroach on this independence, and they also will be considered in the international context to assess the level of variance and uniformity.

Audit firms, in carrying out an audit, will be subject to demands from a range of sources. These include professional body regulatory demands, law and regulations. Demands of these sources on a Jurisdictional and regional basis will be explored to assess the levels of disparity and evident shifts towards harmonisation.

The establishing of international bodies with the objective of working towards global harmonisation applicable for the auditing profession is relatively recent. The work and achievements of international bodies in developing global uniformity will be explored. Progress made and the extent to which further harmonisation can be achieved will be

explored taking account of ongoing localised aims to monitor and improve standards related to the audit and protect auditor independence.

 **PAPER 9:****DISCUSSION PAPER: FINANCIAL CRIME AND
FINANCIAL INVESTIGATION: THE ISIL MODEL
OF TERRORIST FINANCING AND
OPPORTUNITIES TO TARGET THE HIDDEN
ECONOMY**

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Abstract

The fear associated with a number of the national and international challenges in the early 21st century is underpinned by a real and perceived lack of control. Victorian-era approaches continue to dominate many justice systems in which efficiency and effectiveness seems overwhelmed by the modern threat environment. Financial investigation has been under-recognised and under-utilised, and there is a consistent lack of sustained focus on the economic aspects that underpin the structure, organisation and sustainability of priority problems. At the national and international level, there is a need to begin the process of re-conceptualising the threat environment with much greater focus upon the broad spectrum of acquisitive crime. With this

approach we begin to understand the channels to market as well as the money laundering instruments. This focus will raise some (perhaps undiplomatic) questions as to those who directly, indirectly, or through wilful blindness, support contemporary threats, including extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Illicit trade and commerce is a 'necessary evil' that ties ISIL and others to the 'real world', and thus makes them vulnerable to financial investigation without resort to military force and risk to intelligence capabilities.

 **PAPER 10:****POLITICAL DISCONTENT AND THE 21ST CENTURY'S THREATS TO GLOBAL PEACE, SECURITY AND HUMAN PROGRESS**

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Abstract

This paper examines 21st century relations between the State and the communities over which it, nominally at least, has jurisdiction. More specifically the aim of the paper is to explain both why and how so called mainstream politics is failing to engage with many peoples and communities around the world. To this end the paper identifies key areas of conflicts, tensions, mistrusts and other issues in both the domestic and international politics that could compromise the long term stability of nation states and threatens the peace, and security of peoples around the world. Cases are cited of hostile and un-diplomatic relations between states and ill-considered foreign policies that focus on narrow national interests rather than wider societal good. Based on the analysis presented, the paper concludes that the way politics is being played in the 21st century is a principal contributing factor to the current sense of despair and disconnection between the State and the governed. Tentative proposals are advanced towards forming a new politics which addresses the fear and concerns of other states, cultures and peoples as an integral part of any foreign policy and diplomatic relations.

 **PAPER 11:****THE NEED FOR NEW EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE & CRIMINOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HELP END THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’**

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Abstract

Violent attacks in the West in recent years by terrorist groups have reinforced the fact that acts of violence by extremist groups are increasingly becoming a feature of 21st Century life. Understandably, such acts have been met with outrage, condemnation, horror and fear. In addition, the West's responses to such events have been amongst other things, more bombing for Syria; more resources given to the police; more powers for security agencies, greater surveillance employed and new laws passed which highlight that the war on terror is active. However, George Bush's declaration that the 'war on terror', "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" is unrealistic. The state response to terrorism broadly follows a 'war on terror' approach; similarly current criminal justice and criminological approaches also broadly follow a retributive style approach. This paper will argue that a new paradigm for an emotionally intelligent CJS is needed, one which utilises theories and models of criminal justice that are also emotionally intelligent, in order to put an end to the patterns of separation, exclusion, excessive punishment, shaming and humiliation and thus end the misguided approach used at present specifically in relation to terrorism (and more generally in relation to criminality).

Introduction

The state response to terrorism broadly follows a 'war on terror' approach. Similarly current criminal justice and criminological approaches also broadly follow a retributive style approach. This paper will argue that what is needed is a new paradigm to allow for the emergence of a new emotionally intelligent criminal justice system (CJS) with new models and forms of emotionally intelligent justice to accompany it, to end the cycle of further acts of 'violence'. The paper concurs with a radical feminist view that Peacemaking criminologists have utilised when observing that violence is

inherent within the CJS. Thus a violent CJS is seeking to help eradicate and reduce acts of violence by extremist groups who seek to terrorize. The irony is obvious, and the track record of the CJS's effectiveness in dealing with terrorism shows that the current approach is not working.

Therefore, a new paradigm for an emotionally intelligent CJS is needed, one which utilises theories and models of criminal justice that are also emotionally intelligent and end the patterns of separation, exclusion, excessive punishment, shaming and humiliation (some of the very forces and mechanisms that have in part contributed to the creation of such extreme groups in the first place). Whilst the emphasis of this paper is more towards the need for emotionally intelligent justice in relation to terrorist offences, it is believed that an emotionally intelligent CJS and models of emotionally intelligent justice is needed more broadly when dealing with anyone who enters into the CJS.

The term "emotional intelligence" seems first to have appeared in 1964 (Beldoch, 1964) but was popularised by

Goleman (1996). Mayer & Salovey, (1997: 10) define emotional intelligence as a set of interrelated skills:

"the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth."

Therefore emotional intelligence provides an understanding and management of emotional data to help inform resultant judgments and decisions that promote positive growth.

Sherman (2003:26) argues that an emotionally intelligent justice system would be comprised of firstly, knowing the systems emotions in the form of CJS staff being aware of and being able to manage their emotions more effectively; secondly, recognising the emotional states of victims, offenders and others involved in the system; thirdly, being aware of the effects of decisions and the administration of 'justice' on those involved in the system.

It is advocated that Positive Criminology holds the greatest potential at present to help provide some of the much needed answers as to 'what' and 'how' this new paradigm of emotionally intelligent CJS and forms of justice may look moving forward.

"Positive Criminology (not to be confused with Positivist Criminology) is a new conceptual criminological perspective that scientifically targets crime, violence and "bad" experiences at the individual and social levels with goodness and with positively experienced encounters. Positive Criminology places an emphasis on social inclusion and on unifying and integrating forces at individual, group, social and spiritual levels that are associated with the limiting of crime."
(Positive Criminology, 2016)

The existing criminal justice system:

Critical criminologists along with others have rightly highlighted that crime is a social construct and thus the resultant response by the CJS, the public, media, etc. depends on who is accused (Pepinsky, 2013; Young, 2009; Taylor et al, 1973). Labelling theory, social reaction and moral panic theory have

evidenced the powerful role that hegemonic labels and narratives can have on the social construction and reaction of crime and they have highlighted the central role the CJS plays in this (Young, 2009; Cohen, 1973; Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1959).

Terrorists and terrorism, whilst being a reality, also have a socially constructed 'reality' that has given rise to moral panic, stereotypes, and increased fears and anxieties. To date in 2016 there have been 23 terrorist attacks in France, USA, UK, Germany & Belgium (Humphrey's, 2016). Extreme acts of non-state violence, political upheaval, mass migration and conflicts have evoked a great deal of fear, anger, hatred, uncertainty and a heightened sense of risk in the West (Coaffee, 2009). The increasing frequency and the scale of acts of non-state violence against the West have become a feature of 21st Century living. However, the resultant levels of moral panic, fear and perceptions of threat and risk of attack articulated in a media fuelled social construct of terrorism in the UK and the West, do not appear to be in alignment with the fact that since the year 2000 only 2.6% of all deaths from

terrorism have occurred in the West, (and this figure lowers to 0.5% when the 911 attacks are excluded) (Global Terrorism Index, 2015).

The social construct that has been created about terrorists in the West has not aided the public or political discourses or the responses. Karstedt (2002) has noted that the public and political discourse is fuelled with emotionality in its response to crime.

“The ‘return of emotions’ to criminal justice and penal policies has occurred in two arenas: the emotionalization of public discourse about crime and criminal justice, and the implementation of sanctions in the criminal justice system that are explicitly based on—or designed to arouse—emotions. Both developments corresponded to the changing space of emotions and the emotional culture of late modern societies” Karstedt, 2002:301).

Emotional reactions to crime in the public discourse tend to be focused on disgust, outrage and anger at what has occurred (the crime). Then typically emotions of sympathy, empathy and sadness are expressed in relation to the victim of a crime. Yet, it is shame,

remorse and guilt that are the emotions ‘we’ typically want to see the offender experience.

When this ‘emotionality’ moves into the realm of criminal justice sanctions, it also seems that modern punishment has become “a realm for the expression of social value and emotion as well as a process for asserting control’ (Garland, 1990: 4). This potent mix of emotionalization has only exacerbated the situation in relation to terrorism.

“Governments today are on a war footing in respect to...violent crime, and they are expected to produce an instant response whenever this is called for...high visibility crime cases become the focus of a great deal of media attention and public outrage, issuing in urgent demands that something be done. These cases typically involve a predatory individual, an innocent victim, and a prior failure of the criminal justice system to impose effective controls...Almost inevitably the demand is for more effective penal control.” (Garland, 2001: 172-173)

Peacemaking Criminology observes that violence is inherent within the CJS, its models of justice and the practices of its staff (Pepinsky, & Quinney, 1991).

It is believed that patriarchy plays a key role in creating violence within the CJS following a radical feminist view that violence is ‘power over others’ or against ‘power sharing’ (Pepinsky, 2006:3). Thus structures, narratives, knowledge, policies, roles and practices based on someone (‘Father’) knowing best and being best placed to defend and protect has created the politics and practices of violence and fear. It is not difficult to observe patriarchy at play in policies and practices that seek to punish, exclude, shame, seek retribution and claim to be in the best interests of the majority and to offer the greatest protection.

In response to the rise of terrorist attacks in the West, the affected countries have been quick to respond with the creation of new laws to help control and protect their citizens from further harms, and in some cases this has led to a tension in the appropriate balance between the rule of law, upholding the human rights of the accused terrorist as well as ensuring that adherence to democratic processes have been followed. (United Nations 2009; Wouters & Naert, (2004)). It would seem that ‘the

terrorist’ has become the target for the expression of public and political fear, anger, outrage, anxiety and has trumped other criminal actors such as rapists, drug dealers and child sex abusers both in terms of the resultant public discourse and the increased powers given to agencies within the CJS to detain, monitor and punish, as evidenced in the long list of new terrorist legislations the UK has created since 2000 and the measures they have introduced:

- The Terrorism Act 2000
- The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
- The Criminal Justice Act 2003
- The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
- The Terrorism Act 2006
- The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006
- The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
- The Coroners and Justice Act 2009
- The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009
- The Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010
- Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015

Whilst there is not space, nor a focus here to explore each piece of legislation in turn including CONTEST, the British Government’s overarching counter-terror strategy (HM Government, 2011a: 40), it is clear that there has been an increase in control and surveillance.

These acts gave sweeping and vastly increased new powers of stop and search, surveillance, arrest and detention, as well as creating new crimes, for example, the dissemination of material deemed to 'glorify terrorism'. Whilst ostensibly directed at all forms of 'extremism' (including far right groups and individuals) such legislative measures also impacted disproportionately, and negatively, upon Muslims in Britain, raising fears of an unstated policy of 'racial profiling' in policing practice and the application of the law, and leading many critics to argue that British Muslims were a new 'suspect community' (Coppock & McGovern, 2014: 243)

Further examples that demonstrate an increase in control and surveillance can be observed by the fact that the U.K. has one of the longest periods of pre-charge detention of any comparable democracy, currently at fourteen days (and previously at twenty eight days). In the USA the limit is two days, in Ireland it is seven days, in Italy it is four days and in Canada it is one day (Liberty, 2016). Further, stop and search statistics indicate that ethnic minorities are up to 42 times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police under anti-terror measures (Dodd, 2011; Travis, 2009). A further example is that British Muslim children and young people have been noted as being a key population group that the

children and young people's services have been given a clear role by the state to control, monitor and 'police'. (Hickman et al., 2012; McGovern, 2010; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, 2011).

Policies, ideologies and acts of retribution, exclusion, excessive punishments, excessive powers being given to criminal justice agents, a disregard for human rights etc. are counter-productive, especially when dealing with extreme groups and their acts of violence. Such themes contributed in part to their creation and in some measure sustain their continuance. For example, the whole notion of 'radicalisation' where somebody becomes a terrorist or comes to support terrorism, is more likely to occur when an individual becomes or feels so excluded, separated, detached, resentful or 'punished' by British society/culture and it's institutions that they turn to an 'alternative system' (Jackson, 2009; Kundnani, 2012).

Therefore, continuing to apply dominant models of criminal justice, namely the models of Crime Control,

Status Passage and Power (King, 1981) that promote further violence and exclusion, will not and cannot succeed in attaining the results that are needed especially in relation to terrorism. The Crime Control model is defined by its social function of punishment and being typically defined by its creation of high conviction rates due to its disregard for legal controls, support of the police and implicit presumption of guilt as well as the desire to highlight the unpleasantness of the experience for the offender. The Status Passage model is defined by its social function of denunciation and degradation along with its focus on public shaming and asserting the agent's control over the process. The Power model is defined by its social function of maintenance of class domination thereby promoting the labelling, stigmatisation, alienation and punishment of large classes of people.

The political and public discourses, social constructs, and moral panic that need to be created and maintained in order to justify the continuance of the above models can only be based on fear, hate, condemnation, labelling and stigmatisation, fostering a 'them' and 'us' mindset, highlighting 'risks' to the

majority, which in turn can only evoke negative emotions and responses from the general public towards the 'other'/criminal/terrorist, and also, importantly can only evoke negative emotions and responses from those on the receiving end of the punishment provided by each of the above models. When the models are administered in an adversarial system as we have in the UK, which is premised on conflict and opposition and the emphasis of the trial is on the suspected persons guilt, and if convicted their punishment, and latterly their remorse, this only serves to entrench the patterns of negativity and violence.

The response of many western states to acts of violence inflicted upon their citizens has been to retaliate in kind through further violence. President Obama in a recent speech following the Orlando shooting stated:

"At the outset, I want to reiterate our objective in this fight. Our mission is to destroy ISIL...Over the past two months, I've authorized a series of steps to ratchet up our fight against ISIL. ... Our B-52 bombers are hitting ISIL with precision strikes. Targets are being identified and hit even more quickly. So far, 13,000 airstrikes...So far we have taken out more than 120 top ISIL leaders and commanders. And our

message is clear, that if you target America and our allies, you will not be safe. You will never be safe.” (Obama, 2016)

The pattern continues with more casualties and fatalities on both sides but the observation that "An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind" (Ghandi, 1942) highlights the fact that a negative act, responded to in a negative way can only produce a further negative result. What is needed is an input/response of a different kind, as Martin Luther King noted "Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that" (King, 1987?). If we want to see a different result in relation to terrorism, then a different input/approach/response is needed from the State, the CJS, and society in relation to terrorism. In addition, if we want to see a different result, one that is positive, then it is advocated here that the input/approach/response needs to be positive in nature to ensure that the means are inherent in the ends in order to provide the much needed congruency and alignment with the desired positive outcome.

The United Nations (2009:5) commented that

“Many criminal justice systems are currently better at responding to and punishing crimes after the fact than at preventing them in the first place. Often, existing criminal justice practices are ineffective when it comes to preventing terrorist conspiracies from achieving their aim...The goal is to proactively integrate substantive and procedural mechanisms to reduce the incidence and severity of terrorist violence, and to do so within the strict constraints and protections of the criminal justice system and the rule of law.”

A new paradigm of an emotionally intelligent CJS & model of justice

If the pattern of fear, control and punishment continues to be repeated, this will do little to alleviate the situation. It is advocated here that a new paradigm is needed to allow for models and form(s) of emotionally intelligent justice that will allow for the creation of an emotionally intelligent CJS. One that draws upon a non-violent approach, integrates all parties into society, offering the possibility for a transformative and positive experience and to administer effective justice for all. New theories, paradigms and approaches in criminology need to be created and developed further, and existing ones brought to the fore of the discipline to support the creation of such emotionally intelligent justice.

“The new paradigm criminology could build is one in which a justice system becomes emotionally intelligent in all of its interactions with suspected, accused, and convicted offenders, as well as with victims, their families and communities...criminology can also invent ways to foster such intelligence at the level of social systems.” (Sherman, 2003: 25-26)

Sherman (2003) highlighted two major tasks in making justice more emotionally intelligent, the first was to increase the capacity for the justice system to process cases with an awareness of all actors involved in the case so as not to increase the likelihood of recidivism. Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) would seem to be most appropriate here:

“Therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) has sought to look at the law in a richer way by pondering the therapeutic and antitherapeutic impact of “legal landscapes” (legal rules and legal procedures) and of the “practices and techniques” (legal roles) of actors such as lawyers, judges, and other professionals operating in a legal context.” (Wexler, 2013: 463)

TJ has significant potential in reforming certain parts of the CJS. For example, if lawyers and judges were sensitive to and aware of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences that their words, actions and decisions can foster with those they are interacting with, and were adequately trained in how to do

this effectively (Wexler, 2012), this alone would have a major impact within the CJS in terms of enabling it to become more emotionally intelligent. The ‘affective turn’ within the social sciences (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010) has brought about an interest in emotions, and in relation to emotionally intelligent justice occurring amongst criminal justice staff this would not be too dissimilar to the ‘emotional labor’ researched amongst customer service staff where emotions are managed for the benefit of the customer (Hochschild, 1983). One of the central aims of training CJS staff to be emotionally intelligent would be to increase their emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996). Peacemaking Criminology would also seek to change the power dynamics and therefore the nature of the interactions between actors involved in the CJS, moving away from language, narratives and practices based on violence, to peacemaking (Pepinsky, 2006).

The second major task Sherman highlighted was to begin creating ‘bolder experiments’ that produce a broader range of tools which help people to remain law-abiding citizens

but which are non-threatening to them. This will require new justice inventions, processes and practices that are diverse in nature and which are evaluated.

It is advocated here that Positive Criminology has great potential to create new experiments and a range of tools to support citizens, as it posits an alternative to the traditional focus on imprisonment, exclusion and shaming by utilising integrative, inclusive and positive forces and mechanisms.

Positive Criminology encompasses several theories and models. It broadens the focus of traditional criminology, from simply understanding the journey into deviant and criminal behaviour. Rather, with Positive Criminology, the focus is on positive components such as acceptance, altruism, compassion, encouragement, faith, forgiveness, goodness, gratitude, hope, humour, optimism, positive modelling, strengths, self-efficacy, social integration, spirituality with individuals and groups (Ronel & Segev; 2014; Ronel & Elisha, 2011). It is hoped that such foci will allow the transformation to occur to reproduce

the positive component/experience for everybody's benefit. They go on to advocate the adoption of Positive Criminology throughout the entire CJS. This paper would support this. It would seem that this move would afford the system coherence, ensuring that the means are inherent in the ends whilst still allowing for diversity in approaches.]

Flynn, (2013) adds a third major task, the need to include the involvement of the wider public in the creation of emotionally intelligent justice given their role in shaping criminal justice policy via political/election voting power (Loader, 2006; Ryan, 2003). Positive criminologists would support this, especially in relation to social integration, where they place a call for society to 'positively and intelligently use its power, institutions, and means toward this end' (Ronel & Segev; 2014:1394). The problem at present is that,

"Criminal Justice is now less autonomous than it was three decades ago, and more forcefully directed from the outside...A new relationship between politicians, the public and penal experts has emerged in which politicians are more directive, penal experts are less influential, and public opinion becomes a key reference point for evaluating options. Criminal

justice is now more vulnerable to shifts of public mood and political reaction.” (Garland, 2001: 172)

There would clearly need to be a shift away from the popular forms of retribution that dominate political and public opinion to allow for the possibility of new forms of emotionally intelligent justice to emerge.

Table 1: The existing and the new ‘emotionally intelligent’ criminal justice systems in comparison

	Existing	New
Philosophy	Retributive	Transmutive
Method	Punitive	Utilising positive and unifying forces
Examples of some of the Key Values	Control Domination Oppression Punishment Deterrence Power Alienation	Emotional Intelligence Non violent Integration Inclusion Positive encounters Transformation Rehabilitation
Some Potential Outcomes	Social exclusion Shame/humiliation High recidivism rates Anger/Pain/ Resentment/ Hatred/Rejection/ Blame/ Vengeance/Alienation	Social inclusion Social Integration Desistance from crime Atonement/Acceptance/ Taking responsibility for actions/Positive self-identity

The CJS in the UK is dominated by negative responses and reactions to crime and criminality that are focused on retributive punishment and exclusion. What is needed is a new paradigm to create an emotionally intelligent CJS with new forms of emotionally intelligent justice to accompany it. One that is non-violent in its approach and is focused on inclusion and integration, that utilises positive encounters and forces in offering a transformative not punitive experience, and one that is resolute in raising the emotional intelligence and awareness of its staff of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effect of their words, actions, decisions and working practices/systems. The role of empathy should not be ignored here. One that includes and is informed by all of the voices of those affected by crime and criminality. Further, a new paradigm for an emotionally intelligent CJS system and model of emotionally intelligent justice is needed that has a congruence between their aims, means, theories, spirit/values and the principles upon which they are based and the positive outcomes that they aspire to produce. We must ensure that new forms of justice are not excessively

focused on 'order' as opposed to justice, as this is likely to perpetuate the current system of control and power over equality and transformation.

The challenges of creating an emotionally intelligent CJS

Current academic thinking around notions of emotionally intelligent justice, and positive experiences for offenders is very much in its infancy. It should be noted, however, that the current CJS in the UK has pockets of emotional intelligence operating within it already. For example, emotional intelligence within the current CJS can be found in the emergence of various problem solving courts: drug courts, domestic violence courts and community courts following more of a TJ approach (Nolan, 2009); the use of restorative justice by the Youth Offending Teams, by the police when working with victims (HMIC et al, 2012); and the Good Lives Model which is a strengths based rehabilitative approach when working with offenders (Ronel & Segev, 2014). [Nonetheless, it will remain a challenge to the CJS and policy makers as well as a challenge to traditional criminology to

adopt such propositions. As with all new forms of knowledge and practice, there needs to be an appropriate time for the process of trial and error, action and reflection and evaluation to allow an appropriate time for this body of work to find its feet and mature further.

Academics, practitioners and others working in this field should not shy away from admitting that at present we know little about the 'how' in terms of achieving an emotionally intelligent justice system and understanding how it would function, though there have been suggestions from restorative justice advocates, TJ advocates, Peacemaking and Positive criminologists (Ronel & Segev, 2014; Wexler, 2012; Pepinsky, 2006; Zehr, 2002).

The priority of the first stage of this endeavour must focus on defining the best description of 'what' an emotionally intelligent CJS is and indeed what it would look like in practice, along with defining the related emotionally intelligent models of justice that would underpin this new system. Central to this discussion going forward are the questions of: what is justice?

and how should power be exercised within it? It would seem that the current CJS has not got the right answer to such questions given the current results produced. A later phase should focus more exclusively on the creation of new tools, technologies and practices that would provide the operations of the new system.

Positive Criminology offers a perspective that pulls together common principles from a range of different theories, approaches, and models for example restorative justice (Zehr, 2002), the sociology of acceptance (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987), desistance (Burnett & Maruna, 2004; LeBel et al., 2008; Martin & Stermac, 2010), Peacemaking Criminology (Pepinsky, 2013); emotionally intelligent justice (Flynn, 2014); and TJ (Wexler, 2012). This new found 'home' for such a wide range of theories and models may provide a much needed critical mass of people working in the area of Positive Criminology to allow for new synergies and innovations to be created which allow for the much needed experiments, programmes, technologies and tools needed for an

emotionally intelligent system to operate successfully.

There appears to be a range of views as to which emotions should be evoked in emotionally intelligent justice and by which party (victim/offender/community): shame (Braithwaite, 1989, Kahan, 1996, 1998), remorse (Karstedt, 2002; Van Stokkom, 2002), empathy (Strang, 2002) and a whole range of positive emotions advocated by positive criminologists (Ronel & Segev, 2014; Ronel & Elisha, 2011). There will need to be clarity, alignment and agreement as to which emotions should be evoked and by which party, in both the procedures of the CJS and the models of justice underpinning it, and this will then need to be reviewed and evaluated, and changes made in accordance. Further, if shame is to feature in the new models of emotionally intelligent justice then care needs to be exercised as evoking shame can conflict at times with the principles of fairness and procedural justice not to mention the effectiveness of this approach in terms of recidivism and more holistically on the person. Indeed there is a thin line between shame, humiliation and stigmatisation.

It would seem that reintegrative shaming offers the best insight at present in terms of differentiating between the crime committed and the person (Braithwaite, 1989). It is acknowledged that it may be some time before an agreement can be reached as to which emotions should be evoked and by which party.

A key challenge for the establishment of emotionally intelligent justice and also a challenge to TJ is that at present in the UK we have a judiciary made up of predominantly older white males from the higher social classes (Cavadino et al, 2013). There is an obvious disparity between the judges and the judged in terms of race, religion and social class that has the potential to impede the successful implementation of TJ. The judiciary is not renowned for their openness to training or interventions that can limit their decision-making capacity (Cavadino et al, 2013). The contribution of TJ is a positive one by raising the awareness of criminal justice staff of the impact of their interactions on others involved in the CJS. The impact of this alone will be significant. However, a further challenge should be noted that it is hard

to create authentic interactions that genuinely meet the aim of what is trying to be achieved in TJ and it is questioned as to whether such empathic intentions and interactions can truly be passed on via training or regulation in the workplace. This does not mean that such an attempt should be abandoned, rather that such matters will need to be considered in the operational strategy going forward.

A key challenge in including the ‘voice’ of the public in the creation of new emotionally intelligent models of justice is that this is not a simple task to achieve given current levels of understanding and emotionality, nor will it be achieved overnight. As Flynn (2014:365) has noted:

“Establishing an alternative paradigm of emotionally intelligent justice requires systems of communication and public engagement which acknowledge and are capable of challenging the gamut of cognitions, attitudes, values, beliefs, feelings and moral emotions which together underpin and legitimize traditional forms of punishment. Methods of communication must be developed which resonate with the symbols and ideals ordinary people find meaningful. The task of emotionally intelligent justice is to affirm new values of forgiveness reconciliation and recompense. To achieve this, nothing less than a complete reconfiguration of

emotional and intelligent life is required. “

The powers, structures and mechanisms that have created current criminal justice policy and informed public and political discourse are unlikely to have a sudden awakening or desire to want to reform. Therefore we can expect a continuance of the hegemonic mechanisms operating through for example the government, the media and other agencies/actors in order to ensure that their position is secured and that the current punitive status quo is maintained (Nussbaum, 1996). This cannot be ignored in the challenge ahead especially in relation to engaging the public with the possibility of this task.

Conclusion

The need for and benefits of a new paradigm for an emotionally intelligent CJS, one that utilises theories and models of criminal justice that are also emotionally intelligent is clear. The existing criminal justice system, its related anti-terrorist legislation and moreover many of the negative principles and values on which they are based are likely only to exacerbate the

situation further and continue a negative pattern of further ‘violence’.

The magnitude of the task of creating a new paradigm for an emotionally intelligent CJS or new models of emotionally intelligent justice in the UK is not underestimated. However, the task cannot be ignored given some of the current outputs and harms created by the CJS in the UK as well as some of the dynamics present in contemporary life in the West: the increase in terrorist attacks, the negative public discourse dividing people along racial and religious lines, further draconian anti-terrorist legislation as well as the continuance of a ‘war on terror’ style response of the State against specific groups. The scale of the task ahead should not deter those who are committed to such an endeavour, as each step made along the way has the potential to reduce the levels of ‘violence’ and harms occurring in the CJS and beyond. We are presented with a great opportunity and only time will tell if we embrace this opportunity of creating a more emotionally intelligent understanding of justice for the benefit of all.

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PAPER 12:

CHILDREN, HUMANITARIANISM AND DIPLOMACY IN A DIGITAL AGE

Dr Helen Brocklehurst

**Senior Lecturer in International Relations, College of Law,
Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby**

Abstract

There are three aims to this paper. First, is to outline the ways in which children and young people have increasing instrumentality in a digital, networked world. Second, is to examine the means by which young people may, on the one hand, be used or targeted by violent groups (e.g. Nice 2016) while, on the other hand, may resist violence and become symbols and tools of diplomacy (e.g., Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani activist for female education and Nobel Prize laureate). Finally the paper considers how the unregulated circulation of images of children in conflict situations raises new ethical issues in a digital world. Based on the analysis presented, the paper argues for a norm of ‘digital safeguarding’ to be fostered so that future users and archivists of online images, including young people, might be better informed about the rights of such children to privacy and dignity, and the ongoing risks that particular images may pose.

 **PAPER 13:****THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE: A CASE OF DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION?**

Mrs Rachael Ita
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Abstract

International human rights courts are faced with the challenge of protecting human rights standards whilst still acknowledging the sovereignty of member states from which they derive their authority. An important tool that is needed in such situations is an approach to the interpretation of the international human rights treaties that contemporaneously protects the rights of individuals and respects the sovereignty of the state parties. In this paper, it is argued that this form of interpretation that tries to strike a balance between these two competing interests of sovereignty on the part of the state, and the protection of the individual's rights, is a 'diplomatic' approach to interpretation because it seeks to ensure a balance for both parties. The paper examines the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights ('the Court') and proffers it as an example of such a 'diplomatic tool' of interpretation. Through an examination of case law on the evolution of the margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the Court, it concludes that the fluid nature of the doctrine has made it a useful diplomatic tool of interpretation. The margin of appreciation doctrine remains a necessary part of international human rights in Europe and contributes to the continued legitimacy of the Court.

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Director of International Policing and Justice Institute, University of Derby



Professor Kevin Bampton is Professor of Comparative Justice and Director of the International Policing and Justice Institute of the University of Derby

He has worked extensively in the development of international partnerships and formerly worked for the United Nations, the British Council and Overseas Development Administration of the Foreign Office.

He has a particular interest in the interaction between states in the context of Public Law and Policing.

ICDIR Role: Chair of paper presentation session, member of special joint panel session

DR FRANCESCO BELCASTRO

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Dr Francesco Belcastro is a Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Derby. He is currently the admissions tutor for International Relations and Diplomacy and a Fellow of the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrews.

His teaching interests include Contemporary Issues in International Relations and Diplomatic Practice.

His research interests relate to the politics and international relations of the Middle East- broadly defined. He has particular interests in Western foreign policy in the Middle East, especially in relation to regional

security, the Levant and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He regularly contributes to several online publications in the fields of International Relations and Geopolitics.

ICDIR Role: Host

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Dr Helen Brocklehurst is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Derby. Her teaching interests include; International Relations, globalisation, gender studies, children, childhoods and war, security, nationhood, education, qualitative methods, employability and team skills. She currently serves as External Examiner and Consultant for the International Baccalaureate Organisation. Before her current role, she was a lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Swansea, 2003 - 2015.

Her Research Interests and Publications include articles and chapters on *Securities of Childhood: Insecurities of Children* (2015); *Educating Britain: Political Literacy and the Construction of National History* (2014); *Education and the War on Terror; The Early Years* (2011) and books *Who's Afraid of Children? Children, Conflict and International Relations* (2006) and *History, Nationhood and the Question of Britain* (2004).

ICDIR Role: Host, abstract author, member of special joint panel session

DR BARIS CAYLI

Research Fellow in Criminology, University of Derby



Dr Baris Cayli is a Research Fellow in Criminology at the University of Derby. He was trained and educated in Turkey, Netherlands, Italy, UK and the USA. His family background and perspective on life have enabled him to embrace values based on the principles of equality, justice and tolerance. His professional interests involve questioning the everyday life and exploring how the codes of ideal justice and sociocultural harmony promote peace and better life opportunities in plural societies.

He has received a number of research fellowships and grants from institutions and civil society organisation such as Sos Impresa and the University of Camerino. He was the recipient of Human Resource Excellence Award in Research in 2011. He has an interdisciplinary research focus that covers the sub-fields of sociology, anthropology, history, criminology, politics, law and philosophy. Some of the key areas of his research relate to the Sociology of Gangs and Mafias, Criminology & Criminal Justice, Ottoman Empire and the Middle East, Terrorism and Security Studies and Transnational Crime. Before his current role, he was a Fellow at the University of Stirling in Scotland, United Kingdom.

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Charlotte Hargreaves is currently the Head of Criminology and Social Sciences and Deputy Head of Department at the University of Derby.

Before her present role, she was a practitioner in youth justice and trainer of youth justice professionals. She specialises in teaching modules with a youth justice focus those relating to Crime and Society. She has a number of undergraduates and post graduate students under her supervision.

ICDIR Role: Chief Host

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Director of the Multi-Faith Centre and Sociologist, University of Derby



Dr Philip Henry is a sociologist with special interests in policy, politics and religion. He developed his training as a researcher at the University of Liverpool exploring Buddhist social movements, activism, and minority groups in the global landscape.

These professional interests include: inter-faith dialogue, religion and society, cultural identity, social movements and crime, and deviance within society.

Philip's professional interests relates to issues around radicalisation and counterterrorism, Roma and gypsy migration, community cohesion and development. He is also interested in religion and belief matters relating to policy, diversity and religious literacy/education and also inter-, intra- and multi-faith engagement. His research covers a wide area of Religion and Society, Cultural identity, Social Movements, Crime and Deviance - including Radicalisation and contemporary social-psychological approaches to motivation and belonging. He has also done some work on Sociology of Health and migration studies.

ICDIR Role: Paper author, member of special joint panel session.

DR DAVID HICKS

Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Head of Research in Postgraduate Criminology, MSc Criminal Investigation Programme Leader, University of Derby



David is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Head of Research in Postgraduate Criminology, and also MSc Criminal Investigation Programme Leader. He has over 20 years of academic, research and professional experience. This includes national and international recognition as a specialist in financial crime and financial investigation, criminal/financial intelligence, organised crime, and crime prevention. He also has experience lecturing in criminology at Cardiff University (Wales) and the University of Ottawa (Canada).

He has completed a substantial volume of funded research, and published in leading academic venues such as Taylor and Francis, Cambridge University Press, Sage and

others. He currently supervises a number of PhD students in addition to a number of postgraduates/undergraduates. He welcomes prospective doctoral research applicants with interests in the areas of financial crime, financial investigation, cyber-crime, digital investigation and intelligence, and organised crime.

ICDIR Role: Paper co-author.

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Dr Philip Hodgson is currently the Head of Department for Law, Criminology and Social Sciences and Deputy Director of the International Policing and Justice Institute (IPJI).

He also acts as the UK lead on Policing for IPJI. He has conducted research within a number of areas of criminology which include young people, exclusion, policing, partnerships, drugs, probation and anti-social behaviour.

He is a member of a number of professional bodies, including: The Howard League, British Society of Criminology, Health and Care Professional Council, Institute Leadership and Management and Society of Evidence Based Policing. He has worked within the criminal justice sector in various capacities for over twenty years. These include policing, probation, youth justice and the drugs areas.

ICDIR Role: Chief Host, Editor.

PROFESSOR ROBERT HUDSON

Professor of European History and Cultural Politics and College Lead of the Identity, Culture and Representation Research Cluster, University of Derby



Professor Robert Hudson is University Professor in European History and Cultural Politics at the University of Derby, and former Director of the Identity, Conflict and Representation Research Centre. He is also International Visiting Professor at the University American College Skopje (UACS), Macedonia and in 2016 was nominated to the International Academic Council at UACS.


He is a graduate of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, and held a Yugoslav government scholarship as a Post-Graduate Fellow at the University of Sarajevo.

In the 1980s he lectured at Exeter College of Art and Design, whilst serving as an officer in the Royal Naval Reserve, and then taught at the University of Rennes (France). Hudson was a faculty member of the EU (DGXXII) and Marie Curie-funded European Doctoral Enhancement Programme (EDEN) in Peace and Conflict Studies (1997-2010). He has re-visited Yugoslavia and its successor states frequently since 1995, and during the 1990s participated in six missions with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as an election supervisor. More recently he has been working in Macedonia on a regular basis. Hudson is the co-editor of *Politics of Identity: Migrants and Minorities in Multicultural States* (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2000), *Different Approaches to Peace and Conflict Research* (University of Deusto, 2008), *Peace, Conflict and Identity: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Research* (University of Deusto, 2009), *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States* (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012), *Land and Identity: Theory, Memory, and Practice* (Rodopi, 2012) and *Affective Landscapes in Literature, Art and Everyday Life: Memory, Place and the Senses* (Ashgate, 2015). He has also co-edited a trilogy of books on European Integration with colleagues in Macedonia (2013, 2014 and 2015) in which his own contributions have focused on security and identity issues.

ICDIR Role: Paper author, member of special joint panel session

MR CRAIG HUGHES

PhD Candidate, University of Derby



Craig has been involved in law enforcement for over thirty years. The last 20 of which he has been a financial investigator and manager at regional and national levels for the Police and Home Office departments and, most recently, the Serious Fraud Office.

Craig was part of the Implementation Team for the set up of the Assets Recovery Agency in 2002. He is currently researching a PhD on the nature of financial investigation within the UK, and is an Associate Lecturer on the MSc Criminal Investigation programme at the University of Derby.

RACHAEL ITA

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Rachael Ita is a lecturer in Law at the University of Derby. She has considerable experience in teaching law at undergraduate and post graduate levels. Her dominant areas of teaching have been public international law, administrative law and international human rights law. She has also taught contract law, tort law, employment law, and company law on accounting, media studies and journalism studies courses.

She is a qualified barristers and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and was called to the Bar in 2003. She initially practiced as a legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Akure where she dealt with criminal matters. She moved on to pursue her academic career in Law at the University of Derby in 2011. Her main professional interests in law include, advocacy, legal research and pedagogy.

ICDIR Role: Abstract author.

DR FRANCIS JEGEDE

Senior Lecturer and Subject Leader in International Relations and Diplomacy, University of Derby



Francis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy and also the Subject Leader for International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Derby. He oversees the academic delivery and management of this specialist course and provides students with varied learning experience through which they develop necessary skills and training required for a career in international politics

and diplomacy.

He runs study visits to a number of international institutions such as the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), the European Parliament in Brussels, where students learn about key functions of international political institutions and the role these institutions play in promoting democracy, world peace, political stability and development around the world. He also coordinates work-based learning for all International Relations and Diplomacy students through external opportunities for internships and vocational training.

ICDIR Role: Host, Conference Organiser, Author and Editor-in-Chief.

JOEL KLAFF

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Derby



Joel Klaff graduated with an LLB (Hons) in 1986 (University of London), and an LLM in 1989 (University of Miami). His undergraduate and postgraduate degrees were heavily influenced by the contextual approach to law. In this capacity, he became interested in the social, economic and political application of law during his time as a student. As a student, the American Realist movement in jurisprudence had the most significant impact on the development of his approach to, and application of law.

He has continued with this approach to law with respect to his teaching, scholarship and research. All the modules he teaches have at their core the interrelationship between law and politics. This manifests itself in the politics of development,

sustainability and human rights. With respect to the actual engagement with his students he makes as little distinction as he possibly can between the application of law and the use of politics to understand that application of law. In this respect his teaching represents a fusion of the ideas of both legal and political scholars.

His current scholarship and research focuses on the creation of a 'sustainable jurisprudence' for the purposes of ensuring the fair and just application of law. In this capacity, he explains how the incidents of inequality which are manifested through acts of discrimination such as racial, sexual or gender discrimination will never be curbed or contained by our current jurisprudential approach to these matters.

ICDIR Role: Member of special joint panel session.

DR SUNG-HEE LEE

Lecturer in Sociology & Social Policy, University of Derby



Dr Sung-Hee Lee is a Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy within the College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Derby. She is the organiser of the Sociology Research Seminar Series (SSRS) and has published a number of research articles.

She is currently the module leader for 'Researching the Social World' and 'Family Forms and Personal Ties'. She also teaches 'Social Inequalities in Britain Today', 'Sociology of Health and Illness', 'Capitalism, Culture and Class' and 'Sociological Research Methods' at undergraduate level.

She is currently working on a comparative study across East Asian societies entitled 'Gender Politics and the Socialisation of Care in East Asian Countries: South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan'. Since completing her PhD thesis entitled 'The Impact of Gender Politics on the Socialisation of Care in South Korea', in 2014 at the University of Bath, she has been continuing to develop this work to incorporate other East Asian countries. She completed the first fieldwork phase in South Korea in June 2015, second stage in Japan in June 2016 and currently working on the third phase on China and Taiwan in June 2017. The rich information and primary data gathered through her research projects in these countries enables her to explore further the nexus between gender politics and the socialisation of care.

ICDIR Role: Paper author.

LARRY MEAD

Principal Lecturer in Law, University of Derby



Larry Mead is a Principal Lecturer in Law, University of Derby.

He has pursued an academic career in Law for more than 37 years. He has extensive experience of teaching on undergraduate, postgraduate and professional courses in Law.

The dominant areas of his teaching have been; Contract Law, Commercial Law, Business Law Company Law and Corporate governance. He has taught modules in these areas on law across accounting, business and management disciplines.

He is currently Programme Leader for the LLM course and also teaching modules across undergraduate and post-graduate levels, such as Company Law and Evidence, Legal Scholarship and Independent Studies.

He combines an academic career with practice as a barrister. He was called to the Bar in 1977 and completed pupillage in 1978. He is currently a Door Tenant at Derwent Chambers in Derby.

ICDIR Role: Abstract author.

DR PAUL NIXON

Principal Lecturer & Head of Research, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands



Paul G. Nixon is a Principal Lecturer in Political Science and Head of Research at European Studies, Faculty of Management and Organisation, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands. He has contributed chapters to many edited collections on the use of ICTs particularly in the fields of political parties, electronic democracy and social welfare. He has co-edited the following collections for Routledge *Digital Media Usage Across the Life Course* (with Rajash Rawal & Andreas Funk 2016) *Lobbying in the EU: Changing Minds Changing Times* (with Paul

Shotton 2015) *Politics and the Internet in Comparative Context: Views from the cloud* (with Rajash Rawal & Dan Mercea 2014) *Understanding E Government in Europe: Issues and Challenges* (with Vassiliki Koutrakou and Rajash Rawal 2010) *E-Government in Europe* (with Vassiliki Koutrakou 2007), *Political Parties and the Internet* (with Steve Ward and Rachel Gibson 2003.) and *Cyberprotest* (with Wim van der Donk, Brian Loader and Dieter Rucht, 2004) He has also published in the fields of culture and literature including editing a collection entitled *Representations of Education in Literature* (Edwin Mellen Press 2000).

ICDIR Role: Author/discussion Co-presenter.

PROFESSOR ALEXANDER NUNN

Professor of International Political Economy, Leeds Beckett University, UK



Alex Nunn is a Professor of Political Economy at the Leeds Beckett University, United Kingdom. He has fifteen years of experience in academic and applied social policy research and consultancy. His academic research focuses on governance, political economy and social and labour market policy. He has a keen interest in transitions between forms of governance and the effects of these in terms of social justice. He has undertaken a large number of applied research and consultancy projects on behalf of central and local government organisations in the UK and for international organisations such as the Council of Europe and European Commission.

ICDIR Role: Chair of paper presentation session, member of special joint panel session

DR DAVID PATTON

Positive Criminologist and Senior Lecturer, Learning, Teaching & Quality lead for Law, Criminology and Social and Political Sciences, University of Derby



David is a quantitative and qualitative researcher and has conducted research for Cambridge University and the Home Office. The research he helped conduct for the Home Office influenced part of the creation of the Drugs Act 2005, which specifically gave the police the power to conduct a drug test for any arrestee who was arrested for an acquisitive type crime.

He has been involved in various projects aimed at young people and/or drugs, for example, David was Director of a (Communities Against Drugs funded) Drugs Education Project based at Sheffield Youth Offending Team, aimed at drug prevention, reduction, crime reduction and harm minimisation amongst young offenders and school children.

He has trained Community Panel Members to administer restorative justice sentences to young offenders who had received a Referral Order by the Youth Court. The Youth Justice Service recently commissioned David to deliver Life Coaching sessions to high risk young offenders on a 10 week alternative to custody programme to help them consider their progression into further education, training and employment as well as reduce the frequency and gravity of their offending.

ICDIR Role: Paper author, Chair of paper presentation session

PROFESSOR RAJASH RAWAL

Professor of European Studies, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands



Rajash Rawal is a professor of European Studies and Faculty Director at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands.

ICDIR Role: Author/discussion Co-presenter.

DR JOHN STUBBS

External Editorial Review Advisor and Retired University Lecturer



Dr John Stubbs is a retired University Lecturer. Until his retirement in 2015, Dr John Stubbs was Senior Lecturer in Geography at the University of Derby. His research interests have largely followed a dual focus: one has been transport development, particularly related to sustainable transportation systems and the other is population studies with a specific focus on demographic change. Much of his research has been underpinned by extensive overseas field work particularly in the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to teaching in these fields of research, his teaching experience has also included development studies related to low income countries as well as statistical analysis.

ICDIR Role: External Review Consultant - Editorial.

PROFESSOR MALCOLM TODD

Dean of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Derby



Professor Todd is the Dean of the College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Derby, UK and member of the Corporate Management Team.

He has a particular interest in how to best support the student learning experience. He was awarded a National Teaching Fellowship in 2014 and has published widely on learning and teaching matters, especially around the themes of learner autonomy, work-based learning and the teaching of 'race' and ethnicity.

He was, until 2010, the Associate Director of the national Subject Centre for Sociology, Anthropology and Politics, part of the Higher Education Academy (HEA). Currently he is leading on a national project for the HEA and HEFCE on teaching about Islam in the Social Sciences. He was a

Trustee of the British Sociology Association and member of the Heads and Professors of Sociology. Prof Todd has been involved with transnational education, and has developed strong partnership relationships with HEIs in Hong Kong, the Netherlands and the USA.

He is recently appointed as the Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Derby with responsibility for the enhancement of students' experience.

ICDIR Role: Chief Host, Editor

MR NIR TOLKOVSKY

PhD Candidate, University of Derby



Nir is an Associate Lecturer on the MSc Criminal Investigation programme at the University of Derby, and a final year PhD candidate. His background includes counter terrorism and proliferation project management within the Israeli Intelligence community, and Research and Development in the private sector and academia in the United Kingdom. Among his recent engagements are projects utilising a variety of analytical disciplines in criminal justice systems, security and commercial contexts, ranging from cyber intelligence analysis to complex corporate fraud litigation and electronic discovery. Nir's doctoral research studies the interplay between 'criminal' and a range of 'commercial' and 'civil' fraud resolution mechanisms in English law and practice.

ICDIR Role: Paper co-author.

DR DAVID WALSH

University Reader in Criminal Investigation, Departmental Research Lead & Deputy Director of the International Policing and Justice Institute, University of Derby



Dr David Walsh is a University Reader in Criminal Investigation, Deputy Director of the International Policing and Justice Institute of the University of Derby. He is also, the Departmental Research Lead and the Chair of the School's Research Ethics Group.

His teaching interests include: the psychology of investigation, criminology and criminal justice, psychological understanding of criminal behavior and examination of the psychology of criminal justice processes.

He is the founding member of the International Investigative Interviewing Research Group (www.iiirg.org) and an editorial board member for the Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services and the Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology.

ICDIR Role: Abstract co-author.

PROFESSOR PAUL WELLER

(Fractional) Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University; Emeritus Professor, University of Derby; and (Non-Stipendiary) Research Fellow in Religion and Society, Regent's Park College, University of Oxford



Until he retired at the end of July 2006 from his substantive roles at the University of Derby, Paul Weller (Cert Ed, MA, Phil, PhD, DLitt) was Professor of Inter-Religious Relations and Head of Research (MPhil and PhD Students and REF [REF Outputs]) He was a founder and is a Trustee of the Multi-Faith Centre at the University of Derby. During the Cold War he was engaged in the international peace and justice work of the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference. Towards the end of that period he was a member of the European Churches Working Group on Asylum and Refugees of the Conference of European Churches and the World Council of Churches, while being involved in aspects of the sanctuary movement in support of the rights of refugees and migrants.

Towards the end of the New Labour Government in the UK, he was a member on the Expert Panel on Faith Advising the Secretary of State for Communities, Other Ministers and Civil Servants in the Department of Communities and Local Government.

More recently he has undertaken research for, and has been a member of various advisory groups, including the UK's Equality and Human Rights Commission. Among relevant publications he is author of *A Mirror for our Times: 'The Rushdie Affair' and the Future of Multiculturalism* (London, Continuum, 2008); "Human Rights', 'Religion' and the 'Secular': Variant Configurations of Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies)", in *Religion and Human Rights: An International Journal*, Volume 1, No. 1, 2006, pp. 17-39; "Conspiracy Theories and the Incitement of Hatred: The Dynamics of Deception, Plausibility and Defamation", in M. Fineberg, S. Samuels, and M. Weitzman, eds. (2007), *Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred. Essays in Memory of Simon Wiesenthal*, Vallentine Mitchell, London, pp. 182-197; and "The Clash of Civilisations Thesis and

Religious Responses”, *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, Volume 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 83-100. He is also co-author, with Emma Jane Harris and Victoria Bisset of *Violent Extremism: Naming, Framing and Challenging* (London: Dialogue Society, 2015).

ICDIR Role: Paper author, Chair of special joint panel session.

International Conference on Diplomacy and International Relations

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