

The media image of China in Africa: a frame analysis of Kenyan,
Nigerian, and Zimbabwean newspapers

Mthulisi Mathuthu

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Declaration

This thesis is my original work, written by me in its entirety and all the sources of information which have been used in the study have been duly acknowledged. This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously.

List of Abbreviations

AFP	Agence France-Presse
AP	Associated Press
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CRBC	China Road and Bridge Corporation
EU	European Union
EXIM	Export-Import Bank of China
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KRA	Kenyan Revenue Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank

WHO	World Health Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

Abstract

While China-Africa relations date back to the 15th century, China's interest and involvement in the continent increased in the last two centuries leading to the formation of the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. Mainly, the relationship is characterised by huge Chinese migration, business investments and loans across the whole of Africa as well as cultural exchange programs. As a result, there has arisen a concept which researchers commonly refer to as *China in Africa*. However, parallel to the growing academic interest in China's presence in Africa, has been accusations that China is plundering Africa's natural resources and exploiting the local workforce leading to Beijing making strenuous efforts to shape its image by framing its relationship with Africa as a mutually beneficial partnership. Nevertheless, despite growing academic interest, the phenomenon of *China in Africa* is still under researched with need for more studies including on how China is represented in the media. This study, therefore, accesses a cross national media image of China over its involvement in Africa from three Anglophone countries namely Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe through frame analysis and over a five-year period (2014-18). Totally, 1 384 news stories from six newspapers (Two from each country) were analysed. As opposed to a straightforwardly positive or negative media image, this study found a balanced African media image of China in the form of a contest of pessimistic and optimistic frames. Although this finding resonates with the hypothesis of

a balanced image, the thesis, mainly, establishes the image's stability over years. The thesis found that although gravitating towards some degree of complexity this image has remained stable for many years. Because this image is accessed from three distinct African regions (East, Southern and West Africa), the thesis argues that this is enough for it to be said to represent an Africa wide situation and to propose the testing of the ubiquity of the image in the broader Global South. The thesis also argues that while China's soft power and economic statecraft are evident in Africa, their effect on its [China] image have been slow so far hence the stability of the image.

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The Study's Timeline

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of *China in Africa*, identifying its actors, features, contentions, and controversies in the process. Secondly, the chapter explores the existing research on the framing of Chinese presence in Africa. First four sections are purposely conceived to make a case for the project's research problem. As such, the fifth section, drawing from insights from the first two sections, exploits the gaps to locate the research problem, set the objective, create research questions. The first chapter also reveals and justifies the research countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe); the chapter also justifies why the research newspapers (*The Herald*, *NewsDay*, *Nation*, *The Standard*, *The Guardian*, and *Vanguard*) were selected.

As already stated above, this thesis seeks to discover China's media image. As such, Chapter 2's fundamental purpose is to demonstrate the importance of studying the media in relation to social or political

relations. This is because, according to Wasserman (2017), “political, economic, and social relationships” are not just “interrelated” but they are also “mediated” (Wasserman, 2017, p. 195). The second chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, the chapter gives a holistic overview of media theories and media systems with a focus on demonstrating how the mass media work and shape images. While various theories are discussed, the spotlight is on how newspapers shape people’s views and national images.

Mass media serve a “socially central function” by providing audiences with information that “strongly affects their lives” (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976, pp. 6–7). So, as conflict, change and instability have come to be synonymous with Chinese presence in Africa (Aidoo, 2016; Lim, Young. Joon, 2012), it can be argued that by providing readers with information on the issue (*China in Africa*), African newspapers are playing a “socially central function” (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976, p. 6). Therefore, Chapter 2 also discusses the African media systems; it explores the development of the African media systems from colonial beginnings with a view to illuminating their distinct contemporary nature, circumstances, ownerships, and workings.

While lack of empirical data, coupled with the differences in countries’ historical and current circumstances, makes any study of African media systems difficult (Ngomba, 2012; Rodney-Gumede, 2020), there are still common characteristics across Africa’s mediascape that would “permit a general description of the media systems in the continent” (Ngomba, 2012, p. 54). Therefore, Chapter 2 describes the key common features characteristic of the African mediascape while foregrounding the

discussion in historical, contemporary, and theoretical contexts. African media have undergone an evolution (Saliou Camara, 2008) characterised by many stages and changes (Fatoyinbo, 2000; Yusha'u, 2010) since colonial inception. While they are still “significantly Western oriented” (Ngomba, 2012, p. 52) owing to their colonial origins, African media systems are “not exactly like the European or American media” (Salawu, 2009, p. 82). According to Salawu (2009), what distinguishes the African media from the Western media are not only the different circumstances from which they arose but also the environment, cultures and situations they currently operate in.

Lastly, Chapter 2 focuses on three research countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe)’s media systems (See Chapter 1 for insights into the relevance of these countries to the study). According to Brüggemann et al (2014), analysing media systems is the “cornerstone of comparative communication research” and a powerful guide to the conceptualisation of one’s research project as well as mechanism to choosing case studies and hypothesis (2014, p. 1037). Paramount in any comparative investigation is the identification of “commonalities and differences of communication practices by looking at variation in their contexts” (Brüggemann et al., 2014, p. 1038). Therefore, this section discusses the media systems of each of the research countries; it reveals their distinct natures and features and the environments the research newspapers operate in. As shall be seen, the section reveals commonalities and differences in the way in which the newspapers are manipulated by the state, politicians, and owners and how these cultures have been retained since the colonial era.

Whereas Chapter 1 justifies the study in its entirety and demonstrates its [study] essentiality, Chapter 3 specifically discusses how the data was gathered and processed and how frames were tracked and identified. Therefore, as the study relies on frame analysis, Chapter 3 also discusses the theory of framing, describing how it works.

While framing is not the sole dominant media effects theory (Borah, 2015), it, nevertheless, deserves a special focus, argues Scheufele (1999) and more so for this study. Owing to its multidisciplinary nature, framing permits a “holistic” investigation into how mass media effects manifest in individuals and audiences (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015, p. 423). Moreover, as it is “theoretically rich”, framing bears the capacity of “subsuming and trying many of these seemingly unrelated approaches” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 205). Because of its diverse nature, framing could be the best if not the only way to grasp the complexity of the concept of media effects (D’Angelo, 2002; Matthes, 2009). According to Reese (2007), framing adds “some critical flavour to the media effects approach” and has, so far, brought some degree of respectability to the concept of mass media effects (Reese, 2007, p. 149) making it “a fundamental part” of the concept (Aarøe, 2017, p. 1).

According to W. Tankard Jr (2001), information communicated through frames is so powerful that it could trigger the deposition of a president (W.Tankard and Jr, 2001). That, perhaps, is why framing is a “serious matter” (Siraj and Rawan, 2010, p. 88) and a fact (Elegbe and Eze, 2018) which is “almost impossible to avoid” (Cissel, 2012, p. 67). Unlike bias, argues W. Tankard Jr (2001), framing is a more sophisticated concept as it can influence the direction of discourse and events without the

audience noticing that it [Framing] is occurring. However, as already stated, the theory of framing shall be fully explained in Chapter 3 itself.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the study's findings; it shows how the data from where the frames came looks; it identifies and reveals patterns in the news reportage across the newspapers. To do that, the study relies on SPSS crosstabulations and Chi Square (see Chapter 3), to reveal the key patterns. These findings are then interpreted. Using the insights from these findings, Chapter 5 then discusses the frames. As the last chapter, Chapter 6 recaps the study, capturing the highlights, making the conclusion against the set research questions (see Chapter 1) while making recommendations.

Chapter 1: Understanding China in Africa

1.0 Introduction

This chapter defines the concept of *China in Africa* and, in the process, lays out the concept's core features, history and its development over the years. The chapter also demonstrates the importance of studying *China in Africa*. While locating the concept's place in international relations and politics, the study is grounded in media research. This chapter makes a case for the thesis in its entirety and identifies the study's theoretical locations; it explores the existing research while identifying the problem. The chapter also reveals and justifies the units of analysis.

1.1 Defining the concept

There has, over the years, developed a phenomenon and, consequently, an area of study which researchers (For example Ado and Su, 2016; Alden, 2005; Cannon et al., 2022; Lafargue, 2009; Wasserman, 2013) commonly refer to as *China in Africa*. Also known as “China's development in Africa” (Cannon et al., 2022, p. 94), Chinese engagement or involvement in Africa, China's presence in Africa (Ado and Su, 2016; Alden and Otele, 2022; Lafargue, 2009) or China's rise in Africa (Large, 2008; Mawdsley, 2008; Traoré, 2021), this phenomenon is “one of the most critical developments in international affairs” (Leslie, 2016, p. 1).

According to Hanauer et al (2014) and McGregor and Havenga (2019), Chinese presence in Africa is driven by investment and trade. However,

according to Dijk (2009), China's presence in Africa is measured through the Chinese people based in Africa, Chinese merchandise and services rendered to the continent, Chinese aid, and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It can also be measured in terms of Chinese entities undertaking specific tasks in Africa of which the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises, private companies, and embassies are the major actors. Lafargue (2009), argues that the Chinese presence can also be measured through the increasing bilateral trade between Africa and Beijing. For example, according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD, 2021), China is now Africa's largest trading partner (IISD, 2021), while, in the not so distant past, it was trailing behind the US and the EU (Lafargue, 2009). The presence can also be assessed through how Chinese activities impact on governance, commerce, demographics, and the environment (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). In that regard, *China in Africa* boils down to Beijing's actorness in the continent; actorness, according to Sjöstedt (1977, p. 16), is the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system". So, in a nutshell, *China in Africa* is an aspect of what Beck (2005, p. 205) refers to as "transnational China".

Therefore, the "burgeoning literature" and academic interest in this phenomenon (Alden, 2013, p. 2; Alden and Otele, 2022, p. 444), arguably derives from the fact that China today is "madly in love with Africa" (Addis and Zuping, 2018, p. 6) while, on the other hand, and as reciprocation, Africa has so fully embraced China (Alden, 2005) that the Asian giant has, over the years, become a major contributor to Africa's economic development (Fijałkowski, 2011; Lafargue, 2009) causing a

“profound impact” on the local economies (Mohan and Kale, 2007, p. 2). The net effect is that China is currently not only the fourth largest investor in Africa but has been Africa’s largest trading partner for the last 12 years (Meng, 2023). This makes China the “most influential foreign player on the continent” (Meservey, 2018, p. 1). Hence China and Africa need each other as a “car and a battery” (Aljazeera, 2014) while Beijing has turned its foreign policy towards Africa into some kind of activism (Alden and Alves, 2008).

So pleased with its achievements in Africa is Beijing that it can confidently claim to have achieved a feat “unmatched in history” (Leslie, 2016, p. 1). The extent of China’s entry into Africa is such that the Chinese migrants, estimated to be one million by 2014 (Leslie, 2016), notwithstanding “popular opposition” in countries like Zambia (Negi, 2008, p. 41), are, socially speaking, now at home in much of Africa (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). By 2021, there were “between 1 to 2 million Chinese migrants in Africa” (Terry, 2021) while by 2018 there may well had been as many as 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operating in Africa (Meservey, 2018).

1.2 Strategies, projects, and objectives

China’s involvement in Africa is not haphazard; rather, there is some coherent strategy behind it (Adeshokan, 2021; Leslie, 2016). So, because Beijing believes that “states are the only credible actors in the international system”, the central government remains the chief player in China’s external relations (Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 45 citing Jisi, W, 1994). Consequently, China’s relations with most African countries are

on a “government to government” basis (Soule and E. Selormey, 2020). Perhaps that is why, even though various Chinese identities exist in Africa, especially outside government to government relations, Beijing is persistently committed to a “single Chinese identity” (Hodzi, 2019, p. 2). In that regard, Chinese activities in Africa are politically coordinated and fall within Beijing’s broader strategy encompassing different policies such as migration to Africa, trade, aid and investments; this is to the extent that the Chinese government takes the responsibility for the actions of private and official Chinese actors in Africa (Dijk, 2009, p. 9).

Underpinning China’s presence in Africa, are a set of objectives and factors namely the pursuit of African raw materials and the need to secure markets for Chinese products and services (Alden, 2005; Dijk, 2009); pushing back Western hegemony and positioning China as a superpower (Dijk, 2009; Doshi, 2021) by entering into “strategic partnerships” with partner nations (Alden, 2005, p. 148).

However, while the Chinese government is the chief dispenser of foreign policy, there has, over the years, been fundamental changes in the way Beijing engages abroad leading to Chinese presence in Africa manifesting itself at both official and unofficial levels (Nassanga and Makara, 2016). Gradual reforms, for example, have spawned “twin forces of decentralisation and internationalisation” ushering in “a new multi-layered foreign policy system” (Zhimin and Junbo, 2009, pp. 2, 5). As a result, the phenomenon of *China in Africa* has resulted in multiple Chinese actors (Leslie, 2016) triggering a complex and multidimensional presence throughout Africa (Zhang et al., 2016a; Zhimin and Junbo, 2009). For example, while previously it was only the Chinese state-

owned firms venturing into Africa, of late, multiple private companies of all shapes and sizes have also entered the fray. Also, some Chinese individuals, after the end of their working contracts in Africa, routinely opt to remain in Africa to set up own entities (Dijk, 2009; Hsu, 2007). These trends are visibly spread across Africa evidenced in multiple infrastructural developments (Zhang et al., 2016a).

As already mentioned above (see Dijk, 2009), China's presence in Africa is part of Beijing's global ambitions (Ado and Su, 2016). Specifically, China is anxious about the US's global sway and dominance; as such, she [China] has set becoming a global power as one of its core objectives (Dijk, 2009; Doshi, 2021). As opposed to merely challenging the US (Campbell, 2008), China seeks to "break the Anglo American monopoly" (Xiaoling, 2010, p. 42) with the ultimate aim of "providing an alternative to the Western development model" (Dijk, 2009, p. 12). China seeks to achieve its ambitions by spreading into both Africa and other parts of the world like Latin America and the Caribbeans (Devlin et al., 2006; Dijk, 2009). In its Africa operations, China "intentionally targeted US Africa policy" by concentrating on US's Africa "anchor states" namely Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria (C. Chau, 2015, p. 7). The extent of China's presence in Africa, according to Negi (2008, p. 46), is such that the US is losing out as things have come to a stage where Africans will now need persuasion to accept that China is not a better alternative.

As a result of China's incursions into Africa and its attendant ambitions, there has arisen the theory of a "new scramble for Africa" (Southall and Melber, 2009). While the 19th century scramble or struggle for the

colonisation of Africa pitted Western powers against each other, the current one involves the US, European Union (EU), China, among others. This has reduced Africa into a battleground while at the same time being the price on offer. By venturing into Africa, previously and largely regarded as an “undisputed sphere of Western influence”, China is challenging the “geopolitical map” hence the struggle (Southall and Melber, 2009, p. 1).

So, as can be seen and as already mentioned in the preceding sections (Leslie, 2016, p. 2), there is indeed some strategy behind China’s involvement in Africa. With that in mind, it should be noted that China’s growing involvement in Africa feeds off its [China] *Going Global strategy* which entails the deliberate encouragement and prodding of Chinese firms to identify and grab opportunities abroad. Officially announced in 2000 (China Policy, 2017), the *Go Global* call is both an ideological and economic strategy whose ultimate goal is to raise China’s global economic profile by seeing Chinese firms, including media houses, conquering global markets (Bellabona and Spigarelli, 2007). This has been possible because, as China is a capitalist-communist state, the ruling Communist Party, has successfully kept “entrepreneurs subservient to its ideology and governance” (Kamusella, 2021).

Championing the *Go Global Strategy* in Africa is the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) which serves as the strategy’s “major geopolitical expression” (China Policy, 2017) and Beijing’s “signature foreign policy project”(Greer, 2018) whose aim is to “strengthen Beijing’s economic leadership” (Cannon et al., 2022, p. 93). At the core of the *Belt & Road*

Initiative (BRI) is the repositioning of China's external sector by placing Beijing at the centre of global economic activities and connectedness. The initiative aims to achieve this dream through mutual infrastructural and financial development, smooth trade, exchanges and dialogue between China and the strategic Asian, African, and European economies (ChinaPower, n.d.; Huang, 2016).

Embedded in the initiative is the *People-to-People* exchange programme; key to Beijing diplomacy, this exchange programme's purpose is to deepen bilateral relations and ties with people of partner countries. Through the *People to People* exchange programme, Beijing has established and strengthened ties with key and strategic foreign figures and institutions with an eye on boosting China's relations (Chao, 2019).

According to Legarda and Hoffman (2018), the *Belt Road Initiative* has also acted as a catalyst to the growth of China's involvement in conflict resolution. This is because Beijing is keen to ensure peace and stability in regions that are strategic to the initiative such as East Africa. However, according to Leslie (2016), protecting economic interests is not the sole reason for China's increased involvement in security; rather, there is a corresponding need to guarantee and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens operating in specific countries of strategic importance.

As China is known to rely on statecraft, BRI can also be viewed as the "latest and largest manifestation of modern China's economic statecraft"; economic statecraft is when states deploy their economic wherewithal for "political, strategic or security" benefits. As such,

China's economic, security and political goals are not mutually exclusive; they are interconnected (Morgan, 2019, pp. 390–1). So, to augment its soft power strategy, China has, alongside the “tools of culture”, also deployed “the tools of business” meaning the attractiveness of its economic wherewithal (Kurlantzick, 2008, p. 6). As we have seen, above, China's foreign relations are mainly “government to government” (Soule and E. Selormey, 2020); as such, people who matter in Beijing's soft power campaign are government officials and the elites of the country it is dealing with (Zhang, 2016). Arguably this is why China “lacks experience of working with civil societies” in Africa (Zhang, 2016, p. 6). However, argues Kamusella (2021), the BRI is both a facility for the plunder of Africa and the “main conveyor belt for spreading communism globally” and for spreading the Beijing consensus, meaning the type of Chinese capitalism marrying communism and capitalism.

Another of Beijing's strategies is the historicisation of its ties with Africa using the two [Africa and China]'s “common past” of Western colonialism as the rallying point (Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 47). Mindful of the mutual history, China vigorously promotes itself as an agent of a “new development model and partner lacking colonial baggage of Western countries” (Morgan, 2019, p. 391). China does not just “deliberately frame[s] its Africa policy in historical terms” (Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 43), rather it does so to every aspect of its relationship with Africa and at the slightest of opportunities and to the extent that much of what is broadcast abroad about the China-Africa engagement amounts to the “officially mobilised version” (Large, 2008, p. 48). The

result is that “virtually all the contemporary official and semi-official discourse” on China and Africa “stresses on history” with events carefully selected to buttress that point (Strauss, 2009, p. 780). As such, the official dedication to the historicisation of the China-Africa relationship does not just run athwart the “negative tone” Western framing of China’s presence in Africa (Matanji, 2022, p. 1713), but can also be said to speak to Ranger (2004)’s concept of patriotic history* meaning the version of history which pleases the ruling elite.

According to Bräutigam (1998, p. 4), behind Beijing’s aid to Africa is a “deep history” comparable to that of the West while, according to Mohan (2007), Chinese migration to Africa has existed for over five centuries (Mohan, 2007). However, although date backing to many centuries ago, China-Africa relations got their forward impetus at the Bandung Conference of 1955 which brought together African and Asian leaders to strategise on matters of mutual interest. This was to lead to China playing a part in the decolonisation of Africa and to Beijing funding developmental projects such as the Tazara Railway line linking Tanzania and Zambia (Mawdsley, 2008; Traoré, 2021).

While Bandung kickstarted official ties between China and Africa (Wasserman, 2012), the relations were formalised through the triennial Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Onunaiju, 2018). Formed in 2000, in Beijing, FOCAC has since become the official forum of China and African states; it is now a mechanism and framework for enhanced economic, diplomatic, and security ties between Beijing and African countries making it now arguably “a top notch international

organisation with a track record of solid results delivery” (Onunaiju, 2018). According to Jianga et al (2016, p. 1), FOCAC is a “symbol of China’s importance to Africa”.

1.3 Contentions, controversies, stereotypes, and countermeasures

Although China’s presence in Africa is not “uniformly a good or bad thing” (Mohan and Kale, 2007, p. 4) it is still “problematic” as it is not without its own controversies (Ojo, 2016, p. 2). For example, while it could be said that China is decimating African industries thereby causing “poverty and underdevelopment”, it [China] can also be seen as a development agent bringing mutual economic benefit for both parties (Mlambo et al., 2016, p. 258).

According to former USA Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton (Reuters, 2011), China is Africa’s new coloniser while to former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, China has invaded Africa to promote its “authoritarian capitalism” (Groves, 2011). Thabo Mbeki, former South African president, also labelled China’s presence as neo-colonialism (Lafargue, 2009; Shen and Taylor, 2012). According to Lafargue (2009), the idea of China as a coloniser is partly fed by Chinese firms’ tendency to employ more Chinese and fewer African workers. As shall be elaborated soon below, Leslie (2016) argues that apart from the charges of denying locals jobs other additional perceptions that have attracted bad press are that the Chinese companies abuse and neglect their workers by subjecting them to unfit working environments and by paying low wages (See Section 5.2.2 in Chapter 5).

Other common stereotypes attendant to China's involvement in Africa are that it destroys the African environment while plundering the continent's natural resources only to flood African markets with poor quality products. Burdening Africa with huge debts through loans is also one of the charges (Lafargue, 2009) as is imbalanced trade with Africa (Shen and Taylor, 2012). Interestingly, the debt burden notion has stuck despite expert rebuttal (Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021; Singh, 2021). According to Brautigam and Rithmire (2021) the notion that China is burdening Africa with debt trap is a "myth" (Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021) while Singh (2021, p. 12), has dismissed the notion as devoid of "rigour and sophistication" (See Section 5.2.6 in Chapter 5).

As indicated earlier (see Dijk, 2009), central government is the main actor and chief coordinator of all Chinese activities in Africa (Dijk, 2009). However, Beijing faces stiff challenges in monitoring the activities of all private sector actors operating in Africa. As a result, some of these actors end up damaging their country's reputation. As they are solely concerned with profits, some firms sell shoddy products, something which is the major spoiler for China's image in Africa because Africans "care first and foremost" about poor quality goods (Morgan, 2019, p. 406). The result is that cheap Chinese products have attracted pejoratives; for example, in Botswana they are called *Fong Kong* (Yanyin, 2015) while in Zimbabwe they are referred to as *Zhing Zhong* (Stanislous, 2021) and called *One Time* in Kenya (Morgan, 2019) to mean fake and useless (See 5.2.4 in Chapter 5). According to Kaiman (2014), Chinese nationals' "bad habits" are not just "harming China's

image” in Africa but are also known to Beijing. Aidoo (2016), argues that bad habits have fuelled the anti-Chinese sentiments in Ghana.

China’s economic prosperity has, unfortunately, also caused crime to thrive. While the Chinese cross-national crime has got mainland China as its source and reflects the situation at home, its international aspect, a consequence of globalisation, makes it one of the areas which Beijing is failing to control let alone stop (van Uhm and Wong, 2021; Zhang and Chin, 2008). Overseas Chinese misdemeanours typically involve financial crime, human and drug trafficking, violence, prostitution, gambling, and extortion among many others. However, the chief culprits are mostly opportunistic individuals who also indulge in what is called in *baohusan* which means a form of graft where criminals bribe strategic government officials for impunity (Zhang and Chin, 2008).

Also, owing to Beijing’s non-interference policy and strategy in its engagement abroad, Chinese investors are also generally seen as “giving comfort to autocratic regimes” in Africa (Lafargue, 2009, p. 80). In the case of Zimbabwe, former president Robert Mugabe’s repressive rule (Shen and Taylor, 2012, p. 693) may have been encouraged by China (Osondu-Oti, 2016).

Nevertheless, China is neither prostrate nor helpless in the face of criticisms. Rather, Beijing is “attentive to its public image” and is taking steps to reverse negative framing (Mawdsley, 2008, p. 514). This is because a positive state image is fundamental to domestic and foreign policies and plays a key role in promoting national interests. Moreover, “mass public consciousness thinks that the image equals reality” (Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018, pp. 557–8). As such, China has

deployed its soft power (Traoré, 2021), meaning the capacity to charm and influence allies without recourse to force or crude coercion (Nye, 2004). The soft power counter-strategy is arguably embedded in China's desire to be framed as a global peace maker and purveyor of harmony (Shen and Taylor, 2012 citing Yee, 2008). The fruits of the soft power drive are evident in the uptake of Chinese language courses through the Confucius Institutes in African universities, and through the fact that China now has the largest diplomatic representation in Africa (Traoré, 2021). Added to that, in 2015, China announced a media training programme which would see 1000 African journalists trained every year with funding from the Chinese government and this programme has been well received in Africa (Ojeme, 2017). The economic statecraft referred to earlier which includes the use of investments and aid to charm Africa (Morgan, 2019; Traoré, 2021) has, according to Morgan (2019), been fruitful.

While there has yet to be consensus on whether China's media entry into Africa qualifies to be referred to as some form of soft power, there is already a general perception that China uses the media to counter negative criticisms while framing itself favourably (Wasserman, 2017). And indeed, China's media has gone global including into Africa with the blessing and urging of Chinese officials who see that as soft power drive to counter the West by "telling China's story" (Kim, 2020). Arguably, this is because Chinese officials believe that Western propaganda against the Chinese is driven by both envy and malice (Malafia, 2018). Over the years, it has become commonplace for the Chinese media to promote China as Africa's all weather friend (Xinhua,

2013) and equal partner pursuing a *win-win* relationship (Jia, 2021) or strategic partnership (Xinhua, 2021) guided by the principles of equality as opposed to superiority. However, a study (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2018, p. 2212) into African students' consumption of news found that Chinese media had "little impact" in Kenya and South Africa. Also, another study (Madrid-Morales and Wasserman, 2018, p. 1218) found that the Chinese media were "far from having a profound impact" on South African media workers.

Also, Xie and Page (2013, p. 850), argue that "expected factors" such as the extent of China's cultural presence in a given country, strategic ties between that country and China as well as a country's political system, have "no significant measurable impact" on how citizens view China. Instead, a key factor in shaping citizen's image of China is how developed that country is socially and economically. As such, people in poor countries are much more likely to view China positively than people in rich countries.

1.4 China in Africa media studies: similar research

Although *China in Africa* as a research field is still in its early stages (Carayannis, Tatiana and Olin, Nathaniel, 2012; Kwan Lee, 2013; Wekesa, 2013a), it has become a global "hot topic" in both the journalism and academic fields (Giese, 2014, p. 3) sparking "robust research output" (Olorunnisola and Ma, 2013, p. 45), some of it aimed at countering "stereotyped media imaginaries" (Harrison et al., 2017, p. 25).

However, nonavailability of data on Chinese activities owing to difficulties researchers face in trying to secure interviews with Chinese officials, is still a problem for many scholars (Wekesa, 2016a; Zhang et al., 2016b). Journalists too, face the same problem. For example, the Political Journalists Association in Kenya lamented lack of “access to Chinese sources” and “Chinese perspective”. Calls and efforts by the Kenyan journalists for “greater engagement between Kenyan journalists and the Chinese community in Kenya” were ignored by both the Chinese embassy and Xinhua news agency (Li, 2023, p. 39).

Nevertheless, the field of media scholarship into China-Africa relations is beginning to catch up with the fields of politics and journalism (Wasserman, 2017, p. 195). In this regard, it can now be argued that despite there still being a need for more “theoretical pathways”, the field of media studies into the phenomenon of *China in Africa*, has begun to “gain traction”; the result is that a distinction between mere reportage and scientific enquiry is now readable (Wekesa, 2013a, p. 62). And, if framing has “gained remarkable popularity in both the scholarly literature and the public imagination” (Reese, 2007, p. 148) as well as “widespread use” triggering a “rich stream of research” (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014, p. 181), Africa can safely be said to be significantly reflective of the trend as some *China in Africa* researchers (For example, Frank, 2016; Harrison et al., 2017; Sithole, 2012; Umejei, 2015; Vava, 2017; Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013b), are now using frame analysis to investigate Chinese involvement in the continent (Frank, 2016; Harrison et al., 2017; Matanji, 2022; Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe, 2022; Sithole, 2012; Vava, 2017; Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013b).

According to Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe (2022), a huge bulk of the “this emerging literature derive largely from political economy and foreign policy perspectives” with the “economic cooperation” still a “dominant” frame (Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe, 2022, pp. 13, 15). For example, in his study of the image of Chinese investments in Africa by selected African, Chinese and Western newspapers, Matanji (2022) found that Kenyan, Nigerian, Chinese and South African newspapers used a “positive tone”. The *Daily Nation* of Kenya, for example, depicted Chinese investments as a “two-way economic collaboration that has improved both African countries and China exponentially” (Matanji, 2022, p. 1714).

However, as indicated in the preceding sections (see Leslie, 2016), there are general stereotypes attendant to the Chinese presence in Africa phenomena. So, according to Jiang et al (2016), the media framing of China has tended to be varied with positive news reports on economic involvement running athwart “a great deal of criticism” of the conduct of Chinese business folks and workers based in Africa. Poaching, destruction of the environment, opaqueness in contracts and corruption are some of the common stereotypes that end up in the news (Jiang et al., 2016, p. 3). Leslie (2016, pp. 1–2), argues that China’s engagement with Africa is often framed in “two extremes-either very positively, bringing development and a supposedly *win-win* transformative experience; or negatively as imperialistic, exploitative, and ruining the environment” (Leslie, 2016, pp. 1–2). “Looting” of local resources, “promoting elite corruption” and colonising Africa, are

also some of the charges against China found by Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe (2022, p. 13).

Some of these accusations (Jiang et al., 2016, p. 3; Leslie, 2016) against the Chinese were also among Diakon and Rösenthaller's findings on the media's framing of Chinese presence in Mali (Diakon and Rösenthaller, 2017).

More than decade ago, David et al (2011, pp. 329–30), observed that the field of media framing was still “single issue” focused. Strikingly, there has not been a change in this pattern. This is demonstrated in event and issue-focused studies such as Vava (2017)'s research into China's image in the Zimbabwean media during the 2013 elections and Ndlangisa's study (2013; cited in Finlay, 2013) of the media representation of China following the refusal of a visa to the Dalai Lama by South Africa in 2009 and 2011. Arguably, this pattern confirms that the media are “effective in creating specific knowledge of attributes related to issues and people” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 213). Also, this would seem to corroborate de Vrese's idea (2012, p. 368) of “issue specific frames” meaning frames that are “pertinent only to specific topics or events”.

This pattern is noticeable in Brautigam (2015)'s investigation into media reportage of Chinese involvement in the African agricultural sector. Another issue-focused study was Sithole's analysis (2013; cited in Finlay, 2013) of the coverage of trade relations between China and South Africa. Frank (2016) investigated how the South African media framed the debate on the introduction of Mandarin language into the schools in that country confirming the observation (Hallahan, 1999, p. 217) that

framing, among other things, can be used as a “tool for analysing public debates on issues”.

Also, some studies focused beyond a single African country (Brautigam, 2015; Umejei, 2020; Wekesa, 2013c). Umejei (2020), investigated the role and impact of the Chinese media in the broader Africa through interviews which give insights into locals journalists’ thoughts on China’s role in the continent; he manages to bring to light the fears and hopes of the African journalists that have entered the Chinese media in Africa. Brautigam (2015), investigated media exaggerations of thorny issues around Chinese presence in Africa. Although focusing on the broader East African region, Wekesa’s exploratory study of media representation of China’s involvement significantly reflects more on the situation in Kenya than it does on any of the other East African countries (Wekesa, 2013c). This is so because the study is based on four Nation Media Group newspapers with three of them, namely *The East African*, *Nation*, *Business Daily*, based in Kenya, and *The Citizen* of Tanzania.

In seeking to determine “positive, negative and weak perceptions” of China in East Africa, the study (Wekesa, 2013c) echoed Wasserman (2012) who found a balanced portrayal of China in South Africa. Wekesa (2013c) found that China’s involvement in East Africa was “generally seen in positive rather than negative light” with Beijing’s image “inclined towards pragmatic, economic considerations”. The study also found that China’s presence in East Africa was a “complex matter” characterised by a “potpourri of competing images” that went beyond the negative and positive classification. This was evidenced by instances where one paper would frame an issue negatively only for another to

attach a positive spin to the same issue the following day. The same study also found that China was favourably framed as opposed to the US. However, in some cases, Chinese companies caused “negative framing” because of conflation of private entities with the country. Leisure, cultural and educational exchange events as well as elites’ trips enjoyed positive coverage (Wekesa, 2013c, pp. 15, 35,6). Řehák (2016) found that while the Kenyan media portrayed the relationship between Kenya and China as a *win-win* affair, it also challenged the same frame.

According to Zhang et al (2016b, pp. 14; 16), China achieved “partial success in Zimbabwe’s media sphere” as there was an increase in the coverage of China in both the private and government-controlled media between 2009 and 2012. However, the difference was that the state-controlled media allocated more space towards the coverage of China as opposed to the private press. Also, the government-controlled media depicted China as a partner, an “*all-weather friend*” and “Asian economic giant” while the private press cast China as exploitative. Also, the state media framed China as being respectful to Zimbabwe’s liberation history and sovereignty; supportive of land reform and being anti-imperialist. Stanislaus (2021), found a similar pattern of both negative and positive frames with the private press dwelling on known stereotypes such as fake Chinese products, ill-treatment of employees, plunder of resources by the Chinese firms while the state-controlled media framed China as Zimbabwe’s sincere partner.

In the case of Nigeria, Umejei (2015), found that Nigerian media framed China in two overarching frames: opportunity and opportunist. As an opportunity, China was depicted as a model of economic success and a

partner investing in Nigeria. Under the opportunist image, China was depicted as exploitative and neo-colonialist, trading in fake or substandard goods and services. Another study (Umejei, 2017), discovered that China was depicted as both a partner and a predator. The partner frame encompassed images of friendly Chinese doling out aid, engaging in trade, infrastructural development while observing good labour practices. Under the predator bracket, China was framed as exploitative, neo-colonialist, plundering local resources, fuelling insecurity, and pushing substandard products. In another research, the prominence of the “Partner/Role Model frame” (Umejei, 2013, p. 75) chimes with the “strategic partnership frame” observed by Ojo (2016, p. 10) in the study of diasporic magazines’ coverage of China in Africa. Mawdsley (2008), discovered that the press used negative “classic framings” to portray the Chinese as “unscrupulous, inhumanely cruel, despotic, devious and inscrutable” (Mawdsley, 2008, p. 511).

As already indicated earlier, Wasserman (2012) found that China’s image in South Africa was balanced as the South African media framed China in “stark binary terms as either exploitative, predatory force or a benevolent, development partner”. Hence China’s presence in Africa is too “complex” a phenomenon to be “pigeonholed as either a bad or good news story” Wasserman (2012, p. 351). Ndlangisa (2013 cited in Finlay, 2013, p. 157) found a “binary depiction of good vs evil” with the Dalai Lami depicted as holy while China and South Africa were framed as evil for denying “His Holiness” the visa. Robinson (2013; cited in Finlay, 2013, pp. 155, 6) concluded that South African newspapers framed China from a “Western perspective” and, in the process, upheld

“Western stereotypes” (pp. 156). In classic confirmation of Zeleza (2008)’s concept of China being framed in terms of globalisation, imperialism, solidarity, Frank (2016, p. 57) concluded that the China-South African relationship was, during the introduction of mandarin in South African schools in 2015, “framed in either imperialism or globalization terms”.

However, while other studies like Wasserman (2012), Wekesa (2013b) focus mainly on texts, Harrison et al (2017) saw that as a gap and an opportunity for more research and different approach. According to Matthes (2009, p. 349), the neglect of visuals in media framing is “one of the problems in framing research”. Therefore, Harrison et al (2017) took advantage and established the importance of imagery in the media representation of China and its people in South Africa. Harrison et al (2017) discovered that while there were still echoes of Western and colonial representations in the media framing of the Chinese, imagery was a useful counter-framing tool as it “humanized rather than labelled Chinese people” (Harrison et al., 2017, p. 42).

However, Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe (2022) found that, in SA, China was “increasingly” depicted in “negative and hostile” frames, a pattern that is sustained by “news sourcing routines and preferences” (Munoriyarwa and Chibuwe, 2022, p. 22).

In Zambia, Wekesa (2013b) investigated three local newspapers, the *Daily Mail* (government-owned), *The Post Online* (government allied) and *Zambia Watchdog* (independent). The study (Wekesa, 2013c), which investigated the three newspapers’ reportage over a month-long period,

concluded that the papers were more optimistic about Chinese presence than they were pessimistic. Lim (2012)'s study of the coverage of the Anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia, concluded that the media avoided demonising China and instead tended to admit that Africa needed China to achieve economic development.

1.5 Locating the problem

According to Borah (2011, p. 247), exploring existing research or past literature is paramount as it “tracks down the trends in the field” and helps to identify gaps and, therefore, opportunities for fresh investigations. In that respect, past studies cited above (For example, Frank, 2016; Harrison et al., 2017; Sithole, 2012; Umejei, 2015; Vava, 2017; Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013b) on news framing of China in Africa, were either based on one country or one region or were event-based or issue-focused with a time frame of one year or one month. This exposed opportunities, thereby, making relevant what Benford and Snow (2000, p. 616) call the “Leninesque question” (*What is to be done?*).

According to Kwan Lee (2013), the China-Africa research is still in its “fact finding” stage characterised by less focus on theory. Alden (2013), in his general overview of the China-Africa field, also observed “significant gaps” and called for “more scope for comparative analysis” (Alden, 2013). Also, there is lack of “theoretical anchor” and the “understudied nature” of the field to contend with although there are still opportunities for both the seasoned and upcoming researchers

(Wekesa, 2017, p. 14). According to Ado and Su (2016, p. 55), there is also a lack of *China in Africa* studies based on “substantive methodological rigour” and “erudite argumentation” and a need for longitudinal research based on reasonable time frames and anchored in statistical evidence. Mohan and Kale (2007, p. 4) also called for “systematic case studies” “across countries” and by African researchers. According to Rich and Recker (Rich and Recker, 2013, p. 62), “few empirical analyses from Africans have been forthcoming” on China-Africa relations hence the need for a “study from several simultaneous perspectives, rather than general tendency of the literature to focus on China and Africa (or African countries) as unitary states.”

According to Mutsvairo and Ekeanyanwu (2022), Africans have, over the years, “reluctantly accepted racial stereotypes linking them to unproven claims of laziness and incapacity” mostly owing to “some in the West” deliberately and unjustifiably excluding “important media and communication narratives from the South” claiming that they were inadequate. As such, there is a need to “decolonise communication studies” and the urgent need for Africans to address “a noticeable scholarly gap” and demonstrate that they “can tell their own stories” (Mutsvairo and Ekeanyanwu, 2022, pp. 2, 3).

So, to address that gap and to take up the challenge, this study is a longitudinal, cross-national, and qualitative investigation into how African newspapers framed China’s involvement in Africa over a five-year period (2014-2018) using various strategies including statistical tools; it focuses on three Anglophone countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and

Zimbabwe) using two newspapers per country (see sections 1.7.0 to 1.8.3.) for the study's samples and justifications).

The purpose of the study is to discover China's image regarding its involvement in Africa and as portrayed by the African media through frame analysis. Frame analysis is a natural method for this study because, as revealed in the previous sections (Alden and Alves, 2008; Mawdsley, 2008), framing is intrinsic in the general official Chinese rhetoric, scholarship and media reportage on Beijing's involvement in Africa (Alden and Alves, 2008; Mawdsley, 2008). Moreover, there has been a "steady growth in the use of frame analysis" in the study of news and journalism since the 1990s (Touri and Koteyko, 2015, p. 1) making frame analysis a "lively and important methodology" (Matthes, 2009, p. 349) and "one of the most central, applicable and contested theories in communication research" (Walter and Ophir, 2019, p. 248). This is perhaps demonstrated through frame analysis's "omnipresence" which is "noticeable across the social sciences and humanities" (Entman, 1993, p. 51). Therefore, driving the enquiry forward are the following questions:

RQ.1 Which media frames dominate the coverage of Chinese presence in each research newspaper/country and how do identified frames compare from newspaper to newspaper?

RQ.2 What patterns are readable in the reportage from newspaper to newspaper/in comparison with those of other newspapers/countries?

RQ.3 Overall, is China's presence in Africa positively or negatively portrayed?

RQ.4 What effect does Beijing’s soft power drive in Africa have on China’s image?

1.6 Nature of the study

Based on the identified gaps in existing research narrated in section 1.5 (Ado and Su, 2016, p. 55), this research is a case-based cross-national study (three countries) spanning five years (longitudinal). Cross-national research compares nations “on some dimension” with a view to identifying “commonalities across cultures and countries and thus to establish the universality of particular phenomena” earlier. Case-based comparative cross-national studies aim to “understand elements of a country within the context of a whole case” (David de Vaus, 2008, pp. 249–252). However, it should be noted that, in the case of this study, what is of interest is how one element of each country [media] portrays other elements (communities, government and industry, among others) in relation with China’s involvement in Africa.

According to Azarian (2011, pp. 113–115), comparison is a both common and widely applied research strategy because of its “outstanding merits”. For instance, comparison has lately gained considerable attention because of positive developments in both communications and technology and due to the “immanent intensification of internationalisation tendencies”. Above all, comparison is so intrinsic and fundamental to human reasoning that thinking without it is “almost unthinkable”.

A longitudinal approach is appropriate because of the “unique insights” it offers into “process, change and continuity over time” in varying phenomena (Elliott et al., 2008, p. 228). Also, if longitudinal data is “any information that tells us about what has happened to a set of research cases over a series of time points” (Elliott et al., 2008, p. 228), then newspaper articles spanning for a five year period should qualify as adequate data for this study. While longitudinal studies could be expensive and time consuming (Elliott et al., 2008), in this case mitigation was inherent in the study: digital archives. According to Nicholson (2013), while researchers have responded to online archives with “cautious enthusiasm”, they (scholars) have also been “quick to grasp the practical benefits” with “improvements in speed, access, volume and convenience routinely celebrated” (Nicholson, 2013, p. 61).

Further to the above, Nicholson (2013, p. 61) says:

Keyword search engines are widely recognized as a time-saving device; a handy tool which helps researchers to find material quicker than by hand. So far, in other words, the mainstream profession has treated digitization largely as a practical revolution-it has made research faster, easier, more convenient and more productive.

Apart from minimising the costs, this approach (five-year span), means the study captures some of the important events that are relevant in the China-Africa relations such as the Zimbabwe coup of 2017. For instance, according to Westcott and George (2017), China was thought to have had a hand in the ouster of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe by the army. Moreover, President Mnangagwa was already Beijing’s preferred successor in Zimbabwe (see Banerjee and Rich, 2017; Merwe et al.,

2019). Also, Nigeria overtook South Africa as the largest economy in Africa in 2014 (DW, 2014).

So, having these fluctuations and changes in China's relationships fall under the research time frame is important particularly because, as we learnt in preceding sections of the chapter, frames (exactly what the study is investigating) are also "not static characterisations" as they "change with time" (Hallahan, 1999, p. 229). Just as journalists "define issues over time", some frame sponsors "often restructure their issue frames given changing political conditions" meaning "frames also evolve". In that case, "particular frames may gain or lose prominence" (Carragee and Roefs, 2004, p. 216). According to Goffman (1986), as shall be detailed in Chapter 3 and as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 5, the emergence of new information or a change of situations could potentially trigger reframing; this means that as the news story develops new angles and reframing should also be expected. So, the time frame of five years (2014-2018) was thought to be relevant and feasible to cater for transformational possibilities and realities of that nature.

While China's involvement in Africa deepened in the last 20 years (IISD, 2021), this study focuses on the last five-year period to capture the latest trends and patterns. Therefore, there is a balance of currency and history in news samples as some events happened while the study was already underway. For example, the US-China trade war of 2018. In this context, a shorter time frame allowed an increase in samples, as the online data basis do not reach further archives. A shorter timeframe also widens the geographical space to be covered, as more information can be digitally retrieved from recent years without the need of a local investigation.

Specifically, the research time frame (2014-2018) serves three purposes. First, it covers a period long enough for a longitudinal study and, therefore, fill an identified gap in literature; secondly, the years between 2014-18 are reasonably recent enough to qualify as current. Thirdly, within the five-year research period are two successive Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences. As stated earlier above (see Onunaiju, 2018), FOCAC has become the engine and framework of the China-Africa economic political and security ties. Therefore, it was thought beneficial to have the last two conferences (2015 and 2018) falling under the study period as that would capture all the intense activity towards, during and after each of the two successive events.

In addition, as frame analysis often draws from “various theoretical and methodological approaches” (Touri and Koteyko, 2015, p. 2) this study, likewise, draws from grounded theory where frames emerge during the processing of the data (Charmaz, 2014). It is not the first time for research to proceed that way. For example, Pease et al (2012, pp. 1, 2, 3) relied on the grounded theory for “methodological guidance” to “discover types of framing information”. However, this study employs only those aspects of grounded theory that are relevant to the study and which, according to Pease et al (2012), are research, problem identification, data collection and coding.

1.7 Research countries: portraits and justification

As mentioned earlier above, there has been a tendency among China Africa researchers to treat Africa as unitary (Rich and Recker, 2013). Also, according to Moyo (2016), while China enjoys a “diverse historical

relationship” with different African countries, its [China] presence in Africa is “more visible in some countries than others” (Moyo, 2016, p. 59) a fact which informed the focusing of the study on Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe where presence is more visible. Both sets of research countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe) and their newspapers were selected using the purposive sampling method (Acharya et al., 2013). Also known as the convenience sampling, the essence of purposive sampling is that it is unnecessary to list entire elements of the sample. This is so because samples are selected based on their convenience to the researcher’s situation. In that regard, purposive sampling is a commonly used and less costly method, (Acharya et al., 2013, p. 332). Added to that, in cross national studies, countries are sometimes chosen because of similarities in “important respects” (David de Vaus, 2008, p. 252). As such, all the samples are Anglophone countries with English being the official language in each one of them.

According to Alden and Alves (2008, p. 55), among the main drivers of China’s foreign policy towards Africa are “region-specific concerns”. As such, another significant factor in the selection of countries was the need for a fair representation of the regions of the African Union; Kenya represents East Africa, Nigeria West Africa, and Zimbabwe Southern Africa. Writes Moyo (2016, p. 58):

In examining China’s presence in Africa, the continent is often viewed as one big country or region, despite the fact that the continent has a variegated history and contemporary political economy. Indeed, the Sub-Saharan Africa countries have distinctly diverse political demographic, economic and resource endowments of interest to a variety of foreign investors of which China is but one source.

Also, as cases (countries) can also be determined by the investigator's interests in particular issues or sources or the "case's capacity to inform about theory or an issue" (Mabry, 2008, p. 214), this study also boils down to the researcher's interest in Africa, China and the theory of framing. In that regard, the same countries, and the newspapers, in line with the already stipulated thrust and purpose of cross-national case study research, also possess their own unique, relevant, and convenient attributes which are discussed below. However, it should be noted that countries from the Equatorial, The African Transition Zone and the African Sahel regions were omitted because main newspapers in these countries mainly publish in French and Arabic (see section 1. 9 for more and Chapter 6 for recommendations).

1.7.0 Kenya: China's African hub

Formally introduced in 1963, Kenya's relations with Beijing are a "perfect test for Chinese forays into Africa" (Mogambi, 2018). Arguably this is because, owing to Kenya being the "most vibrant economy and democracy" in East Africa, its relationship with China "may have a major bearing on the political economy of Beijing's continued engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Cannon et al., 2022, p. 93).

Like in the case of Zimbabwe, Kenya's relationship with Beijing deepened during the time when it had a "strained relationship with the West" following then president Kenyatta's indictment at the International Criminal Court (ICC) over human rights abuses (BBC, 2013). However, Kenya's embrace of Beijing was also part of its *Look*

East policy which is “largely underpinned by economic considerations” and is already “paying off handsomely” through railway constructions, funding for security and tourism and health sectors. Also, turning East did not entail turning away from Kenya’s “traditional partners like Japan” (Maweu, 2016, p. 124).

In 2018, China pledged financial support for Kenyatta’s *Big Four Agenda* which entailed a five-year plan to turbocharge multiple economic sectors, and improve the Kenyan infrastructure (MUTETHYA, 2018). Also, for decades, Kenya has been one of Africa’s “most stable countries and economic bases” (Farooq et al., 2018, p. 407). This would perhaps explain why Kenya is not just the regional “manufacturing hub” (Omondi, 2017) but also why China nominated it as its “African hub” (Johnston, 2016, p. 16) and a “key pivot point” (Farooq et al., 2018, p. 404) in Beijing’s ambitious *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) project. Also, Kenya, alongside Tanzania, Egypt and Ethiopia, was chosen by China to launch Beijing’s industrial zones project (Mutambo, 2018).

Kenya is also key in the China-Africa relations research because of its “economic geography” as it boasts of a regional port in Mombasa (Johnston, 2016, p. 16) which makes it the gate way to much of Africa (Noel Dussort and Marchetti, 2019, p. 102). Arguably, the recent construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway by China is also a “typical case of China's infrastructure cooperation” in Africa (Noel Dussort and Marchetti, 2019, p. 92). Also, as is Nigeria, Kenya is among the African countries that form the “new theatre for competition” between China and America (AFP, 2018). Controversy was also considered in the selection

of samples; while China is so keen and spending so much on Kenya, many Kenyans do not think Kenya-China relationship “is rosy” (Khafafa, 2018). In 2013, China played a major part in the United Nations Security Council vote for the deferment of “Kenya’s cases” (Ongiri, 2014 cited in Maweu, 2016, p. 125).

Also, Kenya, like Nigeria, and as indicated earlier above, is one of the US’s “anchor states” in Africa meaning strategic nations in Washington’s interests in Africa (C. Chau, 2015, p. 7).

According to a Michigan State University’s International Business Centre research hub, Global Edge (2022), Kenya is a lower middle-income economy and the largest in East Africa. By 2018, China, India and Saudi Arabia were Kenya’s top three trading partners. However, as of 2019, life expectancy was 66 years while over 69 percent of the working age population were dependents. According to the UNDP (2020) out of a population of over 53 million people, 38 percent of Kenyans were “multidimensionally poor” while 34 percent were vulnerable to “multidimensional poverty” as of 2014.

1.7.1 Nigeria: Africa’s China

Dating back to 1971 (Umejei, 2015), China-Nigeria relations are key for this study because the two countries are so close that international investors now refer to Nigeria as “Africa’s China” (Toogood, 2016, p. 5). This is because Nigeria is a leader in Africa (Ijose, 2017). Nigeria is not only the largest economy in Africa (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike,

2016; Tobi Oshodi, 2022) boasting of the continent's highest population (Conroy-Krutz, 2020; Msugter and Phillips, 2020) and, consequently, highest intellectual capital (Ijose, 2017), but is also the "second biggest importer of Chinese products" making it one of Beijing's top trading partners in Africa (Vanguard, 2018). It is an "acclaimed giant of Africa and a foremost beneficiary of China's ready-at-hand loans" (The Guardian, 2018).

Nigeria-China relations are also important because of the natural resource element and, consequently, the controversy attendant to them. At a time when China is engaged in "oil diplomacy" and "oil safari" in Africa for its own domestic gain (Taylor, 2006, p. 937), Nigeria remains Africa's largest producer of oil (Mlambo, 2019) with the governments of both countries apparently enjoying cordial relations. According to Chinese diplomat, Chao Xiaoling (2018), China and Nigeria do not just share the National Day [October 1] but they also jointly celebrate the event. By 2020, China-Nigeria trade was the largest in Africa, according to the Chinese envoys (Ojeme, 2020).

According to Global Edge (2022), Nigeria is a "lower middle income" economy characterised by a mixture of "a variety of private freedom", "centralised economic planning and government regulation" with oil being the main contributor to the country's foreign currency income. As of 2019, India, China and the Netherlands were Nigeria's top three trading partners. China was Nigeria's top import country while on the other hand it was Nigeria's number nine export country. With a population of 206,139,587 as of 2020, Nigeria has a life expectancy of 54 percent while over 85 percent of the working age population are

dependents. According to the UNDP (2020), 46.4 percent of the population are poor while 19.2 percent are vulnerable to poverty.

1.7.2 Zimbabwe: microcosm of China-Africa ties

Studying perceptions of China-Zimbabwe ties is important because, so far, there is apparent “lack of knowledge and trust” on the issue (Mano, 2016, p. 179). Moreover, the relationship between China and Zimbabwe should be of interest to researchers because Zimbabwe was, in early 2000s, one of the first African countries to formally adopt a *Look East Policy* at the height of China’s challenge to the US global dominance (Ganda, 2020). The *Look East Policy* was a “radical shift” in Zimbabwe’s international relations which announced an attempt at “delinking Zimbabwe from Western capitalism” owing to “frosty and hostile” relations with the Britain and the USA over the controversial land reform programme (Musanga, 2017, p. 82).

So “extensive and controversial” is China’s involvement in Zimbabwe that the relationship between the two countries “merits the most attention” ahead of any other China-Africa ties (Alao, 2014, pp. 22; 5). This is so perhaps because China is generally “seen” as both “a panacea and a hindrance to Zimbabwe’s development” (Mano, 2016, p. 169). Also, the Sino-Zimbabwe relations exemplify Beijing’s “tacit support for corrupt African leaders in undemocratic countries” (Wasserman, 2013, p. 1) while typifying “some of the classic challenges facing Africa’s place in the world” (Taylor, 2020, p. 16). Also, China has been Harare’s reliable ally to the extent that, in 2008, Beijing vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (Alao,

2014). The relationship is also a “microcosm” of China-Africa ties because of the natural resources element (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018, p. 18).

At a time when Western powers are accusing China of “predatorily exploiting Zimbabwe’s natural resources”, Chinese firms are the main diamond miners in the Southern African country (Ojakorotu and Kamidza, 2018, p. 21). The significance and scale of Chinese-Zimbabwe relations is historically rooted. During the struggles for African liberation from colonial rule, China’s most important ally in Southern Africa was the Zimbabwe African National Union (Legum, 1979) which, in 1980, eventually became the ruling party and has remained in power since.

According to Global Edge (2022), while Zimbabwe is the “fastest growing market in Africa” it is still a low- income economy which is “highly controlled by the state”. In Zimbabwe, over 80 percent of the working age population are dependents while life expectancy is 61 years.

1.8 Selected newspapers: descriptions and justification

As we shall discover in Chapter 2, according to some accounts, Anglophone Africa was the first to introduce the Western press (Saliou Camara, 2008). As such, contemporary Anglophone Africa boasts of “powerful media groups that own several titles” (Capitant and Frère, 2011a, p. 5). Moreover, there is a “longstanding tradition” of research on English-language media than there is on any other language media

largely because the press began in colonial Britain (Capitant and Frère, 2011a, p. 8). For these reasons, six leading publications namely the *Nation & The Standard*, (Kenya); *Vanguard & The Guardian* (Nigeria); *The Herald & NewsDay* (Zimbabwe) were selected from Anglophone Africa. From a collective viewpoint, these publications were also selected for their accessibility on the internet and because they yielded most stories about China through the web search. As Churchill (2013, p. 260).

Text selection is a considered decision and always combines some aspects of the pragmatic (what is available) with rigour (what is the best available for your purposes). To make this decision, it wise to start with texts that are familiar to you or texts that seem the most logical....Or, if the research problem is related to an initial text or text event, then begin with that text and see whether there are links to other texts... is there another related news article or opinion piece?

Individually, like the countries they are published in, these newspapers possess their own distinct characteristics and local relevance which also caused their selection for the study.

1.8.1 Nation Media Group and the Standard Group

In Kenya, both the Nation Media Group (NMG) and the Standard Group (SG) are the country's "foremost media houses" (Nyanjom, 2012, p. 1). As Prasad (2008) argued, one of the key considerations in the selection of newspapers for academic study is "regional representation" (2008, p. 1). Founded by the Aga Khan Foundation, NMG boasts of over fifteen publications including in other East Africa countries Tanzania and Uganda with a combined print run of over 200, 000. The *Nation*, one of

the biggest and most successful newspapers in Africa (Karikari, 2010), is the NMG's flagship newspaper. It is the dominant daily in Kenya; as at 2009 the *Nation's* daily circulation (205, 000) was double that of *The Standard* (75, 000) (Nyanjom, 2012). NMG also owns radio and television stations and has been listed on the Kenyan national stock exchange for five decades (Capitant and Frère, 2011a). NMG has been in partnership with the Chinese state news agency *Xinhua* since 2011 (Jacobs, 2012; Řehák, 2016).

SG, which is also listed on the local national bourse, owns *The Standard-Kenya's* oldest private daily newspaper which was established in 1902. Both the NMG and SG have not been spared the controversy that follows most Africa media houses. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, Nanjom (2012, p. 1) writes: "While NMG's dominant shareholder, the Aga Khan, has traditionally deferred to the government, SG's dominant shareholding involves former President Moi, even if only indirectly so".

1.8.2 The Guardian and the Vanguard

In Nigeria which boasts of a "long media history" (Capitant and Frère, 2011a, p. 6), both the *Vanguard* and *The Guardian* enjoy the reputation of fighting for the return of democracy after years of military rule in 1999 (Udoudo, 2021, p. 47). Both papers are privately owned (Brown and Udomisor, 2015). *The Guardian* is reputed for its sober, analytical, and professional journalism. Founded in 1982, *The Guardian* counts among Nigeria's credible newspapers enjoying an intellectual readership because of its soberness (Adelekan, 2009; Olukotun, 2000). Academic research (Igbeka and Ola, 2010) into local use of newspapers found that

most of the students favoured *The Guardian* and the *Vanguard* because both publications offered “information relevant to academic disciplines” (2010, p. 4). According to Prasad (2008) one of the “prime considerations” in the selection of newspapers in research is “prominence as reflected in their circulation” (Prasad, 2008, p. 11). As such, another investigation (Brown and Udomisor, 2015) found both the *Vanguard* and *The Guardian* visible throughout Nigeria owing to “a circulation range of 100,000 - 500,000 copies per day” (2015, p. 13) . In 2015, in a public letter, then President Buhari hailed *Vanguard* publisher, Sam Amuka, as a “gentleman of the press” whose work gave many people some “political communication satisfaction” (Agande, 2015).

1.8.3 The Herald and NewsDay

The Herald is Zimbabwe’s “most prominent” (Engelke, 1999, p. 302) and biggest daily newspaper (Sieff, 2017). Now owned by the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (Zimpapers), a public company, *The Herald* is also the oldest having been established in 1891 by Argus group’s William Earnest Fairbridge (Keppel-Jones, 1987a). It is “pro-government” and state-controlled while the *NewsDay* is “pro-opposition” (Nyaungwa and Garman, 2019a, p. 53). As such it was thought necessary to balance between these distinct and opposing ownerships in the study samples. These approaches are similar to the ones explored in other studies (Vava, 2017; Wekesa, 2013b, 2013c). *The Herald* is also appropriate because it has lived in and endured two key African epochs: colonial and postcolonial. Like the *Nation*, *The Herald* is in a partnership deal with the Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua* (The Herald, 2012).

Launched in 2010, *NewsDay* is published by Alpha Media Holdings (AMH) which is wholly owned by Trevor Ncube. According to Ncube himself, *NewsDay*'s purpose is to be a "leading voice in a polarised society" (WAN-IFRA Staff, 2012). However, in 2015, *NewsDay* fell into financial problems as it was failing to pay staff salaries on time (Zhakata, 2015).

For long known for his fierce criticism of the government and for publishing sensitive articles which caused his arrest in 1995 (Wetharall, 1995) and the seizure of his passport in 2005 (Meldrum, 2005), Ncube was to openly endorse the so-called *New Dispensation* brought in by the November 2017 coup. Soon after seizing power from Robert Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa appointed Ncube to his Presidential Advisory Council. Nevertheless, according to Mano, Ncube is "critical of and sceptical about what China is doing in Zimbabwe". Said Ncube: "We know it is not humanitarian; they will earn a bit of interest" (Mano, 2016, p. 170).

1.9 Thesis Limitations

However, this study is not without its weaknesses; as has already been stated and should now be known, the study focuses on Anglophone Africa. It is, therefore, recommended that future cross-national and comparative studies should also focus on Francophone Africa, Lusophone Africa as well as on the Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea as well as Arabic Africa on the assumption that comparisons among the Francophone, Arabic, Anglophone, and Portuguese African countries could reveal patterns of global value and interest.

Also, the study, because of practical constraints, focuses mainly on newspapers. However, as shall be stated in Chapter 2, radio has wider reception in Africa. As such, it is suggested that future studies should investigate radio and television coverage of *China in Africa* and, also, dwell on the digital disruptions of the traditional forms of journalism.

Also, *The Guardian* newspaper did not have stories for the year 2014 as none was found through the Google search. Future studies should also focus on the news framing of China during and after the Covid 19 pandemic while others can also focus on comparing Chinese and African newspapers. Others can also focus on visual images.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter has defined the concept of *China in Africa* and described its characteristics and given both the background and its contemporary nature. The chapter also reviewed the past literature and identified gaps which form the basis of this study. Also, this chapter has revealed this study's objective, problem, and research questions. The chapter also justified the longitudinal, cross national and comparative nature of the study; it also justified the samples and units of analysis used in the study. Also revealed were the limitations of the study.

* The concept of patriotic history and the stereotypes will be revisited and elaborated on in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2: Media theories, workings, and systems

2.0 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the necessity and essentiality of studying the press in relation to their coverage of politics and government policy; it discusses some ways in which mass media impact on society. The first part of the chapter foregrounds the thesis in theoretical discourse; it grapples with relevant media research concepts such as media effects, and the making of the national image. Lastly, the second part of the chapter describes the nature and evolution of the African media systems; it throws light on to the history and development of the African media systems from their colonial origins right up to their contemporary workings.

2.1 How the media work: thoughts on role, effects, and models

According to McQuail (1999), mass media research, in its entirety, is premised on the idea that the media do have effects of note. Borah (2015) concurs by positing that the very fact that media effects are a subject of scientific inquiry should be the clearest sign that mass media do have “some sort of effect” (2015, p. 4). Neuman and Guggenheim (2011) also argue that the notion of media effects is “one of the core ideas of communication research” (2011, p. 169).

What is meant by media effects is whatever consequence of the mass media processes on societal relations, whether deliberate or incidental (McQuail, 1979). Furthermore, McQuail (1999), argues that detecting media effects on societies is a reasonable endeavour because of the amounts of resources poured into the mass media industry.

McQuail (1979, pp. 8–9) also posits that mass communication consequences manifest themselves at individual, group, institution, society and culture levels and they can be “exerted” on “opinion and belief” such as “individual opinion or collective expression of institutions or society”. McQuail further argues that time spans also determine the levels of effects as do other factors such as “changes in culture and society”.

The media effects theory (McQuail, 1999), arguably corresponds with the notion that news media possess some power (Habermas et al., 2015). According to Senam (2022), media’s power is “principally based on their great reach and strong impact on the audiences and society” (Senam, 2022, p. 19). As such, newspapers arguably enjoy this privilege because they add into a people’s understanding of politics and other issues of concern while “they widen the perceived public agenda” (de Waal and Schoenbach, 2008, p. 161). Newspapers are also a “good source for public affairs topics” (de Waal and Schoenbach, 2008, p. 170) as they cover “more topics of public concern” (de Waal and Schoenbach, 2008, p. 162).

Arguably, the media’s power to influence is demonstrable through mass media’s capacity to prod audiences into thinking about particular issues

even though they (media) may not succeed to tell people what to think *specifically* (Cohen, 1993).

This power derives from the newspapers' role of gate keeping and setting the agenda on key discourses in society (Habermas et al., 2015; McCombs, 2011; Nnamdi Tobechukwu, 2007). Gate keeping theory posits that all media organisations transmit what has been vetted, modified and verified; not everything that lands on a journalist's desk is publicised; rather, an assigned gatekeeper' stamp of approval is required (Lewin, 1947). Therefore, this means that newspapers are able to set the agenda by providing "a host of cues about the salience of the topics" (McCombs, 2011, p. 1). News media were bequeathed the privilege to set the agenda by democratic culture (Nnamdi Tobechukwu, 2007, p. 65) making media a cornerstone of democracy (de Vreese, 2005). Arguably, this is because under democracy, individuals should be able to discourse on issues that concern not just themselves but the society at large (Habermas, 1989).

Also informing and undergirding the mass media's agenda setting privilege and power, according to McCombs (2011), is the fact that societies depend on mediated information. Furthermore, while Cohen (1993) argues that mass media may not succeed to tell people what to think specifically, McCombs (2011), argues that audiences still attach importance on specific topics based on news media accounts and narratives. A people's awareness of the world they live in mostly feeds off what the media would have made them aware of. In the end, masses embrace media priorities and adopt them as theirs to the effect that the public mind is largely a consequence of the media agenda (McCombs,

2011). As well as setting it, the media, according to de Waal and Schoenbach (2008, p. 162), will also expand the agenda. “Agenda expanding” occurs when the media step up their effort to focus on other events taking place at that same time as the hot topic of the day instead of dwelling on one specific issue.

As stated earlier, mass media consequences can also be incidental (McQuail, 1979). As such, newspapers do induce “incidental or passive” learning. This occurs when readers chance upon issues they are not keen on only due to their (issues) prominence and or frequency in news coverage. This means that uninterested audiences can find themselves “trapped” by the frequently conveyed information even though they had no initial interest in it (de Waal and Schoenbach, 2008, p. 164) .

Correspondingly and, according to the media malaise theory (Newton, 1999), news media do have harmful consequences on society. Malign effects occur when news media, in competition for audiences, focus on negative and dramatic events especially crime, sex work, scandals, political indolence or when they “exaggerate or try to create” events. At its core, the malign effects theory holds that the fast nature of the news system-from production to distribution-causes “political confusion, fatigue, alienation and distrust among citizens who lack the information, understanding and the motivation to make sense of the news” (Newton, 1999, pp. 577–8). In contemporary Africa and in a recent development relevant to the malign effects theory’s core thesis (Conroy-Krutz, 2020), Africans are “clearly not overwhelmingly supportive of a free press” because they “independently hold an unfavourable view of what the media produce” (Afrobarometer cited in Conroy-Krutz, 2020, p. 104). In

Ghana, for example, this was because political party-owned newspapers published “salacious and unfounded stories about sex lives and alleged crimes” about political opponents, in apparent disregard to people’s daily lives and concerns (Jennifer Hasty cited in Conroy-Krutz, 2020, pp. 104–5).

Nevertheless, while there is some “positive association between the amount of mass media content devoted to an issue and the development of a place on the public agenda for that issue” (Scheufele, 2000, p. 304), it is not always that mass media successfully set the agenda. This is because the outcome of the media’s attempt at setting the agenda largely depends on how the masses receive and process the news articles. For example, the US media’s “gargantuan and persistent” campaign “spectacularly failed” to convince the public against President Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal as the people did not buy its (scandal) relevance (McCombs, 2011, p. 8). According to Frederikse (1982), Zimbabweans rejected the colonialist regime’s sustained and well-funded propaganda system against the 1970s war of independence and embraced the freedom fighters instead. As Behr and Iyengar (1985) argue, “analyses of media agenda setting that ignore real-world conditions will arrive at severely inflated estimates of media influence” (Behr and Iyengar, 1985, p. 53).

According to the hegemony theory (Carragee, 1993), the media, alongside other social entities like the institutions of learning and worship, plays a key role in legitimising and undergirding the existing order. Media hegemony theory derives from Antonio Gramsci’s (2012; originally published in 1971) hegemony thesis which argues that

powerful groups in capitalist societies perpetuate their dominance not just through the sway of the state but by also ensuring mutual consent. So, while Gramsci (1971) does not specifically identify the media as one of the key drivers of hegemony, his thesis serves as a “framework for examining the mass media’s ideological role by focusing on the relationship between the mass media and power” (Carragee, 1993, p. 331). This is because the concept of hegemony is relevant to media research as it places language, ideology and communication at the centre of the legitimation of hegemony (Artz, 2013). According to Tankard Jr (2001, p. 96) media hegemony can also mean a “situation where one frame is so dominant that people accept it without notice or question”.

As opposed to monopoly, media hegemony rides on consent meaning that for it to occur parties to the perpetuation of the existing social order must mutually accept the prominence of a particular media culture and ideological inclination as the social norm. Also, as opposed to outright domination and manipulation, hegemony is undergirded by consensus with one sector providing leadership to the perpetuation of consensual hegemony. As media hegemony is a consensual relationship, “subordinate and allied” groups can only enjoy benefits that accrue from their adherence to the legitimated order. So, leadership and the capacity to identify and satisfy the needs of all who willingly adhere the norm are key (Artz, 2013, p. 336).

The media hegemony theory further posits that mass media legitimise and strengthen the existing order by producing accounts that are in keeping with “meaning, values and interests” of the elite. In doing so, mass media act as “agents of social control” by deploying a “variety of

framing devices” disparaging other views, thereby, preventing dissent. What this means is that the elite collude to “shape popular consent” by determining and controlling what meanings and values are communicated and therefore perpetuated (Carragee, 1993, pp. 331–3).

However, Altheide (1984) argues that media hegemony proponents have yet to prove the validity of the claim about mass media perpetuating the existing political order. According to him, “journalists are not uniformly socialised into the dominant ideology” while not all “elite journalists” embrace “the conservative values and ideology.” As a result, it is not always that news reports sustain the existing order although it is certain that they “have been agents of change in a number of instances” (Altheide, 1984, p. 477). Correspondingly, news stories frequently bear within them “ideological inconsistencies and contradictions” that point to the “collapse of the elite consensus on national and international issues”. What this means is that news articles carry within them elements of dissent whose function is to “challenge hegemonic meanings and values” (Carragee, 1993, p. 333).

According to Herman and Chomsky (1994 originally published in 1988), the private press is a willing propaganda tool of the elite. Although developed based on the US experiences and situations, Herman and Chomsky (1994) argue that their theory (1994) could apply to other countries as well. Herman and Chomsky (1994) posit that strategic honchos and captains of the corporate community, together, constitute a homogenous entity that determines media content to promote and protect mutual interests and consequently shape the public mind. These elites who include media owners, fellow businesspeople, and the military,

collude to manipulate the mass media with a view to creating consent for socio-economic and political policies that perpetuate their dominance.

Herman and Chomsky (1994) identify advertising, government sources, media ownership, anti-communism, and flak as the key determinants of media content. However, it is around the first three filters that the elite's media manipulation pivots. The propaganda model argues that the corporate media is inherently conflicted because the masquerade of quality journalism is betrayed by the collusion of advertisers, government sources and media owners to ensure propaganda which promotes their interests is served to the audience under the pretext of news. According to the propaganda theory, media owners strike advertising and credit deals with the business community and the government. At the same time, the government uses its leverage as a key source of information and as the licencing authority to manipulate the media. In the end, the private press is weakened to the extent of accepting the manipulated propaganda role to manufacture consensus in the public mind. According to this theory, newspapers sell people to the advertisers and not news *per se*.

However, Herman and Chomsky's propaganda theory (1994) is not without problems. For example, Lang and Lang (2004), disparage the propaganda model's theoretical and empirical argument. Correspondingly, Corner (2003) argues that the propaganda model is shut and not fit for purpose. The propaganda model has also been criticised for dwelling more on media content and less on media effects (Gómez Masjuán, 2010).

Nevertheless, the Herman and Chomsky theory (1994) of newspapers selling people as opposed to news, rings resonance with Conboy and Steel (2008) who argue that newspapers “have always produced readers, not news, as their primary goal”. Newspapers do this by “creating a selection of news for a particular readership” to “create profit and/or exert influence on that readership” (Conboy and Steel, 2008, p. 651). Therefore, if, as McQuail (1979) argues, media consequences can occur at individual or societal levels and if, as Conboy and steel (2008) posit, newspapers have exerting influence on their readers as one of their functions, it should not be surprising that people may end up being dependent on the media for their needs.

According to Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976), the more one depends on the media for their needs, the greater the chance of them being affected by the media; the reason being that that individual’s life and actions would be dependent on what mass media report. The dependency theory (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976), also posits that the extent of an individual’s reliance on the media is determined by three needs, namely the need to understand the social environment in which they live; the need to engage and operate positively and effectively in that society and the need to break free in times of trouble.

2.2 The making of the national image: news media’s role

Among the key things learnt so far in this study is that mass media do have effect on our lives be it at personal or at society level (see McQuail, 1999 above). As Habermas et al (2015) argue, and as cited before, mass media do possess some power whose effects, according to McQuail

(1979, p. 9), manifest themselves on “public opinion and belief” and at all society levels.

In that regard, it follows that newspapers would be naturally instrumental in the shaping of a country’s image (Erlbaum, 2016); more so considering that countries are now subject to branding “in the same way as companies and products” (Zhang, 2011, p. 14). And indeed, while “practically anything” can shape a people’s image of a particular country, the potential and role of the mass media on the matter is in “no doubt” (Erlbaum, 2016, pp. 2, 7). Consequently, this makes mass media the “first rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former” (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, p. 65). This is so not only because mass media are responsible for disseminating a substantial amount of information about other countries (Erlbaum, 2016), but also because of the press’s “regularity, ubiquity and perseverance” (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, p. 65), making mass media the “strongest image shapers” (Erlbaum, 2016, p. 1).

The extent of mass media’s role in the formation of a national image is, perhaps, echoed in absolute terms used to describe it [media role]. Words such as crucial (Král, 2009), influential (Farina and Arslan, 2016); important (Brewer et al., 2003; Farina and Arslan, 2016); major (Siraj and Rawan, 2010); significant (Saleem, 2007) are amongst the many absolute terms used to describe the role of the media in the shaping of a country’s image.

According to Zelizer and Allan (2011, p. 1 citing Navasky), it is largely as a consequence of news reports that people make up their “national

mind”. Concurring with the above, Siraj and Rawan (2010, p. 87) postulate that people form images about nations and their inhabitants based on “mediated reality”. Correspondingly, Farina and Arslan (2016) argue that mass media have the capacity and power to either “develop or alter” any country’s image (Farina and Arslan, 2016, p. 76). The extent of this power is such that mass media can cause a people to either “understand or misunderstand” each other’s countries (McNelly and Izcaray, 1986 cited in Farina and Arslan, 2016, p. 76).

According to Král (2009, p. 2), this power and capacity to influence and change perceptions derives from the mass media’s corresponding capacity to present news stories in credible and trustworthy ways. Also, just as the media decide for their readers which stories are “relevant and interesting” they can also “interpret the information” and, in the process, suggest “positive or negative attitude” to the story. Indeed, Farina and Arslan (2016, p. 81), argue that a country’s image amounts to the portrayal of its “positive or negative standing in media”.

In that regard, other relevant and corresponding lessons learnt in Chapter 1 are that, owing to negative stereotypes, China is taking steps to shape its national image (see Mawdsley, 2008) and that a good national image is key to how a country engages internally and externally, and that image is crucial for the promotion of national interests (see Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018). What is meant by a national image is the “climate of opinion formed by collective expressions of perceptions and judgments of a country by its overseas publics”; it is a “multidimensional construct” deriving from both “discursive and non-discursive elements” (Wang, 2008, p. 9). However, according to Vinogradova and Denisova (2018, p.

558), a state's international positive image feeds off citizens' positive view of their country meaning that a "positive internal image" shapes the "external image".

National image management has always been key to governance (Manheim, 1994). This is because politics and the images of states are "inseparably connected" (Posternyak and Boeva-Omelechko, 2018, p. 1). The importance of a country's image can be measured by its [image] role in the attainment of certain foreign policy objectives. An example of this, is how China and Nigeria's positive perceptions of each other brought the two countries together leading to the 1971 establishment of diplomatic relations that have lasted until recent years (Udeala, 2010, p. 64).

According to Posternyak and Boeva-Omelechko (2018), national images are not just "created under the influence of the media" but they also "undergo changes" through the media (Posternyak and Boeva-Omelechko, 2018, p. 1). Posternyak and Boeva-Omelechko (2018, p. 2) also postulate that images of states created by journalists in their everyday work can be accessed by analysing "mechanisms of such creation". Therefore, in this case, those mechanisms are the processes of news writing and framing.

In what is arguably an echo of the framing theory, Hanan (2006, p. 151 cited in Saleem, 2007, p. 136), posits that a country's media image is detectable in "value laden words, phrases, metaphors, sentences and adjectives" used in news stories. What this means is that by studying the language used by the news media in their coverage of a particular

country's domestic and international policies, argues Saleem (2007), a researcher will very likely determine if news media approve or disapprove of that country's government policies (See Chapter 3).

According to Dell'Orto et al (2004), what Lippmann (1997 originally published in 1922) pictures in people's heads, are actually mediated images of foreign nations. Saleem (2007) also posits that a country's image is a picture of that country as conceived in somebody's mind. That picture, mostly, develops in a person's mind out of their personal experiences and circumstances in relation to socio-politico or religious issues (Saleem, 2007 citing Noshima, 2000).

So, just because a great many people do not travel abroad (Saleem, 2007) while "most people's scope of experience is naturally very limited", most people's knowledge of international developments and affairs is largely dependent on the news media (Erlbaum, 2016, p. 12). In the end, news media shape "mass perceptions of other nations" (Brewer et al., 2003, p. 493).

Crucial in the portrayal of a foreign country in the local media, is that country's dominant ideology because ideology often plays a bigger role ahead of newsworthiness in press reports (Siraj and Rawan, 2010 citing Yu and Riffe, 1988). Media frames, posits Saleem (2007), "generally represent a specific ideology" (Saleem, 2007, p. 134). After all, mass media are part of the means by which the powerful elite create and perpetuate ideology (Siraj and Rawan, 2010). These assertions are particularly relevant because communist ideology and framing are at the core of official Chinese rhetoric (See Chapter 1). Added to that, while

journalists' role in the framing process is minimal (de Vreese, 2012), their personal ideologies tend to contribute towards the shaping of their news stories (Dijk, 1998).

Perhaps the strongest case for the importance of ideology in media studies is made by Uche (1991), who argues that just because African media systems lack an ideological base due to the sway of neo-colonialism, they are incapable of portraying their host countries positively. However, things have since changed over the years. For example, Afrokology, a developing concept that advocates for “decolonising, Africanising, internationalising, indigenising media and communication studies” and the “centering” of “African media and communication studies” (Mano and Milton, 2021, p. 37), is arguably the basis for one to say the African media do have an ideology.

According to Saleem (2007), as well as government sway, a news organisation's ideology and stereotypes are among the many factors that help to “create and reinforce a nation's image” (Saleem, 2007, p. 136). A key factor in this case, is how that country's engagement (militarily, diplomatically and economically), both internally and abroad, impacts on the news organisation's proprietors (Noshima, 2000 cited in Saleem, 2007).

Consequently, just as media frames would aid a people's understanding of the world, thereby causing them to hold opinions, the same frames will shape how they view foreign countries; this is because in most cases people “readily adopt” journalists' frames (Brewer et al., 2003, pp. 496; 506).

All these assertions are not unfounded. Just as the “formation of images of foreign countries has long been a crucial research inquiry” (Brewer et al., 2003, p. 295), Farina and Arslan’s study into Turkey’s media image observed that the notion that media plays a key role in the country image formation was “still very high” (Farina and Arslan, 2016, p. 67). According to Brewer et al (2003, p. 493), “exposure to news coverage increases knowledge about and can significantly influence public opinion towards foreign nations” which is why “actors in the international arena often” put “considerable efforts” towards “moulding the content of the media coverage”. Perry (1987), argues that the more the people are exposed to unrepresentative news, the more likely they will have less accurate perceptions of other countries.

When “readers who are already conditioned by the prevalent stereotypes” about “distant lands” embrace false news stories and take them for the truth, “the consequences can be disastrous media effects”; that is if readers have no means to verify the information through either “personal experiences or competing stories” (Saleem, 2007, p. 133). Media stereotypes, alongside archetypes, among other things, “openly affect the image of the state”. Specifically, and as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 5, stereotypes are assigned a “special role” of simplifying an idea that is being communicated for easy comprehension or understanding; they are “easier to use” as they are readily available as “already prepared templates” (Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018, pp. 559–60). This resonates with Leslie (2016) who, in Chapter 1, suggests that stereotyping is attendant to the general representation of China’s involvement in Africa.

However, a country's image is not conceived in isolation; alongside that country's image, people will also develop perceptions of its citizens and its products with the news media among the chief influencers (Farina and Arslan, 2016; Král, 2009). This is particularly relevant because, as already mentioned earlier (Stanislous, 2021), cheap Chinese products in Africa are already framed in pejoratives (see also Chapter 5). Also, according to Vinogradova and Denisova (2018, p. 559), among the key things that are central to the formation of a state's image are the images of that particular country's leader and political institutions.

As shall be discussed later in the closing chapter, the construction of these images is a "complex communication process" (Erlbaum, 2016, p. 1) in which a range of factors including the country's politics, social realities and economic standing play key roles (Siraj and Rawan, 2010, p. 87 citing Zengjun, 2004)

2.3 African media landscape: evolution and features

Among the lessons learnt in the preceding sections is that mass media can perpetuate the interests of the elite and that a newspaper's ideology is key in the shaping of national images (Saleem, 2007, p. 136). Related to that, and according to Shoemaker and Reese (2014), how newspapers frame political events is influenced by their ownership. In that regard, it is important for this study to discuss the African media systems and newspaper ownerships from their formation to the present setting.

2.3.1 Colonial to postcolonial media systems: perpetual subservience

As mass communication and its attendant techniques are not indigenous to Africa, the 19th century European conquerors found a ready niche to import the concepts of printed news and broadcasting, including languages, into Africa to bolster their colonial project (Salawu, 2009).

However, contradictory accounts exist as to who were the first to introduce Western press in Africa. While, according to Saliou Camara (2008), Anglophone Africa was the first to introduce the press in West Africa, Southern Africa and East Africa, Johnson (2019), argues that the first ever newspaper in Africa was the *Announces, Affiches et Avis Divers pour les Colonies des Isles de France et de Bourbon* introduced by the French in Mauritius in 1776.

Among the early colonial publications were Christian newspapers introduced by the missionaries in Nigeria and in much of West Africa (Mano, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Yusha'u, 2010). The colonialists used these newspapers to manage their newly established schools through evangelical messages and for official government communications (Salawu, 2009). In colonial Kenya, Indian businessman, Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee, established the country's first newspaper in 1901 partly to "pursue a feud" with a fellow rival publisher from Europe (Brennan and Patel, 2001, p. 434).

According to Engesser and Frazetti (2011), there is an obvious mutual dependence between the media systems and political system because implied in the phrase media system is that system's reliance on some

particular society's political culture. This idea (Engesser and Franzetti, 2011), is probably more illuminated when one considers the transformation of the African press from inception up to the present day.

Therefore, owing to the “violent and exploitative” nature of the colonial political order, (Saliou Camara, 2008, p. 212), colonial authorities did not just control the media (Nyamnjuh, 2005) but they also used the early press to oppress and disinform their African conquests (Mano, 2010). For example, in South Africa, the Argus Group created the *Bantu Press* mainly to sabotage Africans' growing interest in politics and dissuade them from agitating for self-rule and to prevent the rise of *bona fide* pro-freedom newspapers (Keppel-Jones, 1987b; Mano, 2010).

While British authorities tended to be tolerant to the indigenous newspapers-allowing them to promote African cultural identity-the French, by comparison, viciously suppressed the local press in line with the program of assimilating their colonial subjects to the main French culture. Resultantly, the press became one of key drivers of France's assimilation project (Nyamnjuh, 2005). Consequently, and according to Frère (2012, p. 3 citing Brice Rambaud), Africa today is characterised by two media landscapes which speak to the endurance of colonial Anglophone and Francophone creations and “the attachment of African journalists to ‘their’ French or English-inspired norm”. However, according to Ngomba (2012) and Umejei (2020), the entrance of the Chinese media into Africa is also raising questions as to what impact it will have on the African media landscape.

Nevertheless, despite the varying degrees to which the individual colonial authorities went to control and suppress the local press, they collectively treated the agitation and advocacy for African liberation as subversive acts (Nyamnjoh, 2005). As the criticism for colonial rule gained momentum, all colonial authorities ratified tougher laws to restrict Africans from publishing radical material (Kintz, 2007). France went as far as imposing heavy tax on newsprint and printing machines (Mano, 2010). It was the same in Lusophone Africa where the autocratic Portuguese authorities perceived newspapers as “instruments that could awaken Africans to their rights” (Ocitti, 1999 cited in Saliou Camara, 2008, p. 231).

However, the settler domination of the newspaper publishing industry and attendant colonial restrictions did not deter the alternative media from thriving, thanks to indigenous West Africans who had acquired printing skills (Salawu, 2009). As Mano says (2010), newspapers thrived in that part of Africa because there were many Western-educated indigenous Africans while the white settlers were not many enough to be able to sabotage the development of the press as they did elsewhere in Africa.

The African elite and nationalists used the alternative media to project an Africa that was proud of its cultural heritage and was keen on self-determination and political independence (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Yusha’u, 2010). What is meant by the alternative media are news sources that are independent from the establishment and differ from the mainstream media in their content and ideology (Downing, 2000). As response to colonial tyranny, determined Africans developed tricks such as

clandestine and underground publishing, and churned out numerous pamphlets among other methods and publications. The bulk of the new pro-change African elite were diaspora returnees from North America and Europe and from the Caribbean islands (Campbell, 1998). At this stage, the media constituted a “counter public sphere” (Tomaselli, 2009, p. 15 citing Ronning) or “limited public sphere of debate” (Hall, 2009, p. 250) in which Africans challenged the oppressive colonial state.

However, when Africa gained political independence in the late 1950s to 60s, the same elite who led the struggle for freedom adopted the former colonisers’ authoritarian tactics and maintained a tight grip on the press (Campbell, 1998; Nyamnjoh, 2005). The result was a partisan and pro-government press. Having been victims of repression themselves under colonial rule, Africa’s new rulers understood the advantages of controlling the media in pursuit of particular political goals (Nyamnjoh, 2005). As such, the newly independent states used the press to drive the national development project (Mano, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Oboh, 2016). Mak’ Ochieng writes (1996, p. 23):

In most African countries, independence from colonial subjugation and oppression brought with it a developmental ethic. In time this ethic seemed to justify the abridgment of human rights and establishment of undemocratic governments in the name of development and national unity. The media were likewise expected and indeed pressurised to support the powers that be in what turned out to be the establishment and perpetuation of a subservient media.

Much as they were loathed, these postcolonial dictatorships did not come as a surprise. According to Lumumba Kasongo (2002, p. 88), the perpetuation of the colonial methods was to be expected because modern African states are more of “products of colonial and neo-colonial

configurations of powers” than they are a consequence of “internal evolutionary and revolutionary processes and struggles”. As Mano put it (2010, p. 1), it is down to the legacy of colonial media systems that colonial vestiges such as usage of languages of conquest and “state-biased ownership systems and limited freedoms” persist to this date. One of the major reasons for these vestiges is that independent African states indigenised westernised models and systems.

2.3.2 Liberalisation to patrimonial media systems: a failed revolution

Owing to the perpetuation of authoritarian practices under the post-colonial state, there arose a commonly held strong sentiment that the end of colonialism had not ushered in true freedom in much of Africa (Campbell, 1998). This sentiment was well expressed in Nigerian publisher, Batunde Jose (cited in Campbell, 1998)’s claim that the press in post-colonial Africa was less free than it had been under colonial rule.

Unsurprisingly, the advent of multiparty politics from the 1990s onwards came to be generally held as the “second liberation or revolution” (Mak’Ochieng, 1996, p. 23) or the “second winds of change” (Chuma, 2005, p. 132). Also known as the third wave (Hadland, 2011; Wasserman and Benequista, 2017) or democratisation period (Kupe, 2004), this episode saw the opening up of various sectors of the African economy characterised by media reforms or transformations and other significant milestones in media development (Kupe, 2004). Among the key milestones of the second liberation was the 1991 Windhoek Declaration,

a petition and demand for media freedom by African journalists (Conroy-Krutz, 2020). Later approved by the United Nations' cultural arm, UNESCO, the declaration coincided with the abrupt end of state monopolies, fall of one-party states and other forms of dictatorships across Africa. Wasserman and Benequista (2017) argue that the Windhoek Declaration kickstarted the onset of “a decade of steady progress in sub-Saharan Africa towards greater democratic rights and media freedom.”

This period saw rapid mushrooming of private newspapers Africa wide. It was a period of “media boom” during which a *‘culture of silence’* maintained by both the colonial and post-colonial orders was “rudely broken” rendering Africa “awash with newspapers” (Karikari, 2010, p. 24). State-owned media organisations also gained editorial independence; a major consequence was that African media ratings so much improved that by the end of the 1990s many countries had a freer media than ever before (Conroy-Krutz, 2020). According Capitant and Frère (2011b, p. 4 citing Nyamnjoh 2005), this period saw newspapers abandoning the “the cult of personality and state propaganda” to embrace “a multiplicity of critical, diverse, and politically engaged discourse” that “reflected popular concerns.”

However, three decades on, the “second revolution” (Mak’Ochieng, 1996, p. 23) has arguably failed with most governments having “rescinded on this liberal agenda” (Mabweazara et al., 2020, p. 2). According to Ogola (2015), the process of liberalisation was so chaotic that it eventually failed to yield a positive outcome. Tomaselli (2009) suggests that this was because African governments clung to the belief

that the press exists to please the ruling elite and to serve as part of the civil service. According to Hadland (2011, p. 117), and as shall be seen below, Africa ruling parties still regard the media as a “natural tool” to be used in pursuit of power consolidation and hegemony.

Mabweazara et al (2020), argue that a remnant of strongmen type of leaders has nursed a system of political patronage across Africa. A dominant consequence of this system is its “stranglehold on the media” with the state affiliated press being the most affected (Mabweazara et al., 2020, p. 3). Aggravating the situation has been the collusion between the ruling elite and business interests to reverse the second liberation (Mabweazara et al., 2020, 2020; Waisbord, 2013; Wasserman and Benequista, 2017).

The “tight-knit linkages” between commerce and politics and their collective vice grip on the press (Waisbord, 2013, p. 159), have resulted in “diverse forms of media capture” (Mabweazara et al., 2020, p. 2) leading to loss of editorial independence (Mabweazara, 2018).

As shall be seen below and as was indicated in section 1.8.1, Kenya is perhaps a perfect example of proxy media ownerships as politicians’ newspapers are registered under close associates and companies’ names (Nyanjom, 2012). The African media have been forced into patrimonial relationships as a survival strategy due to economic hardships. The result has been “patrimonial media systems” entrenched through state-controlled media (Mabweazara et al., 2020, p. 6). Under such systems, the media are indebted to the political elite. As economic influence tends to derive from political power in much of sub-Saharan Africa, media

organisations feel obliged to avoid exposing anything that would disturb their relationship with the elite. This impacts negatively on the operations of the media organisations and the manner in which their staff dispense their duties (Mabweazara et al., 2020).

Consequently, low professional standards, characterised by bias and bribery are commonplace (Conroy-Krutz, 2020; Hadland, 2011; Mabweazara et al., 2020; Sampaio-Dias et al., 2019) and are, arguably, exacerbated by poor remuneration of journalists (Conroy-Krutz, 2020; Kupe, 2004; Sampaio-Dias et al., 2019). Poorly remunerated journalists can easily take bribes in return for positive coverage and are vulnerable to manipulative publishers who use their publications for selfish agendas (Ibelema, 2008). Moreover, some journalists, whatever their personal economic circumstances, generally abandon professional ethics in pursuit of “ethnic, religious and regional interests” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, pp. 57–8) while others peddle fake news and indulge in biased reportage (Conroy-Krutz, 2020). Indeed, and as shall be demonstrated below, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwean mediascapes are characterised by their distinct individual biases.

The fragility of the democratisation process and, therefore, failure of the second revolution, are also demonstrated through the resumption of assaults on media freedoms (Kupe, 2004). Commonplace across Africa have been the destruction of newspaper printing plants, the jailing and murder of journalists (Hadland, 2011; Tomaselli, 2009), the tightening of anti-free speech laws in countries like Libya, Tanzania, Somalia and Egypt where journalists disappear or get injured (Conroy-Krutz, 2020).

While the post-colonial media regulation was meant to advance the democratisation agenda and reforms, it has, unfortunately, become a tool to control the media (Sampaio-Dias et al., 2019) and consequently one of the “pillars of media capture” alongside “ownership, funding and economic enticements” among others (Mabweazara et al., 2020, p. 9). Tomaselli (2009, p. 15) aptly captures the situation:

In Africa, typically, yesterday’s resistance fighters become tomorrow’s repressive elites. These groups tend to betray the democratic principles for which they claim to have fought, by curtailing or controlling the nature of the public sphere, as did their autocratic predecessors whom they deposed.

According to Rodney Gumedé (2020, p. 3), the contemporary African media systems, are “modelled on legacies of former colonial masters and or post-independence liberation government agendas”.

According to Hadland (2011, p. 112), there is a need for an alternative model informed by “experiences and dynamics from post-colonial African democracies”. This would be timely because, already, the commonalities between African countries aid the idea of a Pan-African theory (Hadland, 2011) which in turn feeds into what Wasserman (cited in Sampaio-Dias et al., 2019) calls “build[ing] theory from the South” (Sampaio-Dias et al., 2019, p. 8).

While Western-developed theories may be applicable to Africa, it is only because, owing to their “colonial ancestry”, African media are influenced by external commercial dictates as some media organisations are owned by powerful global media firms (Kupe, 2004, p. 355). According to Kintz (2007), African media houses were forced to import Western European content due to international trade laws such as the

World Trade Organisations' free flow of information policy. Kupe argues (2004, p. 355) that this makes "theoretical frameworks about media organisations, production, media workers and their practices in the African context urgent".

2.4. Research countries' press: portraits, contrasts, and comparisons

Notwithstanding the commonalities found in the African mediascape there are still differences in the nature of the individual countries' systems and ownerships (Capitant and Frère, 2011b; Nyamnjoh, 2005). As stated above, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwean mediascapes are characterised by their distinct individual biases. And as shall be seen in subsequent chapters, these unique characteristics of the mediascapes impact on the local press's coverage of news.

2.4.1 Surrogate and political media ownerships: the case of Kenya

So far, Kenya is the "most peaceful and least restrictive political system" in East Africa, enjoying a "vibrant and liberal....mediascape" and a "highly-competitive press scene" (McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 3), making it the "most sophisticated in East Africa" today (BBC cited in McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 4).

As a result of this freedom, Kenyan journalists are often at liberty to criticise major developments such as Chinese involvement. Also, editors have generally had room to "limit the reach of propaganda through careful selection of the stories they publish" and have also been

able to “defend their journalists when critics denigrate their work” (Li, 2023, p. 41).

However, despite this positive outlook, Kenyan newspapers continue to face “challenges related to political influences on coverage” (McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 5). Consequently, while Kenyan journalists are able to resist manipulation and enjoy some degree of freedom, they still have to contend with a “powerful influence machinery that threatens that autonomy” (Marsh et al., 2023, p. 10). For example, Beijing often exerts pressure on local newsrooms through routine complaints to the Kenyan government over specific stories and to the extent that some editors have had to disown their reporters (Li, 2023).

Arguably, such developments are down to newspaper ownerships that prevail in Kenya. According to Kupe (2004) and as referred to earlier above, in some parts of Africa, the second liberation resulted in “surrogate forms of ownerships masquerading as private and independent media” (2004, p. 354). In the case of Kenya, this resulted in the “factually true but legally untrue” (Nyanjom, 2012, p. 36) political ownership of the media, a phenomena which is arguably the most dominant factor attendant to that country’s contemporary mediascape. As shall be demonstrated below, what this means is that while some newspapers are owned by specific and known politicians, they (newspapers) are legally registered under some people’s names allowing politicians to pull the strings from behind the scenes.

Ahead of the liberalisation era (as mentioned earlier above), the Kenyan political elite consistently grumbled about foreigners owning

newspapers in the country. Their persistent argument was that foreign ownership impeded the advancement of Kenya's national interests. Eventually, this concern was to partly inform the formation of the *Kenya Times* by the ruling party, KANU, in 1983 as an "answer to the politicians' press publicity problems" (Mak'Ochieng, 1996, p. 30).

However, according to Nyanjom (2012), when liberalisation hit Africa, the Kenyan elite took advantage to "spread their tentacles" into all economic sectors leading to politicians buying into the media industry just to "secure their place in politics". Doing so had strategic benefits for the politicians because while owning a stake in a media outlet decreases the cost of doing politics it also determines the extent of one's political influence. Consequently, the contemporary Kenyan mediascape is characterised by "extensive connections between politicians and media ownership" with the former presidents Uhuru Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi's families said to have interests in major and strategic media houses (Nyanjom, 2012, pp. 36–41). As Habermas et al (2005) argued, the media are as vulnerable to the elite as the economic and political systems are.

Dominating the Kenyan newspaper industry today are the Standard Group (SG) and the Nation Media Group (NMG) who control "more than 90 percent of the print media market" (Ogola, 2015, p. 97). Many titles came and went but today, both the SG and NMG groups alongside Royal Media Services, dominate the contemporary Kenya mediascape extending into the East Africa region (See Chapter 1 which elaborates on this and profiles each research newspaper). Although there are also

vernacular titles, it is the English titles that enjoy wide readership and circulation (Mak'Ochieng, 1996).

However, foreigners still own a significant stake in both concerns. As at towards the end of 2012, both the SG and the NMG were notably foreign owned. While the NMG's combined local ownership (corporate and individual) was greater than the firm's foreign ownership, the dominant shareholder was the Switzerland-based Aga Khan Foundation for Economic Development with slightly over 46 percent shares. At the SG, foreigners enjoyed 70 percent of the company's shares with the S.NG. Holdings Limited (UK) being the largest shareholder (Nyanjom, 2012).

According to Mak' Ochieng (1996), among the Kenyan elite's concerns about foreign ownership was that it undermined press freedom in general and local editors' independence specifically. And yet, ironically, editorial independence was to remain elusive well into the liberalisation era.

According to a former SG editorial director (cited in Nyanjom, 2012), the late former president Moi would demand that his preferred successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, be granted "exclusive coverage". Also, Moi would summon journalists to the state house if he thought they were disregarding his will and orders (Nyanjom, 2012, pp. 42–3). Arguably, Moi did this because, based on "anecdotal information", he was involved in 85 percent of the SG shares as he was involved in foreign firms as well as in local ones. The view that the Moi family owns SG is "widely held" in Kenya. Also, while Aga Khan [NMG owner] may appear not involved in the Kenyan politics, he enjoys access to the state house and has

“traditionally deferred to the government” and is keen to ensure that his paper does not offend authorities to the extent that several editorial changes have been made to that effect (Nyanjom, 2012, pp. 1, 42, 43).

In what is arguably the clearest indicator of the sway of political ownership in Kenyan media was how the press in that country “went mute” on President Kenyatta’s huge sums of money hidden abroad (Oduor, 2021). Speculating on why the issue was not covered in the local media (Oduor, 2021), Kennedy Wandera, Foreign African Press head, said: "A number of media organizations in Kenya are owned by politicians. So, politicians actually gate keep or allow what gets out of that gate".

According to Mak’ Ochieng (1996, p. 30), the Kenyan elite often fear the “propagation of foreign ideologies” through the local media (1996, p. 30). And yet, like in the rest of East Africa, journalists in Kenya “value Western normative roles” (McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 14). For example, NMG and SG newspapers “unquestionably follow” the English press traditions such as maintaining “close ties with the business community” in pursuit of “profit and profitability” as well as widening readership to lure advertisers. Like in Britain, the Kenyan press exhibits “a strong distinction between quality press and popular press, a journalistic approach that separates factual reporting and its analysis” (Capitant and Frère, 2011b, pp. 5–6). Arguably, the adherence to foreign traditions is because the Kenya press, like that of both Nigeria and Zimbabwe, is of “colonial ancestry” (Kupe, 2004, p. 355). Uche (1991, p. 4) laments Africa’s “ideological barrenness”

which has rendered the African media susceptible to neo-colonial influences.

As such, Kenyan journalists are driven by “Western motivated ethical guidelines” in their work although they sometimes give in to personal biases (Lohner et al, 2016 cited in McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 8). However, according to Li (2023), Kenyan journalists are still able to “protect their own stories and resist external interference”.

Consequently, it can be argued that as a result of their “commitment to media ethics and freedom”, the Kenyan press is “more resilient against foreign media influence than what is implied in some literature” (Li, 2023, p. 43).

However, there are other traditions and traits than can be traced back to the colonial era such as ethnic bias and the use of newspapers for political gain. For example, in colonial Kenya, local Africans were so poor that only wealthy Indian traders and foreigners were able to set themselves up in the media industry (Bourgault, 1995; Mano, 2010). Resultantly, and as stated before, Indian businessman, Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee, established the *Standard* as the country’s first newspaper in 1902 partly to “pursue a feud” with a European publisher and to promote white and Asian interests (Brennan and Patel, 2001, p. 434).

So biased towards white and Asian settlers was the *Standard* throughout its colonial existence, that its readers were shocked by Kenya’s independence from Britain in 1963. The paper had largely ignored the imminent end of colonial rule (Shepperson and Tomaselli, 2009). Titled the *African Standard* then, the paper was later sold to two British

businessmen who later sold it to British giant Lonrho Group in 1963. However, in 1995, the SG, in which “prominent Kenyan politicians are believed to have considerable interests”, purchased the controlling stake (AP, 2002).

By contrast, the *Standard*'s rival, the *Nation*, assembled “the most extensive string of correspondents in all of East Africa” (Bourgault, 1995, p. 164) to cover African affairs. Launched on the eve (1960) of Kenya's political independence, NMG was financed by the Aga Khan and the Ismaili Muslims (Bourgault, 1995; Capitant and Frère, 2011b). The *Nation* thrived on “advanced printing techniques and bold publishing” (Shepperson and Tomaselli, 2009, p. 477).

In contemporary Kenya, the NMG is generally “seen” as being controlled by the Kikuyu tribe elite hence the perception that it is a “Kikuyu fiefdom” (Nyanjom, 2012, p. 55) practicing tribalism through both its reportage and recruitment policy (Mak'Ochieng, 1996).

Corruption, bribery and manipulation are also rife in Kenya with some journalists driving cars bought for them by the police commissioner in exchange for positive press (Nyanjom, 2012). Powerful corporates will also threaten to withhold or cut advertisements as “strategies to ringfence themselves against negative media coverage” (Mare, 2018, p. 217). These problems are neither new nor limited to the corporates. In 2007, the government ordered all state entities to pull out all their advertisements from the *Standard* over murder allegations against a minister (Ogola, 2015). According to Mak' Ochieng (1996), Kenyan

journalists, in the 1990s, would spike certain stories in exchange for money or to protect their fellow tribesmen.

Like in Nigeria, Kenyan press “tend to promote intolerance” during elections and indeed in 2008 they failed to “adhere to professional standard and were used as propaganda tools by politicians” to fan political violence. It was to the extent that the some journalists were brought before the International Criminal Court on “charges of crimes against humanity” (Kamau, 2016, p. 92).

2.4.2 Nigerian press: of propaganda model echoes and ethical laxities

Herman and Chomsky (1994 originally published in 1988)’s argument (See 2:1 above) that their propaganda model is applicable to other societies outside the USA, is arguably echoed in Nigeria where ownership determines a newspaper’s slant and bias to the extent that owners, “private, party or government”, use their newspapers as propaganda tools (Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007, p. 73).

According to Nnamdi Tobeckukwu (2007), setting up a newspaper for economic and political gain has been commonplace in Nigeria. Consequently, this spawned multiple “unprofessional conducts and abuses on the part of media professionals” with politicians assigning political tasks to newspapers (2007, p. 88).

Adesoji and Alimi (2012) also found the propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky, 1994 originally published in 1988) relevant to Nigeria. According to Adesoji and Alimi (2012), the *Nigerian Tribune* newspaper provided a “classic ready example of how newspapers simultaneously serve the common cause and as a potent tool of propaganda”. The paper serves the owner’s interests and other means while projecting itself as a patriotic and political publication (2012, p. 361). So, despite its “plural nature” and its “reputation” for resilience in the face of dictatorship and for being difficult to control, the Nigerian press is, in reality, prone to “ethical laxities” (Saliou Camara, 2008, p. 225 citing Olukotun).

Furthermore, and in another echo of the propaganda model thesis (Herman and Chomsky, 1994 originally published in 1988), the Nigerian press, according to Hall (2009, p. 258), has, since the colonial era, collectively played a mediatory as opposed to a “straightforwardly oppositional role”. This readiness to mediate government policy gives room for mutual commercial negotiations between the press and the state. What this means is that behind its positive international reputation, the contemporary Nigerian press would rather cooperate with than oppose or expose the state (Hall, 2009, p. 258). Often, the Nigerian media protects markets and global interests ahead of and in disregard of popular concerns (Capitant and Frère, 2011b).

Perhaps a good example of this is when it “obeyed an economic logic” by collectively giving more coverage to the “financially endowed” People’s Democratic Party during the transition from military to civilian rule at the turn of the century in return for advertisements (Olukotun, 2000, pp. 31–2). Another example is when China’s information minister,

Guo Weimin, at a meeting attended by Nigerian officials, editors and directors of private and public newspapers, announced a “collaboration” between Beijing and the Nigeria media which he said would “further deepen cooperation between the two countries” (Ojeme, 2017).

Correspondingly, the local ruling elite are willing dependent functionaries of the global elite (Kintz, 2007). Added to that, key and strategic media personnel running the Nigerian press are trainees of nations that control the international communications system, something which promotes “Western media models and perspectives” in the local press (Kintz, 2007, p. 5). Arguably, this tradition can also be linked to the past where foreign trained Africans played a role in the setting up of the press (Nyamnjoh, 2005). Moreover, Nigerian journalists are among the thousands trained by the Chinese government since 2015 (Umejei, 2020). However, Kintz (2007)’s above point does not prove that locally trained journalists do not also contribute to the promotion of Western perspectives. Afterall, according to Ogundimu et al (2007, p. 191) “little information is available publicly about how the training programmes” in West Africa, “are organised” and “what they offer”.

The press’s relationship with the government, politicians and the army in that country has, however, been characterised by “up(s)-and-down(s)” with the conditions under which journalists operate seeing between favourable and unfavourable (Udoudo, 2021, p. 52). As such, argues Senam (2022), in Nigeria, the relationship between the media and the government is “a marriage of convenience of sorts”. This is because while the government will “use the media to achieve certain

goals at one time”, it will also, at other times, “exert hostile and antagonistic force against the smooth operation of the media” whenever the media act contrary to government demands (Senam, 2022, p. 30). For example, President Buhari’s rule which started in 2015, saw the return of the “ugly relationship” between the press and the government characterised by arrests and military raids in a way that was reminiscent of the military rule days (Udoudo, 2021, p. 47).

However, the restrictive environment is not limited to military might; rather, it has also reached petty levels. For example, public officials, mandated to communicate government business to the press, will routinely deny journalists the information they need to carry out their duties, doing so in total disregard for the law (Freedom of Information Act) which requires that they share information. While this implies that these public officials are unable to distinguish between “classified and unclassified information”, their actions have entrenched a “culture of secrecy” within the Nigerian official circles, making the press’s work ever more difficult (Udoudo, 2021, p. 52).

It is not as if this is inexplicable. The Nigerian press has, “since inception”, from the colonial era, been “subjected to a lot of control” with much of that control from the government, a “situation” that still “persists to date” (Senam, 2022, p. 30). What this means is that the press today, as was the case in the colonial era, reflects the environment they operate in and the government they operate under. A significant consequence of this is that in modern Nigeria, as was in early Nigeria, there exists “a strong matrix between the mass media and society”. (Senam, 2022, p. 30).

However, there are other media traditions passed down from the colonial era that illuminate present realities. One such tradition is that of press activism. The early Nigerian press reflected a fierce contest of conflicting interests with the protest press, representing multiple local interests and grievances, ranged against the colonial system (BAMIDURO, 1982; Bourgault, 1995; Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007). As the British colonialists were tolerant of African views, there thrived in Nigeria a diverse, critical press which, at times, showed disrespect towards the colonial authorities (Capitant and Frère, 2011b; Nyamnjoh, 2005).

Among the early colonial era titles were the *Eastern Nigerian Guardian*, *Southern Nigerian Defender*, and Nnamdi Azikiwe's *West African Pilot*. They published scathing, "seditious and criminally libelous" content against the authorities (Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007, p. 72 citing Babatunde Jose). Particularly, the colonial authorities held Azikiwe's paper as a "plague" bent on "disrupting peaceful relations" because it vigorously pursued ideals of independence while instilling a sense of self-confidence among the Africans within and beyond Nigeria (Kintz, 2007, p. 2).

This tradition of political activism on behalf of the press survived well into the postcolonial dispensation. According to Bamiduro (1982), just as the press was pivotal in the anti-colonial struggles, it also plays a similar role in independent Nigeria's political processes. Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine suggest (2003) that also carried into the present was a twin tradition of press virility.

On reflection, this, arguably, could be the reason why by towards the turn of the century, it could be argued that Nigeria had a strong, “fairly well established” media (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003, p. 182) reputable for its vibrancy and outspokenness (Hall, 2009) and for being the “biggest and most virile” in Africa (Olukotun, 2000, p. 33). For example, and as already indicated, *The Guardian* and the *Vanguard* were among the newspapers that “contributed to the return to democracy” in Nigeria, defying “deadly disposition” of the military regimes (Udoudo, 2021, p. 47).

However, some of these traditions, combined with other factors, “enhance or whittle down the Nigeria media effect” (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003, p. 182). For example, the involvement of the early press in political activism laid the ground for a sorry tradition where newspapers play advocacy roles in conflict situations instead of being impartial watchdogs. Since then, one of the consistent factors in Nigeria, as demonstrated earlier above, is the effect of the proprietor or journalists’ personal interests on the quality of the news and overall conduct of the newspaper. Just as the pioneer publishers used their newspapers to pursue their personal political goals, the ownership factor plays a significant role in the modern Nigerian press as owners’ interests and ideology determine the bias and slant of the news organisations. A proprietor’s influence is rife during conflicts, political contests and elections (Adesoji and Alimi, 2012; Anayo Wokemezie, 2020; Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007) which is when the press “always abandons objectivity” in apparent “recklessness and partisanship” (Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007, p. 73).

The activist aspect of the Nigerian press also manifests itself in regional bias. The conversion of private papers into political organs resulted in the regionalisation of the press under the sway of the parties. Consequently, Nigerian newspapers are traditionally known for regional bias-another consequence of colonial history (BAMIDURO, 1982). Nigeria is an amalgam of two British protectorates (Northern and Southern) and, since the merging of the two in 1914 by British Governor Lord Lugard, the Nigerian press has tended to “reflect that dichotomy” in both “content and style”(Yusha’u, 2010, p. 354).

Ethnic bias is also another major factor in Nigerian politics and hence its prominence in the media (BAMIDURO, 1982; Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003; Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007; Udoudo, 2021; Yusha’u, 2010). So commonplace is ethnic bias that newspapers in Lagos are regarded as the Yoruba ethnic grouping press (Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007). Often, journalists will ask softball questions to protect their tribesmen in return for favours in what is called *‘protocol journalism’*. The ethnic factor has its roots in the colonial past where the anti-colonial newspapers were often divided along ethnic lines. Even post-colonial governments are also seen using the ethnic card to divide and control the media by doling out ethnically induced bribes to critical journalists (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003).

According to Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine (2003), the “degeneracy in the Nigerian media” has resulted in charges of various forms of unprofessional practices such as black mail journalism and neglect of corruption among many other contemporary problems. Other forms of degeneracy include denial of media space to the opposition in the state-

owned press as well as the threatening of journalists by leaders such as former president Olusegun Obasanjo (2003).

Like in Zimbabwe and as already stated earlier above, the press in postcolonial Nigeria has gone through repression in the form of periodic closures, bans, arrests, tough legislations and attacks on journalists (Conroy-Krutz, 2020; Hall, 2009). Generally, the sense of insecurity is higher in Nigeria as journalists have been “killed with impunity” (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003, p. 194). Such forms of repression have occurred throughout all kinds of governments that have ruled Nigeria since the end of colonialism namely parliamentary, military dictatorship and civilian (Nnamdi Tobeckukwu, 2007, p. 69; Senam, 2022; Udoudo, 2021). For example, during the transition from military rule to civilian rule at the turn of the century, authorities refused to repeal the so-called “death decrees” (tough laws targeted at the media). Even though the transitional government did not enforce these laws, they hung over the media like Damocles’ sword (Olukotun, 2000, p. 31). Also, many journalists have been arrested in the recent past (Conroy-Krutz, 2020; Udoudo, 2021).

Arguably, this paradoxical nature of the Nigerian press’ operations is also exhibited in situations where the media would fail to expose the excesses of the regime as they would have done with the dictatorial tendencies of the previous one. Consequently, the Nigerian press has gained the label of being an “unreliable partner in the struggle for transparent and accountable government” (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2003, p. 194).

Also, according to Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine (2003), the development of the communication sector has drastically affected the Nigerian media operations. Sharp increases in service charges have meant that investigative journalists who rely on phones are rendered less effective as they must watch their phone bills.

The economic situation has also affected the press immensely. For example, poor remuneration has fuelled corruption amongst the Nigerian journalists with the media owners finding it difficult to enforce anti-graft rules. Moreover, local newspapers regularly rely on foreign copy because they cannot afford to send their own reporters to cover every major event within Nigeria. Also, Nigeria has seen a rise in fake news (Udoudo, 2021).

2.4.3 Zimbabwe: State-controlled vs private press

Like in the rest of Africa, several features characterise the Zimbabwean media landscape; nevertheless, only one feature distinguishes it from the rest: the entrenched “polarity between the state controlled public press and the private press” (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011, p. 100) which manifests itself in pro versus anti-government editorial slants (Nyaungwa and Garman, 2019b).

The extent of the polarisation is such that the country’s mainstream media has, over the years, become not only “vibrant” but “central” to the tussle for the control of public discourse between the ruling elite and the opposition (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011, p. 100).

Historical factors have contributed to this situation. What constitutes the state-controlled press today are the Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980) Limited (Zimpapers) and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC), both colonial creations. Zimpapers, which publishes *The Herald* (see Chapter 3), *Chronicle*, *Sunday Mail*, *Sunday News* and *The Manica Post*, was originally owned by the Argus Printing and Publishing Company (APP), a South African firm in which British imperialist and founder of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Cecil John Rhodes, had a key stake which he used to advance his colonialist project. At independence in 1980, the new black government bought APP with funding from the Nigerian government and renamed it Zimpapers, owned by both the state and private shareholders and run by a trust (Chuma, 2005; Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011; Moyo, 2003).

However, just as the colonialists had used the press to advance their interests, the new government, like in the rest of Africa, immediately showed its authoritarian aspect by manipulating the public press to bolster its “broad hegemonic project” under the pretext of promoting development and national reconciliation (Chuma, 2005, p. 129).

Ministers often threatened or fired Zimpapers editors, accusing them of being either agents of imperialism or opposition activists. In the process, fear and self-censorship set in resulting in the public media readily giving in to the ruling elite’s will and agenda to create a “collaborative and patriotic” media controlled by the state (Chuma, 2020, p. 7) hence the advent of “patriotic journalism” (Ranger, 2004 cited in Matsilele et al., 2022, p. 3) which backs the state and bashes the opposition.

So, when the early 1990s second liberation came, the new private titles naturally assumed the opposition role, becoming the “kingpin” and “mother of the democratisation agenda” (Moyo, 2003, pp. 2 & 13). As the voice of the opposition, the private press became a “significant terrain” around which those opposed to the government mobilised and articulated pressing issues of the day such as democracy, graft and poverty (Chuma, 2005, p. 132).

As reaction to growing opposition and criticism, the government deployed all its mighty roping in the public media which, by the turn of the century, had effectively become a “divisive institution” (Chuma, 2005, p. 123). Mandated to identify and vilify state enemies including private press journalists, the state media zealously carried out its duty while heaping praises on the ruling elite (Chuma, 2005). Arguably this resulted in “vendetta journalism” meaning the type of independent journalism that “exposes the Zanu PF government for failures” (Mabweazara, 2010 cited in Matsilele et al., 2022, p. 3).

Eventually, the state passed draconian laws such as the Public Order and Security Act as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act leading to the closure of private papers, arrest, detention, and deportation of many journalists (Chuma, 2005; Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011; Moyo, 2003). Furthermore, the biting economic situation also led the closure of some private newspapers (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011).

However, a few other publications such as the *Zimbabwe Independent*, *Standard* and *The Financial Gazette* survived while the *NewsDay* was

launched in 2010. These private papers have continued to resist the state's attempt to "control and monopolise public discourse" (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011, pp. 100–1). While the public media remains unquestionably loyal to its dual mandate of parroting government views and vilifying opponents, private papers remain determinedly committed to exposing the government (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011).

The net effect of all these realities is that the private press appears to have "signed a pact with the opposition" to never expose the opposition for whatever wrongdoing while chastising the government for anything it does (Chari, 2011, p. 10). According to Chuma (2005, p. 136), the private press "has become to the opposition and parts of civil society what the public media are to the ruling party and government".

Perhaps the state-controlled media's commitment to pursuing the ruling party and government's agenda was demonstrated in 2008 when their senior editors were placed on the European Union targeted sanctions list alongside the ruling elite for allegedly participating in the brutalisation of the citizenry (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011). Symbolically, as shall be seen in Chapter 3, this was the time when China's influence in Zimbabwe was deepening (Moyo, 2003) in line with Harare's *Look East* policy launched a few years previously following the breakdown of relations with the west.

According to Mawindi Mabweazara (2011), so entrenched is the polarisation between the state-controlled and the private press that it impacts on journalists' associational lives outside working hours. For example, while journalists from the public media will not feel free to

patronise the opposition associated Harare Press Club, private press journalists will shun the Bulawayo branch because it is dominated by colleagues from the state-controlled media. Furthermore, journalists from the private press are so particular about their writing that they do not want to end up “sounding like *The Herald*” (Mawindi Mabwezara, 2011, p. 106).

The polarisation also impacts on news sourcing. Mano (2005) found that most Zimbabwean news sources grant interviews only to those they either prefer or are of the same political persuasion. According to Mawindi Mabwezara (2011), what this effectively means is that journalists who move from a *NewsDay* (anti-government) to *The Herald* (pro-government) will certainly no longer be trusted by their traditional sources and may eventually lose them (sources).

And yet the state-controlled media remains dominant enjoying not just the monopoly (Mawindi Mabwezara, 2011) but the reputation of being Zimbabwe’s largest employer of media personnel (Chuma, 2020). This has entrenched “patrimonial relations” and is manifested in the imposition of editors along partisan and loyalty lines (Mabwezara et al., 2020, p. 8).

Faced with such “a set of vulnerabilities” (Chuma, 2020, p. 15), journalists eventually give in to the manipulative government officials (Mabwezara, 2018). The extent of this vulnerability was perhaps demonstrated in 2019 when *The Herald’s* editor, Joram Nyathi, was fired barely a month into his job for not publishing the president’s return from

abroad on the front page. His expulsion followed a public threat and a warning from a ruling party Member of Parliament (Fadnes et al., 2020).

That journalists are still harassed in Zimbabwe was also well demonstrated in 2020 during the Covid 19 pandemic when many were arrested for operating without accreditation cards despite the fact that the government had not issued the cards for that year (Matsilele et al., 2022). Such incidents have been made possible by an array of laws which include the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act which was replaced by the Freedom of Information Act 2021. As mentioned above, these laws have tended to impede freedom and public self-expression.

However, these laws have been rendered less “effective in stifling dissent” due to the emergence of “social media dissidence” in the form of YouTube vlogging which is now a “counter public sphere and a dissident space” enabling “ordinary citizens to challenge power” (Mututwa and Gwindingwe, 2022, pp. 2001, 2009). Also, owing to the influence of digital media, “whistle blower-aided citizen journalism” has had an impact in Zimbabwe where one blogger by the name Baba Jukwa became a “celebrity” with “credibility” and “reputation” simply by “spilling ruling party secrets through the internet”. His impact was proven in the fact that what he wrote “came to pass” and to the extent that he was “hunted” by the affected elite (Mpofu et al., 2023, pp. 86, 102).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the importance of studying the media and how the media works. It also revealed that some traditions inherited from the colonial era are still dominant in African mediascape and especially in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, newspapers started by the colonialists are still operational and they still dominate the two countries' postcolonial media landscapes although the ownerships have changed. While in Zimbabwe, the ruling elite will control content by manipulating the editorships of the state-controlled papers, in both Nigeria and Kenya content is controlled through private ownerships as politicians have purchased stakes in newspapers for political gain. In Nigeria, the media, despite its reputation for being virile, will routinely play ball with government and the ruling elite whereas in Zimbabwe the private press is rabidly anti-government and unwaveringly pro-opposition. In Kenya, large cooperates will bully newspapers by threatening to withdraw adverts while political owners will order journalists to provide positive coverage to their colleagues. Also in Kenya, the government will also bully newspapers if they report negatively by withdrawing advertisements. In Nigeria and Kenya, corruption is rife as is ethnic and regional bias whereas in Zimbabwe it is political bias that is prevalent.

Chapter 3: Methodological approaches and justifications

3.0 Introduction

As indicated in Chapter 1, frame analysis is the natural methodology for this study because, as scholars suggest (see Alden and Alves, 2008; Mawdsley, 2008), framing is intrinsic in the official narrative of the China-Africa relations. This chapter, therefore, describes framing, demonstrating how it works. The chapter also describes the methodological and systematic steps taken to identify the frames which were analysed to determine China's image in Africa thereby addressing an identified gap in research.

3.1 Framing: what it is and how it works

Framing entails “selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). It is a “schemata of interpretation” through which individuals are able to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events around them (Goffman, 1986, p. 21).

However, Entman's definition is “possibly the most widely accepted” definition of framing (David et al., 2011, p. 330). Arguably, the success of Entman's definition is echoed in the extent to which it has influenced other scholars. According to Ardèvol-Abreu (2015), frames “draw attention to some aspects of reality at the expense of others” (2015, p. 424) while Hahallan (1999, p. 207) argues that frames “reflect judgements made by message creators or framers”. Also concurring with Entman (1993) are Benford and Snow (2000) who posit that at the heart of framing are problem identification, apportionment of blame and or

responsibility as well as the search for solutions. Zoch and Molleda (2006, p. 281) use the “metaphor of a window” to define framing:

The message framer has the choice of what is to be emphasized in the message, as the view through a window is emphasized by where the carpenter frames, or places, the window. If the window had been placed, or framed, on a different wall, the view would be different.

Echoed in the above statement are Entman (1993, p. 52)’s ideas of salience and moral evaluation. However, Entman’s definition is not without its own problems. According to de Vreese (2012), it is not every frame that contains “moral evaluations or treatment recommendations”; as such, problem definition stands out as the most valuable feature of a frame as it can be “captured in keywords or arguments” (de Vreese, 2012, p. 367). However, despite this, Entman’s definition remains the most “frequently quoted” (Carragee and Roefs, 2004, p. 261).

Therefore, going by Entman (1993), framing can be taken to mean a way; a tool (Cissel, 2012) and a process (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015; Chong and Druckman, 2007a; de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 2007; Scheufele and Iyengar, 2014) by which news is conveyed to recipients causing them to form their own opinions. Framing’s “major premise” is that every issue or news item has got multiple sides from which it can be viewed and understood (Chong and Druckman, 2007a, p. 104). As framing involves selection and salience (Entman, 1993) what this suggests is that a framer intentionally communicates or conveys their chosen side of an issue at hand (Reese, 2007). So, “the decisional aspect of choosing the right

words or symbols to convey a particular meaning is part of a conscious effort to frame an issue in a certain way” (Zoch et al., 2008, p. 352).

As a process, framing gives “meaning, interpretation, organization, and classification to experiences” and these experiences “shape cognitive perceptions and mediate in life situations” (Ospina Estupinan, 2017, p. 5). Consequently, framing becomes central in the “construction of social reality” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 207).

As journalists write news, they “cull a few elements of perceived reality” so as to “assemble a narrative” that will “promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2007, p. 164). In the process, readers are caused to “develop a particular conceptualization” of an issue being written about or to “reorient their thinking” about that same issue (Chong and Druckman, 2007a, p. 104). According to Hänggli and Kriesi (2012) political actors too will take trouble to make their audiences understand issues in the same way as journalists do. That way, according to D’Angelo (2002), framing “shapes public dialogues about political issues” (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 874).

As an unavoidable fact (Cissel, 2012; Elegbe and Eze, 2018), framing occurs consciously or unconsciously on the part of communicators (Kuypers, 2009; Entman, 1993). Framing occurs unconsciously perhaps because it is “present in the mind” of a news writer (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015, p. 424). After all, according to Lippmann (1997), humans conduct themselves around perceptions or pictures situated in their heads.

Media framing also plays a part in the shaping of mass opinion through the “prevailing modes of presentation in elite rhetoric and news media

coverage” (Scheufele and Iyengar, 2014, p. 18). News media do this by “using specific frameworks” that will lead readers to reach an understanding of a particular story or issue (Cissel, 2012, p. 67) and by spinning events to influence public attitudes (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). Therefore, as frames can carry either negative or positive emphasis on some issue, they are inherently capable of swaying the public towards policies (de Vreese, 2005).

What this means is that a media frame or frame in communication (Aarøe, 2017) can be said to be “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning” to stories and issues (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). So, a media frame’s function is to “invite and incentivise” news consumers to “read a story in a particular way”. Persuading readers to view things in a some preferred way is arguably inevitable because frames affect individuals based on individuals’ “degree of attention, interests, beliefs, experiences, desires, and attitudes” (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 63).

Frames do not emerge from nowhere. According to Entman (1993, p. 52), frames are found in the “communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture”. This is in line with Matthes (2012, pp. 248–9) who postulates that frames are “part of a culture” and they can be found in “strategic communications of entities like political parties, non-governmental organisations, in the cognitive structures of journalists, in the news media content, and in the minds of citizens”.

The meaning of this is that a range of news sources, politicians and activists included, contribute towards the construction and shaping of

media frames (de Vreese, 2012; Carragee and Roefs, 2004). By their very nature, frames are intrinsic in political debates and messages; politicians rely on frames to portray themselves and their ideas positively for personal gain (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). This brings to attention yet again the observation mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 about framing being intrinsic in the official Chinese rhetoric. According to Gamson (1984), the process where media sources engage in the framing of information is called frame enterprise while the actors are said to be sponsoring frames. To Scheufele (1999) that can also be called frame building.

In the context of political contests, political actors, as news sources, build frames by drawing journalists and individuals' attention to specific aspects of an issue or event as opposed to others (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2012). Such frames, that is, those that are promoted by contestants and proponents in political causes are called advocacy frames (de Vreese, 2012). Integral to such frames, are mutual processes of frame construction and frame promotion. During the construction stage, interested parties will first find their own substantive frame, decide how to neutralise opponents' frame and how much time to allocate to their multiple tasks. As all these happen, the framers will be deciding how to promote their frame and through which medium. However, care must be taken not to "overload the processing capacity of the media" by sponsoring "too many frames" (Hänggli and Kriesi, 2012, pp. 261, 263).

However, as shall be seen in Chapter 4 just because journalists have "little autonomy", they routinely play a peripheral role in the framing process; in the end it is mostly advocacy frames that end up in the news

(de Vreese, 2012, pp. 368–9). Ultimately, journalists’ role in frame making is limited to mere “selection of topics that are subject to discussion” meaning the journalists’ “framing discretion lies in the decision of which advocacy frames to pick up on, which ones to neglect..”(de Vreese, 2012, p. 369). Going by this, advocacy frames can be called substantive and journalistic frames or procedural frames (Entman, 2004). The production of frames, therefore, can also result from an “interplay of between advocacy frames and journalistic frames” (de Vreese, 2012, p. 369).

The most common frames used by both the news providers and consumers are conflict, economics and human impact (Neuman et al., 2018). However, according to Bartholomé et al (2018), conflict frames are the most prevalent in political communication studies. This is because conflict is intrinsic in the natures of both politics and democracy while journalists also routinely play a part in the promotion of conflict frames which are normally built around policy issues.

Carragee and Roefs (2004, p. 214) argue that framing research should discover ways in which political interest groups sponsor frames and how journalists deploy frames in their news stories and “how these stories articulate frames and how audience members interpret them”. Therefore, a researcher can find (David et al., 2011), or extract frames (Matthes and Kohring, 2008) in news stories through “five common devices” (Zoch et al., 2008, p. 352) identified by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) namely catchphrases, depictions, metaphors, exemplars and visual images used in the story (See Chapter 4 where this concept and technique is practicalised).

When a researcher searches for frames he or she is engaging in frame analysis, meaning a “technique” through which one combs texts for their “diverse elements” with a view to finding out what “holds those elements together”. Accordingly, at the core of frame analysis is discovering how these detected elements collectively form “packages of meaning”. Therefore, a frame is a “central concept” that brings and holds a text’s idea elements together; it “is a necessary property of a text” (Creed et al., 2002, p. 37). This resonates with the theory (see Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) of a frame as a “central organising idea”.

However, researchers should stay alert to the fact that frames do not always stay the same; frames evolve and or change with time. What this means is that when new details and previously unknown information about some issue surfaces, it stands a high chance of triggering reframing (Goffman, 1986). According to Anderson (2018), frames that arise as a result of the decay of the older ones and after the decayed ones would have had effect on their intended targets are called counter frames. Also, according to Van Gorp (2007, p. 69), framing, “in all its phases”, is “vulnerable and prone to counter frames”.

According to Hallahan (1999), framing is “essentially a tool of power that can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 223). Also, media framing is “integrally involved in questions of ideology” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 223 citing Glasgow University Media Group). This is particularly important because in Chapter 1 (see Dijk, 2009), it was stated that among China’s core goals is to alter Western global influence and promote its model of development in Africa and beyond.

3.2 Data collection and processing

Data collection and processing occurred symbiotically characterised by specific steps and phases ranging from internet search to classification and storage.

3.2.1 Phase 1: Internet search and storage

To gather the content, the researcher entered the key word ‘China’ into the google search engine, customising the search according to date to retrieve news articles from specific websites, namely the research newspapers’ domain. This was done newspaper by newspaper, year by year, month by month. The exercise took seven months to be completed with a combined total of 3001 articles found. Google was ideal for this task because of the “ubiquity of web searches” on google (Zoch et al., 2008, p. 353).

All the retrieved stories were systematically saved, step-by-step. First, a main folder was created and titled *Data Collection*; inside that folder was created three subfolders namely *Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe*. Inside each subfolder was created six subfolders each one named after a newspaper. For example, *The Guardian* and *Vanguard* for Nigeria. Inside each folder named after the newspaper, was created five more folders for the years *2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018*. The stories were then stored in portable document format (PDF) according to date of publication, for example, day-by-day, year-by-year and month-by-month with each article assigned its specific unique identity code (for example, KE_NA_2016-07f07 for an article retrieved from the *Nation*).

The key components of the identity code are country name (KE=Kenya), newspaper name (NA=Nation), year (2016) and month of publication (7=July) and the alphabetic order in which the articles were retrieved (F). Stories were stored this way to mitigate against the consequences of the “unstable and temporary nature of websites” (Churchill, 2013, p. 262) an inherent condition of websites which manifests in their routine changes and removals (McMillan, 2000). Also, this was done to enable convenient retrieval and referencing as these codes were used to reference news articles in the findings and discussion sections (See Chapter 4 & 5).

3.2.2 Phase 2: Data classification

The second phase involved a thorough reading of all the retrieved articles from headline, stand first, kicker, pull quotes right through the entire body into the last line, placing them in relevant and nonrelevant categories. To do this, an extra subfolder titled *Nonrelevant* was created under each subfolder (year) (see Phase 1) to store nonrelevant articles. A total of 1, 384 relevant stories was found. The relevance criteria was informed by Dijk’s theory (2009) of what constitutes Chinese presence in Africa namely the activities of Chinese government, state-owned enterprises and private Chinese companies, the Chinese embassy in the country concerned and the Chinese people in any African country (See Chapter 1 section 1. 1). For the purposes of this study, a story had to show the actorness of all or any of these actors in Africa or in relation with Africa (see Dijk, 2009 in Chapter 1) for it to be classified as relevant to the study. Only hard news, feature, interviews, and opinion articles

were considered as relevant because, as shall be seen later, it is more convenient to apply frame analysis to written words.

3.2.3 Phase 3: Frame tracking and story coding

Since, as has been mentioned before, framing borrows from grounded theory where frames emerge during the processing of data (Charmaz, 2014), it should be emphasised that the coding of articles and frame tracking occurred simultaneously. The stories were read for the third time, one by one, to classify them according to specific codes and categories (See Appendix L for the codebook, coding procedure and instructions).

To turn the data into “bones of analysis” and, therefore, a “working skeleton” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 113), a codebook was developed first. A codebook is a system of categories supported by a set of instructions on how to code and record units (Churchill, 2013). Therefore, using the codebook guidelines and instructions, all the relevant stories (1 384 in total) were then entered into an excel sheet one by one over a period of 15 months. Each story was carefully entered according to its diverse components; for example, assigned unique storage ID (see section 3.5.1), publication, date of publication, country of publication, authorship, main actors (people and organisations) main subject and activity. It is this excel sheet which was entered into SPSS for crosstabulation and Chi-Square tests (See Chapter 4).

According to Churchill (2013), both the codebook and the process of coding are an integral part of content analysis. Therefore, coding is

making a connection between texts and set categories in order that the researcher can detect similarities and differences in his or her data. These connections, similarities and differences are the very material the researcher uses to analyse the data (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). Primarily, coding involves the summarisation and categorisation of data with a view to solving the research problem; therefore, a codebook helps the researcher to codify and that is to categorise or systematically arrange data (Saldaña, 2016). As such, codes are foundational to a researcher's argument and, a researcher should clearly define the codes and state clearly what those codes are meant to capture and not capture (MacQueen et al., 1998). A codebook's supporting instructions should not just be clear but should also be comprehensive enough with all components fully explained for a researcher to be able to achieve both "validity and replicability" (Churchill, 2013, p. 263).

Through coding, researchers "assign a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute" to parts of their data (Saldaña, 2016, pp. 4–5). Therefore, as opposed to precision, coding's focus is interpretive (Saldaña, 2016).

Coding was necessary for this study as it is the key to unlocking fundamental patterns in the texts [news articles in this case] so as to be able to deduce meaning out of them (Glaser and Strauss, 2009; Jorgensen, 1989). According to Saldaña (2016), patterns are "repetitive, regular or consistent occurrences of data that appear more than twice" and they firmly indicate the trustworthiness of the researcher's evidence or findings and are central to the formulation of sound meanings of observations (2016, pp. 5–6).

As it is “not always necessary to reinvent the wheel” (Churchill, 2013, p. 264) when developing coding instructions and definitions, this study deploys MacQueen et al’ s (1998) method and table which defines the code in brief and in full; states clearly when to use and not use the code before demonstrating with an example of how to do so.

A codebook can either be “text-specific” or “theory-specific” with the former deriving from earlier hasty reading of the data with the latter developing from available literature and research (Churchill, 2013, pp. 264–5). As such, this study’s codebook borrows from both approaches with the instructions based on the insights from both the prior reading of the data and from the existing literature. According to Mihas and Odun Institute (2019, p. 2), a codebook is actually a “product of research”. So, in this case, the codebook takes data processing to another level.

Care was taken to ensure that the categories in the codebook shed as much light as possible to render the data “analytically workable, interesting and coherent”; also, the codes exhaust entire aspects of the data leaving no room for ambiguity owing to their “exclusive, specific, detailed and descriptive” nature (Churchill, 2013, pp. 263–4). Some categories were further broken down into subcategories to refine some groups of data (Saldaña, 2016) and to finetune the “coding schemata” (Churchill, 2013, p. 264).

As the researcher was analysing stories, coding them according to defined categories, frames were also identified and entered in a separate section of the same excel sheet accompanied by the researcher’s notes

and comments and brief observations which came in handy in the actual frame analysis.

If content analysis is the “scientific study of the content with reference to the meanings, contexts and intentions contained in messages” (Prasad, 2008, p. 1), then this thesis identifies, and analyses frames contained in and used by articles to portray China’s presence in Africa. One of the key lessons learnt from above and in this chapter was that in frame analysis, a researcher finds frames by combing texts in search of their “diverse elements” with a view to finding out what “holds those elements together” (Creed et al., 2002, p. 37). As such, this is what happened here. So, to “track frames” (Chong and Druckman, 2007a, p. 106) or “detect frames” (David et al., 2011, p. 329), the researcher thoroughly read all the relevant stories one-by-one, this time in search for each story’s “central organising idea” meaning a frame (Gamson, 1989, p. 157). After all, frame definitions “can be translated to frame indicators” making them [frame definitions] “central to frame validity” (Matthes, 2009, p. 350). However, the researcher was aware of the warning that defining one’s frames beforehand renders discovering more frames difficult presenting the risk of extracting “researcher frames” as opposed to media frames (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, pp. 260–61). Also, the research considers the fact that frames are “abstract and hard to identify” (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 258).

To mitigate against these dangers, the investigation focused mainly on the “five common devices” (Zoch et al., 2008, p. 352) namely catchphrases, depictions, metaphors, exemplars and visual images as identified by Gamson and Modigliani (1989). According Entman (1993),

news frames can be traced and analysed through “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements” (1993, p. 52). These are “traits of a news frame” to mean patterns, frequencies and manner in which news stories persist or emphasise on some issues; the way in which some issues are selected and contextualised in the text and or wording of news articles (Wekesa, 2013b, p. 17). Moreover, as this study seeks to determine China’s image, it should be recalled that in Chapter 2 section 2. 2, it was stated that a country’s media image is detectable in “value laden words, phrases, metaphors, sentences and adjectives” used in news stories (Hanan, 2006 cited in Saleem, 2007, p. 136).

However, this study leaves out visual images for “lack of visual framing devices” (Zoch et al., 2008, p. 357) and because using them [images] in the study would have required a “different analytical framework” (Wekesa, 2013b, p. 11). Besides, one of the ways of conceptualising frames is to treat visual images as “not the main constituent of a frame” even though they [visual images] may be useful when analysing frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 350). In tracking frames, the investigator looked out for four elements or qualities or characteristics of a frame: problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993). Headlines, quotes, subheadings, “thematic structures” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 61) of news stories, statements as well as the entire story texts were all combed for frames. According to Pan and Kociski (1993), headlines are the most powerful tools in tracking frames while a “thematic structure” is a “multilayer

hierarchy with a theme being the central core connecting various subthemes as the major nodes, that in turn connected to supporting elements” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 61).

As already explained, data gathering and coding were driven by the grounded theory which “uses inductive analysis as a principal technique” with “patterns, themes, and categories of analysis emerging from data” (Bowen, 2006, pp. 12, 13). This came in handy in the identification of frames because of notable similarities between certain aspects of both grounded theory and frame analysis.

3.2.4 Phase 4: crosstabulation

An excel sheet bearing coded stories and categorial variables based on what constitutes *China in Africa* (for example, actors and activities) and other variables based on reportage (for example, newspaper, year, subject, authorship, style of reportage), was entered into the SPSS program for cross tabulation and Chi-square (χ^2) tests. Emerging statistical patterns were reported and interpreted (see Chapter 5). Chi-square (χ^2) tests were used to verify the statistical significance of the association between different key variables of the study. This allows more robust interpretations of potential differences of how the subject has been approached in each country across the years. The Chi-square compares the observed frequency of each variable with the expected frequency, utilising the chi-square statistics. The strength of this association is determined by the Phi and Cramer’s V statistics. A significant result ($p < .05$) means that there is an association between the variables entered in the analysis. Regarding the strength of the

association, please see *Table 1* below based on Akoglu (2018). Moreover, the chi-square accounts for the association between all subjects across countries and the statistical significance adds confidence to the interpretation of any differences observed. Results of these tests are reported next, separated by each question of interest.

Table 1 Strength of association based on Phi and Cramer's V according to Akoglu (2018)

Phi and Cramer's V	Interpretation
> .25	Very strong
> .15	Strong
> .10	Moderate
> .05	Weak
> 0	No association or very weak

3.3 Frame analysis

Using the insights from the patterns emerging from crosstabulations (Chapter 4) and from the broader thesis, identified dominant frames were analysed and discussed (See Chapter 5). According to Van Gorp (2007), when it comes to frame analysis, "it can be useful to identify frames that are dominantly applied" meaning the frames that are persistent over "contexts and periods" (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 63). In this case, therefore, a frame's dominance was determined by its persistent and frequent

appearance across subjects, times, space, and publication and then isolated from the rest of the frames identified in *Phase 3* and then analysed. Then questions were sent to identified editors for comment.

One of the characteristics of frame analysis is the inductive approach (Touri and Koteyko, 2015) where frames “emerge from the material during the course of analysis” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53). In any case, the framing approach is so “theoretically rich” that it has the “potential of subsuming and trying together many seemingly unrelated approaches” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 205).

Frame analysis entails analysing the definition and problematisation of issues and how doing so impacts on the broader discussion of the same issues (Mayer et al., 2016). To achieve this, the study uses what Mayer et al (2016) call “frame reflective discourse analysis” approach which entails tracking and identifying frames before discussing how those frames portray the subject under investigation [China’s image in Africa] thereby answering the research questions (Mayer et al., 2016, p. 346).

According to de Vreese (2005) the inductive approach meaning the approach where frames emerge as one analyses their data would be suitable for a small sample of stories. However, this study, despite its large sample, employed the inductive approach because there was a need to first identify all the frames so we could confidently conclude that all the dominant frames had been accounted for. Two overarching themes [optimism vs pessimism] were then identified to help categorise the dominant frames in a way that would permit or facilitate the

measurement of positivity versus negativity of the framing with a view to determining or accessing the image of China.

According to Cazzamatta (2021), positivity in news stories can be measured through their focus on “success, economic aid, peace negotiations, dispute settlements, justice, unification, cultural exchanges” while “violence, crime, war, disasters, electoral fraud, protests, damage, aggression, destruction, demonstrations, conflicts”, among others, are some of the indicators of negativity in news articles.

Classifying articles in terms of negativity vs positivity should be natural to framing studies because frames inherently bear within them either negative or positive elements, according to de Vreese (2005). As Farina and Arslan (2016, p. 81 citing Ahmad) put it, and as mentioned in Chapter 2 section 2.2, a country’s image boils down to its “positive or negative standing in media”. Also, according to Král (2009), the media “interpret the information” and, in the process, suggest “positive or negative attitude” to the news story (Král, 2009, p. 2). Moreover, in framing theory there is “no room for neutral perceptions, only an either/or dichotomy” (Wekesa, 2016b, p. 142). Also, according to Wekesa (2016b, p. 142 citing Chong and Druckman 2007), frames outside this “theoretical straightjacket” are “considered weak” as opposed to neutral.

As such, the study tracks strong dominant frames and relies on Wekesa (2013b)’s optimist vs pessimist theory. Writes Wekesa (2013b, p. 10):

The optimist perspective is motivated by the perception that China needs what Zambia [Africa] is naturally endowed with, while Zambia [Africa] needs investment capital to exploit her natural resources.... Optimism, therefore,

subsumes considerations such as China as partner, role model, benevolent force, etc. The pessimist frame reclines on the understanding that Zambia [Africa] might not be extracting a fair share from its natural resources or that the relations are slanted in favour of China, to the detriment of Zambia [Africa]. It would include considerations such as Chinese malevolence, exploitation, China as a predator and China as a competitor.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has defined the theory and process of framing. It also shows how the data was gathered, stored, and processed. The chapter showed how the frames were identified and analysed.

Chapter 4: Results: patterns, meanings, and framing

4.0 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 3, data was coded and recorded in an excel sheet for Chi-square (χ^2) tests and crosstabulations (See Appendix L for the Codebook). This chapter, therefore, presents those results; it systematically presents data from whence the frames came; it reveals the nature of the data and the hidden meanings through patterns of commonalities and differences between the actors (people, government, embassies, companies), subjects, and activities among other main variables. The chapter also provides insights which are used to discuss the identified frames in Chapter 5. As both Chapters 1 and 3 mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is to find China's image in relation to its involvement in Africa and to reveal the patterns attendant to the research

newspapers' coverage of the phenomena of *China in Africa*. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 3, a total of 1 384 stories were analysed; however, this chapter demonstrates how the stories appeared per newspaper thereby showing how frame enterprise occurred.

4.1 Stories per newspaper and by subject

A significant and strong association was found between *newspaper and subject area*, $\chi^2(60) = 198.27$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .378$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .169$, $p < .001$, based on $n = 1384$ stories (see Appendix A). Most stories (see Table 2) were published in Kenya (590) followed by Nigeria (491) and Zimbabwe (313). In Kenya, the *Nation* had more stories (304) while *The Standard* had less (286). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* carried more stories (275) than *The Guardian* (216) while in Zimbabwe, *The Herald* was far ahead (233) of the *NewsDay* (80).

Subject*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 2

Subject	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	61	N	47	35	31	45	81	13	252
	62	N	3	3	0	2	3	4	15
	63	N	180	192	131	180	102	37	822
	64	N	3	2	1	1	2	0	9
	65	N	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	66	N	3	4	11	5	3	1	27
	67	N	12	10	20	17	12	3	74
	68	N	0	4	0	0	0	1	5
	69	N	32	24	10	11	5	19	101
	70	N	14	10	5	5	5	1	40
	71	N	5	0	4	0	3	0	12
	72	N	3	2	0	3	2	0	10
73	N	1	0	3	6	5	1	16	

Total		<i>N</i>	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384
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*See codebook for newspaper and subject code name

Across all the newspapers, investment was the favourite subject, with 822 stories. Investment/finance/trade stories were more in Kenya where *The Standard* carried most of the articles (192) with the *Nation* just behind (180). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* carried more stories (180) while *The Guardian* had less (131). Zimbabwe was the least contributor of investment stories with *The Herald* well ahead (102) of the *NewsDay* (37). Foreign policy also received considerable coverage (252) with stories appearing more in Zimbabwe (94) where *The Herald* contributed the bulk of the stories (81) against *NewsDay*'s paltry 13. Kenya had the next highest number of foreign policy stories (82) with the *Nation* carrying more articles (47) than *The Standard* (35). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* published more stories (45) than *The Guardian* (31).

Another subject area with a notable coverage was crime, however, barely reaching half of the investment subject (101). Leading in crime subject area were Kenya's *Nation* (32) and *The Standard* (24). Zimbabwe had the next highest number of stories with the *NewsDay* carrying more (19) than *The Herald* (5). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* contributed slightly more (11) than *The Guardian* (10). Worth noting here is that *NewsDay*, which was trailing in both foreign policy and investment subject areas, had far more crime stories than its rival *The Herald* and more than the Nigerian newspapers (see also 5.2.1). Education also had attention (74) with more stories in Nigeria where *The Guardian* carried the highest number of stories (20) with the *Vanguard* just behind (17). In Kenya, the *Nation* carried more articles (12) with *The Standard* just behind (10) while *The*

Herald had more than (12) *NewsDay* (3). The other subjects received from very little to no mention throughout the six publications.

Much of these patterns were replicated across the five-year span (see Appendix A). In 2014, for example, out of a total of 113 articles analysed that year, investment received more attention (74) with more stories appearing in the *Nation* (25) and *The Standard* (23). Following was Zimbabwe where *The Herald* carried more stories (11) than the *NewsDay* (6). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* was the only contributor (9). However, the difference, in this case, is that *The Guardian* had no stories across all the subjects throughout 2014. Foreign affairs stories were more in Zimbabwe where *The Herald* published most of them (5) with the *NewsDay* just behind (2). In Kenya, the *Nation* published just three while *The Standard* recorded no story; in Nigeria, the *Vanguard* published just two. Crime saw *The Standard* leading with six stories followed by the *Nation* (3) and *NewsDay* (3); *The Herald* (1) and *Vanguard* (0). In education, more stories appeared in the *Nation* (2), *The Standard* (2), *Vanguard* (1), *The Herald* (1) while *NewsDay* had nothing in that year out of 113 analysed articles.

A near similar pattern occurred in 2015 where a total number of stories was analysed (166). As in the previous year, investment received more attention with more stories in Kenya where the *Nation* led (28) followed by *The Standard* (28). In Nigeria, the *Vanguard* led (17) with *The Guardian* slightly behind (16) while in Zimbabwe, *The Herald* had more stories (11) while the *NewsDay* had fewer stories (5). Leading the foreign affairs was Zimbabwe where *The Herald* had more articles (11) and *NewsDay* just 1 followed by *The Standard* (4), *Nation* (2) and *The*

Guardian (2) and the *Vanguard* (1). Crime followed with more stories in the *Nation* (7), *Standard* (3) and *The Guardian* (1) while *Vanguard*, *The Herald* and *NewsDay* recorded nothing. Under education more stories were recorded in Nigeria (4) where *The Guardian* had more stories (3) than the *Vanguard* (1) followed by Zimbabwe and Kenya where only two newspapers published thus: *The Herald* (3) and *Standard* (2). Both the *Nation* and *NewsDay* recorded nothing. Other subject areas received little or no attention across the newspapers.

In 2016, out of a total of 274 stories analysed that year, investment stories appeared as follows: *The Standard* (50), *Nation* (47), *Vanguard* (43), *The Guardian* (35), *The Herald* (15) and *NewsDay* (7). Also popular was foreign policy which saw stories distributed as follows: *The Guardian* (11), *The Standard* (6), *The Herald* (4), *Nation* (1), *Vanguard* (1), *NewsDay* (0). Crime followed, receiving more attention in the *Nation* (9) followed by *The Standard* (3), *The Herald* (2), *Vanguard* (2) while both *NewsDay* and *Vanguard* had nothing. In the education subject area, an equal number of stories (3) appeared in the *Nation*, *The Guardian*, and the *Vanguard* followed by *The Standard* (2) while both *The Herald* and *NewsDay* had nothing.

Again, 2017 had more stories on investment. Out of a total number of 310, the stories appeared as follows: *The Standard* (56), the *Vanguard* (52), 39 the *Nation* (39), *The Guardian* (28), *The Herald* (15) and *NewsDay* (3). Foreign affairs were the second most popular subject with stories appearing thus: *The Guardian* (8) the *Vanguard* (8) followed by *The Herald* (7); both the *Nation* and *The Standard* recorded an equal number of stories (3) with *NewsDay* publishing a single piece.

Crime was next; leading in this subject area was the *Nation* (6) and the *Vanguard* (6) followed by *The Standard* (5) and *The Guardian* (5); NewsDay (3) while *The Herald* had nothing. Education was the fourth most popular subject area recording more stories in the *Nation* (6) followed by both *The Guardian* (5) and the *Vanguard* (5) and *The Standard* (3); last were *The Herald* (2) and NewsDay (0). Health also received a notable amount of attention with more stories appearing in the *Daily Nation* (8), *The Standard* (4) and *The Herald* (3) while the rest of the newspapers recorded nothing. Other subjects received little or no attention.

There was hardly much change in the distribution of stories and subjects in the year 2018 where 521 stories were analysed. Again, investment had more stories, appearing more in the *Vanguard* (59) followed by *The Herald* (50), *The Guardian* (52), *Nation* (41), *The Standard* (35) and NewsDay (16). Foreign affairs saw more stories in *The Herald* (54) followed by the *Nation* (38) and the *Vanguard* (33), *The Standard* (22), *The Guardian* (10) and NewsDay (9). Crime was the third most popular subject with more stories appearing in NewsDay (13) followed by both the *Nation* (7) and *The Standard* (7); lastly, came *The Guardian* (4), *Vanguard* (3) and *The Herald* (2). Leading in the education subject area was *The Guardian* (9) followed by the *Vanguard* (7), *The Herald* (6), *Nation* (1) and *The Standard* (1). Health had more stories published in the *Nation* (5) followed by the *Vanguard* (4) and *The Guardian* (3) while the rest had one story each. The rest of the subjects received little or no attention.

As can be seen from above, investment, foreign affairs, education, crime, and health articles dominated across the six newspapers and across the five-year period. The dominance of investment can be attributed to the fact that China is not only the fourth largest investor in Africa but has been Africa's largest trading partner for the last 12 years (see IISD, 2021 in chapter 1). Also, as can be seen from the statistics, investment stories were more in Kenyan newspapers (*Nation and The Standard*); this can be attributed to the fact that by 2018, China was Kenya's largest trading partner (see Kimutai, 2018 in Chapter 1). Specifically, the dominance of investment in Kenyan newspapers can be explained through the dominance of Chinese funded construction (see Table 10 in the activities section). Also, Nigerian newspapers carried a combined second largest number of investment stories. This would explain why, by 2020, China-Nigeria trade was the largest in Africa, according to the Chinese envoys (see Ojeme, 2020 in Chapter 1).

NewsDay received the lowest number of stories in all sectors throughout the five-year period. The only time *NewsDay* led was in the crime sector in 2018; in all the other years it had more stories in that area although not leading. The interest in Chinese crime, is perhaps down to the paper's negative stance on government policy. The paper is also the newest and or youngest of them all having been established only in 2010 (see Chapter 1 section 1.83).

Also worth noting is that in Zimbabwe, *The Herald* began to have more investment stories in 2018 following the 2017 coup in that country. An explanation could be in the effort the paper put in blaming the economic stagnation on ousted president Mugabe who was blamed for blocking

Chinese investment (ZW_HE_2018-04p04). On the other hand, the new leader was promoted as someone out to “restore Zimbabwe's economy” with China being the first country he visited outside Africa since his seizure of power (ZW_HE_2018-04a04). So, the closeness of Harare to Beijing would also explain why foreign affairs were more in Zimbabwe.

More crime stories in Kenya could be down to the relationship between police and the media. In Chapter 2 section 2.4.1 we saw that some journalists were bought vehicles by police bosses in exchange for positive press coverage. Dominant frames associated with these patterns were framed in varying positive and negative ways (See chapter 5).

4.2 Stories by reporting style per newspaper

A significant association was found between *newspaper and story style* category, $\chi^2 (20) = 46.409$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .183$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .092$, $p < .001$ (see Appendix B). As shown in Tables 3, across all the six newspapers, factual, hard news stories that consist of five W's and one H: who, what, when, where, why and how (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 60) and show a “formal, neutral tone” (See BBC, n.d.) dominated the reportage with 1072 out of 1384 stories. Kenya had more hard news stories (437) followed by Nigeria (403) and Zimbabwe (232). Within Kenya, the stories stood thus: *The Standard* (225) and the *Nation* (212) while the *Vanguard* had the highest number of hard news stories (236) in Nigeria with *The Guardian* well behind (167). In Zimbabwe, *The*

Herald published the bulk of the stories (164) leaving the *NewsDay* far behind (68).

Style*Newspaper Crosstabulation

Newspaper

Table 3

Style	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	50	<i>N</i>		212	225	167	236	164	68
51	<i>N</i>		28	30	17	8	24	4	111
52	<i>N</i>		62	28	30	26	32	7	185
53	<i>N</i>		2	3	2	5	2	1	15
55	<i>N</i>		0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total		<i>N</i>	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See Codebook for newspaper and style codes

Opinions (editorials, speeches, commentaries, critiques, columns & essays) had the next highest number of stories (185) under the style category. Again, out of 185 articles, Kenya led with the bulk of the stories published by the *Nation* (62) against *The Standard* (28). In Nigeria most of the stories were in *The Guardian* (30) with the *Vanguard* slightly behind (26). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* carried more stories (32) with the *NewsDay* far behind (7). The prominence of opinion pieces will be further analysed in Chapter 6.

The next highest number of stories were feature articles (111); as mentioned in the Codebook (see Appendix L), feature articles, which include profiles, delve deeper into issues tending to take “a personal point of view” (BBC, n.d., p. 1). Once again, Kenya had more feature articles as *The Standard* remained ahead (30) of the *Nation* (28).

However, this time around, Zimbabwe was the second best with *The Herald* claiming the lead (24) ahead of the *NewsDay* (4). In Nigeria, *The Guardian* published more (17) than the *Vanguard* (8). The rest of the story styles like interviews and others had very little coverage.

Throughout the five-year study period (see Appendix B), year 2018 had the highest number of hard news stories with 378 out of a total number of 521 stories analysed that year. More of those stories were published in the *Vanguard* (92) followed by *The Herald* (87), *The Guardian* (66), the *Nation* (53), *The Standard* (41) and *NewsDay* (39). The next highest number of hard news stories was published in 2017; leading was the *Vanguard* (72) followed by *The Standard* (61), the *Nation* (49), *The Guardian* (38), *The Herald* (17) and *NewsDay* (7). In 2016, the numbers stood thus: *The Standard* (58), *Nation* (47), *Vanguard* (47), *The Guardian* (43), *The Herald* (18) and *NewsDay* (6). Leading in 2015 was both the *Nation* (34) and *The Standard* (34) followed by both *The Guardian* (20) and *The Herald* (20); last were the *Vanguard* (17) followed by *NewsDay* (7). The least number of hard news stories was in 2014; leading was *The Standard* (31) followed by the *Nation* (29), *The Herald* (22), *NewsDay* (9) and the *Vanguard* (8). The same patterns occurred with the opinion pieces and feature articles with the stories shared among the papers throughout the five-year period.

The dominance of hard news stories can be interpreted to mean that all the newspapers ensured that they sold factual news more than personal opinions. However, opinion pieces are considerably high (185). Earlier (see section 2.4.1) we learnt that Kenyan newspapers, like their British counterparts, ensure that they “separate factual reporting” from

“analysis” (Capitant and Frère, 2011b, pp. 5–6). This is echoed here in these patterns and not just in the case of Kenya but also in the case of all the research countries all of which are former British colonies. However, it is interesting that newspapers would have more opinion pieces than feature articles as this implies an effort by opinion leaders to manipulate the press.

Also, as can be seen (Appendix B), the stories increased towards the 2018 FOCAC conference suggesting that the papers were deploying more reporters to the China-Africa beat.

4.3 Who wrote what? authorship by newspaper

According to Appendix C, there was a significant and strong association between *newspaper and authorship* category $\chi^2 (70) = 493.099$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .597$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .267$, $p < .001$. Dominating the authorship category (see Table 4) were stories written by staff reporters (1056) which is almost the entire number of stories used in this study (1384). There were more in Kenya (439) where *The Standard* (238) led the *Nation* (201) followed by Nigeria with the *Vanguard* (228) ahead of *The Guardian* (175). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* (149) was way ahead of the *NewsDay* (65).

The next highest number of contributions is of articles written by experts (105). These are analysts writing opinion pieces on a topical issue in which they have expertise. Such opinion pieces were prevalent in Kenya where the *Nation* was well ahead (48) of *The Standard* (18) followed by

the *Vanguard* (22) and *The Guardian* (18). Zimbabwe had the least number of stories with *The Herald* being the only contributor (3). This pattern is in synch with the prevalence of opinion pieces (see Tables 3).

Authorship*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 4

Authorship	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	501	N		16	2	2	2	0	0
503	N		0	11	1	1	2	2	17
505	N		0	2	0	0	0	0	2
506	N		201	238	175	228	149	65	1056
507	N		10	7	6	1	6	6	36
508	N		13	0	0	1	7	1	22
510	N		2	0	0	0	13	3	18
511	N		48	18	22	14	3	0	105
512	N		2	5	1	0	39	0	47
513	N		10	2	4	2	2	0	20
514	N		0	0	1	2	0	0	3
517	N		0	0	0	0	1	0	1
518	N		1	1	3	2	0	3	10
519	N		1	0	1	2	1	0	5
520	N		0	0	0	20	0	0	20
Total		N	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for newspaper and authorship code name

Even though a small number (47), it is notable that stories by the Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua*, were next in terms of prevalence. As *Xinhua* is the Chinese government's propaganda tool (Brazys and Dukalskis, 2020), this means Beijing propaganda has some attention in Africa. The Chinese state news agency's stories were used more in *The Herald* (39) followed by *The Standard* (5), the *Nation* (2) and *The Guardian* (1); both the *Vanguard* and *NewsDay* had nothing. Stories by other different authors were the next at 36 with the highest number published in the *Nation* (16); *The Standard*, *The Guardian* and the *Vanguard* has two each while both *The Herald* and *NewsDay* do not have any.

French news agency, *Agence France Presse (AFP)*, had the next highest number of stories (22); leading was the *Nation* (16) followed by *The Standard*, *The Guardian* and *Vanguard* who had two stories each; both *The Herald* and *NewsDay* had none. At par with the *AFP* (22), were unassigned stories and they appeared as follows: *Nation* (13), *The Herald* (7), *Vanguard* (1), *NewsDay* (1); both *The Standard* and *The Guardian* carried no such stories. Reluctance to use agency copy could be down to the need to cut down on costs.

Chinese government officials also contributed considerably (20), publishing more in the *Nation* (10) and *The Guardian* (4) while *The Standard*, *The Herald* and *Vanguard* had two each; *NewsDay* had nothing. Also at 20 was the Nigerian News Agency, a government-owned entity whose stories appeared in the *Vanguard* only. This is an interesting development considering that, as stated in earlier (see Agande, 2015 in Chapter 1), the *Vanguard* editor is so close to the Nigerian president Buhari that Buhari would write him [editor] a letter expressing personal satisfaction with his “political communication”.

Articles written by special correspondents were the next (18); leading in this category was Zimbabwe with *The Herald* (13) well ahead of the *Newsday* (3). In Kenya, the *Nation* (2) was the only contributor while in Nigeria there was nothing. *Reuters* news agency followed (17) with more stories published in Kenya where *The Standard* was the only publisher (11); Zimbabwe was the second highest contributor with both *The Herald* and *Newsday* at par (2). It is worth mentioning that unassigned stories were also among the notable (22) across the newspapers while the rest of the authors had very low contributions.

Notable patterns in between the years (see Appendix C) were the annual steady growth in the number of stories; for example, 2014 (113), 2015 (166), 2016 (274), 2017 (310), 2018 (521). These patterns applied to different authorships with the stories written by staff reporters, for example, also in clear annual growth. In that regard, it can be argued that it was inevitable for staff reports to dominate as most stories were hard news reports (see Table 3); hard news is the traditional speciality of daily newspapers. Also, there were many high-profile meetings that demanded news reporting such as the 2018 FOCAC, state visits and US diplomats' trips to Africa.

As stated in Chapter 1 (The Herald, 2012), *The Herald* entered into a partnership with *Xinhua* in 2012. At the time, a senior *Xinhua* official pledged to assist *The Herald's* parent company, Zimpapers, to “counter [ing] Western propaganda”. As such, the use of *Xinhua* stories could be down to that deal.

Also, as the government's *Look East* policy was meant to “delink” Zimbabwe from western capitalism (Musanga, 2017, p. 82), it would explain *The Herald's* preference for *Xinhua* copy ahead of the *AFP* and *Reuters* articles. Considering that most of these stories (32) were published in 2018 after the November 2017 coup, it can also be argued that *The Herald* had an obligation to promote the relationship between the new leader and Beijing; after all, China was the first country Mnangagwa visited, outside Africa after seizing power.

As indicated in Chapter 1 section 1.8.1 (Jacobs, 2012; Řehák, 2016), the *Nation* also entered into a partnership deal with *Xinhua*. However, it is

curious that despite striking such a deal, the *Nation*, unlike *The Herald*, used a paltry number of *Xinhua* stories (2). According to Jacobs (2012), there is reluctance to embrace the Chinese press in some parts of Africa meaning that could be a plausible explanation. Again, as stated in Chapter 1 section 1.8.3 (Zhakata, 2015), *NewsDay* has been in financial problems something which would explain its failure or reluctance to use news agency copy. However, as shall be seen later (see Chapter 5), frames emerged from all kinds of stories written by staff reporters to government officials, agencies, and analysts.

4.4 Embassy work by newspaper

There was an association between newspaper and actor embassy category, $\chi^2 (45) = 72.875$, $p < .005$, $\Phi = .229$, $p = .005$, Cramer's $V = .103$, $p = .005$ (see Appendix D). According to Table 5, while the bulk of the stories (1148), did not mention any embassy, the Chinese embassy in the country of the publishing newspaper, as expected, received more coverages than any other embassy (192). Most of the stories that mentioned the Chinese embassy in the country of the newspaper were published in Nigeria (83) followed by Kenya (64) and lastly Zimbabwe (45).

The *Vanguard* published the bulk of Nigeria's contributions (53) while *The Guardian* ran only 30 pieces. In Kenya, the majority contributor was the *Nation* (45) with *The Standard* far behind (19). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* carried much of Zimbabwe's stories while the *NewsDay* ran as

little as 11 articles. So, overall, *The Guardian* was the largest contributor of such stories.

Actor Embassy*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 5

Actor Embassy	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	149	N		2	0	0	0	0	0
150	N		45	19	30	53	34	11	192
153	N		1	3	4	12	3	1	24
154	N		2	0	0	0	0	0	2
156	N		253	262	180	206	181	67	1149
157	N		0	1	0	0	1	0	2
161	N		0	0	1	1	2	1	5
162	N		0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Total	N		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for actor embassy and newspaper code name

Embassy of newspaper country in China had the next highest number of stories (24). Nigeria had the highest number of stories with the *Vanguard* being the largest contributor (12) and *The Guardian* three times behind (4). Both Kenya and Zimbabwe had four stories each with *The Standard* and *The Herald* carrying three each while the *Nation* and *Newsday* had one story each.

Other embassies that received very little coverage but are significantly mentioned are embassies of China in another research country and in another African country, all of them Africa-based. This means the Chinese embassies in Africa were the busiest confirming Dijk (2009)'s theory of Chinese embassies being one of the key actors and indicator of Chinese presence in Africa. Also, this is not surprising because, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, China now has the highest diplomatic representation in Africa (Traoré, 2021).

So, from the statistics above, the Chinese embassies/consulates in Nigeria were the most active. And as we shall see in Chapter 5, Chinese diplomats were among the frame sponsors as they were active in speaking out, countering USA counterparts' rhetoric; also, they were involved in humanitarian work distributing food relief and scholarships. Also, like in the case of *actor government* (section 4.6), stories that mentioned the embassies framed China as benevolent, investor, and responsible among other representations (See Chapter 5).

4.5 Military relations by newspaper

An association was found between *newspaper and military relations* category, $\chi^2(10) = 26.491$, $p < .003$, $\Phi = .138$, $p = .003$, Cramer's $V = .98$, $p = .003$ (see Appendix E). Stories about civilian-civilian engagement between Africa and China dominated this category with most of them published in Kenyan newspapers (See Table 6). The *Nation* had the highest number of stories (299) while *The Standard* had 284. Next were Nigerian publications led by the *Vanguard* (273) with *The Guardian* behind (213). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* was well ahead (215) of the *NewsDay* (75).

On *military to civilian relations*, only Zimbabwe and Kenya had stories. In Zimbabwe most of the stories were in *The Herald* (5) with the *NewsDay* slightly behind (3). In Kenya only the *Nation* had stories (5). On the military-military relations, Nigeria had more stories with *The Guardian* (3) ahead of the *Vanguard* (2). Zimbabwe had a similar

number of stories (5) with *The Herald* ahead (3) of *NewsDay* (2) In Kenya, only *The Standard* had stories (2).

Relations*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 6

Relations	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	440	N	0	2	3	2	3	2	12
	441	N	5	0	0	0	5	3	13
	442	N	299	284	213	273	215	75	1359
Total		N	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for newspaper and relations code name

Notable Chinese army activities stood thus: while in Zimbabwe the Chinese army was donating cash to their local colleagues (ZW_HE_2018-06m06), in the case of Nigeria, the Chinese army was training their Nigerian colleagues (NG_GU_2015-09e09). In Kenya, the Chinese army was setting up its Africa Headquarters (KE_NA_2015-07b07). Another interesting development is that, according to the *Nation* (KE_NA_2018-11f11), the army was deployed to protect Chinese investors in Uganda something which confirms Leslie (2016)'s theory that China's increased involvement in peace keeping is partly to ensure security for its Africa-based citizens.

However, while military engagements were not pronounced throughout the five- year period (See Appendix E) and across the newspapers, it is interesting to note that Zimbabwe had the highest number of military-military and military to civil engagements. Most of these stories were published in *The Herald*, a state-controlled newspaper.

This is particularly interesting when viewed in the context of the 2017 coup which overthrew Robert Mugabe replacing him with Mnangagwa who was already Beijing's preferred successor, according to research

(see Banerjee and Rich, 2017; Merwe et al., 2019). Also, this should bring into mind the fact that and as revealed earlier in Chapter 2 section 2.4.3 (see Chuma, 2020, p. 15), the Zimbabwean state-controlled media, especially *The Herald*, is manipulated by the powerful elite.

Also interesting is the fact most of the Zimbabwe military engagements occurred in the years running towards the coup (2014, 15 and 16) which is the period when China showed its preference for Mnangagwa (Merwe et al., 2019). And, as shall be seen in Chapter 5 (*see all-weather friends frame*) and as mentioned before, after the 2017 coup the relations continued well and to the extent that China was the first country outside Africa that Mnangagwa visited not very long after seizing power.

Stories that mentioned military relations framed China in varying optimistic ways such as benevolence and *win-win* (see Chapter 5).

4.6 Government actorness and mentions by newspaper

According to Appendix F, there was an association between *newspaper and actor government* category, $\chi^2 (85) = 237.523$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .414$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .185$, $p < .001$. In this category (*actor government*), while out of 1384 stories a considerable number of stories (201) did not mention any government, most of them (551) mentioned the government of the newspaper country meaning the government of the country in which the newspaper is published (see Table 7).

The bulk of these stories were published in Kenyan newspapers (250) followed by Nigeria (195) with Zimbabwe far behind (71). Within Kenya, *The Standard* was the largest contributor (156) against the *Nation*

(129) whereas in Nigeria the *Vanguard* had the highest number of stories (117) with *The Guardian* well behind (78). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* contributed most of the stories (46) while *NewsDay* published just 25 stories throughout the five-year period.

Actor Government*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 7

Actor Government	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	120	N	21	6	15	40	20	7	109
	121	N	129	157	78	117	46	25	552
	122	N	0	0	1	0	2	1	4
	123	N	4	2	2	4	2	0	14
	124	N	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
	125	N	68	49	75	60	63	18	333
	126	N	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
	127	N	4	0	0	1	8	0	13
	128	N	35	38	28	30	44	26	201
	129	N	0	1	1	0	4	0	6
	132	N	24	15	10	19	29	2	99
	133	N	8	11	3	0	0	1	23
	134	N	3	2	0	0	1	0	6
	135	N	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	136	N	1	2	2	0	0	0	5
	137	N	4	2	1	2	0	0	9
138	N	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
Total	N	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384	

*See codebook for actor government and newspaper code name

The combination of the Chinese government and the government of the newspaper country (meaning where these governments acted together) had the next highest number of stories (333). In this combination, Nigeria contributed most of the stories (135) with *The Guardian* ahead (75) of the *Vanguard* (60) followed by Kenya (117) where the *Nation* (68) carried more stories than *The Standard* (49). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald*

(63) stayed ahead of the *NewsDay* (18) bringing the country's total number of contributions to 81.

The next highest number of stories was on the independent actions of the Chinese government. However, on its own, the Chinese government received far less coverage (109). In this case, Nigeria, once again, had more stories (55) while Kenya and Zimbabwe were at par, contributing 27 articles each. Within country comparisons, the *Vanguard* had more stories (40) than *The Guardian* (15). In Kenya, the *Nation* contributed more (21) than its rival, *The Standard* (6). Once again, in Zimbabwe, *The Herald* contributed more (20) than the *NewsDay* (7).

The Chinese government acting together with the broader Africa governments (conferences, workshops, and meetings) was the next highest contributor of stories (99). Yet again, Kenya led in this category (39), followed by Zimbabwe (31) and lastly Nigeria (29). Within Kenya, the *Nation* was the largest contributor of stories (24) while its rival, *The Standard*, had 15. In Nigeria, most contributions were from the *Vanguard* (19) against *The Guardian*'s 10 while in Zimbabwe there was a wide gulf between *The Herald* (29) and *NewsDay* (2). So, as can be seen, Chinese government was frequently mentioned across the publications along the years. This confirms that, as discussed earlier (see Dijk, 2009 in chapter 1) that the Chinese government is the leading actor in the phenomena called China in Africa.

However, even though far below 100 in terms of news stories, other categories worth noting were the Chinese government acting together with the western governments (23) as well as the USA government (9).

Arguably, this pattern should be read in the context of the theory (see Xiaoling, 2010 in chapter 1) that China seeks to “break the Anglo American monopoly” (Xiaoling, 2010, p. 42) and replace the Western development with its own model (see Dijk, 2009 in Chapter 1). As such, Western and US governments’ actorness and mentions in China Africa affairs can be interpreted as indicators of their agitation about China.

As shall be seen and discussed in the next chapter, stories that mentioned governments were about international meetings such the FOCAC 2018 and they were more in 2018 (see Appendix F). There was an annual increase in the total number of stories that mentioned governments: 2014 (113), 2015 (166), 2016 (274), 2017 (310), 2018 (521). These increases also reflected in the case of the Chinese government in newspaper countries. For example: 2014 (8), 2015 (18), 2016 (17), 2017 (27), 2018 (39). While there was slight interruption to the rise in 2016, the rise continued again the following year right into 2018. These patterns occurred in all government mentions. The stories framed China in many varying ways including as a benevolent state, scrambler for Africa and as an investor (See Chapter 5).

4.7 Companies’ involvement by newspaper

An association was found between newspaper and actor company category, $\chi^2(85) = 477.794$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .588$, $p < .001$, Cramer’s $V = .263$, $p < .001$ (See Appendix G). According to Table 8, out of 1384

stories, Kenyan newspapers had more stories under this category (companies) with the *Nation* contributing 304 and *The Standard* less (286) throughout the five-year period. Following were the Nigerian publications who reported as follows: *The Guardian* (275), *Vanguard* (216) while Zimbabwean newspapers reported thus: *The Herald* (223) and *NewsDay* (80).

Throughout the study period, most stories (304) were silent on companies. Most of the stories that did not mention any firm were published in *The Herald* (77) followed by *The Standard* (58), *Vanguard* (53), *Nation* (50), *The Guardian* (46) and *NewsDay* (20). However, 249 stories mentioned Chinese state-controlled firms with most of them in the *Nation* (59) followed by the *Vanguard* (58), *The Standard* (55), *The Guardian* (38), *The Herald* (30) and *NewsDay* (9).

Actor company*Newspaper Crosstabulation

Newspaper

Table 8

Actor Company	Code	30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	101	N	59	55	38	58	30	9
102	N	19	18	25	30	12	2	106
103	N	6	0	0	7	10	1	24
104	N	9	12	7	3	1	0	32
105	N	4	1	3	4	6	2	20
106	N	4	7	6	7	2	4	30
107	N	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
108	N	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
109	N	42	68	35	34	21	8	208
110	N	5	4	0	4	26	2	41
111	N	50	58	46	53	77	20	304
112	N	11	3	2	1	20	4	41
113	N	74	51	45	61	14	3	248
114	N	1	3	0	0	1	0	5
115	N	0	0	0	1	1	1	3

	116	<i>N</i>	18	3	6	2	0	24	53
	117	<i>N</i>	0	1	2	4	0	0	7
	118	<i>N</i>	1	0	1	6	0	0	8
Total		<i>N</i>	340	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for actor company and newspaper code name

Next were stories which generally referred to companies without mentioning any firm by name or by speciality or country (248); they appeared as follows: *Nation* (74), *Vanguard* (61), *The Standard* (51) *The Guardian* (45), *The Herald* (14) and *NewsDay* (3). Joint ventures between Chinese and newspaper country firms were mentioned in 208 stories with *The Standard* leading (68) followed by the *Nation* (42), *The Guardian* (35), the *Vanguard* (34), *The Herald* (21) and *NewsDay* (8). Chinese private companies featured in 106 stories with the biggest number of such stories in the *Vanguard* (30), followed by *The Guardian* (25), *Nation* (19), *The Standard* (18), *The Herald* (12) and *NewsDay* (2).

Entities referred to as just Chinese companies without being mentioned by name, trade or speciality appeared in 53 stories across the five-year period with most of them in *NewsDay* (24) followed by the *Nation* (18), *The Guardian* (6), *The Standard* (3), *Vanguard* (2) and *The Herald* (0). Appearing 41 times were stories that mentioned other companies with most such stories published in *The Herald* (26) followed by *Nation* (5), *The Standard* (4), *Vanguard* (4), *NewsDay* (2) and *The Guardian* (0). Also at 41 were stories that mentioned various companies inclusive of none-Chinese entities; they appeared as follows: *The Herald* (20), *Nation* (11), *NewsDay* (4), *The Standard* (3), *The Guardian* (2) and *Vanguard* (1). Stories that mentioned several Chinese firms were at 32 with most of them in *The Standard* (12), *Nation* (9), *The Guardian* (7), *Vanguard*

(3), *The Herald* (1) and *NewsDay* (0). The rest of the companies received between 30 and 20 coverages.

As can be seen (Appendix G), year 2018 had the combined highest number of stories mentioning companies (521) followed by 2017 (310), 2016 (274), 2015 (166) and 2014 (113) across all the six newspapers. 2014 saw the highest number of stories (25) that did not mention any company; they appeared as follows: *Nation* (8), *The Herald* (7), *The Standard* (6), *NewsDay* (3), *Vanguard* (1) and *The Guardian* (0). Next were joint ventures between Chinese and Newspaper country firms (23); leading in such coverages were *The Standard* (13), *The Herald* (5), *NewsDay* (3), *Nation* (2) and *The Guardian* (0). Chinese state-controlled firms received the next highest number of coverages (19) with most stories in the *Nation* (8) followed by both *The Standard* and *Newsday* at 4; *The Herald* had 2 while *Vanguard* had a single piece. These patterns were maintained throughout the study period with minor or insignificant fluctuations and differences.

It will be recalled that among the chief actors in the *China in Africa* phenomena are companies (see Dijk, 2009 in chapter 1). Also, as stated earlier that the Chinese government coordinates much of the Chinese activities in Africa and that Beijing has granted firms the right and permission to venture abroad and conquer the international markets (see Bellabona and Spigarelli, 2007 in chapter 1), it is significant that Chinese firms (state-controlled and private companies) dominated throughout the period of the study. Therefore, these data and patterns confirm the actorhood of companies or involvement in Africa.

This also resonates with the dominance of investment stories (see Table 2). As shown in Table 10, construction and trade were among the leading activities in Kenya, this would also explain the dominance of companies there. In Zimbabwe, it was down to diamond mining. Stories that mentioned Chinese companies framed China in varying ways from as responsible to agents of environmental destruction (see Chapter 5). This shows that soft power and economic statecraft as well as the *Go Global* strategy (See Chapter 1) were in full swing.

4.8 Most active or mentioned people per newspaper

According to Appendix H, there was a significant association between *actor people and the newspaper*, $\chi^2 (150) = 552.345$, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .632$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .283$, $p < .001$.

In this category (see Table 9), stories were more in Kenya (590) followed by Nigeria (491) with Zimbabwe well behind (303). Within Kenya, the *Nation* had more coverages (304) with *The Standard* slightly behind (286) while in Nigeria the *Vanguard* was ahead (275) of *The Guardian* (216). In Zimbabwe, it was *The Herald* which contributed the bulk of the overall count (223) with *NewsDay* contributing a paltry 80.

Overall, and throughout the five-year period, government officials of the newspaper country were the most mentioned (429). Upfront was Kenya (222) followed by Nigeria (168) with Zimbabwe a distant 39 behind. Within country comparison, in Kenya, *The Standard* carried more stories (129) against the *Nation*'s 93 whereas in Nigeria, *The Vanguard* (98) led

The Guardian (70). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* (22) was slightly ahead of the *NewsDay* (17).

However, when it came to newspaper country's *government officials* acting together with their Chinese colleagues, the coverage dropped significantly (223). This time around Nigeria received more mentions (83) with Zimbabwe slightly behind (77) while Kenya came last (63). In Nigeria, *The Guardian* had more stories (47) than the *Vanguard* (36) while, in Zimbabwe, *The Herald* (65) was ahead of the *NewsDay* (12). In Kenya, the *Nation* led (43) with *The Standard* contributing less than half of that country's total number of stories (20). Apparently, whereas the Kenyan leaders were independently more visible they were less so when they were acting together with their Chinese counterparts. However, the Zimbabwean leaders needed their Chinese colleagues (joint activity) to be more visible while Nigerians maintained consistence. This means that and as shall be seen later, there was more activity in Kenya while there was less in Zimbabwe; it will also be recalled that, as stated previously, there was more investment in Kenya.

Actor People*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 9

Actor People	Code	30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	132	N	0	0	0	1	0	0
138	N	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
169	N	44	46	48	57	28	5	218
170	N	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
171	N	1	0	1	0	3	0	4
173	N	10	0	0	2	2	17	31
174	N	0	1	2	1	0	0	4
175	N	3	5	3	6	10	0	27
176	N	13	21	7	10	11	2	64

	177	N	93	129	70	98	22	17	429
	178	N	14	5	12	25	15	5	76
	179	N	43	20	47	36	65	12	223
	180	N	17	27	17	11	4	10	86
	181	N	12	1	0	0	28	3	44
	182	N	7	6	5	5	2	6	31
	183	N	20	4	10	13	17	0	64
	184	N	0	0	1	1	1	2	5
	185	N	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
	187	N	2	2	0	0	1	0	5
	188	N	2	5	0	1	3	0	11
	189	N	3	1	1	3	6	0	14
	190	N	3	0	0	0	1	0	4
	191	N	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
	192	N	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	193	N	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	194	N	1	2	1	0	0	0	4
	195	N	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	196	N	4	6	0	0	0	0	10
	197	N	6	4	1	2	0	0	13
	198	N	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	199	N	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total		N	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for actor people and newspaper code name

Also mentioned substantially were the *businesspeople and company executives* (218). As we saw in Table 2, investment was the leading subject while according to Table 8, companies were among the major actors hence the considerable mentions of company executives. In this case, most stories were published in Nigeria (95) followed by Kenya (90) and lastly Zimbabwe (33). Within Nigeria, more of these stories were published in the *Vanguard* (57) while *The Guardian* covered (38). In the case of Kenya, there was hardly much difference in the contributions of both *The Standard* (46) and the *Nation* (44). However, a huge difference was noticeable in Zimbabwe where *The Herald's* stories (28) were much more than those of its rival the *NewsDay* (5). Apparently, *NewsDay* paid little attention to commerce while, as shown in Table, it was devoted to

Chinese crime. Also, Chinese businesspeople were more active in both Kenya and Nigeria than they were in Zimbabwe, something which rings resonance with the prevalence of investment in those countries.

In what also resonates with the theory (Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 45 citing Jisi, W, 1994) that the Chinese government is key to Chinese activities abroad, Chinese government officials were, independently, also among the most written about (76). Most stories in this category were published in Nigeria (37) followed by Zimbabwe (20) with Kenya coming last (19). The *Vanguard* (25) covered most of Nigeria's contributions in this case against *The Guardian's* 12. In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* contributed the most (15) with the *NewsDay* far behind (5).

The Chinese officials were also notably visible in their engagement of the broader African community and beyond the research countries as evidenced by the overall coverage in this category (65). Most of these stories were published in Kenya (24) with the *Nation* contributing the bulk of them (21) against *The Standard's* meagre 4. In Zimbabwe it was just *The Herald* which paid attention as it contributed all the stories (17).

Other groups of people that got less coverage (below 100 stories) but are worth noting were analysts; these were people providing analysis to feature articles or writing pieces that did not mention anyone. Also notable were the *workers* and the *accused*. Workers are particularly important in relation to unfair labour practices (see Chapter 5) while the accused are key to the crime aspect (see Table 2 as well as Chapter 5). Other groups of people who got significant coverage were mixed people, other and stories that did not mention people.

Just as stories that mentioned people were from various subjects, the frames about the actions of these people were also mixed ranging from investor, benevolence, criminal and responsible (see Chapter 5). These statistics resonate with the actorness of the governments, embassies and with the foreign affairs stories being among the dominant.

4.9 Dominant activities per newspaper

An association was found between *newspaper and activity area* χ^2 (245) = 825.540, $p < .001$, $\Phi = .772$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .345$, $p < .001$ (see Appendix I). Throughout the five-year study period (See Table 10), a combined total of 139 loan or grant deals between China and the three research countries were reported on, making deals the most dominant activity. Leading the coverage of this area was Nigeria with *The Guardian* publishing 31 articles and the *Vanguard* 30. Next was Kenya where the *Nation* covered deals 28 times while *The Standard* published slightly fewer stories (25). In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* had 15 while *NewsDay* published only 10 stories on deals.

Construction was the next most covered activity with a total of 92 stories. Within country comparison, the *Nation*, yet again, led in Kenya with 43 while its rival, *The Standard*, recorded 30. Both Nigerian newspapers (*The Guardian and Vanguard*) had nine stories each while in Zimbabwe only one piece appeared throughout the five-year period and in the *NewsDay*.

With a combined total of 86 articles, ceremonies (meaning events such as ceremonies, celebrations, commemorations, commissioning, launch, anniversary, festivals, and promotions) were the next most covered activity. Nigeria had more of such events with the *Vanguard* featuring 31 against *The Guardian*'s 25. *The Standard* recorded 11 while its rival, the *Nation*, had eight. In Zimbabwe, only 11 ceremonies were recorded with *The Herald* leading at seven against *NewsDay*'s four.

In the trade area, Kenya had more coverages as *The Standard* published 26 stories while the *Nation* had 13. In Nigeria, *The Guardian* led with 13 against eight by the *Vanguard*. In Zimbabwe, *The Herald* had a paltry three against *NewsDay* which had nothing taking the combined overall count to 63.

On meetings meaning farewells, reception and consultations, conferences, public lectures, seminars, Nigeria had more coverages with the *Vanguard* at 13 while its counterpart *The Guardian* had 10 stories. In Zimbabwe, *The Herald*, which was ahead of all, had 14 recordings while *NewsDay* recorded just seven. However, this time around, Kenya had the least number of stories as *The Standard* published 13 with the *Nation* a distant two bringing the overall total count to 59.

Again, Kenya had more pieces on transport with the *Nation* publishing 16 against *The Standard*'s 12 items. Within Nigeria, the *Vanguard* had the next highest number of stories publishing eight against *The Guardian*'s paltry three. In Zimbabwe only one article appeared at that was in *The Herald*. Overall, there was a total 40 articles on transport

throughout the research period. With slightly fewer stories, protests were the next most dominant activity, and they were prevalent in *The Standard* (13) and the *Nation* (12). Leading in Nigeria was the *Vanguard* at 4 against *The Guardian*'s three stories. *NewsDay* was in rare lead in Zimbabwe at four while *The Herald* recorded three. The overall count for the five-year period was 38.

Activity in Newspaper Country*Newspaper Crosstabulation
Newspaper

Table 10

Activity in Newspaper Country	Code		30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
	248	N		3	5	7	7	0	0
249	N		2	5	4	5	0	0	16
250	N		28	25	31	30	15	10	139
251	N		13	26	13	8	3	0	63
252	N		7	6	1	1	1	1	17
253	N		0	2	3	3	12	0	20
254	N		0	0	0	0	3	0	3
255	N		1	0	2	2	1	1	7
256	N		13	0	0	6	0	1	20
257	N		5	2	0	3	3	0	13
258	N		8	11	25	31	7	4	86
259	N		4	1	7	9	14	1	36
260	N		2	3	2	3	5	5	20
261	N		3	3	0	0	3	0	9
262	N		5	6	6	2	4	0	23
263	N		2	2	0	0	0	0	4
265	N		1	0	0	0	0	0	1
266	N		0	0	0	0	0	1	1
267	N		5	0	0	2	0	4	11
268	N		3	2	0	1	0	1	7
269	N		9	5	0	6	0	1	21
270	N		0	1	0	0	1	2	4
271	N		1	5	1	1	1	4	13
272	N		0	0	0	0	1	0	1
273	N		3	2	0	0	2	0	7
274	N		2	2	5	11	3	0	23
275	N		4	1	3	3	8	0	19
276	N		3	10	0	0	1	0	14
277	N		16	12	3	8	1	0	40

	278	N	12	13	2	4	3	4	38
	279	N	18	9	10	25	6	1	69
	280	N	46	41	36	47	101	9	280
	281	N	1	2	2	0	3	0	8
	282	N	2	13	10	13	14	7	59
	283	N	1	2	6	1	1	0	11
	284	N	0	1	14	12	1	1	29
	285	N	2	4	2	0	0	0	8
	286	N	0	0	0	0	5	1	6

	287	N	11	8	0	0	0	4	23
	288	N	0	1	1	2	0	1	5
	289	N	2	1	4	2	0	0	9
	290	N	43	30	9	9	0	1	92
	291	N	4	6	0	6	0	6	22
	292	N	3	2	2	2	0	3	12
	293	N	3	0	0	1	0	1	5
	294	N	1	5	1	1	0	5	13
	295	N	10	6	0	5	0	0	21
	296	N	1	1	4	3	0	0	9
	297	N	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
	298	N	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total			304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

*See codebook for activity and newspaper country and newspaper code name

With a combined total of 36 stories, donations followed. Under this category, Nigeria, once again, had more stories with the *Vanguard* leading at nine against *The Guardian*' slightly behind with seven stories. In Zimbabwe, most of these stories were covered by *The Herald* (14) while *NewsDay* managed a single piece. A rare last, Kenya had the fewest stories (5) with the *Nation* covering four against *The Standard*'s single item.

Stories on the Yuan (Chinese currency) circulation were at 29 throughout the study period; the bulk of those stories were in Nigeria where *The Guardian* published 14 while the *Vanguard* had slightly fewer (12). In Zimbabwe both *The Herald* and *NewsDay* had a single article each while in Kenya only one story was published and in *The Standard*.

Manufacturing had a combined total number of 23 stories with more of them published in Nigeria. The *Vanguard* led, publishing 11 items against *The Guardian*'s modest five. Both the *Nation* and *The Standard* had two apiece bringing Kenya's combined total output to four whereas in Zimbabwe it was only *The Herald* which covered manufacturing publishing all the remaining three stories. At par with manufacturing was training with most of the 23 stories published in Kenya. Whereas *The Standard* had six stories the *Nation* published five. In Nigeria, *The Guardian* covered six against the *Vanguard*'s two. In Zimbabwe, it was only *The Herald* which published the remaining four.

Trailing just behind (22) were parliamentary events which occurred more in Kenya with *The Standard* covering more of them against four by the *Nation*. Only six such events were covered in Nigeria and by the *Vanguard* alone. It was the same in Zimbabwe where only six stories were solely published by the *NewsDay*. Also at 23 were stories on non-criminal court cases with most of them in Kenya. *The Nation* had 11 against *The Standard*'s eight while Nigeria recorded nothing. In Zimbabwe only four stories were published and in *NewsDay*.

At 21 were company closures (raid, seizure, tender cancellation, disqualification) and immigration issues while at 20 were imports, talks and exploration. Other activities that received less than 20 coverages but are worth mentioning were state visit (17), probe (16) and Foreign Direct Investment (19). The rest of the stories were either general (22) or did not mention any activity (280).

Notable pattern across the years is that loans led almost throughout (See Appendix I). An exception was in 2015 where construction was slightly ahead (18) of loans (16) in terms of coverage. Also, in 2014, construction and loans were at par (10). It is also notable that there was an annual growth in the coverage of loans: 2014 (10), 2015 (16), 2016 (31), 2017 (31), 2018 (51).

These patterns are in sync with the dominance of investment stories (see Table 2) and it also resonates with China being one of Africa's biggest investors and Africa's largest trading partner for the last 12 years (see IISD, 2021 in chapter 1). Also worth noting is that both Kenya and Nigeria were constructing and trading while Zimbabwe was engaged in meetings with the Chinese; there was more practical action and less talk in Kenya; in Zimbabwe things happened at meeting level. Nigeria also was commemorating accomplishments or milestones.

As shall be discussed in Chapter 5, the framing of stories about these activities was a mixture of positivity and negativity throughout the five-year period; some stories were framed as *trade imbalance*, *debt trap*, Chinese benevolence, Chinese investment, environmental destruction.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how the data, from where the frames come, looks showing how each newspaper reported on the subjects, actors, and activities. The chapter also interpreted the patterns attendant to the data while indicating how the stories were framed.

Chapter 5: Framing analysis and discussion

5.0 Introduction

As stated in Chapter 3 section 3. 6, optimism vs pessimism were the two overarching themes that emerged from the data analysis. Therefore, this chapter identifies, analyses, and discusses the actual frames categorising them as either optimist or pessimist for the purposes of measuring positivity versus negativity of the framing with a view to determining the image of China.

5.1 Optimist frames

According to Wekesa (2013b), and as indicated in Chapter 3 section 3. 6, central to the optimist theme is the notion that China and Africa need each other and are already in a mutually beneficial partnership. According to this perspective, while Africa brings its natural resources, China brings investment to the partnership. However, China is not just a partner but is also a kind role model to Africa.

5.1.1 China the investor

As proven earlier (See Table 2 in Chapter 4), investment stories were the most dominant throughout the five-year period of this study. Consequently, and notwithstanding its sparsity in the *NewsDay* where it appeared only twice (ZW_ND_2018-08a08; ZW_ND_2018-10a10), this optimistic frame was consistently deployed by all the other newspapers throughout the five-year period.

In that regard, this pattern can be taken as proof that “Chinese investment and aid generally make a positive contribution to Chinese soft power in Africa” and that Africans generally welcome the economic ties with China (Morgan, 2019, p. 387). After all, as indicated in Chapter 1 (see IISD, 2021), by 2021 China had become the fourth largest investor in Africa and the continent’s largest trading partner for the past 12 years (IISD, 2021).

Based on prior data classification, the researcher looked for metaphors and phrases portraying Chinese actors and activities. For example, words such as catalyst, contractors, builders, businessmen, biggest manufacturer, largest developer, biggest investor, biggest funder, biggest trading partner, joint venture, exploration, business partnership, were frequently used to portray Chinese actors and activities across the newspapers throughout the five years and across the subject areas.

Central to this frame is the collective message and claim that China is Africa’s main investor and the theme that contemporary China-Africa ties are commercially driven with a focus on investment. This is

encapsulated in the feature article ZW_HE_2017-07a07 which states that: “Across trade, investment, infrastructure and aid, China is a top five partner to Africa-no other country matches this level of engagement. China's presence is bigger and more multifaceted than previously thought”.

In what is arguably a validation of the theory (see Zhang et al., 2016a; Zhimin and Junbo, 2009 in chapter 1) of multisector Chinese presence in Africa, sectors in which Chinese investments dominate are energy, agriculture, brick making, mining, health care, construction, wildlife management, loans, tourism, telecommunications, human capital with technology being the “most logical industry for the next stage of Sino-Africa” (ZW_HE_2018-09a09).

Frequently and across all the newspapers, Chinese actors are engaging in typical commercial activities, signing agreements and deals, *Memoranda of Understanding*, exploring for opportunities, studying the African investment culture and business climate before acquiring entities or entering joint ventures or starting solo projects. For example, the EXIM Bank of China signed a US \$1bn deal with the Afreximbank to set up industrial parks Africa-wide (NG_GU_2016-07a07) while Nigeria and China signed a US \$328 deal for the development of Information and Communication technology infrastructure (NG_VG_2018-09za09).

As such, typical sources of the investor frame are private and state-controlled firms, government officials, diplomats, Chinese provinces and cities, and international telecommunications concerns such as Huawei, media houses. This resonates with companies, government officials, and

embassies being among the busiest actors (see Chapter 4). This confirms that a number of players contribute towards the shaping of media frames as previously stated (de Vreese, 2012; Carragee and Roefs, 2004). An example is that of Chen Xufeng, the Chinese mission to the African Union Chargé d'affaires, who says “Today, China has become Africa's largest trading partner, main investor and engineering contractor,” (ZW_HE_2017-10b10). This confirms that frames are “embedded in political discourse invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye on advancing their own interests or ideologies and intended to make favourable interpretations” (see Kinder and Sanders, 1990, p. 74 in chapter 3 section 3.1).

The Chinese investment is also framed as having “maintained an upward trajectory” (ZW_HE_2016-03c03) or “upward trend” (ZW_HE_2016-03a03). This is to the extent that in the last two decades, China grew “from a relatively small investor to becoming one of Africa's largest partners” (NG_VG_2018-10a10). The zealous commitment to investment also led to China overtaking both the EU and the USA to become Kenya’s largest source of Foreign Direct Investment (KE_ST_2017-12e12). During the 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing, China pledged to invest \$60 billion in Africa before the next 2021 summit (NG_VG_2018-09m09; ZW_HE_2018-09h09).

The investor frame is also boosted by the fact that the Chinese are so focused on investment that despite the Beijing-Washington rivalry (See Scramble for Africa frame), Chinese firms are still prepared to partner US entities. A case in point is that of an unnamed Chinese firm negotiating a possible partnership with an US company in the

construction of an \$3 billion Batoka Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme in Zimbabwe (ZW_HE_2018-04h04).

Chinese investors are also prioritising Africa which is their “favourite destination” ahead of other regions like Latin America and the Caribbeans (KE_NA_2014-07c07). The readiness of Chinese mobile maker TECNO to directly take on big rivals like Samsung and LG with its new product in Kenya proves this (KE_NA_2014-06). So does Chinese Pay TV StarTimes’s construction of the billion-dollar headquarters and broadcasting centre in the same country to rival the Western propaganda (KE_NA_2014-07b07).

The extent of China’s commitment to investing in Africa is also demonstrable through plans to build a billion-dollar city with “skyscrapers and infrastructure” to “match the splendour of Dubai” in Kenya (KE_NA_2014-04d04) as well as a billion-dollar tourism city in Zimbabwe (ZW_HE_2018-04e04). President Xi comes out as a champion of investment and as so committed to investing in Africa that he would make surprise investment and funding commitments and stick to them (ZW_HE_2016-06d06). As a result of such commitments, Chinese institutions were, by 2013, “the largest single source of funds for African infrastructure” (ZW_HE_2015-12c12).

Chinese diplomacy is also conducted with an eye on commerce. For example, Chinese diplomats’ interest in Zimbabwe’s political affairs is only in as far as it could lead to investment opportunities. This is demonstrable through Chinese diplomat Liu’s comment: "I think this peaceful election [2018] will send a good signal to Chinese investors"

(ZW_HE_2018-08c08). Investment is also an integral part of the Chinese Communist Party's agenda as the ruling party leaders will often travel with a "big team of businessmen to explore investment opportunities" during their visits to Africa (ZW_HE_2018-06n06). Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Kenya in 2014 is also framed as a possible catalyst to business as it is "expected to spark off major Chinese" investment (KE_NA_2014-05f05). Li himself is quoted throwing his weight behind more Chinese investment in the East African country (KE_NA_2014-05f05).

Correspondingly, Chinese companies are framed as taking their investments so serious that they are sensitive to a country's political climate. This is shown through the news analysis piece ZW_HE_2018-04l04 which posits that while the Chinese business community were "sceptical about Zimbabwe's future under Mr Mugabe" the post-coup dispensation gave them a "a guarantee" that their businesses would be safe. Says Chinese ambassador to Zimbabwe: "We now have a new leadership with very good policy with Zimbabwe opening for business," (ZW_HE_2018-09k09).

Among the key consequences of this growing Chinese investment is employment creation. Chinese firms are portrayed as employers of local labour further boosting the investor frame. For example, Assistant President of China Road and Bridge Corporation, Wen Gang, announced that his company had recruited about 2,500 Kenyans and was aiming at increasing the number to 30, 000 (KE_ST_2014-08). Another example of typical spinning investments which are generally lauded by the Chinese and African government officials is the International Free Trade

Zone, a network of warehouses and Export Processing Zones linked to Djibouti's ports worked by 15000 locals (ZW_HE_2018-07f07). According to a Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua*, report (ZW_HE_2017-08a08), because of Chinese investments, African workers have “gradually gained skills required and adapted to Chinese work systems” all over the continent.

Also, Chinese investment is framed as the catalyst for Africa's industrialisation- a phenomena which is poised to “lift a lot of African countries out of poverty” (ZW_HE_2017-08d08). Chinese investment in agriculture, for example, “significantly contributed to mechanisation and full utilisation of land” and helped to end food shortages in Zimbabwe (ZW_HE_2016-12d12) through “state like agricultural demonstration centres and experimental farms” (ZW_HE_2016-01a01). According to a *Xinhua* feature article (ZW_HE_2018-08e08) Chinese firms have brought clean water to Mauritius through dam construction as expressed by a thankful president of that country. Because of their commitment to investment, Chinese companies have come to have a reputation in the continent; this is well encapsulated in the case of the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a state-owned construction company, which has “made great impact in the infrastructural landscape” in its more than 30 years of presence in Kenya (KE_NA_2014-12a12). This runs athwart the accusations (see Mlambo et al., 2016, p. 258 in chapter 1) of China as an agent of “deindustrialisation, poverty and underdevelopment” in Africa.

However, these accusations (see Mlambo et al., 2016, p. 258 in chapter 1) would, arguably, be lent credence if one considered some negative developments. For example, the investor frame is countered when a

deluge of Chinese firms leads to the “edging out local construction firms”. Due to the influx of Chinese contractors, many African contractors are “miss [ing] out on mega projects” (KE_ST_2016-04e04). This trend is Africa-wide, at one time, forcing the African Development Bank to condemn the “unfair competition from Chinese firms” (NG_VG_2018-11b11). Corruption is also another problem; in Nigeria, for example, the government illegally gave the Nigerian Railway quarters to Chinese firms (NG_VG_2018-12e12). Such developments arguably lend credence to the theory (see Mlambo et al., 2016 in chapter 1) of China deindustrialising and impoverishing Africa (see Section 6.2.1).

However, not every negative development is a counter to the investor frame. For example, in Kenya, Chinese investors fought over a multibillion shillings real estate company until the tussle spilled into the courts (KE_NA_2015-06d06). While this is a negative development, it, however, also demonstrates that the Chinese are so eager to invest in Africa to the extent of fighting among themselves thereby perpetuating the notion of investment being the foremost driver of Beijing’s involvement in Africa. In another report (KE_NA_2015-06b06), a Chinese firm, HCIG Energy Investment Company of China, sued the Kenyan government after it lost a tender to a local firm. Again, this shows how desperate to invest in Africa the Chinese firms are thereby ultimately boosting the frame.

5.1.2 Global model/exemplar

Throughout the five-year period, across all the newspapers, subjects and authorships, the image of China as a model and an exemplar worth copying is unmistakable. Again, and as was the case with the investor frame, *NewsDay* was an exception as this frame appeared there once (ZW_ND_2016-03) only in 2016.

Emerging global giant (ZW_HE_2014-08g08), a model (ZW_HE_2015-03a03), world's second biggest economy (ZW_ND_2016-03), powerhouse (NG_VG_2018-02d02), global force (KE_ST_2018-02c02), world power (NG_VG_2018-04), economic giant (NG_VG_2018-10eq0), world class (NG_VG_2018-09t09), China's example (ZW_HE_2016-07a07) are some of the common adjectives, metaphors, and phrases that portray China as an achiever and leader with global presence and impact. Some of these words interchangeably describe China the country, her products, companies, services, government, and leaders. This resonates with Umejei (2013) who found that China was depicted as a partner and a role model.

The frame confirms that China is “seen as a new development model and partner in Africa” untainted by colonial accusations (Morgan, 2019, p. 391). Accruing from the theory (see Ado and Su, 2016; Dijk, 2009 in Chapter 1) that China harbours superpower ambitions, this frame's main theme is that China's global leadership and greatness manifests in international politics, diplomacy, commerce, security, and education amongst many other sectors; essentially; it depicts China as a symbol of success and excellence which Africa does not just admire but must emulate. Writes (ZW_HE_2015-03a03) Professor Said Adejumobi: “China's rise to stardom provides a model, an incentive for Africa, which

it needs to watch closely if not mimic. In other words, Africa sees in China a possible image of its own future.”

In another piece (KE_ST_2018-02c02), Professor Macharia Munene argues: “China emerged as a global force that others have no choice but to acknowledge. The challenge to Kenya and other African states is to learn from China’s global magnetism”.

As can be seen from the above quotations, China is presented as a natural model of irresistible presence and pull so much so that Africa and the rest of the world have no option but to mimic her. The notion of an irresistibly attractive China is a through line connecting publications and years. For example, according to article ZW_HE_2018-04s04, “every country” and all people “want to be associated” with China because of its “greatness” (ZW_HE_2018-04s04). According to Nigerian opposition party, All Progressives Grand Alliance (NG_GU_2016-04a04), China’s global attractiveness is down to her “economic giant” status which has spawned “vast opportunities” for many countries.

China’s status and exemplariness are not accidental. According to article ZW_HE_2014-12a12, a news piece by *Xinhua*, China’s global successes and reputation are fruits of quality leadership. To bolster that argument, former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, is quoted saying “the quality of Chinese leaders has always been extremely high.” This resonates with Vinogradova and Denisova (2018)’s view that the image of a country’s leader and political institutions are key to the national image (See Chapter 2 section 2. 2). So, thanks to that quality leadership,

posits article ZW_HE_2018-04d04, China today boasts of “high standards” of living and education.

Chinese education is not only of “high standard”; rather it is “the best” because it focuses on skilling (ZW_HE_2018-04d04). This would seem to explain why China has, over the years, become the favourite destination for African students second only to France (See story NG_GU_2017-06a06 in section 5.2.3). As if to put an icing on its achievements on the educational front, the Chinese government founded the China-Europe International business school which boasts of 19,000 alumni globally and branches in West Africa, according to the *Vanguard* (NG_VG_2017-03b03).

Among other fruits of good leadership and evidence of China’s attractiveness are the Asian nation’s ease of doing business policies that have attracted global capital and ensured China is on course to attain the superpower status, argues article ZW_HE_2018-06k06. One of the notable government policies that championed this excellence is devolution which propelled China’s “giant leap” into becoming one of the world’s leading economies. As such, Africa had better copy the “Chinese model” which places government at the centre of national business development (ZW_HE_2018-12d12). Also, and according to article ZW_HE_2016-03d03, modern China is an “open receptive society” which, contrary to common beliefs that China is a closed country, welcomes foreigners.

Just as quality leadership is responsible for transforming China from a “terribly poor country” into a “rich country” (NG_GU_2017-03d03), it

[leadership] was equally instrumental in shaping China's global icon status. For example, Chinese foreign minister Yi's "bumper harvest diplomacy" during his 2014 tour of Africa is praised (ZW_HE_2014-12a12). The essence of the article (ZW_HE_2014-12a12) is that it was top notch leadership that paved the way for Chinese excellence abroad by ensuring "peaceful development and *win-win* cooperation" with other economies.

According to then Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari (NG_VG_2018-02d02), China's excellence and leadership in both domestic and international fronts are not just self-evident, but they are also not mutually exclusive. Implied in Buhari's speech is that domestic success spawned international excellence. What this means is that China's internal success gave her confidence and energy to shape the outside world.

On the international stage, China saw Africa as an opportunity to demonstrate her capacity and leadership. So, by assisting Africa and the rest of the developing world, China triggered a "paradigm shift in the international relations" thereby establishing herself as a "world power", Buhari claims (NG_VG_2018-02d02). One area where China is assisting Africa and where her [China] global exemplariness is evident is in the international security sector. Arguably, China's leadership in global security was demonstrated through the setting up of a China-Africa peace and security fund at Beijing's cost to finance peacekeeping in the continent as revealed by president Xi (ZW_HE_2018-09u09).

Beijing brags about its commitment to global peace (ZW_HE_2014-12a12). This is also emphasised in a *Xinhua* piece (ZW_HE_2016-06b06) which praises the Chinese army for winning the “hearts of the Malians” by extending “military and defence” aid to their country. Moreover, says article NG_VG_2017-07e07, China, which boasts of an advanced army that has embraced modern technology and has sent more soldiers to United Nations (UN) peace keeping missions than all the other members of the UN Security Council.

Such determined pursuit of global peace and stability is not without cause and logic; as stated before, (see Legarda and Hoffman, 2018; Leslie, 2016 in Chapter 1), China has got an eye on protecting both her economic interests along the *Belt and Road Initiative* route and her citizens who are pursuing various projects across Africa.

The technology industry is also one of the sectors whose achievements play a part in the shaping of China’s image. Article ZW_HE_2015-12h12, depicts the Chinese company, Huawei, as the “world’s largest telecommunications and ICT solutions provider” serving more than 90 percent of the top telecom firms worldwide. Moreover, says the same article, Huawei’s global training program, *Seeds for the Future*, has skilled many students worldwide thereby painting the impression of Huawei’s ubiquitous presence and impact. According to article NG_VG_2018-10g10, so excellent are Chinese firms that one of its top smartphone makers, Transsion, beat giants like Apple and Samsung to the African market leaving them “trailing its wake” in terms of sales.

According to article ZW_HE_2018-01c01, Chinese ubiquity and excellence are not only limited to a few entities; rather, many Chinese companies are now “global names with markets and visibility across the whole world” something that is emblematic of the entire Chinese economy which is one of the “fastest growing in the world”.

According to article KE_ST_2018-07d07, China is changing the global infrastructure by constructing new “glamour mega cities” and introducing bullet trains throughout Africa and beyond. At the centre of this revolution are firms like China Communications Construction Company which counts among the world’s largest infrastructure development firms (ZW_HE_2018-04w04) and “world-class” BUA cement SINOMA (NG_GU_2015-09b09). Contrary to the maltreatment of workers frame, trade unionists also regard China as an exemplary leader as it has not just created jobs but has also improved the lives of its own citizens and Africans. Says Nigerian trade unionist, Issa Aremu, (NG_GU_2017-11e11): “Africa should copy China by also adding value to its abundant natural raw materials, create jobs for its youthful population... What was good for China is even more desirable for Africa”. This statement is interesting because as shall be seen later (see Section 5.2.2), Chinese firms’ workers are amongst the sponsors of the unfair labour practices frame.

Another area in which the Chinese government has excelled is in the spreading of the Chinese culture around the world (NG_GU_2017-11c11). The extent of this is that it has spawned a new “Chinese revolution” which is evident in the uptake of Mandarin language and the way in which it [Mandarin] has acted as a tool of connecting people

around the world (NG_GU_2016-05b05). According to article (NG_GU_2015-09a09) the accelerated uptake of Mandarin is so much of a “global trend” that even the Americans and Europeans are following suit all because of China’s “giant strides” in international commerce and relations. Director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos, Professor Yongjing Wang, argues (NG_GU_2017-11c11) that the Chinese government’s performance in the spread of Chinese culture has been instrumental in the transformation of China into a “world stage” where “everyone wants to come”. This rings resonance with the soft power theory meaning the capacity to win allies without coercion (see Nye, 2004 in chapter 1).

5.1.3 Benevolent/Compassionate/responsible China

As the title shows, this frame derives from its two core aspects or areas of emphasis namely humanitarianism and corporate social responsibility. As such, the frame projects China as a benevolent society compelled by twin principles of responsibility and humanitarianism to assist other societies and nations in advancement of human welfare and development.

While the corporate social responsibility notion boils down to entities [Chinese in this case] giving back to the communities they operate in and in fulfilment of legal obligations (Jones, 1980), humanitarianism is rooted in compassion and cross border charity (Orgad and Seu, 2014).

This frame, also identified by Wasserman (2012) and as stated in Chapter 1, appeared in all the newspapers except the *NewsDay* where it was

completely absent. However, it was prevalent in both Kenyan and Nigerian newspapers. It should be remembered that the Zimbabwean private press of which the *NewsDay* is a part, is anti-government [Zimbabwe] and opposes anything that government does (see Chari, 2011 in Chapter 2); also, and as shall be demonstrated (see criminality frame in section 5. 2. 1) the *NewsDay* is rabidly anti-Chinese.

In Chapter 4, we discovered that both investment and foreign affairs were the busiest subject areas, and that companies and embassies were among the most engaged actors (see Tables 2, 5 and 8). In that regard, we should recall that investment was more in Kenya and Nigeria (see Table 2). Therefore, this frame reflects those patterns as the Chinese firms, embassies and other central government officials featured most in the humanitarian/responsible frame enterprise and progression. Also, this would explain the concentration of stories on corporate social responsibility in those two countries.

It will also be recalled that in Chapter 1, we had Western leaders, including their African colleagues, accusing China of colonising Africa (see Lafargue, 2009; Shen and Taylor, 2012). However, this frame runs athwart the colonialism narrative (see Lafargue, 2009; Shen and Taylor, 2012); its primary import is that rather than colonise, compassionate China knows and understands that, instead, it has got a responsibility to uplift Africa. Also, as stated in Chapter 1, all the three research countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe) are low-income economies with most people being poor or dependent on others. As such, it follows that Chinese benevolence would thrive in those countries.

Apart from colonialism, this frame also counters multiple pessimist stereotypes about China such as exploitation, maltreatment of workers, and environmental destruction (See Leslie, 2016, p. 4 in Chapter 1); the frame shows the Chinese state and firms ably exhibiting the warmer side of China. In essence, it is a typical counter-frame meaning a frame whose primary purpose is to contradict an earlier frame and after that earlier frame would have impacted on public perceptions (Anderson, 2018).

Perhaps, the notion and claim of Chinese compassion as opposed to colonialism was best encapsulated in Zimbabwean president, Emmerson Mnangagwa's speech (ZW_HE_2018-09f09) at the 2018 FOCAC summit:

We are happy that this is a country that has never colonised anybody, who today is giving us a helping hand to grow. As a matter of fact, China is helping us to become a middle-income country. As a result of that helping hand we leapfrog and grow into a modern economy. Left alone it will take us more years to develop with our domestic investment, but given the technology, the assistance, the financial know-how, we leapfrog and become an important cog in the global economy.

So, as can be seen, this frame is embedded in Chinese and African official speech. At the core of the frame is the notion that China's compassion for Africa is purposeful, undergirded by honesty and genuineness. China is a "responsible contributor to Africa's success" and is "sincerely helping Africa" to uplift itself, claims article ZW_HE_2018-09g09. In that regard, according to China's foreign affairs minister, Wang Yi, central to China's benevolence towards Africa is the genuine desire to eradicate poverty drawing insights from President Xin Jinping's anti-poverty ideals (ZW_HE_2017-06a06).

A general impression gleaned from all the newspapers (save for the *NewsDay*), is that to demonstrate its compassion and to empower Africa to extricate herself from poverty, China deploys multiple methods and strategies. One such strategy is mass skilling; this entails imparting critical skills to as many Africans as possible in various sectors and professions. According to article ZW_HE_2017-09, the mass skilling of Africa is not haphazard; rather, it is methodical as it targets specific and symbolic groups such as poor children some of whom are awarded scholarships to study in China (ZW_HE_2017-09). Such programmes include 40 young Nigerians sent to study every year in China through the *China-Nigeria Bilateral Education Agreement*, according to the *Vanguard* (NG_VG_2016-01). Further to that, according to *The Guardian* (NG_GU_2017-07b07), by training Africans in information and communications technology, through its bilateral training programme, China is “boosting talent development”.

However, benevolent training is not a preserve for formal tertiary education; instead, it extends to all sectors including national security. Chapter 1 (See Legarda and Hoffman, 2018) mentioned that China is particular about security and peace and will make efforts to ensure stability in areas through which the *Belt and Road Initiative* route passes. Also, as stated in Chapter 1 (see Morgan, 2019), China is prone to deploying its economic wherewithal to secure its other strategic interests or goals. As such, Chinese benevolence is, from the look of it, tailor-made to Beijing’s security concerns and peace keeping initiatives.

Therefore, while the Chinese naval team training the Nigerian army on the operation of offshore patrol vessels would appear as impartial and

sincere benevolence (NG_GU_2015-09e09), it is, from the look of it, a self-regarding gesture. The same can be said of the training (KE_ST_2017-01a01) of hundreds of Kenyan police officers on how to operate armoured vehicles; the exercise is framed as a case of responsible and caring China helping Kenya in its “fight against terrorism in the borders” and yet it is about Beijing making sure peace prevails along its areas of interest and focus.

This confirms that, as stated earlier in Chapter 3 (see Farooq et al., 2018, p. 404), Kenya is a “key pivot point” in Beijing’s ambitious *Belt and Road Initiative* project. As Morgan (2019, pp. 390–1) argues, “China’s economic engagements are closely connected to political and security goals”.

The Chinese benevolence also extends to recreational life; for example, members of the Kenyan social and youth clubs received free Kung Fu training from Chinese experts to “impart best practices”, “sharpen local skills” and “grow” the sport and raise Kenya’s profile in international competitions (KE_ST_2016-10a10). African entrepreneurs are also empowered with Chinese skills such as when 100 Nigerian shoes makers were sent to learn automated shoe making technology at the Chinese government’s expense (NG_VG_2018-01a01).

Yet another gesture that bolsters the anti-poverty empowerment strategy thereby boosting the Chinese benevolence or humanitarianism frame, is donating to Africa. Donations come in the form of humanitarian assistance that is as response to disasters. From the stories (for example, ZW_HE_2014-12b12; NG_GU_2015-09e09), it is evident that Chinese

humanitarianism is purposely designed to present China in positive light; it is symbolically directed at strategic sectors like health, education, security, youth, and women groups and is tied to one of Chinese foreign policy's core principles: non-interference. This was best captured in Chinese foreign office spokesperson, Hua's comment: "China's aid to Africa sticks to a principle of non-interference in countries' internal affairs, no political strings attached, and never offering blank promises" (ZW_HE_2015-12b12). As can be noticed from the quotation, China is keen to be framed positively and as being driven by a sense of duty and responsibility as opposed to control and subjugation.

In that regard, on handing over US \$1m "humanitarian assistance" to the Zimbabwean government following the 2017 floods, ambassador Huang Ping said China "felt duty bound to take action because actions speak louder than words" (ZW_HE_2017-04b04). On the donation of 525 mobile solar units, Ping framed the gesture as China "doing its part" in tackling energy poverty (ZW_HE_2014-01). However, what is apparent is the element of self-regard as this gesture came at a time when, according to Compagnon and Alejandro (2013), China is keen to show itself as a clean energy promoter.

In another case, when the embassy donated to the poor and disabled, *The Herald* newspaper, quoting a Zimbabwean government official, headlined the story: "China's good gesture" (ZW_HE_2014-12b12). Following the donation of 5,000 litres of petrol and 20 Huawei phones to the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) by the embassy, the same newspaper framed the gesture as "representative of Chinese sincerity" (ZW_HE_2018-06m06).

In fact, the donations to strategic African institutions and needy folks also follow the same considerations as training strategy; examples are when the Chinese army donated US \$4, 2 million to the Zimbabwe National Army for unexplained “various army projects” (ZW_HE_2014-04a04). In Nigeria, as already mentioned above, the Chinese army donated an offshore patrol vessel and sent a naval team to train the Nigerian army on how to operate it for four months (NG_GU_2015-09e09).

As already mentioned above, these supposedly good gestures are not a preserve of the Chinese central government and the embassies; instead, multiple Chinese actors, among them companies, routinely promote themselves as responsibly involved in Africa thereby perpetuating the frame [/Benevolent/compassionate/Humanitarian/Responsible].

There is both history and context to the pattern. As mentioned earlier (See Kamusella, 2021 in Chapter 1), Chinese entrepreneurs are “subservient” to the ruling party’s ideology. In that regard, the mid-2000s promulgation of stringent laws directing how Chinese companies should conduct themselves among the communities they operate in both inside the country and abroad was always “likely” going to prod Africa-based entities into adopting cooperate social responsibility strategies and policies (Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013, p. 223).

From the stories (for example, ZW_HE_2015-02; NG_VG_2017-07c07; NG_VG_2018-11e11) the Chinese embassies lead by example in promoting and perpetuating the frame. Going by article (ZW_HE_2015-02), China’s interest in the social responsibility activities and, therefore,

the shaping of this optimist frame, is apparent in the ambassador to Zimbabwe's official speech at a football match sponsored by the embassy: "We encourage the Chinese community and Chinese firms to shoulder local communities' responsibilities. Today the embassy sponsors this friendship soccer match".

Consequently, many stories (For example, NG_GU_2016-08d08; NG_VG_2018-07a07; KE_NA_2016-03c03; KE_ST_2016-03h03) across the publications are wholly and purposely framed to project Chinese entities as enthusiastically fulfilling their corporate social responsibility obligations. For example, according to *The Guardian* (NG_GU_2016-08d08), to affirm its adherence to government rules and promote itself as a responsible outfit, Huawei went as far as developing its flagship Corporate Social Responsibility programme titled '*Seeds for the Future*' through which it, together with the African governments, "nurtures", and "hones young people's e skills" (NG_GU_2016-08d08). Also, Alibaba Business School's *eFounders Fellowship* hosted its inaugural class of young businesspeople from "underbanked and unbanked" African communities to "empower" them with business skills (NG_VG_2018-07a07).

One of the most common measures the Chinese firms took to fulfil their social responsibilities was the hiring of locals thereby promoting themselves as job creators. According to article, KE_NA_2016-03b03, an example out of multiple such reports, China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) released a report titled *Social Responsibility Report* to prove it was fulfilling its obligations. The news article quotes the CRBC report at length arguing that "contrary to popular beliefs that

Chinese only hire Chinese workers, 93 percent of the companies report hiring Kenyans.” In another report (KE_NA_2016-12c12), Chinese Standard Gauge Railway operator is quoted pledging to hire as many as 3,000 Kenyans.

In Chapter 3 (See de Vreese, 2012), we learnt that in some cases journalists play a little role in the framing as they just adopt the work of other framers. So, as can be seen from above, this was an advocacy frame as most of the framing was done by the companies with journalists mimicking Chinese actors who strove to be depicted in positive light.

5.1.4 History/Historically bound ties

While the history frame appeared in all the research countries, it was, by and large, a [The] *Herald*, *The Guardian*, and *Vanguard* frame and in that order. In Kenya, it appeared just once (KE_NA_2018-07b07) in the *Nation*. As shall be demonstrated down the line, two key themes (shared history and ancient precolonial ties) were attendant to the official rhetoric and, therefore, to the frame throughout the study period. In what is a resounding echo of Large (2008, p. 48)’s argument that China never misses an opportunity to anchor every aspect of its relationship with Africa on history, this frame featured frequently across the subject areas with Beijing leaders being the main sponsors.

The frame’s prevalence in *The Herald*, a state-controlled newspaper, could be down to the fact that the frame wholly speaks to the patriotic history concept (see Ranger, 2004 in Chapter 1). According to Ranger (2004), patriotic history is the version that highlights and promotes

only those aspects of history that are acceptable to the establishment. As Becks argues (Beck, 2005, p. 77), states as well as corporations, are “strategic” when it comes to handling the truth often “maintaining a huge and expensive apparatus” to “hush up those facts that are harmful to them and propagate those from which they hope to gain an advantage”.

In his adaptation (Musanga, 2017) of Ranger’s theory (2004), the author argues that, in the context of China-Africa relations, patriotic history is “inherently narrow and monolithic” because it “ignores and marginalises other histories and narratives”. Implied in Masanga (2017) is the idea that the patriotic version of history wholly glorifies the China-Africa relations by illuminating only the rosy aspects of the ties while consciously omitting the ugly ones. So, precisely, it could be down to self-censorship on the part of fearful editors who would rather toe the line to be seen as “collaborative and patriotic” by the ruling elite (Chuma, 2020, p. 7). Inevitably, owing to its (patriotic history) “inherent” limitedness, the private press readily punch holes into this version of history through their “cynical and sceptical” narratives (Musanga, 2017, p. 83). In that respect this would, arguably, explain the frame’s absence in the *NewsDay*, *The Herald*’s rival.

Therefore, as already indicated in the first paragraph, the frame rests on twin themes namely the ancient precolonial origins of the China-Africa relations and the historical commonalities that bind the two [China and Africa] together. While the precolonial contacts theme is anchored in the notion that China and Africa discovered each other well before Western colonialism, the shared history theme emphasises the notion that China

and Africa are natural allies as “Africa's experience of domination and underdevelopment bear resemblance to that of China” (ZW_HE_2015-03a03). In an opinion piece (ZW_HE_2015-11b11), Phyllis Johnson writes:

“China has been engaged in commercial relations with Southern Africa for more than a thousand years. There is firm archaeological evidence of Chinese products found in coastal Mozambique and far inland at Great Zimbabwe and elsewhere, an indication of trade relations that existed long before the arrival of European explorers and settlers”.

Apparent in the above quote is the emphasis on the length of time China has been involved in Africa and on the establishment of the ties well before the West colonised Africa. These mutual emphases have the effect of presenting China as Africa’s natural, loyal, and rightful ally; one gets the sense that the first China-Africa contacts of many centuries ago were cordial as opposed to violent Western colonialism something which makes China occupy a high moral high ground. As such, the modern-day commercial ties between China and Africa appear as a natural continuation of the earlier era contacts. This is also evident in a Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua*, feature article (ZW_HE_2017-08a08) which claims that the Chinese people first arrived in Africa in the 15th century, and they have stayed put for six centuries, enduring both “good and bad times” along the way.

So, given that the ties date back to centuries ago, and that the official emphasis is on that historic aspect of the relationship, and as shall be demonstrated below, the catch phrases and metaphors bearing the frame indicate the extent to which the precious relationship is cherished, and the corresponding urgency to preserve and perpetuate it. For example,

President Xi, during Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe's state visit, spoke (ZW_HE_2014-08c08) of China and Zimbabwe's mutual "principles and values since both countries fought imperialism and colonialism". According to article (ZW_HE_2016-06c06), a Chinese foreign minister said Xi and Mugabe had agreed to "deepen and further develop" the relationship between their countries. In a message (ZW_HE_2018-08n08) congratulating Zanu PF for winning the 2018 Zimbabwe elections, the Communist Party of China said it was ready to "further deepen" historical relations and take them to a "new height after another".

Strengthening, broadening (NG_GU_2018-10c10), expanding, deepening (NG_GU_2018-12a12; NG_VG_2016-06a06) and renewing (NG_VG_2018-06g06; NG_VG_2018-09i09) the ancient relationship between China and Africa in all areas of cooperation was the same message and mantra in Nigeria. According to article (NG_VG_2018-09zf09) the Africa-China ties of the earlier era constitute a "solid foundation" which even though still "full of vitality" must still be "upgraded". As a result of shared history, China and Africa share the same destiny, claimed the *Nation* (KE_NA_2018-07b07) and the *Vanguard* (NG_VG_2018-09zf09) editorial comments.

Apparently, in all the situations and or stories mentioned above, chief actors were the Chinese and African, entities, diplomats, and presidents who clearly cherish the history of China in Africa and wish the relationship would persist for ever. This confirms that, as previously mentioned (see Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 43 in Chapter 1), among the strategies that China relies on to perpetuate its presence in Africa is to

calculatedly frame its relations with Africa in historical terms. Furthermore, and as stated earlier (see Strauss, 2009, p. 780 in chapter 1), this confirms that Beijing's reliance on this strategy is to the extent that just about every official communication on China-Africa issues pivots around the historical aspect of the relationship with a view to persuading target audiences into accepting China's mission.

However, the concept of shared history is not limited to the ancient era; rather, there is a modern aspect which is the basis of the current China-Africa solidarity. That aspect derives from China's support for the 1960s to 70s African liberation armies against colonial rule. For example, one of China key allies during the struggles for African independence was the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which has been the ruling party since independence in 1980 (see Legum, 1979 in Chapter 1). The importance of this aspect is captured in Joseph Okpaku, CEO of Third Press publishers' *Vanguard* piece (NG_VG_2018-09ze09):

It is essentially incontrovertible that China and Africa have a fundamentally good relationship. Historic in nature, it is founded on a long record of mutual support. China supported Africa's struggle for independence and the uncompromising commitment to the total liberation of the entire continent at a time when a fair number of Western responses, especially by colonial powers epitomized nothing less than prevarication and recalcitrance. For its part, Africa gave China total support in her struggle for acceptance in the global comity of nations, especially her membership in the United Nations. This solidarity of purpose enabled the evolution of a "Third Force" in international relations, something outside of the Capitalist West and the Communist East Cold War rivalry.

This is also supported by Saidu Adejumo's opinion piece (ZW_HE_2015-03a03):

The History of political fraternity and solidarity between Africa and China dates-back to the anti-colonial struggles in which China stood firmly on the

side of the future. It supported liberation movements in Africa by offering them training facilities, education, and arms for liberation purposes. Africa remains grateful and feels connected to China.

From the above statements, one can deduce that the sub themes of solidarity, reciprocity, and gratefulness are some of the major aspects of the history frame. However, this could just be a result of persuasive and emotional official rhetoric and therefore patriotic history. According to Strauss (2009, pp. 77–8), such “rhetorical continuities” are distinguished by the fact that they “skate over some of the realities in which China has been rather less happily involved” in Africa. Among the less happy Chinese involvements in Africa, argues Strauss (2009), are arming rebels while at the same time publicly claiming adherence to the principle of non-interference as well as competing with the then Soviet Union over influence in some parts of Africa.

5.1.5 *Win-win*

Earlier in Chapter 1, we learnt that China promotes its ties with Africa as a *win-win* relationship (see Jia, 2021). While echoing that observation (see Jia, 2021), this frame mainly feeds off both foreign and investment affairs something which is in line with the dominance of foreign affairs and investment stories (see Table 2 in Chapter 4). However, as shall be seen, while it also appeared in Kenya and Nigeria, the *win-win* frame was mainly in *The Herald* while it was totally absent in the *NewsDay*. As stated in Chapter 1 section 1. 7. 2 (Ganda, 2020), Zimbabwe is one of the countries that turned to China through its *Look East policy* owing to the breakdown of what Harare thought was an unfair relationship with

the West. As such, that would explain the prevalence of the *win-win* frame in *The Herald*.

To get the gist and central import of the *win-win* frame, a look into the general mutual official rhetoric will, perhaps, suffice. For instance, according to Rwandese leader, Paul Kagame (ZW_HE_2018-09c09), China has proven that it is Africa's "*win-win* partner and sincere friend"; so sincere are the ties between the two that "the gains are enjoyed by everyone". To then Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Lin Songtian, while Africa is in a *win-win* relationship with China, no African country could claim a similar relationship with the West; as such, it was time China and Africa "upgraded" their cooperation to "a new height" (ZW_HE_2017-08b08). So, at the core of the China-Africa '*win-win*' bilateral relations are "solidarity, mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual benefit," said Senegalese leader Macky Sall (ZW_HE_2018-07e07).

Win-win development path (ZW_HE_2018-07k07), real *win-win* cooperation (ZW_HE_2018-06g06) *win-win* friendship (NG_VG_2018-06a06) *win-win* benefits in all aspects (NG_VG_2018-07c07) *win-win* situation (KE_NA_2017-05f05) *win-win* and equal partnership (KE_ST_2015-12a12) mutually beneficiary relationship (ZW_HE_2016-05) *win-win* strategy (ZW_HE_2016-10b10) *win-win* progress and common development (ZW_HE_2017-02ao2) and *win-win* outcomes (ZW_HE_2018-06g06), were also among the common phrases used to buttress the *win-win* frame.

So, as can be seen from the above statements and phrases, the main import of the *win-win* frame is that the China-Africa ties are based on the principles of mutuality and sincerity and neither of the parties is being exploited. In that regard, the *win-win* frame is a counter to the colonialism and exploitation notions referred to (see Lafargue, 2009; Shen and Taylor, 2012) earlier in the first chapter as well as the *trade imbalance* (5. 2. 7) and *debt trap* frames (5. 2. 6).

The *win-win* frame, like the *historically bound ties* frame, feeds off the official rhetoric with the Chinese and African leaders being the chief sponsors. This would confirm that, as mentioned (see Kinder and Sanders, 1990, p. 74) earlier in Chapter 2, frames are “embedded in political discourse invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye toward advancing their own interests or ideologies and intended to make favourable interpretations”.

However, by no means is the *win-win* rhetoric and framing a preserve for the political leadership; rather, the business elite too are involved in the framing enterprise. According to article (ZW_HE_2014-08b08), during a Chinese business delegation’s visit to a Zimbabwe Tobacco firm, delegation leader emphasised the need to “create a *win-win* situation” for both parties. And indeed, according to article ZW_HE_2017-05b05, the *win-win* concept and, therefore, relations are a “pull factor for investors” as they “make it possible” for the Chinese business folks to choose Zimbabwe ahead of other destinations.

In that regard, even President Xi’s *Belt Road Initiative* project (see Chapter 1) is also an outcome of the *win-win* concept. Speaking at the

2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing, Xi said the project was an opportunity for Africa and China to upgrade the *win-win* and shared community strategies (ZW_HE_2018-09e09). As such, the importance of the *Belt and Road Initiative* will be seen through its *win-win* outcomes and shared prosperity, such as shared skills, assets, and economic corridors (KE_NA_2017-05f05).

5.1.6 All-weather friends

Among the many contentions attendant to China's involvement in Africa has been Beijing's support for repressive regimes especially the Zimbabwean government (see Lafargue, 2009 in Chapter 1). However, China and its like-minded African allies have defied the opprobrium and weathered the storm (see Osondu-Oti, 2016 in Chapter 1). It is, therefore, from this perspective that the *all-weather friends* frame should be understood.

Given that the China-Zimbabwe relations are amongst the most disapproved ties (see Lafargue, 2009 in Chapter 1), it would explain the dominance of the frame in *The Herald* although it [frame] also appeared once in Nigeria (*Vanguard*). And indeed, according to *The Herald* (ZW_HE_2018-03c03), China is an *all-weather friend* because it has “stood by Zimbabwe in the face of illegal sanctions imposed by Western countries”. The dominance of the frame in *The Herald* also resonates with Zhang et al (2016b) who, as mentioned in Chapter 1, found that the Zimbabwean state media framed China as an *all-weather friend*.

In that regard, one of the developments which can be said to have lent credence to the *all-weather friendship* notion was in 2008 when Beijing vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (see Alao, 2014 in Chapter 1). This resonates with the observation (see Musanga, 2017 in Chapter 1) that Zimbabwe turned to China as a consequence of its [Zimbabwe] fallout with the Western nations over its controversial land reform exercise.

Therefore, based on the above, the essence of the *all-weather* frame is that China and her allies, Zimbabwe included, are in a permanent friendship, a bond which no amount of trouble and pressure will destroy.

True to the idea (Kinder and Sanders, 1990, p. 74) that frames are “embedded in political discourse”, the *all-weather friends* frame is embedded in the official rhetoric. For example, according to the then Chinese ambassador to Zimbabwe, Lin Lin, (ZW_HE_2014-08a08), China and Zimbabwe’s “*all-weather* partnership” is “smooth and fruitful” owing to both countries’ standing together “in weal and woe”. Also, as an *all-weather friend*, China will “continue supporting Zimbabweans”, according to Lin (ZW_HE_2014-08d08). This support will also include financial aid (ZW_HE_2014-12b12). This resonates with Zimbabwe’s *Look East Policy* whose aim was to “delink” Zimbabwe from “Western capitalism” and embrace China (see Musanga, 2017, p. 82 in Chapter 1).

Detectable in the general official rhetoric above is the emphasis on endurance and sincerity on Beijing’s part, the intention, according to article, ZW_HE_2017-04a04, being to prove that China is a “true friend”

whose truthfulness ensured that its *all-weather friendship* with Africa “stood the test of time”.

Therefore, this *all-weather friendship* is not limited to financial assistance; rather, it extends to other areas and is constantly expressed through unhindered solidarities during tense situations like coup, elections, and leisure like football matches. The overall impression one gets is that while the West abandoned Zimbabwe, China will stay put and handhold its partner in the face of adversity. For example, according to article ZW_HE_2018-08h08, when the Western nations were condemning the 2018 election result as unfair, China endorsed outcome as “peaceful, orderly and credible” sure to send a “positive signal to Chinese investors”.

The *all-weather friendship* also extends to the military. For example, according to Table 6 in Chapter 4, Zimbabwe had one of the highest military engagements with China. And, indeed, Mugabe affirmed (ZW_HE_2015-11d11) that army relations, date backing to the 1970s Africa liberation war, were one of the mainstays of the *all-weather friends* notion or bond.

Another way to understand the *all-weather friendship* concept is to consider it as an affirmation or extension of the history frame.

“That historical link together with the common experience and mutual support in the struggle for independence, informed the solid foundation for the “*all weather friendship*” between China and African countries” (Guijin, 2007, p. 75).

5.2 Pessimist frames

On the other hand, according to Wekesa (2013b), the pessimism notion holds that as opposed to being an equal partner, China is actually an evil rival, exploiting and harming Africa.

5.2.1 Chinese criminality

In Chapter 1 we learnt (van Uhm and Wong, 2021; Zhang and Chin, 2008) that one of the major downsides of China's economic growth and global presence was the prosperity of organised crime conducted by Chinese nationals and entities around the world, Africa included. In that regard, while the global exemplar frame showed analysts, Chinese, African and US leaders alike lauding China's domestic and international successes (see ZW_HE_2015-03a03; KE_ST_2018-02c02; ZW_HE_2014-12a12 under the global exemplar frame), crime, apparently, cast a dark shadow over these positives. This frame's central implication is that crime is not a sideshow; rather it is an integral part of the Chinese business culture and, therefore, an inevitable consequence of Chinese presence in Africa; it paints a sordid picture of sheer villainy, graft, theft, bribery, violence, and all manner of transgressions.

Also, and as revealed in Chapter 4 (see Table 2), crime was one of the subjects that received attention in terms of news coverage throughout the five-year period; as such, the appearance of this frame followed the same pattern. The criminality/crime frame appeared throughout the five-year period through a combination of news, feature and opinion pieces written by either staff writers or Western news agencies, or individual contributors.

In classic confirmation that Chinese crimes vary (see Zhang and Chin, 2008 in Chapter 1), typical crimes underlining this frame are asset stripping, tax evasion, bribery, smuggling, money laundering, trafficking, espionage, poaching, physical assault among others. As shall be seen, these crimes are prevalent across the three research countries and beyond.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the crime frame is that it is not only more prominent in the *NewsDay* but is also the same paper's flagship representation of the Chinese presence in Africa. Perhaps this would explain the *NewsDay*'s total silence on the benevolence aspect of China abroad. However, by contrast, in *The Herald*, *NewsDay*'s local rival in Zimbabwe, the frame appeared only thrice during the entire five-year period; once in 2014 (ZW_HE_2014-11c11), once in 2016 (ZW_HE_2016-10a10) and finally in 2018 (ZW_HE_2018-12a12).

Considering *NewsDay* is a private newspaper and *The Herald* a state-controlled publication, this development brings into focus the concept of "vendetta journalism" (see Mabweazara, 2010 cited in Matsilele et al., 2022, p. 3 in Chapter 2: 4: 3) which means the type of journalism practiced by the private press to expose government shortcomings. In this case, and as shall be seen, while *The Herald* largely ignored Chinese crime, *NewsDay* latched on it with verve and vim, literally venting its spleen in the process.

The extent of the *NewsDay*'s commitment to this frame was such that, with time, the noun *Chinese* easily became a metaphor for the accused. For example, in article ZW_ND_2018-12b12, the headline reads,

“Chinese factory workers found selling polished ivory”; the impression given is that the accused were Chinese nationals and yet all the accused were local Zimbabweans employed by a Chinese-owned company. In another piece (ZW_ND_2018-10b10), a combination of Chinese men and Zimbabweans are reported to have shot a former member of parliament’s son and yet the headline focuses on the two Chinese nationals. It reads: “Chinese pair jailed 42 months for shooting ex-Zanu PF MP’s son”.

Capping what appears to have been an anti-China campaign is a piece (ZW_ND_2018-05f05) in which the main opposition party leader, Nelson Chamisa, vows to “expel looting” Chinese investors if he was to be elected in the 2018 presidential poll (ZW_ND_2018-05f05). This was after Chinese individuals and companies had laundered over US \$1,3 billion, according to President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s “Looters List” (ZW_ND_2018-03e03). However, an editor at the *NewsDay* denies any agenda behind the newspaper’s approach to the Chinese presence in Zimbabwe:

We have no particular policy on how to cover China or any organisations with Chinese links. As an independent media house, we seek to cover key issues of particular interest to our readers, advertisers, or any consumer of our products. I believe crafting a policy on how to cover China would be tantamount to being captured if you like (NewsDay Editor, 2022).

In the same interview, the editor also hinted at *baohusan* which, according to Zhang and Chin (2008) and as cited in Chapter 1, is some form of political corruption involving the bribing of government officials in return for impunity. He said:

Chinese do not respect local laws because when they came to set up shop in the country they probably were behind some powerful politician. They pay these politicians and that is the main reason why they do not respect local leaders where they operate from. Another issue is that following the ouster of late former President Robert Mugabe and his regime who were the Chinese godfathers in Zimbabwe, the new leaders found a way of ensuring they get a grip on these so that they start paying them. So, they unleashed the regulatory authorities across the country. Those who refused to budge were exposed and some lost their businesses. The frenzy has sort of died down if you like, why? Almost every Chinese business is now accountable to the new masters, our "owners" if you like. So, the changeover period was hectic for the Chinese and everyone else whose business was politically linked unless you were close to the new masters so to say (NewsDay Editor, 2022).

However, apart from its excessive use in the *NewsDay* and its sparsity in *The Herald*, this frame was common to all other publications. In some situations, for example article ZW_HE_2018-12a12 and article KE_ST_2017-07g07 the criminal cases were almost similar in both nature, method of commission and detail. According to article KE_ST_2017-07g07, a lady traveller was caught with 120 kilos of ivory worth millions of American dollars in Nairobi, Kenya while according to article ZW_HE_2018-12a12, a group of male travellers was caught with more than a US \$1 million worth of rhino horns in Zimbabwe. So, as can be seen from the above cases, while in other frames (for example, scramble for Africa and investor frames) government officials and departments were the sole key frame sponsors, this frame's main actors are mostly private individuals or groups of ordinary people in a development which rings resonance with the assertion (see Zhang and Chin, 2008 in Chapter 1) that most overseas crimes are committed by private individuals.

However, as already shown above (see ZW_ND_2018-03e03) the crime frame enterprise was not a monopoly of individual actors; companies,

management and employees also played their fair share. For example, the Kenya Revenue Authority sued a Chinese company for tax evasion after the smartphone firm failed to pay tax on its imports (KE_NA_2016-09i09). Smuggling of macadamia (KE_ST_2014-05a05) and blankets with the intention to avoid paying duty (ZW_ND_2017-04) issuing of receipts written in Chinese language without the Value Added tax numbers (ZW_ND_2018-03c03) and theft of minerals from local firms (ZW_ND_2018-03f03) were some of the common crimes committed by Chinese companies.

Illegal immigration is also one of the crimes; often some Chinese will enter a country and set up businesses without permits. The seriousness of this is demonstrated through regular raids by the local police leading to the arrest of unregistered workers (KE_NA_2018-09r09) and to deportation (KE_NA_2018-09b09). Espionage was also one of the common crimes; for example, a Chinese firm hacked into the Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA)'s database leading to police charging its employees with espionage (KE_NA_2017-03i03). Also, another Chinese firm, on behalf of the Chinese government, financed the installation of a computers at the African Union headquarters and then inserted a mechanism through which to secretly steal the union's data in an act of brazen skulduggery (ZW_ND_2018-01b01).

Brazenness and defiance suggesting unhindered intent were common themes across newspapers. For example, according to article ZW_ND_2014-07b07, one Huo, an investor, was convicted of breaching the Firearms Act, the Gold Trade Act, and the Parks and Wildlife Act all at one go. In Kenya (KE_ST_2016-07c07), a Chinese firm, going against

expert advice, defiantly constructed a railway line over a private pipeline resulting in it [firm] being sued (KE_ST_2016-07c07). In Zimbabwe, a Chinese firm took brazenness to another level by constructing an upmarket hotel on a wetland in sheer breach of council environmental byelaws, thereby compromising the underground water in the areas surrounding the hotel (ZW_ND_2018-02d02). Illegally constructing a huge structure such as a hotel would suggest a strong sense of impunity.

Other common themes were cruelty and obnoxiousness on the part of the accused Chinese. For example, according to article NG_VG_2017-06d06, when a Chinese manager kicked a Nigerian employee causing him to be hospitalised for a damaged spinal bone during a petty squabble over food, a headline to the story went: “Chinese boss paralyses Nigerian staff with Kung fu kicks”. Implied in the phrase “Nigeria staff” is that a kung fu specialist, in a sudden fit of rage, assaulted multiple staff members leaving them for dead. Also suggested is a sense of impunity on the part of the manager and indeed, according to the victim, the manager bribed the police to escape justice. Also, the emphasis on the Chinese national paralysing a Nigerian citizen was, arguably, incitive more so when one considers that Kung Fu is part of the Chinese national pride.

In another case of cruel violent crime (ZW_ND_2017-12a12), a Chinese boss assaulted and shot at his defenceless victims, injuring them in the process (ZW_ND_2017-12a12). However, the most extreme report (NG_VG_2018-12d12) was that of a Chinese man allegedly caught in Nigeria with 15 human heads in what eventually turned out to have been fake news. The report, which was accompanied by a video, framed a

Chinese man as a cannibal (NG_VG_2018-12d12). This, arguably, echoed the malaise theory (see Newton, 1999 in Chapter 2) which argues that media do have harmful consequences on society especially when they “exaggerate or create events” in competition for audiences (see Newton, 1999, pp. 577–8 in Chapter 2). The theme of cruelty also resonates with Mawdsley (2008) who, as stated in Chapter 1, discovered that the “media” generally portrayed the Chinese as “unscrupulous, inhumanely cruel, despotic, devious and inscrutable” (Mawdsley, 2008, p. 511).

The cruelty theme is also present in child neglection misdemeanours. According to article KE_NA_2015-01b01, Chinese construction workers sired children with Kenyan women who lived along the Thika Superhighway construction route and disappeared. “Chinese babies” is a pejorative in reference to the abandoned children. In article KE_ST_2017-11d11, jilted Ugandan women petitioned a Chinese company after Chinese men, referred to as “Chinese baby daddies” abandoned them together with their infants and disappeared.

Article ZW_ND_2018-03b03 quotes the Chinese embassy in Harare refuting the allegations of looting by Chinese companies; in another piece (ZW_ND_2018-03a03), Zimbabwean fraudsters stole a Chinese company in case of injustice against the Chinese. However, what is readable in these above pieces is that even though they are countering the Chinese crime frame the counter framing is weak because both articles, as in nearly all articles about crime or injustice against the Chinese, retain the implication or suggestion that their [Chinese] fate was

a consequence of their meanness or transgressions. A tinge of whataboutism is a palpable thing.

According to Compagnon and Alejandro (2013), the perpetuation of the criminal enterprise points to mutual state policy failures; this is because, while the African state lacks capacity to formulate and implement strong standards, the Chinese state is failing to monitor all overseas activities. Moreover, the Chinese state has got a policy and rule that all Chinese entities operating abroad should strictly adhere to the laws of their host country. So, what this means is that by indulging in criminal behaviour abroad, the Chinese companies and people are in breach of the laws of both China and their host country.

5.2.2 Unfair labour practices

As already mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 (see Leslie, 2016, p. 4), among the issues that generally receive the most media attention in the context of Chinese presence in Africa are perceptions that Chinese firms hire Chinese people ahead of the locals, subject workers to bad working conditions, pay paltry wages, and hardly ever develop workers' skills. And indeed, as shall be seen, mistreatment of workers was common to all the research countries often manifesting itself in criminal and noncriminal practices.

In that regard, this frame's core message is that Chinese companies are, among other things, exploitative and disrespectful to their African employees. So, while the investor frame showed the Chinese as investors creating employment in Africa, this frame, on the other hand, depicts the same investors as exploitative. As revealed in Chapter 4 (see Table 9),

local workers employed in Chinese firms were among the most active or most mentioned people across the six newspapers. Therefore, if the workers and trade unions were among the most active people what it means, in the context of this frame, is that they were the key frame sponsors.

So, apart from *The Herald* where it appeared once (ZW_HE_2014-11a11), the unfair labour practices frame was common to all the newspapers throughout the entire study period. And indeed, workplace abuse was a key driver of workers' grievances and therefore prominence. For example, dismissed workers sued a Chinese firm for "unfair and gross violations" (ZW_HE_2014-11a11). Still in Zimbabwe, workers sued another Chinese-owned miner for "abuse" (ZW_ND_2016-10) while other workers sued another miner over terminal benefits (ZW_ND_2017-01b01). According to another report (KE_ST_2017-05f05), workers complained of extreme oppression, claiming they were subjected to "donkey work".

As can be seen from the above pieces, Chinese employers are depicted as so unfair that they will need to be sued to pay their workers while assigning employees hard labour tasks. And indeed, according to a *NewsDay* feature article (ZW_ND_2014-03c03), the Chinese are "renowned for poor employment conditions" and for disrespecting their employees. According to article ZW_ND_2018-05e05, so widespread were Chinese abuses that the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions claimed it had noticed a "spike in labour abuse cases" at Chinese-owned firms.

Disrespect for workers, poor remunerations, exploitation and poor working conditions were also common themes in Kenya. For example, construction workers in Nakuru protested over “low pay and poor working conditions” accusing managers of “mistreating them” (KE_NA_2016-08h08). Chinese workers also showed extreme disrespect for their Kenyan colleagues (KE_NA_2017-01d01). Poor pay and poor working conditions was also the cause of yet another strike by China Road and Bridge Corporation employees (KE_ST_2015-02c02). The extent of the problem of mistreating employees and how widespread it was across Kenya was captured in *The Standard* news analysis (KE_ST_2016-02d02) which said in part: “Everywhere along the line, local workers complained of exploitation by their Chinese counterparts. Apart from low pay, workers said they are denied hardship allowance and that their meagre salaries are taxed”.

Another of the key aspects of the frame was the issue of discrimination against the local workers. As shall be soon demonstrated, there are two aspects to discrimination; first there is discrimination which happens right at the actual workplace practiced by both Chinese employers and Chinese employees. For example, according to feature article KE_NA_2015-04b04, while the Kenyan factory workers were accommodated in “metal shacks” with neither furniture nor electricity, their colleagues from China were housed in “well-furnished, air-conditioned rooms” with luxury facilities like swimming pools and sports courts. Another news report (KE_NA_2015-01b01) said there was so much discrimination at the workers living quarters that “everything is done in segregation” with Kenyan employees “living on dusty grounds”.

Article KE_ST_2017-07e07 said “Chinese sweepers” were earning “three times more than Kenyan train operators”.

The second component of discrimination is discrimination by exclusion meaning the deliberate hiring of the Chinese ahead of the locals. According to article, KE_NA_2016-08a08, so committed to hiring Chinese only that unemployed local youths attacked 14 Chinese workers “demanding a share” in the “construction jobs” in the area. In another case (KE_ST_2017-02b02), villagers of Suswa and Duka demonstrated a Chinese construction firm for not hiring them.

Unprovoked physical violence against locals and by the Chinese companies is also one of the aspects of the frame and to the extent that Chinese communication firm, Huawei, was one of the implicated (NG_GU_2015-07b07). Common forms of assault included slapping (KE_NA_2017-01d01) and kicking (KE_NA_2017-06j06). There was also harassment and intimidation (KE_ST_2018-08e08), yelling, ranting and victimisation (KE_ST_2017-06g06). Ironically, Huawei was also depicted a responsible firm (see responsible China frame in section 5.1.3).

Abuse also manifests in the death of local employees owing to employer’s negligence. For example, in Amuwo-Odofin, Nigeria, a Chinese company, Hongxing Steel Company Limited, was banned following the death of a local worker caused by safety laxities (NG_VG_2015-10). According to another report (KE_NA_2015-04b04), a Kenyan government investigation found that workers’ quarters were a “safety and health hazard” with the risk of fire while the

inhabitants were exposed to “hydrocarbon emissions” while they had no toilets often using bushes to relieve themselves.

However, the frame was also countered in Kenya through Chinese firms hiring locals (KE_NA_2017-06b06) (see Section 5.1.3).

5.2.3 Scramble for Africa: China vs USA, Britain, and the West

As already demonstrated (see Table 2 in Chapter 4), foreign affairs were one of the study’s busiest subject areas throughout the five-year period. As such, the scramble for Africa frame is embedded in and reflects the state and nature of China’s relations with other global powers in relation to Africa. This resonates with Hallahan (1999)’s thesis (see Chapter 3) that framing is a “tool of power that can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will predominate” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 223) and is “integrally involved in questions of ideology” (Glasgow University Media Group cited in Hallahan, 1999, p. 223).

However, while the scramble for Africa frame appeared in all the newspapers, it was prevalent in *The Herald*, *Nation*, *The Standard*, and *The Guardian* where it appeared consistently throughout the five-year period save for minor variations.

As mentioned earlier (see Xiaoling, 2010 in Chapter 1), one of the key objectives behind China’s incursions into Africa is to end the collective monopoly enjoyed by the USA and Britain. Also, as indicated earlier (see Southall and Melber, 2009 in Chapter 1), China’s entry into and its activities in Africa have triggered a new scramble for Africa involving herself, the US, EU among other interested nations.

As such, the central theme and collective import of this frame is that there is a bitter tussle for the control of Africa with the ambitious China ranged against the USA, Britain, the EU, and the rest of the West (KE_ST_2017-01f01). So, by venturing into the US' strategic African allies and into former British colonies (see C. Chau, 2015 in Chapter 1), in its [China] bid to break the Anglo-America sway (see Xiaoling, 2010 in Chapter 1), Beijing can be said to have been goading the two powers into revanchism thereby triggering the scramble.

In an opinion piece (NG_VG_2018-09ze09), Joseph Okpaku, a Chief Executive Officer at the Third Press Publishers, writes: “The appearance of yet another scramble for Africa in the making, a Chinese scramble this time, is a real possibility that must be addressed now”. And yet, according to article ZW_HE_2018-09b09, the “new scramble for Africa” is already underway pitting the USA against China while article KE_NA_2018-08g08 argues that both the USA and the United Kingdom “need Kenya if they are to checkmate Beijing” in Africa. Also, according to article KE_NA_2018-08g08, both the US and the UK are “locked in a battle for the soul — and pocket — of Kenya” with China.

Arguably, the crescendo of the scramble for Africa frame's progression was in 2018; this was the climax of the frame enterprise meaning the process where news sources [government officials in this case] were most engaged in the framing of the information (see Gamson, 1984 in Chapter 3). Key triggers of this pattern were the US-China trade war and the run up to the 2018 FOCAC summit and the Zimbabwean coup which happened at the end of 2017. Following the US government's decision to slap Beijing with tariffs in May 2018, China reacted by accusing the

US of “launching a trade war with the whole world” including with Africa (KE_NA_2018-08b08). According to article KE_ST_2018-03a03, tension was already bubbling under surface following USA Secretary Rex Tillerson’s warning to Africa against “predator” and “plundering” China. Beijing was so “angered” that Africa “found herself in the middle of the two superpowers.”

Article KE_ST_2018-07b07, quotes President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and US government official, Ray Washburne, saying the US needed to venture into “ports, railroads and the highways” to rival China in Africa. Later, the USA was to “pour billions in Kenya to rival China’s dominance” (KE_ST_2018-07f07). In another development (KE_ST_2018-09r09), 16 US senators warned that China’s “growing influence in Africa” was a threat to US’s national security interests. According to the same piece, the reason for that move was that both China and the USA are “scrambling for a slice of the continent [Africa]”.

The rivalry also manifests itself in peace keeping missions and in national elections. For example, article ZW_ND_2017-01a01, suggests a competition between the Chinese and the European Union armies as they are both involved in similar programs across Africa. In article ZW_HE_2018-08n08, Beijing hails the controversial election of Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa, a development disputed by all the Western governments.

As stated earlier, (see Alden, 2005; Dijk, 2009 in Chapter 1), China is after Africa’s resources and markets. Article KE_ST_2018-09g09

concur by positing that behind the scramble for Africa are purely selfish reasons with Africa being the loser: “What do the Chinese want? They want raw materials, energy, markets. Like the West before them, they don’t seem to give a damn how they get these things. They are determined to “replace” the West in Africa”. In another opinion piece ZW_HE_2016-12b12, the author, Richard Poplak, poses a rhetorical question: “Is this ... a new scramble for Africa in which the continent is once again left in tatters?”.

And indeed, African countries seem to be on the receiving end as they are caught up in the crossfire; Africa is not just a target but also a “pawn” and a “battleground” (KE_ST_2018-09t09). An example is that of Kenya which is in the “middle of a bare-knuckle war of words” between Washington and Beijing (KE_ST_2018-03b03). In Nigeria, the elites warned that the trade war between the USA and China would visit “harsh financial” consequences on their country (NG_GU_2018-06e06).

Another common import of this frame is that the USA is losing Africa to China (ZW_ND_2018-07b07). This lends credence to the notion (See Negi, 2008, p. 46 citing Eisenman and Kurlantzick in Chapter 1) that Africans are already so much into China that it will take an effort to persuade them to think otherwise. Article ZW_HE_2015-12J12, suggests that the development is not surprising because the Chinese already had a good reputation in Africa based on their previous support for Zimbabwe in its war against imperial Britain.

China’s positive reputation among the Africans is also suggested through the report NG_GU_2017-06a06 which says it [China] is now “the second

most popular destination for African students studying abroad, after France” having surpassed the US and UK in 2014. So, according to this frame, Beijing already enjoys an upper hand in the scramble for the control of Africa and to the extent that it is now more influential and trusted ahead of both the USA and the West.

As stated earlier (IISD, 2021), China long overtook the USA and the West to become Africa’s biggest trading partner. In article ZW_ND_2018-07b07, this is framed to mean that China is winning against the West in Africa. According to a feature article, KE_NA_2018-09w09, Western nations have their unreasonably tough lending policies to blame for losing Africa to China. In article ZW_ND_2018-07b07, Ian Taylor, an expert on China in Africa, is quoted arguing that the US was losing to China because it was “taking Africa for granted”. Piece ZW_HE_2015-08b0, concurs by arguing that Chinese funders are by far better than their Western counterparts (ZW_HE_2015-08b0).

As stated earlier (see Dijk, 2009 in Chapter 1), one of China’s goals is to become Africa’s preferred economic model. As if to concur, article, NG_GU_2018-08c08, lauds the Chinese economic model against the “widely discredited” and “arrogant” Washington Consensus. Also in agreement is Kabanja (KE_NA_2018-05h05) who argues: “China is the only country today that is run like a corporation by a sophisticated and forward- looking political class, with determination to rollout State loans without the conditionalities associated with the West”. Arguably, this confirms China’s use of the economic statecraft meaning “waging geopolitics with capital” (Baldwin, 1985, p. 4).

According to US analyst, Gordon C Chang (ZW_ND_2018-07b07), if the US was to be effective in its competition against China in Africa, it needed to up its game; it was “a shame”, he said, that US presidents did not travel to Africa as often as their Chinese counterparts. And indeed, President Xi’s tour of Africa in 2014 was interpreted (KE_NA_2014-05e05) as a counter to Western envoys’ trips. In another trip in 2018, Xi was projected (KE_NA_2018-03f03) as having outclassed Trump’s envoys in his charm offensive. According to pieces KE_NA_2018-05e05 and KE_NA_2018-03b03, this was to extent that the US was shaken and extremely worried about China’s influence in Africa which has accelerated over decades.

The notion of the Chinese victory is also buttressed through the fact that as this war rages, it is to Beijing that the African countries seem to go for protection against the West. This is apparent in the article ZW_HE_2018-04J04 which claims that China is shielding Zimbabwe and other ‘Third World’ nations against the bully West. According to article KE_NA_2018-08f08, Kenyan leaders have also become bold enough to tell the US off knowing they have China’s backing. For example, on his way to the USA enroute to China for the 2018 FOCAC summit, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, lashed out at President Trump for meddling in African affairs; the central message of his rant was that if the US stayed disrespectful to Africans, Trump should bear in mind that Africans still had China as an option (KE_NA_2018-08f08).

The idea that China is winning the scramble is also apparent in article ZW_HE_2018-08n08, which claims that the China is generally preferable to the US, and in piece KE_NA_2018-03d03 which claims

that China is outflanking the West even though it [China] is killing democracy in Africa. Article ZW_HE_2017-08c08 takes this theme a step further, arguing that, as opposed to Westerners, the Chinese are morally upright and more polite.

As stated in Chapter 1 (Lafargue, 2009; Shen and Taylor, 2012), western and African leaders framed China in negative terms. The scramble for Africa frame, therefore, takes this up. For example, Western leaders are unconvinced about China's intentions in Africa (KE_NA_2018-09f09). While in Nigeria, secretary of state claimed that China was encouraging dependency through corrupt deals (US NG_VG_2018-03c03). Likewise, the Western media is also upping its anti-China propaganda in Africa, claims (ZW_HE_2017-02co2) *The Herald*.

However, Beijing, as part of her *Global Strategy* of sending its firms abroad (see Bellabona and Spigarelli, 2007 in Chapter 1) is also breaking Western media monopoly in Africa by setting up own media houses (ZW_HE_2017-08b08). In an opinion piece NG_VG_2018-09j09, the writer warns Nigerians against anti-Chinese “Euro-American propaganda”, urging vigilance against the West which he claims is envious of and malicious against China.

The notion of Western malice is also bolstered by Kabanja Karage (KE_NA_2018-05h05), an advocate of the Kenyan High Court, who argues that the West has maliciously ganged up with the International Monetary Fund, to fight China over Africa. This is also the import of article NG_VG_2018-09j09, which argues that because of China's successful incursions into Africa, there has developed “Euro-American

jealousy” and the fear of China (NG_VG_2018-09v09) which is also called “China threat” (NG_GU_2018-09a09).

Nevertheless, according to article KE_ST_2018-09j09 (also see Khafafa, 2018 in Chapter 1), it is not always that China is winning; Kenyans still prefer US over China.

5.2.4 Chinese Fakes

As previously revealed (see Farina and Arslan, 2016 in Chapter 2), among the many things that impact on a country’s image are that country’s products and services. Also, according to Chapter 4 Table 10, trade, alongside investment, was one of the significantly covered activities. Therefore, this frame is a pessimist representation of the Chinese products and services traded in and rendered to Africa. Although it appeared in all the newspapers, the frame was, and as shall be seen below, prevalent in Kenyan and Nigerian newspapers because of the influx of specific types of products in those countries. Also, the prevalence of this frame there resonates with China being both Kenya and Nigeria’s top trading partner as stated in Chapter 1. Predictably, in *The Herald*, a Zimbabwean pro-government publication which has got a news share deal with a Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua* (see Chapter 3), this pessimist frame appeared only once in a story (ZW_HE_2014-11c11) about a “counterfeit” ballpoint pens dealer.

Throughout the five-year period under study and across publications, story styles, and trade issues, Chinese products were continually and similarly depicted as fake, substandard, shoddy, unsafe, counterfeit,

undesirable, harmful, small, and as being of low or poor quality, inferior to Western labels. A marketer of second-hand products in Nigeria arguably fully captured an Africa-wide attitude towards Chinese goods and, therefore, the essence of the frame, when she said:

Nigerians believe fairly used items are branded genuine items with longer life span than Chinese products. For instance, a customer would rather purchase used Nike sneakers from the United Kingdom or a United Kingdom used iPhone than buy a China copy. For many Nigerians, it is the authenticity of the product that is key. They would rather buy popular items and brands made in the UK than buy items from China (NG_GU_2016-09d09).

The above quotation resonates with Ries and Trout (1981, cited in Hallahan, 1999, p. 212)'s theory that "people rank products and brands using 'little ladders' in their heads" with the ladders being "product categories" and "ladder rungs representing brands".

In another incident which demonstrates the seriousness of the issue of Chinese fakes, a Nigerian government minister, while negotiating an agricultural infrastructure loan with a Chinese company, bluntly "cautioned that Nigeria would not accept low quality equipment from its Chinese counterpart" (NG_GU_2017-02b02). And when the Kenya Bureau of Standards raided Chinese-owned supermarkets around Nairobi and seized "several substandard goods" (KE_ST_2015-09b09).

Perhaps, such pessimist framing and attitudes were to be expected particularly because, as stated in Chapter 1 (Morgan, 2019, p. 406), when it comes to China, Africans "care first and foremost" about the low quality products which are so loathed that they have, over the years, earned Chinese merchandise pejoratives in some parts of Africa.

From the framing, it can be concluded that the impact of Chinese products and services is ubiquitous, affecting multiple critical sectors such as health, commerce, transport, and infrastructural development. Across the countries and publications, one of the key factors which perpetuated this frame was the perceived effect of counterfeit Chinese food products on public health. The framing of the products was extremely alarmist characterised by inflammatory language, exaggerations, and assumptions. A case in point was a story (NG_VG_2015-03b03) which claimed that “fake tomato paste” from China was “killing Nigerians”. Instead of producing the evidence of fake tomato paste casualties, the article merely called for an investigation into the “quality” of the Chinese products. In other words, it was a case of a post-mortem before there was a corpse.

In essence, the newspapers’ coverage of the fake consumables’ saga amounted to a campaign for the ban of Chinese goods; the sensational language sought to prove the lethality of the products. Headlined “Concern over cancer risk on imported fish”, article KE_NA_2018-08c08 was also supported by a rhetorical and sensational kicker which went: “is the fish Kenyans are consuming from China safe?” The campaign intensified when a “part of” the fish from China “failed toxic minerals test” because they contained “heavy metal harmful to human health” (KE_NA_2018-12e12). Found in the fish imported from China were “traces of mercury, lead, arsenic and copper” thereby “exposing millions to health risks”, said article KE_NA_2018-12d12. In Nigeria, a report (NG_VG_2016-07g07) clearly intended to instigate public indignation, said the Chinese were sending to African countries

substandard food stuffs which they would not dare eat in their own country.

Another major factor that sustained this frame was the emergence of fake medical drugs, “most of them” from India and China, and which, like the eatables, were putting locals’ health at risk (KE_NA_2017-06f06). Again, the language was alarmist laced with such phrases as “huge risk of poisoning” and headlines like, “The poison in your cabinet: Kenya’s fake drugs scourge” leaving “millions of sick and desperate patients in its wake” (KE_NA_2017-07c07). To emphasize the panic and indignation over fake drugs, article KE_NA_2017-12e12 went beyond generalisation, publishing the drug batch number and the name of the manufacturing company followed by a declaration that the company was making fake products. According to a *The Guardian* report (NG_GU_2018-10h10), some drugs were found to be containing human body parts in drugs with insinuations of cannibalism on behalf of the Chinese. In Zimbabwe, Chinese condoms were so small men complained (ZW_ND_2018-02e02).

Apart from causing health scare, fake Chinese products also appeared to cause conflict among the Africans. A case in point was when a provincial governor in Kenya angrily and publicly threatened to sue the central government for allowing the sale of Chinese fish on grounds that there was a shortage of fish in the country (KE_NA_2016-10c10). Also, according to article NG_VG_2016-06d06, after the Nigerian government carried research which discovered that the fake goods were “majorly from China” it reacted by destroying them in a bid to stop “massive importation of substandard goods”.

However, the negative framing was not limited to products only as it also extended to services rendered by the Chinese entities; and this was prevalent in the construction industry where infrastructural projects were framed negatively. For example, the Nigeria's Ebonyi state parliament ordered the Chinese Civil and Engineering Construction Company to refund the state for a shoddy job in a road construction deal (NG_GU_2015-08a08). In another case, the same company made a "mess" of the airport terminals which had "defects in the structural designs" making the whole project a "waste of funds" as the terminals needed to be "knocked down" (NG_GU_2018-08i08). In Kenya, a bridge constructed by a Chinese firm collapsed a few weeks before completion leading to speculation that the company was being hurried to finish the project (KE_ST_2017-06a06). The incident was "catastrophic" as witnesses said they saw the bridge shaking before it collapsed suggesting incompetent engineering, said another report (KE_NA_2017-06k06). In Zimbabwe, a bridge constructed by a Chinese firm collapsed after heavy rains "evidently" showing signs of "poor workmanship" (ZW_ND_2014-04a04).

The frame was also potentially amplified by the multilateral organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations (UN)'s interventions; given their international clout and reputation, the mention of the WB and UN clearly gave the impression of the severity of the Chinese fakes problem while galvanising more opposition to the imports. According to the *Nation* (KE_NA_2016-09g09), the WB warned against the continued influx of cheap Chinese imports, saying it was very likely going to "hurt" Kenya's chances of being admitted into

the “elite club of industrialised nations”. A report by *The Standard* (KE_ST_2016-07a07) said the UN “weighed in” on the issue of Chinese imports and quoted trade experts advising Kenya to evoke the international anti-dumping laws and ban the fakes.

However, while the narrative of Chinese fakes is far reaching, casting a shadow on literally anything coming from China it, however, faced occasional counter framing from the success of the Chinese HIV drug called Tian Immunity Booster (TIB), an “effective product of modern technology” which has “gained prominence in Africa” (KE_ST_2016-08b08). According to *The Standard* (KE_ST_2016-11c11), TIB is so “popular”, that it has “gained recognition” worldwide because of its “clinical efficacy” as it has passed tests in Europe and the US where will soon be sold.

The Chinese diplomats also led the counter framing crusade, fiercely defending the Chinese products. For example, Chinese embassy’s Consul General, Liu Kan, claimed that while there were “few poor-quality Chinese products” in Nigeria there was a “large demand” for them because of widespread poverty. He added that because the Chinese government was committed to the “Made in China Brand”, Chinese products were only just cheap otherwise they were of high quality (NG_VG_2015-01). The notion of Chinese products being suitable for poor Africans also has currency in both Kenya and Zimbabwe and as counter to the Chinese fakes frame. For example, rather than call Chinese products cheap and fake, an opinion piece (KE_NA_2018-02d02) referred to the fakes as “affordable” imports, arguing that without them many Kenyans would never afford gadgets like smartphones. According

to Gukurume (2019, p. 8), the popularity of the Chinese products among the poor in Zimbabwe is “in no doubt”.

Interestingly, the Kenyan government rather than run with the UN experts advise and the national sentiment to ban the Chinese imports instead went against the grain, choosing to cosponsor the positive counter frame with China. For example, a story headlined “Nothing fishy in China imports as deficit widens” quoted a senior government official saying Kenya had not “alternative over fish importation” because there was a “huge fish deficit” and that the fish were safe. That at a time when the newspaper was saying dangerous chemicals had been found (KE_NA_2016-09j09). Headlined, “Fish from China gets clean bill of health”, another article (KE_ST_2016-09b09) said the Chinese fish were safe for human consumption as they were “thoroughly checked” in both China and at entry point in Kenya.

Apart from health and safety concerns, one of the chief drivers of negative framing of Chinese goods was the effect they had on the local businesses. By “invading” (NG_VG_2014-12b12) or “flooding” the African market they “suffocate the local industries” (ZW_ND_2015-07b07) in the process killing or decimating them (ZW_ND_2018-06a06). For example, in Kenya a tyre manufacturing firm collapsed after cheap Chinese imports “heavily ate into market share” (KE_ST_2016-09c09).

5.2.5 Environmental destruction

Despite its apparent relationship with the crime frame, the pattern of environmental destruction caused by the Chinese actors in Africa emerged as a strong and distinct frame not only because of the frequency of reportage but also because of the speciality of the environment sector.

The environment deserves special attention because, according to Compagnon and Alejandro (2013, p. 220), of all the criticisms levelled against China's operations in Africa, it [environment] stands out as the "hotly debated" and most current issue (Also see Lafargue, 2009 in Chapter 1). Arguably, this is the reason why, as demonstrated under the responsible China frame (see Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013), Beijing, during the early 2000s, passed new environment laws and guidelines raising hopes of changes in the manner in which Chinese firms treated the environment in Africa.

And yet, as this frame's title attests, environmental destruction persisted almost unabated in all the research countries and beyond. Consequently, the Chinese environmental transgressions appeared throughout the five-year period and in all the newspapers, save for the *Vanguard*, thereby providing enough framing patterns. An obvious pattern is that virtually all kinds of environmental damage were visited on the local communities due to the Chinese activities: air pollution, water pollution, land degradation, desecration, noise pollution, infrastructural damage, and poaching.

Apparently, at times the destruction of the environment occurred with the blessing of the authorities in Beijing; a case in point was that of a Chinese man caught smuggling 329 scales of pangolin scales who told

Nigerian police that he had the permission from his government (NG_GU_2018-03a03). The most active sponsors of the frame were environmental activists, aggrieved private citizens, businesspeople, companies, politicians, the police, environmental tribunals and agencies, customs departments, animal welfare groups, conservation groups, and the individual Chinese.

Across the publications and story styles, the language was generally and uniformly alarmist and incitive, often larded with absolute terms and adjectives depicting the problem of environmental harm at the hands of the Chinese as a clear and present danger to Africa. Lamented were a “surge in poaching”, a “spate of killings of elephant and rhino” (KE_NA_2014-03c03) “increased butchering” of donkeys to the extent of “crippling” rural economies (KE_ST_2017-06b06). As such, a “battle” against poaching which had “risen sharply” to the level of a “national disaster” in Kenya became necessary (KE_ST_2014-06a06).

On many occasions, to raise more alarm, some adjectives and phrases were repetitively used and in a frequency which is not to be expected in a professionally edited news article; for example, the phrase “massive slaughter of donkeys” appeared six times in one article [in *The Standard*] which was less than 500 words (KE_ST_2017-06b06).

At the core of the environmental destruction frame is the notion that Africa-based Chinese actors, people, and companies mostly, operate with impunity and to the detriment of the natural habitat. Perhaps this was well captured in article KE_NA_2016-08J08:

Chinese contractors rule the roost in Kenya. The other day, the Principal Secretary for Transport, Mr Nyakera Irungu, publicly

confessed that a Chinese contractor had started constructing a section of the Nairobi-Naivasha standard gauge railway without the knowledge of his ministry.

Incredibly, China Road and Bridge Corporation was proceeding with the work — building pillars and tunnels through Maasailand when even the route the line would follow had not been determined by the government.

An environmental impact assessment study had yet to be done, no agreement had been reached with the Kenya Wildlife Service on the sections of national parks where the railway would pass, and, although a great deal of work had been accomplished with regard to finalising financing agreements for the section, the pacts had not been signed.

Where else can a contractor be allowed to operate with this level of impunity? It only happens where a contractor has the patronage and political connections of the very top, where he believes he is untouchable and can, therefore, get away with murder.

Like in the case of the crime frame, cruelty is one of the through lines which was emphasised and detectable from reportage across the publications. An example was the slaughter of 100 000 donkeys for the purposes of Chinese medicine and for Middle East meat markets in under a year (KE_ST_2017-06b06; KE_ST_2017-07a07). In Zimbabwe, an unknown Chinese cement manufacturer evicted villagers from their homes rendering them destitute as he offered them neither compensation nor alternative resettlement with pleas for justice falling on deaf ears (ZW_HE_2015-01). Yet another detectable theme is the disdain the Chinese are shown to have for the inhabitants of the areas they operate in. A case in point was that of a mining company which destroyed a local graveyard and tossed the remains into a nearby dam much to the horror of villagers who thought that was gross disrespect for both their culture and the dead (ZW_ND_2016—01).

Perhaps the extent of disregard for the environment on the part of the Chinese is vividly demonstrated through the plunder of the endangered species meaning animals protected by the international law on grounds that they face extinction. According to van Uhm (2020), Chinese criminal gangs are plundering animals like the African pangolin and Rhino for the purposes of Chinese medicine in defiance of the United Nations environmental protection protocols.

And indeed, the framing of these acts suggested sheer defiance on the part of the offenders; for example, a Chinese woman lived in Tanzania for 14 years funding the mass slaughter of elephants in protected zones to supply international ivory buyers (KE_NA_2015-10b10). Another Chinese national, in a case that suggested both cruelty and brazenness, was caught with 81 elephant tusks and the skins of two pangolins following a “massacre of herds of elephants” across East Africa (KE_NA_2014-03c03). Defying tough sentences of as much as 20-year jail terms shows top level determination and lucrative incentivisation. In Nigeria too pangolin poaching was rife (NG_GU_2018-03a03) while the porcupines were not spared either in Kenya (KE_ST_2014-11a11).

Yet another case (ZW_ND_2018-02d02) of violation of protected spaces was the construction of an upmarket hotel on a wetland in Harare, Zimbabwe causing the underground water in the surrounding areas to be compromised (ZW_ND_2018-02d02) as mentioned earlier. Wetlands play a crucial role in “protecting human life and biodiversity” and their protection is “essential for countries’ transition into resource-efficient

and sustainable economies”(UN News, 2012). And yet the Chinese firm disregarded that fact.

Still on the theme of lawlessness, there were many cases of Chinese entities either operating or attempting to operate without environmental impact assessment permits resulting in pressure groups suing. For example, a railways construction firm was found tunnelling through the national park without clearance from the Kenyan national environment agency (KE_NA_2016-09109) while, in Zimbabwe, it took a High Court judge to stop a Chinese factory from operating without the impact assessment certificate (ZW_HE_2018-10b10).

Yet again in Kenya, it took environmental campaigners to mount a legal challenge opposing the construction of a coal power plant before the issuance of an impact assessment licence. Again, the language of protest and advocacy was alarmist, warning of “harmful and irreversible effects to the ecosystem”, “irreversible” air, water, and soil contamination; “increased erosion potential”, “run-off impacts”, and the “poisoning of aquatic life” if the project was to go ahead without assessment (KE_ST_2016-09f09).

Private citizens too, found Chinese excavators causing “nuisance and the damage” to their surroundings and property. In court papers, two Kenyans accused a Chinese construction firm of damaging their windowpanes and perimeter walls by blasting rocks and quarry without an environmental impact assessment permission. They also complained of loss of peace and of noise caused by endless blasting (KE_ST_2015-08a08)

This pattern of last minute injunctions obtained by private citizens and activists against Chinese firms confirms that the African state is too weak to formulate and implement strong standards and that Chinese firms do “lower their environmental standards” just to “undercut” Western competition (Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013, p. 221). And indeed, the police in Kenya admitted that environmental crimes were on the surge despite efforts to curb the trend (KE_ST_2017-07g07).

However, as stated earlier (see Mawdsley, 2008 in Chapter 1), China is sensitive to how it is portrayed and will routinely act to shape its image (see Mawdsley, 2008 in chapter 1). In that regard, the environmental damage frame was also frequently countered by Chinese government officials, companies, and analysts.

Counternarratives included absolving the Chinese poachers and presenting them as victims of “misinformation” duped into purchasing ivory on the mistaken belief that it was from animals that had died of their own accord. Also, China was “showered with praises” for taking the lead in the fight against poaching and ivory trade by publicly destroying tonnes of ivory; this saw the representation of China change from “the world’s largest ivory market” to a global leader in the campaign against illegal ivory (ZW_ND_2014-01a01).

According to article KE_ST_2016-03b03, penned by a Chinese diplomat, Liu Xianfa, China “places a high premium on wildlife protection and nature” and has “worked tirelessly” and in the process “made great strides” in the fight to conserve the environment. In Article KE_NA_2017-06i06, Chinese Vice- Foreign Minister Zhang Ming,

defended Chinese firms operating in Kenya saying they took “a lot of consideration” to protect wildlife. According to piece NG_VG_2016-12d12, Chinese car manufacturer, CIG, boasted of being a leader in eco-friendly technology and of using “environmentally friendly materials”.

According to Compagnon and Alejandro (2013), these misdemeanours are down to mutual government policy failures; while the African government is unable to formulate and implement strong standards, the Chinese state is unable to monitor all overseas activities. Moreover, the African state gives less regard to issues of the environment. However, notwithstanding these problems, the Chinese entities operating abroad are bound by law to strictly adhere to the laws of their host countries.

5.2.6 Debt-trap/burden/diplomacy

Notwithstanding the fact that research (see Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021; Singh, 2021 in Chapter 1) has dismissed the notion of Chinese debt trap as a “myth” (Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021) devoid of “rigour and sophistication” (Singh, 2021, p. 12), this frame is not only one of the enduring and lingering depictions but is arguably the signature stereotype of Beijing’s loans to Africa and beyond. This resonates with Vinogradova and Denisova (2018), who, in Chapter 2, posit that it is easy for people to rely on stereotypes whose ready availability means the communicator has a lesser burden of thinking.

However, save for only three appearances in Nigeria, this frame, as shall be seen below, was exclusive to Kenya where it appeared consistently throughout the five-year period in both *The Standard* and the *Nation*

newspapers. In Zimbabwe, the frame was completely non-existent including in the *NewsDay* where one would have expected pessimist reportage given the paper's anti-China stance (see the crime frame) and the Zimbabwe private press's propensity to oppose whatever the government engages in (see Chari, 2011 in Chapter 2).

As shown earlier (see Table 2 in Chapter 5), investment was not only the dominant subject while lending (See Table 10 in Chapter 5) was not just the leading activity, but both were also prevalent in Kenya. In that regard, it could be that the frame's dominance in Kenya was down to huge investments projects such as the Thika Superhighway, Nairobi Northern Bypass and the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway all financed through Chinese loans. Particularly, according to the *Nation* (KE_NA_2018-12b12) there was widespread fear that China was lightly going to seize the Mombasa Port in the event of the Kenya Railways failing to service the debt owed to the Exim Bank of China, a development which significantly perpetuated the frame.

Also, given that the notion of Chinese *debt trap* “resonates more in Western countries” (Moore, 2018), another explanation for the dominance of the *debt trap* frame in Kenya is that, as revealed in Chapter 2 (see Capitant and Frère, 2011b, pp. 5–6), Kenyan newspapers “unquestionably” mimic the English press. That could be a plausible interpretation because, as stated earlier in Chapter 2 (see Uche, 1991, p. 4), African newspapers are afflicted by “ideological barrenness” and to the extent that they often pander to neo-colonial influences.

Sharing his wisdom on the issue, an editor at the *Nation*, however, said:

Traditionally, the Kenyan media have never seen themselves merely as national or even regional (East Africa or African) entities. Kenyan media see themselves as global players and therefore will focus on international as well as new trends and how they affect the region and the world. So, on the one hand it is a matter of policy to see ourselves as more than just Kenyan newspapers. Coupled with this, Nairobi is an international global hub, hosting not just the United Nations office in Nairobi, United Nations Environmental Programme, among others, but also the headquarters of many international corporations and brands. It is said that if you have a presence in Nairobi, then you will be felt across the continent. So, the Chinese presence in Kenya and Africa can be viewed from that context. And the Chinese did not just come in and keep quiet. Their investment in infrastructure, especially roads and rail, is a true game changer in Kenya's infrastructure network. But of course, the media also scrutinise the expenditure and everything else going with it. Their speedy delivery, not asking questions and not being influenced by international Non-Governmental Organisations unlike Western funded projects. That seems to explain the coverage of China by Kenyan newspapers (Nation Editor, 2022).

Arguably, the above quotation echoes Ngwenya (2020, p. 77) who argues that the global political economic apparatus of power, through Western controlled institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (WB), have so much sway in the Global South that they now shape local "knowledge and identities". This is to the extent that, Ngwenya further argues (2020, p. 77), it can now be safely said that "there is no local without the global". And indeed, as shall be seen below, the IMF and the WB were among the chief sponsors of the *debt trap* frame buttressing the idea of media frames being "imprints of power, central to the production of hegemonic meanings" (Carragee and Roefs, 2004, p. 222).

In that regard, while the global exemplar and investor frames argued that spearheading infrastructural development through loans was a boost to

China's reputation and was taking centre stage in Africa, this frame pushes an opposite angle; it is a pessimist representation of China's lending and loans to Africa. According to Brautigam and Rithmire (2021), at the centre of the *debt trap* narrative is the false claim that China cajoles underdeveloped countries into accepting multiple loans for infrastructural development beyond their means with the intention of seizing the assets when the indebted nations default on repayments. As such and as shall be demonstrated below, Kenyan newspapers appeared to have fallen for the *debt trap* narrative hook, line, and sinker.

In classic confirmation of the observation (Singh, 2021) that the debt trap narrative has “gained currency with a myriad of journalists, researchers and politicians”, the reportage, across the newspapers, years, and story styles, and authorships and frame sponsorships, was alarmist (Singh, 2021, p. 2). Kenya was burdened (KE_NA_2016-05a05) and so distressed (KE_ST_2018-09a09) by debt that it was not just reeling (KE_NA_2018-09c09) but “falling into China's honey trap” (KE_ST_2018-07e07) and sinking (KE_NA_2016-03a03), it was said. The reason for that was intensified and “heavy borrowing” by the Kenyan government (KE_ST_2014-07c07).

Generally, the reportage was also invective, with Kenya cast as a debt addict, a condition allegedly triggered by China's lending (KE_NA_2018-12g12). The debt itself was ever growing and in “meteoric rise”, on course to “plunge” Kenya into a “debt overhang” (KE_ST_2014-07c07). By 2016, it had reached “unsustainable levels” (KE_NA_2016-04a04) and yet it kept on piling (KE_ST_2016-02b02) to levels never seen before in Kenya (KE_NA_2016-03a03) and

mounting (KE_NA_2018-09K09) until it became a “national security threat” (KE_ST_2018-07e07). According to *The Standard* (KE_ST_2018-09a09), a clergy man, without citing any figures, claimed that the debt owed to China was so huge Kenya would never be able to repay placing the country in danger of losing its sovereignty to China. Prior to that, a report (KE_NA_2016-03a03) said even the unborn Kenyans were already “saddled” with the Chinese debt.

In that regard, China itself was continually referred to in equally alarmist and denigratory language that cast aspersions on Beijing’s lending. For example, crafty China (KE_NA_2016-03a03) was engaged in “dept diplomacy” or “debt trap”, “honey trap” making her a Shylock-a vengeful Shakespearean creditor (KE_ST_2018-07e07). Wielding a “debt weapon” (KE_NA_2018-08d08), China was trapping other countries into a “Siri Lanka pit” meaning endless indebtedness such as Siri Lanka finds itself in (KE_NA_2018-05g05). China was keen to bury other countries “under massive debt”_(NG_VG_2018-09o09) by building white elephants (KE_ST_2017-02c02). China was also a “ruthless”, “Asian dragon” (KE_ST_2018-09a09) and a constrictor “swallowing” up Kenyan taxpayers’ earnings (KE_ST_2017-05c05). China had also “shackled developing countries in a debt abyss” (KE_ST_2018-09r09) as it was her deliberate strategy to bankrupt her partners (KE_ST_2018-10d10).

Chinese loans were cast as huge (KE_NA_2016-05f05), stinging (KE_NA_2018-08d08) “non-concessional” and, therefore, expensive meant to “chock” African economies with a “huge repayment burden” (KE_NA_2016-06c06) as there was no “proper debt analysis” prior to

receipt (NG_GU_2018-10d10). As such, they (loans) were “a recipe for huge debt burden”; a “free to spend affair” (KE_NA_2016-08k08).

As previously stated (see Moore, 2018 above), the notion of debt burden is, by nature, Western oriented. As such, this frame’s typical and foremost sponsors were Western leaders and institutions including US-based multilateral organisations and foundations. For example, in an article (KE_ST_2018-07b07) titled “China overloading poor nations with debt”, top US official says, Ray Washburne, head of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation, was quoted casting aspersions on Chinese investments and lending. China was “overloading poor nations with debt”, “saddling” them with “unsustainable debt through large-scale infrastructure projects that are not economically viable”. In the end, there was a danger that the indebted countries may have to lose their sovereignty to China as repayment, he claimed. According to article KE_NA_2018-09j09, The Heritage Foundation, a US-based conservative thinktank, African countries are “deeply” indebted to China. As can be seen, this confirms that US officials routinely use the debt trap notion to “launch diplomatic offensive seeking to undermine China’s ties with developing countries” (Singh, 2021, p. 2).

In a news article titled “A fifth of Kenya’s budget committed to repaying loans” (KE_NA_2016-05a05), the World Bank, in a doomy representation of the Chinese lending, was quoted lamenting Kenya’s “soaring debt levels” which stood to “further distress rapid rise in borrowing”; the report said China’s loans were certain to exacerbate Kenya’s “heavy debt burden”. According to article KE_NA_2016-05f05, the IMF also warned that Kenya’s “debt burden and the huge

loans” from China were pushing debt to “unsuitable levels”. The UN, too, lamented (KE_ST_2016-10c10) Kenya’s “unsustainable debt”. As stated in Chapter 1, one of China’s core aims is to be an alternative to Western development model of market friendly policies (Dijk, 2009). As such, it is only natural that the WB and the IMF, as global champions of market friendly policies, would be among the chief sponsors of this pessimist framing of Chinese lending in Africa.

However, and perhaps owing to its mythical nature (see Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021) and Western roots (see Moore, 2018 above), and also to its acerbic tone, the *debt trap* frame faced vehement and uninhibited counterargument; much of it from African and Chinese leaders and independent analysts. In a scathing rebuttal (KE_NA_2016-06b06), an analyst accused the World Bank and the IMF of “telling a big, fat lie that will burst”. Also, according to the *Nation* (KE_NA_2016-05b05), Guo Ce, economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy in Kenya, counter framed the debt trap narrative as “sensational and patently untrue” arguing that Chinese loans had a grace period and were inexpensive. Another Chinese foreign affairs official dismissed (NG_VG_2018-03b03) what he said were allegations of debt trap from the “international community” as “biased and not fact-based”, “groundless words” driven by an “ulterior motive”. An opinion piece (KE_ST_2018-11f11) by the Chinese state news agency, *Xinhua*, said, the *debt trap* theory was “pure fabrication”; “overblown”; “ill-informed or ill-intended” and was sheer “smearing” by some “finger-pointers”. After all, the piece said, Africa owed more to the West than it did to China.

From Africa, Rwandese leader, Paul Kagame said (KE_ST_2018-09b09), any talk of debt talk was meant to derail China-African ties. Kenyan leader, Uhuru Kenyatta (KE_NA_2018-10b10) framed his country's situation as that of a "healthy mix of debt", wondering why there was so much focus on Chinese debt as if Kenya was also not indebted to the US and Japan. Buhari also called upon fellow Africans to "dispel insinuations about a so-called Chinese debt trap" (NG_GU_2018-09d09).

5.2.7 Trade imbalance

According to de Vreese (2012, p. 369) and as discussed in Chapter 3, some media frames are journalists' "selection of topics" that would have been under discussion at particular times or issues they would have decided "to pick up on" from the frame sponsors' speeches, emphasis or advocacy. In that regard, and as shall be seen, the *trade imbalance* frame is a typical example of a frame taken from the hot topic of the day and from everyday speeches and statements.

Although it was more prevalent in both *The Standard* and the *Nation* (Kenya), *trade imbalance* is, yet again, another of the frames that were exclusive to both Kenya and Nigeria; it appeared there consistently in all the newspapers [Kenyan and Nigerian] and across story styles from 2016 to 2018. In Zimbabwe, and in both newspapers (*The Herald* and *NewsDay*), the frame was absent throughout the entire study period.

The *trade imbalance* frame's dominance in Kenya could be down to the fact that, as Kenya hosts the port of Mombasa, a busy trade gate way to

much of Africa (see Noel Dussort and Marchetti, 2019, p. 102 in Chapter 1) there was a large volume of imports coming in through there especially considering the influx of Chinese fish (5.2.4). It will also be worth recalling that investment and trade stories dominated all the countries throughout the five-year period with both Kenya and Nigeria leading (see Table 2 in Chapter 4). It should also be recalled that in Chapter 1 it was stated that while China was Nigeria's top import country it was, on the other hand, Nigeria's number nine export country (Global Edge, 2022).

While China's economic programs in Africa have always been anchored in both investment and trade (McGregor and Havenga, 2019), it is "primarily...trade related issues" that trigger unfavourable views about Chinese activities in the continent (Morgan, 2019, p. 387). In that regard, the central message of this frame is that while trade between China and Africa has grown and that while China is currently the fourth largest investor in Africa, and Africa's largest trading partner since 2010 (see IISD, 2021 in Chapter 1), trade has, however, remained in favour of China with Africa still being "one of China's smallest trading partners" (Mureithi, 2022).

Across the newspapers, authorships, and styles, the frame was embedded in official statements, speeches with chief sponsors of the frame being governments, experts, and multilateral organisations. Overall, the tone was generally that of alarm and lamentation; for example, trade between China and Kenya was not just "heavily skewed" (KE_NA_2016-09g09; KE_ST_2017-07t07) or "severely skewed" in China's favour (KE_ST_2018-05b05) but it was also "deep" and "huge", according to

the official Kenyan government statements (KE_NA_2017-01b01). “Kenya getting a raw deal from China, says World Bank report”, was the headline to another story (KE_ST_2016-03e03) which lamented Kenya’s “dismal” exports to China against a “dramatic increase” in Chinese imports.

Also, while China’s imports from Africa “plummeted” in 2015, her exports to Africa “rose”, according to a statement from the Chinese government (KE_NA_2016-01a01). Also, while Chinese exports to Kenya had “more than doubled” Kenya’s had “remained low and stagnant” (KE_NA_2018-05e05). The Kenyan manufacturing industry was not just “struggling” but was also “sinking” owing to an influx in cheap Chinese imports (KE_NA_2016-09k09). There was also a danger of Kenyan manufactures being “over-run” by Chinese counterparts (KE_NA_2018-05e05). In Nigeria, the situation was the same; the trade imbalance was not just in favour of China, but it was so “large” that Chinese exports “represent[ed] some 80 percent of the total bilateral trade volumes” between the two countries (NG_VG_2016-04f04).

Among the things that fuel trade imbalance between China and Africa and consequently resentment in Africa, are subsidies that Beijing grants to Chinese manufacturers as well as “trade barriers against foreign goods”, argues Eisenman (2012, p. 810). And indeed, these concerns did fuel and shape the trade imbalance frame. For example, according to the *Nation* (KE_NA_2017-06d06), Kenyan flower exporters complained about lack of “market access” to China thanks to the four per cent duty on their flowers; as such, they demanded “duty free and quota free trade” so they could access the Chinese market “without difficulties”. So topical

was the unfair trade issue that MPs asked the government to intervene (KE_NA_2018-10g10) and indeed President Kenyatta asked President Xi of China to “enact measures which can raise the volume of goods coming from Africa to China” (KE_NA_2018-11g11).

Therefore, as demonstrated above, there is evident readiness on the part of both the newspapers and government officials to agree; not only is the data quoted by the newspapers from the government, but officials will go an extra mile to add their own personal thoughts to shape and perpetuate the trade imbalance frame. So, while the government opposed other frames [Chinese fakes frame, for example], it however, promoted the trade imbalance frame with the newspapers parroting. However, the irony is that while some Kenyan government officials were rebuffing the fakes narrative (See KE_NA_2016-09j09 in Section 6.2.4), unfair trade partly derives from the dumping of fake products (see NG_VG_2014-12b12 in Section 5.2.4).

The newspapers’ unhindered willingness to regurgitate the trade imbalance mantra [frame] without question could be down to Kenya and Nigeria’s national media traditions and cultures. As revealed earlier (see Hall, 2009 in Chapter 2), the Nigerian press is, traditionally, willing to cooperate with the State; as such, this could be an example of when they willingly parroted the State line. Also, given that the hot issue of trade imbalance had to require the intervention (see KE_NA_2018-11g11 above) of President Kenyatta who is thought (Nyanjom, 2012, pp. 36–41) to have shares in the local newspapers, it could be that the parroting of the frame was another case of dancing to the master’s tune. After all, while Kenya enjoys the “least restrictive

political system” and a “vibrant and liberal...mediascape” in East Africa (McIntyre and Sobel Cohen, 2022, p. 3), politicians can still indulge in gate keeping and decide what is printed (Oduor, 2021). Also, according to Ogola (2015), the Kenyan government has previously ordered state departments to withdraw adverts from the local press as a way to influence favourable coverage.

Perpetuators of the frame were high charges on African goods entering China and China’s dumping.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has identified and analysed the actual frames that dominated the reportage on Chinese presence in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe between 2014 and 2018. The chapter also showed the similarities and differences in how the newspapers framed China; also revealed were the roles of varying actors involved in the framing enterprise. The chapter successfully categorised the frames in terms of optimism vs pessimism making the image of China accessible. As such, the chapter shows a balanced contest of positive and negative framing.

Chapter 6: Overall thesis conclusions

6.0 Introduction

This chapter caps the entire research project demonstrating how each of the research questions (see 1: 5 in Chapter 1) was successfully answered. The chapter reveals the overall conclusion showing how the

research project contributes to knowledge; it also reveals the potential and, therefore, indicators for future research.

6.1 Final Reflections

This thesis's core objective was to assess the African media's image of China pertaining to its [China] involvement in Africa over a five-year period through frame analysis. The purpose was to fill a gap in existing literature which was lack of a longitudinal, comparative, and cross-national studies on the same subject (see 1:5 in Chapter 1). Using Kenyan (*Nation & The Standard*), Nigerian (*The Guardian & Vanguard*) and Zimbabwean (*NewsDay & The Herald*) newspapers, the thesis also sought to establish similarities and differences between newspapers' reportage and framing. The thesis also sought to establish the effect of Beijing's soft power drive on China's image.

Therefore, from the above framing analysis (Chapter 5), it can be concluded that the overall African media's image of China is balanced albeit gravitating towards some degree of complexity. However, before any elaboration on this, it will be worthwhile to first attend to each research country's situation. In both Kenya and Nigeria, there was a contest of pessimist and optimist frames. Also, just as there was hardly much difference in the way in which *The Standard* and *the Nation* [Kenya] framed China, a similar scenario obtained in Nigeria where the difference between *The Guardian* and the *Vanguard* was minimal.

However, in the case of Zimbabwe, there were notable and obvious differences between how *NewsDay* and *The Herald* framed China. As

stated in Chapter 5, *NewsDay* stuck to the criminality frame throughout whereas *The Herald*, which has got a dedicated crime and courts desk, gave scant attention to the criminal element, and, instead, dwelt on Chinese benevolence and exemplariness, among other positive frames. Arguably, reasons for this pattern can be traced back to the “polarity between the state-controlled public press and the private press” (see Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011, p. 100 in Chapter 2). Also, it should be recalled that the extent of political pressure in the state media is such that journalists would rather censor themselves than risk irking the political elite (see Chuma, 2020, p. 7 in Chapter 2). As an editor said (*NewsDay* Editor, 2022), the Chinese pay Zimbabwean elites in exchange for impunity; so, it could be that the state media editors are keen to avoid irking both the Chinese and the local elites.

However, some frames are common to all the newspapers and countries regardless of newspapers’ different ideological inclinations. For example, the *benevolence*, *exemplar*, and *crime* frames were found in all the countries with the framers being either government officials or state affiliated or ordinary folks. The wording of the common frames was similar too; differences lay only in the varying frequencies of appearance. While some papers carried more stories than others, the stories were still framed the same way as in newspapers where the stories were few. Other notable differences were that some frames were limited or pertinent to specific countries. For example, *trade imbalance and debt trap* frames were mainly Kenyan frames while crime, even though dominant in all the countries, was the Zimbabwean-based *NewsDay*’s special frame. The dominance of *debt trap and trade imbalance*

narratives in Kenya was arguably down to the fish imports coming into the country through the regional port of Mombasa as well and construction loans. Also, the *all-weather friends and history* frames were *The Herald* frames perhaps because of the paper's narrow conception of patriotism and its bias towards the state.

Earlier in Chapter 1, it was revealed (see Lafargue, 2009; Leslie, 2016; Morgan, 2019) that attendant to the China in Africa narratives were stereotypes depicting Chinese companies and people as abusive employers, destroyers of the environment, sellers of fake products, debt trap agents, and criminals among many other accusations. And indeed, as we have seen above in the Chapter 5, the same stereotypes were readily adopted by the newspapers as framing devices. This pattern of stereotypical representation confirms the theory (see Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018 in Chapter 2) that stereotypes play a “special role” in the “formation of the image of the state” by making the job of the communicator easier. Communicating through stereotypes is “easier” because stereotypes are “already prepared templates” as they “greatly simplify” issues leaving both the communicator and the receiver with little need for too much thinking. As such, stereotypes make it easy for the message recipients to comprehend what is being communicated to them (Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018, pp. 559–60). This pattern of stereotypical framing also confirms Saleem (2007)'s theory that stereotypes count among the factors that “create and reinforce a nation's image” (Saleem, 2007, p. 136); it also resonates with Entman (1993) who argues that stereotypes are among the sources of media frames.

Moreover, the general prevalence of stereotypes in the framing of the news articles used in this study can also be attributed to the nature of framing itself as well as to human nature. As stated in Chapter 3, framing can be triggered either consciously or unconsciously on the part of the framers (Kuypers, 2009; Entman, 1993). Moreover, humans often act based on perceptions or pictures situated in their heads (Lippmann, 1997). Therefore, as stereotypes are “already prepared templates” (see Vinogradova and Denisova, 2018, pp. 559–60 in Chapter 5) ready to be used, it could be that these stereotypes about China are pictures already ensconced in the average African person’s mind.

Also in Chapter 1, it was stated that to counter these stereotypes and, therefore, negative press, China had deployed its soft power and economic statecraft (Morgan, 2019, pp. 390–1) and augmented its “tools of culture” strategy with “the tools of business” (the use of economic wherewithal) to attract allies (Kurlantzick, 2008, p. 6). By so doing, China is actually “waging geopolitics with capital” (Baldwin, 1985, p. 4). As such, this study found traces of Chinese soft power and economic state craft influence in the form of frames depicting China as a benevolent, responsible, or compassionate and exemplary leader and having a competitive edge over Western rivals in the struggle for supremacy in Africa. In that regard, it can be concluded that the general framing of the news articles across the countries was essentially a case of stereotyping versus soft power-driven rebuttals or counter framing.

Meanwhile, as already mentioned earlier, it can still be concluded that, looked at from a collective point of view, the African media’s image of China, as opposed to being straightforwardly negative or positive, is

balanced and stable, characterised by a different degree of complexity. These core findings resonate with previous studies (Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013c). The findings also echo Mohan and Kale (2007, p. 4) who, as stated in Chapter 1, found that China's presence in Africa was not a "uniformly good or bad thing".

Also stated in Chapter 1, Wasserman (2012) discovered that the South African media framed China in "stark binary terms as either exploitative, predatory force or a benevolent, development partner". In the end, he concluded that China's involvement in Africa was so "complex" it could not be "pigeonholed as either a bad or good news story" (Wasserman, 2012, p. 351). Wekesa (2013c) concluded that the image of China in East Africa was "more or less balanced between negative and positive perceptions" owing to an "interplay of both negative and positive media frames" with the margin between the two "not too wide". He also concluded that Chinese involvement in East Africa was a "complex matter" characterised by a "potpourri of competing images" that went beyond the negative and positive classification. This was evidenced in cases where papers spined the same event (Wekesa, 2013c, pp. 34–35).

However, although in the case of this study there were moments of blatant negativity especially in the *NewsDay* which stuck to the crime frame and moments of praise singing (*The Herald*), on average and overall, those cannot be said to be fully representative of the broader Africa. Therefore, considering how this study resonates with earlier studies (Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013c) and considering its cross national and longitudinal natures, it can be said that, on average, the African media is neither negative nor positive.

Therefore, the meeting point of this thesis and existing research (Wasserman, 2012; Wekesa, 2013c) is in the complexity aspects and in the less wide margins between negative and positive framing. The complexity of this thesis's findings derives from the fact that some frames carried within them conflicting elements such as when a dominant frame ran parallelly to a counter frame with both frames given equal weight and in the same publications. For example, in this study, China was framed as an investor creating employment and yet it was, at the same time, framed as an agent of trade imbalance and debt trap. Also, while, generally, there was an interplay of positive and negative frames, there were also some situations of pragmatism and, therefore, complexity. For example, while the scramble for Africa frame is presented as negative for Africa it is also presented as China's victory, with China shown shadowing the USA with White House officials and envoys admitting that China was a problem for Washington. Such pragmatic depiction represented a part of the complex aspect of China's image in Africa (See Section 5.2.3).

The complexity aspect of China's media image is perhaps inherent in five distinct natures namely the nature of China itself, the making of a national image, the nature of the news story, the nature of the China-Africa relationship and that of the process of framing. First, China is itself, a "complex entity" (Norris, 2016, p. 4). Also, according to Erlbaum (2016, p. 1) and as indicated in Chapter 2 section 2. 2, the construction of the national image is a "complex communication process" in which many factors play varying roles. Also stated in Chapter 2, was the fact that news stories are inherently contradictory

because within a news story is often located “ideological inconsistencies and contradictions” suggesting the “collapse of the elite consensus on national and international issues”. Also situated within a news story are elements of dissent that “challenge hegemonic meanings and values” (Carragee, 1993, p. 333). Also, as Altheide (1984) contends (See Chapter 2), it is not always that news articles sustain the existing order because of various factors such as differences in the extent and ways in which journalists are socialised and the way they receive social values.

Moreover, according to Hallahan (1999, p. 207), story framing is the “most complex form of framing” because, and as we have seen from the frame discussion above, it entails “selecting key themes or ideas that are the focus of the message and incorporating a variety of storytelling or narrative techniques that support that theme”. Therefore, considering the above, it could be that the frequent counter and contradictory framing speaks to the natural flow of both the news and framing processes. After all, for every frame there is a counter frame (Davis, 2009). That is why, and as stated in Chapter 3, framing, “in all its phases”, is “vulnerable and prone to counter frames” (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 69). As such, according to Goffman (1986) and as mentioned in Chapter 3, frames evolve meaning that any new or latest detail pertaining to a particular narrative could trigger reframing.

Just as the news story is naturally prone to “inconsistencies and contradictions” (Carragee, 1993, p. 333) and just as storytelling is complex (Hallahan, 1999), China and Africa are also involved in a “complex relationship” dogged by “competing perspectives” manifesting themselves in “varied and polarised” African viewpoints

(Morgan, 2019, p. 391). Also, as stated in Chapter 1, attendant to Chinese presence in Africa are controversies; for example, while some may think of China as an agent of African “poverty and underdevelopment”, some see it [China] as an agent of development whose role in Africa is of mutual benefit to both parties (Mlambo et al., 2016, p. 258). Added to that, according to Jiang et al (2016), the reportage on China in Africa has tended to be characterised by positive framing of economic involvement on one hand and “a great deal of criticism” of the behaviour of Chinese business folks and workers on the other hand (See Chapter 1).

In that regard, and as can be seen from the dominant frames above, positive framing and criticism of the Chinese is exactly what this study has found; positive framing on economic development ran athwart negative framing on the actions of the companies and individuals. So, just as the nature of the story is contradictory and just as the nature of the China Africa relations is complex, the media representation of China is a messy affair characterised by counter framing and antonyms. An example is the appearance or existence of both criminality and benevolence in the same newspaper and pages at the same time especially considering the fact that while companies were donating to the communities they were also seen as abusive. To have all these opposing frames in the same newspaper and, on the other hand, have similar frames in newspapers of opposing ideologies and ownerships arguably speaks to China and Africa’s “complex relationship” (Morgan, 2019, p. 391). While Chong and Druckman (2007b) argue that “framing effects are cancelled when opposing frames are presented concurrently” (Chong

and Druckman, 2007b, p. 638) in this study the situation is too complex to readily accept the cancellation of framing effects theory. This is so because, for example, the benevolence and criminality frames remained strong and dominant throughout the entire five-year study period with actors or frames of both extremes active throughout. Also, in some cases, the counter framing was just sparse and not strong enough to weaken the dominant frame. A case in point was the brief framing of Chinese as victims of crime (see Section 5.2.1).

Nevertheless, this study's strongest contribution to knowledge is that it can now be confidently said that the African media's image of China is balanced, stable, albeit complex at the same time characterised by mixed framing. Therefore, this study establishes the longevity, ubiquity, and stability of China's balanced image; it proves that the image has remained stable for a reasonably long-time frame and that this is not limited to one region but spread across a reasonably wide geographical area (East, Southern and West Africa) for one to be able to say it represents the African situation. Also, this image has been tested not based on select events or issues but across the board.

According to Gartner and Hunt (1987), changing the state image is always a long "tedious process" because, by its [state image] very nature, it changes "slowly" (Gartner and Hunt, 1987, p. 15). It is, therefore, from that position that the longevity and stability aspects of China's image in Africa should be understood. As we saw in Chapter 1 (Morgan, 2019; Traoré, 2021), China is not only concerned about its image but has deployed soft power and economic statecraft to win hearts and minds and yet its image has remained stable over years (Morgan, 2019; Traoré,

2021). As such, it can be argued that the stability of China's image in the middle of a soft power campaign speaks to the natural slow evolvement of the state image. In that regard, frames that paint China as a benevolent/compassionate nation could be the evidence of soft power's slow effect on the stable image.

As mentioned in chapter 4, the Chinese state news agency stories were the second most prevalent in the study. So, the slow effect of the soft power on the image of China can also be down to the Chinese media's little effect in Africa. In Chapter 1 it was stated that a study (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2018, p. 2212) found that Chinese media had "little impact" in the African students' consumption of news. Also, another study (Madrid-Morales and Wasserman, 2018, p. 1218) found that the Chinese media were "far from having a profound impact" on South African media workers. Also, according to Xie and Page (2013, p. 850) and as cited in Chapter 1, the extent of China's cultural presence in a given country, strategic ties between that country and China have "no significant measurable impact" on how citizens of that country view China.

Speaking of the stability and slow evolvement of the state image, it should also be mentioned that while frames evolve (see Goffman, 1986) they actually "change very little or gradually" and "over time" and are themselves "stable because they are part of culture" (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 63).

Also, the reason for the slow effect of the Chinese soft power could be inherent in China's foreign policy. In Chapter 1, we learnt that to Beijing,

states are the only “credible actors in the international system” (see Alden and Alves, 2008, p. 45 citing Jisi, W, 1994) and that, as a result, China’s relations with Africa are mainly conducted on “government to government” basis (Soule and E. Selormey, 2020) or “state-centred” (Mano, 2016, p. 180). Consequently, China’s soft power focuses on government officials and the elite of the host country as they are the ones who control the resources that China is targeting (Zhang, 2016). Consequently, as Mano (2016) argues, while China is a powerful actor, there is a limit to what it could do to shape its image because of “other points of power” where it has limited control (Mano, 2016, p. 180). In that regard, it is argued herein that this has not just caused China’s “lack of experience in working with the civil society” (Zhang, 2016, p. 6) abroad but has also isolated and antagonised the African civil society and consequently slowed down the progress of the soft power campaign. And indeed, as we saw earlier in Chapter 5, among the chief sponsors of the unfair labour practices frame [pessimist], were trade unions and organised youth groups.

Also, the general framing of the news articles across the countries echoed framing experts (see Benford and Snow, 2000; Entman, 1993 in Chapter 3) who posit that at the heart of framing are problem identification, apportionment of blame and or responsibility as well as the search for solutions. This is particularly so when one considers frames like *debt trap*, criminality, unfair labour practices and environmental destruction. According to de Vreese (2012), problem definition is the most valuable feature of a frame; and this study, arguably, resonates with that claim as most frames mainly highlight problems attendant to Chinese activities in

Africa. Also confirmed was Hahallan (1999)'s argument about frames being reflections of "judgements made by message creators or framers" (1999, p. 207). This is apparent in US officials' absolute judgements about China burdening Africa with debts (see debt burden/trap frame).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, frames come from politicians, activists among many other news sources (de Vreese, 2012; Carragee and Roefs, 2004). And this study has confirmed that as senior Chinese and African government officials were among the main actors in the framing of the news. Also confirmed by this study is the theory (Kinder and Sanders, 1990) of frames being intrinsic in political debates and messages. So, the ready recourse to stereotypes by the journalists could also be down to the nature of news framing. According de Vreese (2012), journalists have "little autonomy" and play a marginal role in the framing of the news something which forces them to rely on frames brought by some people; as a result advocacy frames are generally prevalent in the news (see de Vreese, 2012, pp. 368–9 in Chapter 3). This is a plausible argument considering frames such as benevolence, *win-win* and *all-weather friends* are stereotypes and cliches sponsored by government officials. Added to that, in chapter 5 (see Table 9), we discovered that Chinese government officials were among those who authored a significant number of articles.

The study also confirmed the researched newspapers' weaknesses. For example, and as already has been stated above, the crime frame confirmed *NewsDay* and *The Herald's* biases. While the *NewsDay* demonstrated total dedication to the demonisation of the Chinese as criminals, *The Herald*, despite having a crime desk, almost ignored

stories about Chinese crime. As Mawindi Mabweazara (2011) observed, the private press workers are so particular about how their writing is perceived to the extent that they always ensure not to end up “sounding like *The Herald*” (Mawindi Mabweazara, 2011, p. 106). In that regard, the *NewsDay*’s dedication to the crime frame can be taken as an effort to avoid sounding like the official press. It should also be recalled that, as stated earlier (see Mano, 2016 in chapter 1) *NewsDay* publisher, Trevor Ncube, is also as “sceptical” about the Chinese and is certain that whatever they do in Zimbabwe is “not humanitarian” (Mano, 2016, p. 170). Although Ncube is known to say, “I am not my newspapers” (Ndlovu, 2019), it is striking that his stance on China would so resonate with one of his newspapers.

In Kenya, both newspapers parroted the Chinese *debt trap* myth. However, research (see Brautigam and Rithmire, 2021; Singh, 2021 in Chapter 1) proved that the notion of China burdening African nations with debt is a Western idea with no evidence to support it. Given that the notion of Chinese *debt trap* “resonates more in Western countries” (Moore, 2018), another explanation for the dominance of the debt trap frame in Kenya is that, as revealed in Chapter 2 (see Capitant and Frère, 2011b, pp. 5–6), Kenyan newspapers “unquestionably” mimic the English press. That could be a plausible interpretation because, as stated earlier in Chapter 2 (see Uche, 1991, p. 4), African newspapers are afflicted by “ideological barrenness” and to the extent that they often pander to neo-colonial influences.

As such, in the case of Nigeria, the dedication to the debt trap myth could be down to the fact that, as stated in Chapter 2, Western trained Nigerian

journalists often promote “Western media models and perspectives” (Kintz, 2007, p. 5). It could also be down to the fact that the Nigerian press is generally prone to “ethical laxities” (Saliou Camara, 2008, p. 225 citing Olukotun). Also, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Nigerian media are given to protecting markets and global interests ahead of and in disregard of popular concerns (Capitant and Frère, 2011b citing Hall).

So, as we learnt in Chapter 2 (Borah, 2015, p. 4), that we study mass media because they [mass media] do have “some sort of effect”, this has been validated because this study has accessed a media image of China.

6.2 Recommendations

As indicated earlier in Chapter 1, this project does have its limitations. Therefore, and as was also suggested earlier, future work should investigate the press coverage of China in Francophone, Lusophone Africa, and other parts of Africa.

Also, as this study dwelt on the pre-Covid 19 period, future studies should focus on the pandemic’s effect on China’s image.

Also, as already stated above, this study establishes the longevity (plus five years) and ubiquity (East, Southern and West Africa) of China’s image in Africa in a way that creates opportunities for more studies within the broader Global South. As stated above (Devlin et al., 2006; Dijk, 2009), China is also involved in the Caribbeans, Asia and Latin America; it is, therefore, anticipated that this solid, stable African media image of China will be tested in the broader Global South as part of follow up studies.

It is also anticipated that other follow up cross-national studies, in the form of either journal pieces or books, will investigate specific and sectorial Chinese involvement such as mining, loans, grants, infrastructure, culture, and Yuan circulation.

6.3 Conclusion

As the last part of the study, this chapter has successfully showed how China's media image in Africa has remained stable over the years. In doing so, the chapter showed how the research successfully answered the research questions thereby contributing to knowledge and playing a part in the closure of a gap in research. Also revealed in the chapter were the study's limitations and hence recommendations for future research.

Positional Statement

China watchers from all over the world often ask: is Beijing good or bad for Africa? Should Beijing be condemned or praised for the loans, grants, infrastructural development, and peace keeping missions in the continent? Should Africa reject the Chinese largesse? Is Beijing getting a raw deal from some observers over its involvement in Africa?

So, as can be seen, my interest in China's image is not an isolated case; it comes in the backdrop of these multiple, common, and urgent questions regarding Beijing's engagement with Africa. And, as the Africa-Africa relations continue to gain momentum, there is no

gainsaying that these abovementioned questions have become ever more urgent needing equally urgent answers.

Just as there are many questions about China's engagement, views about China's role in Africa also vary. There may well be numerous *China in Africa* watchers but so far one frequently encounters what arguably constitutes three distinct groups of such people namely the anti-China, pro-China and the ambivalent.

The first group's core thesis is outrightly and unapologetically cynical; it holds that China is not just ghoulish but is also up to mischief and must be stopped forthwith. It is also in this camp that one finds those who accuse China of 'colonising' Africa and of plundering the continent's natural resources as part of its ambition to supplant the West and dominate the world. And yet, the second group is unquestionably loyal to the opposite view of China as a sincere juggernaut genuinely out to uplift common humanity. In this group, one often finds those who believe that China and Africa are natural allies, and the West must not disturb because of its colonialism history. Among the core beliefs of the second group of watchers is that the West is jealous of the progress China is making in Africa and is [West], therefore, projecting its colonialism guilt on Beijing. They accuse the West of the burden of dual guilt; the guilt of watching as Africa continues to wallow in poverty on top of that of colonial legacy.

However, the third group of the ambivalent lot's overall view is that China is neither good nor bad; it is just an alternative player in the global system and rather than antagonise it, we should cautiously

embrace her, warts, and all. In this group, one also finds those who advocate for a bipolar international system and those who believe that China and the West, especially the US, must learn to coexist and complement each other in global leadership and save the planet from World War III.

As easy as it is for any ordinary person to choose their side on the topic of *China in Africa*, it is not so for a researcher. Whilst to some people answers to the above questions are obvious and straightforward, a researcher's choices must always be guided by empirical evidence. And yet, as members of society there is somewhere where researchers begin. As such, it is my submission that I am more likely to be seen as an ambivalent China watcher; especially, my views are more likely to chime with those who believe in the need for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between the world powers.

Two situations inform my ambivalence. I come from a continent [Africa] whose liberation struggles against colonial rule were partly funded by China. While I did not fight in any liberation war, many did. As such, African liberation from colonial rule is a special source of pride for many Africans myself included. However, in the post liberation dispensation Chinese firms, while employing locals, seem to operate with impunity Africa wide, including in my own district (in Zimbabwe) where I come from. Moreover, while China is doling out to our communities, it is not alone. The USA, EU and the UK are also amongst the leading aid providers, and they have done so for decades. As such, non-extreme and sober approaches are necessary.

So, in answering the earlier above questions above, personally, I believe China's status and position in the international system should be informed by research as opposed to our personal opinions. Because of its influence today as evidenced in its sway in Africa and elsewhere, it would be wrong and dangerous to let personal opinions and prejudices be the basis of our response to her presence in Africa. One of the responses I believe is key is to identify China's media image. Media image is a natural delve for me because of my experience in the media industry having served as a print, radio, and online journalist for nearly 20 years and having covered China's activities in Zimbabwe.

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Appendix A Subject

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Subject * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Subject * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper						Total	
		30	31	32	33	38	39		
Subject	61	Count	47	35	31	45	81	13	252
		Expected Count	55.4	52.1	39.3	50.1	40.6	14.6	252.0
	62	Count	3	3	0	2	3	4	15
		Expected Count	3.3	3.1	2.3	3.0	2.4	.9	15.0
	63	Count	180	192	131	180	102	37	822
		Expected Count	180.6	169.9	128.3	163.3	132.4	47.5	822.0
	64	Count	3	2	1	1	2	0	9
		Expected Count	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.5	.5	9.0
	65	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0
	66	Count	3	4	11	5	3	1	27
		Expected Count	5.9	5.6	4.2	5.4	4.4	1.6	27.0
	67	Count	12	10	20	17	12	3	74
		Expected Count	16.3	15.3	11.5	14.7	11.9	4.3	74.0
	68	Count	0	4	0	0	0	1	5
		Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0
	69	Count	32	24	10	11	5	19	101
		Expected Count	22.2	20.9	15.8	20.1	16.3	5.8	101.0
	70	Count	14	10	5	5	5	1	40
		Expected Count	8.8	8.3	6.2	7.9	6.4	2.3	40.0
	71	Count	5	0	4	0	3	0	12
		Expected Count	2.6	2.5	1.9	2.4	1.9	.7	12.0
	72	Count	3	2	0	3	2	0	10
		Expected Count	2.2	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.6	.6	10.0
	73	Count	1	0	3	6	5	1	16
		Expected Count	3.5	3.3	2.5	3.2	2.6	.9	16.0
Total		Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384
		Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	198.273 ^a	60	.000

Likelihood Ratio	185.208	60	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.858	1	.050
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 47 cells (60.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.378	.000
	Cramer's V	.169	.000
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	Subject * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384

Subject * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year	Subject	Newspaper						Total
		30	31	32	33	38	39	
2014	61	3	0		2	5	2	12
	62	0	0		0	0	1	1
	63	25	23		9	11	6	74
	66	1	0		0	0	0	1
	67	2	2		1	1	0	6

		69	3	6		0	1	3	13
		72	1	0		0	0	0	1
		73	0	0		0	5	0	5
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	Subject	61	2	4	2	1	11	1	21
		62	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
		63	28	28	16	17	11	5	105
		64	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		66	0	1	1	0	1	0	3
		67	0	2	3	1	3	0	9
		68	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		69	7	3	1	0	0	0	11
		70	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
		71	1	0	0	0	3	0	4
		72	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
		73	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	Subject	61	1	6	11	1	4	0	23
		62	0	1	0	1	2	0	4
		63	47	50	35	43	15	7	197
		64	0	1	1	0	1	0	3
		65	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		66	0	2	3	0	0	0	5
		67	3	2	3	3	0	0	11
		68	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		69	9	3	0	2	2	0	16
		70	0	4	1	0	1	0	6
		71	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
		72	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		73	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	Subject	61	3	3	8	8	7	1	30
		62	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
		63	39	56	28	52	15	2	192
		64	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
		66	1	1	4	2	1	0	9
		67	6	3	5	5	2	0	21
		68	0	2	0	0	0	0	2

		69	6	5	5	6	0	4	26
		70	8	4	0	0	3	0	15
		71	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		72	0	1	0	1	1	0	3
		73	0	0	0	4	0	1	5
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	Subject	61	38	22	10	33	54	9	166
		62	0	1	0	0	1	2	4
		63	41	35	52	59	50	16	253
		64	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		66	1	0	3	3	1	1	9
		67	1	1	9	7	6	3	27
		68	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		69	7	7	4	3	2	13	36
		70	5	1	3	4	1	1	15
		71	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
		72	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
		73	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	Subject	61	47	35	31	45	81	13	252
		62	3	3	0	2	3	4	15
		63	180	192	131	180	102	36	821
		64	3	2	1	1	2	0	9
		65	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		66	3	4	11	5	3	1	27
		67	12	10	20	17	12	3	74
		68	0	4	0	0	0	1	5
		69	32	24	10	11	5	20	102
		70	14	10	5	5	5	1	40
		71	5	0	4	0	3	0	12
		72	3	2	0	3	2	0	10
		73	1	0	3	6	5	1	16
	Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix B Style

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Style * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Style * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper							Total
		30	31	32	33	38	39		
Style 50	Count	212	225	167	236	164	68	1072	
	Expected Count	235.5	221.5	167.3	213.0	172.7	62.0	1072	
51	Count	28	30	17	8	24	4	111	
	Expected Count	24.4	22.9	17.3	22.1	17.9	6.4	111.0	
52	Count	62	28	30	26	32	7	185	
	Expected Count	40.6	38.2	28.9	36.8	29.8	10.7	185.0	
53	Count	2	3	2	5	2	1	15	
	Expected Count	3.3	3.1	2.3	3.0	2.4	.9	15.0	
55	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
Total	Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384	
	Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	46.409 ^a	20	.001
Likelihood Ratio	46.591	20	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.003	1	.316
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 12 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.183	.001
	Cramer's V	.092	.001
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Valid	Cases Missing	Total
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	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Style * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Style * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

			Newspaper						
Year			30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
2014	Style	50	29	31		8	22	9	99
		51	3	0		0	0	2	5
		52	2	0		1	1	1	5
		53	1	0		3	0	0	4
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	Style	50	34	34	20	17	20	7	132
		51	6	2	2	1	3	1	15
		52	4	2	1	2	7	0	16
		53	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	Style	50	47	58	43	47	18	6	219
		51	6	6	6	2	5	0	25
		52	12	6	5	2	1	0	26
		53	0	1	1	0	0	1	3
		55	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	Style	50	49	61	38	72	17	7	244
		51	7	9	3	0	7	0	26
		52	9	6	10	5	6	1	37
		53	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	Style	50	53	41	66	92	87	39	378
		51	6	13	6	5	9	1	40
		52	35	14	14	16	17	5	101
		53	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	Style	50	212	225	167	236	164	68	1072
		51	28	30	17	8	24	4	111

	52	62	28	30	26	32	7	185
	53	2	3	2	5	2	1	15
	55	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix C Authorship

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Authorship * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Authorship * Newspaper Crosstabulation

			Newspaper						Total
			30	31	32	33	38	39	
Authorship	501	Count	16	2	2	2	0	0	22
		Expected Count	4.8	4.5	3.4	4.4	3.5	1.3	22.0
503	Count	0	11	1	1	2	2	17	
	Expected Count	3.7	3.5	2.7	3.4	2.7	1.0	17.0	
505	Count	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	
	Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0	
506	Count	201	238	175	228	149	65	1056	
	Expected Count	232.0	218.2	164.8	209.8	170.2	61.0	1056.0	
507	Count	10	7	6	1	6	6	36	
	Expected Count	7.9	7.4	5.6	7.2	5.8	2.1	36.0	
508	Count	13	0	0	1	7	1	22	
	Expected Count	4.8	4.5	3.4	4.4	3.5	1.3	22.0	
510	Count	2	0	0	0	13	3	18	
	Expected Count	4.0	3.7	2.8	3.6	2.9	1.0	18.0	
511	Count	48	18	22	14	3	0	105	
	Expected Count	23.1	21.7	16.4	20.9	16.9	6.1	105.0	
512	Count	2	5	1	0	39	0	47	
	Expected Count	10.3	9.7	7.3	9.3	7.6	2.7	47.0	
513	Count	10	2	4	2	2	0	20	
	Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0	
514	Count	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	
	Expected Count	.7	.6	.5	.6	.5	.2	3.0	
517	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
518	Count	1	1	3	2	0	3	10	
	Expected Count	2.2	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.6	.6	10.0	
519	Count	1	0	1	2	1	0	5	
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0	
520	Count	0	0	0	20	0	0	20	
	Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0	
Total	Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384	
	Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	493.099 ^a	70	.000
Likelihood Ratio	423.399	70	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.654	1	.010
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 68 cells (75.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.597	.000
	Cramer's V	.267	.000
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Authorship * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Authorship * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count		Newspaper						Total
		30	31	32	33	38	39	
2014	Authorship	501	3	0		0	0	3
		506	22	31		11	20	10

		507	3	0		0	0	0	3
		508	4	0		0	1	0	5
		510	1	0		0	0	0	1
		511	2	0		1	0	0	3
		512	0	0		0	2	0	2
		518	0	0		0	0	2	2
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	Authorship	501	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		503	0	2	0	0	0	1	3
		506	35	34	23	19	21	7	139
		507	1	1	0	0	2	0	4
		508	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		510	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
		511	5	1	1	2	0	0	9
		512	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	Authorship	501	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		503	0	3	1	0	0	0	4
		506	52	62	44	49	18	7	232
		507	0	0	5	0	2	0	7
		511	10	2	3	1	2	0	18
		512	0	1	1	0	3	0	5
		513	2	2	1	0	0	0	5
		518	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		520	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	Authorship	501	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
		506	48	69	41	71	23	7	259
		507	1	2	1	0	1	1	6
		508	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
		510	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
		511	6	4	8	3	0	0	21
		512	1	2	0	0	1	0	4
		513	4	0	0	1	0	0	5
		518	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		519	0	0	0	2	1	0	3
		520	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310

2018	Authorship	501	5	2	2	2	0	0	11
		503	0	6	0	1	2	1	10
		505	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		506	44	42	67	78	67	34	332
		507	5	4	0	1	1	5	16
		508	7	0	0	1	5	1	14
		510	1	0	0	0	4	3	8
		511	25	11	10	7	1	0	54
		512	1	1	0	0	32	0	34
		513	4	0	3	1	2	0	10
		514	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
		517	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		518	1	0	2	2	0	1	6
		519	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
		520	0	0	0	18	0	0	18
		Total			94	68	86	113	115
Total	Authorship	501	16	2	2	2	0	0	22
		503	0	11	1	1	2	2	17
		505	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		506	201	238	175	228	149	65	1056
		507	10	7	6	1	6	6	36
		508	13	0	0	1	7	1	22
		510	2	0	0	0	13	3	18
		511	48	18	22	14	3	0	105
		512	2	5	1	0	39	0	47
		513	10	2	4	2	2	0	20
		514	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
		517	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		518	1	1	3	2	0	3	10
		519	1	0	1	2	1	0	5
		520	0	0	0	20	0	0	20
		Total			304	286	216	275	223

Appendix D Embassy

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A - Embassy * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

A - Embassy * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper						Total
		30	31	32	33	38	39	
A – Embassy	149	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	150	45	19	30	53	34	11	192
	151	1	1	0	2	2	0	6
	153	1	3	4	12	3	1	24
	154	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	156	253	262	180	206	181	67	1149
	157	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
	161	0	0	1	1	2	1	5
	162	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	72.875 ^a	45	.005
Likelihood Ratio	72.626	45	.006
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.803	1	.094
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 47 cells (78.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.229	.005
	Cramer's V	.103	.005
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent

A - Embassy * Newspaper *	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%
Year						

A - Embassy * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year			Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
2014	A - Embassy	149	1	0		0	0	0	1
		150	3	3		0	6	3	15
		153	0	0		1	1	0	2
		156	31	28		11	16	9	95
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	A - Embassy	150	6	2	1	5	1	0	15
		153	1	0	0	1	2	1	5
		156	37	37	23	15	27	7	146
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	A - Embassy	150	5	4	7	8	3	0	27
		151	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		153	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		156	60	66	48	42	22	7	245
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	A - Embassy	149	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		150	12	5	9	14	8	1	49
		151	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		153	0	2	0	3	0	0	5
		156	52	70	42	61	20	7	252
		157	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	161	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310	
2018	A - Embassy	150	19	5	13	26	16	7	86
		151	0	0	0	2	2	0	4
		153	0	1	4	6	0	0	11
		154	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		156	73	61	67	77	96	37	411
		157	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		161	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
	162	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	
Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521	

Total	A - Embassy	149	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		150	45	19	30	53	34	11	192
		151	1	1	0	2	2	0	6
		153	1	3	4	12	3	1	24
		154	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		156	253	262	180	206	181	67	1149
		157	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
		161	0	0	1	1	2	1	5
		162	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
	Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix E Military Relations

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Relations * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Relations * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper						Total	
		30	31	32	33	38	39		
Relations	440	Count	0	2	3	2	3	2	12
		Expected Count	2.6	2.5	1.9	2.4	1.9	.7	12.0
	441	Count	5	0	0	0	5	3	13
		Expected Count	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.1	.8	13.0
	442	Count	299	284	213	273	215	75	1359
		Expected Count	298.5	280.8	212.1	270.0	219.0	78.6	1359.0
Total		Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384
		Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26.491 ^a	10	.003
Likelihood Ratio	31.052	10	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.212	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 12 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .69.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.138	.003
	Cramer's V	.098	.003
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Relations * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Relations * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year	Relations		Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
2014	Relations	440	0	0		0	1	1	2
		441	1	0		0	0	1	2
		442	34	31		12	22	10	109
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	Relations	440	0	0	1	0	2	0	3
		441	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
		442	43	39	23	21	27	8	161
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	Relations	440	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
		441	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
		442	65	70	54	50	23	7	269
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	Relations	440	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
		442	66	77	50	77	30	7	307
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	Relations	440	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		441	3	0	0	0	2	2	7
		442	91	67	86	113	113	43	513
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	Relations	440	0	2	3	2	3	2	12
		441	5	0	0	0	5	3	13
		442	299	284	213	273	215	75	1359
	Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix F Government

Case Processing Summary

Cases

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A - Government * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

A - Government * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper						Total
		30	31	32	33	38	39	
A – Government	120	21	6	15	40	20	7	109
	121	129	157	78	117	46	25	552
	122	0	0	1	0	2	1	4
	123	4	2	2	4	2	0	14
	124	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
	125	68	49	75	60	63	18	333
	126	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
	127	4	0	0	1	8	0	13
	128	35	38	28	30	44	26	201
	129	0	1	1	0	4	0	6
	132	24	15	10	19	29	2	99
	133	8	11	3	0	0	1	23
	134	3	2	0	0	1	0	6
	135	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

	136	1	2	2	0	0	0	5
	137	4	2	1	2	0	0	9
	138	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	237.523 ^a	85	.000
Likelihood Ratio	242.896	85	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.205	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 77 cells (71.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.414	.000
	Cramer's V	.185	.000
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A - Government * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

A - Government * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year		Newspaper						Total	
		30	31	32	33	38	39		
2014	A - Government	120	2	1		1	3	1	8
		121	15	23		8	7	4	57
		125	5	7		1	3	3	19
		127	1	0		0	1	0	2
		128	8	0		2	9	4	23
		132	3	0		0	0	0	3
		136	1	0		0	0	0	1
		Total	35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	A - Government	120	9	1	2	4	2	0	18
		121	14	26	14	14	4	2	74
		123	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		125	5	1	4	2	10	6	28
		128	14	7	4	1	8	0	34
		129	0	0	0	0	4	0	4
		132	0	2	0	0	2	0	4
		133	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	44	39	24	21	30	8	166		
2016	A - Government	120	6	1	1	3	6	0	17
		121	40	47	16	33	6	2	144
		123	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		125	13	9	27	11	8	1	69
		127	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		128	6	11	9	4	3	4	37
		129	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
		132	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
133	0	1	0	0	0	0	1		

		134	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	A - Government	120	2	1	6	12	6	0	27
		121	33	41	16	35	4	4	133
		123	1	2	0	1	0	0	4
		124	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		125	25	13	16	16	9	1	80
		128	3	12	9	12	9	2	47
		132	2	5	1	1	2	0	11
		133	0	1	2	0	0	1	4
		134	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		136	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	A - Government	120	2	2	6	20	3	6	39
		121	27	20	32	27	25	13	144
		122	0	0	1	0	2	1	4
		123	1	0	1	3	2	0	7
		124	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		125	20	19	28	30	33	7	137
		126	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
		127	3	0	0	1	6	0	10
		128	4	8	6	11	15	16	60
		132	19	8	9	18	24	2	80
		133	8	7	1	0	0	0	16
		134	3	0	0	0	1	0	4
		135	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
		136	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
		137	4	2	1	2	0	0	9
		138	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	A - Government	120	21	6	15	40	20	7	109
		121	129	157	78	117	46	25	552
		122	0	0	1	0	2	1	4
		123	4	2	2	4	2	0	14
		124	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
		125	68	49	75	60	63	18	333
		126	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
		127	4	0	0	1	8	0	13

128	35	38	28	30	44	26	201
129	0	1	1	0	4	0	6
132	24	15	10	19	29	2	99
133	8	11	3	0	0	1	23
134	3	2	0	0	1	0	6
135	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
136	1	2	2	0	0	0	5
137	4	2	1	2	0	0	9
138	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix G Company

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A-Company * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

A-Company * Newspaper Crosstabulation

			Newspaper						
			30	31	32	33	38	39	Total
A-Company	101	Count	59	55	38	58	30	9	249
		Expected Count	54.7	51.5	38.9	49.5	40.1	14.4	249.0
	102	Count	19	18	25	30	12	2	106
		Expected Count	23.3	21.9	16.5	21.1	17.1	6.1	106.0
	103	Count	6	0	0	7	10	1	24
		Expected Count	5.3	5.0	3.7	4.8	3.9	1.4	24.0
	104	Count	9	12	7	3	1	0	32
		Expected Count	7.0	6.6	5.0	6.4	5.2	1.8	32.0
	105	Count	4	1	3	4	6	2	20
		Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0
	106	Count	4	7	6	7	2	4	30
		Expected Count	6.6	6.2	4.7	6.0	4.8	1.7	30.0
	107	Count	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
		Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0
	108	Count	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
		Expected Count	.7	.6	.5	.6	.5	.2	3.0
	109	Count	42	68	35	34	21	8	208
		Expected Count	45.7	43.0	32.5	41.3	33.5	12.0	208.0
110	Count	5	4	0	4	26	2	41	
	Expected Count	9.0	8.5	6.4	8.1	6.6	2.4	41.0	
111	Count	50	58	46	53	77	20	304	
	Expected Count	66.8	62.8	47.4	60.4	49.0	17.6	304.0	
112	Count	11	3	2	1	20	4	41	
	Expected Count	9.0	8.5	6.4	8.1	6.6	2.4	41.0	
113	Count	74	51	45	61	14	3	248	
	Expected Count	54.5	51.2	38.7	49.3	40.0	14.3	248.0	
114	Count	1	3	0	0	1	0	5	
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0	
115	Count	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	
	Expected Count	.7	.6	.5	.6	.5	.2	3.0	
116	Count	18	3	6	2	0	24	53	
	Expected Count	11.6	11.0	8.3	10.5	8.5	3.1	53.0	
117	Count	0	1	2	4	0	0	7	
	Expected Count	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.1	.4	7.0	
118	Count	1	0	1	6	0	0	8	
	Expected Count	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.6	1.3	.5	8.0	
Total	Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384	
	Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	477.794 ^a	85	.000
Likelihood Ratio	397.942	85	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.704	1	.017
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 55 cells (50.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.588	.000
	Cramer's V	.263	.000
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A-Company * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

A-Company * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year			Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
2014	A-Company	101	8	4		1	2	4	19
		102	0	2		3	1	1	7
		103	0	0		1	0	0	1
		104	0	2		0	0	0	2
		105	1	0		2	3	0	6
		106	0	0		0	1	0	1
		108	1	0		0	0	0	1
		109	2	13		0	5	3	23
		110	1	0		0	1	0	2
		111	8	6		1	7	3	25
		112	1	2		0	3	1	7
		113	3	2		4	0	0	9
		116	10	0		0	0	0	10
			Total		35	31		12	23
2015	A-Company	101	10	14	4	7	3	2	40
		102	9	6	3	4	2	0	24
		103	3	0	0	2	0	0	5
		104	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		105	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
		106	1	1	3	1	0	1	7
		107	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		109	7	4	3	1	6	1	22
		110	1	0	0	0	4	1	6
		111	5	7	6	2	8	2	30
		112	0	1	1	0	6	0	8
		113	4	3	2	3	0	0	12
		116	3	1	1	0	0	1	6
		118	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	A-Company	101	19	16	12	17	8	1	73
		102	5	1	5	5	2	0	18
		103	3	0	0	2	0	0	5
		104	2	2	5	1	0	0	10
		106	1	4	2	4	0	0	11

		108	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		109	10	19	11	9	1	0	50
		110	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		111	7	17	13	4	9	1	51
		112	7	0	1	0	5	1	14
		113	5	8	6	7	0	0	26
		114	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		116	5	0	0	0	0	4	9
		117	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		118	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	A-Company	101	15	14	12	18	4	1	64
		102	4	5	8	13	1	0	31
		103	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
		104	3	4	0	0	0	0	7
		105	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
		106	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
		109	15	26	3	11	3	0	58
		110	0	0	0	0	9	0	9
		111	11	11	12	10	8	3	55
		112	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
		113	14	13	14	17	1	0	59
		114	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
		116	0	1	2	1	0	4	8
		117	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
		118	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	A-Company	101	7	7	10	15	13	1	53
		102	1	4	9	5	6	1	26
		103	0	0	0	1	7	1	9
		104	4	2	2	2	1	0	11
		105	1	0	2	1	3	2	9
		106	1	1	1	1	1	3	8
		107	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		109	8	6	18	13	6	4	55
		110	2	4	0	3	12	1	22
		111	19	17	15	36	45	11	143
		112	2	0	0	0	5	2	9

		113	48	25	23	30	13	3	142
		114	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
		115	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
		116	0	1	3	1	0	15	20
		117	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
		118	1	0	1	3	0	0	5
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	A-Company	101	59	55	38	58	30	9	249
		102	19	18	25	30	12	2	106
		103	6	0	0	7	10	1	24
		104	9	12	7	3	1	0	32
		105	4	1	3	4	6	2	20
		106	4	7	6	7	2	4	30
		107	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
		108	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
		109	42	68	35	34	21	8	208
		110	5	4	0	4	26	2	41
		111	50	58	46	53	77	20	304
		112	11	3	2	1	20	4	41
		113	74	51	45	61	14	3	248
		114	1	3	0	0	1	0	5
		115	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
		116	18	3	6	2	0	24	53
		117	0	1	2	4	0	0	7
		118	1	0	1	6	0	0	8
	Total		304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix H People

Case Processing Summary

		Cases					
		Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	
<hr/>							

A-People * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%
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A-People * Newspaper Crosstabulation

			Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
A-People	132	Count	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0
138	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0
169	Count	44	46	38	57	28	5	218	
	Expected Count	47.9	45.0	34.0	43.3	35.1	12.6	218.0	
170	Count	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	
	Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0	
171	Count	1	0	1	0	3	0	5	
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0	
173	Count	10	0	0	2	2	17	31	
	Expected Count	6.8	6.4	4.8	6.2	5.0	1.8	31.0	
174	Count	0	1	2	1	0	0	4	
	Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0	
175	Count	3	5	3	6	10	0	27	
	Expected Count	5.9	5.6	4.2	5.4	4.4	1.6	27.0	
176	Count	13	21	7	10	11	2	64	
	Expected Count	14.1	13.2	10.0	12.7	10.3	3.7	64.0	
177	Count	93	129	70	98	22	17	429	
	Expected Count	94.2	88.7	67.0	85.2	69.1	24.8	429.0	
178	Count	14	5	12	25	15	5	76	
	Expected Count	16.7	15.7	11.9	15.1	12.2	4.4	76.0	
179	Count	43	20	47	36	65	12	223	
	Expected Count	49.0	46.1	34.8	44.3	35.9	12.9	223.0	
180	Count	17	27	17	11	4	10	86	
	Expected Count	18.9	17.8	13.4	17.1	13.9	5.0	86.0	
181	Count	12	1	0	0	28	3	44	
	Expected Count	9.7	9.1	6.9	8.7	7.1	2.5	44.0	
182	Count	7	6	5	5	2	6	31	
	Expected Count	6.8	6.4	4.8	6.2	5.0	1.8	31.0	
183	Count	20	4	10	13	17	0	64	
	Expected Count	14.1	13.2	10.0	12.7	10.3	3.7	64.0	
184	Count	0	0	1	1	1	2	5	
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0	
185	Count	0	0	0	1	3	0	4	
	Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0	
187	Count	2	2	0	0	1	0	5	
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0	
188	Count	2	5	0	1	3	0	11	
	Expected Count	2.4	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.8	.6	11.0	
189	Count	3	1	1	3	6	0	14	
	Expected Count	3.1	2.9	2.2	2.8	2.3	.8	14.0	
190	Count	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	
	Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0	
191	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	
	Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0	
192	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
193	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
194	Count	1	2	1	0	0	0	4	
	Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0	
195	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
196	Count	4	6	0	0	0	0	10	
	Expected Count	2.2	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.6	.6	10.0	
197	Count	6	4	1	2	0	0	13	
	Expected Count	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.1	.8	13.0	
198	Count	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
	Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0	
199	Count	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0	
Total	Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384	
	Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	552.345 ^a	150	.000
Likelihood Ratio	488.591	150	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.511	1	.475
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 134 cells (72.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.632	.000
	Cramer's V	.283	.000
N of Valid Cases		1384	

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
A-People * Newspaper *	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%
Year						

A-People * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year	A-People		Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
2014	A-People	169	8	3		5	7	2	25
		170	1	0		0	0	0	1
		171	1	0		0	1	0	2
		173	4	0		0	0	3	7
		174	0	0		1	0	0	1
		175	2	0		0	0	0	2
		176	1	0		0	0	1	2
		177	6	24		4	2	1	37
		178	2	1		0	2	0	5
		179	3	2		0	8	3	16
		180	2	1		0	0	1	4
		181	1	0		0	3	1	5
		182	0	0		2	0	0	2
		183	2	0		0	0	0	2
		188	1	0		0	0	0	1
194	1	0		0	0	0	1		
	Total		35	31		12	23	12	113
2015	A-People	169	16	10	8	7	2	1	44
		173	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
		174	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		175	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		176	2	2	1	2	1	0	8

		177	4	21	7	6	5	1	44
		178	2	0	1	3	1	0	7
		179	7	1	3	1	9	4	25
		180	0	0	3	0	0	1	4
		181	3	0	0	0	9	0	12
		182	2	3	1	2	2	1	11
		183	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
		190	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		192	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	A-People	169	7	17	8	10	3	0	45
		173	1	0	0	1	1	1	4
		175	0	1	2	1	2	0	6
		176	6	4	1	2	1	0	14
		177	29	34	19	26	2	1	111
		178	5	1	1	1	4	0	12
		179	2	4	18	6	7	0	37
		180	4	8	5	3	0	2	22
		181	7	1	0	0	3	0	11
		182	3	0	0	0	0	3	6
		183	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		184	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
		185	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		187	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		193	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	A-People	169	5	11	7	19	3	1	46
		171	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		173	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
		174	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		175	0	2	1	1	5	0	9
		176	0	8	4	1	3	0	16
		177	33	30	16	33	2	1	115
		178	1	1	5	9	1	0	17
		179	17	3	12	9	10	1	52
		180	4	15	2	4	1	0	26
		181	1	0	0	0	3	1	5
		182	2	2	1	0	0	1	6

		183	1	2	1	0	2	0	6
		189	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
		194	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		195	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		66	77	51	78	30	8	310
2018	A-People	169	8	5	15	16	13	1	58
		170	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		171	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
		173	0	0	0	0	1	10	11
		174	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		175	0	2	0	4	3	0	9
		176	4	7	1	5	6	1	24
		177	21	20	28	29	11	13	122
		178	4	2	5	12	7	5	35
		179	14	10	14	20	31	4	93
		180	7	3	7	4	3	6	30
		181	0	0	0	0	10	1	11
		182	0	1	3	2	0	1	7
		183	18	1	9	13	13	0	54
		184	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
		185	0	0	0	1	2	0	3
		187	2	1	0	0	1	0	4
		188	1	5	0	1	3	0	10
		189	2	0	1	2	6	0	11
		190	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
		191	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
		194	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		196	4	6	0	0	0	0	10
		197	6	4	1	2	0	0	13
		198	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
		199	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	A-People	169	44	46	38	57	28	5	218
		170	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		171	1	0	1	0	3	0	5
		173	10	0	0	2	2	17	31
		174	0	1	2	1	0	0	4
		175	3	5	3	6	10	0	27

176	13	21	7	10	11	2	64
177	93	129	70	98	22	17	429
178	14	5	12	25	15	5	76
179	43	20	47	36	65	12	223
180	17	27	17	11	4	10	86
181	12	1	0	0	28	3	44
182	7	6	5	6	2	6	32
183	21	4	10	13	17	0	65
184	0	0	1	1	1	2	5
185	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
187	2	2	0	0	1	0	5
188	2	5	0	1	3	0	11
189	3	1	1	3	6	0	14
190	3	0	0	0	1	0	4
191	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
192	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
193	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
194	1	2	1	0	0	0	4
195	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
196	4	6	0	0	0	0	10
197	6	4	1	2	0	0	13
198	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
199	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix I Activities

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ac-NP Country * Newspaper	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Ac-NP Country * Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper						Total	
		30	31	32	33	38	39		
Ac-NP Country	248	Count	3	5	7	7	0	0	22
		Expected Count	4.8	4.5	3.4	4.4	3.5	1.3	22.0
	249	Count	2	5	4	5	0	0	16
		Expected Count	3.5	3.3	2.5	3.2	2.6	.9	16.0
	250	Count	28	25	31	30	15	10	139
		Expected Count	30.5	28.7	21.7	27.6	22.4	8.0	139.0
	251	Count	13	26	13	8	3	0	63
		Expected Count	13.8	13.0	9.8	12.5	10.2	3.6	63.0
	252	Count	7	6	1	1	1	1	17
		Expected Count	3.7	3.5	2.7	3.4	2.7	1.0	17.0
	253	Count	0	2	3	3	12	0	20
		Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0
	254	Count	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
		Expected Count	.7	.6	.5	.6	.5	.2	3.0
	255	Count	1	0	2	2	1	1	7
		Expected Count	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.1	.4	7.0
	256	Count	13	0	0	6	0	1	20
		Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0
	257	Count	5	2	0	3	3	0	13
		Expected Count	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.1	.8	13.0
	258	Count	8	11	25	31	7	4	86
		Expected Count	18.9	17.8	13.4	17.1	13.9	5.0	86.0
	259	Count	4	1	7	9	14	1	36
		Expected Count	7.9	7.4	5.6	7.2	5.8	2.1	36.0
	260	Count	2	3	2	3	5	5	20
		Expected Count	4.4	4.1	3.1	4.0	3.2	1.2	20.0
	261	Count	3	3	0	0	3	0	9
		Expected Count	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.5	.5	9.0
	262	Count	5	6	6	2	4	0	23
		Expected Count	5.1	4.8	3.6	4.6	3.7	1.3	23.0
	263	Count	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
		Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0
	265	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0

266	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0
267	Count	5	0	0	2	0	4	11
	Expected Count	2.4	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.8	.6	11.0
268	Count	3	2	0	1	0	1	7
	Expected Count	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.1	.4	7.0
269	Count	9	5	0	6	0	1	21
	Expected Count	4.6	4.3	3.3	4.2	3.4	1.2	21.0
270	Count	0	1	0	0	1	2	4
	Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.8	.6	.2	4.0
271	Count	1	5	1	1	1	4	13
	Expected Count	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.1	.8	13.0
272	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.1	1.0
273	Count	3	2	0	0	2	0	7
	Expected Count	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.1	.4	7.0
274	Count	2	2	5	11	3	0	23
	Expected Count	5.1	4.8	3.6	4.6	3.7	1.3	23.0
275	Count	4	1	3	3	8	0	19
	Expected Count	4.2	3.9	3.0	3.8	3.1	1.1	19.0
276	Count	3	10	0	0	1	0	14
	Expected Count	3.1	2.9	2.2	2.8	2.3	.8	14.0
277	Count	16	12	3	8	1	0	40
	Expected Count	8.8	8.3	6.2	7.9	6.4	2.3	40.0
278	Count	12	13	2	4	3	4	38
	Expected Count	8.3	7.9	5.9	7.6	6.1	2.2	38.0
279	Count	18	9	10	25	6	1	69
	Expected Count	15.2	14.3	10.8	13.7	11.1	4.0	69.0
280	Count	46	41	36	47	101	9	280
	Expected Count	61.5	57.9	43.7	55.6	45.1	16.2	280.0
281	Count	1	2	2	0	3	0	8
	Expected Count	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.6	1.3	.5	8.0
282	Count	2	13	10	13	14	7	59
	Expected Count	13.0	12.2	9.2	11.7	9.5	3.4	59.0
283	Count	1	2	6	1	1	0	11
	Expected Count	2.4	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.8	.6	11.0
284	Count	0	1	14	12	1	1	29
	Expected Count	6.4	6.0	4.5	5.8	4.7	1.7	29.0

285	Count	2	4	2	0	0	0	8
	Expected Count	1.8	1.7	1.2	1.6	1.3	.5	8.0
286	Count	0	0	0	0	5	1	6
	Expected Count	1.3	1.2	.9	1.2	1.0	.3	6.0
287	Count	11	8	0	0	0	4	23
	Expected Count	5.1	4.8	3.6	4.6	3.7	1.3	23.0
288	Count	0	1	1	2	0	1	5
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0
289	Count	2	1	4	2	0	0	9
	Expected Count	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.5	.5	9.0
290	Count	43	30	9	9	0	1	92
	Expected Count	20.2	19.0	14.4	18.3	14.8	5.3	92.0
291	Count	4	6	0	6	0	6	22
	Expected Count	4.8	4.5	3.4	4.4	3.5	1.3	22.0
292	Count	3	2	2	2	0	3	12
	Expected Count	2.6	2.5	1.9	2.4	1.9	.7	12.0
293	Count	3	0	0	1	0	1	5
	Expected Count	1.1	1.0	.8	1.0	.8	.3	5.0
294	Count	1	5	1	1	0	5	13
	Expected Count	2.9	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.1	.8	13.0
295	Count	10	6	0	5	0	0	21
	Expected Count	4.6	4.3	3.3	4.2	3.4	1.2	21.0
296	Count	1	1	4	3	0	0	9
	Expected Count	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.5	.5	9.0
297	Count	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
	Expected Count	.7	.6	.5	.6	.5	.2	3.0
298	Count	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
	Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.4	.3	.1	2.0
Total	Count	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384
	Expected Count	304.0	286.0	216.0	275.0	223.0	80.0	1384.0

Chi-Square Tests

Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
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Pearson Chi-Square	825.540 ^a	245	.000
Likelihood Ratio	814.358	245	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.991
N of Valid Cases	1384		

a. 241 cells (80.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.772	.000
	Cramer's V	.345	.000

Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ac-NP Country * Newspaper * Year	1384	100.0%	0	0.0%	1384	100.0%

Ac-NP Country * Newspaper * Year Crosstabulation

Count

Year	Ac-NP Country		Newspaper					Total	
			30	31	32	33	38		39
2014	Ac-NP Country	248	0	0		2	0	0	2
		249	0	1		1	0	0	2
		250	4	3		1	1	1	10
		251	0	0		0	2	0	2
		252	3	0		0	0	0	3
		253	0	0		0	2	0	2
		257	0	0		1	0	0	1
		258	3	2		1	1	0	7
		259	0	0		0	6	0	6
		260	0	1		1	1	1	4
		261	0	1		0	0	0	1

	262	2	0		0	0	0	2	
	263	1	0		0	0	0	1	
	269	0	0		1	0	0	1	
	270	0	0		0	1	0	1	
	271	0	3		0	0	4	7	
	273	1	1		0	0	0	2	
	274	0	1		0	0	0	1	
	275	0	0		0	2	0	2	
	276	0	2		0	0	0	2	
	277	0	1		1	0	0	2	
	278	4	5		1	1	0	11	
	279	0	1		1	0	0	2	
	280	5	1		0	5	1	12	
	281	0	0		0	1	0	1	
	282	1	1		0	0	2	4	
	283	0	0		1	0	0	1	
	287	3	0		0	0	0	3	
	288	0	0		0	0	1	1	
	290	6	3		0	0	1	10	
	291	2	2		0	0	1	5	
	292	0	1		0	0	0	1	
	297	0	1		0	0	0	1	
	Total	35	31		12	23	12	113	
2015	Ac-NP Country	248	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		249	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
		250	2	2	2	2	6	2	16
		251	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
		252	0	1	0	0	1	1	3
		253	0	2	0	1	2	0	5
		254	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		255	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		256	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		257	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		258	2	2	2	1	2	0	9
		260	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
		261	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		262	1	1	2	0	1	0	5
		267	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

		269	4	1	0	1	0	0	6
		270	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		271	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		272	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		274	1	0	0	2	1	0	4
		275	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		276	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
		277	3	1	0	0	0	0	4
		278	2	3	1	3	1	0	10
		279	0	0	1	4	0	1	6
		280	6	3	2	0	10	0	21
		282	0	1	0	1	1	0	3
		283	0	1	2	0	1	0	4
		284	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
		285	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
		287	4	2	0	0	0	0	6
		289	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
		290	8	5	4	1	0	0	18
		291	2	2	0	0	0	1	5
		294	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
		295	3	2	0	1	0	0	6
		296	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		298	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		44	39	24	21	30	8	166
2016	Ac-NP Country	248	0	0	1	2	0	0	3
		249	0	1	1	0	0	0	2
		250	8	7	5	6	3	2	31
		251	0	5	4	2	1	0	12
		253	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		255	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
		256	7	0	0	1	0	0	8
		257	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		258	1	5	9	10	0	0	25
		259	1	1	2	1	3	0	8
		260	1	1	0	1	1	0	4
		261	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
		262	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
		263	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

	265	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	267	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	268	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	269	0	2	0	0	0	1	3
	270	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	271	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	273	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	274	1	1	3	3	1	0	9
	275	3	0	1	0	3	0	7
	276	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
	277	1	0	0	6	1	0	8
	278	4	2	0	0	1	1	8
	279	5	2	4	1	1	0	13
	280	2	5	10	1	6	0	24
	281	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	282	0	5	2	4	2	0	13
	283	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
	284	0	1	6	2	0	0	9
	285	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
	286	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	287	3	5	0	0	0	1	9
	288	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	289	1	0	1	1	0	0	3
	290	13	10	1	2	0	0	26
	291	0	2	0	1	0	0	3
	292	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
	293	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	294	1	3	0	1	0	0	5
	295	1	4	0	2	0	0	7
	296	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
	Total	65	71	55	51	25	7	274
2017	Ac-NP Country	248	0	0	3	0	0	3
		249	0	1	0	0	0	1
		250	4	7	7	11	1	31
		251	0	12	4	3	0	19
		252	1	2	1	1	0	5
		253	0	0	1	1	2	4
		254	0	0	0	0	1	1

	256	1	0	0	3	0	0	4	
	257	4	0	0	1	2	0	7	
	258	2	2	6	7	1	0	18	
	259	3	0	1	4	4	1	13	
	260	0	1	1	1	1	0	4	
	261	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
	262	2	2	2	0	0	0	6	
	263	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
	267	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	
	268	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	
	269	1	1	0	4	0	0	6	
	271	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	
	274	0	0	2	5	0	0	7	
	275	1	1	1	2	2	0	7	
	276	1	3	0	0	0	0	4	
	277	9	8	2	1	0	0	20	
	278	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	
	279	3	1	2	5	1	0	12	
	280	4	8	7	7	13	1	40	
	281	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	
	282	0	3	3	4	2	0	12	
	283	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	
	285	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
	287	1	1	0	0	0	2	4	
	288	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	
	289	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	
	290	14	11	4	5	0	0	34	
	291	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	
	292	2	1	2	0	0	2	7	
	293	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	
	294	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	
	295	4	0	0	1	0	0	5	
	296	0	1	0	2	0	0	3	
	297	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	298	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	
	Total	66	77	51	78	30	8	310	
2018	Ac-NP Country	248	3	5	3	2	0	0	13
		249	1	2	1	4	0	0	8

250	10	6	17	10	4	4	51
251	12	7	5	3	0	0	27
252	3	3	0	0	0	0	6
253	0	0	2	0	6	0	8
254	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
255	1	0	0	2	1	1	5
256	4	0	0	1	0	1	6
257	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
258	0	0	8	12	3	4	27
259	0	0	4	4	1	0	9
260	1	0	0	0	2	2	5
261	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
262	0	1	2	2	2	0	7
266	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
267	2	0	0	0	0	4	6
268	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
269	4	1	0	0	0	0	5
270	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
271	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
273	2	0	0	0	2	0	4
274	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
275	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
276	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
277	3	2	1	0	0	0	6
278	0	2	1	0	0	3	6
279	10	5	3	14	4	0	36
280	29	24	17	39	67	7	183
281	0	1	1	0	2	0	4
282	1	3	5	4	9	5	27
283	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
284	0	0	8	9	1	0	18
285	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
286	0	0	0	0	4	1	5
287	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
288	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
289	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
290	2	1	0	1	0	0	4
291	0	0	0	1	0	4	5

		292	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
		294	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
		295	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
		296	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
		297	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Total		94	68	86	113	115	45	521
Total	Ac-NP Country	248	3	5	7	7	0	0	22
		249	2	5	4	5	0	0	16
		250	28	25	31	30	15	10	139
		251	13	26	13	8	3	0	63
		252	7	6	1	1	1	1	17
		253	0	2	3	3	12	0	20
		254	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
		255	1	0	2	2	1	1	7
		256	13	0	0	6	0	1	20
		257	5	2	0	3	3	0	13
		258	8	11	25	31	7	4	86
		259	4	1	7	9	14	1	36
		260	2	3	2	3	5	5	20
		261	3	3	0	0	3	0	9
		262	5	6	6	2	4	0	23
		263	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
		265	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
		266	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		267	5	0	0	2	0	4	11
		268	3	2	0	1	0	1	7
		269	9	5	0	6	0	1	21
		270	0	1	0	0	1	2	4
		271	1	5	1	1	1	4	13
		272	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		273	3	2	0	0	2	0	7
		274	2	2	5	11	3	0	23
		275	4	1	3	3	8	0	19
		276	3	10	0	0	1	0	14
		277	16	12	3	8	1	0	40
		278	12	13	2	4	3	4	38
		279	18	9	10	25	6	1	69
		280	46	41	36	47	101	9	280

281	1	2	2	0	3	0	8
282	2	13	10	13	14	7	59
283	1	2	6	1	1	0	11
284	0	1	14	12	1	1	29
285	2	4	2	0	0	0	8
286	0	0	0	0	5	1	6
287	11	8	0	0	0	4	23
288	0	1	1	2	0	1	5
289	2	1	4	2	0	0	9
290	43	30	9	9	0	1	92
291	4	6	0	6	0	6	22
292	3	2	2	2	0	3	12
293	3	0	0	1	0	1	5
294	1	5	1	1	0	5	13
295	10	6	0	5	0	0	21
296	1	1	4	3	0	0	9
297	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
298	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Total	304	286	216	275	223	80	1384

Appendix J Ethics

Ethics ETH1819-0061: Mthulisi Mathuthu

Date Created	13 Feb 2019
Date Submitted	03 Apr 2019
Date of last resubmission	20 Mar 2020
Date forwarded to committee	04 Apr 2019
Date of committee meeting	01 Nov 2019
Researcher	Mthulisi Mathuthu
Student ID	
Category	Postgraduate research student
Supervisor	Ivana Ebel
Project	The media image of China in Africa: a frame analysis of Kenyan, Nigerian and Zimbabwean newspapers

College College of Arts, Humanities and Education
Current status Approved after further information provided

Ethics application

Initial screening

Does the project involve collecting and/or analysing primary or unpublished data from, or about, living human beings? Yes

Does it involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data about people who have recently died, other than data that is already in the public domain?

No

Does it involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data about or from organisations or agencies of any kind, other than data that are already in the public domain?

No

Does it involve research with non-human vertebrates in their natural settings or behavioural work involving invertebrate species not covered by the Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1993)? No

Does this project involve human participants? Yes

Background

Title of current research study

The media image of China Africa: a frame analysis of Kenyan, Nigerian and Zimbabwean newspapers

Has this research been funded by an external organisation (e.g. a research council or public sector body)? No

If yes, please provide the name of funder:

Has this research been funded internally (such as the RLTF fund)?

No

Have you submitted previous requests for ethical approval to the Committee that relate to this research project? No

Are other research partners involved in the proposed research?

No

If yes, please provide details

Should your research adhere to the British Psychology Society (BPS) code of ethics and conduct? No

Study

What is the aim of your study? What are the objectives for your study?

- To identify how the increasing presence of China in the African continent is perceived and portrayed in media.

To critically assess and analyse how the Chinese presence in the African continent is perceived by the media.

To critically analyse how African newspapers portray the Chinese presence in the continent.

- To discover the extent to which the African newspapers reflect or do not reflect Western perceptions about China presence in the continent.

Brief review of relevant literature and rationale for study

China's presence in Africa has been so pervasive that the digital magazine, *Diplomat*, in its February of 2011 edition, described it as "... arguably the most important development for the continent since the end of the Cold War". While president XI Jinping, in 2014, told guests at the 60th anniversary of the principles of co-existence that "China will remain a reliable friend and sincere partner of other developing countries" her expansion into Africa has sparked varying reactions, views and reports. Also, there have been clashes involving Africans and Chinese expatriates taking up opportunities opened by Beijing in the continent.

As Beijing shows signs of concern about her image, this project seeks to find out how the African online newspapers have reported on China. The media is often seen as a reflection of a society's political and economic realities and as paramount in the shaping of public thoughts (Flook, 2006). However, while many researchers have dwelt on the economic, political and trade aspects of China's presence in Africa few have examined how these have been portrayed in the media, particularly utilising comparisons between newspaper reports country by country showing how they have represented these deals.

Western perceptions widely project China as an imperialist, predatory, and an exploitative state undermining democracy in Africa. To others, China might behave similarly to former European colonial states. Because of the colonial connection between Africa and the West and continued economic and cultural dependency of Africa, most of the Western views are still influential.

As such, this thesis seeks to discover how the African media has, in the period between 2014 and 2018, reported on China focusing on the language, framing, and use of stereotypes. The study will, among other things, address the portrayal of Chinese aid, loans, investments, partnerships, and China as a global power. It will also examine how Chinese workers brought by Chinese firms into Africa are reported about. Even experts admit that “very little is known from the African perspective about the African media coverage of China’s involvement in the continent” (Nassanga and Makara, 2016). To contribute towards remedying this gap, the focus of this study will be on Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.

This thesis will contextualise the history of China’s contact with Africa and Beijing’s status and or place in world politics. This will also allow the analysis of Beijing’s specific relationships with the selected countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe) as well as the media landscape of those countries. How the African media has covered racism and ethnic minorities in the past will also be tackled with a focus on experts’ reflections (Mano, 2015). Africa’s historical connection with the West will also come into focus so as to capture the known stereotypes and perceptions. This background will help to understand and interpret news articles flow, ebb, and tone.

Outline of study design and methods

Rooted in qualitative research with frame analysis being the theoretical approach, the study will give a comprehensive scholarly account of how news media frame issues. The project will review the available literature analysing the works of framing theory scholars.

Also paramount to the research will be the works of China in Africa experts (Zhang et al., 2016) with a focus on their findings and suggestions. This will help to highlight gaps and leads to be exploited by this project.

However, the core of the thesis will involve content analysis of news articles from leading six select newspapers from five African countries namely Kenya (The Nation & The Standard), Nigeria (Vanguard & The Guardian) and Zimbabwe (Herald & NewsDay). All the newspapers are written in English. Also, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa; Kenya is the Africa capital of international developmental and charity organisations; Zimbabwe (this researcher’s country of origin)’s relationship with China has been seen to be undermining democracy.

China's involvement in Africa deepened in the last 20 years. This study will focus on the last five-year period to capture the latest trends and patterns. A shorter time frame also allows an increase in samples, as the online data basis do not reach further archives. A shorter timeframe will also widen the geographical space to be covered, as more information can be digitally retrieved from recent years without the need of a local investigation. The sample process will involve capturing data from the selected newspapers' websites using keywords. The articles will be captured from the websites and archived in PDF files in case the data bases go offline.

To complete the investigation, semi-structured expert interviews will be conducted with the editors of newspapers.

Please provide a detailed description of the study sample, covering recruitment, selection, number, age and if appropriate, inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Interviewees selected on the basis of them being editors of selected newspapers.

Are payments or rewards/incentives going to be made to the participants?

No

If yes, please provide details

Do you intend to give participant points for taking part in your study?

No

What resources will you require? Phone

References for any sources cited in the sections on rationale, methods etc.

Ethical considerations

Consent

A participant will be given a consent form and the interview will commence only if they consent and in accordance with the data protection act. See attached consent form.

Deception

I have read and fully understood the university rules and regulations and I undertake to adhere to them. I know of the implications and consequences of academic deceit.

Debriefing

All interviewees will be debriefed according to the law and university rules. They shall be made aware of their rights. See the attached debriefing sheet.

Withdrawal from the investigation

All interviews will be made aware of their right to withdraw from the project and without giving any reasons. They shall, however, be made aware that they can only do so within a stipulated time frame.

See attached forms.

Confidentiality

Protection of participants

If expert interviews were required, the participants will be requested to provide a written consent for publication. The anonymity will be guaranteed if requested by the editors, ensuring the narrative does not connect the specific editor to any story or newspaper, preventing the identification, if required.

Protection of participants

All the interviewees will not be named. See attached forms.

Observation research

NA

Giving advice

NA

Research undertaken in public places

NA

Data Protection (GDPR considerations)

All legal and ethical obligations for handlers of personal information about individuals will be observed and strictly adhered to in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. The researcher has read and understood his obligations as well as the rights of others.

Animal Rights

NA

Environmental protection

NA

Are there other ethical implications that are additional to this list?

No

If yes, please provide details

Have/do you intend to request ethical approval from any other body/organisation?

No

If yes, please provide details

Do you intend to publish your research? Yes

If yes, what are your publication plans?

I may write academic journal articles after submission. This will be determined by the outcome of the data analysis.

Have you secured access and permissions to use any resources that you may require? No

If yes, please provide details

NA

Have the activities associated with this research project been risk-assessed?

No

If yes, please provide details

Attachments

Cover letter/invitation to participants

Information sheet about your research study

Focus group questions

Self-completion questionnaire

Debriefing material

Location consent form

Psychometric scales

Interview questions/schedules

Informed consent forms for participants

Informed consent from other parties/organisations

Relevant testing materials

Other

The initial online data collection exercise will determine if interviews are necessary. This will also determine what questions to ask from the experts and or editors.

Kedleston Road, Derby
DE22 1GB, UK

T: +44 (0)1332 591060
E: researchoffice@derby.ac.uk
Sponsor License No: QGN14R294

Dear Mthulisi

Thank you for submitting your application to the College of Arts, Humanities and Education Research Ethics Committee, which has now been reviewed and considered.

The outcome of

your application

is: approved.

Feedback on your application is available [here](#).

If any changes to the study described in the application are necessary, you must notify the Committee and may be required to make a resubmission of the application.

Please note that ethical approval for this application is valid for 5 years

On behalf of the Committee, we wish you the best of luck with your study.

Yours sincerely

Jonathan O'Donnell

Appendix K Story Samples

CODE

ZW_HE_2014-01
ZW_HE_2014-03a03
ZW_HE_2014-03b03
ZW_HE_2014-04a04
ZW_HE_2014-04b04
ZW_HE_2014-05
ZW_HE_2014-06a06
ZW_HE_2014-06b06
ZW_HE_2014-08a08
ZW_HE_2014-08b08
ZW_HE_2014-08c08
ZW_HE_2014-08d08
ZW_HE_2014-08e08
ZW_HE_2014-08f08
ZW_HE_2014-08g08
ZW_HE_2014-09a09
ZW_HE_2014-09b09
ZW_HE_2014-09c09
ZW_HE_2014-11a11
ZW_HE_2014-11b11
ZW_HE_2014-11c11
ZW_HE_2014-12a12
ZW_HE_2014-12b12
ZW_HE_2015-01
ZW_HE_2015-02
ZW_HE_2015-03a03
ZW_HE_2015-03b03
ZW_HE_2015-08a08
ZW_HE_2015-08b08
ZW_HE_2015-08c08
ZW_HE_2015-08d08
ZW_HE_2015-09a09

ONLINE HEADLINE

China donates mobile solar units
China donates US \$500 000 for solar units
Chinese doctors offer free treatment
Chinese army donates to ZDF
Sino-Zim confident of meeting target
Chinese investment in Zim surges
China's silver lining for Zim tobacco farmers
China-Africa fund to acquire stake in Cottco
China Zim friendship built on mutual co-operation
Chinese delegation commends Zim tobacco
Chinese leader salutes president
City twins Chinese province
President meets Chinese counterpart
Zim China mull tobacco processing plant
Zim China signs nine mega deals
China has shamed the West: president
Chinese firm to fund Gwayi power project
Zim-China trade pacts benefit bus operators
China Cotton Africa fires senior managers
China Mega deal projects to start soon
Chinese man cleared
China's diplomacy wins global applause
China's good gesture
Charumbira villagers demands compensation before relocation
Sino-Zim cement cup launched
Africa-China ties-Beyond the money
China's long history in Africa
China experts meet VP Mnangagwa
Chinese mega projects to be launched by December
Sino-Zim to set up \$50m brick plant
Zim China millitary ties reaffirmed
Harare twins Guangzhou

ZW_HE_2015-09b09	Chinese man in \$20 million externalisation charge
ZW_HE_2015-09c09	Mandarin the language of the future
ZW_HE_2015-09d09	Sinosure pledges more cooperation with Zim
ZW_HE_2015-10	Zim-China in high level talks
ZW_HE_2015-11a11	China commends Zim students
ZW_HE_2015-11b11	China in Zimbabwe, Africa: past, present and future
ZW_HE_2015-11c11	Is China's role in Africa good for her?
ZW_HE_2015-11d11	President hails Sino-Zim ties
ZW_HE_2015-11e11	Sino-Africa and Sino-Zim ties: the present
ZW_HE_2015-11f11	Sino-Zim to start tile, brick-making
ZW_HE_2015-12a12	China could be a game changer in Zim
ZW_HE_2015-12b12	China defends policy
ZW_HE_2015-12c12	China largest investor in Africa
ZW_HE_2015-12d12	China could not rob us: president... Asian giant doing more
ZW_HE_2015-12e12	China, Zimbabwe's biblical Hiram
ZW_HE_2015-12f12	Chinamasa hails China mega deals
ZW_HE_2015-12g12	Chinese group acquires stake in Sunlight Energy
ZW_HE_2015-12h12	Huawei boosts ICT sector
ZW_HE_2015-12i12	Mega deals, Chinese banks to weigh in
ZW_HE_2015-12j12	Zim China ink 12 landmark deals
ZW_HE_2015-12k12	Zim, Chinese firm sign scholarship MOU
ZW_HE_2016-01a01	Chinese firm to set up agric demo centers
ZW_HE_2016-01b01	Zinwa, Chinese firm in Kunzvi Dam talks
ZW_HE_2016-03a03	China economic growth good for Zimbabwe
ZW_HE_2016-03b03	China raps western media coverage on Africa
ZW_HE_2016-03c03	Chinese firm to set up explosives project in Zimbabwe
ZW_HE_2016-03d03	Chung examines Look East policy
ZW_HE_2016-03e03	Follow laws, Chinese traditional medicine agents urged
ZW_HE_2016-03f03	Anjin Investments challenges shutdown
ZW_HE_2016-04	Fresh trial for jailed Chinese man
ZW_HE_2016-05	Sino-Zim relations for mutual benefit
ZW_HE_2016-06a06	Beitbridge-Harare highway dualisation timelines to be set
ZW_HE_2016-06b06	China contributes to Mali's peace
ZW_HE_2016-06c06	China envoy meets president on deals
ZW_HE_2016-06d06	Unpacking China's \$4bn Zim investment
ZW_HE_2016-07a07	Africa, begging with a golden bowl
ZW_HE_2016-07b07	Zim Sino-Hydro sign \$600m deal
ZW_HE_2016-08	China hands over children's home
ZW_HE_2016-10a10	Chinese national fined for selling Zim flags
ZW_HE_2016-10b10	Exploring the China-Africa Development Fund
ZW_HE_2016-11a11	Zim among China's top 18 targets
ZW_HE_2016-11b11	Zim-China trade to reach \$1bn mark
ZW_HE_2016-12a12	China donates cervical cancer equipment
ZW_HE_2016-12b12	How China became the darling of Africa

ZW_HE_2016-12c12	Unpacking the Beijing Consensus
ZW_HE_2016-12d12	Zim-China Wanjin joint venture bears fruit
ZW_HE_2017-01a01	Special economic zones: Zimbabwe on the money
ZW_HE_2017-01b01	Zim exports 35 jumbos to China
ZW_HE_2017-01c01	Zim eyes Chinese markets for farm products
ZW_HE_2017-01d01	Zim, China joint ventures set to expand: president
ZW_HE_2017-02a02	Africa reaps benefits of close ties with China
ZW_HE_2017-02b02	Big boost for Kariba South project
ZW_HE_2017-02c02	Boosting China-Africa media cooperation
ZW_HE_2017-02d02	Sino Hydro to get 36pct in Hwange power project
ZW_HE_2017-03a03	China donates \$1m to flood victims
ZW_HE_2017-03b03	China, the Asian giant that thrives on unity of purpose
ZW_HE_2017-03c03	The truth about Chinese eating habits
ZW_HE_2017-04a04	China donates \$60k food food
ZW_HE_2017-04b04	China hands over \$1m in humanitarian assistance
ZW_HE_2017-05a05	Chinese firm to set up assembly plant in Zimbabwe
ZW_HE_2017-05b05	Chinese provinces to explore investment opportunities in Zim
ZW_HE_2017-06a06	Chinese keen to end poverty in Africa
ZW_HE_2017-06b06	Economic development lessons from Xi's book
ZW_HE_2017-07a07	China's involvement in Africa understated
ZW_HE_2017-07b07	China: the imperialist people's republic of Africa?
ZW_HE_2017-07c07	Utilise Chinese ties, companies told
ZW_HE_2017-08a08	Chinese leaving Africa? If true, no need for concern-commentary
ZW_HE_2017-08b08	Media key in China-Africa cooperation
ZW_HE_2017-08c08	Why China brings jobs to Africa
ZW_HE_2017-08d08	President Mugabe sends off 49 students to China
ZW_HE_2017-09	What is China's game in Africa?
ZW_HE_2017-10a10	Chinese officials to explore chrome smelting opportunities
ZW_HE_2017-10b10	Chinese partnerships for rural transformation
ZW_HE_2017-10c10	Khaya Moyo meets Chinese envoy
ZW_HE_2017-12a12	China extends \$213 m loan facility for three projects
ZW_HE_2017-12b12	China hands over school worth \$2 million
ZW_HE_2018-01a01	Chinese spring festival set for Harare
ZW_HE_2018-01b01	President to visit China
ZW_HE_2018-01c01	Sino-Zim relations to benefit from CPC, ZANU PF rejuvenation
ZW_HE_2018-01d01	Tanzania hails China ivory ban
ZW_HE_2018-01e01	Chinese envoy pays courtesy call on VP Chiwenga
ZW_HE_2018-02	China's first African Silk Road
ZW_HE_2018-03a03	Top Construction firm head to Zimbabwe
ZW_HE_2018-03b03	Chinese firms seek clearance on externalisation
ZW_HE_2018-03c03	Local firms invited to China
ZW_HE_2018-03d03	President names, shames looters
ZW_HE_2018-04a04	Busy schedule for President
ZW_HE_2018-04b04	China congratulates Zimbabwe

ZW_HE_2018-04c04	China drives tobacco exports
ZW_HE_2018-04d04	China-Zim scholarships transform lives
ZW_HE_2018-04e04	Chinese company to build \$7 billion tourism city
ZW_HE_2018-04f04	Chinese delegation gets down to business
ZW_HE_2018-04g04	Chinese delegation jets in for \$1, 2 billion deal
ZW_HE_2018-04h04	Chinese firm, General Electric in talks over Batoka
ZW_HE_2018-04i04	Chinese delegation jets in
ZW_HE_2018-04J04	
ZW_HE_2018-04k04	

Appendix L Codebook

Identification

This category is broken into four subcategories namely year, month, country of publication and newspapers. According to Churchill (2013) and Saldaña (2016), subcategories are a good method of refining some data. The category identifies and codes the dates of publication, the names of the publications and countries of publication. Therefore, these codes (dates of publication and months, newspaper names) capture and represent precisely what their names mean and the research timespan. Chapter 3 justified the selection of the time frame (2014-2018) hence these categories and codes. The purpose and use of these codes are straightforward. For example, under the year column a researcher would enter 2014.

Year

2014 - 2014

2015 - 2015

2016 - 2016

2017 - 2017

2018 – 2018

Month

1-Jan

2-Feb

3-March

4-April

5-May

6-June

7-July

8-August

9-Sep

10-Oct

11-Nov

12-Dec

Country of publication

20 Kenya

21 Nigeria

22 South Africa

23 Zambia

24 Zimbabwe

Newspapers

30 *Daily Nation*

31 *The Standard*

32 *The Guardian*

33 *Vanguard*

34 *Mail and Guardian*

35 *Independent Online*

36 *Daily Mail*

37 *Zambian Watchdog*

38 *The Herald*

39 *NewsDay*

Journalistic Aspects

This category is refined into two subcategories namely the journalistic style and the main subject area of coverage.

Journalistic Styles

This subcategory differentiates between the varying types of reportage. For example, news reports “tend to have a more formal, neutral tone” while feature articles “explore the issues raised by news stories in more depth ... taking a personal point of view” (BBC, n.d., p. 1). As such, the aim of this category is to facilitate the analysis of the balance between different kinds of news reporting.

50 Factual oriented articles (reports, breaking news)

Code	Factual (50)
Brief Description	Factual Oriented Articles

Full Description	Factual hard news stories that consist of the “familiar” five W’s and one H: who, what, when, where, why and how (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 60) and show a “formal, neutral tone” (See BBC, n.d.)
When to use this Code	Apply this code to all factual, hard news stories showing what happened, where, when, who was involved, why and how and are unbiased (See BBC, n.d.)
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories that are not factual, do not consist of the five Ws and one H and are biased and informal
Example	There was drama yesterday when the minister of finance Trevor Manuel was assaulted by MPs as he was presenting his budget statement in Parliament

51 Hybrid Forms (reportages, features, profiles)

Code	Features (51)
Brief Description	Feature news articles, profiles
Full Description	Feature articles which “explore the issues raised by news stories in more depth ... taking a personal point of view” (BBC, n.d., p. 1) as well as profiles of people, companies and organisations
When to use this Code	Apply this code to feature news articles, profiles of individuals, groups of people, countries, companies, and organisations
When not to use	Do not use this code on any other type of news articles that are not features, profiles
Example	China is a big Asian country inhabited by billions of people

52 Opinion (editorials, speech, commentaries, critiques, columns & essays)

Code	Opinion (52)
Brief Description	Opinion articles
Full Description	Opinion articles such as editorial comments, critiques, readers' right to reply, columns, speeches, and essays
When to use this Code	Use this code on editorial comments, critiques, columns, speeches and essays and other opinion pieces
When not to use	Do not use this code on articles that are not opinion pieces
Example	I am convinced that the government is clueless

53 Interviews

Code	Interviews (53)
Brief Description	Q& A interview-based articles
Full Description	Wholly Question and Answer interview articles
When to use this Code	Apply this code on Question & Answer interviews
When not to use	Never use on articles that are not Question & Answer interviews
Example	Question: When was your Company formed? Answer: 1978

54 Other

Code	Other
Brief Description	Other stories
Full Description	Any other type of an article deemed relevant (For relevance criteria see Chapter 1 & 3) but is not part of the coded styles
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles deemed relevant but are not part of the coded styles

When not to use	Never use on articles are not relevant to the study whether part or not part of the coded styles
Example	10 facts about China

Main subjects of coverage

According to Saldaña (2016), a code can “summarize, distil or condense” data (Saldaña, 2016, p. 5). As such, this category captures and codes the precise aspects and sectors that reflect China’s involvement in Africa in condensed form but in a way that reflects China in Africa. According to Dijk (2009) (See Chapter 1), China in Africa means companies, Chinese people, commercial and developmental activities undertaken by the Chinese within Africa and political activities in international affairs about China and Africa. As such, it was necessary to code these specific sectors and indicators of involvement. These will be further distilled down the line through categories, activities.

61 Foreign Policy, Defence, and International Affairs

Code	Foreign Policy (61)
Brief Description	Stories on international engagements
Full Description	Stories on foreign and international affairs and engagements including defence and diplomacy
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories to do with foreign and international affairs and engagements including defence and diplomacy
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories that are not about foreign and international affairs and engagements, defence and diplomacy
Example	The African foreign affairs ministers are gathered in Beijing for a two-week conference

62 Environment, Wildlife, Water, land

Code	Environment (62)
Brief Description	Environmental stories
Full Description	Articles about environmental issues including water, land, and wildlife
When to use this Code	Use this code on all articles that are about the environment, water, land, and the wildlife
When not to use	Never apply this code on articles that deal with the criminal matters; (See 69).
Example	The Chinese firm yesterday reiterated its commitment to the protection of the environment.

63 Economy, Trade, Investment & Finance

Code	Economy (63)
Brief Description	Articles on economic issues
Full Description	Articles on economic investment, trade, and finance
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories whose main focuses are economic investment, trade, and finance
When not to use	Do not apply this code on articles whose main focuses are not economic investment, trade, and finance
Example	A Chinese firm yesterday said it was investing \$1bn in shoe manufacturing

64 Domestic policy and Social & Social Order, Immigration

Code	Domestic policy (64)
Brief Description	Articles on domestic affairs and order
Full Description	Articles on the country's internal activities and peace and social order maintenance

When to use this Code	Use this code on articles to do with the domestic affairs, peace, and social order maintenance
When not to use	Do not apply this code on articles that are not about the domestic affairs, peace, and social order maintenance
Example	The minister said the police will be on high alert during the festive season

65 Media

Code	Media (65)
Brief Description	Articles on the media
Full Description	Apply this on articles to do with the media activities
When to use this Code	Apply on articles to do with publishing and broadcasting through print, online and airwaves
When not to use	Do no use where the main subject is not media activities
Example	A Chinese media company opening a base in Kenya

66 Culture, arts & society, sports

Code	Culture (66)
Brief Description	Articles on cultural affairs
Full Description	Articles on cultural affairs, sports, arts, and other recreational activities
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles to do with cultural affairs, sports, arts, and other recreational activities
When not to use	Never use this code on articles that have nothing to do with culture, arts, and other recreational activities
Example	The Chinese embassy yesterday said it will this year be sponsoring a universities arts festival

67 Education, Skills, and Technology

Code	Education (67)
Brief Description	Stories on education and training
Full Description	Articles on education, skills transfer and development and technological training
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories that deal with education, skills transfer, and technological training
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories that have nothing to do with education, skills development, and technological training
Example	The Chinese embassy this week organised a training workshop for computer science high school teachers

68 Celebrity, Style, and Gossip

Code	Celebrity (68)
Brief Description	Celebrity and gossip news
Full Description	Articles on celebrities, lifestyle, and showbiz gossip
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles focusing on celebrities, lifestyles, and showbiz gossip
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories not focusing on celebrities, lifestyles, and showbiz gossip
Example	The popular Chinese musician was in Zimbabwe to promote his latest album

69 Crime, corruption & Delinquency

Code	Crime (69)
Brief Description	Articles to do with crime, corruption, and delinquency
Full Description	Articles in which crime, corruption and or delinquent conduct across the social spectrum are the main subjects
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which criminal, corrupt and delinquent conduct across the social spectrum are the main subjects
When not to use	Do not use this code on articles that are not about crime, corruption, and delinquency
Example	Police yesterday said they were investigating reports of smuggling against the department of customs

70 Disasters, Health & Accidents

Code	Health (70)
Brief Description	Articles to do with health matters
Full Description	Articles in which with health, the well-being of the members of the community, accidents, and disasters are the main subjects
When to use this code	Use this code on articles in which health, the well-being of the members of the community, accidents, and disasters are the main subject
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories that have nothing to do with the health and well-being of the community members, accidents, and disasters. For stories on donations, see 73
Example	The government said it was testing all the medicine from China to protect Nigerians from harmful substandard products

71 General

Code	General (71)
Brief Description	General stories
Full Description	Stories that generalise about China's involvement in Africa but are difficult to place in any of the coded specific categories.
When to use this Code	Apply this code on stories that generalise about China's involvement in Africa but are difficult to place in any one of the coded specific categories or codes
When not to use	Never apply on stories that are straightforward and can be placed in specific categories
Example	He said China is not bad for Africa

72 Other

Code	Other (72)
Brief Description	Other relevant stories
Full Description	Any other stories than can be deemed relevant (for relevance criteria see Chapter 3) but cannot be placed in any of the specific codes.
When to use this Code	Use this on any relevant story but which cannot be placed in any of the specific codes.
When not to use	Do not use on stories that are not relevant; and on stories which can be specifically coded
Example	

73 Philanthropy

Code	Philanthropy (73)
Brief Description	Articles of philanthropic work

Full Description	Articles on aid (food, goods), charity and donations
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles in which aid, charity, and donations are the main subject
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories in which philanthropic activities like aid and donations are not the main subject
Example	The Chinese embassy this week donated blankets and food to the Harare old people's home

Actors

According to Dijk (2009), the Chinese government, Chinese state-owned enterprises, private Chinese companies as well as the Chinese embassy in the concerned African country are the major actors characterising China's presence in the continent hence the need to code these actors and their co-actors. However, as shall be seen, China's presence in Africa has global implications meaning the actorness is broad; it includes other countries, people from international organisations and countries, among other actors.

Companies

The importance of companies in China's involvement in Africa is apparent. By 2018, there may well have been as many as 10, 000 Chinese owned firms operating in Africa (Heritage Foundation cited in Meservey, 2018). As such, this subcategory aims to analyse the balance between all types of companies that are relevant to the phenomena of China's presence in Africa. This will, for example, help to ascertain the extent of the Chinese state and private firms' involvement in Africa. Newspaper country (NC) means any of the research countries.

101 Chinese state

Code	Chinese state-owned (101)
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Brief Description	Chinese state-owned company
Full Description	A company owned by either the Chinese central government or a provincial government with all its assets being the property of the state (Szamoszegi and Kyle, 2011)
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which Chinese state-owned companies are the main actor firms
When not to use	Do not use this code on articles in which companies that are not state-owned are not the main actor firms
Example	Zhu, a Chinese state-owned firm, will open a branch in Harare soon

102 Chinese Private

Code	Chinese Private (102)
Brief Description	Chinese private owned company
Full Description	A company which is neither owned by the central nor the provincial government
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles in which the Chinese private-owned companies are the main actor firms
When not to use	Never apply this code on articles in which the Chinese private-owned firms are not the main actor firms
Example	Xip is a Chinese private company with offices across many African countries

103 Chinese Mixed

Code	Chinese mixed (103)
Brief Description	Mixed Chinese companies

Full Description	Companies owned by both the Chinese government and other private investors
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which companies jointly owned by the Chinese government (central and provincial) and other private entities are the main actor firms
When not to use	Never use this code on stories in which companies jointly owned by the Chinese government (central and provincial) and other private entities are the main actor firms
Example	Shong Shing is owned by both the Chinese government and a group of private businesses people.

104 Several Chinese mentioned

Code	Several Chinese (104)
Brief Description	Several Chinese firms mentioned
Full Description	Many companies mentioned without any being the overall main actor firm
When to use this Code	Use this code in articles that mention many Chinese companies without any one of them being the main actor firm
When not to use	Never apply this code on articles which do not mention many Chinese firms with none of those being the overall main actor company
Example	About 10 Chinese companies, Z, X, D, Y among them, are said to be interested in the tender

105 Newspaper country public/state firm

Code	NC public or state (105)
Brief Description	Newspaper country (NC) public or state-owned firm

Full Description	A company from the country of the publishing newspaper which is owned either by the government of that country or is publicly owned (owners being the general public shareholders)
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories in which public or state-owned companies are the main actor firms
When not to use	Never apply this code on articles in which public or state-owned enterprises are not the main actor companies
Example	Z, a state-owned publishing company, yesterday declared loses. Or Z, a listed public company, yesterday declared profit.

106 Newspaper country private company

Code	NC Private (106)
Brief Description	Newspaper country (NC) private company
Full Description	A company from the country of the publishing newspaper which is privately owned.
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which privately owned enterprises from the publishing newspaper country are the main actor firms
When not to use	Never use this code on articles in which privately owned firms from the publishing newspaper country are the main actor firms
Example	D, a local private manufacturing firm, was, this week, the latest to list at the Nigerian Stock Exchange.

107 Newspaper country mixed company

Code	NC mixed (107)
Brief Description	Newspaper country (NC) mixed company

Full Description	Company which is jointly owned by both the government of the newspaper country and local private investors
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles in which the main actor companies are those jointly owned by the newspaper state and local private investors
When not to use	Never apply this code on stories that are not jointly owned by the newspaper state and local private investors
Example	K Construction company which is partly owned by the state and D construction, has been awarded the tender

108 Newspaper country and other

Code	NC Other (108)
Brief Description	Newspaper country (NC) and other
Full Description	Any company from the newspaper country together with any other company
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles in which the main actor companies are any local newspaper country entities operating together with any other firm from wherever
When not to use	Never apply this on articles in which the main actor company is not the newspaper country firm acting together with any other firm
Example	KD from Zimbabwe and an Israeli firm

109 China-Newspaper country joint venture or initiative

Code	Joint Venture or Initiative (109)
Brief Description	Joint venture between a company from China and another from the Newspaper Country

Full Description	Companies from both China and newspaper country coming together to undertake a particular project
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles in which firms from China have come together with those from the newspaper country to undertake some project
When not to use	Never use this code on articles in which the main actor companies are not Chinese and newspaper country firms working together on some specific project
Example	Zhi, a Chinese construction firm and Dey, a local Nigerian firm, are jointly constructing a dam

110 Other

Code	Other (110)
Brief Description	Any other firm
Full Description	Any other company that is not coded
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which the main actor company is any other firm from wherever and is not a coded type of an entity
When not to use	Do not apply this code on articles in which the main actor company is not any other firm from wherever and is not coded entity.
Example	QD, a pharmaceutical firm from Dubai, has been awarded the tender

111 No company

Code	No company (111)
Brief Description	No company mentioned
Full Description	No company is mentioned in the article

When to use this Code	Use this code in articles where there is no actor company
When not to use	Do not use this code on articles in which there is or are actor companies
Example	NA

112 Various

Code	Various (112)
Brief Description	Various companies
Full Description	Various companies mentioned
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which various companies are mentioned with none of them being the overall main actor
When not to use	Never use this code on articles which do not mention many companies with all of them being of equal significance
Example	Companies such as Diy, Soul Pvt LTD, Mel, Kays and Day are all interested in the deal

113 General

Code	General (113)
Brief Description	Companies generally referred to
Full Description	No companies mentioned by name; enterprises generally referred to in the articles
When to use this Code	Apply this code in articles which generally refer to enterprises without mentioning any company by name
When not to use	Never use this company in articles in which companies are specifically named
Example	Companies are also represented at the conference

114 Chinese and other country company (ies)

Code	Chinese and other country (114)
Brief Description	Chinese and other country firm
Full Description	Companies from China and from any other uncoded country acting jointly in some project
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which companies from China and from any other country are in joint operation as main company actors
When not to use	Never use on articles in which the Chinese firms are not in a joint initiative with firms from any other country as main company actors
Example	The Chinese giant, Zee, is jointly bidding for the construction of the dam with a company from Saudi Arabia

115 Another African country company

Code	Another African country (115)
Brief Description	Another African country firm
Full Description	Companies from any other African country mentioned as main actor companies in the story
When to use this Code	Apply this code on stories in which the main actor company is from another African country which is not a research country
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories where the main actor company is not from another African country which is not a research country
Example	A Mozambican manufacturing giant, Spivo, is keen on the project

116 Chinese unnamed or ownership unmentioned firm

Code	Chinese unnamed (116)
Brief Description	Unnamed or ownership unknown Chinese firm
Full Description	Chinese firms that are not mentioned by name and whose ownership is not known
When to use this Code	Apply this on articles where a Chinese firm is the main actor company but is not specifically named and where the ownership is not known
When not to use	Never use this where the Chinese main actor company is specifically named and its ownership is known
Example	A Chinese company was said to be on course to clinch the deal

117 Several newspaper country firms mentioned

Code	Several NC (117)
Brief Description	Several newspaper-country firms
Full Description	Several companies from the newspaper country mentioned as equal main actor companies
When to use this Code	Apply this code where several entities from the newspaper country are equal main actor companies
When not to use	Do not use this code where several newspaper entities are not mentioned as equal main companies
Example	Four Nigerian companies, D, W, X, and Y, are lined up for the project

118 NGO, Charity organisation

Code	NGO (118)
Brief Description	Non-Governmental Organisation or Charity Organisation

Full Description	Non-Governmental and Charity organisations mentioned
When to use this Code	Apply this code where NGOs or Charity Organisations are the actors instead of companies
When not to use	Never use this use code where companies are actors
Example	A Chinese charity organisation, Zeng, distributed presents to children at a local school

Government

Much of Chinese activities (both private and official) in Africa are coordinated by the Chinese government (Dijk, 2009, p. 9). In the process, and as stated in Chapter 1, China's activities in Africa have elicited reaction from other nations, such as the USA. This category, therefore, codes government (s) activities that are relevant to China's presence in Africa.

120 Chinese government (state departments, ministries, treasury, immigration etc)

Code	Chinese government (120)
Brief Description	The government of China
Full Description	The Chinese government mentioned as the main actor government in the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the main actor government is the government of China
When not to use	Never use in stories where the government of China is not the main actor government
Example	The Chinese government yesterday donated clothes to the Harare Old people's home

121 Government of newspaper country

Code	NC Government (121)
Brief Description	Government of the Newspaper country (NC)
Full Description	Government of the country where the newspaper is published is mentioned as the main actor government in the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the main actor government is the government of the newspaper country
When not to use	Do not apply this where the main actor government is not the government of the country where the newspaper is published
Example	The Zimbabwean government yesterday said it was ready to start the project (Herald, Zimbabwe)

122 Government of another research country

Code	Research country (122)
Brief Description	Government of another research country. Research countries are (Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe)
Full Description	The government of another research country mentioned in the article as the main actor government
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the government of another African country that is being researched is mentioned as the main actor government
When not to use	Never apply this code in articles where the government of another research African country is not the main actor government
Example	Kenya will soon be constructing a new railways line, the minister of transport said last week

123 Government of another African country

Code	African country (123)
Brief Description	Another African country government
Full Description	Government of any other African country mentioned as the main actor government
When to use this Code	Use this where the main actor government is the government of any other African country which is not under research
When not to use	Do not apply where the main actor government is not that of any other African country
Example	The government of Ghana has opened negotiations with Beijing

124 Government of other country

Code	Other country (124)
Brief Description	Government of other country
Full Description	Government of any other country apart from the coded ones mentioned as the main actor government
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which the main actor government is government of any other country but not from the coded ones
When not to use	Never use this code when the main actor government is not government of any other uncoded country
Example	The New Zealand government

125 Chinese government and newspaper country government

Code	Chinese and NC governments (125)
Brief Description	Chinese and the newspaper country (NC) governments

Full Description	The governments of both China and the country where the newspaper is published acting together
When to use this Code	Apply where the governments of both China and the newspaper country are acting together
When not to use	Do not use this code if the main actor government is not those of China and the newspaper country acting together
Example	The president of China and his Zimbabwean colleague commissioned the new bridge

126 Chinese government and government of another analysed country

Code	Chinese and analysed country (126)
Brief Description	Governments of China and another analysed country
Full Description	The governments of China and that of any of the countries under research acting jointly together
When to use this Code	Apply where the government of China is acting jointly together with that of another analysed country
When not to use	Never use where the government of China is not acting jointly with the government of any of the countries under research
Example	The Chinese government is negotiating with the Kenyan government

127 Chinese government and government of another African country

Code	Chinese and another African country (127)
Brief Description	Chinese government and government of another African country other than research country
Full Description	Governments of China and that of any other African country other than the research country acting together

When to use this Code	Apply where the Chinese government is acting with any other African country government which is not under research
When not to use	Never use where the Chinese government is acting jointly with the government of a research African country
Example	Chinese government and the government of Mali

128 No government

Code	No government (128)
Brief Description	No government mentioned
Full Description	Article totally silent on government
When to use this Code	Apply this code on articles in which no government is mentioned as an actor
When not to use	Never use where any government is an actor
Example	Chinese man football team playing Zimbabwean team

129 Asian govts

Code	Asia (129)
Brief Description	Asian governments
Full Description	Governments of Asian countries acting together
When to use this Code	Apply this where the governments of Asian countries are acting together and a unit; for example, in conferences, workshops, summits
When not to use	Do not use this code where the Asian governments are not acting together
Example	Leaders have started arriving for the conference as Asian governments seek to find solution to the problem of famine

130 Chinese local government (Cities, towns, provinces)

Code	Chinese local government (130)
Brief Description	Chinese local government mentioned
Full Description	Local government of China (cities, towns, provinces) authorities mentioned as main actor government in the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Chinese cities, towns and provinces are the main actor government
When not to use	Never use where the main actor government is not Chinese local government authorities
Example	The Chinese province of Guanglung is keen on investing in Kenya

131 Chinese local government and local government of newspaper country

Code	Chinese local and NC local (131)
Brief Description	Chinese local government and local government of newspaper country
Full Description	Local governments (cities, towns, and provinces) of China acting together with the local government of the newspaper country
When to use this Code	Apply where the main actor government is the joint operation between the Chinese and newspaper governments
When not to use	Do not use where both the Chinese and the newspaper country local governments are not acting together
Example	The Chinese province of Guan is seeking investments opportunities in Bulawayo metropolitan and the two authorities have opened negotiations

132 Chinese government and African governments (Conferences etc)

Code	Chinese and African (132)
Brief Description	Chinese government and African governments
Full Description	Government of China acting together with a collection of governments of African countries
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the Chinese government is acting together with governments of African countries in activities such as conferences and workshops
When not to use	Never apply where the actor governments are not the Chinese government acting together with the governments of African countries
Example	The ongoing China-Africa conference which is attended by presidents from China and African countries will end on Friday, Beijing said yesterday

133 Chinese government and the West

Code	China and the West (133)
Brief Description	Chinese government and Western governments
Full Description	Chinese government acting together with western governments (EU, UK, US)
When to use this Code	Apply this where the Chinese government and governments of Western countries are acting
When not to use	Never use where the actor governments are not those of China and Western countries
Example	Chinese government and the EU have agreed on the way forwards

134 Newspaper country government and the world

Code	Newspaper country and the world (134)
Brief Description	Newspaper country government and the general global community
Full Description	Newspaper country named and the global or international community generally mentioned
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the newspaper country government is named with the global community generally referred to
When not to use	Never apply this in articles where the newspaper country government is not mentioned alongside the global community
Example	Zimbabwe is trying to regain its status in the global community of nations and Harare is lobbying other friendly governments

135 Local government (cities, towns, provinces) of newspaper country

Code	NC local government (135)
Brief Description	Newspaper country local government mentioned
Full Description	Local government of newspaper country (cities, towns, provinces) authorities mentioned as the main actor government in the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where newspaper country cities, towns and provinces are the main actor government
When not to use	Never use where the main actor government is not the newspaper country local government authorities
Example	Zimbabwe province of Mash West hosting Chinese investors

136 Africa governments

Code	Africa (136)
Brief Description	A collection of many African governments
Full Description	Governments of African countries acting together
When to use this Code	Apply this where the governments of African countries are acting together and as a unit; for example, in conferences, workshops, summits
When not to use	Do not use this code where the African governments are not acting together
Example	Leaders have started arriving for the AU conference as African governments seek to find solution to the problem of famine.

137 US government

Code	US government (137)
Brief Description	Government of the Unites States of America
Full Description	Government of the United States of America acting alone as the main actor government
When to use this Code	Apply this where the US government is the main actor government
When not to use	Never use in articles where the government of the United States of America is not the main actor government
Example	Secretary of state Hillary Clinton began her shuttle diplomacy as the US government launches its charm offensive in Asia

138 Newspaper country and US government

Code	NC and US (138)
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Brief Description	Newspaper country (NC) and US governments
Full Description	Governments of the newspaper country and the government of the United States of America acting together
When to use this Code	Apply this where both the newspaper country government and the US government are acting together
When not to use	Never use where the two (US and Newspaper country governments) are not acting together
Example	The US secretary of state arrived in Nigeria yesterday where she held closed door talks with the president as both governments seek to find common ground

Embassy

As stated earlier in Chapter 1, one of the ways China's presence in Africa is manifesting itself is through the activities of the embassies (Dijik, 2009). So, this category codes embassy works. Also, as mentioned earlier and as shall be seen later, Chinese presence in Africa has global implications sparking reactions from other nations. This means this section will also code embassies of other nations relevant to China's presence in Africa. This is because precoding, meaning the process of reading through the data highlighting striking issues and passages, (Layder, 1998) revealed embassy activity in Africa on the issue of Chinese presence to include embassies of other countries.

149 Western Embassies

Code	Western (149)
Brief Description	Western embassies
Full Description	Embassies of western countries collectively or individually as the main actor embassies in any country

When to use this Code	Apply this code where western embassies, individually or as a group, are the main actor embassy
When not to use	Do not apply in articles where the western embassies are not the main actor embassies
Example	The embassy of France said it was supportive of China's move. Or Australia, German states embassies said they were opposed

150 Chinese embassy in the newspaper country

Code	China in Newspaper Country (150)
Brief Description	Chinese embassy in the newspaper country
Full Description	The embassy of China in the country where the newspaper is published
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the Chinese embassy in the newspaper country is the main actor embassies
When not to use	Do not use where the Chinese embassy in the newspaper country is not the main actor embassy
Example	China's ambassador to Nigeria said Beijing was committed to Nigeria and the embassy was going to donate more towards improving education in the host country.

151 Chinese embassy in another African country

Code	In African Country (151)
Brief Description	Chinese embassy in another African country
Full Description	Chinese embassy in any African country save for the research or newspaper countries
When to use this Code	Apply this where the Chinese embassy in any other African country is the main actor embassy

When not to use	Do not use where the Chinese embassy in any other African is not the main actor embassy
Example	The Chinese embassy in Senegal

152 Chinese embassy in another country

Code	In another country (152)
Brief Description	Chinese embassy in another country
Full Description	The embassy of China in any other country save for African and research countries
When to use this Code	Apply this in articles where the embassy of China in any other country is the main actor embassy
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor embassy is not the Chinese embassy in any other country
Example	Chinese embassy in Uruguay

153 Embassy of the newspaper country in China

Code	In China (153)
Brief Description	Newspaper country embassy in China
Full Description	The embassy of the newspaper country in China
When to use this Code	Apply this where the embassy of the newspaper country in China is the main actor embassy
When not to use	Do not use where the embassy of the newspaper country in China is not the main actor embassy
Example	Zimbabwean embassy in Beijing

154 Embassy of another country in China

Code	Another country in China (154)
Brief Description	Embassy of another country in China
Full Description	The embassy of any other country (apart from the research countries) in China
When to use this Code	Apply this where the embassy of any other country in China is the main actor embassy
When not to use	Do not apply this where the main actor embassy is not the embassy of any other country in China
Example	Israeli embassy

155 Japanese embassy

Code	Japanese embassy (155)
Brief Description	Japanese embassy in Africa
Full Description	The embassy of Japan in any African country including research countries
When to use this Code	Apply this code in articles where the embassy of Japan is the main actor embassy in any African country
When not to use	Do not use where the embassy of Japan is not the main actor embassy
Example	Japanese embassy in Malawi

156 No Embassy

Code	None (156)
Brief Description	No embassy
Full Description	No embassy involved

When to use this Code	Apply this in articles where no embassy is mentioned or involved
When not to use	Do not use where there is any embassy involved
Example	NA

157 Other

Code	Other country embassy (157)
Brief Description	Any other country embassy
Full Description	Any other country embassy involved in newspaper country as the main actor embassy
When to use this Code	Apply this code where any other country embassy is the main actor embassy in the newspaper country
When not to use	Never use where the embassy involved is not the embassy of any other uncoded country
Example	Belarus embassy in Zimbabwe

158 Indian

Code	Indian embassy (158)
Brief Description	Indian embassy in Africa
Full Description	Indian embassy involved as the main actor embassy in any African country inclusive of research countries
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the embassy of India is the main actor embassy in any African country including in research countries
When not to use	Do not use where the embassy of India is not the main actor embassy
Example	The Indian embassy in Lesotho

159 Taiwan

Code	Taiwanese embassy (159)
Brief Description	Taiwanese embassy in Africa
Full Description	Taiwanese embassy involved as the main actor embassy in any African country
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the embassy of Taiwan is the main actor embassy in any African country
When not to use	Do not use where the embassy of Taiwan is not the main actor embassy in any African country
Example	Taiwanese embassy in Swaziland

160 Turkish

Code	Turkish embassy (160)
Brief Description	Turkish embassy in Africa
Full Description	Turkish embassy involved as the main actor embassy in any African country
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the embassy of Turkey is the main actor embassy in any African country
When not to use	Do not use where the embassy of Turkey is not the main actor embassy in any African country
Example	Turkish embassy in Swaziland

161 Chinese Embassy in Research Country

Code	China in RC (161)
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Brief Description	Chinese embassy in any research country (RC)
Full Description	The embassy of China in any of the research countries
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the Chinese embassy in the research country is the main actor embassy
When not to use	Do not use where the Chinese embassy in the research country is not the main actor embassy
Example	China's ambassador to Kenya said Beijing was committed to Nigeria and the embassy was going to donate more towards improving education in the host country.

162 Africa embassies in China

Code	Africa in China (162)
Brief Description	African embassies in China
Full Description	Embassies of African countries acting collectively in China
When to use this Code	Apply where African embassies in China are acting collectively
When not to use	Do not use where African embassies in China are not acting collectively
Example	African ambassadors in China formed an association

People

This category codes the people through whose work *China in Africa* is reflected. These are government officials, diplomats, businesspeople among many. Estimated to be one million by 2014 (Leslie, 2016) in Africa, Chinese people are now part of the continent's social life (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009). It is key, therefore, to differentiate between the background and positions of the people named in the data be they Chinese or locals.

169 Businesspeople/company reps

Code	Business leaders (169)
Brief Description	Business leaders and senior company representatives
Full Description	Senior people acting on behalf of their business entities or companies that employ them
When to use this Code	Apply this where business leaders are the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use this code where the main actor people are not business leaders
Example	Anjin Pvt Ltd Chief Executive Officer

170 Celebrities

Code	Celebrities (170)
Brief Description	Celebrity people
Full Description	Celebrity people from the arts, sports, and fashion industries and the broader entertainment industry
When to use this Code	Use this where the main actor people are celebrities
When not to use	Do not apply where the main actor people are not celebrities
Example	Top Chinese musician

171 Expatriates (visiting Chinese professionals)

Code	Other Chinese professionals (171)
Brief Description	Chinese professionals on duty abroad

Full Description	Other Chinese professionals such as researchers, prospectors briefly visiting the country as part of their duties
When to use this Code	Apply where visiting foreign professionals who are on duty are the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not visiting foreign professionals; also, do not use where the visiting professionals are employed by the government of the country they come from and are business executives
Example	Zhu, a researcher from Wuhan

172 Tourists

Code	Tourists (172)
Brief Description	Chinese tourists
Full Description	Chinese tourists on holiday
When to use this Code	Apply this on stories in which the tourists are the main actor people
When not to use	Never use where tourists are not the main actor people
Example	Lo a Chinese tourist was mugged

173 Illegals, convicts, accused, litigants

Code	Accused (173)
Brief Description	Accused people
Full Description	People brought to court accused of committing an offence
When to use this Code	Apply this where the main actor people are those accused of committing an offence
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not the accused

Example	Four Chinese illegal immigrants in court
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174 General

Code	General (174)
Brief Description	Generalised reference
Full Description	People generally referred to without mention of specific names
When to use this Code	Apply this where people are not specifically referred to by names
When not to use	Do not use where main actor people are specifically named
Example	Chinese people travelling to Africa

175 Other

Code	Other (175)
Brief Description	Other people
Full Description	Any other people mentioned as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply this where the main actor people are any other groups of people not coded
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are specifically coded groups of people
Example	Israeli miners

176 No direct mention of people

Code	No mention (176)
Brief Description	No direct mention of people

Full Description	People not mentioned whether directly or by generalisation
When to use this Code	Apply this code where people are not directly mentioned
When not to use	Never use where people are mentioned by name or are generally referred to
Example	Silent

177 Diplomats/government officials of newspaper country

Code	NC govt officials (177)
Brief Description	Newspaper country government officials
Full Description	Government officials of newspaper country as main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply where government officials of newspaper country including their diplomats are the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not diplomats and government officials of newspaper country
Example	Zimbabwe home affairs minister

178 Diplomats/government officials of China

Code	China officials (178)
Brief Description	Chinese government officials
Full Description	Chinese government officials as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Use where Chinese government officials including diplomats are the main actor people
When not to use	Never apply where Chinese diplomats and government officials are not main actor people
Example	Chinese ambassador to Kenya

179 Diplomats/government officials of both China and Newspaper country

Code	Both governments officials (179)
Brief Description	Chinese and newspaper country officials
Full Description	Government officials and diplomats from both China and the newspaper country
When to use this Code	Apply this code where diplomats and government officials from both countries are the main actor people
When not to use	Don't use where the main actor people are not government officials of China and the newspaper country
Example	The Chinese president Xi and his Kenyan counterpart Kenyatta

180 Analysts, experts, lobbyists

Code	Analysts (180)
Brief Description	Providers of analysis
Full Description	People providing analysis and views or lobbying in their area of expertise and interest
When to use this Code	Apply this code where specialists, experts, lobbyists are the main actor people providing analysis or pushing a certain cause
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not analysts
Example	According to Dube, an expert in Sinology, China is keen on Africa

181 Mixed

Code	Mixture (181)
Brief Description	Mixture of various people
Full Description	A mixture of various people mentioned together in the same piece with equal significance in the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the main actor people are a mixture of various people with equal significance in the article
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not a mixture of various people
Example	Villager John, farmer Moses, Teacher Dube, school children, pharmacist

182 Workers/clients/consumers/community

Code	Workers (182)
Brief Description	Workers and community
Full Description	People who work for and live in the community where the company is operating
When to use this Code	Use this where the main actor people are workers or members of the community where the company is situated
When not to use	Do not apply where the main actor people are not workers or members of the community where a company is situated
Example	Workers and villagers demonstrating against the company management

183 Chinese and African countries government officials

Code	Chinese and Africans (183)
Brief Description	Chinese and African government officials

Full Description	Chinese government officials together with African government officials as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply this where the main actor people are Chinese government officials named together with African governments officials
When not to use	Never use where the main actor people are not Chinese and African governments officials acting collectively
Example	Chinese president addressing African presidents

184 Party politicians

Code	Politicians (184)
Brief Description	Party politicians
Full Description	Ruling or opposition party politicians acting as representatives of their organisations
When to use this Code	Apply where the main actor people are politicians acting in their capacity as representatives of their parties
When not to use	Do not apply where the politicians are not representing their parties
Example	Opposition leader in Zimbabwe

185 Officials from Chinese govt and govt of another analysed country

Code	Chinese and analysed country (185)
Brief Description	Chinese and another analysed country government officials
Full Description	Officials from the Chinese government named together with officials from another analysed African country as main actor people

When to use this Code	Apply this code where the main actor people are officials from the Chinese government acting together with officials from another analysed African country
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not officials from the Chinese government acting together with those from another analysed African country
Example	The Chinese minister of foreign affairs and his Nigerian counterpart

186 Chinese Communist party officials

Code	Communist Party (186)
Brief Description	Chinese Communist Party officials
Full Description	Chinese Communist Party officials as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply where the main actor people are officials from the Chinese Communist Party
When not to use	Do not apply where the main actor people are not officials from the Chinese Communist Party
Example	Chinese Communist party touring Africa

187 Communist Party of China officials and newspaper country ruling party

Code	Communist and NC party (187)
Brief Description	Officials of the Chinese Communist party and newspaper country ruling party
Full Description	Officials of the Chinese Communist Party together with officials from the newspaper country's ruling party
When to use this Code	Apply where Chinese Communist Party officials are the main actor people together with those from the newspaper country ruling party

When not to use	Never use where the main actor people are not officials of both the Chinese Communist Party and the newspaper county ruling party
Example	Chinese Communist Party leaders meeting Zanu PF leaders

188 Chinese government and government of another Africa country officials

Code	Chinese and another African country (188)
Brief Description	Chinese government and another African government officials
Full Description	Chinese government officials together with the officials of any other African government as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Chinese government officials are mentioned together with those from any other African country as the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not Chinese government officials mentioned together with those of any other African country
Example	Chinese immigration officers and Ghanaian counterparts

189 Officials from another African govt

Code	Another African (189)
Brief Description	Officials of another African government
Full Description	Officials of any other African country government as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the main actor people are officials of any other African country government
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not officials from any other African country government

Example	Ghanaian customs officials
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190 Newspaper country officials/diplomats and global leaders

Code	NC & the world (190)
Brief Description	Newspaper country government officials and global leaders
Full Description	Newspaper country government officials together with government officials from the rest of the world
When to use this Code	Apply this code where newspaper country government officials are mentioned together with officials from the rest of the world as the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not newspaper country government officials mentioned together with officials from the rest of the world
Example	Kenyan president holding a meeting with leaders from all over the world before a summit in Nairobi

191 Chinese government officials/diplomats and AU officials

Code	China and the African Union (191)
Brief Description	Chinese government officials and African Union officials
Full Description	Chinese diplomats and government officials together with the officials of the African Union
When to use this Code	Apply where diplomats and government officials of China are mentioned together with the officials from the African Union as the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not African Union officials mentioned together with the Chinese government officials

Example	China's ambassador to Ethiopia donated computers to the African Union at a ceremony attended by AU officials
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192 China and Asia

Code	China and Asia (192)
Brief Description	Chinese and Asian leaders
Full Description	Chinese government officials and government officials from the rest of Asia
When to use this Code	Apply this where the main actor people are government officials mentioned together with officials from the rest of Asia
When not to use	Do not use the code where the main actor people are not Chinese and rest of Asian government officials
Example	Chinese president Xi opened a summit attended by leaders from the Asian countries

193 Japanese

Code	Japanese (193)
Brief Description	Japanese government officials
Full Description	Japanese government officials
When to use this Code	Apply where the main actor people are Japanese government officials
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not Japanese government officials
Example	The Japanese foreign affairs minister making a statement

194 Africa governments officials

Code	African (194)
Brief Description	African government officials
Full Description	Officials of African governments as the main actor people
When to use this Code	Apply where African governments officials are the main actor people
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not officials of African governments
Example	Leaders from East African countries met to discuss the problem of drought

195 Asian governments officials

Code	Asia (195)
Brief Description	Asian government officials
Full Description	Officials from governments of the rest of Asia
When to use this Code	Apply where Asian governments officials are the main actor people
When not to use	Never apply where Chinese officials are included
Example	Indonesia leaders

196 Chinese and western govts officials

Code	China and the West (196)
Brief Description	Chinese and Western governments officials
Full Description	Chinese government officials and westerns governments officials together
When to use this Code	Apply the main actor people are Chinese government officials and their Western governments colleagues

When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are Chinese government officials together with their Western colleagues
Example	Chinese president meeting US president

197 US government leaders

Code	USA (197)
Brief Description	US government officials
Full Description	United States of America government officials
When to use this Code	Apply where the main actor people are US government officials
When not to use	Do not use where the main actor people are not US government officials
Example	The US secretary of state making a statement

198 Newspaper country leaders and US leaders

Code	NC and USA (198)
Brief Description	Newspaper country and the US government officials
Full Description	Newspaper country government officials together with the US government officials
When to use this Code	Use where the main actor people are officials from the newspaper country government together with the US government officials
When not to use	Never apply where the main actor people are not officials from the US government together with those of the newspaper country

Example	US secretary of state held closed door talks with the Nigerian foreign affairs minister
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Mention of other countries and global agencies

China’s involvement in Africa is not just controversial; it apparently impacts on its relations with other countries and multilateral organisations. This is because one of China’s core aims is countering Western hegemony and positioning itself as a superpower by entering into partnerships with the African countries (Dijk, 2009, p. 12). It is fundamental to seek insights into China’s relationships with not only the chosen African countries of focus but with global powers, neighbours, and multilateral institutions because China, its dealings with African partners, emphasises on such institutions like the African Union.

Apart from the US and the broader West, China is also competing with India, Japan, Taiwan, and Turkey for influence in Africa. For example, the rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo has grown to the extent that it is now a “global phenomenon” which is now “evident in Africa” (Hirono, 2019, p. 831). Also, India and China are involved in what is called “Sino-Indian Trade competition in Africa” (Nowak, 2016, p. 140). Turkey is also spreading its influence in Africa (Tepeciklioglu, 2017). On the other hand, so bad are relations between China and Taiwan that Beijing runs a deliberate policy of isolating its rival on the international stage including in Africa. This is to the extent that China will withdraw all relations and all forms of support from any African country that has relations with Taiwan (Taylor, 2002).

220 Kenya

Code	Kenya (220)
Brief Description	The Republic of Kenya mentioned

Full Description	Kenya being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Kenya is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Kenya is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Kenya

221 Nigeria

Code	Nigeria (221)
Brief Description	The Republic of Nigeria mentioned
Full Description	Nigeria being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Nigeria is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Nigeria is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Nigeria

222 South Africa

Code	South Africa (222)
Brief Description	The Republic of South Africa mentioned

Full Description	South Africa being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where South Africa is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where South Africa is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in South Africa

223 Zambia

Code	Zambia (223)
Brief Description	The Republic of Zambia mentioned
Full Description	Zambia being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Zambia is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Zambia is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Zambia

224 Zimbabwe

Code	Zimbabwe (224)
Brief Description	The Republic of Zimbabwe mentioned

Full Description	Zimbabwe being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Zimbabwe is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Zimbabwe is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Zimbabwe

225 Other African countries/Africa in general

Code	Africa (225)
Brief Description	Other African countries or Africa in general
Full Description	Other African countries or Africa in general mentioned in the article apart from the country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply where Africa in general or other African countries apart from the country which is the subject of the article are mentioned
When not to use	Never apply where the other country mentioned is one of the research countries
Example	Apart from Zimbabwe, the company also has offices all over Africa

226 BRICS

Code	BRICS (226)
Brief Description	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

Full Description	BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries mentioned in the article apart from the country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply where BRICS, apart from the country which is the subject of the article is mentioned
When not to use	Never apply where the other country mentioned is not BRICS
Example	BRICS is also another factor

227 EU/Western countries

Code	Euro and Western (227)
Brief Description	European country or other Western countries
Full Description	European country or other Western countries being the other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply where a European country or other Western country is the other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Never use where the other country mentioned is not a European or another Western country
Example	Germany or Canada

228 The USA

Code	USA (228)
Brief Description	The USA mentioned
Full Description	The USA being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article

When to use this Code	Apply this code where USA is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where USA is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in the USA

229 Russia

Code	Russia (229)
Brief Description	Russia mentioned
Full Description	Russia being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Russia is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Russia is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Russia

230 Other countries

Code	Other (230)
Brief Description	Other countries mentioned
Full Description	Any other country mentioned as the other country in the article
When to use this Code	Apply where the other country is any other uncoded country

When not to use	Never use where the other country mentioned is one of the specifically coded ones
Example	Oman

231 No other countries are mentioned

Code	None (231)
Brief Description	No other country mentioned
Full Description	No other country apart from the main subject country mentioned
When to use this Code	Apply where there is no other county mentioned apart from the main subject country
When not to use	Never use where there is another or are other countries mentioned
Example	NA

232 Various

Code	Various (232)
Brief Description	Various countries mentioned
Full Description	Various countries mentioned and being of equal significance in the article
When to use this Code	Apply where various countries are mentioned and are of the equal significance in the article
When not to use	Do not use where various countries are not mentioned as the other countries apart from the main subject country
Example	Cuba, Jamaica, Niger, Chad, and Libya

233 EU/Europe and the USA

Code	EU and the USA (233)
Brief Description	European Union and the United States of America acting collectively
Full Description	The EU and the USA being the only other countries mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the EU together with the USA are the only other countries mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where the EU and the USA acting collectively are not the only other countries mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The EU and the USA held a summit where Zimbabwe was discussed

234 United Nations agencies/World Food Programme/WHO

Code	UN (234)
Brief Description	United Nations
Full Description	United Nations and or its agencies are mentioned as the other significant actor apart from the main actor country
When to use this Code	Apply where, apart from main actor countries, the UN and or its agencies are mentioned as the significant actor
When not to use	Do not use where the UN and or its agencies are not the other significant actor mentioned instead of another country
Example	To fight hunger, Zimbabwe has sent an SOS call to the United Nations

235 International Organisations

Code	Intergovernmental organisations (235)
Brief Description	Other intergovernmental organisations
Full Description	International organisations such the International Criminal Court, World Trade Organisation and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora are mentioned as the other significant actor apart from the main actor country
When to use this Code	Apply where international organisations are mentioned as the significant actors instead of another country
When not to use	Do not use where international organisations are not mentioned as the other significant actor instead of another country
Example	To fight hunger, Zimbabwe has sent an SOS call to the United Nations

236 Asia in general (other Asian countries)

Code	Asia (236)
Brief Description	Asia in general
Full Description	Asia in general mentioned in the article apart from the country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply where Asia in general apart from the country which is the subject of the article are mentioned
When not to use	Never apply where the other country mentioned is not a general reference to Asia
Example	The company also has offices all over Asia

237 West in general

Code	West (237)
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Brief Description	West in general
Full Description	West in general mentioned in the article apart from the country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply where West in general apart from the country which is the subject of the article is mentioned
When not to use	Never apply where the other country mentioned is not West in general
Example	The company has also invested in the West

238 African Union

Code	AU (238)
Brief Description	Africa Union
Full Description	African Union and or its agencies mentioned as the other significant actor apart from the main actor country
When to use this Code	Apply where the African Union and or its agencies are mentioned as the significant actor apart from the main actor country and instead of another country
When not to use	Do not use where the AU and or its agencies are not the other significant actor apart instead of another country
Example	To fight hunger, Zimbabwe has sent an SOS call to the African Union

239 Taiwan

Code	Taiwan (239)
Brief Description	Taiwan mentioned

Full Description	Taiwan being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Taiwan is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Taiwan is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Taiwan

240 General

Code	General (240)
Brief Description	General reference to countries
Full Description	Other countries generally referred to without any country specifically mentioned
When to use this Code	Use where other countries are generally referred to without any country mentioned
When not to use	Do not use where countries are specifically named
Example	Many countries are expected to follow suit

241 US and Britain/The UK (together)

Code	US and The UK (241)
Brief Description	The United States of America and the United Kingdom
Full Description	The USA and the UK being the only other countries mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article

When to use this Code	Apply this code where the US acting together with the UK are the only other countries mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where the USA and the UK acting together are not the only other countries mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The USA and the UK to meet

242 IMF and the World Bank

Code	World Bank and IMF (242)
Brief Description	The World bank and the International Monetary Fund
Full Description	The World Bank and or the IMF mentioned apart from the main actor country and instead of another country
When to use this Code	Use where the World Bank and or the IMF are mentioned apart from the main actor country and instead of another country
When not to use	Do not use where the World Bank and or the IMF are not mentioned instead of another country
Example	The IMF has also released a statement on the issue

243 England, Britain, UK

Code	The UK (243)
Brief Description	The United Kingdom mentioned
Full Description	The UK being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article

When to use this Code	Apply this code where UK, England, Britain is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where the UK is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in the UK

244 African Development Bank

Code	AfDB (244)
Brief Description	The African Development Bank
Full Description	The AfDB and or its agencies are mentioned as the other significant actor apart from the main actor country
When to use this Code	Apply where the AfDB and or its agencies are mentioned instead of another country and apart from the main actor country
When not to use	Do not use where the AfDB and or its agencies are not mentioned instead of another country
Example	AfDB has also provided Zimbabwe with funding

245 India

Code	India (245)
Brief Description	India mentioned
Full Description	India being the other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where India is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article

When not to use	Do not use this code where India is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in India

246 Japan

Code	Japan (246)
Brief Description	Japan mentioned
Full Description	Japan being the other mentioned in the article apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Apply this code where Japan is the only other country mentioned apart from the main country which is the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use this code where Japan is not the only other country mentioned in the article apart from the main country
Example	The company has also done the same in Japan

Activity

This category codes activities of the China in Africa actors (people, firms, governments etc). According to Harding (2013, p. 102), “codes can be placed in more than one category or subcategory” if needs be. As such “multiple classification” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 11), is employed here. Afterall, coding is “cyclical” with codes resulting from “scrutinising, pondering and organising observations” (Locke et al., 2016, p. 372). For clarity, while some codes may be uniform across the subcategories (Ac-NP Country, AC-Re Country, AC-Af Country, and AC China) some are peculiar to each country.

Activity in newspaper country (Ac-NP Country)

248 General

Code	General (248)
Brief Description	General involvement
Full Description	Involvement generalised with no activity specifically named
When to use this Code	Apply this code where the involvement of any actor is generalised with no activity specifically named
When not to use	Do not use where the activity is specifically and clearly named
Example	The Chinese are also involved in Zimbabwe

249 Probe/Investigation

Code	Probe (249)
Brief Description	Investigation
Full Description	The investigation into some accident, incident or alleged crime by the state departments or organisations
When to use this Code	Apply where an investigation or probe is being carried out by either the state or organisations
When not to use	Do not apply where an investigation has been completed and the crime or outcome has been determined and referred to court
Example	The company said it was investigating the incident

250 Deal/Loan & joint venture/shares/tender award/MOU, agreement

Code	Deal (250)
Brief Description	Deal signing

Full Description	Deal, loan, joint venture, and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signing or agreement
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activity or event is the signing of a deal, loan, joint venture, MOU or agreement
When not to use	Do not apply where the main activity is not a deal signing
Example	China and Nigeria signing a \$50 billion railway deal

251 Formal and informal trade (expo/exhibition)

Code	Trade (251)
Brief Description	Formal and informal trade
Full Description	Trade expo, exhibition, fairs
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activity or event is trade expo, exhibition, fair and where imports and exports are generally compared
When not to use	Do not apply in exclusively exports and imports stories (see 256 & 257)
Example	A trade fare held in Lagos

252 State visit

Code	State visit (252)
Brief Description	Official state visit
Full Description	An official visit by a leader to another country
When to use this Code	Apply where country leaders or their ministers of special envoys are on official visit to another country
When not to use	Do not use where the leaders or their ministers are on private business

Example	Xi in Zambia for talks with Lungu
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253 Exploration and Evaluation

Code	Exploration (253)
Brief Description	Learning and innovation
Full Description	The “pursuit and acquisition of new knowledge”(Gupta et al., 2006, p. 693) by prospective investors
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activity is prospective investors seeking more information or knowledge about their area of interest
When not to use	Do not use where the main activity is not exploration
Example	Chinese investors in the country for exploration

254 Purchase

Code	Purchase (254)
Brief Description	Acquisition of essentials
Full Description	The buying of assets or services for the organisation
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activity is the purchase of services or assets for the organisation
When not to use	Do not use where purchasing or buying is not the main activity
Example	The company purchasing land

255 Exchange

Code	Exchange (255)
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Brief Description	Cultural exchange
Full Description	Mutual cultural and educational interactions between the people and institutions of two countries (Katzarska-Miller et al., 2021)
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activities are cultural and educational interactions through exchange programs or events between people and institutions of different countries
When not to use	Never use on any other interactions that are not cultural and or educational
Example	Chinese teachers conducting mandarin lessons in Harare

256 Imports

Code	Imports (256)
Brief Description	Goods coming into the country
Full Description	Where the subject of the article is mainly imports coming into the countries which are also the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Where the subject of the article is mainly imports coming into the countries which are also the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use where imports and exports comparison are the subject of the article (see 251)
Example	Chinese goods coming into Nigeria

257 Exports

Code	Exports (257)
Brief Description	Goods going out of the country

Full Description	Goods going out of the countries which are also the subject of the article
When to use this Code	Where the subject of the article is mainly exports out of the countries which are also the subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use where general imports and exports comparison are the subject of the article (see 251)
Example	Nigerian exports to China

258 Ceremony

Code	Ceremony (258)
Brief Description	Commemorative or launch events
Full Description	Events such as ceremonies, celebrations, commemoration, commissioning, launch, anniversary and festivals and promotions
When to use this Code	Apply where ceremonies, celebrations, commemoration, commissioning, launch, anniversary and festivals and promotions are the main activities
When not to use	Do not use on deal and Memorandum of Understanding signing ceremonies
Example	Chinese embassy celebrating Independence Day

259 Donation/Philanthropy

Code	Donation (259)
Brief Description	Donations of goods and other needs
Full Description	Events where organisations, companies or individuals donate goods, assets, and money among other such things

When to use this Code	Apply where the main activities are donations of goods, assets, and money among such things
When not to use	Do not apply where donations are not the main events
Example	Chinese firm donating food to the local community

260 Talks/Negotiation

Code	Talks (260)
Brief Description	Businesses negotiations
Full Description	Events where countries, companies and organisations are negotiating towards an agreement or a deal
When to use this Code	Apply where negotiation of business deals and agreements are the main activities
When not to use	Do not use on disputes or conflict (See
Example	China and Kenya bilateral talks

261 Tax Evasion/Tax deals

Code	Tax (261)
Brief Description	Tax evasion
Full Description	Tax evasion by companies and individuals
When to use this Code	Use where tax evasion is the main activity
When not to use	Do not use where the main activity is money laundering (see 267)
Example	Businessman arrested for tax evasion

262 Training/scholarships/University

Code	Training (262)
Brief Description	Student and professional training
Full Description	Educational and professional development of students and employees
When to use this Code	Apply where training is the main activity
When not to use	Do not use where training is not the main activity
Example	Student undergoing IT training

263 Holiday/tourism

Code	Tourism (263)
Brief Description	Private visits and tours
Full Description	Private visits and holiday by people from abroad
When to use this Code	Apply where foreigners are on private visits, holiday
When not to use	Do not use where the foreigners are on business and or state duty
Example	Chinese couple in Kenya

264 Marriage

Code	Marriage (264)
Brief Description	Matrimonial events
Full Description	Events such as court or religious marriage or wedding parties
When to use this Code	Apply where the main events are marriage or wedding parties

When not to use	Do not use where matrimonial events are not the main activities
Example	Chinese man marrying a Kenyan woman

265 Banking

Code	Banking (265)
Brief Description	Banking activities
Full Description	Where financial institutions are undertaking their day-to-day activities such as receiving, collecting, and paying customers
When to use this Code	Apply where banks or financial institutions are undertaking their duties
When not to use	Do not use where the bank is under construction or is in planning stages
Example	Bank lending money to a businessman in Kenya

266 Theft

Code	Theft (266)
Brief Description	Common theft
Full Description	Where the intentional and dishonest taking of what belongs to someone for the purposes of gaining from it is the main activity
When to use this Code	Apply where theft is the main subject of the article
When not to use	Do not use where the main subject and activity are violent crime such as armed robbery (see 294).
Example	Worker stealing tools from a Chinese company

267 Money laundering/capital flight/externalisation /Fraud

Code	Laundering (267)
Brief Description	Money laundering
Full Description	Converting money gained through criminal means into clean profit (Levi, 2002)
When to use this Code	Use where the attempt to or the actual act of concealing criminal proceeds and externalisation of profits are the main activities
When not to use	Do not use where money laundering and externalisation of profit are not the main subject
Example	Chinese national accused of money laundering

268 Bribery/extortion/blackmail

Code	Bribery (268)
Brief Description	Bribery and extortion
Full Description	The act of giving or offering a bribe; and gaining something from someone by instilling fear and by blackmail
When to use this Code	Apply where giving, offering and the taking of a bribe take place or are attempted; and where extortion is either attempted or done
When not to use	Never use where both bribe and extortion do not take place or were not attempted
Example	A person offering money to an immigration officer to let them pass without a passport; or someone threatening to expose someone unless they pay them cash

269 Immigration rules/visa application

Code	Immigration (269)
Brief Description	Immigration department activities
Full Description	Matters to do with the movement of people into and out of the country
When to use this Code	Apply where the processing of people by the immigration department is the main activity; this includes visa issuance, extradition, deportation, asylum, work permits.
When not to use	Do not use where immigration matters are not the main activities
Example	Deportation of illegal workers

270 Pollution/environmental damage

Code	Pollution (270)
Brief Description	Environmental pollution
Full Description	The contamination of the environment through chemicals, heat, light, or noise
When to use this Code	Apply where any form of pollution including sand poaching is the major activity and or the main subject of the article
When not to use	Do not apply where game poaching (see 271) is the main activity
Example	Residents complained of noise from the construction site

271 Poaching (includes theft of livestock)

Code	Poaching (271)
Brief Description	Illegal animal hunting and capturing
Full Description	The hunting and capturing of animals without permission from the property owner or relevant authorities

When to use this Code	Apply where poaching is the main activity and or subject of the article
When not to use	Do not apply where sand poaching is the main activity
Example	Chinese man charged with poaching

272 Tournament

Code	Tournament (272)
Brief Description	Sports games
Full Description	Competition in which sports teams play for a sponsored price
When to use this Code	Apply this in which teams of people compete for a sponsored price
When not to use	Do not apply in ceremonies and trade fairs
Example	Dynamos Football Club playing against Highlander Football Club in Zimbabwe

273 Offer/ Bid/Proposal

Code	Bid (273)
Brief Description	Show of interest
Full Description	The show of interest in some project and or company
When to use this Code	Apply where a show on interest is the main activity and or event or subject
When not to use	Do not use where the award of the tender is the main activity and or subject
Example	A Chinese firm showing interest in Zimbabwe diamonds

274 Manufacturing

Code	Manufacturing (274)
Brief Description	Industrial manufacturing of goods
Full Description	The manufacturing of goods in factories through manual labour and machinery
When to use this Code	Apply this where the actual manufacturing has commenced and is the main subject and or activity
When not to use	Do not use where the process is still at the deal signing or ceremony and or negotiation levels
Example	Workers manufacturing bags at a factory

275 Non-specific FDI

Code	FDI (275)
Brief Description	General Foreign Direct investment
Full Description	Foreign direct investment generally referred to without any specific sector being the main subject
When to use this Code	Apply where the article is generally referring to FDI
When not to use	Do not use where the specific investment sector is clearly the focus of the article
Example	Zimbabwe FDI declines sharply in 2000

276 Tender

Code	Tender (276)
Brief Description	Tender award
Full Description	The awarding of a tender following a bidding process

When to use this Code	Apply where a tender has been awarded following a bidding process
When not to use	Do not use where there has not been a tender bidding process
Example	A firm awarded a tender

277 Transport

Code	Transport (277)
Brief Description	Transportation of goods and people
Full Description	The movement of people and goods as well as the running and maintenance of the services and transport infrastructure
When to use this Code	Apply where the movement of goods and people as well as maintenance of the infrastructure are the main activities
When not to use	Do not use when deal-signing and the construction are the main activities and or subject
Example	Movement of cargo from the port to the factory

278 Protest

Code	Protest (278)
Brief Description	Protests and disputes
Full Description	Protests, marches, row, and disputes
When to use this Code	Apply where protests, marches, rows and disputes are the main activities and or subjects
When not to use	Do not use when the matter is in court
Example	Workers held a protest outside the company premises

279 Other

Code	Other (279)
Brief Description	Other activities
Full Description	Any other uncoded activities
When to use this Code	Apply where any other activity and or event is the main activity ad or subject
When not to use	
Example	

280 None

Code	None (280)
Brief Description	No activity
Full Description	Neither event nor specific activity
When to use this Code	Apply where neither activity nor specific event is the subject
When not to use	Do not use where there is a specific event as the main activity
Example	Overall analysis of the general political situation

281 Variety

Code	Variety (281)
Brief Description	A variety of activities
Full Description	A mixture of activities and or events
When to use this Code	Apply where events and or activities are so mixed that none of them is the main subject

When not to use	Do use where activities are not mixed
Example	In feature articles describing different activities and events to make sense

282 Meeting, farewell, reception and consultation, conference also public lecturing, seminar

Code	Meeting (282)
Brief Description	Formal gatherings for deliberations
Full Description	Formal meetings where people are discussing something
When to use this Code	Apply where people are gathered in conferences, seminars, workshops, consultation meetings, farewell receptions, public lectures
When not to use	Do not apply in launch, ceremonies, festivals, and commemorations
Example	African and Chinese leaders conference

283 Mandarin use

Code	Mandarin (283)
Brief Description	Mandarin use
Full Description	Usage of the Chinese language also referred to as Mandarin as the main subject and or activity
When to use this Code	Apply where the usage of mandarin is the main activity and or subject
When not to use	Do not apply where Mandarin use is not the activity and or subject
Example	Universities introducing Mandarin into the curriculum

284 Yuan circulation/use

Code	Yuan (284)
Brief Description	Yuan use
Full Description	Usage of the Chinese Yuan currency as the main subject and or activity
When to use this Code	Apply where the usage of the Chinese Yuan is the main activity and or subject
When not to use	Do not apply where Yuan use is not the activity and or subject
Example	Bank transacting in the Yuan currency

285 Research (Survey etc)

Code	Research (285)
Brief Description	Academic and scientific research
Full Description	Scientific and academic research activities as the main activity
When to use this Code	Apply this code where scientists and academics or other professionals are engaged in research
When not to use	Do not use where research is not the main activity and or subject
Example	Chinese scientist in Ghana to study Africa traditional medicine

286 Elections/campaign/rally

Code	Polls (286)
Brief Description	Elections

Full Description	Campaign rallies, elections and run offs
When to use this Code	Apply where the main activities elections, campaign rallies and run offs.
When not to use	Do not apply where elections, rallies and run offs are not the main activities
Example	Zimbabwe elections

287 Court cases (Lawsuit/injunction/Appeal, charge, trial)

Code	Court (287)
Brief Description	Court cases and processes
Full Description	Court cases and processes such as lawsuits, appeals and injunctions
When to use this Code	Apply in civil cases only
When not to use	Do not apply in criminal cases
Example	Company suing another company

288 Mining

Code	Mining (288)
Brief Description	Extraction of minerals
Full Description	The mining of minerals and related activities
When to use this Code	Apply where mining activities are the main subject and or activity
When not to use	Do not apply in deal signing and exploration stages
Example	Chinese firm mining diamonds in Zimbabwe

289 Agriculture/Farming

Code	Agriculture (289)
Brief Description	Farming activities
Full Description	Cultivation of plants and livestock
When to use this Code	Apply where agricultural activities are the main subject and or activity
When not to use	Do not apply in deal signing and at exploration level
Example	Farming cotton

290 Construction (infrastructural development)

Code	Construction (290)
Brief Description	Infrastructural construction
Full Description	The construction of roads, dams, buildings other forms infrastructural development
When to use this Code	Apply this where the actual construction has started and ongoing or on temporary hold
When not to use	Do not apply where the activity is exploration or deal signing
Example	Construction of dam started

291 Parliamentary events (parliamentary debate or hearing)

Code	Parliament
Brief Description	Parliamentary processes

Full Description	Parliamentary processes such as debates, hearings, and lobbying by interest groups
When to use this Code	Apply this where parliamentary processes are the main activity and or subject
When not to use	Do not use where construction of the parliamentary building is the main subject or activity
Example	Company executives being quizzed by MPs

292 Smuggling/Trafficking

Code	Smuggling (292)
Brief Description	Smuggling activities and cases
Full Description	The illegal taking of goods and people in and out of the country
When to use this Code	Apply where smuggling and trafficking (including cases dealing with the same) are main activity and or subject
When not to use	Do not apply where the smuggling is of live animals
Example	The smuggling of fake products into Zimbabwe

293 Common Assault

Code	Assault (293)
Brief Description	Common assault
Full Description	Physical fights and assaults
When to use this Code	Apply where fights and assaults are the main subject and or activity
When not to use	Do not use in gun and other types of armed crime
Example	Chinese workers and Kenyan workers in fist fight

294 Armed crime (Murder/attempted murder/shooting/robbery/abduction)

Code	Armed (294)
Brief Description	Armed and fatal criminal conduct
Full Description	Acts of murder, attempted murder, shooting, armed robbery, abduction, rape and other forms of violent crime
When to use this Code	Apply where any form of violent is the main activity and or subject
When not to use	Do not apply where common theft or common assault is the main activity and or subject
Example	Man accused of murdering a tourist

295 Closure (raid, seizure, tender cancellation, disqualification)

Code	Closure (295)
Brief Description	End of an activity or company
Full Description	The closure, ban or disqualification of an organisation and or activity
When to use this Code	Apply where a company or organisation or activity is seized, raided, banned, closed, or disqualified by authorities or due to other circumstances
When not to use	Do not apply where ban, closure, raid, seizure, tender cancellation or disqualification are not the main activities and or subjects
Example	Chinese firm raided and ordered closed

296 Energy/Power

Code	Energy (296)
Brief Description	Energy and or power
Full Description	Provision of light, heat to homes and or work machines
When to use this Code	Apply where the provision of power is the main subject and or activity including repairs and upgrades of stations
When not to use	Do use on deal signing and dam construction
Example	Energy firm supplying power to homes

297 Espionage/Hacking

Code	Espionage (297)
Brief Description	Spying
Full Description	The act of secretly and illegally collecting and relaying information about another country
When to use this Code	Apply where the main subject and or activity is the illegal collection and reporting of information about another country
When not to use	Do not apply where espionage is not the main activity and or subject
Example	Foreigners accused of collecting information in Kenya without permission

298 Accident

Code	Accident (298)
Brief Description	Work, traffic, and other accidents
Full Description	The injury and killing of people as well as the destruction of property and or infrastructure due to accidents

When to use this Code	Use where work, traffic and other accidents are the main subject and or activities
When not to use	Do not use where violent crime or other intentional harming of people and or property are the main activities
Example	People dying due to the collapse of a bridge

Activity in researched country (AC-Re Country)

300 Deal/Loan signing & joint venture (See 250)

301 Trade (See 251)

302 State visit (See 252)

303 Exploration (See 253)

304 Purchase (See 254)

305 Exchange (See 255)

306 Exports (See 257)

307 Imports (See 256)

308 Ceremony/Celebration/Commemoration (258)

309 Donation/Philanthropy (See 259)

310 Invitation/offer

Code	Offer
Brief Description	Offer of an opportunity
Full Description	Firm invited to take up an opportunity
When to use this Code	Apply this where a company is invited to take up an opportunity

When not to use	Do not use where a tender has been granted or where a bidding process took place.
Example	Kenyan president inviting Chinese firm to Kenya

311 Theft (See 266)

312 Training (See 262)

313 Espionage (See 297)

314 Marriage (See 264)

315 Mining (See 288)

316 Tax evasion (See 261)

317 Money laundering (See 267)

318 Bribery (See 268)

319 Immigration (See 269)

320 Publishing

Code	Publishing
Brief Description	Publication of information
Full Description	The publication of information by media houses
When to use this Code	Apply where publishing and broadcasting through print, online and airwaves is the main subject and or activity
When not to use	Do no use where the main subject is not publishing
Example	A Chinese media company publishing newspapers in Kenya

321 Poaching (See 271)

- 322 Tournament (See 272)
- 323 Tourism (See 263)
- 324 Research (See 285)
- 325 Manufacturing (See 274)
- 326 FDI (See 275)
- 327 Agriculture/Farming (See 289)
- 328 Transport (See 279)
- 329 Dispute/March/protest/row (See 278)
- 330 Other (See 279)
- 331 None (See 280)
- 332 Variety/General; (See 281)
- 333 Yuan Circulation (See 284)
- 334 Meeting and Consultation/conference (See 282)
- 335 Mandarin Use (See 283)
- 336 Elections (See 286)
- 337 Banking (See 265)
- 338 Lawsuit/appeal/injunction/legislation (See 287)
- 339 Peacekeeping

Code	Peacekeeping
Brief Description	Post conflict actions to maintain peace
Full Description	Actions taken to maintain peace in conflict afflicted areas

When to use this Code	Apply where states and other international organisations are maintaining peace
When not to use	Do not use in mere police arrests for riots and demonstrations
Example	Kenyan army deployed to patrol the border with Ethiopia

340 Construction (See 290)

341 Bid/Proposal (See 273)

342 Smuggling (See 292)

Activity in another African country

350 Deal/Loan signing & joint venture (See 250)

351 Trade, expo/exhibition (See 251)

352 State visit & trips, tour (See 252)

353 Exploration (See 253)

354 Exports (See 257)

355 Imports (See 256)

356 Purchase (See 254)

357 Exchange (See 255)

358 Ceremony/Celebration/Commemoration (See 258)

359 Donation/Philanthropy (See 259)

360 Publishing (See 320)

361 Construction (See 290)

362 Theft (See 266)

- 363 Training (See 262)
- 364 Banking (See 265)
- 365 Marriage (See 264)
- 366 Mining (See 288)
- 367 Tax evasion (See 261)
- 368 Money laundering/capital flight/externalisation (See 267)
- 369 Bribery (See 268)
- 370 Immigration (See 269)
- 371 Poaching (See 271)
- 372 Tournaments (See 272)
- 373 Tourism (See 263)
- 374 Research (See 285)
- 375 Manufacturing (See 274)
- 376 FDI (See 275)
- 377 Agriculture/Farming (See 289)
- 378 Transport (See 277)
- 379 Dispute/March/Protest (See 278)
- 380 None (See 280)
- 381 Variety (See 281)
- 382 Yuan Circulation (See 284)
- 383 Mandarin use (See 283)

384 Meeting, consultation, conference (See 282)

384 Elections (See 286)

385 Invitation/offer (See 310)

386 Peace Keeping (See 339)

387 Espionage (See 297)

388 Talks/Negotiations (See 260)

389 Ban, closure, cancellation (See 295)

390 Bid/Proposal (See 273)

391 Other (See 279)

Activity in China

399 Election (See 286)

400 Deal/Loan signing & joint venture (See 250)

401 Trade, expo/exhibition (See 251)

402 State visit (See 252)

403 Exploration (See 253)

404 Exports (See 257)

405 Imports (See 256)

406 Purchase (See 254)

407 Exchange (See 255)

408 Ceremony/Celebration/Commemoration (See 258)

409 Donation/Philanthropy (See 259)

- 410 Publishing
- 411 Construction (See 290)
- 412 Tax Evasion (See 261)
- 413 Training/scholarship/University (See 262)
- 414 Banking (See 265)
- 415 Marriage (See 264)
- 416 Mining (See 288)
- 417 Theft (See 266)
- 418 Money laundering (See 267)
- 419 Bribery (See 268)
- 420 Immigration (See 269)
- 421 Poaching (See 271)
- 422 Tournament (See 272)
- 423 Tourism (See 263)
- 424 Research (See 285)
- 425 Manufacturing (See 274)
- 426 FDI (See 275)
- 427 Agriculture/Farming (See 289)
- 428 Transport (See 277)
- 429 Dispute/March protest/row (See 278)
- 430 None (See 280)

431 Variety (See 281)

432 Yuan Circulation (See 284)

433 Mandarin use (See 283)

434 Meeting, consultation, conference (See 282)

435 Other (See 279)

436 Lobbying (See 291)

437 Talks/negotiation (See 260)

438 Ban/Closure (See 295)

439 Bid/Proposal (See 273)

Relations

China is promoting its party army model (conflation of the ruling party and the national army) in Africa and has set up politico-military schools across Africa, further deepening its military ties with the continent (Nantulya, 2020). Also, China was generally seen as having been behind the Zimbabwe coup which toppled Robert Mugabe in 2017 (Hartmann and Noesselt, 2020). As such, it is important to study the trends in the reportage about this military aspect of China-Africa relations. According to Locke et al (2016), at the core of coding is generation of “named groupings of observations and relationships” (codes) (Locke et al., 2016, p. 372).

440 Military x military

Code	Military x military (440)
Brief Description	Military to military engagements
Full Description	Stories that show engagements between the Chinese military and the African country military

When to use this Code	Use this code on articles that show engagements between the Chinese and African country armies
When not to use	Do not apply this code on stories that do not show an engagement between the Chinese and the African country armies
Example	The Chinese army donated new equipment to the Nigerian army

441 Military x civil

Code	Military x civil (441)
Brief Description	Military to civilian engagements
Full Description	Engagements between the Chinese military and the civilian institutions or organisations of an African country
When to use this Code	Apply this code on stories that show engagements between the Chinese army and the civilians (including institutions and organisations) of an African country
When not to use	Never use this code on stories that do not show Chinese Army to African civilian engagement
Example	Chinese army donated blankets to Nairobi Hospital

442 Civil x civil

Code	Civil x Civil (442)
Brief Description	Civilian to Civilian engagements
Full Description	Engagements between Chinese civilians and African country civilians
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories showing engagements between Chinese and African civilians
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories showing any other engagements apart from civilian-to-civilian engagements

Example	Chinese firm employs 20 Nigerians
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Authorship

Earlier categories mentioned the different newspapers and different types of news reports and stated the need to balance between different kinds of news reporting. For the same reason, it is important to code the authorship of every story whether it is by the Chinese state sponsored news agency *Xinhua* or *Reuters* or a columnist or African journalists sponsored by China.

500-African News Agency (ANA)

Code	ANA (500)
Brief Description	African News Agency
Full Description	The African News Agency (ANA) based in Cape Town, South Africa.
When to use this Code	Use this code in every story regardless of style or subject signed or by-lined ANA
When not to use	Do not apply this code on any story that is not written by or signed ANA
Example	By ANA or ANA

501-Agence France Presse (AFP)

Code	AFP (501)
Brief Description	Agence France Presse (AFP)
Full Description	Agence France Presse (AFP), an international news agency based in France
When to use this Code	Use this code on all relevant, coded types of articles signed or by-lined Agence France Presse (AFP)

When not to use	Do not use on any story not signed or by-lined AFP
Example	By AFP or AFP

502 Associated Press (AP)

Code	AP (502)
Brief Description	Associated Press (AP)
Full Description	The Associated Press (AP) no-profit news agency based in the US
When to use this Code	Apply this code on all stories signed or by-lined Associated Press (AP)
When not to use	Do not use this code on any story not signed or by-lined AP
Example	By AP or AP

503 Reuters

Code	Reuters (503)
Brief Description	Reuters news agency
Full Description	Reuters, an international news agency owned by Thompson Reuters
When to use this Code	Use this code on all stories signed or by-lined Reuters
When not to use	Do not apply this code on any story not signed or by-lined Reuters
Example	By Reuters or Reuters or Thompson Reuters

504 IPS

Code	IPS (504)
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Brief Description	Inter Press Service (IPS)
Full Description	Inter Press Service (IPS), a global news agency
When to use this Code	Use this code on all stories signed or by-lined Inter Press Service (IPS)
When not to use	Do not apply this code on all stories that are not signed or by-lined Inter Press Service (IPS)
Example	By IPS or IPS

505 Bloomberg

Code	Bloomberg (505)
Brief Description	Bloomberg Press or News
Full Description	Bloomberg Press or News, a part of the Bloomberg LP, a US-based private financial, software, data and media company.
When to use this Code	Use this code on all stories signed or by-lined Bloomberg
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories that are not signed or by-lined Bloomberg
Example	By Bloomberg or Bloomberg News/Press

506 Staff Reporter

Code	Staff Reporter (506)
Brief Description	Staff reporter or writer
Full Description	A writer working for the newspaper publishing the story who can also be named by his for her name or the newspaper name.

When to use this Code	Use this on stories signed or by-lined staff reporter/writer or stories where a reporter or the publication is mentioned in the by-line
When not to use	Do not use this on stories not signed or by-lined staff reporter/writer or stories where a reporter or the publication are not mentioned in the by-line
Example	Staff Reporter or Guardian Reporter or John Kamau

507 Others

Code	Others (507)
Brief Description	Other writers or agencies
Full Description	Other writers or news agencies that have not been coded under Category 7 because of their nonrelevance
When to use this Code	Use this on stories assigned to un-coded writers or news agencies
When not to use	Do not use on stories written by coded agencies and, therefore, relevant writers
Example	By Express News or Express News

508 Unassignable/Silent

Code	Unassignable/Silent (508)
Brief Description	Not attributed to any writer or agency
Full Description	Stories not assigned to anybody or stories silent on the author or source
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories that are not attributed to anybody or any agency or source

When not to use	Do not use this code on stories attributed to some named writer or source
Example	

509 Travelling staff Reporter

Code	Travelling staff writer (509)
Brief Description	Staff writer travelling abroad
Full Description	Staff writers travelling abroad to cover specific assignments like conferences
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories attributed to a newspaper staff writer travelling abroad with the country's leader to cover conferences, workshops
When not to use	Do not use this code on any other writer who is not a travelling staff writer
Example	Herald Reporter in Beijing or James Darwin reporting from Beijing

510 Special correspondent

Code	Special Correspondent (510)
Brief Description	Signed or by-lined Special Correspondent
Full Description	Correspondents based either in another country or in another province or town within the country writing special pieces for the newspaper
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories signed or by-lined Special Correspondent
When not to use	Do not use on stories that are not signed or by-lined Special Correspondent

Example	By Special Correspondent or Special Correspondent
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511 Experts/specialists/analyst

Code	Experts (511)
Brief Description	Specialists or experts writing on some issues
Full Description	Contributors with specialist knowledge or expertise in some area analysing some topical issues
When to use this Code	Use this code on opinionated articles clearly contributed by specialists or experts in some area they are analysing
When not to use	Do not apply this code on articles whose writers are not credited as experts, specialists, or analysts
Example	John Dew is a banker or John Maxwell is an economist

512 Xinhua

Code	Xinhua (512)
Brief Description	Xinhua News Agency
Full Description	Xinhua News Agency or China News Agency; China government run news agency
When to use this Code	Use this code on all stories signed or by-lined Xinhua or China News Agency
When not to use	Do not apply on stories that are not signed or by-lined Xinhua or China News Agency
Example	By Xinhua or Xinhua

513 Chinese officials

Code	Chinese officials (513)
Brief Description	Chinese government officials
Full Description	Official members of the Chinese government and state departments including diplomats
When to use this Code	Apply this code on stories attributed to Chinese government officials including diplomats
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories not attributed to Chinese government officials
Example	Xi Jinping is the President of the People’s Republic of China or Boa is China’s ambassador to Nigeria

514 Research country government official

Code	Research Country officials (514)
Brief Description	Officials from the research country government
Full Description	Official members of the government and state departments of any of the African countries under research including their diplomats
When to use this Code	Apply this code on stories attributed to officials of the research country’s government
When not to use	Do not use this code on stories not attributed to people who are not officials of the research government
Example	Dodo is Nigeria’s minister of foreign affairs

515 Other African country government officials

Code	African government officials (515)
Brief Description	Other African government officials

Full Description	Officials of any other African government apart from the research country governments
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories attributed to officials from any other African government apart from those of research countries
When not to use	Never use this code on stories attributed to anyone who is not an official of any African country which is not listed as a research country
Example	Zu is Egypt's minister of information

516 Western country government officials

Code	Western government officials (516)
Brief Description	Official from any Western government
Full Description	Any officials from any Western country government
When to use this Code	Use this code on stories written by officials from any Western country government
When not to use	Never apply this code on any story written by anyone who is not an official of any Western country
Example	George Osborne is Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer

517 South China Morning Post

Code	Morning Post (517)
Brief Description	South China Morning Post
Full Description	Hong Kong based South China Morning Post newspaper owned by Alibaba Group
When to use this Code	Use this code only on stories signed or by-lined South China Morning Post

When not to use	Never apply this code on stories not attributed to South China Morning Post
Example	Taken from South China Morning Post or South China Morning Post

518 Editor's View

Code	Editor's View (518)
Brief Description	Editor's personal thoughts
Full Description	A column or piece in which any one of the newspaper's senior editors airs their personal thoughts on topical issues
When to use this Code	Use this on personal opinion articles attributed to any of the senior editors of the newspaper
When not to use	Never apply this code to articles not attributed to a senior editor of the newspaper
Example	David James is The Herald managing editor. This is his personal view

519 Sponsored content/journalist

Code	Sponsored (519)
Brief Description	Sponsored journalist
Full Description	Content by a journalist or writer on some sponsored training or trip
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles attributed to a sponsored writer
When not to use	Never use this code on articles that are not attributed to a sponsored writer

Example	Lovemore Dube is in China on a three-month training programme sponsored by the Chinese Embassy in Harare
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520 NAN

Code	NAN (520)
Brief Description	Nigerian news agency
Full Description	Content by a News Agency of Nigeria
When to use this Code	Use this code on articles attributed to NAN
When not to use	Never use this code on articles that are not attributed to NAN
Example	By NAN
