THE RELEVANCE OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

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Appreciation

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Abstract

The territorial formations of African modern nation-states, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, discussed in this study are unique in their development since the levers for rationalizing the obligations of duty and concern between the nation's administrative structures and the indigenous nation-community were imposed by 'colonial settlers' with neither ethnic nor native allegiance to the indigenous inhabitants. The motivation for the 'colonial settlers' ranges from the formation of a nation-state superimposed on existing ethnic nations for an imported community of black people unable to find accommodation as legitimate identities elsewhere, to the financial prospecting for wealth. Regardless of the motivation for colonial settlements, in all three instances of territorial conversion into modern nation states, the colonial identity structures clashed with the ethnic nation's identity structures. The imported identity traditions used to establish legitimate and functional identities of the nation-state subverted and replaced the pre-colonial ethnic nation's customs and mechanisms used for identifying the people of the ethnic nation. This subversion disrupted the relationship between the inhabitants of the nation-community, their inherited allegiance to the nation-state and the associations between the indigenous inhabitants and the settlers.

Consequently, this thesis seeks to examine the fractures in the evolution of national-identity within nation-states that have used unfamiliar European and colonial identity management structures and mechanisms. While the Liberia and Sierra Leone systems of identity administration that have resulted in nation-state collapse contrast with the endurance and integrity of Zambia's national-identity ecosystem, all three countries based their systems on the unfamiliar European national identity structures and mechanisms. Using qualitative analysis, and inductive logic, the thesis rejects Davis and

Huttenback's theory that views the national identities of post-colonial communities as a result of the transformation of the component identities of the indigenous inhabitants and 'colonial settlers'. Further, it challenges Basil Davidson, and Walter Rodney's wholesale renunciation of modernity in the identity-management ecosystems of these nation-states.

The findings of the study revealed that as much as primordial ethnic identity anchors remain strong, purposely designed national identity instruments and tools that promote recognition, equity and parity such as Zambian Humanism, will sustain multiple ethnic identities within a structured nation-state. Building on the research, the study recommends a blended approach to identity management in sub-Saharan nation-states conceived to promote sustained national identity ecosystems for development and *patria potestas* in contrast to imported and completely alien national identity solutions in the nation formation process.

Contents

Acronyms, Abbreviations

Acronym / Abbreviations	Name in Full
AASS	American Anti-Slavery Society
ACS	American Colonization Society
AFASS	American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society
AMU	Northern Rhodesian African Mineworkers' Union
APC	All People's Congress
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAF	Central African Federation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (of The United States of America)
CRBP	Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor
EMA	Election Management Authority
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IT	Information Technology
KYC	Know Your Customer
MOJA	Movement for Justice in Africa
MRU	Mano River Union
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAL	Progressive Alliance for Liberia
Q and A	Questions and Answers
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal (World Bank)
SLC	Sierra Leone Company
SLTRC	Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
SPI	Social Progress Index
UN (O)	United Nations Organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNIP	United National Independence Party
US(A)	United States of America
WW1	World War I
WW2	World War II

Key Terms and Distinct Terminology

Key Term Distinct Terminology	Explanation
Breeder Documents	A document or certificate that proves the origin of an identity and therefore allows a person to apply for an Entitlement Document, such as Driver's Licence or Passport. A breeder document may or may not contain an identity component of the bearer. Some educational certificates are breeder documents but do not have the date or place of birth of the holder (identity components), but are sufficient breeder documents when combined with other documents that have identity components.
Colonialists	People who advocated but not necessarily participated in the physical colonisation of the other's territory.
Colonist	People who actually left their land or territory of origin and settled and colonised another territory.
Entitlement Documents	Documents or certificates that uniquely entitles a person to the performance of an activity, a profession, or the freedom of an association. They are usually issued or granted by institutions of the nation-state after the completion of tests and confirmation of the existence of an actual person. Examples are national passports, driver's licence, medical practitioner's licence, lawyer's licence or club membership card.
Functional Identity	The proofs, including the name, date and place of birth and address, of a person's existence that entitles the person to apply for an entitlement document. Ordinarily, it is with a functional identity that a person is acknowledged as corporeal and is either granted a privilege or has restrictions imposed on him/her. Such privileges are not entitlements but identity transactions. A 'functional identity' is not necessarily equivalent to a national-identity. For instance, a 'refugee identity' is a 'functional identity' sufficient to obtain the entitlement of a driver's licence. This 'refugee functional identity' may also be adequately prosecuted but is not equivalent to a 'national identity' that grants the privilege of a passport.

Identity Eco-system	The concepts of identity eco-system and national-identity management eco-system are interlinked. They refer to a social identification system within a community setting where all the people within the community are registered in various seemingly independent data-bases for social, professional and entitlement activities.
	While these may start with birth certificates and national identification cards, the eco-system would extend to passports, educational certificates, economic, health and social entitlement privileges.
Identity Document	This is a document or certificate with unique parameters that attests to the existence of a person's identity.
	Traditionally, the unique parameters have been full name, date and place of birth. Other than Siamese twins given identical names, the occurrence of identical name, place and date of birth parameters is statistically exceptionally rare.
	Increasingly today, the addition of biometric data such as fingerprints for adults or footprints for new-borns, have been included along with the other traditional parameters. Examples of 'Identity Documents' are Birth Certificates, National ID cards,
Identification Transaction	The concept of an identification transaction describes an event or a process that involves the demonstration of a functional identity by one party (the 'Demander'), verified by the other party (the 'Grantor'), who is the administrator and responsible for granting a privilege or entitlement to the owner of the functional identity.
	In an identity transaction, the authenticity and validity of the Identity or Entitlement Document (containing the functional identity) presented to the Administrator has to be verified and the legitimacy of the person proved prior to the granting of the privilege or entitlement.
	Examples of identity transactions are travellers who present travel documents such as passports and visas at a country's entry-port to an Immigration Officer. The Immigration Officer as Grantor will grant the traveller (the 'Demander'), the right to enter the country and categorize the traveller as a visitor or citizen.
	Banks engage in identity transactions with potential clients during the 'Know Your Client' (KYC), and continually engage in identity transactions every time banking services such as cash withdrawals are performed by the bank on behalf of their clients.
Pilgrims	This refers to emancipated slaves and their descendants who were fleeing servitude in North America, Europe and European colonies in pursuit of their ancestral cradle yet they ended up colonising territories in Africa.
Sub-Sahara	A geographic description of countries in Africa south of the Sahara Desert.

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1. Introduction

In any contemporary environment, it is impracticable for a person to interact with another person without a functional identity within familiar identity structures that give meaning to the interactions. Functional identities, their inter-relationships and their equitable administration by the institutions of the community assures their survival and perpetuity. The 'Age of Modernity' that began in the late seventeenth century with the formation of modern nation-states from ethnic communities gave to the institutions and structures of nation-states the absolute monopoly to grant functional identities. The creation of nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa started not with the conversion of ethnic communities and nations into the modernity of nation-states, but rather with the success of the communities and nation-states of Europe imposing their version of modernity over the ethnic nations of sub-Saharan Africa. The imposition of European modernity arrived in sub-Sahara Africa as settler domination and colonisation.

This study is about how these identities within selected sub-Saharan Africa nation-states are managed, the development of identity structures operative in these nation-states, the relevance and effect of the identity management to the survival of these nation-states. A nation-state is non-existent without the people with the national-identities that make up the nation-community and nation-state. The sub-Saharan countries selected for the study are Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. Figure 1. Below shows the Political Map of Africa with the study countries Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia circled in red.

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Figure 1. Political Map of Africa

1.1.   Rationale for the Countries Chosen for The Study

These three countries Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia were chosen to enable a wide geographical study range between West Africa and South-Central Africa. Liberia is selected for this study because of its self-claim never to have undergone European colonisation although its colonisation by the USA is evident and documented. Amongst the nation-states of Africa, Liberia has evidence of self-governance since 1847, however, the formation of what became the nation-state, was by an Act of (US) Congress of 1819 authorising the acquisition and 'settlement' in Africa. The 'settlement' began in 1822 and was governed by Congress appointed governors between 1822 to 1847. 'The Elizabeth', the first African ex-slave ship, left New York and docked with eighty-six (86) settlers on the West coast of Africa. Reminiscent of the maiden voyage of The Mayflower[1], with Puritans fleeing English persecution to settle in the 'New World', the voyagers aboard The Elizabeth[2] fleeing slavery in America in 1820, decades later nicknamed the ship The Elizabeth 'The Mayflower of Liberia'. The modern nation of Liberia was formed as an independent nation-state in 1847. While the American Colonisation Society (ACS), an unlikely alliance of the US legislator, the Congress, sponsored the voyage, other patrons and promoters of the voyage included individual politicians, religious leaders, Quakers and rather remarkably some slave owners. The emancipated slaves 'returned' to Africa endeavouring to obtain a legitimacy of identity and in the process, with the use of

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[1] The Mayflower is the name of the ship that transported pilgrim English families the 'New World' in 1620, later to become the USA. The motivation for the voyage was to 'seek a better world' and escape the impiety of both the Church of England and the Catholic Church.

[2] The Elizabeth was the actual name of the ship that transported emancipated and manumitted slave families from USA to settle on the West Coast of Africa which later became the Republic of Liberia.

mechanical ammunition and administrative coercion, gained dominance over the indigenous people in the territory. They created sub-Sahara Africa's first written and formal constitution, which institutionalised national governance and the 'separation of powers' that led Liberia to be recognised as an independent Republic with a seat at the United Nations in 1945. Figure 2 below depicts the Political Map of Liberia.

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Figure 2. Political Map of Liberia

Sierra Leone is selected as the second study country mainly because, Freetown the capital city of Sierra Leone, is acknowledged as the first real British Colony on African soil. It was selected because in contrast to Liberia that attempts to repudiate its colonial past, the Sierra Leone nation-state reveres its affiliation and colonial history with Britain. Pre-colonisation and at the height of the resistance to the Atlantic slave

trade, Freetown is known to have been a very cosmopolitan settlement attracting hundreds of people with and without legitimate and functional identities. Also known as the 'Province of Freedom', besides freemen, emancipated and escaped slaves, it attracted freed prisoners from The Caribbean. As early as 1792 the Freetown settlement had a thriving community of freed slaves and as such it became the centre for the slave-trade abolitionist movement. As well the fleeing slaves from other colonised territories, Freetown and the surrounding territory became a haven and refuge settlement of the persecuted communities from elsewhere in Africa. The territory that became the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone in 1808 was settled by Africans, Europeans, and other ethnic communities living freely in the territory and recognising each other's identities as valid for legitimate interaction. Sierra Leone is depicted in Figure 3 below.

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Figure 3. Political Map of Sierra Leone

Critically, the arrivals from Nova Scotia[3] were already recognised with a category of national-identity before they arrived in Africa to adopt another national identity. By 1786, following several years of a vociferous campaigning by the 'Clapham Sect'[4] and the circulation of two landmark publications, Thomas Clarkson's '*Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species'* and Ottobah Cuguano's *'Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species'*, slave ownership in Britain and across the British Empire became increasingly unacceptable. Although in deplorable conditions, many Black and Asian slaves were released by their British slave-owners into even worse conditions on the streets of Britain. In 1787 The Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor (CRBP) and the growing anti-slavery lobby organised the resettlement of the freed destitute slaves to the African territory that became Freetown (Braidwood, 1994).

Zambia, previously known as Northern Rhodesia, was selected because of its South/Central Africa location. As a land-locked nation-state, it has a unique diversity of nomadic migratory and static genealogical Bantu[5] descendants who dominate the

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[3] Nova Scotia was a North American British colony (later to become Canada) the *émigrés* to Freetown were additionally keen to maintain their newly elevated status as military ex-service men and escape their slave identities and cohabitation with the European colonialists in Nova Scotia.

[4] The Clapham Sect was a group of social reformers of the day that included powerful opinion leaders, bankers and members of the House of Commons such as William Wilberforce, Henry Thornton, Beilby Porteous, the Bishop of London, Granville Sharp, Thomas Clarkson who eventually organized the Sierra Leone expeditions that founded the colony.

[5] Bantu people are not classified as an ethic community but as an ethnic gene-pool. Today they are comprised of over 90 million people spread over 225 ethnic groups in Sub-Sahara Africa, from the West Coast of Africa covering Central African and the Great Lakes Region of Southern Africa (Lockard, 2011).

region. From Northern Rhodesia governed by a Chartered[6] company beginning in 1911, to a British Crown Protectorate in 1924, and again in 1953 to a Federation with Southern Rhodesia that disintegrated in 1963, Zambia became an independent nation-state in 1964. Throughout its various incarnations that begun 1911, Zambia has experienced an extraordinary set of governance transitions that shaped its modern state. Governed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1923, it was spurned as an economic burden with supposedly little economic value in 1924 (Gann, 1969). However, when Southern Rhodesia rekindled its desire to become a self-governing state the British moved to regain control of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because of the rising economic fortunes of the Copperbelt. The British House of Commons set up the Central African Federation (CAF) that served to recognise and admitted the flawed foundations for the federation as a "separate and uniform African ethnic" culture of the three territories (Cooper, 2018 p. 67). During the House of Commons debate concerning CAF, the Minister, Oliver Lyttelton, acknowledged that the culture of the inhabitants of the federation were sufficiently different so much so that a legal constitution, fundamental to the governance of any legitimate nation-state, would be impossible to establish (Viscount Chandos, 1953). Nevertheless, the British Government allowed itself to be forced by the self-governing white Southern Rhodesian government into enacting the law that set up the Central African Federation (Richardson, 1959). The three reasons for the federation were, principally for the governing class of white Southern Rhodesia to gain access to the copper mines of

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[6] Chartered companies like the British South African Company (BSAC) were commercial privately-owned companies that were given governing rights over colonial territories and protectorates and exploitation of mineral resources in return.

Northern Rhodesia's Copper belt. Secondly to tap the cheap labour of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and thirdly to protect the white settlers emigrating from Southern Rhodesia from the Northern Rhodesian civil service, which by 1950 had a sizeable black African membership.

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Figure 4. Political Map of Zambia

1.2. Research Overview

The management of identities within the nation-state structure has been a challenge for many countries in sub-Sahara. This lack of efficient national-identity management ecosystems is a major threat to the governance and stability of these nations. Ancestral lineage linked to clans created conditions of continued stability in communities where individuals of a shared culture and a common system of values recognised ethnic identity that brought a permanence of *patria potestas* to communities in sub-Sahara Africa prior to colonisation. This research aims to critically examine whether imposed and injudicious frontiers created in sub-Saharan Africa led to imbalanced and unnegotiated national communities with divergent aspirations to use ill-suited identity management structures.

Historians such as Davidson (1980 p. 271) connect the enforced migratory history of the 'Atlantic Slave Trade' as one of the major disruptions that arrested ethnic nations evolving into successful modern nation-states. Davidson argues that, 'the depopulation of the continent although grave is negligible compared to the loss of identity of the victims of the Atlantic Slave Trade' (p.41). He presents the victims of the trade, not only as the freemen forcibly removed from Africa forced to lose their identity and endure 'slaveship' as a culture, but also those left behind on the African continent, unable to develop their ethnic governance institutions and nation-communities into modern nation-states. Others like Nunn (2010), and Rodney (2018), whilst agreeing with Davidson that the Atlantic Slave trade "had an adverse effect on Africa's long-term economic development" (pp.142-143), link this economic argument and under-development not to modern nation-states but to swathes of Africa's regions.

Irrespective of the slave-trade, Rodney (2018), interweaves the development and prosperity of communities in Africa to comparable nebulous nation-state status of fifteenth century Europe, "after surveying fifteenth century [Africa] and Europe, the difference in the two was in no way a discredit to Africa" (p.83). While both schools of thought offer alternative explanations to the stunted sub-Saharan development trajectory, this study believes that neither Davidson's (1980) isolation of slavery as impacting the development of nation-states nor Rodney's (2018) unwillingness to delineate development attributable to each modern nation-state is correct.

The study seeks to demonstrate that the concepts put forward by Basil Davidson and Walter Rodney that segregates economic development and the formation of successful nation-states have been inadequate in explaining the under-development, civil war and disintegration of nation-states that have plagued sub-Saharan Africa. This study seeks to examine the two narratives and the relevance of identity management explored through the heritage of ethnic identity. Within ethnic nations, ethnic identities were managed by ethnic institutions, however, in the creation of nation-states the ethnic identities became national-identities managed by institutions of the nation-state. The research will investigate the subsequent correlation between the 'Partitioning of Africa' that resulted in colonisation and re-demarcation of ancestral ethnic territories which already contained resident communities. The people were relocated into modern nation-states with transformed national-identities. Sub-Sahara nation-states, have experienced more disruptions to the nation-state, such as *coup-d'états*, that directly impact and disrupt national-identity management and the nation-community. The study will explore the arguments and issues relating to the identity

structures of the nation-states of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia and how each nation's institutions manage their national-identity. The study will, therefore, examine the relevance of identity management and its effect on national development.

1.3.   Aim and Objectives of the Study

This research aims to examine the view that a combination of imposed and injudicious frontiers created in sub-Saharan Africa led to imbalanced national-identities in unnegotiated nation-states with divergent aspirations.

The specific objectives are:

1. To examine the penetration of identity management tools in the selected countries

2. To evaluate the efficiency of identity management tools in the selected countries

3. To examine the visibility of all members of the nation-community in the nation-state's identity ecosystem

4. To explore the identity structures that form the foundation of the nation-state's identity management ecosystem.

5. To critically examine the effect of identity management systems and tools on the development of the selected countries

1.4. Assumptions of the Study

The research assumes that:

1. All the study nation-states are made up of various primordial communities of irreversible historical antecedence united into the nation community.

2. In all the study nation-states, the nation community of varying identities, with varying identity structures, are governed within an equitable identity ecosystem.

3. In all the study nation-states the universal acceptance of historical and ethnic differences is factored into the administration of the national-identity. eco-system for effective national development.

4. The nation-state and national-identity will endure beyond the lives of the individual identities of the nation-state.

5. All the study nation-states need to maintain a harmonious administration of sustainable identity structures and identity ecosystems.

6. The Identity eco-system in the nation-states could accommodate and had structures to manage the differences and overlap between identity documents and entitlement documents.

1.5. Research Questions

The research questions that guided the study were:

1. What is the of meaning national-identity for the individual and the national-identity of the nation-state?

2. What is the meaning of ethnic identity?

3. Is there a conflict between ethnic identity structures and national-identity structures?

4. How penetrative is the national-identity ecosystem?

5. How effective is the administration of national identity documents in granting functional identities?

6. What role does the national government play in the administration of a national-identity eco-system and is there room for improvement?

1.6.   Significance of the Study

The study's significance will be discussed based on theoretical, methodological and practical perspectives, as shown below.

Nation-states exercise robust administrative power over their nationals within the national-identity eco-system by providing functional identities. Nation-states further influence the very existence and quality of life of their nationals by instituting progressive policies programmes and avenues to development in addition to the apprehension of people that threaten the nation-state and its people. The significance of this study is to return to the fundamental understanding that a nation-state is non-existent and cannot be sustained without the people that make up the nation-community.

1.7.   Theoretical Significance

The critical and theoretical studies on national-identity, national-identity management, nationalism, and nation-formation are discussed in this study. The critical views of Caplan and Torpey (2001), Davis and Huttenback (1986), Davidson (1992), Anderson (2016) Hobsbawn (1983), and Rodney (2018) are significant to the research.

Given the exposition of national management structures and nation-state identity in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia, the study, which reviews existing studies on identity management in the study countries, is significantly broad. This research will complement the academic studies into the development of sub-Saharan Africa nation-states. Scholarly works of Murray (2013), Mamdani (2018), Rotberg (2003) and Thompson (1997), amongst others, will be reviewed. Although most of these works do not deal with the issue national identity management in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia, they are relevant to the discussion and understanding of nation-state-formation, the development of the and its national-identities. In this context, identity management is crucial to the judicious administration and governance of these nation-states. Earlier studies do not adequately portray the relationship between indigenous communities and settler communities within the national identity ecosystem. Therefore, this gap forms the point of departure from previous studies. This study is notionally important as it forms a paradigm shift from other critical studies on identity management structures in sub-Saharan Africa and specifically the study countries.

Although Africa is not the continent with the highest population in the world, people, it is the fastest growing continent (World Report 2020, UN). Thus, the addition to specific

academic research on how to manage, govern and administer the African continent's people within the permanent units of the nation-states is essential in the maintenance of peace of the continent.

1.8.   Methodological Significance

Relevant existing literature on identity management structures and national identity is reviewed and thereafter the study adopts a qualitative research approach in the field survey (questionnaires, interviews) in order to generate data. In addition to the discussions of the identity management concepts, the data collected is presented in tabular form using simple percentages. The process is important since it will contribute to the understanding of nation-state identity management structures in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa countries.

1.9.   Practical Significance

In addition to the 21,600 incidents of armed conflict in 2019, a 36% increase on the previous data set, there are 15 on-going armed civil conflicts and wars in Africa today (The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 2020). These are clear indicators of an increasing problem of stability of African nation-states. Whereas some of the causes for this instability may not be attributable to poor national-identity administration, the solution to the conflict-resolution would invariably involve and impact national-identity. The study will reveal the basic inherent contradictions in identity management structure projects and national policies, which obstruct the process of equitable national-identity administration. The findings of this research will offer a forum for the reframing and overhauling of policy for governments and people

working in identity management departments. This will help to develop viable identity management approaches towards tackling the national identity question, which will in turn allow the reduction of conflicts in sub-Saharan nation-states.

1.10. General Approach

Sub-Sharan nation-states have lacked the years of a managed evolution from the communities within the territory into the nation-community of a nation-state. It is difficult to understand the motivation and rigidity behind modern sub-Sahara nation-states that use unsuited European mechanisms and tools for their national-identity ecosystems, nation-building and development. In the context of self-governance and independence, these nation-states have been sovereign since the mid-1950's when the first sub-Sahara modern nation-state became independent from colonial rule. The legitimate identity of sub-Saharan people which has undergone uncontrolled colonial change originates from historic pre-colonial values and culture. Generally, this evolution of national identity in Africa contrasts with the logical progression of ethnic nations that did not undergo wholesale colonisation into modern nation-states in Europe.

The cycle of identity and governance is as important as any community's claim to sovereignty and legitimacy as a nation-state. The nation-community made up of the governed and the government gives legitimacy to the identities using identification mechanisms. The people's acknowledgement of the evolution in the governance, culture and identity structure of the community is one of the pivotal components of any claim of legitimacy by the government over the individual identities claiming

membership of the community. The study analyses interlinked national-identity issues within the nation-state and the institutions that interact with the individuals and communities of the nation-state. Before the arrival of Europeans, in their interactions with neighbouring ethnic nations sub-Saharan, ethnic nations and communities held legitimacy over their identities. The inter-communal or inter-state interactions had different effects on the development of the communities, more specifically their management of legitimate individual identities. Consequently, even today, the provision of representative governance for these legitimate identities forms the cornerstone of every nation-state's development. Ironically, in the period after independence, the sub-Sahara African governments in their clamour to provide representative governance not only disregarded the old-age structures but misused modern fast-paced European technology to identify legitimate identities of the governed for selfish ends.

Undeniably, for modern sub-Sahara nation-states that inherited colonial European systems of recognising legitimate identities, the discredited pre-colonial ethnic indigenous identification systems anchored on heritage and kinship, clashed with the imported colonial systems that focused on segregation. The progression of identity-management within ethnic states is contrasted with the management of national-identity in modern nation-states. The study, therefore, takes into account the social context of historical incidents and events so as to raise the relevance of national-identity management in the development of the selected nation-states.

Since the inauguration of sub-Saharan independent governance in 1954[7], most sub-Sahara African nations have experienced disruptions to continuous governance from *coup-d'états*, civil wars, and internal ethnic conflicts. Notably, although Liberia[8] and Ethiopia[9] were not subjected to direct European colonisation, they have not escaped the affliction of internal civil wars. The root cause of this nation-state and identity-management instability is the inability to govern a diverse nation-community within a peaceful polity.

The delivery of a peaceful polity requires the completion of the cycle of credible governance within a recognised territory with legitimate identities governed by a suitable administration. To critics such as Davidson (1992), Rotberg (2004), and Mamdani (2018), if various sub-Sahara Africa governments had acknowledged this status quo, many civil wars could have need avoided. What one notes about these critics' views, however, is their failure to relate national identification management mechanisms, such as citizenship laws and the efficiency of national-identity institutions, to the delivery of a peaceful polity. For instance, while Manby (2009) demonstrates how governments in sub-Saharan Africa deliberately disorganise national identification institutions in favour of immediate electoral advantage, he ignores the reality of ethnic heritage and ancestral identification as pivotal in organising the popularity of legitimate governance.

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[7] In 1954, The Gold Coast (present day Ghana), in preparation for independence, was the first sub-Sharan Africa colony to attain self-rule with control over all national affairs excluding foreign affairs and the declaration of foreign wars.

[8] Civil war started in Liberia in 1989 and spread to Sierra Leone in 1991 and lasted till 2003.

[9] Ethiopian civil war 1974 – 1991 and Liberian civil wars 1989 – 1997, and 1999 – 2003.

Arising from the respondents' discussion of the turmoil in post-independent sub-Saharan countries is the association of legitimate electoral popularity with ethnic cleavages. However, to the interviewees this is an issue that is over-hyped. Several respondents stated that it is natural for people to desire the advancement of their community-identities in the nation-state. Political power gained through the popularity of policies that preserve ethnic cleavages is not equivalent to a manipulated national identification system for elections; indeed, it is proof of a successful transition of ethnic identity into national identity. Contested eligibility to participate in the nation-community's elections and disputed electoral outcomes should not be based on imported and alien identification methods that could not have been validated in the ethnic nation from which the nation-state derived its sovereignty.

1.11. Historic Narrative Approach

To analyse sub-Saharan national identity-management and locate both the rare highpoints and numerous crisis events that have led to civil wars, *coup-d'états* and the failure of some nation-states, the study adopts a historic narrative approach. Sometimes this necessitates the use of certain identity terminologies such as 'native', 'indigene', and ethnic, which are used interchangeably in the discussion. Notably, these identity labels, similar to others such as 'negro', 'coloured', and 'race' have no absolute scientific delineation but have evolved out of historic nation formation. While there are lexical variations, the usage of one or other of these labels aims to emphasise the nuanced interpretation that was attributed to each description during the territory's metamorphosis into a modern nation-state. 'Native' as a descriptive label was used by colonialists to describe people within the jurisdiction of the colony or

protectorate that could trace and demonstrate lengthy ancestral hereditary connections to the territory. Often, the 'native' tag had a pejorative undercurrent. This is derived from the colonialist prejudiced rationale for colonisation, popularised by Rudyard Kipling's 'White Man's Burden'[10], and the need to 'civilise the heathen natives' by colonisation, civilization, and Christianisation. Post colonisation, as modern nation-states developed, different African communities that also included the descendants of the victims of the Atlantic Slave Trade, the Europeans, Lebanese Syrian traders and immigrants from other parts of the world, the word 'native' was gradually replaced with indigenous. Africans that could demonstrate lengthy ancestral hereditary preferred to be indigenous rather than call themselves native (Stanley, 2009). Other terms such as 'settler', 'pilgrim', 'colonist' and 'colonialist' are used interchangeably to underline the differences within the nation communities. This study examines how a set of seemingly identical events that befell communities and ethnic-nations, such as the Atlantic slave trade, colonisation, the Pan-Africanist movement, and the rise of nationalism have impacted their formation into nation-states.

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[10] Rudyard Kipling's poem published in 1897. It venerates white supremacy and the moral obligation to colonize and civilise inferior races.

1.12. Statement of the Problem

> "The most important challenge facing African countries today lies here:
> How does the African state transform its component identities – its ethnic
> diversities inherited from colonial boundaries into nation-states."
>
> (Deng, et al., 2008, p. 31)

The nation-state is primarily the sum of its composite parts, the human members of diverse ethnic communities that make up the nation-community. The study findings established that the most imperative challenge that sub-Saharan Africa nation-states have been unable to meet is keeping their composite parts sufficiently cohered as a nation-community within inherited and defined territories capable of pursuing agreed national development agendas.

The imperative falls on the institutions that manage the identities within the nation-community to maintain the continuous integrity and national-identity of the nation-state. Maleševìc (2006) nevertheless cautions practitioners and researchers analysing social events to detach 'identity in all forms from endeavour', particularly in modern sub-Sharan Africa nation-states where both Europeans and Africans have purposefully produced events that have weakened nation-states. As he states,

> "Instead of coming to grips with the overwhelming force of nationalism, that
> dominant ideology of modernity, identity talk pacifies and makes obvious
> something that is distinctly extraordinary, historically novel structurally
> contingent and human made" (p.5).

Anderson's (2016) analysis concerning the problems faced by nation-states seeking to evolve into a viable nation-community with a robust and equitable national-identity is indicative of many African nation-states. He is of the view that if a nation-state is under the strains of contrasting cultures, disparate languages, conflicting traditions and values it cannot effortlessly become a state with a formidable national identity. That said, on the Africa continent, other than living in an 'international UN recognised' territory with defined frontiers, the post-colonial organisation of modern Africa has produced nation-states with mixed populations with little in common. As well as Anderson, Simpson (2008), another critic, attributes the problems of nation formation to the multiple languages spoken within a single nation-state. He comments that in the attempt to build a viable modern nation-state, sub-Saharan nation-states grapple with the challenge of fusing into single cohesive nation-communities a tapestry of 1.3 billion people in 3,000 ethnic communities that speak over 2,100 different languages into 52 nation-states. By comparison, Asia with 4.5 billion people speak 2,300 different languages in sustained mono-language communities within 48 nation-states. In this context, one can see that the formation of 'a people' into a 'nation-community' involves at a minimum, a common language and common naming conventions.

In order to preserve the integrity of the nation-state, each sub-Saharan nation-state must manage its nation-community with effective national-identity tools since a national development plan, within an equitable national-identity eco-system should be appreciative of all the nation's communities, traditions values and culture. The national-identity eco-system must sustain the viability of the nation-state and avoid the catastrophe of a failed state.

1.13. Genesis of the Problem

All sub-Sahara Africa's nation-states, borders and frontiers as they exit today were created for colonial expediency without consideration of the geographic ethnic spread. The frontiers of the colonised territories and borders of the nation-states were obtained without either the acquiescence or consultation with the inhabitants. The focus was on the purpose and merits of European colonisation and expansion into Africa. However, the rhetoric supporting colonisation and leading to the 1884 Partitioning of Africa discredited sub-Saharan culture, tradition and organisation of ethnic nations. That J. Hobson's views in his book *Imperialism: A Study*[11] in 1902 galvanised capitalist and imperialist consensus that European nations colonising Africa had a moral responsibility echoed Kipling's poem 'White Man's Burden' shows that the imperialists had no respect for indigenous cultures. The convenor of the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference that partitioned Africa, Belgian King Leopold II, declared that economic and altruistic advancement must be the motivation for colonisation. Leopold's administration of his Belgian Congo was the most brutal violent capitalist administration of early colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Other European nations behaved in a similar way only that they were less brutal in administering colonial territories since they disguised their approaches of bringing enlightenment to the communities. Indirectly, within the colonies, this helped this was a convenient way of identifying and managing the identities of the indigenous occupiers.

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[11] Ironically, Hobson in *Imperialism: A Study*' avoids blatantly advocating for either imperialism or colonisation Imperialism: A Study', but still describes indigenous communities as inferior "colonial primitive peoples", and their "gradual [global] elimination "in the wider social interest, [and] repression of the spread of degenerate or unprogressive races".

The original ethnic nations, by extension their communities, and identity-management institutions, were irrelevant to the enterprise of colonisation. The human and mineral resource were the motivation for European nations' demarcating their territorial borders in Africa with a pencil and ruler with no regard to the geographic spread of the "ethnic nations". In modern nation building, however, ethnicity, a shared past and ethnic footprints are crucially important in modern nation building. The historic evolution of a people links the inhabitants of the territory with collective expectations, privileges and benefits of identification within the nation (Ross, 2001). During nation-state formation, the success of the nation-state in managing of identities and privileges of identification is dependent on the empathetic development of institutions, such as, Births and Deaths, Electoral Management Bodies and Income Tax Departments (Ting, 2008).

The national-identity institutions in modern sub-Sahara Africa nation-states have been inherited from departing colonial administrations that bastardised pre-colonial identity management institutions. Although the corrupted and re-demarcated ethnic nationalities were shoe-horned into colonially convenient nation-states, in some cases, the communities of these nation-states did not originate from a fraternal "horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 2016), and their expectations of a national-identity within the territory could have been achieved only through war and domination.

Given such a fracture in the nation's comradeship, an equitable national-identity eco-system managing privileges and entitlements impartially within the territory during the period of nation formation would always be difficult to achieve. As Manby states;

> "the nationality laws adopted at independence were based on European models, all of which discriminated on the basis of gender [and identity] at that time and were ill-adapted for African realities, including the very low rates of civil registration bequeathed by the colonial powers, the substantial numbers of people who follow a nomadic lifestyle, or the effective integration of populations who migrated during the colonial period" (Manby, 2016, p.2).

Motivated by the discovery and availability of raw materials that would restore decimated European economies, the entry of Europeans into Africa ignored the welfare of the indigenous communities (Bell, 1995). The abolition of human exploitation, The Atlantic Slave Trade[12], was replaced with mineral exploitation, 'The Scramble for Africa' that framed colonisation, developed a nearly virtuous persuasion (Davis and Huttenback, 1986).

The inconvenience that within these artificial frontiers, the territories consisted of a people, with legitimate identities living within ethnic nation structures was lost in the colonial endeavour. This deletion of ethnic nations, replaced with European colonial occupation, eventually led to a societal deficit in a shared national-identity (Dowden, 2008). Within the irrational colonial frontiers, the national aspirations of the colonised

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[12]Although the 'Abolition of the Slave Trade Act' was enacted in 1807, illegal trade in African slaves to British Caribbean islands and non-British slave trafficking continued well into 1830.

and colonisers, all inhabitants of the nation-state would never converge (Memmi, 1991).

The establishment of European colonies and territorial protectorates in Africa meant that citizens of European colonisers now had divergent national aspirations and trajectories with the inhabitants of their assigned territories (Ypi, 2013). A period of colonisation in any ethnic community's transition into a nation-state, where there is a disruption of 'the will, culture and consent of the people' produces a void of enthusiasm for patriotism (Gellner, 2006). From the period of colonisation, to the attainment of self-government, the pride of belonging to these newly independent nations was a remote appreciation, while the sense of belonging to one's ethnic group was often more valued. Therefore, in these dishevelled ethnic nations that became nation-states, the use of unmodified and inappropriate European identity management systems that do not accommodate ethnic identity structures to forge a national-identity would be ineffective.

Had European colonialists, modified the colonial structures that became national-identity structures, in alignment with ethnic nation structures, the transition of ex-colonies into nation-states would have been more successful. In contrast, the views of the indigenous ethnic inhabitants of the territories who considered themselves similar to each other in language, culture and a shared heritage were neglected. Their communal aspirations of modern statehood, and a shared national-identity was overlooked (Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, May, 1956). Recognisable ethnic leadership structures, respected by generations of indigenous people in their

indigenous nations, were disregarded in the new colonial and post-colonial nation's identification ecosystems.

In sub-Saharan Africa, present-day poor governance and the inability of governments to establish equitable administrative structures within the parameters of the nation-state is partly caused by a historical failure of the colonial authorities to respect indigenous territorial boundaries. The unwillingness to confront and incorporate ethnic identification structures in the formation of the nation-states led to lack of equal opportunities for all deserving persons within the nation-state.

1.14. Consequences and Effects of the Problem – National-identity Ecosystems

Apart from the ideological inability of colonial administrations to accept parity between inhabitants and colonising settlers, the obvious differences in the physical appearance, culture, value-sets of modesty and dress code, emphasised the disruption in identity parity. Colonial identity management systems and tools, already unsuitable in the sub-Saharan environment, were reinforced by the ease with which the 'us and them' differences could be easily detected. The cohesion of settlers contrasted with a 'bundling' of all indigenous communities as one, was an ignorance of the culture and values of the inhabitants (Eriksen, 1995). The colonised, in identifying with each other, revelled in the covert indigenous methods of identification and only adopted imported European primary components of identification including names as matter of convenience, but not an actual belief in European traditions of identity management. A broken system of identity management, an unwillingness to share governance power, an alien system of justice, one that the inhabitants neither

understood, nor identified with was thus bequeathed to these countries on the granting of independence (Fourshey, et al., 2018). Other ex-colonies that wrestled colonial powers violently and became independent nation-states were left with an even bigger void in the national-identity administrative structures.

Dowden (2008) and Irobi (2013) argue that the failure of governance and the inability to manage diversity within communities in Africa can be attributed to issues of ethnicity and structural imbalances which were the residues of colonisation. The result is an inherited institutional failure; colonisation, in-coming independent governments of the nation-states could not give a parity of value to all individuals within the territory (Okoth, 2006). In some sub-Sahara countries, the appreciation of belonging to a nation-state and solidarity with its ideals is non-existent. At best, national empathy comes second to ethnic solidarity. The difficulty of this historical discovery is that too many ethnic groups with strong, yet disparate ideals and aspirations are contained within a colonially created nation-state, or the reverse, where a single dominant ethnic group is split across multiple colonial borders.

The absurdity that someone can be stripped of both a functional identity and nationality as has been the case in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Zambia to prevent suffrage participation was an eruption in sub-Sahara nation-communities waiting to happen. In sub-Sahara, whereas the demarcation of territory, legal impositions and formation of federations that created nation-states were taken as sacrosanct with the capacity to authorise engagement in deadly wars, the reconciliation of national-identity events,

their effects on modern nation-communities, that ought to occupy nation-formation agendas was woefully absent. Ikaweba Bunting obtained from Julius Nyerere:

> "men women and children have with stood repression, torture, depression, suffering and death in uprisings, civil wars, border disputes and coups, all in the name of nation-building and developing African States [this] is too high a price, the object of anti-imperialist nationalism and Pan-Africanism was not the nation-state, but rather justice, equity, dignity, prosperity, and freedom from domination" (Bunting, 1999).

1.15. Consequences and Effects of the Problem – National Development

National development is both a qualitative and quantitative change in the well-being of the nation-community (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 2015). Evidentially, national development must mean growth, progress, transformation in the socio-economic status of the inhabitants. In addition, this standard of national development provides an expansion in the cultural opportunities for the entire nation-community, not just a section (OECD, 2001).

This study uses Hans W. Singers' definition of 'development' where he states that "development is the improvement in the quality of people's lives" in the nation-state (Singer, 1964, p. 12). In the majority of sub-Saharan nation-states, there has been neither progress nor improvement in the quality of people's lives as evidenced by the 'Social Progress Index' (SPI), a specific developmental index, aimed at obtaining a holistic development assessment measurement. This index is used for the study because it incorporates accepted economic growth indicators such as Gross National

Product (GNP), per-capita, disposable income, life expectancy, security and level of crime measurements. The SPI not only quantifies the availability of social interventions such as education and health but it measures the actual access to and the quality of these facilities. This gives an awareness of possible internal discriminatory practices against sections of the nation-community which is the interest of this study. Further, the SPI measures other social variables such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, right information, and protection of rights associated with development. Finally, and uniquely, the SPI takes into consideration the inclusiveness of individuals within the nation-community, governance, *coup-d'états* and civil wars that attest to a dissatisfaction and regression in the quality of people's lives.

The SPI criteria which ranked one-hundred and forty-nine (149) worldwide countries for the 2019 index found Norway, Denmark and Switzerland as the three (3) most developed nation-states. As shown in Appendix C, however, no African country was ranked within the forty (40) most developed countries. According to the SPI criteria, thirty-four (34) sub-Sahara African nation-states were among the forty (40) least developed countries (Social Progress Imperative, 2019). Further still, in 2006 The UK Government Ministry of Defence and its Department for International Development (DFID), reported on the stability of forty (40) African countries. Amongst the forty (40) countries there had been two hundred and five (205) successful or attempted *coups d'états* between 1946 and 2004 (Government of the United Kingdom, 2006). In the same period, seventeen (17) African countries have witnessed civil wars triggered by ethnic conflicts and national-identity ambiguities (Marshall, 2006). In Sudan, for instance, between 1955 – 2005, the opposing sides of the first and second civil wars

emphasised differences in political ideology as the rationale for taking up arms, it would be later revealed as concealing ethnic schisms among other grievances that eventually led to the separation of the main ethnic divisions into the two nation-states.

Whereas the identity management ecosystems used in most sub-Sahara nation-states cannot monitor and empirically evaluate the individual effects of infrastructural expansion, and scientific industrial development projects (Calderón, et al., 2018). An efficient national-identity management eco-system such as HM Revenue and Customs of the UK, Internal Revenue Service of the USA, the Skatteetaten of Norway and the Income Tax Department of India is key to national development, as they include the monitoring of individual income tax paid and tracks the individual's development within the identity lifecycle. In the context of sub-Saharan African nation-states, a considerable number of institutions of governance even when not challenged by civil war, fail to track identity lifecycles, and macro socio-cultural development (Social Progress Report, 2019). In addition to economic indices, these developmental strides are often measured by the nation's political stability, peaceful community coexistence, basic education for all, the absence of discrimination and the defence of cultural diversity. The tracking of relevant national-identity data and developmental progress of the entire nation would assuage the criticism that some infrastructural projects, attract a level of negative publicity as discriminatory to some sections of the nation-community (Afoaku, 2005). A well-organized national-identity eco-system will identify marginalised and affected communities overlooked by the governing elite for positive interventions and compensatory arrangements. It is the use of unsuitable

identity management ecosystems for the development of sub-Saharan Africa nation-states that this study aims to expose.

The sub-Sahara Africa inherited, nation-states that jealously guard colonial borders with every means possible while ignoring cohesive national-identities for development within these frontiers. The inverted side of the same problem are sub-Saharan nation-states unable or even unwilling to assemble their nationals into a shared aspiration, and a collective national-identity management ecosystem. Sub-Saharan nation-states, as net importers and consumers, if unable to develop their nations with equitable national-identity ecosystems, will in the context of globalisation be unable to meaningfully contribute to the global economy. This has been evident with sub-Sahara nation-states have as their principal trading partners European nation-states, and yet are unable to develop meaningful trade treaties with neighbouring countries because of colonial rivalry. The European donors donate, lend and sell resources under Western conditions and cultural values to sub-Sahara nations unable to insist on trading terms that favour the sovereignty of sub-Sahara nation-states. The acceptance of these grants, loans and projects translates into stereotype nationwide identification and classification tags by the donor nations, such as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPIC) and Debt Distressed Countries (DDCs). The evolution, causes and effects of sub-Saharan nation-states contribution to global economic progression is undermined irrespective of the land and minerals riches (Cooper and Brubaker, 2005).

1.16. Justification – Reforming National-Identity Management in Sub-Sharan Africa

According to the Governance and Rule of Law 2020, global ranking conducted by the World Justice Project, sub-Sahara African nation-states are amongst the lowest thirty (30), countries with the weakest governance structures (World Justice Project, 2020). These nation-states exercise robust power over their nationals with 'inequitable administrative' systems that lead to marginalisation and discriminatory identity management systems. At the heart of sub-Saharan poor governance and inequitable administrative structures is the inability of governments to administer 'national-identity'. Equitable national identity ecosystems originate from a sense of belonging, individual visibility, recognition and opportunities for all persons within the parameters of the nation-state. Building long term stable nation-communities is dependent on an empathy between all the inhabitants and ethnic communities of the geographical territory on the one hand and equitable national-identity institutions on the other. People need to be legitimately identified by the nation's identity management structures and subsequently governed within the nation-state. They must have shared nation-state aspirations. All nations with a government have to govern within the recognition of a national consciousness (Connor, 1994). According to Schahbasi (2017), 'individual identity and governance are intertwined' - to belong to a nation-community or a legal community of individuals, one must first accept and identify with the national consciousness. The expression of a shared national consciousness is sometimes in conflict with other competing internal consciousness and external influences such as religion and ethnicity. For instance, in Mauritania ethnic communities describe themselves as either Bidhanes (White Moors) or Haratins

(Black Moors) rather than as Mauritanians. All this is in the interest of claiming ethnic proximity to the original nomadic Arabic traders that came from north of the Sahara African. Indeed, as evidenced in Sudan, internal ethnic fault lines led to its division into two nation-states; the Arabic dominated Sudan and the Bantu dominated South Sudan in 2011.

In sub-Sahara nation-states, symbols and representations of nationhood, such as national-identity cards, were introduced and reinforced to maintain the supremacy of the national consciousness rather than attentiveness to the suppression of competing destructive sectional interests. The possession of a legitimate identity encompasses several components that are interrelated but which become a complete and recognisable identity for interaction. On one hand, some components of identity such as physique and biometrics are tangible, measurable, and inherited. Being tangible, some completely rigid components would include age, date and place of birth. On the other hand, other components that are tangible but not measurable are subjectively quantifiable; for instance, maternal language, level of education, access and proximity to clean water, electricity and educational facilities. These tangible but immeasurable components have an enormous impact on the functional and legitimate identity possessed by the individual, in the identification of ethnicity, religion social inclination, voting preferences and community. The mechanism of identifying a person, that is, the recognition of a legitimate identity involves, but is not limited to, the use of both rigid components such as 'Primary Recognition Features' and subjectively quantifiable components (Edensor, 2016). These unseen bonds of language, involve a shared territorial ecology, such as local trade and battering sharing climatic opportunities

adversity and empathy of proximity and lifestyle designate legitimacy in identity (Billig, 1995). Recent emphasis on the sole use of tangible primary recognition features and mechanisms for identification; name, age and sex, and by extension biometric data and absence of silent and intangible identity markers is a set-back in the appreciation of a 'legitimate identity' for social interaction in sub-Saharan countries. Whilst the recording of inflexible but subjective components, such as ethnicity and culture, may lead to institutional discrimination, the complete invisibility of such identity cleavages also fails to meet elevated standards of national-identity ecosystems that proactively mitigates discrimination. National identification or identity registration is the state's monopolisation and standardisation of the legitimate means of identification that confirm one's citizenship (Pierson, 2004). Therefore, the management of national-identity must be empathetic with these cleavages and clutches to be effective.

1.17. Justification – Inefficient National-Identity Management

With reference to national identification and legitimacy, Balibar (2002) asks rhetorically, "How are individuals nationalised, or socialised to belong to any nation?" He proceeds to explain that: "All identity [although individual] is historical, constructed within a field of social values, behaviour and collective symbols, the real question is how the individual identity change[s] over time [within] the changing institutional environment" (p. 94). This understanding of perpetual national-identity is symbolised in Figure 1. where the legitimate identity of an individual and citizenship involves more than the use of primary recognition features which are the core dominant inflexible reference points. However, these are surrounded by ever mutating flexible reference components of identity. The individual components of a functional national-identity

administration taken as singular elements may be contradictory notions that have to be reconciled by constant monitoring to construct a perpetual organic and inclusive national-identity eco-system (Balibar, 2002).

Figure 5.
Components of a 'Legitimate National-Identity' Sphere

Although contradictory and illusive, the reference points of social belonging are essential in any nation-community. For one to maintain legitimacy of existence in any nation-state, sub-Saharan Africa being no exception, an individual must submit to the reference points of the community. The individual is subject to the governing authority of most of the components within the Legitimate National-Identity Sphere as shown in Figure 5. The governing authority, in other words the government of the nation-state, intervenes and is responsible for inflexible, tangible and intangible elements of every legitimate identity. The government of the nation-community is responsible for naming the recognised place of birth. The record of birth is written in the language of the nation

that would textualize a recognised event of birth and death; thus, a legitimate and functional identity. Additionally, governments regulate addresses, employment and professions. Indeed, all aspects of governance of every nation-state is achieved by the laws of the nation-state, which disallows any activity including religious that does not submit to state regulation. The legitimacy of an individual or an identity is an obligation of the government of the nation community. A functional identity is achieved through various institutions of the nation-state that regulate the national-identity ecosystem.

Within the scope of national-identity ecosystems, most sub-Sahara Africa governments have not adequately linked social mobility programmes such as free education, health delivery and provision of modern housing to national-identity management and citizen registration. In developing nations of sub-Sahara Africa, the implementation of social mobility programmes, similar to national-identity programmes are problematic because both rely on functional identities in order to be successful. In order to implement them nation-states needs to put in place an efficient national-identity administrative structure. Understandably, nation-states cannot improve the standard of living through social mobility unless they have an efficient national-identity administrative structure that is able to track the mobility of the less privileged as they progress economically in the nation-community, some of which is the taxable income earned.

Principally, the inability to improve the living standards of less privileged is the inability to identity and invisibility of the eligible people entitled to the privileges of the social

mobility programme. Another reason for the inability to improve the living standards of less privileged is the perceived impartial delivery of the social mobility programmes. The power of political patronage distorts the appreciation of members of the nation-community with a shared national-identity with members of the same ethnic community. Inadequate identity management ecosystems are unable to capture at birth the functional identity of members of the nation-state or later track all qualified people issued national-identity cards benefiting from social mobility programmes. Hence, the governments are unable to efficiently plan 'on the ground' interactions between themselves and the governed. These interactions and registers of eligible nationals decide who is entitled to designated privileges of mobility. In modern nation-states a fair identity eco-system must ensure that citizens are individually defined and registered within the nation-community such that the nation's assets, entitlements and privilege can be associated with identification. The associated entitlements and privileges could require financial contributions, such as taxation, or access to social mobility programme. The absence of a definition as a citizen in the constitution points directly to a section of the nation-community denied visibility, incapable of registering for participation in national events and being discriminated against – not obtaining the designated privilege. According to Gobewole (2015), writing in *Public Corruption in Liberian Government*, the constitution and institutions of Liberia are the very source of nepotistic identity management. –"The denial of citizenship to indigenous Liberians [by the patronage government] gave an absolute authority to discriminate against the indigenous people", he states. (p.17) Much like Gobewole (2015), this study identifies the "challenges in administering national security [public order, public safety, border control] managing public resources [natural resources, tax collection, compensation

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payment] and enforcing public policies [due process, self-determination, civil rights, electoral process] for maximum public good" (pp. 23:24).

However, this study sees these challenges as self-inflicted and ill-managed national-identity issues. Corruption, I argue, is a symptom of an inadequate national-identity management eco-system rather than the cause. This ill-managed national-identity eco-system extracts eligibility and privileges of identification of the registered inhabitants, such that the abusers cannot be held accountable as the evidence from a mismanaged eco-system does not exist. The abuse of power, the ethnic discrimination of governing administrators appears as patronage and nepotism, the privileges of inclusion via national-identity classification disappears.

1.18. Justification – Challenges and Effects of National-Identity Management

The compilation process of eligible beneficiaries of desirable social mobility programmes, such as internal and international scholarships are skewed towards the ethnicity or clan of the political leadership. These inefficiently implemented programmes inadvertently exasperate tensions and pose challenges of national-identity administration within sections of the nation-state. Poorly managed divisions of the nation's identity management ecosystem, for instance, the electoral rolls in sub-Saharan nation-states, such as Liberia, reinforce the cycle of marginalisation of communities and nepotism. The absence of a robust identification technology that captures and makes visible all members of the nation-state and the inability of governments to communicate the benefits of identification leads to a toxic mixture of an unappreciated government and an inefficient delivery of services (Miller, 2005).

The lack of efficient Identity Management ecosystems in sub-Sahara African countries is a continuing major threat to the governance and stability of these nations. Of the forty-six (46) sub-Sahara African countries, twenty-six (26) have had civil wars. Liberia and Sierra Leone, neighbouring countries with similar indigenous populations and prominent communities of ex-slave descendants, have had the misfortune rolling into civil wars, which when combined and lasted 22 years. In both cases, social, economic and political inequalities and endemic disregard for sections of the nation-community, sparked off the conflicts. In Liberia, although the settlers found sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, in existence, the 'unsuited', imported identification mechanism records only the descendants of slave-returnees from the USA 'Americo-Liberians' as recognised identities. All the other ethnic groups are at best recorded as indigenous people, 'natives' or aborigines. The Americo-Liberians who were in control of Liberia's wealth were perceived as an oppressive, greedy and corrupt community by the indigenous people, who endured marginalisation and identified among themselves with indigenous identification mechanisms (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009). This study seeks to show how the in-efficient national-identity management ecosystems in sub-Saharan Africa can be tailored to provide equitable privileges of identification required for continuous peaceful governance.

While Rotberg (2014) attributes the cause of most civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa to marginalisation and social exclusion of 'unrecognised' and 'unidentified' individuals within the nation-state, the inability or identity mechanics of the governing 'us-faction' to accord equality of recognition and opportunity to the ethnic 'them-faction' faction is not sufficiently investigated in those studies. The seeds of marginalisation that

eventually mature into full blown civil-conflict often begin with sections of the community that have a distinctive and recognisable presence within the nation-state (Berman, 2004). Civil conflict can be prevented by equal participation in national opportunities and resources through an efficient national identification eco-system that recognises the presence of marginalised communities and addresses imbalances. (Rotberg, 2003). The progression towards marginalisation of a section of the community often develops unnoticed till the damage of disunion and discord erupts into civil conflict. It is an inability of some of the state institutions to record and maintain properly the identities of the progressively marginalised (Bebbington, et al., 2008). Having inadequate and unsuited records of identification means an inherent inability to effect policies designed to remove disunion and discord.

In addition to the obvious violent effects of civil conflict, the resultant consequence is the internal displacement of people with additional complications of identification. There is further pressure on the national identification eco-system with unregulated movement of displaced people within and across national boundaries. This accelerates the cycle of poor identification systems across sub-Sahara African. Zambia has experienced civil disruption, xenophobic and ethnic confrontations attributed to marginalisation and denial of citizenship claims leading to tensions (Gewald, 2007). Pre-colonisation, ancestral lineage and clans encouraged and reaffirmed the nurturing of individuals of their ethnic group to have shared values and aspirations as a means of identification. The rigidity of modern western systems of national-identity management that exclude people's values and aspirations cannot contextualise African cultural systems, their contemporary history towards

independent nation-status, and the colonial/missionary effect on the nation communities.

The impact of colonisation and the effect of ethnic migration on post-colonial sub-Saharan nations is yet to be examined in relation to identity management tools. The argument that these governments are unable to formulate policies for identity management and consistent economic growth for the entire nation-state is spurious. Sub-Saharan Governments' use inconsistent data from inappropriate identity management tools that do not record ethnicity thus prevent the assembling qualitative identity data for governance. This study seeks solutions to identity management tools that can be modified and deployed in a context that will enable Africans (particularly in the three study countries), to articulate efficiently their identity in simple quantitative formats that can be used by governments for effective governance and developmental programmes.

All identity management tools and mechanisms involve assigning multiple unique labels to describe a collection of individuals (identities) that subscribe and show membership of a recognised community. A national-identity card administration is thus the assigning of a common and communal category label that is also personal to the individual within the nation-state. Inhabitants within the nation will include citizens by birth, naturalised citizens, legal residents, and visitors of various categories. There can be no two identical national ID individuals. Within a nation-state, identity management ecosystem, the assigning of a unique label to each member of the nation-state (including legal residents) goes beyond 'mere identification'. The ultimate purpose of

an identity management eco-system is to use historical, institutional and technological boundaries to manage the nation's economy, security, migration and routine governance. Sub-Saharan identity management pre-colonisation had no concept of identity-theft. Identity-theft or identity fraud happens when a dishonest person takes advantage of an identity token and diverts the privileges of that identity to him/herself. The ease and frequency of identity theft and fraud is as a result of an over-reliance on incoherent technology marketed as the ultimate panacea to efficient identification and a discard of the traditional mechanisms of identification appreciated by most. Harper (2006) makes the point that even in the developed nation-states, biometric identification technology have been "illogically introduced ad hoc' as an all-purpose-remedy to every identification difficulty. The over-reliance on this technology in Africa is an expensive pursuit of an untested and un-modified technology for African climatic conditions.

In two of the study countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the inability to develop of a cohesive national-identity regime and an equality of citizenship suffered further from a long civil war. The humanitarian eagerness to end the civil war at all costs in both countries led to the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions with unrestrained amnesty clauses (Bloecher and Roepstorff, 2008). This deliberately engineered structural flaw in national identity-management in the two countries would haunt the future national-identity cohesion in the two countries. Combatants on all sides of the civil-war could claim immunity from prosecution for heinous crimes by simply confessing and divulging the details of the crime to the Reconciliation Commissions. This elevates the privileges of identification for some members in the

uniform nation-community at the expense of others. Equality before the law, a right that should be enjoyed by all, is circumvented for a section of the nation-community. Parity for all is abandoned and replaced with a superiority of some identities to avoid prosecution by the institutions of the nation-state.

The unwillingness or inability of many African individuals to quantitatively respond to Western style identity interrogation leaves the data collected, and its usage for national development, inconsistent. Nevertheless, governments in the selected study countries manage to extract sufficient identity data from these identity ecosystems to misgovern individuals and sections of the nation community, as showed by the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Davies, 2005). Such is the focus of Western national-identity management tools on isolation rather than inclusion that the prevention of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the founder of the nation-state of Zambia was easily achieved using European interpretation of colonially bequeathed laws for competitive elections (Erdmann and Simutanyi, 2003). Today, the progress of modern sub-Saharan nation-states and efficient governance requires that data from national identification administration is used to direct and implement policies on measurable data gathered from identity management tools.

1.19. Organisation of the Research and Research Sections

The study is made up of eight (8) main chapters.

1. Chapter 1, the Introduction, gives an overview of the study and focuses on how identity is perceived by different cultures and nations. It explores components and aspects of identity and how they can be catalogued. The chapter notes that

the prerequisite model for orderly national communities is to have an efficient national-identity ecosystem. It examines the mechanisms of what makes credible identity structures, functional identity and identity documents. The chapter also outlines the limitations of the study, particularly the unexplored areas and contradictory data results that would benefit from additional and further study.

2. Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on identity and the theoretical framework on national-identity management. Focusing on the analyses of concepts of nationalism, citizenship, culture, and ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa, the chapter explores how these concepts are cross-referenced with the actuality of sub-Saharan governance and the resulting effects of this process. The chapter acknowledges the use of customary tools and systems of identity management similarities and common aspirations of the nation communities of sub-Sahara African nation-states. In examining these tools and systems it aims to show the possibility of their use for effective nation-state administration. In this chapter, the use of European based identity management systems is examined in order to assess the progressive governance that will eliminate strife and promote development in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, this chapter explores the impact of biometric technology used for Identity Management and the impact of European culture and Artificial Intelligence on the national-identity management ecosystems in Africa as a whole.

3. Chapter 3, 'The evolution of Liberia National Identity', focuses on the analysis on Liberian national-identity. The discussion traces significant events from the founding days in the USA when a community of mainly emancipated slave excluded from obtaining a functional identity and in search for a nation in Africa to develop into a modern nation-state of their own. The chapter discusses the interlinked nation-formation events, national-identity interactions, the causes for identity conflicts between and amongst the settlers and the indigenous people, and how they impacted each other eventually failing the Liberia nation-state and cascading into attrition and civil war.

4. Chapter 4, 'Sierra Leone National Identity', continues the discussion on the return of slave descendants, already assigned the national-identity of Britain as 'subjects', from north America to Africa amidst the community of Niger-Kordofanian ethnic-nations. This chapter discusses how, as a consequence of this migration, the national-identity strata of Sierra Leone was achieved using imported identity structures of the British colonist on the quartered settlements. The themes of national-identity, the events that characterised the evolution of Freetown into a British colony, the first stage of Sierra-Leone nation-formation, and the historical context of the development of the indigenous communities into a protectorate, are discussed in this chapter. The use of contemporary historical events and the demographic evolution, culture and religion, will enable the study to draw distinctions and similarities that makeup Sierra Leone's national-identity journey.

5. The fifth chapter, 'Zambia National Identity', which starts the discussion of the 72 ethnic nations of Central Africa, concentrates on the formation of Zambia's national-identity from a collection of ethnic national identities that include the Lozi and Bemba, descendants of the Bantu people who migrated across east, central and southern Africa. The chapter also examines the complex inter-relationship of the overlapping ethnic nations including the Khoisan and the San people that are also found in modern Zambia's neighbours. In addition, the chapter explores the multiple incarnations of Zambia from Zambesia, to Northern Rhodesia, to Central African Federation and finally to the independent nation-state of Zambia. Against this historical backdrop, the discussion will draw out the themes of national-identity that developed out of ethnic identities.

6. Chapter 6, presents the data gathering process, discusses the rationale for the methodology. The research method used is a semi-structured, repertory grid method. The data gathered is analysed both through cluster topics and principal components to be able to draw out not only the similarities of experience, but also measure the varying degrees of how the relevant issues affects the identity management eco-system in each of the three countries. The chapter presents the additional findings uncovered during the process of the study.

7. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the interviews with respondents. The chapter highlights pertinent views of the respondents and analyse the data gathered against the objectives of the study. The chapter also assess the study's 'contribution to knowledge', from professionals actually working in the study

nations. Finally, the chapter reviews the findings and summaries, drawn from the study.

8. Chapter 8 is the conclusion, and it makes recommendations based on the study. It also makes suggestions for a way forward in the development of identity management tools and ecosystems for use in sub-Saharan Africa.

1.20. Limitations of the Study

This section delineates aspects of study that have not been the focus of the research. Although the research looked principally at the relevance of identity management and its effect on the development of specific sub-Saharan countries, alternative discussions which would have involved mono-ethnic nations and federal nation-states were excluded. In the case of federal nation-states, some administrative structures of the identity eco-system such as state taxes and vehicle ownership have been devolved to state governments. Mono-ethnic nation-states such as Sao Tome and Principe uninhabited before 1470, resisted the domination of a single imported culture and spawned a peculiar 'Creole nationalism'. The dichotomy and tensions between the imported culture of communities and nation-formation was regularly sign-posted and resolved into a near homogenous ethnicity. According to Disney, "the disappearance of ethnic whites from Sao Tome led to the emergence of a new elite category referred to locally as 'native whites' (*brancos da terra*). These *brancos da terra*, while ethnically mulatto or African, claimed the status formerly enjoyed by whites and mixed freely". (Disney, 2009 p.111)

Arrivals to the Sao Tome islands readily mixed, cooperated and produced the uniform ethnolinguistic Foro Creole ethnicity, including even a Jewish contingent (Becker, 2008). In the most recent census available for this study (Gov. of São Tomé et Príncipe, 2008), over eighty-five percent (85%) of the population describe themselves as 'Foro-Creole, from the Portuguese freemen, slaves of either freed European and African descent, shipwrecks and mutinies that escaped to the island. The rest, fifteen percent (15%), are made up of recent arrivals to the islands who are nationals either through marriage or a conscious aspiration to naturalise. Eighty percent (80%) practice Catholicism, fifteen percent (15%) are Christian protestant and less that 5% belong to Islamic and African traditional religions. Both the positive and negative impact of 'invented traditions', formulated nationalism, ethnic nationality, and territoriality on this peculiar national-identity eco-system could be explored.

By contrast, the alternative governance adopted in sub-Saharan Africa, such as that is practiced in Nigeria, was the colonial imposition of a federal system of governance for modern nations. The Study is focused on the national-identity ecosystems of the three study countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas all the study countries have had migrant communities from within the continent of Africa, in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, a great influence on the nationalism came from immigrants originally from outside the continent – the USA and Britain. Contrastingly, African migration is the dominant cultural influence on Nigerian national identity. This study is limited to the examination of the effects of merged or morphed migrant cultural identities from outside the African continent on the national-identity management in sub-Saharan countries.

In Liberia, this study analyses the effects of the civil war that lasted a combined 20 years on national identity administration. As many as 1.5m civilians sought refuge from the war in neighbouring sub-Saharan African countries and the USA. The UNDP had a record of 2m displaced Liberian war refugees outside the territory, of these 500,000 were born in the refugee camps during the war years. Liberia is recorded to have 70% of the population under 30 years. The return of the refugees to Liberia commenced in 2003. With such a large proportion of returnee Liberians who did not experience identity nurturing within the Liberian territory, further research on the effects of Liberian nationalism on 'un-nurtured' Liberians would be advantageous.

Although the effects of the Liberian Civil war on the national-identity was considered, the actual length of the war and reasons for further disintegration into opposing forces must have had its own dynamic effect on the Liberian nation-identity management structure. Due to the limitation of the research, the pursuit of national political power predominantly through the use of child soldiers could not be explored. Child soldiers, some as young as ten (10) years and most not older than eighteen (18) years were the foot-soldiers and combatants. This meant that the effects of the war on their character formation would last into their adulthood. When a peaceful transition concluded the war, these child soldiers, who now evolved into ex-war-lords, became the leaders and minsters of state. They coexisted and found compromise to inhabit the territory under the transitional government of President Judie Bryant. Ultimately, they transited into the elected national government and opposition parties of Liberia. Both presidents Charles Taylor and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who were actors in the civil war emerged as democratically elected presidents. Their reasons for engaging in the

bloody conflict, understanding of nationalism, tribalism, national-identity and the effects these had on their character when they became leaders of the nation is an area worthy of further research (Utas, 2003).

Given the vacuum of technology and the use of immature and un-exposed child soldiers as combatants, the instant and violent consequences of weapons of war were equated to witchcraft or at best magic. Indigenous aural folklore and myths that attempted to rationalise the domination of African colonisation and imperialism emphasised these myths. The unrestrained use of gun-fire by child soldiers to dominate rival indigenous communities often had undertones of witchcraft, and dominant force from gunfire to build community to subdue and takeover communities. In a sub-Saharan region of multiple faiths, the collective effect of beliefs in animist religions, occultism, magic and witchcraft, juxtaposed with Christian beliefs, on the national polity, particularly on the values of the leadership, has emerged as another aspect worth exploring in relation to Nation-identity management (Klay Jr., 2004).

According to scholars such as Dobbins, 2013, a nation's peace and stability is correlated to the number of professionals working law enforcement and policing. After the civil war years, nation-rebuilding in Sierra Leone has happened at a comparatively faster pace than in neighbouring Liberia because there was less internal and external displacement of people and identities that have to re-integrated. The result of this was twofold;

    i.   sufficient professionals remained in their communities to manage the required sections of the nation's identity management ecosystem, and

ii. the reintegration of returning refugees into communities was less stressful compared to Liberia that had over 25% of the population at the time displaced (Fagen, 2011).

A further area of study may be the distribution of identity management professionals working directly in the identity management eco-system vis-a-vis the population of the country. This may reveal additional material and indicators for future policy makers of sub-Saharan countries.

Automation and biometric technology are major components in all identity management eco-systems in sub-Sahara. That said, some biometric applications are better suited than others for the region, although the challenges of automation in general were researched, this study could not do a comparative analysis of the specific automated biometric applications, solutions and the adaptation of each technology to sub-Saharan conditions. While automation in lifestyle and the familiarity of technology is synonymous with levels of literacy the competent use of technology cannot be discounted in a region where the literacy level is never in excess of 40% of the general population. Therefore, a study of the understanding of biometric technology and its uses in identification would be valuable to nation-states that are expanding the delivery of universal basic education.

Most development technology follows the availability of real demand. That is the purchasing power of nations to purchase fund the cost of development by purchasing the solution developed. In each of the study countries the per-capita GNP has never

exceeded an annual value of 600 USD in the last decade. Should financial resources not a be restriction, a study of the most appropriate identity management eco-system for each country given the environmental conditions and the purpose the identity eco-system would be worthwhile.

2. Literature Review – Concepts and Themes

2.1. Introduction to the Literature Review

The review of literature will be conducted on four major themes: the evolution of national-identity in sub-Saharan African nation-states. This chapter will review literature, concepts and scholarly writing on national-identity ecosystems and nation-state formation in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. As well as exploring non-nation specific continent-wide events that are applicable to all sub-Saharan nation-states, this chapter will highlight specific themes, previously described by some researchers as common failings found in most sub-Saharan nation-states that specifically impact the study nations of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. To achieve its aim the chapter will set the discussions against historical narratives so as to reveal the arguments in the correct historical perspective.

2.2. Background

The progression of modernity in the world, and the legitimacy of any person is based on a modern nation-state administering and giving to a person an individual record of existence. The legitimacy of an existence is irrespective of the person's status and privileges of identification within the nation-state. The legitimacy of existence is recognised by the identity eco-system and the institutions of the nation-state. It is the institutions and structures of the nation-state through which the person interacts that forms the nation's identity ecosystem. It is not obligatory for every person within a modern nation-state to possess a passport, or national-identity card as some countries do not compel their use. Nonetheless, the ownership of any identity document is always as a result of the person's interaction with the administrative structures of

nation-state such as birth registration that form part of the national-identity ecosystem. The ability to live legitimately, interact with other legitimate identities and institutions of the modern nation-state, engage in mundane activities such as a dwelling place, to sophisticated banking and bureaucratic endeavours requires the acquisition of a state issued national identity.

National-identity management involves various agencies and departments of the nation-state registering and verifying members of the nation-community for legitimate national undertakings, commitments, privileges and pursuits. A complete and functional national-identity eco-system is formed through a complex interweaving of the independent but interrelated identity management building blocks. The national-identity eco-system involves tangible components of national-identity such as births and deaths administration that results in the issuance of the appropriate certification, as well as intangible privileges of identification such as passports that provide the ability to travel internationally. Further, tangible components of identification with intangible privileges also include the work carried out by election management bodies, immigration, nationality departments, and other national identification mechanisms. Collectively, in sub-Saharan Africa, these tangible and intangible components have historically been impacted by significant events such as the clash of colonial and indigenous African cultures and the disintegration of ethnic nations.

These impacts and clashes have affected both a cohesive national-identity formation and the dynamics of national-identity administration. The dynamics of suitable national-identity systems for development are affected by colonial culture and other

indiscernible yet important considerations of identity such as religion, language, ethnicity, political philosophy, social affiliation, and collective history. Gecau (1999), suggests that national identities in sub-Sharan Africa are

> "…struggles for either domination or freedom… struggles over what history to tell; what history is to become dominant, who is to be glorified and who is to be vilified. The re-telling of histories therefore accompanies efforts at decolonisation and nation-building" (p.19).

As introduced in Chapter 1, this study will debate the ancestral heritage that formed ethnic identities, the intricate layers and the role of indigenous culture interwoven with colonial culture in the identification process. The study will evaluate how the (in)efficiency in the administration of nationality documents has given indigenous people within the countries national-identity ambiguities. The national-identity of indigenous people was not spawned from the retelling of a history of their domination and subsequent overthrow of their oppressors, but rather unique experiences of inequalities, deliberate injustices and actual structural flaws in the national identity administration that resulted in an abstruse nation-formation.

2.3.   National-identity Management in the Nation-State

Hastings (1997) identifies a uniquely African difficulty in nation-formation when he argues that the concepts 'nation' and 'nationalism' are problematic when they are universally applied to Africa since unlike other world nations, Africa's political realities are different (see Hastings, 1997: 148). The difficulty expressed by Hastings is rooted in the uniquely African colonial experience of nation formation. Contrary to Hastings' argument concerning the past, the debate of the meaning of the mundane words, this

study argues that beginning with colonisation, the modern African nation-formation experience has been inextricably linked to both 'nation' and 'nationalism'. Whereas the colonisation of other ethnic nations in other parts of the world, such as India, parts of China (Hong Kong, Shanghai, Taiwan) acknowledged the culture and traditions of the colonised ethnic nations , the partition and colonisation of Africa was different. For, by acknowledging culture and traditions, the colonising power acknowledged the identity management institutions in non-sub-Saharan territories. In as much as the person (the identity) managed by the nation-state is assumed to remain constant, their interactions with institutions of the nation-state's may not receive a constant equitable reaction. Institutions of the nation-state may have different focuses and may deliberately downgrade the entitlements due the identity. Institutions such as Electoral Management Authorities have been known to contribute to gerrymandering and deny people voting rights to legitimate identities. The territories of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia were formed abruptly and mechanically through colonisation with the enforced interjection and exclusion of communities that may not have been migrant but were considered migrant in order to exclude their participation in elections. This wholesale inclusion of friendly communities and exclusion of others is partly responsible for in the breakout of civil-wars, *coup d'états* and the collapse of countries referred to as failed nation-states. The discriminatory practices of tribalism, corruption, nepotism, miscarriage of justice is what Rotberg (2003) terms as the inability to "deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants" leading to a failed nation-state. To Rotberg (2003 p.1), "Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate

in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens". This research's study-nations reveal that these enforced community unions of varying economic, cultural, ancestral and territorial provenance have received varying emphasis of legitimacy and belonging to the nation-state meted out by the nation-state institutions. Immediately after the Atlantic slave trade that equated Africans slaves to beasts of burden, the protagonists of the 1884 Berlin Conference and colonisers did not acknowledge that Africans had culture nor traditions. In effect, the ideologues of the 1884 Berlin Conference did not consider that the ethnic nations even if they existed, had neither, culture, traditions, or identity management institutions worth preserving with the colonial administration. For example, the Kissi ethnic nation dominant in West Africa was spread across what is today Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Their ethnic consolidation was organised in small, federated villages that seemed autonomous but with recognised identity anchors such as a common language, common puberty rights that were preformed periodically as festivals uniting the village communities. The different villages each had village heads who derived their generational leadership through the 'casting of lots'. The collection of villages were further organised into clans, each linked to soap-stone figurines denoting the clan they belonged to, which were passed on from generation to generation. Undeniably, although pre-colonial African ethnic nations evolved into modern nation-states, the rapid surge in the creation of nation-states based on colonial territories did not consider the effect of both colonisation and self-rule on national-identity administration in the new nation-states. It is in this context that this chapter will review and evaluate literature on the prevailing knowledge that sub-Saharan ethnic communities are primordial static communities that cannot be redefined under a single national identity.

The original intentions on the adoption and use of colonial rudimentary national-identity documents and structures informed the contemporary penetration and efficiency of the national-identity management tools and identity cards. Modern sub-Saharan nation-states are accused of failing in national-identity management and steeped in 'ethnic politics', a euphemism for unbalanced identification privileges in favour of the ethnic community that produces the elected leaders, but against the other communities of the nation-state. Koter (2016) asserts that ethnic politics, "is considered the norm in Africa, largely due to the difficulties of forging ties with the voters" (p. 2). She also blames weak media and the for failure of political leaders to link with people. This study views her conclusions as too hasty, especially when she bases her argument on the fact that "developed democracies are to a large degree determined by ideology and programmatic differences,". For instance, if one takes the example of Britain, a developed northern hemisphere democracy with multi-ethnic communities, we find of the seventy-seven Prime-Ministers since 1721, there have been only two from the minority Welsh or Scottish ethnic communities, the Welsh Lloyd George and the Scottish Gordon Brown.

The contention that ethnic consideration in national-identity management and politics in developed democracies is inconsequential to the leadership and management of the nation's communities is unproven. In fact, the evidence in other multi-ethnic mature democracies such as USA, Australia, New Zealand, dominant ethnic communities in the majority always produce the elected leaders and influence national-identity management. Significantly, politicians in sub-Saharan Africa, similar to politicians in mature democracies have through generations adapted, accommodated and utilised

available technology to make their positions known to the eligible voters of the nation-community. All politicians within the nation-community will have available to them identical communication infrastructure to propagate their message. As a member of the larger or dominant ethnic community, the politician's pragmatic ideological message towards electoral victory could be a nepotistic one – an ideology that would ensure a 'fairer' larger allocation of the nation's resources to the larger ethnic community. This research aims to demonstrate that a combination of imposed and injudicious frontier creation in sub-Saharan Africa, leading to imbalanced national-identities in unnegotiated nation-states, with divergent aspirations, using ill-suited identity management structures, has produced underdeveloped nation communities that have disintegrated into civil wars. Further, the multi-ethnic composition and interacting cross-border communities that span modern nation-state borders in sub-Saharan Africa additionally increase the challenges of national-identity management tools. The research will review literature relating to post-independent attempts at re-building Africa's nations, designed to correct the territorial legacy colonisation and artificial borders. These events in turn have affected the development of national-identity management structures. The negotiations that took place between the indigenous people/ indigenous monarchs and the colonialists immediately after colonisation created dilemmas since there were vitiations in the way each community handled national-identity and the reverence ascribed to national patria. In a way, the benchmark of fluid identity allegiances, successful nation-building and productive modernity, the outcome of a settled national-identity is evaluated in this chapter.

Rigid European mechanisms of identification used in sub-Sharan Africa which had negative effects on national-identity management, development and the stability of governance are disregarded by several contemporary critics. For instance, Gobewole (2015), similar to many critics, focuses his research on the simplicity by which Liberian government institutions can be corrupt as they can use rigid European indices of identification like rigid territories to single out and target indigenous people, "corrupted and unequal practice continues today through the denial of election information, voter education, and access to voting machines precincts for rural voters" (p. 27). Elsewhere, Murray (2013) equally focusses on the use of rigid European nicknames that avoided the use of the African naming culture recognisable to indigenous Africans. He states that what is "problematic is the widespread use of sobriquets and nicknames for Africans utilized by western travellers". He goes further to a state that "the purported actual name of the individual is recorded along with their nickname; in this manner we know that King Freeman, the ruler of the African village attached to Russwurm's colony, was actually named Pah Nemah." (p.41). This evidences how these researchers avoided investigating the actual damage that these rigid European indices did to the community. In this way, within Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, the rudiments of identification such as calendarial recording of births, brought in by missionary endeavours, keeping of birth records and the functions of biometric identification critical to modern national-identity management are not comparable with those of European nations that have different parameters.

The effectiveness of European colonial governance on indigenous people in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Sierra Leone, was as a result of the historical identity

management experience gained from the slave-trade, the consequence of which was an effective suppression of sections of the nation-state by not affording them with functional identities. Once regarded as property, slaves were not included in the national-identity management institutions of European nation-states and in that regard the legitimacy of colonial governance with a history of slave culture was questionable. The colonial settlers that formed the Liberia nation-state and therefore its governance imposed what the was norm, the perpetuation of invisible sections of the community in the national-identity administration. Pan-Africanism, which had its roots in the resistance to the slave culture of America and the Caribbean, while advocating for nation-communities that would recognise the legitimate identities of all black people became popular when it interacted with African geopolitics in the post-independence era. Much as Pan-Africanism spread across the continent between the 1950 and 1970, it was ironically challenged in the 1980s in countries such as Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. Thus, the interactions between Pan-Africanism with post-independent nation-states, as this chapter demonstrates, affected national-identity administration and the governance of the new nation-states in unexpected ways.

2.4. Ethnic Nation Evolution into Nation-States

This sub-section examines the influence of international evolution of pre-colonial ethnic sub-Saharan Africa nations with dynastic leadership into modern nation-states, and its effect on people's identity. The identity management of ethnic nations with dynastic traditions was not based on egalitarian social equality, but on the privilege of rank within the community often acquired at birth. Wimmer and Feinstein's (2010) research demonstrates that until 1900. "states were still governed on the basis of other

principles of legitimacy. In dynastic states, a prince was entitled to assume the mantle of power upon the death of his father" (p.764). The formation of modern nation-states, however, transformed the status of multiple (social) ranks and privileges of identification within the ethnic communities into new classifications; a universal legitimacy of rank of each person within the modern nation-state. In most former British colonies such as those discussed in this study, after colonisation, community leadership and state administration was transferred by means of force from segments within the indigenous communities to the colonialist. The violent transfers of responsibilities and shift of administrative power in the territories was carried over into what became modern nation-states. Between 1900 and 1970, forty-eight of the fifty-two modern nation-states created on the Africa continent were formerly colonised territories.

A well-managed national identity-management eco-system with the appropriate tools and structures is inherently important to the recognition of a legitimately identified nation-community. The study finds it interesting that most colonising nations that carved out colonies that became modern nations of sub-Saharan Africa, such as Britain, Spain, France and Portugal were still grappling with the structures of modern national-identity registration and the privileges of identification within their own nation-states. For instance, it was not until 1928 at the height of colonisation that in Britain, the 'Representation of the People Act' of 1928 an egalitarian registration of national-identity was established (Hansard, House of Commons, fifth edition, vol. 219, col 1035). Of course, the Act was not applicable in the colonies and as such the privileges of identification, that is, 'the right to vote', was debased. In the colonies, Britain had no

fewer than five categories of British national-identity registration - subjects, nationals, citizens, overseas citizens and protected persons. None of these categories were clearly defined by any legislation from the British Parliament, but rather by arbitrary interpretation, discretion and allocation of privilege. The status, value and privilege of national identification was unequal across the unitary governed British Empire, instead, it was dependant on the interpretation given by the local colonial governing administration. How could these European colonising nations be capable of creating egalitarian modern nation-states with an objective identity management eco-system for development under the guise of colonisation? Sierra Leone and Liberia, territories that ought to have been empathetic towards egalitarian identity management structures since they were designed to resettle formerly enslaved people, instituted discriminatory identity management structures in these forming modern nation-state. In Liberia, with the use of force, the black colonists, the settlers/pilgrims assumed the responsibilities of governance, and removed and consigned the indigenous people to a position that made them unable to contribute to the governance of their nation, be it the ethnic or a modern nation-state. In Sierra Leone, freed slaves and descendants of slaves neither received the recognition privilege nor the automatic right to participate in the colony/nation's voting exercise for a new government. France, Spain and Portugal introduced the universal franchise systems in their home countries in 1965, 1933, and 1976 respectively. Thus, viewing the colonised communities that became nation-states, this research examines national identification structures of the former settlement territories.

If nation-building and identity management of individuals in the nation-state goes hand-in-hand, then mass identification within the nation-state commences at the micro level and involves various state processes including the extensive registration exercises of all people across all sections of the nation-community. To this end I employ the work of Bloom (1993), who argues that "Nation-building requires that the mass of individuals make an identification with the nation-state [and] the individual actually experiences the state" (p.61). In this context, experiencing the nation-state involves an extensive registration including activities such as adult suffrage that results in the 'proven national identity' of the individual and is a requisite for participation in the nation-state. The identification transaction between the election management authority of the nation-state and individuals of the nation-state, is based on their registered identities collected through a registration exercise, which assembles a register of eligible individuals within a geographically defined territory. This is irrespective of their belonging to other communities such as ethnicity or religion into a larger nation-community. The election management authority subsequently returns the privilege of recognition by granting the individual, irrespective of their supplementary micro-community, the privileges that accrue to the identity – participation in national elections.

National-identity management ecosystems are required for nation-building and the nation-state. According to Davies (1996), by registering to participate in suffrage, various ethnic communities of the nation-state, irrespective of belonging to micro-communities of the nation-state, are demonstrating solidarity with each other as components of a larger community. According to Davies, similar to "other forms of

identity, ethnicity provides a sense of belonging and a way of knowing 'who we are'."

His process is not only important if other members of other ethnic groups in the nation community/state are going feel secure, but it is also a way of creating a sense of belonging to a larger community or nation. (p.87). Thus, ethnic pride and modern-nation-state development are not mutually exclusive. In order to reduce ethnic division within their modern nation-state, the newly created nations-states of sub-Saharan Africa used inappropriate but inherited identity management tools for mass identification of individuals. This no-doubt reduced the visibility of ethnic nations within the modern nation-state, but equally, it blurred the pride of the ethnic communities cultivated over generations. Koter's (2016, p.167) argument, that ethnic polarization is the cause of the breakdown of modern sub-Saharan nation-states, and that the presence of strong ethnic leadership is enhanced by viable ethnic networks which provide the leverage for politicians fails to acknowledge that it is the failure of the voter-registration exercise and national-identity management structure that opens the go-to strategy for the unscrupulous politicians. This research will demonstrate that the inappropriate identity management tools from western cultures which were used in these newly created nation-states by inexperienced post-colonial governance administrators created the subsequent breakdowns in the nation-states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

2.5. The 'Nation-State', The 'Nation-Community', The 'Territorial State'

Colonial boundaries had no respect for ethnic territorial land occupation and in a context where some members of ethnic communities spanned the colonial borders, such as between Liberia and Sierra Leone, a strict enforcement exercise threatened

to provoke ethnic commotion. In any case, the omission of attaching ethnic occupation of land to colonial frontiers that became modern nation-state frontiers led to the complete breakdown of the nation communities of both Sierra Leone and Liberia. The research will demonstrate that although non-territorial alignment by ethnic groups to modern national frontiers was partly the cause of the breakdown of both Sierra Leone and Liberia, it was rather the failure to accept the formation of the modern nation-state and the non-adaptation of African identity management culture instead of a total embrace of Western identity management systems that is at the root of the breakdown of these nation-states. This research argues that the split-up of the ethnic Vai, Loma, Kono, and Mende communities between modern Sierra Leone and Liberia without anticipating the damage to indigenous solidarity deepened their sense of injustice, unified ancestral ethnic bonds and prolonged the civil war in both countries. African peoples of all ethnicities have since time immemorial criss-crossed the continent merging, dividing and evolving into different complimentary and contesting ethnic nations. Significantly, the advent and use of Western identity management structures and systems that informed the process of merging, dividing and evolving caused the genocidal wars of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Additionally, as will be discussed later, the Pan-Africanist empathy for an African-wide solidarity of nation-states, particularly within neighbouring colonised nations headed towards self-rule led to a surge of internal instability and weakened the nation-building process. The combination of mishaps here is significant in setting up a chain of incidents vital to the events of the rest of ten years following the time when the first sub-Saharan country[13]

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[13] Ghana was the first sub-Saharan nation to be granted self-governance in 1957. Please refer to Appendix D for list of coup-d'états in Africa since 1957.

was granted independence; over twenty-five *coup-d'états* had taken place in the nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa.

Decolonisation and the formation of modern nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa happened without adequate planning, leaving governance responsibility with all the levers and powers of the nation-state to a section of the community. I take this as one of the starting points of this study - the examination of inadequate planning of identity management institutions inherited from those established by colonial administrators without taking into account local political and generations of social evolution that created ethnic nations with ethnic identities. In this, I am exploring an anomaly in current studies between the types of African styles of national-identity ecosystems - that is, one that has taken into consideration the ethnic evolution from pre-colonial events and migration, the effects of colonisation through to the post-colonial antecedent of nation-formation as Zambia. This is in contrast with the use of imported Western national-identity systems that are contingent on the existing inner and external (neighbouring) political infrastructure so often accepted as the finite essential identity of the individual residents. According to Larémont (2005), the creation of a successful nation-state out of diverse communities can only be achieved by a steady and purposeful progression towards the goal of a recognised national-identity aligned

to the nation-state. Larémont cites the former Yugoslavia where the endeavour to instantaneously unite and create a nation-state out of diverse communities was unsuccessful; it was "a complex [combination] of multiethnic and multireligious society, that tried to coalesce into a nation-state, [that] failed as an experiment" (p. 19). Like Yugoslavia, within some sub-Saharan African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia with a far more complex ethnic and religious diversity, the sudden replacement of ethnic allegiance with the non-existent national *patria potestas* would crumble into the void of a failed nation-state.

Unlike Yugoslavia, however, sub-Sahara Africa Liberia and Sierra Leone were surrounded by equally fragile nation-states such as Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Burkina Faso, that were equally affected by the ripple effect of the breakdown of failed Liberia and Sierra Leone states. Interestingly, Larémont's observation deals with ethnic and religious diversity of the communities as the overarching threat to nation-building and national-identity since, as he states, "States in Africa have experienced serious political distortion because power relationships between ethnic groups and sometimes religious groups were often intentionally manipulated by colonial powers" (2005, p.19). On the contrary, this study, unlike Larémont, observes the disparity between the failure of the enforced coalescence of ethnic communities into nation-states in Europe and the formation of nations in Africa as dependent on the stability of neighbouring nation-states with solid national-identities that could absorb dissenting ethnicities and offer alternate ethnic nations, even though temporary. In Africa, the ethnic and religious problems caused by the rush to coalesce communities overnight was continuously practised within territories

in close geographic proximity creating waves of regional national-identity turmoil. In Africa, there was a permeation of troubled communities with non-descript identities criss-crossing these artificial borders seeking solutions and privileges of identification, an additional unwelcome layer of national-identity dysphoria. This study compares the development of national-identity management in Zambia, the centre of the Bantu migration, a hotpot of all African ethnic communities to the national-identity management in Liberia and Sierra Leone nation communities that were injected with ethnic communities metamorphosed in USA and Europe but were considered primordially identical.

The transformation of pre-colonial ethnic dynastic states into modern states in sub-Saharan Africa adversely affected nation building and national-identity management. Colonisation relegated kings of ethnic nations into mere tribal chiefs, who were not responsible for the disparities within the territory. This disrupted the allegiances of their communities overnight and the gradual formation of a modern national-identity within the still analogous nation-state was confused. In these cross-ethnic new nation-states, the recognition of identity and allegiance was no longer to the ethnic overlord, or king but rather to the newly formed nation-state that was created overnight. Contrastingly, the evolutionary process that disrupted colonisation was led by people who neither accepted nor recognised the same level or type of allegiance to the nation-community of the colonial territory; the desire was for self-rule. Despite the need to decide the political destiny of the community residing in the same colonial territory, not all communities aimed to achieve the same destiny; hence, when self-rule came, different communities could not easily collapse their diverse ethnic and religious allegiances

into a single nation-state allegiance. Country and national-identity gained different and sometimes acute opposing definitions. The Asantes of Ghana for instance wanted a federal nation rather than a unitary nation-state so that the Asante king could retain dominion over the Asante ethnic nation. Similarly, the Ibo ethnic nation of Nigeria wanted a complete separation from the rest of the colonial community although they had the independence of a federal nation-state.

Significantly, the governors and administrators of colonial governance in sub-Saharan Africa did not remain within the territory to negotiate and settle the shared equal status and privilege of national identification within the new nation-state; instead, they abruptly left the colonies returning to Europe where their functional identities were still intact. In fact, if the situation is contrasted with that of the feudal nations in Europe, one notes that when feudal nations became modern nation-states, the creators and administrators of the disparity remained in the European territories, resulting in a negotiated transition period that ended with the elevated and unambiguous modern national-identity eco-system that recognised minimum rights and responsibilities for all sections of the nation-community. This research contends that the abrupt departure from sub-Saharan Africa meant that the European administrators and colonisers arrested the evolution of ethnic nations into the formation of modern nation-states and avoided the negotiated transition period that would have resulted in a suitable national-identity eco-system adapted to the culture and people of the nation-community. While the process of de-colonisation had a domino effect on other European colonies with ethnically flawed territorial frontiers, it also left the anxious inhabitants without an established allegiance or national-identification system, perhaps to counter the

perception that "the Blackman was unable to manage his own affairs" Nkrumah (1957). The British Commonwealth and French Francophonie only prolonged this period of national allegiance ambiguity.

2.6.   The Purpose of Administering Identities in a Nation-State

Larémont's observation on Yugoslavia, discussed earlier, shows the immense vision of European countries in the realisation of disparate communities that eventually became seven (7) separate nation communities. By comparison, the challenges of inadequate identity management ecosystems meant that the need to implement national identification regimes in particularly Liberia and Sierra Leone and less so in Zambia, had different emphasis. For instance, as Szreter (2006) observes, in Europe, typified by Britain, a major colonial power,

> "A national system of identity registration dates from 1538 in England and
>
> was used by individual citizens to verify their property and inheritance
>
> rights and by local communities to verify social security claims" (p.68).

Although there had been civil unrest in Britain, the governance of the nation-state managed to implement a national-identity system that protected the rights of the individuals and communities. The purpose of colonial identity registration and administration in Zambia as well as Liberia and Sierra Leonne was reversed; registration was not to protect the rights, liberty and properties of the inhabitants of the community, but rather to control and restrict. Elsewhere, colonial administrative structures in African territories such as Kenya and South Africa subjugated the indigenous clans and ethnic groups with whom they shared habitation. For instance, in Kenya, the identification papers were known as '*kipande*', while in Zambia and other

mining colonies such as South Africa the passbook and other identity papers were a means of preventing black indigenous people from entering white exclusive areas other than as domestic servants or workers in the mines.

Although organisationally efficient in identifying individuals, the purpose of the identification was to restrict privileges, regulate and preclude the indigenous people within the colonial territory segregated into a colonised under-class. The colonised indigenous people were required to permanently carry identification papers on them simply to walk in the communities that they had been nurtured in since birth. Unsurprisingly, the white colonial settlers did not require identification papers, such as passports, other than to travel outside the colonial nation-state. Longman (2001), commenting on passbooks and pass laws states, "while pass laws in British Africa were not initially intended to structure group membership and individual identity, they were easily adapted to this purpose, (they) set out identity details and comments on his character". (p.348) The use of these identification papers in colonial territories that later became nation-states, became symbolic of an oppressive and racially discriminative symbol that spurred anti-colonial sentiment and freedom-fighters' commitment to the liberation of Africa from colonial rule.

The effect of this nationwide identity management structure, the administration of identification papers such as pass-books and 'kipande', the meticulous categorisation of identity data, became symbolic of colonial discriminatory oppression of the indigenous people. Although a detailed recording of individual identity data, the identification papers could not be an efficient method for managing entire nation-

communities they were used nonetheless. These legacy identity management structures were not intended to achieve unison and parity amongst the colonial-community that would become the nation-community. Instead, the system sought to identify unwilling adherents to a categorisation system that effectively branded them as inferior within the colonial nation-state. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the controversial colonial identification management structure that enforced the registration and categorisation of people symbolised by the '*kipande*' and the passbook in Zambia, South Africa and other mining colonies not only provoked the defiance of the laws by the people but it also affected the efficiency of colonial identity management.

Identity papers were a means of preventing black indigenous people from entering white exclusive areas other than as domestic servants or workers in the mines. Of course, when upgraded into a national system, the efficiency of an identification system that does not equitably capture all the inhabitants of the defined territory will not be sufficiently penetrative to equitably administer the nation-state. In the context of colonised communities, formalised European-style identification was not freely engaged with by the indigenous community to ensure the protection of their tangible and intangible possessions, instead identification was obtained through involuntarily coercion of sections of the community who needed it to obtain cheap labour for the economic benefit. Post-independence, problematic colonial identity management systems migrated into national-identity management systems used by the newly independent nation-states. Indigenousness people who did not want to be identified moved into the 'administrative shadows' avoiding accurate identification.

2.7. African Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Development of National Identities

The defiant indigenous individuals that refused to be categorised within the colonial administration system of their home countries evolved into the freedom fighters that travelled to newly independent African nation-states searching support for militarised resistance to colonisation and apartheid. Freedom fighters, activists and fugitives mainly from the Southern African territories of Northern Rhodesia, Angola, and all the people from Congo living in exile, were eagerly incorporated as citizens/nationals by the leaders of the newly independent nation-states without sufficient consideration to the extra layer of national-identity legislation. Significantly the exiled freedom fighters as well as refugees were enabled and incorporated into the host nation's national-identity structures, this allowed them to acquire passports documents, a process that destabilised the identity institutions of the host nations where they were exiled and significantly devalued the national identification structures of the host countries.

Whereas most of these new nation-states including Uganda, Zambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone, as a legacy of colonial territory administration and political transformation, had entrenched constitutional requirements to national-identity prohibiting dual nationality, in the new political context of supporting activists and fugitives the leadership of the new nation-states, they disregarded identity legislation and the value national identity. They granted national-identity papers such as passports to the freedom fighters and activists to enable them to travel across Africa to advocate for independence for their indigenous territories. These moves prompted challenges to the interpretation and value of national-identity documents that give

privileges of recognition in a national-identification ecosystem. Could these acquired nationals obtain suffrage rights as a privilege vote and decide on the governance of their host nations without any historic associations? Unsurprisingly, after the liberation struggles, the majority of the people who acquired questionable dual nationality dumped their earlier passports for the passports of independent Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa where they could in addition obtain ethnic-nation privileges of recognition.

The territorial frontiers arbitrarily created to suit the convenience of the European colonisers are illogical to the generations of indigenous ethnic inhabitants. Nationalism and true national-identity as opposed to the quest for self-governance asserted by indigenous people assumes a less significant value to ethnic identity. Indeed, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana Independence Day speech reverberates with comradeship and ignoring the impossible scale of work trying to align all sub-Sahara national interests into one. "We have won the battle and again rededicate ourselves, our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa" (Nkrumah 1957). The temporary comradeship and euphoria amongst the proponents of independence ignored the various ethnicities, yet struggled with the elusive structures of nationalism and nation-identity. When Herbst (2014), similar to other writers and critics such as Davidson (1992), notes how "At independence, Africa's new leaders were well aware of just how artificial the creations they were about to inherit were" (p.126), he fails to acknowledge the synthetic nature of the nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, the absence of nationalism and the failure of national-identity management is the additional layer of complexity brought about by multiple civic identification

documents that is produced at will by mobile freedom fighters who evolved into nationalist leaders. From this point of view, it is worth noting that the immediate effect of giving national-identity documents to fighters with no territorial or specific ethnic allegiance was positive to the struggle against South African apartheid, it proved negative to the formation of individual sub-Sahara nation-states.

Perhaps most significantly, the anti-apartheid (and anti-colonial) struggle to liberate countries from foreign occupiers subtlety *mélanged* with Pan-Africanism, race and ethnicity. For instance, apart from the freedom fighters embedded in the frontline states such as Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia struggling to liberate South Africa, Pan-Africanist from the Caribbean such as Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois and Malcolm X had attached themselves to sub-Sharan Africa freedom fighters advocating for the formation of an all-embracing African nation-state to aid the liberation of the continent from white occupation. These Pan-Africanists, along with African freedom fighters and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia who were the founding members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Organisation of Afro-American Unity, were accorded multiple national-identity documents of various newly independent countries that enabled them to criss-cross Africa. In this way, Pan-Africanism contributed in multiple ways to the current problems with national-identity management systems in Zambia, Lebanon and Sierra Leone. Ijeoma (2007) argues that the Pan-Africanist movement was "was borne by non-state actors and deeply influenced by the African Diaspora and by the racism that pushed Africans together". To him, "Pan-Africanism was both a "movement" and "an ideology that has left a strong imprint on African political thinking and sensitivities" (p.1).

Although Pan-Africanist philosophy of unifying all people of African descent was negatively utopian and an imaginary Africa-wide nationalism unattainable, the constructive recording of the determinants of an individual's identity within the colonial territories, that included ethnicity, could have been a positive tool for nation-building, ethnic inclusion and eradication of discrimination. Indeed, in the sub-Saharan Africa political environment of the 1960s, Pan-Africanism was a considered antidote for the arbitrary partitioning of the African continent that led to colonisation. To the leaders of African nation-states created between 1950 – 70, the ills of ethnic partitioning and colonisation could only be sustained by rejecting arbitrary classifications and categorisation of territories and their inhabitants. The only criteria would be the colour of the skin. The social evolution and colonial administration clock however cannot be reversed to the nomadic existence of African clans with little concern for territoriality, the imposition of colonisation and formation of modern nations attempting to administer national-identities.

In this shifting space of transitions, the struggle for self-rule and the already nondescript brand of nationalism in the failing colonial territories was affected by a concoction of ethnic-nationalities, which in turn morphed into 'African nationalism' and Pan-Africanist euphoria. It is instructive to know that the in their attempts to convert Pan-Africanism theories into reality of governance and state-craft, early African nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, at the fore-front of struggles for Africa self-determination, injected yet another layer of confusion in the pursuit of

national-identity for the newly decolonised sub-Saharan nation-states. Indeed, Pan-Africanism ignored national-identity and instead elevated colour and continental solidarity. As Mentan (2002) argues, the debate was complicated by Marcus Garvey's declaration that the Pan Africanist's "paramount political goal was to wrestle the continent from tyrannous European imperialist grasp and build a free united black Africa" (p.97). Thus, the African nationalist leaders, Nkrumah, Azikiwe and Kenyatta in their quest for self-rule, followed Marcus Garvey's liberation script. To Ackah (1999), as well as compounding all the injustices of the world-order to colour prejudice and a disdain of people from the African continent Garvey's ideology was opposed to all institutions and communities that were "racist in tone and imperialist in design" (p.13). But in a context where ethnic identity, territoriality, and allegiance to dynastic overlords of ethnic nations cannot be collapsed into a single black African nation, the naivety of the Pan-Africanists vision was the omission to grasp the anthropological and evolutionary reality of evolving ethnic communities that competed with each other over resources, eventually becoming ethnic nations with unique ethnic identities now pursuing national-identities after the injustices of colonisation.

Whereas African nationalism could never exist because there is no African 'nation-state', researchers like Khapoya (2012) have romanticised African nationalism as "a subjective feeling of kinship or affinity shared by people of African descent" (p. 139). He goes further to state that Pan Africanism is " a feeling based on shared cultural norms, traditional institutions, racial heritage, and a common historical experience" (p.139). These expressive discourse on African nationalism and the objectives of Pan-Africanism that were venerated by early African nationalist leaders and underlined by

Wallace Johnson another Pan-Africanist activist. Johnson, who simultaneously held Sierra Leonean, Nigerian and Ghanaian national-identity travel documents campaigned for the colonial configurations of national-identity to be irrelevant to Africans. According to Kilson (1996), Johnson believed that all Africans were of a single race and ethnicity. Johnson's views on race ethnicity and national-identity help to underline how the 1960s romanticisation of an utopic outcome of the Atlantic slave-trade, slave-ownership and discriminatory national-identity management structures of the USA and Europe was effective as a rallying cry but harmful to the reality of modern national-identity management in sub-Saharan nation-states. Rather than restructuring the damage of colonisation that had supressed ethnic identities and Africa's natural modernist progression into nation-states from colonial territories, the leaders of the newly independent nation-states practiced aspects of a misconceived African nationalism, Pan-Africanist ideology. Thus, while Nkrumah, Azikiwe and Kenyatta imagined the Pan-Africanist dream of a contrived single African culture and ethnicity and an Africa that could be merged into an assertive nation-state with a national-identity without negative consequences, in reality, the opportunity to recreate a true national-identity from synthetic colonial territories was non-existent. For, Western style, bureaucratic, but disciplined identity-management systems that offered people the legitimacy of a functional identity was resisted by many newly independent sub-Saharan governments in preference for the unstructured Pan-Africanist struggle to liberate all Africa.

Crucially, an elusive negative effect of Pan-Africanist ideology and its damage to the organisation of national-identity in modern sub-Sahara nation-states is the total

rejection of dual citizenship, a strategy that alludes to the colonial aversion to dual citizenship. For the new self-governing nations, the internal challenge was to calibrate ethnic identities into legal national identities, yet, they bluntly issued national-identity documents to exiles in support of the African liberation struggle and apartheid (Manby, 2009). As Davidson (1992) comments,

> "The new nationalist of the 1950's would then embrace nation-statism as the only available escape from colonial domination. Striving to transform colonial territories into national territories, they would find Africa's wealth of ethnic cultures both distracting and hard to adsorb into their schemes. They would fall back into the colonial mentality of regarding it as tribalism and, as such retrogressive. This diversity it seemed had to be just another hangover from an unregenerate past… That was to prove difficult" (p. 99).

In the spirit of the Pan-Africanist movement, nations like Zambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the frontline states[14], all blacks of African descent, including West Indians (African Caribbeans), who made their way into their territories, were accepted as citizens, or at the very least as legal residents with equal rights as the indigenous peoples. On the contrary, Liberia and Sierra Leone found it difficult to accept non-black people as citizens of their countries. Liberia treated citizenship as a rare prize, not simply attained even by the indigenous people within the Liberian territory, who predated the arrival of the 'Mayflower of Liberia' ship[15]. The pre-Mayflower indigenous people had to adopt the imported bureaucratic procedures of Americo-Liberian arrivals to gain recognition in the nation and territory that their ancestors had long occupied.

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[14]The phrase, Frontline States refers to– countries that bordered Apartheid South Africa and hosted leaders of the Africa National Congress.

[15] The Elizabeth, nicknamed Mayflower, brought the first settlers from the USA to modern Liberia

The national-identity structures of the Liberian nation-state were generous with national-identity documents given to new-arrivals from the West Indies and Caribbean. These unresolved questions of constitutionality, geo-politics and nepotistic interpretations of nationality and dual citizenship have all impacted on the mishandling of national-identity systems in sub-Saharan Africa. In Ghana, the successive civilian government to Nkrumah, under K.A. Busia, reinterpreted national-identity legislation and introduced the Aliens Compliance Order. In addition to Black Caribbeans, Americans, and Canadian nationals, "…the expulsion order affected close to 200,000 aliens from Togo, Mali, Burkina-Faso and Nigeria" (Aremu and Ajayi, 2014 p. 177). Countless "aliens" were arrested in a xenophobic haste, irrespective of the correct status of their national-identity and deported. In 1964 Sierra Leone, Albert Margai's government, excluded descendants of the 1792 settlers from Nova Scotia and Jamaican Maroons from the civil and public service because their national-identity was not descendant of African origins. Zambia under Fredrick Chiluba, and Kenya under Arap Moi, heirs to the Pan-Africanist generation of leaders also used aspects of unrevised national-identity management ecosystems from the colonial era that fostered ethnic discrimination divisiveness and civil wars.

2.8. Colonial Administration and Governance Culture on Ethnic Identity and Culture

Whereas the literature on colonialism in Africa is mainly about governance, the focus on identity-management ecosystems and its effect on the national-identity of the indigenous people after the realisation of self-rule does not exist. Two entirely opposed perspectives can be discerned here: One looks at the African continent as nothing but

an ensemble of transactions, a marketplace and by-product of European industrialisation; the other sees it as a collection of households in a nonmarket milieu of kin-based relations, a cauldron of ethnic confusion. During the era of colonisation, a self-assessment of African colonial governance by the European colonisers would have considered the governance and identity management institutions as 'ethical'. While these executive institutions were controlled from the home capital cities like London and Paris, in the case of Britain, the governance institution, the House of Commons, relied on the singular opinion of appointed governors, district officers and provincial commissioners handpicked from Britain.

Davis and Huttenback (1986) state,

> "Despite those wags who conjectured that the British Empire had been conceived in a fit of absence of mind and that its progress was solely dictated by the whims of the man on the spot without benefit of coherent governing philosophy, Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, in fact scrutinised the affairs of Britain's far-flung possessions with some care. No major change in fiscal or administrative policy could in practice be effected without the House's scrutiny" (p.253).

In the above statement Davis and Huttenback have mis-represented the administration of the British Empire, when they argue that everything was being scrutinised by the House of Commons. In reality to the "wags" and the colonised it is difficult to govern a country without taking into account the philosophy, values and cultures of the people. In a way this is one of the questions in which indigenous people's identity which has ignored, denied and distorted. It is through culture that

people of a common community interact with each other and with the levers of the community's authority. Similarly, people of the same territorial community and nation-state must acknowledge a similar culture to be able to interact peacefully with each other and the levers of authority.

However, European culture, through which colonies were administered was dissimilar to the African governance culture. That indigenous governance culture further varied between different ethnic groups and affected every colony's transition into a modern nation-state. This transition involved institutions that managed ethnic governance and ethnic-identity into national-identity. Significantly, this unstable period of European governance history, particularly between 1845 – 1945, eventually led to different philosophies of governance that suited each European modern nation-state, their national identities and territorial frontiers. Contrastingly, this turbulent period of governance and national-identity transformation in Europe coincided with the scramble and subsequent colonisation of Africa. Thus, African colonisation brought with it untested foreign governance traditions that lacked both a cognitive and an emotional relationship between the values of established indigenous communities. To McNamara (1989) "Too often the combination of [the colonialists'] own ignorance and the commonly held cultural assumption of the time led to out of hand denigration of the unfamiliar as primitive and uncivilized" (p.28).

The suppression of the indigenous culture and customary laws that gave meaning to the identity of people was vital for the successful imposition of colonial administration. Indigenous people that would not conform to European culture, a code of conduct and

laws enacted by the far-flung House of Commons or the French Parliament risked being identified as uncivilised and inferior savages, a deterrence towards a national-identity now based on previously indigenous 'uncivilised' values. The basis for any legitimate possession of territory would be as a result of an interactive process (even if violent), with the inhabitants of the territory, but not because members of the House of Commons had constituted laws, rules and legitimacy of national identification for the 'far flung' colonies. Crucially, none of the members of the House of Commons had ever conducted a Constituency surgery with any individual who could demonstrate or articulate the ethnic identity (soon to be nation-identity), from the colonies. Thus, as Thomas (1994) observes,

> "colonial exploration and administration are not self-evident crudely political operations, but practices perceived and enacted through fields of symbolism and meaning that are often densely conflicted and contradictory" (p. 18).

In such a vacuum of indigenous culture, values and economic aspirations, the House of Commons would have been unable to take cognisance and debate the national-identity affairs of the territories they possessed. In this way, the colonial policies, legislation and practices were 'densely conflicted' against the national-identity of the colonies and 'contradictory' to the well-being of the indigenous people. Colonial systems deliberately subverted the indigenous cultures of the indigenous inhabitants they met on the African continent and by extension their identity.

2.9.   Recognised Identities, Restructured Systems and Anticipated Privileges

Under colonial governance it was difficult to ensure an equitable society with equal privileges of identification. Within the same territory the legal rank and privilege of an individual was specific to the identification transaction that still appertains in modern nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa. In the colonies, the lopsided privileges of identification experienced by indigenous community affected their interaction with governance and contrasted with their experience prior to colonisation. In establishing 'formal European' means of recognising an individual's identity the colonial administration structures in sub-Sahara Africa ignored the rudiments of indigenous identification such as land tenure, clan, tribe and language. This is underlined by Mamdani in his *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (2018), when he notes, "The precondition for legal equality was civil inequality: an end to customary tenure and holdings and the appropriation of land." (p. 69). Mamdani focus on the unfair appropriation of communal land to the benefit of the colonial endeavour and capitalist intent resonates with the emphasis of this study and the association of indigenous identity with land tenure. Colonial Liberia and Sierra Leone, did not practice universal adult suffrage, the registration of voters to participate in elections was based on a prequalification and ability to prove that an individual voter is a land-owner at the time of the elections. Far beyond the fundamental fact that indigenous communities owned land as a communal asset, the injustice was the mandatory alien registration of land to a single member of the indigenous community to obtain an alien document as proof to the colonialist that they were entitled to the equal privilege of voting to select the leadership of the territory. This absurdity caused a breakdown of parity with members of the same clan, having been forced by the

colonial government to register parcels of land to a single person if they wanted to express their vote. In addition, communal ownership of land, and by extension the colonised governed territory was a concept unknown to the colonialist, it was easier to exclude the unfamiliar practices in the governing colonial institutions than a modicum compromise that would create an equity in the identity structures. Further, the enforced appropriation and removal of people from the occupation of ancestral land had more negative consequences for the indigenous community's sense of historical identity associated to the land-tenure. Thus, according to Lund,

> "Few things are more fundamental in social life or politics than what we have and who we are. Property and social identity, in the broadest sense, are perhaps the most overt and familiar manifestations of these core dimensions. Few issues in Africa connect the two aspects more intimately than land, where claims to land are partly defined by social identity, and social identity partly defined through property" (Lund, 2011, p.31).

Smith (1994) points out that it is rare that 'the boundaries of a nation-state's territory matches those of a homogenous ethnic community' (pp. 228-229). It is rather the norm that inhabitants of modern nation-states possess a diversity of culture, but a uniformity of recognition. Ethnic and identity anchorage may be diverse in the study nations, but it is still vital to an efficient and evolved national-identity eco-system that the administration of the identity is rational to the community and impartial in the recognition of privileges. The efficient organisation of a National Identification eco-system connecting all aspects of national-identity requires clear cognitive responses to who this actual person is, and to which (ethnic) nation s/he belongs to. An awareness of the multi-ethnic composition of the territory would have allowed the new

colonial masters to mitigate the disrespect to ethnic identity and identity dysphoria in sub-Saharan Africa today. Thus, for Smith (1994), similar to the views of this study, the understanding of national-identity that draws parallels with the evolution of a community of inhabitants into a nation-state cannot be detached from nation-building. "Nations are formed most enduringly and fruitfully around… solidarity and community", he states (p.61). Similar to Smith's views as well as those off another critic, Rex (1980), this study contends that post-colonial nation-building exercises were flawed, irrespective of the legal designs that created colonial territories. Indeed, Rex asserts, that within the territories "when the social order could no longer be buttressed by legal sanctions, it had to depend upon the inculcation in the minds of both exploiters and exploited" (p. 131). Therefore, the very existence of a colonial administration shattered the 'solidarity and community' which is critically required to sustain a cohesive national-identity through ethnic states into modern nation-states

The colonialists knew that the survival of the colony and the pursuit of colonisation in the image of the colonising European nation could be successful if indigenous traditions and ethnic consciousness are excluded from the fabric of the embryonic nation-state. To the historian Hobsbawm (1983) however, the establishment of traditions and the pageantry that surrounds the practice from the immemorial past enables the continuity of nations. For, the traditions normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition. This research argues that within the territorial confines of the colony that inevitably experiences the clash of colonial imposition with the traditions of the immemorial past, people struggle to belong to the historic ethnic

community that gives him/her recognition. The colonised indigenous person is compelled to be involved in imported traditions that lack historic foundation.

The inherent attraction for an individual to engage in the practice of traditions and values obliges the individual into nondiscretionary duties, claiming parity of identity and a sense of belonging to the indigenous community or a clan. By the performance and participation in traditional customary practices of the ethnic nation, people apportion their time and resources to the continuity of the clan; for example, payment of membership dues, attendance at funerals and festivals aspects that are fundamental to formation of the modern nation-state. Critically, the identity of the inhabitants within the ethnic-nation is preserved into the nation-state. This research contends that colonial imposition with its alien traditions destroyed the formation of viable modern nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa. The identity of the inhabitants within the ethnic-nation could have been preserved, aspects of indigenous tradition and by extension, entrenched pre-colonial identities, could have been transformed into the basic identity structures essential to the development of a modern national-identity ecosystem. A national-identity based on revered historic traditions was jettisoned. According to the historian, Ranger (1983), the complexity of an evolution from an ethnic-nation with ancestral traditions into the formation of a modern nation-state, would have been better evoked if only the British administrators have not been committed to the strategy of "inventing African traditions for Africans" (p. 212). As noted earlier, the attempted and sometimes successful termination of historical anthropological African traditions by the colonisers left a void of an identity structure for the generation of African leaders that struggled to create modern nation-states after

the attainment of self-rule. The complexity of the evolution from an ethnic-nation with ancestral traditions into the formation of a modern nation-state, would have been better evoked by the devotion to patriotic duties that imply meeting certain demands such as the payment of taxes, allegiance to symbols of nationhood, flags and anthems. Nonetheless, as this study will show, this lack of commitment to collective duties and the endearment to a structure for an enduring national-identity eco-system is a causal effect of a dysfunctional state. The evidence today in Zambia, Libera and Sierra Leone, similar to various other sub-Saharan Africa is a national-identity and ethnic identity conflict, a discord of loyalties that has led to civil wars bedevilling these new nation-states.

Ethnic nations in Africa had the same high level of collective identity and social consciousness, found in European nation communities, they required similar social constructs, laws, and constitutional provisions to shape the allegiance to *patria potestas*, a national-identity and citizenship. The ethnic communities and clans being subdivided across several newly created nation-states needed strong legislative instruments and intellectually robust principles of national assimilation to dissociate themselves from their ethnic kin, now members of a competing neighbouring nation-state. Smith (2007) acknowledges the pragmatism of historic ethnic connections but rejects the primordial view that these allegiances are cast in stone when he states: "every human being must be a member of one or other ethnic community; ethnicity is essential to our understanding of history; ethnic bonds override other loyalties; yet given ethnies may lose their vitality, may fade and languish, to be revived by outside forces" (p. 32). Colonial territorial transformation into nation-states in sub-Saharan

Africa left weak legislation, incoherent logic and conflicting legislative paths to recognition nation-identity. Constitutional provisions such as the Sierra Leonean denial of national-identity to descendants of Syrians who arrived a generation after descendants of Nova Scotia loyalists is a case in point. The irrationality can only be defended based on skin colour.

In attempting to impose decisive legislation, the British colonialist composed a significant clause into the Sierra Leonean constitution at independence. The clause attempted to inject primordial, but discriminatory origins into the nation community creating institutional and generational prejudice that would permeate into all aspects of national-identity management structures that formed the identity eco-system of Sierra Leone.

> "Every person who, having been born in Sierra Leone before the nineteenth day of April, 1971, or who was resident in Sierra Leone on the eighteenth day of April, 1971, and not the subject of any other State shall, on the nineteenth day of April 1971 be deemed to be a citizen of Sierra Leone by birth:
>
> Provided that -
>
> a)   his father or his grandfather was born in Sierra Leone and
>
> b)   he is a person of negro African descent."
>
> (Thompson, 1997 p.134).

In addition to the discriminatory sexist paternal interpretation, Sierra Leonean national-identity and citizenship was only valid to a person of "negro African descent", a clause

that can never be scientifically proved or disproved. In addition, the provision purported change the place of birth of people irrespective of the actuality of events facts. The provision was both racist, sexist and a dull interpretation of primordialism. These irrational legal landscapes affected national-identity acutely to the point of civil and ethnic insurgencies and wars.

The studies by Davidson (1992), Murray (2013), and Deng (2008) is the focused on the evidentiary adverse spectacles obvious in sub-Sahara Africa and the failings of national institutions. They identify the ills of corruption, the effects of poor governance and collapse of nation-states into civil wars. However, in pointing out the obvious fault-lines of the young modern nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa, this research focuses on the actual mechanics of what governance entails which is the administration of the people that make up the nation-state, the administration of the national-identity. Notably, the first function of any legitimate government or nation-state must be a definition of who are the people that belong to the nation community and secondly the obligation of governing the people within the territorial confines.

2.10. The Consequences of Imported Religions and Colonial Culture on Ethnic Identities

More than any other influence, it is the nature of the introduction of Muslim and Christian evangelism in the tenth century and eighteenth/ nineteenth centuries Africa, which made for how the colonialist pursued the creation of modern nation-states and the integral national identities with the nation-states. In this section, I will try to examine how the foreign religions are vital to the formation of the modern-nation states of sub-

Saharan Africa. Religious faith has strong dynamics in building national cohesion and nation-identity. Islam was introduced by Arab traders to sub-Sahara Africa somewhere between the eighth and tenth century. Their trade evolved along credit terms, based on accepted bonds of trust in a shared Islamic faith, given to settled communities along their cyclical caravan routes. The traders that could guarantee repayment of the credit to the Arab traders were mainly community leaders who had converted to Islam; some of them were feudal and dynastic rulers integral to the identity of the community. According to Freund (2016), the "Arabic traders were primarily interested in commerce, especially in gold" (p.23). Freund draws our attention to the fact that Arabic traders were not missionaries and propounded Islamic conversion essentially for trade. In this context, African traditional religion continued and "the peasantry remained deeply involved in earlier rituals and wore Islamic garb lightly if at all" (p.24). Islamic religious identity, therefore, did not attempt to change the loyalties and allegiance between the rulers and the ruled, ethnic identities remained intact. In contrast, Christian missionaries that arrived on the African continent from Europe emphasised conversion based not on trade, but essentially to change the values of the community – the very identity of the communities they encountered. The Roman Catholic Church missionaries who arrived as early as 1500 on the African continent with Portuguese traders, attempted to convert the Mbanza-Kongo a powerful indigenous people in modern North-East Angola through the power structures that ruled the ethnic nation. Beginning with their rulers they built the very first cathedral in Africa – The Cathedral of the Holy Saviour of Kongo -, but failed to make headway even though with the people themselves the missionaries were considered innocuous. Indeed, in Sundkler and Steed's (2000) research, *A History of the Church in Africa*,

that emphasizes the route to successful conversion of indigenous people to Christianity, they state that in Africa,

> "He [Bishop Truffet], had met the belief that Westernization was a necessary preparation for Christianization. That this idea was mistaken was shown by the situation in Dakar – then a little village – and Gorée. The people had been exposed to French influence for over 200 years yet there was not one indigenous Christian. 'The only things they had received from Europe' he felt was 'the love of money, the use of the gun, tobacco and alcohol, Lieberman's view was that Africa had to be converted by Africans. To that end he started a school intended for African clergy." (p.176).

This research intends to further establish that European Christian missionary endeavours, referred to as westernization being a perquisite to Christianisation was a euphuism for the structured and systematic destruction of the indigenous identity culture that indigenous ethnic groups lived by. For this reason, not only did the schools train Christian clergy, but they introduced alien Christian doctrines that bastardised the religious anchors of indigenous identity administration. Whether the Christian evangelical doctrine was delivered by European missionaries, returnee pilgrims as was the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia, or converted indigenous Africans, the effect was the same - the destruction of indigenous identification structures and the introduction of social vices unknown to the indigenous people as evidenced by Bishop Truffet's description of the Dakar situation. This consequently destroyed the indigenous social fabric and historic identity markers.

Freund (2016) suggests that in the era of the scramble for Africa and the abolition of the African slave-trade: "Every large state preyed on and raided its small neighbours who were often prepared to welcome European influence and power" (p.81). This protection trade-off meant structural changes to the community's religious allegiance, identity and organisation. This research will reveal that the protection trade-off and willingness to accept that the protection of European Christian missionaries was the acceptance of an 'alien god' that came with guns as more powerful than the god they shared with the aggressing neighbour and able to give the endangered community protection. Indeed, the free-for-all community raid-on-raid damaged both the aggressor's and the aggressed social and identity. The Kilukeni Princes "were quick to adopt one venerable Western innovation: the gun" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013 p.59). The formidable fire-power given to the Kilukeni Princes was used to raid neighbouring communities for slaves that were traded to the Portuguese merchants for ever more firepower. This malevolent cycle of gun-running, incursions into neighbouring communities, allegiance to an identity with the bearers of guns ended up with "the King of M'banza-Kongo converting to Catholicism, [He] changed his name to João I" and changed the name of M'banza (the Kongo capital) to São Salvador" (p.59). Early conversion to Catholicism on the African continent had little to do with piety but more to do with the nefarious slave-trade that disrupted ethnic nationality's progression into modern nation-states with national identities. During the scramble for Africa and the colonisation era, conversion to Catholicism evolved into an identity projectile aimed at exterminating African culture as barbaric and demonic that had to be purged. Hence, social identity dysphoria and consequently the construction of a national-identity consensus was damaged.

Conversion to imported religions was not an innocuous proclamation of a new faith but an additional facet of identity consciousness. A consciousness that requires reflective examination and modernisation of archived material. The effect of a multiplicity of imported religions competing overtly with one another for coverts, subliminally destroyed the chronological social evolution of the indigenous communities into modern nation-states. Further, indigenous tangible means of recording both social history – oral tradition and higher technical learning - written text was disoriented. Christian and Muslim evangelists, introduced new forms of reading and writing, to African communities some of whom, as Diop (1987) notes, had developed their "own scripts". He states: "in Cameroon there is a hieroglyphic script, the syllabic script of the Vai in Sierra Leone and the cursive script of the Bassa [in modern day Liberia]". (p. 185) Of all these scripts, Arabic was the most widely used, following the tradition of learning in mosques. Diop continues, "In Africa the language of higher learning was Arabic as was Latin in Europe", written text was used for religious and intellectual learning. It was not used for the recording of indigenous social identity footprints this was left to oral tradition. Whereas oral tradition was dismissed as irrelevant to the colonisation project and eventual modern nation formation, generational oral traditions have been critical to the progression and continuity of ethnic nationalities in sub-Saharan Africa.

Additionally, for the purposes of modern national-identity administration, African oral records of migratory history providing genealogical trace of identity was considered inadequate for colonial national-identity management. This research contends that it

is the contempt of indigenous oral tradition that has continued into modern nation formation, it is evident as one of the failings of the complete adoption of Western identity management structures. For the European colonisers, "without written records, there was neither history" (Shillington, 2019: p.2), nor data source for the formation of citizenry in the colonised territories that were to become modern nation-states. Indeed, the missionaries with their imported religions in demonstrating the success of their evangelical missions to their home organisations in Europe, organised unequivocal written records of social identity footprints of the converted. The untrue suggestion was that the existence of an indigenous people, the ethnic nation attained legitimacy as a people only after the arrival of European missionaries and colonists who kept written records of their identities and conversion records. It is instructive to note that the root of sub-Saharan personal African identity and the privileges of identification within the community is inextricably linked to oral tradition. For, as Tonkin (1995) notes, "people's legitimating histories; Any representation of pastness is identity constitutive and can be elaborated into an identity-support as well" (p.135). Missionaries deconstructed the identities of the converts by destroying the value of oral tradition which were their "people's legitimating histories" (Tonkin, 1995, p. 135). The abrupt change of the recording format of genealogical identity and identification practices from oral tradition to Western missionary style formats excluded some legitimate members of the community unfamiliar with the missionary criteria whilst including non-members to suite the missionary purpose. A case in point is Kenneth Kaunda's father, Rev. David Kaunda, who, although born to the Tonga ethnic group of Northern Nyasaland (present day Malawi) was baptised and converted as of native Bemba ethnic group (in present day Zambia) to suit the missionaries who required a

native missionary to teach in the Bemba community and facilitate the propagation of Catholicism within the community. These written records of the converted (births and baptisms) became source-documents for civil identification and determinants of identity privileges within the self-governing new nation-states (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2017). This has affected national-identity administration and internal cohesiveness during the formation of modern sub-Saharan nations, for the foundation for national-identity was divided and a foundation for multiple identities was formed (Dolan, 1998).

The merging of conflicting ethnic nations into a single country in sub-Saharan Africa has given rise to hybrid identities with competing interests in the nation-state[16]. This creation of arbitrary national borders oblivious to the formation of minorities within nation-states has given rise to the permanence of ethnic conflict, hand-in-hand with the demand by these various groups for political recognition and affirmation of their identities (Miller, 2005), a modern feature of modern-day national governance. This research suggests that the desire for prominence by an ethnic community in the newly created nation-states of sub-Sahara Africa should be expected to disrupt the unison and parity for all the ethnic communities in a national-identity ecosystem.

As stated earlier, these events signalled a paradigmatic shift, from an ethnic (dynastic) state to new nation-states with territorial frontiers yet without an internal common

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[16] In addition to the competition for territorial resources like grazing land, mining, independence pitched neighbouring nations with unified ethnic bonds into competing geopolitical spheres of the cold war. Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire on the Anglo-American side, Ghana, Guinea, Mali on the Eastern USSR side.

ethno-lingua nor anthropological history (Smith, 1994), which at independence devised representations of nationhood. These devised depictions of the new nation were principally to demonstrate the overthrow of the colonial administration rather than deep-seated emotional symbolism of nationhood. As Mamdani (2018) has remarked, this misguided attempt to demonstrate a unity for anti-colonisation within the territory lacked a genuine sense of nation-state formation. For instance, in designing the Zambian coat-of-arms, the use of the zebra-like black and white stripe of the Barotse indigenous group making up 40% of the population failed to give recognition to the other indigenous communities that make up the 71 ethnic communities that form the rest of the nation. This failure of a national-consensus and vision was counterbalanced by the prudent leadership of Kenneth Kaunda of minority ethnic origin. In resisting the lobbying and urge to infuse the new nation's motto "One Zambia, One Nation" with a witty text proposed by his freedom fighter peers, "Kenneth Kaunda knew the diversity of his people and he knew that his biggest task would be to knead them into one nation". (see Sardanis, 2003, p. 156). The text of the motto was maintained as not "too simplistic nor degrading" (pp.157). This research argues that although unplanned and, in most instances, co-incidental to the formation of the modern Zambian nation-state, these incidents moderated the negative effects of colonisation on Zambian national-identity management. In contrast, the Liberian Coat of Arms has no symbolism nor representation of the indigenous people that make up over 90% of the people of the nation-state. Rather the representation is of The Elizabeth that first brought the pilgrims to west Africa, and plough to demonstrate the desire of the pilgrims to till and cultivate the land and the motto "The love of liberty brought us here", alienating the existence of the indigenous people that occupied the land before the arrival of the

pilgrims. There is no consideration entertained by the emancipated slaves in forming the modern nation-state of Liberia for the amalgamation of the indigenous people into the nation-community.

Although the bulk of the colonisation agents that moulded modern Liberia and Sierra Leone were black, and the American Colonisation Society (ACS), was discredited, their evolution into modern nation-states was black on black colonisation, with far more serious impact on national-identity management than in Zambia. In Zambia, the close association of the British colonial power to one specific group, the Barotse, signified by the depiction of the coat-of-arms although affected historic inter-ethnic community relationships and causal to a weak national-identity management ecosystem. Unlike Liberia and Sierra Leone where neither colonialist nor inheritors of colonial power recognised the importance of symbols and representations in national-identity management. In this context, Elgenius (2018) agrees with Mamdani (2018) that symbols and representations of nationhood must stimulate an emotive vision of the institutions of the nation-state to be effective. Thus, in the absence of an organic nation-formation genesis, the fault lines of ethnic-nationalism in the ex-colonies were set in motion in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Crucially, when leaders of most post-colonial polities accepted colonial arbitrary territorial boundaries as sacrosanct, they attempted to realign the pugnacious dissection of ethnic communities and clans within the territories they inherited and most importantly redefine national-identity management. Notwithstanding the fundamental complaint against the injustices of colonisation as the manner in which

they carved up the communities, some of these leaders attempted dismantled the artificial frontiers, creating nation-states along ethnic frontiers and fusing ethic identities into national identities. For instance, in 1982, former French and British colonies, Senegal[17] and Gambia[18], respectively, aiming to address the arbitrary colonial frontier dividing their people fused their post-colonial territories into a Senegambia federal nation. The two countries could not pool their combined resources together long enough to create a viable single nation-state (Hughes and Lewis, 1995). In a similar vein, Sierra Leone and Liberia, later joined by Guinea and Ivory Coast, formed the Mano River Union in 1971 aiming to "promote social progress and cultural advancement" of their nationals (Robson, 1982). The confederation lasted for 6½years before the founding principle of 'cultural advancement' was abandoned in an attempt to control unrestrained border activity. Surreptitiously it was their mutual concern for the security of the governing positions threatened by the smuggling of arms, during the protracted regional civil wars between 1989 – 2010 (Jörgel and Utas, 2007)[19] that led them to drop the 'cultural advancement'. As Dobbin states, "The security concerns over arms and most significantly migratory identity management was sufficient stimulus for Ivory Coast to join" (2013, p. 91). Dobbins (2013) further discusses the discord between the neighbouring nation-states by stressing on the failure of security within the region such as cross-border arms smuggling but ignores the impact of cohesive identification structures managing the ethnic groups that span

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[17] The ex-French colony gained independence 4 April 1960

[18] The ex-British colony gained independence five years later 18 February 1965

[19] It is worth noting that Ivory Coast along with the other three countries were already members of the regional body Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS).

the borders of the neighbouring nation-states. In this context, the protection of the borders against arms smuggling would have limited national-identity administrative significance if understood without consideration of issues relating to migratory identity management.

Since the new self-governed territorial nations of sub-Saharan Africa were composed of multi-ethnic nations, the mere perception of marginalisation of an ethnic group within the territorial nation was sufficient reason for the ethnic nation to take-up arms as means of redress, as witnessed in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Cameroon civil wars (Ilorah, 2009). Unlike the 21st century Arab-spring uprisings of North Africa, the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia have been typified by ethnicity, governance challenges, and a failure of national-identity management (Bloom, 1993). Elsewhere, Ruggie (1993) has also stated that although focused in Europe, "The orthodox liberal position that these developments somehow imply the growing irrelevance of states is…fundamentally misplaced" (p.142).

Issues of ethnicity affect governance particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where new nation-states with national-identity management challenges yet aiming for modernity need to adapt their nation-state structures and national-identity ecosystems to suit. Moreover, in addition to human injury and physical destruction, when civil wars galvanise ethnic identity and solidarity as a competing force against the nation-state, they further encourage territoriality.

2.11. Social Strata Organisation and the of Calendrical Implications in Naming Culture

Whereas obligatory interaction between agents of the colonial administration and the indigenous communities included daily routine etiquettes such as titles, forms of address, that resonate within the indigenous communities, the understanding given to routine or administrative titles of etiquette in Western identity management culture contrasts with sub-Saharan formal etiquette titles. For, indigenous ethnic communities mostly have a relationship with other neighbouring communities and use formal etiquette titles and banal cultural interactions as part of the identification process (Billig, 1995). Importantly, in an initial interaction within most indigenous communities, these formal titles of etiquette are exchanged to relay genealogical information and relational information. This research articulates that the repression of indigenous traditions of address replaced with Western ones that neither have the same meaning to indigenous people nor the historical significance within the territory left a void in social interactions, identification privileges and social strata amongst the indigenous people. For example, within the larger Hausa ethnicity, when a ruler of a sub-ethnic community marries the daughter or sister of a neighbouring ethnic ruler as an accord of peace, the title shared between the two sub-ethnic groups will always be, '*nam-suruka*' - 'my in-law'. Whereas the generational bloodlines might have been lost, this form of formal identification etiquette extends to generation relationships between the two sub-ethnic groups (Gyekye, 1997). In a western identification system, these formal titles of reverence, used by the indigenous communities between communities and individuals, cannot be found or positioned in the reality of western identity structures. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, for example amongst the Hausa, their omission

suggests either a deliberate attempt to conceal genealogical identification or a sense disrespect in address (Classberry, 2012).

To Groebner (2001), the identification transaction is "linked to larger bodies of medieval and Renaissance medical and juridical knowledge in which concepts of gender and race played a decisive role" (p.19). Groebner's establishment of the linkage between identification indices of gender, race, medical and juridical knowledge is appropriate and applicable, yet the focus is on European identification practices traced from the "medieval and Renaissance" period. These evolved European practices have neither meaning nor historical context to identification systems in sub-Sahara Africa. This research maintains that although Africa did have its own medieval age, sub-Sahara Africa, colonisation punctuated what would have been the recognised development with the imposition of alien culture and the artificial creation of territorial nation-states with no consideration of the indigenous culture.

Granted that the expression of identity globally is based on indices of gender, race and the modernity of nationality administration, the expression of identity in European societies is based on these limited and narrow quantifiable identification indices. In sub-Saharan African countries, identification is still based on these indices but it is also hinged on subjective aural traditions, of evolving parameters within time and space. Thus, as Mama (2001) argues in her rejection of the application of the Western concept of identity to Africa, "no all-encompassing concept of identity" across sub-Saharan Africa, therefore any attempt to use it as a universal term is a conscious simplification of their individuality. (pp.9-10).

This research goes further to investigate 'substantive apparatus' in the form national-identity management tools and systems that can be developed to accommodate the complexity of sub-Saharan national-identity administration efficiently. My argument is that the Western concept of human ageing is an unshakeable and uniform lineal association between time and the human body, which is used for interaction and identification. In contrast, in most African indigenous cultures, while time is considered as progressive, it is still relational to events that impact the community and birth and sibling sequencing in reference to both the nuclear and wider family. This non-lineal perception of time influences the identification practices of the indigenous ethnic communities. The primary and customary apparatus of identifying and recognising people in European communities is limited to a person's full name, nationality, date of birth, and gender. However, in African societies although names are also the primary apparatus for identification, African names are based on socio-cultural and ethno-pragmatic context. The circumstances of birth, sibling order, ethnic naming customs determines the child's name or as in some communities the re-use of only the names of worthy ancestors (Saarelma-Maunumaa, 2018). Consequently, embryonic African communities end up with a proportionally small variance in the names (Classberry, 2012). These subjective considerations like specific ancestral / parental heritage, sibling-sequence rather than date of birth, and religion in Africa play a far more important role in defining individuality than measurable indices of individuality (e.g. date and place of birth) as used in European societies. Although researchers such as Mama (2001) and Diagne (2001) recognise these differences in identity in Africa, neither of them have researched its impact on national-identity management itself.

An observable difference between European and African naming culture which may superficially seem a comparable identification index is in the culture of naming, the general acceptability of inheriting your father's name as your surname is recent in Africa – circa 6 decades. For instance, the matrilineal Bemba of Zambia, the largest ethnic group, place less reverence to a father's name as a surname, but rather give new-borns the name of a worthy ancestor like Chibemba, and Chisanga meaning 'founder' and 'rock of the clan', in addition to sibling-sequence names. Thus, when the colonists with western-structured identification systems first interacted with the indigenous communities, they were confounded with a recurrence of very similar names from the Bemba as either a first-name or surname. Given the predominance of traditional polygamous practices in sub-Saharan Africa such as the Lozi and Bemba communities of Zambia, particularly during the colonial period, the interpreted accuracy of family identity data and genealogical record differed between western interpretation and indigenous understanding (Richards, 1995).

In the study countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, every government driven national identification program has been because the regime in power requires 'something' from the identification process. That 'something' is most often electoral legitimacy, encouraging registration and identification used for suffrage and regime legitimacy. On the contrary, regular birth registration, a mandatory legal requirement, that provides both functional breeder document identification (birth certificates), nurture origins (parents, place, and date of birth), is a hardly an enforced civic responsibility (Zambia, 1994). The majority of birth certificates and breeder documents that grant privileges of citizenship in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia are

either obtained at the start of 'free formal education', usually when the child is 6 years or even later when an individual requires a passport, for which the birth certificate is a pre-requisite breeder document. The Passport Office of Liberia records that sixty percent (60%) of all birth certificates supporting passport applications were issued within 10 years of the actual passport application (The House of Representatives, Liberia - Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2019). This research argues that as with ethnic nationality traditions in sub-Saharan Africa where the naming of the new-born by the family elders signify the commencement of a communal responsibility for the nurturing of the new-born, so also should the registration of new-borns into the national-identity register signify the communal acknowledgement of a shared responsibility. This could be in the form of a nation-state voucher for kindergarten education redeemable when the child attains six (6), years.

In most of sub-Sahara Africa, as illustrated in the selected study countries, where foundational systems like birth registration and certificates, lack comprehensive coverage (UNICEF, 2017), alternative functional have often filled the gap. These alternatives are less accurate 'entitlement documents', such as voter's identity card or a driver's license that cannot completely satisfy the understanding of the existence of an actual identity. These 'Entitlement Documents' are a demonstration of an entitlement or proficiency to participate in a particular community activity. When used outside that particular activity, their veracity is never assured. Hence the unreliability of six-year breeder documents, such as birth certificates in sub-Sahara Africa issued long after the actual birth, is a threat to the national-identity management and security of the nation-state. They are used as issuance credentials for far more poignant

identification documents and entitlement participation in civic life such as passports, visas, civil registrations, driver's license and the provision of banking services. The unreliability of the data and the interrelation to other identities who may be in a community of influencers of the actual identity is an incessant threat to good governance and national-identity management in sub-Sahara African nation-states.

In defence of political liberalism in social organisation, implicit in national-identity management advances the theory, John Rawls (2003) argues that "the initial agreement [to be recognised fairly in the modern nation] to justice must be unanimous" and "if unanimity is impossible, disparities between the judgements are greatly reduced once this standpoint is adopted" (p. 41). His argument leads us to the illogical conclusion that for a society to be fairly organised by consent, there ought to be complete unanimity in identity management. W If a nation-state assumes governance over a defined people, that unanimity is bound to be impossible, in which case, the indices of identity must be so recorded to the most common denominator so as to achieve fair justice for all. This research however argues that the contrary is true in sub-Saharan Africa. Fair and just communities including national communities are achieved as a function of ethical leadership governance and in the acceptance that the nation community cannot be homogenous yet all sections of the nation-community are deserving of the same privileges of identification within the nation. This research finds similar to Goetze (2020), that whereas in some near-homogenous European nation-communities utilitarian justice may seem attainable and logical through unanimity in identity-management systems "when transposing his political liberalism to the international sphere, Rawls struggles to make a cosmopolitan claim about a

global original position." (p. 182). Goetze (2020) disagrees with Rawls, stating that "he [Rawls] does not address the original, foundational assumption that people are born as individuals with innate reason and liberty, and with equal status one to each other." As discussed earlier, sub-Saharan nation-states are anything but a homogenous ethnic community. Sierra Leone recognises 52 different ethnic groups, Liberia 50 and Zambia 72. This research contends that it is the dogged determination to use of identity-management systems wholly imported from Europe as an attempt to replace ethical governance with blind unanimity that has led to the break-down of many sub-Saharan nation-states. Further, one notes that suitably modified national-identity management structures that are empathetic to indigenous history and take cognizance of colonial intervention are better suited for use in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, increased unanimity in national-identity management structures would leave huge loopholes for organized crime to exploit and a greater activity in stolen identities that appear as unanimous identical units. Short of this, the international commercial banking requirement to "Know Your Customer" (KYC) meant to expose terrorist and criminal activity is likely to become inconsistent.

2.12. Social Footprints, Biometrics and Aural Heritage

Sub-Sahara governments are yet to examine how cultural ancestral / oral heritage can impact national-identity management. This research intends to reveal that modernity and recognition of ancestral heritage are not mutually exclusive in national-identity management ecosystems. Whereas modern Identity-Management tools designed in Europe significantly emphasise the cross-referencing of documented, quantifiable and long-standing social footprints, in the three sub-Saharan Africa study countries,

documented social footprints are less developed. In sub-Saharan Africa, the same long-standing tracking and cross-referencing of social footprints is however available through aural heritage. With the use of modern technology this wealth of history can be corroborated with recent written documentary records to improve national-identity management to mitigate the effects of the 'Scramble for Africa'. Improved use of indigenous identification methods would increase the efficiency of identity management ecosystems that breakdown in sub-Sahara nation-states under the strain of unethical governance. To focus our discussion of identity management in sub-Saharan African countries we need to note that the European style cross-referencing of identity data for governance, such as a non-existent convention of inheriting a father's name in an undocumented, African environment makes social footprint data unreliable within parameters defined by a European system. While there is no equivalent study of this phenomena in Africa, Gelb and Clarks's (2013) study of the biometric revolution in Latin American countries is the most cognate within the non-Western world. In that context, they concluded that a strategic approach is required in the use of cross-referenced data and an understanding of indigenous naming customs because unbridled European technology is inadequate in establishing a comprehensive identity management ecosystem. The following discussion, therefore, concentrates on the possible adaptation and use of biometric technology to construct identity management tools/systems in the selected African countries.

Nanavati, et al. (2002) in researching the use of biometric technology in national identification notes that developing countries aspire to include biometric technology as an indication of the nation-state's sophistication and speeding up recognition of

identities in order to assign the privileges of identification. They draw a distinction between the USA, Europe and developing countries particularly Nigeria and other sub-Saharan countries. Whereas in Europe and America the use of the technology for national identification and "met with various objections" is resisted (p.215), this contrasts with the enthusiastic adoption for national identification by the leaders of developing countries particularly in Nigeria and other sub-Saharan countries. In spite of this enthusiasm, Nanavati et al. (2002) assert, "biometric projects in developing countries are often revoked, contested, or altered in scope and can change overnight." (p. 215). They suggested the technology's non-success is due to the early stages of project application. This research disputes the causal link made between the early stage of the technology's deployment in sub-Saharan Africa and the apparent failure evidenced by the ever-present revocation and the overnight contraction of scope highlighted in their research. The sub-Saharan nations have discovered that the overreliance on biometric technology as the primary engine for a national identification eco-system and interacting with legitimate identities was imprudent. This research suggests three main reasons.

First is the historic reputation of biometric technology associated with criminal investigations and Social Darwinism that is yet to be tackled holistically. The study and use of biometric technology evolved from the categorisation and use of measurements of parts of the human body. Through the progeny's of the early science of finding association of body measurements to race, Eugenics and Social Darwinism, peaked in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eugenicists such as Francis Galton and John Harvey Kellogg injected sexist, racial and ethnic bias into dishonest

research and made claims of mundane discoveries and differences in body measurements to denote intelligence and therefore the superiority of some races over others in addition to men over women. Coincidentally, the misguided credibility for Eugenics in the 1920s in Europe, and England in particular, such theories like the determination of race by three variables, skin colour, hair texture, lip colour and genitalia were widely held and used as a pillar for slavery advocates (MacGaffey, 1994), met with the European scramble for Africa of the same period. In the early nineteenth Century, although the Clapham Sect had successfully obtained the abolition of slavery fifty years hence, there persisted the opinion that the black people and poor of course poor could be distinguished by their body measurements. The popularity of associating body types and measurements with supposed superiority of one race over another fed into the justification for colonisation – to civilise the heathen blacks who were from Africa. These very authors of Social Darwinism, Eugenics and Anthropometry, advanced by Francis Galton, Leonard Darwin and Karl Pierson relied on measuring body segments digitising the accompanying statistics. They were the pioneers of modern-day biometrics. Galton's work in Anthropometry, particularly with fingerprints and the classification of communities by associating ethnicity, social-class, and crime with the observations he made from fingerprints fermented prejudicial attitudes of minorities (Galton, 1909). This research argues that in national-identity management in Europe's dominant colonising nations, namely England, France, Germany Belgium and Portugal, biometric technology for national-identity is repugnant to the national conscious. The same can be said of the United States of America that practically colonised Liberia.

Secondly, biometric distinctions between people such as skin colour and shallow finger-print depressions are functions of genetic heritage and socio-economic environment. Communities that share the same environment over generations because of the genetic pool of the community and environment conditions will share similar skin colouration and even similar fingerprint formation. Nanavati et al. (2002) does not examine the variations in human physiology of the individuals and social communities within the nation-state let alone the comparison between peoples separated on different continents for centuries. This research similar to Murray (2013) research 'Whiteness in Africa: Americo-Liberians and the Transformative Geographies of Race', argues that as in Liberia, the biological circumstance of skin colour in identity-management has been used by unprincipled leaders to categorise communities into illogical divisions and disproportionately unfairly administer these communities, hence their apparent unsuccessful introduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Biometric technology fails in national-identity management in sub-Sharan Africa because a socio-economic classification was derivable from the data and such data has been used discriminately against a section of the nation-community. Murray (2013), articulates "These disputes between ex-slaves and freeborn, northerners and southerners, light- skinned and dark-skinned, female and male, [in Liberia] not only reflected fractures within American society, but also had practical real-world ramifications in Liberia as certain individuals arrived in the colony with greater economic support, a better network of acquaintances in the United States, and the literacy and mixed-race heritage to ensure promotion within the government" (p. 244)

The failure of Biometric technology in identification management is not however exclusive to sub-Saharan countries. This research suggests that lessons and modifications from their failure in Europe and USA should be taken into account before their adoption for use in sub-Sahara Africa. Biometric facial recognition systems were hailed as a flawless identification technology post the September 11 (9/11)[20] atrocities in the United States of America. In the early 2000's a number of vendors sold their system as perfectly reliable system to determine the guilt or otherwise of criminals. When instances of failures began to surface, such as false negatives and false positives, the vendors blamed the failures on human error. They attributed the in-correct identifications to operators using dissimilar lighting conditions between data-capture and data-authentication. In other words, there was insufficient light when the digital photograph was taken, when the same subject presented themselves for facial recognition, the system failed to recognise the subject under brighter normal light (Magnet, 2011). What they failed to show was that identical light is absorbed and reflected at different rates by different skin tones. Furthermore, the sensitivity of biometric detection equipment can be set to either a negative or positive scale, and to report on either differences or similarities. This variable sensitivity setting can determine any level of recognition expected recognition. It is a project variable that can be determined at will. In sub-Sahara communities with dark skin tones, the accuracy setting can be set so low in order to evade inaccurate readings. This results in a high number of false positives and false negatives. Such discoveries by governments often lead to the abandoning of biometric projects in sub-Sahara Africa

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[20] al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of The World Trade Centre in New York, 11 September 2001

until another vendor is able to resell the next generation of a proprietary biometric technology also not tested in the right environment. A cyclical discontinuance and restart of numerous biometric technology projects with various levels of efficiency and completion (Strandburg and Raicu, 2006) is evidence of its unsuitability in its current state for sub-Sahara identity management.

This research suggests that the termination of centuries old sub-Sahara indigenous systems of identity management that were replaced by European identity management mechanisms could not comprehend the incidence of 'identity theft' in the era of globalisation. The latter has given some sub-Sahara nation-states a 'silver-bullet' veneration of identity management ecosystems based on the sole use of biometric technological (Whither Biometrics Committee, 2010). That said, even nation-states with advanced infrastructures such as the USA, in a national debate after the atrocities of September 11, 2001, decided that a 'silver-bullet' national ID card or Social Security number was ill-considered. Sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria that introduced biometric identification as a 'silver-bullet' in 2003 as a core-determinant for a national-identity management eco-system noticed that the system gave insufficient consideration to historical factors and deployment by diverse institutions. After an investigation and report in the daily newspaper, '*This Day'* newspaper on 10 August 2006, uncovered over 7 million fraudulent identities (Agbroko, 2006) in the national register. Therefore, by 2007, the Federal government accepted the failure of the original 2003 project and altered the scope of the project for re-implementation in 2013.

It is worth noting the cost implications of the storage and efficiency of any identity management eco-system using biometric technology. The utilisation of this technology goes with the unavoidable burden of large storage of personal information, privacy and trust, issues of and data-protection. Since the colonial period, the experience of most African national communities has been the misuse of such information by post-colonial governments. The fear among the nation-communities is that personal biometric information data is held by 'faceless government officials' and could be used against them gives rise to certain unwillingness to participate in national biometric identity registration projects. Given the chance, individuals, even though they would have nothing to warrant secrecy, would not want to give 'big brother' the ability to track and trace every location they visit. The perception that members of the community no longer have any personal freedom is reinforced by the structure of an all-encompassing biometric identity ecosystem, a criticism often levelled at the Indian Aadhaar system (Henne, 2019).

3. The Evolution of Liberia Nation-identity

3.1. Introduction to the Evolution of Liberia National-Identity

The establishment of modern Liberian in 1824 amidst European colonial territories in Africa and at the height of geopolitical European power is significant to this study. The antecedent of the creation of the modern state of Liberia recounts how a multi-ethnic ill-content nation community, some derided as half-castes, barely out of a debilitating civil war engineered the emigration of ill-valued members of the community. This chapter concentrates on the analysis of how Liberian nation-identity has evolved into the modern nation-state. The effects of the issues and nation-formation events that underline the discussion relate to the national-identity interactions between the governed and the government, and the mis-management of the Liberian nation-identity eco-system that led to the failure of continuous governance, attrition and civil war. The chapter, while reviewing the historical narrative, which frames the themes of modern nation-formation, governance and nation-identity management, traces the fracture lines from its genesis, the formation of Liberia, through the institutions that governed and administered the nation-identity of the nation-community within the legitimacy of the frontiers of the nation-state. Finally, the chapter explores varied themes and understandings of the 'big idea' of the birth of Liberia. The 'big idea', commenced of a pure Anglo-Saxon nation with little tolerance for parity of a nation-community with black slaves. The 'big idea' continued as an enforced migrant community 'black slaves' inspired to recreate and replicate the nation-formation process, and 'the 'big idea' of a community of black slaves insisting on a primordial relationship amongst each other.

3.2.   Background to Modern Liberia and its National-Identity

The communities of the Liberian nation were formed from a complexity of interwoven historical events. The motivation for each community's, recognition by the nation's institutions at various stages in the nation-formation process, is steeped in the historical roots of identity formation. The descendants of slaves that formed the pilgrims to settle on the west of Africa coast had libertarian motivation. They documented the first national constitution that was meant to define Liberian nation-identity. Previously, as discussed in Chapters one and two, indigenous Africans' membership of the community was intrinsic, therefore there was no necessity to define their identity and notion of belonging to the territory. Nonetheless, the community of people who had found an accommodation as ethnic neighbours, although recognised as a mono-bloc group by the incoming pilgrims, were generational ethnic competitors in the territory. Further into the nation-formation process, other groups whose motivation was market driven came to the Liberian territory as economic opportunities arose. Although it is argued that the culturally anchored communities, the indigenous residents, should have had dominance over Liberian nation-identity, this did not happen. No matter whether their numbers far exceeded the arriving emancipated slaves, the indigenes fragmented into opposing ethnic communities struggling for dominance against each other. Settler annexation of Liberian nation-identity in the form of the nation's institutions was hardly realised till the discriminatory practise became a cohesive hinderance to national development. The arrival, dominance and recognition of the pilgrim communities on the west coast of Africa is chronologically the historic formation of modern Liberia. The chapter will therefore analyse how 'the big idea' of nation formation: the return of people of disenfranchised people with slave

identities returning to Africa, was actually the origins of the chronological fractures that affected the nation-identity eco-system of Liberia.

The romanticisation of the formation of Liberia by pilgrims, later to be known as Americo-Liberians, and the events that led to the first 1820 pilgrimage from New York fails to interrogate the actual conditions. The conditions that led the first pilgrims to Liberian territory started with the formation of the American Colonisation Society (ACS). That the Liberian national motto, "The love of liberty brought us here" inspired by the pilgrims' triumphant escape from the environment of a national-identity management injustice in America, neither recognises the pre-existing indigenous ethnic nations nor celebrate them in the Liberian nation-state's symbols of existence evidences a parallel injustice. Apart from anecdotal evidence there is little documented record of the indigenous people's perspective of the formation of the nation-state. As noted in chapter two, oral tradition was the bedrock of identity formation and articulation amongst the indigenous people before the arrival of the pilgrims. However, the ACS's account of the formation of the modern nation of Liberia chronicled in detail from the 1800s, exposes the disregard of the oral tradition of these ethnic nations. The method of the establishment of the territory, which excluded indigenous communities at the onset informs the incapacity of the Liberian nation-state's identity eco-system to recognise indigenous communities with equal deference. In this way, it is inextricably linked to the collapse of Liberian nation-state into the 1989 civil war.

Aspects of modern Liberian nation-identity viewed from the European settlers in America who were the instigators of the pilgrimage to Africa, marked the pilgrims lofty

ideas of the formation of a nation that was at odds with the indigenous' people's perception of their statehood. The idea, the birth of the modern nation of Liberia and the advancement of the specific endeavour of nation-formation took insufficient cognisance of the ethnicity and cultures of the host ethnic nations. Notably, to the indigenous communities, the evolved culture of the pilgrims was no longer recognisable as African, therefore there was only a narrow and arduous possibility of integration in the community. In the meantime, in America, the lessons of USA nation-formation and the misguided intentions of a 'pure' Anglo-Saxon national-identity had been confronted and discredited after the departure of the pilgrims. The descendants of the pilgrims, oblivious to the lessons of USA nation-formation precipitated deliberate conspiracies that exposed and antagonised the peaceful co-existence of ethnic communities in a singular nation-state with an effective national-identity ecosystem.

The chapter is divided into subsections that detail the rise of the American Colonisation Society (ACS), at the close of the American wars, the Liberian constitutional and societal nation-formation process. The ACS subsection focuses on issues that would affect both the 'Despatchers' of the pilgrims from American soil and the 'Recipients' on African soil. The Pre-constitutional subsection considers the ethnic origins and cultures of the communities of the nation-state, the shared bonds and the origins of an evangelical delusional duty of civilising the indigenous community assumed by the pilgrims. The actual declarants, the legitimacy and the participation of the indigenous people in The Declaration of the Liberian Independence are discussed in the Constitutional subsection. Given the international recognition of the nation-state of Liberia, the chapter will look at how international geopolitics and internal mis-

management of the communities within the nation-state contributed to advent of the civil war. The specific historic events that relate the events to the origins of the nation are examined to understand that the civil war was a predestined product of the ill-suited origins of the national-identity eco-system of Liberia. In as much as the examination will focus on Liberian national-identity, the instability of the national-identity cannot be examined without discussing the complexity of relationship between Liberian national-identity and American nation-formation. Although rejected as incapable of processing individual identities that could be elevated into American national-identity, and ostracised to the west coast of Africa, for seeking such an inclusion, the pilgrims adopted American national-identity symbols – the national flag, and replicated American primary institutions of national-identity – the constitution. This study argues that the psychological impact of the culture of slavery endured in America over generations, left an indelible indentation on the individual identities of the pilgrims that was un-corrected and eventually led to the collapse of the nation-identity.

3.3. The Karma of American National-Identity Discrimination

A full appreciation of the formation of the modern nation-state 'Republic of Liberia', its constituent communities and nation-identity cannot be recounted without an understanding of the history and formation of the American Colonisation Society (ACS) and the handful of other colonisation societies that organised pilgrims to pursue an undetermined pilgrimage to the West coast of Africa. The settlement communities were organised by ACS on the coast of West of Africa, which eventually became The Republic of Liberia. Revised and contemporary Liberian sentiment casts a disreputable consideration on the ACS at worst and an insufferable but necessary evil

at best. The idealistic recounting of its founding is often lacking in the historical perspective and conditions in the USA. A detailed and analytical scrutiny of the multiple communities assimilating into a Union of the United States of America reveals several facets of disunity that gave birth to the ACS and its project; the expedition of taking pilgrims to Africa as settlers or colonialists. The American constitutional phrase; "all men are created equal" in relation to the make-up of the USA nation-community did not extend to emancipated African slaves nor tolerant of indigenous native-Americans. The expedition on the first ACS ship, 'The Elizabeth', nicknamed 'The Mayflower of Liberia', began in 1820 from New York and arrived in Mensurado in 1822. This development eventually led to a flood of other pilgrims, both free emancipated black slaves from other colonisation societies that pursued the same pilgrimage to settle in Liberian territory.

3.4. The American Colonisation Society and The American War of Independence

The putsch of ethnic nationalism within the nation-identity eco-system against the 'elite' pilgrim community cannot be recounted without examining the roots and motivation of the American Colonization Society and the ideology from whence the pilgrims came. When the British went to North America the original objective and philosophy was to establish colonies of Britain, not a sovereign USA nation-state. The philosophy of colonisation accommodates an unequal national-identity ecosystem. Under colonial administration, those colonised can never enjoy identical national-identity privileges as the colonisers. The colonial administration in America excluded the indigenous communities from the emerging ˜American identity. Additionally, the

slave culture identity that survivors of slavery possessed likewise excluded from the emerging American nation community until some of them were admitted following the War of Independence, Civil War and War of 1812/13. Thus, the indigenous communities which were regarded as inferior races, and the enslaved black community were literally excluded from a nation that recognised only European ancestry as a legitimate. It is worth noting that it was only when Britain, the coloniser denied members of its own European community, distinguished by the location of 'abode', national-identity privileges of recognition that the American civil war broke out.

The conditions that compelled the formation of the ACS a year after the American Peace treaty of 1815, in 1816 were created by the activities of the anti-slavery campaigners during the prosecution of the three American wars. The conditions were created disenchantment and more polarised national-identity structures in the various communities. Weiss (2002) notes that the succession of wars in the Americas and Caribbean including the Haitian revolt by black slaves that sparked off other rebellions in the West Indian colonies (p.11) had no ideological motivation other than the desire for emancipation from cruel the slave masters. The philosophical arguments of governance authority, taxation and international trade, the causes of the American war of independence was irrelevant to the slaves. Indeed, the slave revolts in the Americas, of which the Haitian revolution was the most successful, was a distraction to the raging Napoleonic, Spanish and American war. An African slave's motivation to join the war had more to do with an aspiration for an 'actual identity' rather than be listed as a property of an 'actual identity'.

On the American continent, in the period leading up to the meeting of the leaders of the thirteen (13) founding British Colonies that became the core of United States of America, there had been persistent nationalist agitation by European settlers on American soil for greater participation in the House of Commons in Westminster. The agitation became known as The Stamp Act Congress of 1765, the immediate catalyst that sparked the American Revolutionary War was the Townsend Duties, and Stamp Act taxes. What came out of the Stamp Act Congress was the mantra of "no taxation without representation" (Blumrosen and Blumrosen). By 1770, before the immediate catalysts that led to the American War of Independence, the dismantling of slavery in the British Isles was already underway. By that time that the British House of Commons had received petitions from people like William Wilberforce, they were beginning to discourage ownership (Davis, 1999). In America, Jefferson administration was encouraging the formation of the ACS. In arguing for this separation from the British Empire, the separatist leaders were compelled to elevate the debate on slave ownership into a nationalist discussion alongside their opposition to Westminster and its accompanying taxes.

The incompatibility of egalitarian founding ideals; equality, representation of all men in the American Polity versus slave ownership was a frequently visited sub-plot during and after the civil war. Thomas Jefferson a founding father who shaped '*The American Constitution*' and republican philosophical foundation in the embryonical years, was conflicted and owned slaves, (Cohen, 1969 p.1). Although a generation later and nearly three years into the civil war, President Abraham Lincoln, on 1 January 1863 made the 'Emancipation Proclamation' and is credited with the abolishing of slavery,

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his political publications and rhetoric denigrated black slaves. Both sides of all three American wars used slaves to prosecute their conflicts and complicated the arguments of who the legitimate identities and warring factions of the nation-state were. Would the slaves continue as unrecognised rather than legitimate identities in the forming polity? Would they be documented as property of legitimate identities fighting for their masters? This rebounded question would bedevil the future Liberia for generations after the ACS and descendants of emancipated slaves fled the American wars colonised and by force of arms enslaved the indigenous Liberian communities. The disintegration of the Liberian nation-community and national-identity into the crisis of the civil-war can be traced to these early events.

The conclusion of the War of Independence had led other colonies joining the Union. By December 1816, a further six (6) states had joined the original thirteen (13) Northern States to make nineteen (19). Amongst the raging intellectual arguments of the day, occupying the burgeoning USA nation-state, published as 'Letters on Slavery' in a periodical entitled 'The Castigator', was the national-identity of the USA to include emancipated and free slaves. The national-identity and formation of the United States of America to be achieved from new states joining the Union was established. The view propagated by the forerunners of ACS such as the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS), and the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (AFASS) led by John Rankin, William Lloyd Garrison and Theodore Weld, was that the joining states to the Union should achieve parity with the founding Northern States by eliminating the culture of slave-ownership. Their argument was that an egalitarian nation-state that had fought and won a war for equal recognition and independence from Britain, to

reinstate inequalities in the nation-community based on a racial categorization was absurd. The dogma that all human beings irrespective of colour, gender, African origins, or social-class were 'created equal' in a nation-community was far too drastic even for conservative reformers of the day to subscribe to. The liberal American Colonisation Society (ACS), whose objective was to find alternative territories outside the USA for unwanted identities such as the community of free black-slaves, to be re-located and developed into nation-states was preferable. The concession that the ACS would to agree in return for funding from Congress and finance from established national institutions would be the decline to proliferate the 'extreme' ideas of slaves created equal to Anglo-Saxons.

3.5. The Missouri Compromise – The Sacrifice of a Community

The 1820 Missouri Compromise, a cornerstone of the American Constitution later to be overturned by the Thirteenth (13th) constitutional amendment joined slave owning states with non-slave owning states in the expansion of the federation of the United States. It relates to the exploitation of the values and ethics of the leaders of American nationalism that led to the abandonment a section of the nation-community. The pursuit of American nationalism which was the expansion of the Union caused the segregation of communities and denied the extension of a national-identity to persons of African descent. Their arrival unto American soil was not voluntary, yet the beneficiaries of the African Slave-trade were unwilling to extend legitimacy of recognition to a section of the nation-community that applied their vigour in nation-building. The compromise sacrificed the national legitimacy of a community that had fought for the creation of the nation. USA national legitimacy and privileges of

recognition were removed from emancipated slaves. The ACS vehicle that became a catalyst in the creation of modern Liberia was increasingly attractive as an alternative route to a nation of 'men created equally', but not created to live alongside on another.

The USA nation-project went ahead despite the accepted nation-state problems relating to unresolved slave-ownership institutions and nation-identity privileges of recognition The expansion of the Union, amplified the identity problems within the nation-state, an entire section of the nation-community, recognised by the nation's identity eco-system were now eliminated. This elimination was in the form of concessions given to the pro-slavery States. The programme of emancipation in the founding Northern States to expand national-identity of the USA to include free slaves was halted. Rather than reinforce the ideal, that joining states were no longer 'colonial territories' and 'slaves were no longer property but identities' to be managed within the nation-state, the expansion of the Union reduced this national-identity dilemma into the Missouri Compromise. "In 1819 the proposed admission of Missouri as a slave state stifled this national debate. With eleven free states and eleven slave states, Missouri would tip the scales of power between North and South" (Holbrook Brown, 1964 p.5). The mainly slavery-free Northern dominated Union backed Thomas Jefferson into the reversal of emancipated slaves being accorded legitimate nationwide national-identities. To accommodate Missouri into the Union, legitimate national-identities created out of slave emancipation, albeit with fewer privileges of suffrage and property ownership would be downgraded to state-recognised identities. A legitimate semi-functional national-identity obtained through emancipation, was only valid within the state, nationwide legitimacy was removed.

The Missouri Compromise, which downgraded and de-nationalised identities into state freedmen was significant because: First, the role of Thomas Jefferson in the Missouri Compromise and subsequently in the creation of the ACS. As a slave-owner, did he encourage the ACS enterprise to rid the new-nation of black emancipated slaves within the nation-state or had he philosophised that emancipated slaves could only be elevated outside the nation-state of the USA? Second, when The Elizabeth sailed in 1820 from New York, the pilgrims existed in a confused state of national-identity. Were they individuals of USA national-identity sent to colonise territory in Africa or did they depart the shores of the USA without any form of national-identity? The black slaves that fought on the side of the Patriots from the North-West States had won their freedom, but their identification privileges obtained ex-slaves were unfair. They could not own property and were thus incapable of being resettled as equitably as their white compatriot soldiers. The new states joining the Union were slave owning states and therefore the legitimate recognition of emancipated slave identity as a composite within the nation-state had been overturned. The public debate taken to the United States Congress concerned the plight of the ex-combatants and freedmen. What could the states do with the irksome difficulty of emancipated, ex-combatants and freedmen all in a single community living alongside shackled slaves? These debates led Congress to pass a bill to facilitate the resettlement of "freed negroes and Freedmen"[21] to Africa. Consequently, a Charter[22] was given to the American Colonization Society

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[21] Freed negroes and freedmen were ex-slaves and descendants of ex-slaves.

[22] Chartered companies were private profit-oriented companies, given rights by the government of their home country to govern an annexed or conquered territory in exchange for trade and exploration. Although the practice commenced in Europe with The British Crown, The Dutch and Spanish, The United States followed this method and gave a Charter to the American Colonisation Society for the colonization of the territory along the west coast of Africa that became Liberia.

(ACS) to mobilise funds in addition to what was voted by Congress and effect the bill to facilitate the emigration of freedmen to the west coast of Africa, later to become Liberia.

Not all those that travelled to Africa from America were emancipated slaves. Some slaves had been forcibly manumitted when they were no longer commercial valuable to their owners or expelled from their master's compound to avoid the social repercussions of slave ownership. (also see Davis, 1999 Kindle ed.) Critically, these freedmen, demoted to become ACS pilgrims in search of a nation-state, would only obtained a re-nationalised identity following the flawed Liberian Declaration of Independence. The nation-identity of all ACS pilgrims was undefined, inconsistent, malleable, it would develop into the national-identity misperceptions of the future Republic of Liberia.

3.6.   Nationalism Negotiated, International Legitimacy of Identity Established

This subsection will examine the limited geopolitical dialogue that joined the anti-slavery protagonists to colonisation promoters on both sides of the Atlantic and how their limited objective, the eradication of slavery, became irrelevant in the face of the deeper empathy of the pursuit of a legitimate identity for their African migrant community – an actual national-identity. While the United States had regressed into a consolidation of the slave culture with the acceptance of slave-owning-states into the Union, Britain's House of Commons had progressed into recognising the legitimate national-identity of an ex-slave Stuart and freed him from Somerset who wanted to ship back to the Caribbean.

To add to the flawed foundations of the formation of the ACS was the United States' response to Great Britain's Abolitionist Movement led by Thomas Clarkson, James Cropper and Wilberforce. This was the group that founded the nation-state of Sierra Leone, unlike the ACS and the beginnings of Liberia, the British Abolitionist Movement did not suffer the anti-colonisation masquerade that bedevilled ACS enthusiasts. Similar to the Wilberforce Abolitionist Movement of Great Britain the ACS was made up of Quakers and other clergy. Some of the British Abolitionist such as Thomas Clarkson, believing that the ACS had similar anti-slavery scruples originally gave ACS their support. Although both organisations either side of the Atlantic shared colonisation objectives, there was a marked difference in their view of every person being entitled to a legitimate nation-identity. The American Colonisation Society saw colonisation as a panacea that would drive out unwanted persons from the nation community; emancipated African slaves from American territory, lead them to colonise distant territories with no entitlement to American nation-identity. British Abolitionists saw colonisation as an opportunity to drive out inferior persons to colonise additional territories with the view to extend to them an appropriate rank of nation-identity and expand the British Empire. It is important to note that the British evolution of nation-identity had always been a tiered structure. All identities were legitimate and national, but tiered. National identities differed in tiers of subjects, citizens, nationals, overseas nationals and yet others were dependants. The republican objectives of European settlers precluded a tiered nation-identity in the American nation. Therefore, the ACS goal would be to make this tiresome problem disappear.

The ACS comprised of individuals attracted to this goal, whose intent was to use the ACS as a vehicle to achieve their objective of disowning of national-identity responsibility to the tiresome section of the nation-community. In forming an American nation-state, white European nationalist settlers were of the view that United States of America territories were White-only settlements. This could not be achieved without the extinction of the Native Indians and the removal of African ex-slaves. (see (Foreman, 1972 p.13) Foreman quotes Gen. Thomas Jessup who stated that "slaves must be separated from them and sent out of the country" (p.361). Black slaves that were emancipated and having a legitimate identity would could not remain legally in the territory. They could only remain legitimately in the territory as the property of White nationalist settlers. This attempt at White European primordial purity and settler appropriation of American territory to themselves found support amongst the community leaders. The removal of emancipated African slaves was a solution offered by the ACS that seemed benevolent and benign. The evaporation of an ethnic community of Americans and emancipated slaves, from American territory was an extension of the primordial sentiments of the European settlers. (Power-Greene, 2014 p.9). Abraham Lincoln was not himself a slave owner, but he espoused the same ideals of an incapacity to extend legitimate nation-identity to black people, emancipated slaves and that colonisation would provide a solution (see McPherson, 1988 p.127-128; Lincoln, 1989).

The anti-slavery campaigners' opposition to slavery on the grounds of a parity of all human beings was ground breaking at the time as the vexed question of freedmen and emancipated slaves had also become topical in the aftermath of the sort of nation-

state the United States would be after severing colonial links to Great Britain. The American Colonisation Societies' aim perceived to be using prevailing establishment, opportunities and legal institutions to eradicate slavery was supported by politicians like Thomas Jefferson who advocated for an official policy of reducing the black population by "purchasing all slave children and then deporting them to Africa" (Rierson 2011, p.780). British Anti-Abolitionists were accommodating of tiered identities and were thus less inclined to confront the ACS on the non-extension of nationwide legitimacy to emancipated slaves. It seemed that the larger objective of abolition of slavery was a shared objective that they could all focus on. "Other members, however, such as Thomas Clarkson and even Willian Wilberforce, were initially persuaded to accept the goodwill of the ACS" (Power-Greene, 2014 p. 216), as the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) and American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (AFASS) were too radical and revolutionary in their objectives, opposing the accepted wisdom of the time; to pursue ideas of anti-slavery gradually.

In achieving an altruistic ambition of the abolition of slavery the attendant hope of white nationalist was that no black man of legitimate functional identity could ever achieve United States national-identity. It was with such support that the ACS gained traction and was formed in 1816 to remove emancipated black people from American soil to colonies that would be purchased by the United States such as Texas, Chiquiri in Panama, Belize, Florida, Hiati, Mexico, Liberia and other territories outside the then Confederacy

3.7. Economic and Commercial Arguments that Formed the ACS

The effect of the commercialisation of the value of African slaves exploited by some sectors of the ACS project led to the discrediting of the ACS. Notably, its objectives had become either unclear or deliberately concealed to avoid uncovering the motives of the promoters who wished to hide under the seemingly benign ACS objectives. The ACS, an American cultural invention was in all but name a chartered company charged and funded by Congress to dominate and exploit the culture of the African communities that they came across. The ACS was further infiltrated by ex-slave owners who preferred this outcome than to contend civil parity with ex-slaves on American soil. Shortly after their arrival in the territory of the indigenous people of West Africa, during the period of territorial entrenchment, the ACS with the fire-power backing of the USA Congress, enacted deleterious laws over the acquisition of land occupied for centuries by the indigenous people. The repulsive crimes against humanity committed by the commercial activity of the enforced capture of slaves by Slave Catchers deployed from Liberia during King Leopold's reign is further discussed in Chapter 5 . The effect of violent black on black slave-catching would prove to be an insurmountable barrier to modern nation-formation in sub-Saharan Africa as the slave catchers were often from neighbouring ethnic communities that had been furnished with European gunfire and encouraged to pillage neighbouring villages. The generational wounds would be difficult to erase when these two communities find themselves enclaved into a modern nation-state.

The less publicised but equally odious view supported by many promoters of the ACS was that slave-ownership and its trade was a commercial production activity; the

objectives of obtaining slaves from Africa was for wealth-creation. According to Stilwell (2014), prior to the abolition of the Atlantic Slave-trade, "Slavery became a central institution in Atlantic Africa because more slaves were used in production; they had a central economic role, not just as objects, but also as labour. Slavery became important for the continued production of new slaves" (p. 53). The 'industrial' breeding of more efficient slaves similar to those imported on the slave ships, bred purely for sale as an economic component used on cotton farms and other agri-fields, would be better achieved on the African continent.

Whereas Stilwell (2014), attempts to highlight slave revolts as struggles for inclusion, the point is cloaked with in-offensive liberality. Inclusion requires a basic acceptance of respect and appreciation between the two groups; that is, slaves and masters respect and appreciate each other and are only segregated by community recognition. In the Atlantic Slave environment, slaves were not a community but were traded objects. Their acquisition and disposal by masters required no input no slaves bred on American soil were more rebellious and less productive. This exposure was eloquently articulated by James Cropper in a published letter to Thomas Clarkson, 2 October 1832 (Cropper, 1832). In the letter, he debunked the idea that slaveholding Americans who had become millionaires through commercial slavery, were anxious to annihilate slavery. They would waive their fortunes in a selfless pursuit of securing a permanent and dignified homeland in Africa for ex-salves. Cropper also exposes the risk identified by these American slave-traders to their privileged positions should there be a classless evolution of nation-identity recognition in the United States. He very vociferously points out that the privileges of egalitarian identity recognition and

management would be a threat to slave-trading, should parity be extended in the form of education to blacks with whom they share land. Cropper writes,

> "We ought never to lose sight of two facts, the first is that slaves are regularly bred for sale. The second is that laws affecting free blacks so violently persecuting, as to compel them to leave that state, why are slaveholders so anxious to send away free people of color, because their institutions would be affected by respectable free black laborers, and they dread still more their education and advancement in science, To this the real scheme, for the ultimate extinction of slavery, by the transportation of the whole black population to the coast of Africa, A most extraordinary statement for which, there is no foundation in either fact or probability. Can it be believed that the slaveholders of the United States are ready to give up their property at least worth five million sterling? - a liberality unheard of since the foundation of the world, the (cotton) planters are friendly to this colonisation scheme, Perpetuation and not extension of slavery is its object."

> (Cropper 1832, p.5).

What was demonstrated during this period by Cropper (1832), was that some returnees were encouraged by diabolical ACS elements to return as black slave traders to breed and export more efficient slaves from Africa. Undoubtedly, in the formation of a modern Liberia, returnee black slave traders would be unable to construct a shared nation-identity with indigenous inhabitants.

This led to a distortion of the argument that propelled some slave-owner members of the ACS; given the opportunity, freed slaves were mentally incapable of forming viable

societies hence the reluctance to be repatriated (Everill, 2012). Amidst this quagmire, prominent black leaders and advocates of repatriation maintained that, the creation of Liberia "was not only a means of achieving individual self-advancement, but was also a political expression of their racial identity" (p.57).

The aspiration for the creation of the nation-state Liberia with a distinct nation-identity did not come as the expression or validation of an internal ambition of the inhabitants of the territory but rather the desire of an ever-growing world Super-Power to rid itself of bad publicity. As David (2014 p. 93) noted:

> "Plantation owners had other motives, and altruism was not one of them. They wanted to enforce the removal of freemen out of America. Early antislavery movements such as colonization found themselves allied with slaveholders not out of a compromise in their belief in antislavery or a cynical calculation of political-economic realities, but as a reflection of slow imperial communications, complex relationships between formerly enslaved people and the institution of slavery."

The stimuli of positive nationalism and the preservation of patriotism in the creation of a nation-identity was missing from the onset.

The formation of the American Colonization Society was thus founded amidst torrid nation-identity objectives that instigated the return of an introverted tightly-knit but troubled community of emancipated slaves to Africa. The rhetoric disseminated by European settlers in America, white enthusiasts, eager to rid their forming nation of black slaves was pervasive. They would identify African slaves as primordially and

irreversibly African, with no portion or possibility of American nation-identity; "colored people of America, or any other part of the world, may be regarded as borrowed from Africa, and inheriting a natural adaptation to her soil and climate" (Kazanjian, 2003 p. 119). This inequitable determination of American national-identity and its privileges commenced to unravel; thus, the dominant European settler communities were vicariously affected.

American national-identity was settled if not peaceably but eventually via the civil rights movements of the 1950's. Discriminatory Liberian national-identity was equally and momentously confronted by Samuel Doe's *coup d'état* and the decade old civil war. The primary objective of the settlers was not to form a nation with the indigenous people, but a pilgrimage to colonise and exploit the land of their primordial roots. The pilgrims nursed an urge to find redemption from a nation that did not integrate them as equals, and harboured a self-belief that they had the capacity to recreate an African colony equal to the American one that recently declared itself independent. The roots of an unsettled Liberian nation-identity was not grounded in the evangelical eighteenth century British and American abolishing of slavery but rather in the inheritance of the American model of nation-formation repeated on African soil. The effects of 'black on black' colonisation, the discriminatory tide endured by the ostracised indigenous communities, left the nation-identity of Liberia unresolved. President James Monroe steered the Missouri Compromise and his administration superintended over the first ACS ship to sail and occupy what would be modern Liberia. The naming of Monrovia the capital city of Liberia is attributed to his efforts. "Delany made it to Liberia, the country he had vilified for more than two decades, before he ever laid eye on the

former ACS Colony on July 10, 1859, he arrived in Monrovia, a town named in honor of former U.S. President and slaveholder, James Monroe." (David, 2014).

3.8.   Formation of a National-Identity – Pre-Constitution

The formation of Liberia as a modern nation-state is re-counted from the declaration of its independence 26 July 1847. This subsection will examine the inspiration for the declaration of its independence, the source and actual text of the declaration. The adoption of the legitimacy of the governance conferred only on a section of the nation-community affected the nation-identity of Liberia, especially since the broad misunderstandings of the culture of the ethnic communities forming the nation-state were misinterpreted as either savagery or of inferior slave value. The desire of the settler community was to dispose of the label of this perceived inferiority, termed 'partly-civilised', and convert it into a 'superior' and dominating community. Not surprisingly, the retrograde 1800 nation-formation ideas were confronted by Liberia in the form of a revolutionary civil war and the USA via an evolutionary civil rights movement. Amidst this transition from partly-civilised to a claimed superiority of rank, the relevance of the legal infrastructure in managing identities in the new-nation-state becomes questionable.

The American mantra of nation-identity - "all men are created equal" - that gives the right to be recognised within a shared polity, motivated Liberia and its nation-identity establishment, however unsuccessfully. The process of nation formation in Liberia, similar to its founders in America, incorporated the acquisition of territory, violent warfare and the domination of an indigenous community by the settlers. Further into

the Liberian nation-formation project, the nation's institutions moulded on that of the USA denied indigenous communities any rights of parity or privileges of identification such as universal suffrage within the nation-state for over a hundred (100), years. As Liebenow states, "There is abundant evidence that in official circumstances at least, the many historic barriers to legal, political and social equality between the tribal masses and the descendants of the settlers" (Liebenow, 1987 p.154).

3.9. Primordial Origins and the Exclusion of the Indigenous Community

According to J. G. Herder, 'the notion of the 'big idea', noted earlier in this chapter, originated from the view that in addition to skin colour, the slave settlers spoke the same language 'Slave-Patois', had similar backgrounds, their ancestors were all plucked from Africa as slaves to America, and finally they had all returned to Africa via the same mechanism. Therefore, the settlers would empathise with each other as deeply as any blood ethnic community. They had endured generations of classification in America as an inferior and separate race – 'negroid'. Their 'inferior negroid' ancestry meant they could not even share the same privileges of identification with European settlers in the new nation of USA. Van den Berghe (1978), constructs this debate by emphasising the importance of ethnicity in an evolving multi-ethnic nation-community: "Much more common than either for race or caste as a basis for stratification is ethnicity" (p. 158). He continues to state that: "Where several ethnic groups live side by side, in the same state, they generally do so on the basis of ethnic inequality" (p. 159). The returnees identified with each other as a categorical 'socio-biological' community. They were prepared to declare their 'socio-biological' community independent of the USA, while simultaneously and paternalistically including an

invisible native indigenous community as an unequal ethnic neighbour. They recognised and accepted common African ancestry with the indigenous native Africans yet in parallel they regarded themselves as exclusively superior to the 'savage' ethnic natives. They were thus entitled to administer the new nation-state of Liberia in a similar way as the Europeans administered their ex-habitation of America. The foundation for an equipoised nation-identity was flawed at inception.

The settlers intrepidly seized the indigenous people, their privileges and formed a nation-state with without their express consent. They declared themselves independent of the United States of America and their white governors who governed the settlements. To the signatories of the Liberian Declaration of Independence, the ethnic roots of the declarants and settlers were 'cradled in Africa'. The declaration was made from the African soil. However, similar to the European declarants of American independence did not factor the inclusion nor involvement of the indigenous native Americans, the indigenous communities were extraneous to the pilgrims, their presence was unacknowledged and would be irrelevant to nation-formation. They "hoped to live together as neighbours and friends" but not as one people (Davis, 2005 p. 50). The glaring and conspicuous omission of the indigenous communities in the declaration is critical to the nation-formation project and nation-identity construction initiated by the slave settler community. Thomas Jefferson, the main architect of the American Declaration of Independence and champion of the colonisation endeavour, identified indigenous Native Americans, as savages and African slaves as partly civilised. Cohen (1969 p. 505) in debating the contradictions of the heroic Jefferson, notes how the latter could not reconcile his declaration of "all men being born equal"

with his innate consideration of the inferiority of a community of men who did not share his skin colour and were his slaves. The 'Jeffersonian' of returning the formerly enslaved people to Africa to civilise the remaining savage communities living there with whom they would find equality demonstrates that the struggle of the Native American peoples and African slaves for national-identity equality within the communities of colonial America is the first tier of disputed nation-identity commenced on American soil and repeated on the African soil in Liberia.

A modernistic reality is offered as the motivation for the founding of Liberia. According to Charles River Editors, "The motivations for this were complicated and varied, and in part they could be explained by an interest in creating circumstances advantageous to blacks, but also to give them an opportunity to form and run a colony effectively in order to debunk a widely held belief that no black man could do such a thing" (Charles River Editors, 2001 p. 55). Running a colony, is the management of the inhabitants of the colony, management of the identities that make up the colony. The harsh but widely held belief, with some truth is that a European model of perpetual colonisation as United States of America model was the vision of the ACS. Even if rebranded as the Republic of Liberia on African soil, the only mechanism known to the pilgrims was the degenerate dominance and destructive identity management of the indigenous people. This eventually would fail and spectacularly end into a decade of civil war. In Anderson's (2006 pp. 6 – 7) discussion of nationalism and nation-formation, he comments that

> "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in
> each, the nation is always conceived, ultimately it is this fraternity that

makes it possible, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings".

In this context, we note that the settlers acknowledged the presence of the indigenous peoples of the territory but this acknowledgement was irrelevant to the declaration of independence. The settlers constructed a governance and nation-identity eco-system that deliberately isolated the indigenous peoples from the privileges of national identification. Gerdes (2013), offers a fragile extension of Anderson's (2006), nation-formation argument when he states that "At its core, state formation is a two-pronged process of extension of powers of an empirical state over the peoples of a territory" (p.6). The encounters, alliances and battles fought by the settlers for domination within the borders are casuistry explained away as settlers attempting to exploit the territory. The settler's unwillingness nevertheless to share leadership of the forming polity with the indigenous people makes the alternate modernistic but brutal explanation of nation formation offered by Anderson more realistic. A fierce modernist but tempered evolution of nation-formation and relevance of nation-identity management ensued over-time in the USA in the form of abolition of slavery, various civil rights movements and indigenous nation rights between 1950 - 1969. There was no such civil recalibration of national-identity management in the Liberia nation-formation project. The settlers and indigenous people were confronted with an abrupt and violent recalibration of nation-formation and nation-identity management that came in the form of a long civil war.

3.10. The Formation of a National-Identity

 Who were the people that recognised themselves as the Liberia nation-state's nation-community and declared themselves independent of the USA? The following discussion examines the effects of the Declaration on the relationship between settlers and the indigenous community and note the similarities of sequence with the American Declaration of Independence and its aftermath. It also examines the culture of national laws and regulation introduced by the minority community of settlers based on the minority community's cultural rationality.

3.11. Background - The Context of the Constitution and the laws of Liberia

On the 26 of July 1847, the leaders of the emancipated slave settlers that had been arriving from the United States of America on to a section of African territory since 1822, formulated and issued a Declaration of Independence that ushered in the nation-state of Liberia. The ship had originally, sailed into Sherbro Island near Freetown, Sierra Leone. Sherbro Island already a settlement of freed slaves from the British Caribbean colonies. However, this group of emancipated slaves had a different provenance from those already on Sherbro Island. They could not find an accommodation together and the voyagers on The Elizabeth continued their quest for 'virgin territory' where there were no prior slave arrivals from the Americas nor Europe. Since the Declaration of Independence and the creation of a nation-state is wholly impossible without the nationals that make up the constituent communities, a curios fact later to bedevil the evolution of the nation-state, it is surprising that none of the signatories to the document included either an indigenous community leader or inhabitant of the territories. The Liberian Declaration reads:

"We the representatives of the people of the Commonwealth of Liberia, in Convention assembled, invested with authority for forming a new government, declare the said Commonwealth a FREE, SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT STATE, by the name and title of the REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA. While announcing to the nations of the world the new position which the people of this Republic have induced them, first to expatriate themselves from the land of their nativity and to form settlements on this barbarous coast, and now to organize their government by the assumption of a sovereign and independent character. Therefore, we respectfully ask their attention to the following facts"

(The Republic of Liberia Declaration of Independence,

Government of The Republic of Liberia, 1847)

The significance of the 1847 Liberian declaration is that no other sub-Saharan nation, indeed no other African nation-state had come into existence and received international recognition via the use of a "Declaration of Independence". Which nation-state or nation-community were these settlers on African soil in the creation of the new nation-state of Liberia declaring independence from? By inference, the Liberian declarants were announcing their change of nation-identity from USA to Liberia and therefore their independence of the USA.

The declarants constitutionally and primordially state their origins as exclusively from the USA positively designating the USA as the "land of their nativity" and relegating the land of the native indigenous people as "barbarous" and by inference uncivilised. The primordial 'Declaration of Independence' would mean the settler-community was

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the new nation-community, distinct of the indigenous communities and determined to enforce that distinction. This had the most prejudiced effect Liberian nation-identity. As noted earlier, the Declaration excluded the indigenous people as part of the formation of the nation of Liberia. This was similar to the supposition of European settlers on American soil that indigenous savage native Americans could not share of identity with Europeans. Thus, an impossible mechanism based on the bigoted view of slavery, racisms, inferiority and exclusion of a section of the community was sewn into the fabric of Liberian nation-identity. Similar to the USA, where there needed to be reformation in the form of the abolition of slavery in order to arrive at an equitable institution of national-identity, the realisation decades later in Liberia that similar reformations were never undertaken in Liberia led to a civil war and thereafter a breakdown in the national-identity administration.

The American Declaration of Independence announced their separation from the Europeans. The deliberate similarity of context of the Liberian Declaration to the American Declaration was not a coincidence. The intention and inequitable identity cohabitation with the indigenous people practiced by both the American and Liberian Declarants was not inadvertent but meditative. According to Liebenow (1987),"Far from rejecting the institutions, values, dress and speech of a society that rejected them, the free persons of colour painstakingly attempted to reproduce that culture on an alien shore. What they had rejected, apparently, was a situation that had denied them full participation in American society" (p.22). Liebenow (1987), isolates the similarity in nation-formation, but does not sufficiently highlight the extent of what "full

participation" is – an equitable recognition of an actual identity with acknowledged rights and privileges within a nation-community.

Indeed, the Liberia nation-formation project persisted in an imbalance because of lessons learnt from the only template the settlers knew; the USA Declaration of Independence of 1776, forty-six (46), years before The Elizabeth docked on African soil. The establishment of the nation 'Liberia' was based on American ideals of governance, including the crafting of the nations' constitution, yet the freed slaves who were nation-building loathed the concept of slavery which was protected by the American constitution. Having arrived from a society in 1820, that protected the dominance of one group of individuals as masters over the others as slaves, with a constitution near-enough a mirror of the American constitution, it would be an arduous task, if not impossible for the returnees to create a community of parity with the indigenes that they considered to be inferior. (Also see Key, 1814; Calloway, 2006 p.16), was founded through a process of intense imbalanced dominance over the native Indians using extreme violence The returnees to Africa, used similar fire-power and organisation skills, and although in the minority, approbated governance power to administer the new Liberia nation with little consideration to the indigenes; setting the foundation for future unrests in the country (Liberia: America's Stepchild, 2002).

According to The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia report, "Liberians of indigenous descent had few options for full participation in Liberian society", (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009, p.61). In trying to create a modern nation-state both geographically far away and as fundamentally different from the

slave-owning communities they left behind, the governance structures adopted by the returnees as modern Liberia, mimicked what they considered to be the progressive aspects of the slave-owning community they had left behind – the capitalist economic model, law and order. As Balibar (1991) argues, capitalist wealth creation has winners and losers within the same community, thus the appreciation of its virtue as an economic model will always be subjective.

3.12. The context of the Common Law and the Liberian Legal framework

Law and order by definition requires the imposition of someone else's law and order. As Balibar states, "a historical system of complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually interconnected" (Balibar, 1991, p.49). Land tenure before arrival of the settlers was held by the entire community. This had suddenly been converted into the law of the returnee's communities individual ownership and tenure. Mgbako and Baehr (2011), state that in order to retain the confiscation of indigenous community land,

> "both the colonizer and post independent states [were led] to adopt a transformation approach that ignored customary tenure and aggressively pursued policies that sought to replace it with new systems of land laws based on Western concepts" (p. 323).

In its most passive application the imposition of someone else's law and order, imported from The United States required the replacement of centuries old indigenous customary laws in Liberia with imported laws familiar to the settlers but unfamiliar to the indigenous community. The customary laws had been developed communally and

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collectively for the orderly administration of each legitimate and functional identity within the ethnic nation, the new laws would be 'uncommon' to the indigenous community. According to Polletta and Jasper (2001), "the legal institutionalization of racial privilege in the United States and South Africa generated severe and pervasive inequality and eventually provided the basis for demands by blacks for legal equality" (p. 287). Similarly, the rejection of indigenous ancestral customs replaced with imported and legalised codes of communal conduct formed the evidence of a formalised oppression of the indigenous community and the eventual putsch and resistance to this oppression. A lack of mutual residual memory between indigenes and the returnees, an absence of shared civic aspirations and a lack of recognition would create opposing patria and contesting national identities within any territory. Imported values that venerated gun ownership with accompanying instant and violent settling of disputes was a transformation too sudden to be incorporated by the indigenous community's ethic. These alien and foreign concepts of land tenure was enforced as the new national law by an equally alien legal right to possess private gunfire. If the settlers no longer shared the values of the ethnic nations of the territory, how does Liberia achieve a cohesive nation-identity with such opposing values?

On the international front, these were dotted settlements along the West coast of Africa, with in-descript territorial boundaries obtained through private land purchase and forcible conquest. Backed by the 1816 US Congress Charter, these settlements since 1824 were collectively occupied by a people without a nation-identity, but territorially acknowledged as an ACS / American colony. In the absence of a legitimate nation-identity, national allegiance out of which national-patria and national

development would have been incubated and consolidated was absent. This status would continue till 1847, when the unstructured nation-state / colony would change. There was a need for recognised legal status but this was only formed based on a problematic American imperialist legal structure. As Banton notes,

> "On the eve of independence, while the ACS continued to hold influence over the colony, debates over a future constitution emerged. Simon Greenleaf, a white colonizationist, ensured that the new political body would be inspired by American ideas of race, much like the one in the United States in 1787 – [it] held similar kinds of problematic contradictions that went beyond engagement in slavery" (Banton, 2019 p. 241).

The national-identity management semblances and contradictions were dormant mines waiting to explode in both nation-states. Firstly, the refusal to overhaul USA nation-identity management by outlawing slavery in America was mirrored in the Americo-Liberian settlements in Africa. Significantly though, USA denial of parity of identification privileges with a significant portion of the nation community - emancipated slaves, was manifest in its racial injustice. The, Liberian denial of nation-identity parity to a nation community was 'black on black' and did not involve transatlantic sea-crossings. Liberia's veiled but no less traumatic institutions denied legitimate nation-identity privileges to communities living in the land of their birth. The Liberian civil war of 1989, that lasted for over a decade was a gestation of events during the formation of the nation - an echo of the USA events.

Secondly, the exclusion of indigenous people in the formation of the nation and s declaration of independence denied them a legitimate nation-identity, which ironically was acknowledged and corrected in retrospect in the USA with the creation of native Indian nations. The declarants of Liberian independence did not include the indigenous people in the declaration nor did they retrospectively acknowledge that legitimate nation-identity had been denied the indigenous people and thus needed correction. This comparable sequence of events that led to the creation of a Liberian nation-identity diverges from the USA experience when the Liberian experience could not accommodate the luxury of creating internal legitimate indigenous nations with indigenous national identities. Tamir (1993), in his research on the clash of ethnic nations and evolution of nation-identity, established that "attempts to turn back the historical clock are often marked by bloodshed and by a violation of the rights of neighbouring nations. In their enthusiasm to regain their nation-identity and acquire recognition and self-respect, national activists often overlook look the changes that have taken place in the surrounding political, economic, and strategic circumstances" (loc. 46-48). The unresolved constitutional contradictions of nation-identity exploded in both nation-states in the form of the USA race riots of the 1960s and the Liberian civil war of 1989.

The international recognition of the Commonwealth of Liberia as the responsibility of the USA protected Liberia in the early 1800's. The European nations in the Scramble for Africa did not attempt enter into what was seen as a semi-autonomous American colony. The pilgrims, the settlers, the colonisers named its capital Monrovia, in honour of President James Monroe, the American president in 1847. After the Declaration of

Liberian independence, the lead up to the First World War saw an upturn in the fortunes of Liberia. America was active in the support of Liberia both economically and militarily. Nevertheless, as Banton (2019), recounted in her research 'More Auspicious Shores' Liberia was surrounded by British and French colonies and had attracted a lively community of French and Englishmen who settled in Monrovia. The significance of this was that although these French and Englishmen were neither indigenous nor descendants of emancipated American slaves, they enjoyed better privileges of identification over and above the indigenous Africans. These proved to be additional incendiary developments to an already fractured beginnings of Liberian nation-identity management.

By 1911 the geopolitics of economic blockades and breakdown of diplomacy leading up to WW1 led to a Liberian national debt of USD 1.7million. The USA government continued to demonstrate responsibility for Liberia and the governing ACS Governors and in a paternalistic protection of the internationally recognised nation-state and community, took over the debt of Liberia (David, 2014). Indeed, this paternalistic protection of the independent nation-state was demonstrated further in an obstructive intrusion of the national-identity of Liberia when the USA requested a British steamer to chase out of the Harbour of Monrovia, a German submarine that threatened Liberia at the height of WW1. (Gillispie, 2018). Significantly, what may have seemed a paternalistic extension of protection offered to an ally generated a two-way *patria potestas* to the already disturbed and ambiguous communities of Liberia, some of who considered themselves as extending American nation-identity to Liberian territory. Nevertheless, as Tamir (2004) confirms: "All [nationalist activities] are meant to

demonstrate that individuals view the protection of the distinct nation-identity they have chosen as an important aspect of their well-being, and as an interest that justifies holding others under duty, substantiating the claim that individuals have a right to preserve the culture of their choice." (Loc. 471 – 472). The interpretation of USA activity to protect a section of its nation-community and [albeit second-class] living on the West coast of Africa as evidence of an extension of nation-identity management further distorted the Liberian nation-identity experience. No amount of USA international [national] Liberian protection and paternalistic inducement could distort the aspiration of the pilgrims to digress from the indistinct status of the Liberian-USA nation-identity to seek a distinct and separate nation-identity as Liberians.

Thus, this research argues that the formation of a distinct people that emigrated from America without a legitimate nation-identity was the onset of the difficulties of Liberian nation-identity. The period between the arrival of the pilgrims, the creation of the settlements, and the Declaration of Independence did not support the construction of a legitimate national-identity. Finally, on creating the first national institution - The Liberian Constitution to manage national-identity, the refusal of the indistinct community of American 'nationals' to incorporate the indigenous people of the land in the Declaration of Independence, solidified the national-identity contradictions that would eventually erupt into the civil war of 1989.

3.13. Introduction - Formation of Liberian National-Identity, Communities of the Nation-State

This section, as well as exploring the context of nation formation from the indigenous people point of view examines the broad interactions that permeated equitable national-identity formation. The initial interaction between indigenous communities with distinctive indigenous characteristics created ambiguities in the national-identity management of Liberia. Interestingly, an examination of the intra-ethnic interactions between the indigenous communities, their origins and rivalries, leads one to understand the generational expedient ethnic alliances and lasting hostilities that disrupted the formation of a national-identity. In some adverse instances, these intra-ethnic interactions would lead to the resurfacing of hierarchical disagreements within the nation-communities, further disrupting any possibility of a communally responsive national-identity. The embrace of colonisation by a section of the nation-community, the rejection of imperialism by the same section, imbedded in the misguided but evangelical commitment to bring enlightenment to the indigenous community fostered a deteriorated intra-community relationship. Crucial to the discussion in this section are the practical interactions of nation-formation, the effects of imported wealth and imported status of people into modern Liberia and how this distorted equitable nation-identity formation. Murray (2013), in his research Whiteness in Africa – Americo-Liberians and the Transformative Geographies of Race, found that "slavery served as a type of training that had bestowed civilisation on African Americans, of course such [*perverted*] thinking was not limited to Euro-American colonization leaders, but likewise undergirded the ideology of many African Americans." (p.172). It is this

imported definition of superiority and ranking of communities that injected another layer of disrepute into the national-identity organisation of modern Liberia.

3.14. The interactions – Indigenous Communities and Returnee Pilgrims

Prior to the arrival of the ships it is generally believed that there were sixteen (16) different ethnic communities were already settled in the region. The Kissi and Gola people, are thought to be the territory's earliest settlers, an ethnic subdivision of the Mandé people that migrated into most of West Africa during the conflicts that besieged the ancient Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires (Rashid, 2006). The arrival of both the long and near absent Africans, who looked similar, but spoke different languages, and had no deference for indigenous cultural values created tensions between the inhabitant ethnic communities. According to (Murray, 2013), "Ashmun [ACS Governor] was fondly [remembered by the settlers] for, defending Mesurado from early African assaults and expanding the settlement beyond its nascent boundaries" (p.296). The long-absent descendants of the victims of the Atlantic Slave trade apportioned to themselves and demonstrated a tenacious tenure of the territory with the importation and replacement communal privileges identification and property ownership with imported hierarchical practices unknown to the indigenes that inhabited the same territory. Murray continues, "The arrival of settlers to the region reinforced an understanding that those groups who had inhabited the area before the settlers shared certain cultural traits identified as black to signify [inferior] natives (p.40). Murray exposes from both the pilgrims and the indigenous people's points of view, the nation-identity dysphoria that the settling of pilgrims initiated. "The Americans were strangers who had forgot their attachment to the land of their fathers; for if not, why had they not

renounced their connexion with white men altogether, and placed themselves under the protection of the kings of the country?" (p. 12). This would have been an acceptance of the indigenous ethnic nation's governance amongst whom the pilgrims had settled. "It was that refusal to place themselves under African kings and their continued connection to the cultural practices and governance of the United States", asserts Murray (p.13) that instigated the perception that the pilgrims were 'strangers', a euphemism for visitors with a strange culture that should be politely and temporarily tolerated till they depart.

Even before The Elizabeth docked on African soil, Sherbro Island in Sierra Leone, there was an ensuing disagreement on land allocation between the intended settlers and the US Government officials that embroiled the established Nova Scotia locals on the island (Everill, 2013). At the heart of the disagreement was recognition of hierarchy versus egalitarian values. Reverend Samuel Bacon, the US Government's appointed Agent aboard, decided to sail further as there was growing pressure coming from the USA on the futility of the expedition and the inability to locate suitable territory for the settlers. Eventually, Rev. Bacon's expedition landed at the mouth of the Mensurado River in 1820 (Ashmun, 1826), today Montserrado. The disagreement about Sherbro Island was an unresolved legacy of slave hierarchy, an overspill from the roles of slaves in the United States. This time, Rev. Bacon with the experience of the Sherbro Island disagreement managed to resolve the problem of land-allocation based on imported hierarchical status. The pilgrims on The Elizabeth, returnee settlers, emancipated and manumitted slaves found an accommodation with themselves, this community hoped "to replicate the same privileges for itself in Africa that exclusion

from whiteness had prevented its denizens from enjoying in the United States" (p.6) . They would assume power and dominance over all other communities. The strangers bonded together, buried their differences and together they subjugated the indigenous people into what became the future Liberia. By the refusal to institute equitable national-identity institutions recognising all communities within Liberian territory, the empathy between the indigenous host community and the arriving strangers would not descend to a neighbourly tolerance but rather an internal non-violent but equally insufferable civil conflict that simmered away for generations until the explosion of the civil war. Additionally, most of the land acquisition process for the settlers was violently enforced and irreconcilable with peaceful nation formation and the privileges of ethnic-nation identification. Between 1816 and 1846, the ACS and other colonisation societies continued to ship emancipated and manumitted slaves to the settlements for cultivation and exploitation of the land that is modern Liberia. As new arrivals arrived and settled, their increased population led to a discard of the 'strangers' tag and an increased confidence in the formation of an exclusive nation-state with or without the indigenous people. The national-identity conflict between the hosts and strangers would deepen.

Between 1820 and 1840 all the settlements established by the ACS and other colonisation societies were governed locally by white slave owning governors such as Thomas Buchanan the cousin of President John Buchanan and Jehudi Ashmun who were under instruction from the government of the United States (Levitt, 2005). The debate for slaveowners and reformers on either end of the abolition debate in encouraging the African settlements had been informed by both the purpose and

misunderstanding of colonisation. Doyle (1986), in his book *Empires*, insists that Colonisation is a reformation of Imperialism and its motives are rooted in the domination of one culture over another; therefore the political and economic objectives of the coloniser can only be achieved through the imposition of ideological social practices and force. Yarema (2006) , similar to Doyle, extends this point by recounting how landowners in the American colonies supported the ACS to colonise lands in Africa. This was an extension to the conquest of the Americas. Domination by slavery and exploitation by colonisation of one culture over the other is not only concerned with the obvious difference in skin colour, in Liberia it was achieved irrespective of the parallels of skin colour.

This research argues that contrary to the claim made by modern Liberia that it has never been colonised, the indigenous people were indeed colonised under a brutal yoke by the settlers.

> "The first Americo-Liberian settlers brought with them the Western statutory system of land ownership, early state policy and recognized a separation of civilized and uncivilized people in the application of Liberian laws, including land laws. Per the Hinterlands Rules and Public Lands Law, the process for obtaining fee simple ownership required that the tribe be civilized, and limited claims of tribal land to 25 acres per family."
>
> (United States Agency International Development - USAID, 2008, p.1).

The Liberian civil war of 1989 was in effect comparable to the American civil war that eventually led to reforms in national-identity management in modern Liberia.

Both settlers and the indigenous people would have had an ill-appreciation of each

other over the enforced co-habitation of an already inhabited territory. In addition to the physical causalities of the violent land acquisition, settler deaths due to diseases and natural mortalities, the major casualty of this episode of the formation of modern Liberia was the causality of nation-identity management. These deleterious land laws formulated between 1840 and 1843 when Liberia became an independent republic and imposed by the brutal authority of an Americo-Liberian Executive were not reviewed until 1973. By this time the damage of division, prejudice and bigotry had been established (Community Forestry in Liberia, 2005).

3.15. The interactions – Indigenous Communities, Returnee Pilgrims and Freed Captives

Slaves freed on the high seas aboard the slave ships heading towards North America and the Caribbean joined the already emancipated slaves of American origin to settle on Liberian territory. After the abolition of slavery in Great Britain, The Royal Navy formed a West Africa Squadron of several ships to patrol the West African coast, challenge and free any slave cargo they came across. Led by HMS Derwent and HMS Solebay, this was the British determination to lead the international abolition of the Slave-trade. Separate to the USA 'Africa Squadron' also established with similar responsibility. According to Canneys (2006), the two squadrons apprehended over 3000 ships. Some of the ships, rather than release their slave-captives into the custody of the US and British anti-slave ships would dump their human cargo overboard to drown (Thomas, 1997). The forceful liberation of these Caribbean and American bound slaves from the apprehended ships did not lead to their return to their original ethnic communities, for there was no documented recording of the ethnic origins. They

were released into the territories of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria and The Gambia (Wills, 2019). According to DuBois (1896), all the USS Africa Squadron captives were released onto Liberian territory. These undocumented arrivals injected further distortions for the nation-identity management of the young Liberia nation, without the semblance of an organised nation-identity.

The released captives from the ships, other than the trauma of capture and violent detention onto the ships, had not experienced the North American embrace, even as slaves neither had they been captured long enough to have lost their ethnic African culture. Arrivals of ACS origin did not acknowledge those freed from the ships as either equal to the indigenous 'heathens' to whom they were grudgingly grateful to, for the welcome of a shared territory nor equal to themselves as the harbingers of civilisation and development and deserving deference.

Contrary to nation-building, an obstructive identity lexicon of the day developed, and contributed to the disjointed nation-identity of the inhabitants of the territory into a people. These disjointed communities of divergent ethnic origins, all with violent but different collective memories of their arrival in Liberia had reciprocal contemptuous vocabulary for each other (James, 2010). ACS 'Americo-Liberians' often with mixed Caucasian ancestry were referred to as 'Coloured', or 'Black-Whites', the 'Unadulterated Natives' were the original African ethnic communities indigenous to Liberian territory, and somewhere in between were the released captives from ships known as 'Kongos', because of their perceived origin from the ethnic communities of the Congo Basin (Bridge and Hawthorne, 2007). Subsequently, the term 'Kongo'

continued to be used pejoratively for all non-indigenes, including North American settlers having lost their African culture after capture into slavery (Dennis and Dennis, 2008).

The ex-slave community in the forming Liberia was splintered on the ACS agenda. Most emancipated slaves, particularly those involved in the abolition of slavery and civil rights movements in the US were known as 'Banditti'; law-breakers and delinquents. Some ex-slaves supported the colonisation ideals as they believed that they would never receive equality of identity status in the United States. On the other hand, black anti-slavery protagonists on the British mainland such as Ouladah Equiano, Quobna Ottobah Cuagano, were revered as buccaneering pioneers and missionaries in European society (Hanley, 2019) as they had a recognised British national-identity category. Still others had the innocuous conviction that emancipated slaves would be happier in Africa, where they could live free of racial discrimination. In parallel, emancipated slaves from the British mainland as well as others from British Nova Scotia had sailed to the Port of Freedom, soon to be Sierra Leone's capital. David (2014) in his research 'The American Colonization Society and The Founding of the First African Republic', argues that for African-American opponents of slavery, to convert from a 'Banditti' without a national-identity and be re-identified as an American colonialist had a great allure, hence the original success of the ACS project. The first wave of ACS arrivals onto the Liberian territory did not see themselves as the creators of a new nation with the consequent forging of a nation-identity. This research agrees with Yarema (2006) that most African-American identified as colonialists with chartered instructions to colonise, Christianise, civilise and save the savage heathens

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of Africa. They arrived in what became Liberia with the objective of "evangelising and civilising the land" (James, 2010, p. 59) a euphemism describing the indigenous inhabitants as uncivilised. Yet, as noted earlier in the chapter, others arrived with a purely commercial motive to breed and export slaves to the United States.

The clash of aims led to several layers of ethnic identity tension amongst and between the peoples of the Liberian territory. The ACS settlers on Liberian territory ignored the chronological circumstance that they did not share national-identification parity with Caucasian Americans from whence they came. David (2014) asserts that they arrived on African soil and self-identified as 'American emissaries' in Liberia. They further kept frequent communication with relatives in the USA, regularly returning to the USA and sending their children born in Africa back to be educated in the then inequitable American system. Yarema (2006) notes, whilst in Africa, the emancipated slave pilgrims settling in Africa, regarded themselves as White Americans. According to Murray (2013), in the founding of modern Liberian, ACS Governor Jehudi Ashmun not only described himself as white (for he was), but also described and cloaked all African-American settler proxies as white in order to 'strike fear' into the indigenous people and avoid imminent attack. Murray illustrates that the African-American settler community arrived in Liberia with a severe and entrenched liminal-identity thoughtlessness. A determination to be identified as part of a superior and different ethnic group bequeathed with a heritage of governance over the indigenous community (David, 2014). The very basis of this logic contributed to an inability of the African-American settlers to fully integrate and galvanise an effective management of a national-identity with the co-inhabitants of the territory. According to Clarke (1996),

other than the idealised geo-political discussions of the day, the possibility that the African-American had a passionate ancestral connection to the territory they now occupied as Liberia was tenuous. Nation-identity management of the different communities in Liberia would have an intolerant foundation.

The captives were from different ethnic communities of inner Africa, and could neither fluently communicate amongst themselves in Pidgeon nor in English like the ACS Americo-Liberians. They were not an ethno-lingua community. This non-homogenous rag-tag community of inner-African arrivals did not readily fit into any of the indigenous lingua-ethnic communities existent in Liberia, neither could they mix with the North American ACS returnees. A decrepit hierarchal identification structure of returnee settlers gained acceptance in the territory. The Africans with a light skin complexion , known as 'Black-Whites' had the highest status within a rapidly forming Liberian class-structure. The assumption was that their African ancestor may have been a 'domestic servant', the highest-ranking slave position in North America or may have a white ancestor. The dark-skinned returnees were on the other hand considered as either released captives from the slave ships or at best descended from cotton farm slaves, the lowest rank for menial slaves in North America. The indigenous people of Liberia also had dark skin complexion, but would not be identified as either captive released from the slave ships nor having lost his African ethnic roots, they were known derogatively as 'Natives'.

3.16. Formation of a National-Identity - The Effects of Geopolitics

Late Nineteenth Century and early twentieth Century turmoil in Europe caused by the rise of nationalism in Europe, consequences of WW1, the realigning of European national territories, the Russian Revolution of 1918, and the Balkan wars had an immense effect on the geopolitics of coalescing national identities in Europe. The French and to a lesser degree the Germans and their colonies were ambivalent about the abolition of slavery. They were unwilling to re-adopt freed slaves into their colonies and territories with all the problems of status, clashes and integration. This would have devastating effects on territorial identity, soon to be nation-identity (Wills, 2019). This acute geopolitical nationalism debate had many dimensions and effects on American society given the vast quantity of emancipated slaves in the Northern States of USA. The period coincided with the beginning of the Civil Rights movement, the intractable problems of native Indians, and the continued influx of Europeans into Ellis Island (Du Bois, 1896). The debate to integrate or not the emancipated freemen within American society led to the reluctant recognition of slave descendants as a people with a unique identity in American society (Yarema, 2006).

The West coast of Africa was the focal point for militarised anti-slave patrols and pirate slave ships. In these conditions, returnee black slave traders would be unable to easily breed and export slaves from the West Africa arena. Whereas the apprehended ships attempted to arrest the exportation of people along the West Coast of Africa to North America, the very captives were either willingly sold into slavery by the settlers or an armed slave-running indigenous community or at worst rejected as delinquents in their communities and sold to slave runners. Slave raids by returnee African-Americans into

the Liberian and Sierra Leone affected their shared ethnic communities that spanned the still fluid borders. Further, the returnees however found opportunity in King Leopold II's Congo Free state to practice their breeding and exporting of slaves (Ewans, 2002).

In the early nineteenth century (C19), before the Berlin Conference's African frontiers were concretised into modern nation-states, Charles Stuart (1833, p.22) makes known in the Liberator the deception that the Africa territories was dominated with emancipated slaves who could form a cradle nation community for more emancipated slaves:

> "The American Colonisation Society tell us that Liberia consists of emancipated slaves, this is a deception, they consist chiefly of free people of color."
>
> (Stuart, 1833, p. 22).

So, the opposition to ACS activities appreciated that although the returnees to Africa were of the same skin colour as the indigenous people, Africa was the home of generations of free ethnic communities. These ethnic nations had identity traditions and customs incompatible with the communities being re-exported to Africa, they would clash within any nation-state rather than coalesce into a harmonious national-identity (Deng, et al., 2008).

The of government of the United States, encouraged the establishment of colonization societies. Some whites saw colonization as a way of ridding the nation of blacks, while others saw it as an extension of territorial acquisition in Africa. These states were eager to rid themselves of their freed African-American slave residents but could not

be associated with the discredited ACS. These 'alternative' colonisation societies, such as The Maryland State Colonization Society established Cape Palmas in Liberia solely for the removal of free African-Americans to Africa. The conditions for emancipation in all these states such as Virginia and Mississippi was an enforced removal to Africa (Banton, 2019). With the arrival of competitive colonisation societies in the west coast of Africa was the formation of independent micro-nations of emancipated slaves, they neither wanted association with the US congress backed ACS nor the indigenous natives. The future collapse of the alternative colonisation societies into the better funded ACS disguises the rivalries preventing a national-identity accommodation between the pilgrims of the ACS and the alternatives.

Unlike the Wilberforce Abolitionist Movement however, the American chartered colonisation Societies or companies had neither altruistic nor commercial motivation. They subsequent successors of the alternatives to ACS had an internal self-destructive purpose. They were mainly concerned with the racial make-up of American Society after the abolition of slavery and sponsored colonisation societies as a means influencing American demographic make-up (Blackett, 2013). The burgeoning world-power USA was reluctant to get involved in the partition of Africa proposed by Leopold II of Belgium. The individual founders of ACS were all politicians, elected members of the legislator and were actively involved in the formation of the national-identity of the United States of America. Indeed, some like Henry Clay held positions of Speaker, John Randolph Senator, and Bushrod Washington was a judge on the Supreme Court (Barnes, 2006). The ACS a chartered company, assumed a quasi-government role with the support and financial backing of the US government. The less discussed

objective of some of the founding members of ACS was to delineate the nation-identity of the United States of America by precluding the integration of emancipated slaves into American society. This destroyed the widespread support that the ACS enjoyed hitherto. They preferred to re-export them to Africa, encouraging them to colonise what was their spiritual home (Yarema, 2006).

Reports of the inequitable accommodation between the returnee-settlers and indigenes gained public discourse to in the USA by 1927 after WW1. Peace Corps volunteers and returning black American soldiers from the Territory of Liberia had horrible tales of brutality meted out to the indigenes by the returnee-settlers. The entente between the returnee-settlers and the indigenes had been exposed as a deception after a visit to the territory from a Harvard University delegation in 1929. The Harvard University report claimed slavery conditions even worse than what was in the USA (Harvard University, 1929), to the huge embarrassment of USA. The USA severed diplomatic relations with ACS and the Territory of Liberia for five (5), years on the strength of the report. Indeed, the merits and flaws of colonisation project was an active dialogue in American society. Some black leaders within the ACS armed with the discourse of inequalities of Liberian society saw no reason to give up the pursuit of equality, civil rights, and identity-parity within the USA.

The internal arguments over repatriation, the withdrawal of US government support, the reports of black-on-black slavery in Liberia and the cessation of diplomatic relations led to led to the bankruptcy of the ACS in 1843. The domino effect was the eventual declaration of independence by the colony of Liberia to the 'Sovereign

Republic of Liberia' in 1847 (Yancy, 1954). By 1847 the returnees had weaned the colony of Liberia from the ACS, asserted the territory as 'The Republic of Liberia', albeit at then only recognised by the USA. The settlers and ACS couched Liberia's first constitution which remained the supreme law of the land till the People's Redemption Council *coup d'état* of 12 April 1980. Amongst some the strangest aspects of that constitution, repeated in later ones, was that the President and Legislator could only be elected by 'land-owning citizens'. There was no reciprocal recognition of identity parity with the community of indigenes that had accepted the returnees on the resettlement ships onto their territory. The returnees had formulated a 'legal basis' with documents that gave them title to the land and prevented the indigenes form participating in the governance thereof. Although the civil liberties were enshrined in the constitution the indigenes could not vote hold public office nor even attend the university unless adopted by an Americo-Liberian. The settler community from the ships did not inhabit beyond the coastline and the edges of the Monsterrado River "the indigenous African communities thus followed their separate traditional patterns of life while also attempting to adapt to settler dominance" (The Truth and Reconciliation, Commission of Liberia, 2009, p. 54), Other than the provision of slave labour to the settler community there was little interaction.

In the decades between 1950 and 1970s, at the height of public demonstrations, anti-Vietnam war sentiment and demand for black civil rights in the USA, Fletcher Knebel, an American journalist and activist with connections within the US Peace Corps, in addition to his campaign against incoherent American foreign policy, revealed in a series of publications, the alarming and inequitable society that Liberia was. His novel

ZinZin Road, published in 1966 was a thinly veiled accusation of President William V. S. Tubman's Administration, and the brutality of Americo-Liberians against the indigenous Liberians. The book was a prophetic caution of an impending coup-d'état should the ruling class of Americo-Liberians not change their ways and administer equality of suffrage, share parity of land tenure, and give uniform tertiary educational access to all. After 120 years of Americo-Liberian governance of the country, in 1957, President Tubman sensitive to international criticism and the growing movements for self-governance across Africa visited for the first time, the "hinterland provinces" a bestial description of the outskirts of Monrovia the capital where the indigenes dwelt (Dunn and Tarr, 1988). Subsequently in 1959, after hosting Presidents Nkrumah and Sekou Toure of Ghana and Guinea respectively, Tubman's government granted better recognition to Liberian indigenes to participate in civic life with the 'Unification and Integration Act' of 1960 (Dunn, et al., 2001). In the very year, motivated by rumours of coup-d'états in Liberia, general political instability in other West Africa countries, but catalysed by the signing of a military cooperation pact between newly independent neighbouring Guinea with the Soviet Union, Tubman was pressurized by the ex-military President Eisenhower of the USA, to re-invite the Peace Corps to Liberia. This accelerated the use of proxy-countries Liberia and Guinea by the USA and the Soviet Union to prosecute the Cold War in Africa (Schmidt, 2007).

The consequences of the 'Cold-War' on the governance of fledgling democracies and newly independent African countries was destructive. African autocrats were sustained in power by the USA and Soviet Union primarily because of the geo-political position of the autocrat at the expense of good national governance. America's support

of Tubman's regime was blind to the fact the suffrage that elected President Tubman did not extend to the indigenous communities. Liberia's application to join the UN as the first sub-Sharan African member was sponsored by the USA. In parallel, Tubman revelled in the reputation of Liberia being a 'Little America' in Africa. Although Tubman is credited to have commenced the Unification Policy by recognising indigenous communities as 'Liberians', this was designed to conciliate criticism from Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah of Guinea and Ghana respectively (Breitborde, 1998). Tubman's reign lasted twenty-seven (27), years. William Richard Tolbert's government that succeeded Tubman's from 1971, stuttered with internal reforms of national identification, civic participation and the creation of an egalitarian Liberia (Bell, 2008). With the nepotism of the ruling class, the colloquial social and overt identification distinctions between the descendants of emancipated Americo-Liberians, released captives from slave ships on the high-seas, and the indigenous people, the civil-war genie had escaped the lamp. Opposition groups to the governing True Whig Party, such as MOJA and PAL were formed. It would only be a matter of time till the ferocious decade-long civil war broke out. There were food riots throughout the late sixties and early seventies, eventually Henry Fahnbulleh Sr, from the oppressed indigenous ethnic Vai community staged a coup d'état that failed to topple the True Whig Party in 1968, yet set in train the events that led to Master Sergeant Doe's successful coup d'état and ultimately his torture and execution during the civil war (Dunn, et al., 2001).

3.17. Formation of a National-Identity – The modern era

In April 1979, what seemed an innocuous routine increase in the price of rice, a staple food, sparked violent clashes that was only quelled by massive use of military might over the indigenous civilian population. The years between 1973 and 1980 in Liberia's history is potholed with food riots that fuelled civil unrest, public demonstrations, riots and attempted coup d'états. Before 1979 there were no commissioned officers of indigene extraction in the Liberian army. This pent-up frustration of a parity deficit within an inadequate identity management eco-system that imported American land tenure as a basis of identification[23] found fertile ground in the Liberian army. Another popular-based coup d'état was staged in 1980, led by Master Sergeant Doe, a non-commissioned indigene. This coup d'état was successful, and thus accelerated the dismal slide leading to the civil war between 1989 – 2003.

The effects of the prolonged civil on Liberian Nation-identity further widened the breach in national cohesion that commenced with the objectives of the earlier ACS settlers of 1820. The factions claiming to be combating for Liberian identity had splintered into multiple fronts. The primary progression of the war split the factions into those that supported the overthrown Samuel Doe administration and those that did not. Some professing a nationalist agenda, such as Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, yet with predominantly ethnic Nimba fighters that had suffered persecution under Samuel Doe's ethnic Krahn group. Yet others, as bucolic as the

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[23] The colonisers replicated on Liberian territory the American practice of excluding from civic and suffrage participation persons that did not own land such as slaves. The culture of the indigenous inhabitants was communal clan tenure of land. Indigenes were excluded from suffrage without an ability to provide ACS documented proof of land tenure.

Lofa Defence Council also represented narrow ethnic communities sprang up and engaged in the free-for-all massacre (Utas, 2003). The violent explosion of the Liberian civil conflict, although the genesis is rooted in the so called 'founding' of Liberia, had an obviously sudden violent plunge with the Doe coup-d'état in 1980. The frustration of marginalisation and social deprivation, irrespective of clan or ethnic community motivated the 1980 coup-d'état. Those that occupied the powerful positions of state mainly from the Kongo community, were the original targets of the disaffection.

As with all wars, particularly civil wars, the proximity of the opposing parties stimulates exaggerated cultural divisions and ethnic alliances. As the war progressed, the triggers of the civil war became lost on impressionable recruits conscripted along ethnic allegiances. This ethnic approach and use of child-soldiers introduced a latent but powerful cultural mechanism that ensured a comprehensive ethnic-nationality devotion to the leader war and effort (Klay Jr., 2004). The sensitive age of the recruits and the damage of warfare continued into the next generation of the already fractured nation-state of Liberia. The length of the civil war, two decades, and the faltering development of the Liberian economy had produced insufficient prosperity for even mature Liberian nationals that re-ignited centuries old ethnic and tribal rivalries. The accusations levelled against some ethnic communities were as preposterous as the use of witchcraft generated wealth requiring human parts for medieval sacrificial rituals. The blood-stained decimated spoils of war now became desirable war trophies, the possession of which was believed to give 'voodoo-like' protection, the pursuit of which cultivated further violence (Utas, 2003).

The 2005 Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up after the civil war, as a means of galvanising the peace Liberia enjoyed since 2003, lists six main reasons for the civil war, two of the reasons are directly linked to nation-identity; separate nation-identity aspirations and an ongoing conflict between the ethnic nationalities within the territory.

> "oppressive dominance of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy over the indigenous peoples of Liberia", and "conflicts amongst the indigenous people" (p6),
>
> (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009).

Nation-identity in modern Liberia is thus, quite complex, considering its history characterized by the coaxing of a disadvantaged community that enforced the ills of their own previous distress on a credulous community. The loss of pride in the indigenous identity, the dichotomy, imposition of eighteenth-century slavery values, coup d'états and civil war removed community cohesion. The creation of an underclass through 'black colonization', bastardisation of the indigenous values replaced with wholesale American laws erased whatever nation-identity parity the community could share. This in addition to the prevailing sub-Saharan African challenges, mentioned in the earlier chapters, have all contributed to a present-day disjointed organisation of Liberian Nation-identity.

3.18. Conclusion Chapter 3

The complex origins and intentions of the ACS induced leading pioneers to Africa to do for the colonised African territory Liberia, what the Europeans had achieved with the colonisation of America. What is missing is the celebrated undertaking, of the ignominious treatment of the natives of both North America and Africa. The awakening

of the conscience of Congress after the American civil war had left the unwilling desire of the USA to contribute towards international colonisation and empire building. Furthermore, the ex-slave owners of the USA who could not share American territory with ex-slaves as equals were happy to fund the elimination of African-Americans to Liberia. The African-American 'non-citizens' had arrived on African soil in the same way as the pilgrim Europeans had done – immigrants seeking a better life from another continent (Barnes, 2006). Albeit the Slave Trade had removed Africans by force to America, further injustice was done to the subsequent African-American generation, by their repatriation to Liberia without research to either their ancestral African origin or what effect the de-Africanised blacks would have on the receiving African communities. Murray (2013), asks, could there have been an attempt to purchase land and segregate the returnees as a separate ethnic group that deserved a nation-state of their own? The ACS permitted its ranks to be infiltrated and were eager to dump a section of their nation-community, legitimate Americans, that had been denied equitable national-identity privileges on African soil to fend for themselves. The pilgrim community arriving on the west coast of Africa had no other identity anchors than the slave culture from America that had excluded them from belonging and national-identity. They however arrived with technologically superior weapons of destruction with which they used to dominate the indigenous nations. They would re-institute the symbolism and institutions of nation-identity that had banished them to Liberia.

4. Sierra Leone National-Identity

4.1. Introduction to Sierra Leone National-Identity

The similar processes of migration by the descendants of the victims of the Atlantic Slave Trade from North America to the west coast of Africa is often cited as the origins of the modern nation-states of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Indeed, Africa academics such as Amidst this transition from partly-civilised to a claimed superiority of rank, the relevance of the legal infrastructure in managing identities in the new-nation-state becomes questionable. -Everill (2013), Rodney (2018) and Davidson (1992) often draw compassions from the demographic similarities of the two nation-states. Although the indigenous ethnic communities of both nation-states are descendant of the Niger-Kordofanian movements across Africa and can be viewed as sharing similar identity anchors, the migrants from North America to Liberia and Sierra Leone could not have been assigned a more polarised national-identity description. The migrants that demarcated the modern territory of Liberia arrived without a national-identity; they were stateless, having been refused the national-identity of the USA. Similarly, the emigrants that headed for Province of Freedom, what later became Sierra Leone, arrived in Africa with a nation-identity. They were British subjects picked either in from the *'Book of Negroes'*, frankpledge or volunteers encouraged to emigrate by the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor, (CRBP). Notably, the colonialist promoters of Liberia migration were victors from the American War of Independence, whereas it was the vanquished from the same war that promoted the migration to Sierra Leone. What is undoubtedly indistinguishable is that both nation-states in the late twentieth suffered debilitating civil wars cross-fertilised from each country and made for a protracted and undulated cessation to hostilities.

Crucial to understanding the development of identity management in Sierra Leone is the historical context showing how it emerged partly in the course of the creation of the nation-state as a slave colony, and secondly, through its colonisation by the British that transformed it into a colony-protectorate state. The colony-protectorate contained groups of people with such distinctly different nationality aspirations that the nation-community had little chance of identifying with each other with a single national-identity.

The British colonial macro-view of the communities occupying the Sierra Leonean territory broke down into three peoples, firstly the indigenous people having never left the African continent, secondly the returnees to the continent and their descendants the Krios, whom they would often refer to as Liberated Africans, and thirdly the white Europeans. Indeed, even long after their arrival from Nova Scotia and Britain some of the Krio communities for generations still regard themselves as British living amongst culturally distinct indigenous African ethnic communities. The creation of separate but subordinate identity structures for natives, settlers and immigrants in Sierra Leone preceded that of Liberia discussed in Chapter Three. Similar to Liberia, the Europeans in Sierra Leone created multiple systems: one for the settlers or colonists, another for the indigenous people, and a third for migrants from outside Europe and America. For the indigenous Sierra Leoneans, the identification system emerged through different stages of colonisation, and it was several years later after independence in 1961 that it could be codified as a law and merge the disparate identities into one Sierra Leonean identity. As we shall discuss later, this management identification system did not, and still does not, conform to a fully-fledged national-identity management eco-system for all the nation's communities. It lacks certain of the key feature of a homologous nation,

a nation that has identical privileges of identification irrespective of which nation community you belong to. These were still missing even after independence.

With regards to Sierra Leone and its development of a nation-identity, it was easy to ignore the success of the ethnic nations already settled in the territory. In fact, such was the 'colonial convenience' and invisibility of the indigenous ethnic communities that for administrative efficiency ethno-lingua communities such as Sherbros were mistakenly classified as Temnes (Wilberforce, 1885). Notably, most literature, for example Peterson (1969), focuses on new arrivals. He states,

> "There were three groups of immigrants to Sierra Leone before 1807: the Original Settlers of 1787, the Nova Scotians of 1792, and the Maroons of 1800. I have called these three groups 'settlers in the study. 'Liberated Africans' refers to the 60,000 to 70,000 Africans who were saved from the holds of the slave ships trading illegally after 1807 and settled in Sierra Leone" (p.13).

This discriminatory classification of the people of Sierra Leone by Sierra Leone historians, researchers and indeed the colonial masters that was for no other coherent reason than the convenience of colonisation destroyed the potential for a collaborative development of national-identity of modern Sierra Leone. Since the formalisation of the modern nation of Sierra Leone, however, 16 Niger-Kordofanian ethnic groups of mainly Bantu, Wolof, and Mandingo (Madinka) extraction have been recognised.

Perhaps the most controversial issue in tracing the journey of nation-formation and identity management of Sierra Leonean society arises from the fact that studies have been based on Krios as the dominant nation community of Sierra Leone. In actual fact

they form less than 2% of the population of modern Sierra Leone (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015) and as a minority they have been the victims of discriminatory identity management in the early years after independence. The Krios nevertheless considered themselves as a hybrid ethnic group bringing civilisation to the indigenes (Spencer-Walters, 2006). Over the hundred and sixty (160) years of colonisation, the Krios had evolved into an urbane community. Although less than two percent (2%) of the colony's population are Krio and speak 'Creole' a pidgin English, the language of the African slaves, 'Creole' is the lingua-franca for the entire colony and protectorate. Within the colony, Krios served as civil service administrators and in the governance Sierra Leone. As literate civil service administrators, Krios condescendingly replaced indigenous naming practices and customs that they could not understand with imported British practices. Notably, despite the time devoted to the integration of communities in Sierra Leone, the Krios have predominantly remained in Freetown and have limited appreciation of the indigenous rural communities, their governance and hierarchical structures. Often, Krios react contemptuously to the customs traditions and languages of the indigenous communities. Indeed, they demonstrate an advanced paradigm of liminal identity as they refer proudly to themselves as "Black Englishmen" rather than the polite reference used by white colonialists - Liberated Africans (Dixon-Fyle and Cole, 2006, p.3).

In their study of the conversion of ethnic identities into the formation of a nation-state with a nation-identity, Kandeh, et al. (2005) found the Sierra Leone experience a failure in national-identity administration have all played their part in the collective failure to accomplish a national-identity for Sierra Leone. They state,

"Sierra Leone has fared just as poorly in constructing a coherent national imaginary as it has in establishing legitimate and durable political institutions. Anticolonial nationalism did not give birth to a new nation, nor has state performance brought disparate ethnic communities any closer.…ethnic loyalties, which in turn subverted progress toward the elaboration of a new national-identity and consciousness". (p.181)

This chapter allows us to reconstruct the moments of the settlement and colonisation of Sierra Leone as a convergence of several developments that focuses on the administration of national-identity in Sierra Leone. Collectively, these form the parameters within which identity management policies developed in the new colony-protectorate. Secondly, the chapter examines the development of systems of identification from their Euro-American beginning to their composition within the Sierra Leone nation-state. Thirdly, it investigates the contours of identities that emerged as a result of the process of the formation of the Sierra Leonean state during and after colonisation. Finally, the chapter examines the national identities and identity management system produced by the complex legacy of a *'colony-protectorate'* administrative structure.

4.2.   Background to modern Sierra Leone and its National-Identity

Similar to Liberia, discussed in Chapter 3, the creation of modern Sierra Leone, and the identity management of its inhabitants was influenced by the American War of Independence that ended in 1783 as well as the abolition of slavery Coincidentally, while to the black slave descendants the mortal sacrifice of participating on the

American side was now questionable they could not reconcile the values of the war of independence and slave ownership (Blumrosen and Blumrosen 2006).

In 1783, while vanquished Loyalists, as part of the Peace Treaty, agreed to return to the victor Patriots properties including slaves that had been lost to the Loyalists, many slaves were unwilling to return as slave property to the victorious Patriots. However, The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793[24] passed by Congress denied slaves an identity and reinforced slave ownership. According to David (1924, p. 19), the application of the Act meant that escaped slaves living in the Confederates had to be returned to their owners. David demonstrates how the Act was in conflict with State laws that required a jury to convict a legitimate person of his liberty. The arbitrariness of the Act was in the interpretation of which members of the nation community were legitimate persons. It was also hinged on the fact that by just the word-of-mouth, a ranger could recapture a suspected black fugitive slave with or without 'Freedom Papers', revoke their liberty and be resold into servitude. In addition to The Fugitive Slave Act, before the passing of the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery in 1864, many Southern states enacted state laws that further curtailed the tangible privileges of an acknowledged legitimate identity. In this way, the concluding skirmishes, armistice and eventual Peace Treaty of the American War of Independence signed in New York USA, sublimely affected the formation of Sierra Leone and its identity management.

While Patriots, such as Thomas Paine, who were advocating for the abolition of slavery had little credibility within the Patriot movement, Loyalists who were also

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[24] The Act blurred the distinction between a fugitive slave and one liberated from servitude, it created a legal basis for the recapture of hitherto liberated slaves by ignoring the Freedom Papers.

Abolitionists, including the clergy such as Henry Vern and the Bishop of London, later to be known as the Clapham Sect, a reformist group, became active in the American colonies. The group also included influential businessmen, politicians and members of the British Parliament such as Granville Sharpe and William Wilberforce who had been campaigning in Britain and its colonies for the abolition of slavery. Their credibility and standing in seventeenth century British homeland and the American colonies was unquestionably altruistic. Adam Hochschild the American historian and publisher of the multiple awarded *Mother Jones* magazine, in his publication *Bury the Chains: The British Struggle to Abolish Slavery* (2006) describes them as the most engaging but odd-ball collection of philanthropic people ever to have established the colony of Sierra Leone: "No philanthropic venture ever included more oddballs" (p.145). Sharpe and his cohorts conceived the idea of recognising members of the founding community to establish the Sierra Leonean colony based on "an ancient system of government called frankpledge"[25], which if applied to the Sierra Leone settlement, would not only "satisfy his passion" but would also "smite slavery at the same time". To Sharp, this system was "the only effectual antidote to unlimited or illegal government of any kind", because once applied, "it would enable the administrators ten households based on family relationships. In this way, the community of migrants/colonists would be protected "from violent or "morose" individuals" (p. 146). In this sense, the emergence of the modern nation of Sierra Leone is rooted in complications over the morality of slavery intertwined with the puritanical Christian origins, layered with battlefield self-preservation drives. The embedment of the Frankpledge, the first ever identity-

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[25] Fankpledge is a medieval Anglo-Saxon system of community identity management, usually made up of less than 80 people, in which each person has a personal affiliation to every other member of the community and is responsible for the absolute adherence of community law by every member and regulations.

management system, albeit ill-suited to the location, underlies the unconcerned attitude to the development of an inclusive colony-protectorate national-identity management system.

4.3. The Nation Community - Krio Contradictions

Krio, the ethnic name, originated from a determination of the returning North Atlantic community to assert their identity that distinguished them from the indigenous Africans (Adu Boahene, 1985). This echoed the creation of a new community following the arrival of the Portuguese, the first Europeans on the West African coast, the Portuguese. In the Portuguese settlements, some indigenous Africans would be assimilated into the household to assist in trade and interaction with the indigenous community. The Portuguese developed the word 'créole' to mean 'brought-up in-house', a common usage for the assimilated Africans that lived with them (da Silva, 2011). Créole', Krio, Kru, Criollo, and other derivations of the original Portuguese word are all a corruption of 'Créole' but with a substantial semantic association with the English word "crew" (Holm, 1994). The history of the name cannot be divorced from the prerogative association of the community's inclusion with the national-identity of Sierra Leone. In fact, in asserting an ethno-lingua identity formation on return to Africa from Nova Scotia, the conflict within their recent histories could not have been starker. Since the suggestion by their white settler contemporaries that the Nova Scotia returnees were also a tribal African ethnic community was abhorrent to them, their preference was to be identified as distinct Krios with a distinct heritage. In the formation of a negotiated nation-identity, Krios sabotaged this evolution by the very antagonistic relationship they had with the indigenous ethnic communities. When Thomas Alldridge, a Colonial Inspector of the British Empire's visited Freetown in 1910

he equated the dislocation of the indigenous ethnic communities from their ancestral land by the Nova Scotia colonists and their scorn of the various ethnic communities as "shocking terrorism" (Alldridge, 1910, p.81). Such was the discriminatory acrimony Alldridge observed from the Krios towards the indigenous communities that he further encouraged the colonial government to "pacify the various tribes" for an inequitable appreciation for the welcome given to the colonists. Krio colonists suffered from liminal identity challenges that were fundamental impediments to the formation of a viable national-identity of Sierra Leone so much so that they were eager to be recognised as superior to the indigenous ethnic communities.

To successfully over-power and govern indigenous ethnic communities that outnumbered both white colonist and Krios, British colonial administration, was based on 'divide and rule', to avoid a union of the trouble-making Krio community with indigenous ethnic communities who could swamp the colonial administrators in any sporadic mutiny. The Krios, disliked by the other two macro-racial communities, were unable to apportion ancestral land within the larger Sierra Leonean territory to themselves, but were courted by the Europeans as supervisors and agents of the colonial regime. Indeed, according to Rodney (2018), once they disembarked from the ships, returnees to Sierra Leone from the Caribbean, North America and Brazil were quickly enlisted as representatives of the colonial administration as overseers in the construction of colonial infrastructure such as roads, rail-roads, and domestic dwellings. Black people from the Caribbean and North America, on arrival into the colony, having no proof of ancestral link to the indigenous ethnic communities other than colour, were described by the colonial administration as 'Krios of Sierra Leone'.

To the colonial administrators, Krios were identified as a distinct ethnic community that aspired to remain in the privileged class positions. A caucus of accomplished Krios, Mulatto missionaries and descendants of entries from *'The Book of Negroes'*, were instrumental in the founding of Freetown's tertiary Fourah Bay College in 1827. The ambiguous colonial identity of 'the African' either belonging to an indigenous ethno-lingua community or as clan-formed contemporary label achieved through the adversity of the Slave trade resulted in the unstructured categorization given to all blacks and the ambivalence to the construction of a national-identity eco-system fit for nation formation. Irrespective of their origin, whether Nova Scotia or alternative indigenous descent, the abolitionists and colonial administration undervalued the intricate inter-relations of all the peoples of the territory and their developing interlinked identities that would later form a national-identity (Clapham, 2009) were undervalued by the abolitionists and colonial administration. Instead, they recognised all African people of the different and ethnic tribal communities as a single people with minor differences (Adu Boahene, 1985). Ancestral migratory and linguistic ethnic identity formation was hardly a serious consideration of the nineteenth century colonialist and abolitionist, the relevance of identity interaction was simply a matter of skin-colour.

4.4.   'The Book of Negroes'

Loyalists Brigadier General, Samuel Birch, and General Guy Carleton, were instrumental in the first mass compilation of documented identity data of Black Loyalists or African slaves that had fought with the British in the war. The compilation of identity data available from the ex-combatants was in fulfilment of the promise of emancipation for every slave that took-up arms on the side of the British. According to Walker (1999), Sierra Leone was "Britain's first permanent African colony that caused

the British to see Africa not merely as it was but as it might be and with full consideration for the new Africa in the imperial scheme of things" (p. ix). The compilation of the identity data between 1783 – 1784, labelled, *The Book of Negroes*, demonstrated how most Black Loyalists were liberated from slavery because of their entry into this database. As soon as they were recorded, they travelled via Nova Scotia, which became known as Birchtown, from where they departed to resettle as agents of Britain in Sierra Leone.

The creation of *'The Book of Negroes'* was revolutionary. It was the wholesale compilation of identity data of a supposedly recognised ethnic group that gave both a collective and individual tangible value of having a legal identity. *'The Book of Negroes'* was the first to attribute such identity provenance and data to people that wanted to travel to the west coast of Africa later to become modern Sierra Leone. Loyalist Lieutenant John Wentworth, Governor of Nova Scotia, based on *'The Book of Negroes'*, issued rudimentary passports enabling the Black Loyalists to sail to Sierra Leone as British Subjects. (Fyfe, 1993). Thus, the very identity management of not only the ordinary migrants to Sierra Leone, and the ex-servicemen, but the entire nation-community of modern Sierra Leone was adversely affected by an ill-suited British Frankpledge system that started with *'The Book of Negroes'*.

Crucially, *'The Book of Negroes'* as a document is fundamental to the evolution of identity management in Sierra Leone since it was the basis for individual identity documents and legitimacy for people who eventually founded modern Sierra Leone. Prior to the abolition of slavery in 1865, civic authorities in the American colonies recorded only the births and deaths of legal persons with identities. Newspapers and

churches did not announce the births and deaths of slaves since, as the property of their masters and slave-owners, slaves did not have functional legal identities. The bill-of-sale for a slave did not constitute a legal identity but rather a contract of property exchange for a monetary consideration (Thomas, 1997). The birth, death or indeed the existence of a slave in a household held irrelevant significance outside the confines of the household. Slave-owners that liberated slaves, would compose 'Freedom Papers' meant to convert the slave's status as property within the household to a person with an identity that could now interact with the community, as a 'legal person'. 'Freedom Papers' and certificates of freedom were documents declaring the free status of black slaves. These papers were important because "free people of color" lived with the constant fear of being kidnapped and resold into slavery. 'Freedom Papers' proved the free status of a person and served as a legal affidavit. Manumissions and emancipations were legal documents that made official the act of setting a black slave free by a living or deceased slaveholder. It was prudent for "Blacks to file papers attesting to their free status with the county deeds office in order to protect themselves from slave catchers and kidnappers" (University of Pittsburgh, 2019).

As identity documents, the value of the ex-slave's 'Freedom Papers' was debatable since they did not give the liberated slave identical privileges of identification or comparable legal status as his previous master and owner to subsequently also own a slave or indeed that his or her offspring born in the household of the slave master was equally free. Nonetheless, the 'Freedom Papers' entitled the bearer to limited privileges such as travel, entering marriage, the purchase and ownership of livestock and agreement to tenanted farmland. The 'Freedom Papers' held legitimacy only if the

grantor of the freedom and signatory was a legal person and could be identified. In the Southern American States, the outright purchase and ownership of land by a black person based on his 'Freedom Papers' was inconceivable in pre-abolition America. The 'Freedom Papers' entitled the bearer to interact independently outside the household such as entering into marriage, purchase and own livestock and enter into an agreement for tenanted farmland. Significantly, outside the community that knows the signatory and grantor of the Freedom Papers, many liberated slaves were recaptured and re-enslaved if the grantor could not be found or was deceased.

The concept of a free person, a legal identity, layered privileges of identification, and discretionary government protection from kidnaping confused the identity management and nation-building process of modern Sierra Leone entrusted to a people that originated from this twisted identity management tradition. The British promoters of the Sierra Leone Chartered company engaged manumitted and emancipated slaves as the agents of nation formation and nation-identity. These unrewarded agents from the war between Britain and the Colony of America, unaccustomed to the privileges of a legal identity in colonial America neither the opportunity to debate nor experience national-identity had the responsibility of instituting the national-identity structures of Sierra Leone, a continent away.

4.5.   The Dawn of The Privileges of Identification

Simultaneous events on the British mainland between 1767 and 1790 contributed to the formation of the national-identity of Sierra Leone. From 1767 onwards, there was a recognised community of blacks living in England who campaigned for the abolition of slavery. To remain at liberty with a limited legal identity, many escaped slaves

converted to Christianity and took part in public baptism ceremonies in order to acquire godparents as guarantors of their liberty. Most of the latter were abolitionists that encouraged enslaved blacks to flee servitude and obtain emancipation by public conversion to Christianity. Philanthropist abolitionists, Granville Sharpe and Alexander Falconbridge's of St. George's Bay Company focused on the resettlement of 'destitute liberated slaves' in Sierra Leone. In 1786 St. George's Bay Company obtained a commission from the British Parliament and joined the CRBP in their dual humanitarian and commercial mission to return black slaves to Sierra Leone in Africa. Their aim was twofold, firstly to expand British imperialist aspirations by establishing a colony and secondly to provide a revenue source as a Chartered company to reduce the huge war debt resultant from the Seven Year War. Despite the philanthropic vision, the promoters ignored the impact of the venture on nation formation and the identity of the nation-community of the British Empire. Having been collected from the streets of London by the CRBP, the destitute descendants of black slaves who had no formal identities had now acquired the privilege of identification. They were given national identities as 'British Subjects' to establish a colony in Africa. The first returnees to Sierra Leone landed in 1787. Their settlement, 'Granville Town', was intended to be the first Abolitionist inspired independent state for returnee slaves to Africa.

Under questionable circumstances, the twenty square miles of land Sharp had negotiated from the indigenous Temne King Nimbana metamorphosed into 200 square miles for his 300 British subjects. In reality, the colonists were eager for adventure but unprepared for what awaited them in the Sierra Leone Peninsula. According to Rankin (1936) whose account of the arrival is grim, "Every object around wore a grave and warning aspect. This external gloom produced its effect on the ships

company" (p.2). Elsewhere Land and Schocket (2008) describe the 1787 expedition as an "economic and demographic failure" (p.12).

In addition to underlying uncertainty surrounding land acquisition and tenure, fundamental to national or ethnic identity in Sierra Leone and other African countries, there were three principal causes that led to the collapse of the Granville Town. Firstly, the opacity of the land acquisition made the pioneers appear as invader. They settled and farmed on parcels of land without respect to either the frontiers or the cultivation customs of the indigenous people. Although the indigenous inhabitants were mainly engaged in subsistence farming, their farms were outside the village habitation, requiring a 5 to 10-mile trek to the farm. In contrast, however, the Krios ignored this custom and cultivated within the village dwelling confines, an affront to the indigenous people (see Sharp and Hoare, 1820). It is important to relate the traditions surrounding usage of land, the delineated purpose of usage and the ownership of the land itself to understanding the rupture that would introduce to Sierra Leone nation-identity. To the indigenous African communities, land was a communal asset never owned by anyone person but held in trust for the benefit of the entire community. The delineation of farmland outside the village dwellings exhibited the reverence of the village confines, with some sections of village land being used for centuries as sacred land for worship. The culture, traditions and very distinct identity of the indigenous community as an ethnic-nation emanated from the fact that they were tied to the land they occupied; they passed it on to future generations, and most importantly it symbolised the preservation of their identity, culture, and traditions. The wanton disrespect of traditions of land usage and desecration of scared land for the raising of livestock by the 'Liberated Africans' was an affront to the indigenous people's culture. Thus, from

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the beginning of settler community migration to Sierra Leone this caused initial skeletal fractures in a negotiated nation-formation process and the identity management of the colony's communities. These historic skeletal fractures in nation-formation and discourteous identity appreciation by the 'Liberated Africans' haunted Sierra Leone national-identity into the present-day identity management ecosystem.

Secondly, during the founding of Granville Town, the West African Slave trade was still on-going. The shipping bays enveloping Freetown were important commercial active slave ports used for the transhipment of captured slaves (Kaifala, 2017). Some of Sharp's pioneer colonists such as Harry Demane had regressed from a liberated slave into a slave trader (Sharp and Hoare, 1820). The slave raids into the Temne territory were blamed on all settlers rather than the few recalcitrant colonists who had become slave traders. The hostility between Sharp's black colonists who were British Subjects and the indigenous Temne people was deep-seated and pot-holed with regular armed conflict and violent raids into opposing territories. These invasions, which began as disputes over territorial frontiers inevitably led to the surrender and capture of prisoners on both sides. An already hostile atmosphere of co-habitation between the indigenous locals and the colonists escalated further after the death of the Temne King who had 'sold' the land to Sharp. Eventually, in an ultimate battle in 1789, the Temne locals burnt down Granville Town settlement and chased out Sharp's British colonists. The colonists who had neither succumbed to fierce battles nor malaria, fled back to Britain aboard Royal Navy Ships.

Whereas Anderson (2020), asserts that "Africans forcibly removed from their homeland, rebuilt new lives, communities and collective identities, in an early British colony in Africa" (p.4), it is uncertain that they could have ever returned to their homeland in Africa after the Atlantic slave trade to reconstruct their lives. The 'forcibly removed Africans' were long dead therefore the ex-combatants, the entrants into *'The Book of Negroes'* originally promised land in Nova Scotia by Britain did not set out to the Coast of Africa voluntarily with a mission of re-building lives. They left Nova Scotia and the streets of Britain as a community of people unable to claim equivalent privileges of identification in the nation-communities that they were born into and fought for. Indeed, The decision of the House of Commons Charter granting a Royal Charter for the SLC expedition to Africa, did not intend that the Charter nor expedition be a separate nation-formation project with a nation-community, but rather a commercial colonisation project designed to alleviate the worsening British economy after the war. As the aims of the House of Commons and those that were dispatched on the expedition was different, these national and geopolitical developments had indirect but obvious grave challenges for the future nation-formation and national-identity management in Sierra Leone.

4.6. The Fractured Foundations of community identity in the Territory

Babacan (2010) states, "The cornerstone of the democratic nation-state is the establishment of rights: political, social and civil. Membership in a nation-state denotes both civic belonging in the political community and cultural belonging in the national community." This basis for a national-identity and similar to Ranger (1983) discussed in Chapters One and Two, that indigenous Africans do not need invented traditions to locate their sense of belonging to and within their ethnic nations. As Ross (2001)

states, "Ethnic identity connects individuals through [a] perceived common past experiences and expectations of shared future ones" (p.157) . The indigenous ethnic nations, already settled on the west coast of Africa, when they received the 'Liberated Africans'; the Nova Scotia ex-combatants, benefactors of the 'Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor', the Maroons and the emancipated slaves, already had an indigenous shared past. On one hand, while the indigenous nations saw a future where they would remain under traditional ethnic governance and identity management systems, the black settlers, on the other hand, relied on the newly constructed The Book of Negroes and the formulated Frankpledge system of identification, which had formalised a shared slave past and the future expectation of colonising the rival indigenous ethnic residents of the land.

In a way, a retrospective analysis of the formation of modern Sierra Leone foretells the inevitable clash and breakdown of the nation-state since the foundations of a modern Sierra Leonean national-identity management eco-system was fractured at inception. 'The Book of Negroes' registered members' who arrived on the west coast of Africa did not travel there to either politically or culturally join with the indigenous people of west Africa nit as an intact Frankpledge community carrying out orders to colonise and exploit the territory. The first SLC arrivals were 1,000 emancipated slave migrants from Nova Scotia plus 550 rebellious negro slaves from Jamaica. By the first census of 1802, the number of arriving settlers grew to over 21,000, (Banton, 1957). Between 1792 and 1835, the territory accepted over40,000 more liberated slaves from North America, the Caribbean and other parts of the British Empire who, according to The Vice Admiralty Court in Freetown, included arrivals released by the Royal Navy's West Africa Squadron. Thus, within the colony a community that would have grave

future national-identity consequences was being created without any corresponding community identity administration policy formation.

The implementation of the 1807 and 1811 Abolition of The Slave Trade Acts, gave rise to the number of formerly enslaved people legally recognised and identified by The Vice Admiralty Court and its successor, the Mixed Commission Court. The application of the new anti-slavery justice through the proceedings of the Vice Admiralty Court, by which liberated slave was identified with a descriptive hereditary record, unconsciously reaffirmed the identity management of the territory. The unintended but undesirable consequences on the identity management of the inhabitants of the Territory begun with the establishment of Freetown as a segregated quartered city in a context in which the arrivals who received the justice of liberation from the Freetown Courts did not view each other as people belonging to the same flourishing city-community. The process of identification for the new settlers established two groups: first, those who nurtured the opportunity of returning to their origins, second the other hand new residents from the far reaches of the British Empire who regarded themselves either as colonist British subjects or as settlers intending to make their new lives in Freetown – the colony. Although all the migrant groups, the registered members of The Book of Negroes, and the Maroons from the Caribbean, arrived to settle with recognisable and descriptive identities, the relationship between the two communities became distant and acrimonious as they saw each other as belonging to distinctive communities (Banton, 1957).

Quarters in this new colony were set up by people who either shared the same place of origin, the ability to assimilate European culture, or, the capacity to rebel against the ruling white Europeans. The colonial administration census of 1802, the earliest modern identity management exercise in Africa, was based on the quartered settlements in the Freetown peninsula (Banton, 1957), which had a large concentration of settlers from Nova Scotia. By 1850 Freetown was a bustling metropolis with mixture of residents that identified with multiple cradles of origin (Kaifala, 2017). All the enforced arrivals to the Freetown peninsula met pre-1780 arrivals from the Manden Kurufaba, Ghana, and Mali empires, and Bantu migrants from what is today Central Cameroon, (Fourshey, et al., 2018). While one quarter, Maroon Town housed former prisoners of war who had fought and lost two successive wars against the British in Jamaica, another quarter, Aku Town, was occupied by a cohesive community of people composed of descendants of the Yorubas liberated from slave ships. Indeed, Maroon Town, Settler Town, Congo Town, Kru Town, Bambara Town, and Kosso Town all grew out of the disparate communities arriving in Sierra Leone, attempting to redefine their deracinated lives (Banton, 1957). By 1798, Kline Town and a rehabilitated Granville Town, established by an Hausa migrant and an Englishman, respectively, were considered cosmopolitan suburbs of their day. In this multi-ethnic and multiracial context, the six imported national-identity classifications that arrived with the colonists such as subject, citizen, overseas citizen, protected person, a feature of British Colonial administration, was the commencement of the distortions in identity management that marred the development of modern Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leonean national-identity was formulated not as a single identity but as many sets of identities. The ambiguous acquisition of the 200 square miles by Granville Sharp, which led to the formation of the Crown Colony and the establishment of the Protectorate is the confluence of the duality of identities in Sierra Leone. The identity management administration and differentiation of residents of the Colony as opposed to the Protectorate was farcical. For although there was neither a physical border nor migratory restriction of movement between the two areas[26], part of the population, voluntary colonists and their descendants that arrived as settlers, were British Subjects while the other part were the pre-1787 residents now known as 'natives' or British Protected Persons.

The identity label that was attributed to an individual by the Colonial Administration would determine the entitlement of privileges that went along with that class. It is ironical that while British Subjects had voting rights to Freetown City Council and were eternally subject to the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the British Crown Courts, British Protected Persons were subject to the Court of Native Chiefs presided over by chiefs. Should the civil dispute or criminal matter be serious enough, on appeal, the case would be referred to the Final Court of Appeal for the Natives, which was a joint Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs. Evidently, even during the delivery of justice, the identity of the individual as seen by the guardians of justice would alternate. The very insular sets of identities created by the British colonial system for governance was further strained since individuals/inhabitants did not know which system of justice would be applied to the severity of the case under consideration. That the disordered

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[26] By 1947 The Colonial Administration permitted the chiefs of the hinterlands as a revenue generator to charge a migratory fee for Freetown inhabitants that wished enter their chiefdoms.

justice system with indeterminate offences depending on which community - indigenous or Liberated African - was affronted meant that the identity-management system was equally undefined. The judicial system was itself ambiguous, shifting from indigenous to European, with European and Krio offenders escaping trial because of their ethnicity or race.

Although the colonists could not have been of a monolithic genetic origin, because of *'The Book of Negroes'* and the Frankpledge system, they were nevertheless classified as a single ethno-lingua group – the Krio. Sixteen (16), of the indigenous Sierra Leone ethnic groups including the Koranko, Kono, Kissi, Vai, and Gola are also found in neighbouring Liberia. The two largest ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, however, are the Mende and Temne that together form sixty percent (60%) of the population. The rest are a combination of indigenous communities made up of forest people and coastal fisher folk. During colonisation, the independent legislative, executive and judicial governance powers given to each chiefdom to administer the identity management of the 'natives' who evolved into citizens of modern Sierra Leone compelled the ethnic community to expect leadership and development from their ethnic chiefs rather than the national government (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilation Commission, 2004). Collins (2006, p.18) posits that identity and political clan-formation is most enduring amongst people that "share both kinship values and are faced with a common adversity". The Maroons from Jamaica were fifth and sixth generation slaves who, between 1400 – 1600, were uprooted from Africa to Jamaica originally by Portuguese and Spanish slave traders and after 1655 by the British (Thomas, 1997). They had gained their freedom from the Spanish and Portuguese during the 1530 slave revolts in Jamaica. While the Maroons had a dominance of Akan linguistic traditions from

modern day Ghana, they are thought to have come from various parts of Africa - the Congo Basin, Cameroon and modern Nigeria - insufficient detail of their origin was recorded. To Banton (1957), the Maroons, 'lacking in African heritage', neither emancipated nor liberated slave, were also known as 'Liberated Africans' and were referred to as non-native because they could not identify with any of the forming ethnic communities from North America or off the slave ships. Significantly, they established their community around European ideals learnt in Jamaica, dressed in European styled clothes, practised Ecclesiastic governed Christianity, and held hierarchical positions in Churches and Chapels reminiscent of Victorian England. This community of settlers, irrespective of the similarity to indigenous Africans in skin-colour tone, also suffered from liminal-identity. It is interesting that although Banton (1957), and Peterson (1969), both refer to the Akan linguistic legacy of the Marrons and Nova Scotian arrivals, the generational period of slavery endured by both communities in the different cultures of West Indies and North America had set both communities on divergent paths of community identity, they no longer recognised each other as kith nor kin. Once in Sierra Leone, the Maroons formation of a clan identity fuelled by competing internal consciousness of Jamaican origin, combined with the adversity of external aggressive aversion from indigenous ethnic communities galvanised the Maroons and engendered their desire for a collective (modern) national-identity in the colony-protectorate.

The British Government recognised the Nova Scotia Krios as colonist, with greater privileges of identity and authority. In 1808, the Province of Freedom, governed by The Sierra Leone Company, handed over the governance of the commercially acquired territory to the British government without so much as a discussion with the

inhabitants. Freetown became a Crown Colony whilst the rest of the non-descript territory and inhabitants of various indigenous ethnic communities became the Protectorate of Sierra Leone (Froman and Foster, 2002). The foundations for patria although strong during the migration from Nova Scotia, was based on loyalty to one another as compatriots embarking on an adventure to Africa. Therefore, in the face of competing interests and the hybrid identities that were formed in the evolution from 'The Province of Freedom' to the modern nation-state of Sierra Leone, patria crumbled. Notably, the forging of a national-identity Sierra Leone has been unable to reconcile the enduring clan-based frankpledge system of identity management from its 'The Province of Freedom' origins to the modernity of the nation-state.

4.7. The Effect of British Colonial Administration, and Regional Geopolitics on National-Identity

The British Empire showed colonial control and dominance over the territory by reinforcing the British imperialist fronts against the French imperialist march. Freetown was located adjacent to French settlements of present-day Guinea and Ivory Coast. During the early 19th century scramble for Africa, the ascendancy of competing European empires was demonstrated by the acquisition and control of territory. Territory was acquired either by violent defeat or coercion of the inhabitants. This led to surges and contraction of imperialist territory on both British and French sides, which further gave way to fluctuating identity-management and alliances in the newly acquired territories, often resulting in clashes between indigenous clans belonging to competing spheres of imperial domination. Whereas Byron and Van de Vijver (2017) suggest that identity formation and acculturation in Africa is a result of multidimensional layers of association with indigenous but competing clans, the reality

of sub-Sahara identity formation from its origins of ethnic nations has been weakened marauding geopolitical imperialism. This study reveals that when divisive imperialist objectives are mixed with inherited ethnic values during colonisation, they form a complex dirge of indeterminate, sometimes violent outcomes, incompatible to the formation and acculturation of a settled unitary nation-state with a nation-identity.

Solid foundations of individual identity formation either within ethnic communities or the nation community leads to stable national-identities. Peterson (1969) in his research, '*Province of Freedom: A history of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870*', paraphrased the lack of confidence, and the muddle in individual identity formation of the un-indemnified migrants from Nova Scotia. "In Sierra Leone, the Liberated African's position was even more desperate, differences were compounded by that 'oppression', which wherever exercised, had a natural tendency to fetter, to depress, and to blunt the powers of the mind" (p.173). As discussed previously, the euphemism 'Liberated Africans' was used for tortured slaves rescued from North America bound slave ships as well as returnees from North Atlantic Slave Trade 'emancipated slaves', who later became colonists agents of the white colonialist in Africa – the Krio. The failure of some these communities to recover from torture, capture, and enslavement on one hand and the aspiration of other communities to be recompensed for their service in the American wars and yet another community shipped to West Africa by Sharpe and Wilberforce would never find an accommodation amongst themselves to pursue a single negotiated national-identity. Sharpe's white abolitionist, but imperialistic expansion unsympathetic to the genuine prosperity of either the Nova Scotia migrants or indigenous inhabitants asphyxiated the cultural values and

nationality aspirations of both the indigenous clans and Nova Scotia arrivals; Equitable, and progressive national-identity management would be unattainable.

The imbalanced multi-spiked Sierra Leone national-identity was still evident two hundred years after Sharpe and the first Nova Scotia immigrants arrived such that the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted "Imperial social engineering strategy was deeply divisive, the Colony and Protectorate were developed separately and unequally. On one hand, the Colonialists used commerce, Christianity and notions of civilisation as their tools to manipulate the relationships among the indigenous peoples who had intermingled and dealt with one another for centuries. On the other, in place of harmonious co-existence, the colonialists sowed seeds of distrust, competition and intransigence" (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004, p.6). Byron and Van de Vijver (2017) suggest that nations like Sierra Leone that do not have a negotiated historic relationship between indigenous people, returnees, abolitionist policy formulators, and British colonialists cannot achieve an 'active nation-identity', nor in fact an organic national-identity based on recognised ethnic kinships. Amidst the shifts in nation-formation, the indigenous and established ethnic communities as mentioned earlier in the chapter continued to live under the pre-arrival governance and identity structures of traditional chiefdoms, they lead separate lives different from that of the Europeans and Krios.

The route to modern nation formation for Sierra Leone rather than leading to a settled national-identity, reinforced quartered disjointed communities that eventually led to a breakdown of the nation-state. The Krios from Nova Scotia and their descendants were neither fully integrated with the indigenous Africans who lived in the disparagingly

described tribal 'hinterland' nor with the Europeans that had enslaved them. In fact, the original Frankpledge system used for the ex-slave families from the *Book of Negroes* created fractures in these already synthetic communes. The already disjointed communities and alliances were later made more complex as the Syrian and Lebanese arrivals settled in the colony-protectorate. Clifford (1999), writing in 'From Slavery to Freetown: Black Loyalists After The American Revolution, suggests that by 1900 when modern transportation and modernity was being introduced to the territory, "rather than benefiting the Freetown settlers" it introduced "the intrusion of energetic Syrian traders settlers who hustled far more industriously than the status conscious Krios and awakened the indigenous Africans of the interior to the possibility of eventually controlling affairs of their homeland" (p. 215). The Krios, returned to Africa with ideas of creating a self-governing African homeland in which they could recreate an identity springing from the territory they now regarded as home. The indigenous people on the other hand, were galvanised by Syrians and Lebanese not to accept shrinking indigenous control and management of their identity by relinquishing territory which was theirs as a birth right. They were considered as trouble-makers by the white European colonialist and also became rivals to the 'Liberated Africans' with their own ideas of self-governance of the territory and communities into modernity. Much like the trading Arabs that introduced an identity transformation to the indigenous African community discussed in Chapter 2, the Lebanese and Syrian focus was on commerce and an interchange of tradition that would foster trust, not to control or modify identity, culture and traditions in an imperialistic objective.

But how could a colonial governing authority of a territory nearly five thousand (5,000) kilometres make laws for the peaceful administration and recognition of privileges in accordance to a foreign English Law? How could a colonial administration avoid formulating a national-identity management system that would equate identical privileges to Black people in Sierra Leone? Throughout the colonial history of Sierra Leone, neither the SLC, operating under Royal Charter nor the British government that formalised identity management in the colony-protectorate recognised the people of Sierra Leone as having legitimate identity independent of Britain. Neither of these governing authorities, cloaked with legislative, executive and judicial authority had the intention of administering the identity management of the colony-protectorate to the benefit of the inhabitants. Bankole Thompson (1997) asserts that the colonial governments of Sierra Leone were charged to "make laws for the [the inhabitants of] territory as long as they [the laws] were not repugnant to the laws of England" English law was developed for habitation in England. Sierra Leonean nation formation and national-identity management was meant to avoid repugnance to English law which was inherently discriminatory to Black people. The system introduced by colonisation was intentioned to be discriminatory. It was this form of discriminatory identity management that the independent government of Sierra Leone inherited form the colonial authority.

4.8.   The Effect of the Hut Tax War on the Indigenous Community and National-Identity

As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, community identity and by extension national-identity involves the acceptance of onerous duties to the nation-community to which one belongs. The imposition, collection and payment of taxes is one of onerous

traditions that binds a community together. In British territories, as Hobsbawm (1984) explains, taxation, an invented communal tradition of financing communal infrastructural development, and one of the pillars of community and national-identity was bungled by the colonial administration. No imposition of taxes is ever considered popular by the payers; however, no nation-community nor national-identity can exist when the imposition of a tax leads to a violent war against the governing colonial authority and consigns the communities to opposing positions of a civil war. The Hut Tax War of Sierra Leone was one of such irrationally considered colonial dictates. The very occurrence of the Hut Tax[27] War in Sierra Leone emphasised the quartered and non-communal accommodation the communities of the territory had with each other. The war occurred after the replacement of an indigenous pattern of social taxation, which underscored the individual's relationship to the clan and thereby the allegiance to ethnic chiefdom. The introduction of the Hut Tax as an enforced obligation, underscored the indigenous people's view that the colonialist promulgators did not or want to recognise what was offensive to the indigenous community. While 'The Hut Tax' was advocated as a revenue stream to improve the infrastructure of both the Colony and Protectorate, particularly roads to the hinterland, the British Crown had a history of imposing taxes in Sierra Leone and their other colonies in order to assert territoriality and identify all inhabitants irrespective of identity classification under the same identity management eco-system as British subjects or protected persons.

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[27] The Hut Tax was a British colonial flat tax charged on every "hut" of household. The collectors would impound whatever food harvest was available if the hut owner /head of household did not have the money to pay the imposition. In addition to raising money for colonial infrastructure, the tax was aimed at integrating local communities into a formal colonial economy.

The Hut Tax War of 1898, which has its genesis in 1895, was sparked by the formalisation and administrative definition of the identities of inhabitants in Sierra Leone. The determination of the Colonial Administration to impose by will of armed-force, the Hut Tax, unwittingly galvanised the hitherto latent ethnic identities of the indigenous clans. This deliberate disruption of the indigenous community's traditions, or ignorant oversimplification of the recognition given to inhabitants in forming a nation-community, was reduced to the simplicity fiscal administration. The clumsiness of the colonial administration's genuine entitlement to an income from the territory's inhabitants for civic development led to a rupture of Sierra Leone's future national-identity ecosystem. For the indigenous community, consent to taxation like to all other onerous community responsibilities can only be achieved within reciprocal identity management ecosystems recognising privileges of identification. Therefore, such a sudden introduction of an enforced community taxation breached the development of a national-identity for nation-formation. In relation to the Hut Tax wars, Ferme (2004), emphasises this breach in the national-identity management of Sierra Leone when he states that

> "rural people inhabiting neighbouring villages separated by the invisible border between the protectorate and colony experienced, difference in treatment; on the protectorate side, [Hut] taxation was announced in 1896, the same time foreign rule was established, and was enforced beginning 1898 without exemption; on the colony side, taxes were established a full century after the inception of colonial rule – later than in the protectorate and with exemptions."

The reaction of the indigenous people to the Hut Tax was reinforced with a signed petition by twenty-nine (29), local chiefs / clan heads about the injustices of the Hut Tax imposition. The petition acknowledged the individual ethnic divisions within Sierra Leone and further marked a turning point in the resistance to colonisation led by the indigenous African communities rather than the Krio who were unaffected by the new tax. The protest grew out of hand when the indigenous communities embraced the possibility of avoiding taxation imposed by what was to them an illegitimate government over their indigenous communities. This research argues that, as Hobsbawm (1984) observes, community dissent and possibly violent dissent happens "when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which old traditions have been designed, producing new ones to which they are not applicable, or when such traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible or otherwise eliminated:" (pp. 4-5). The Krios, did not live in the Protectorate, they occupied what was known as the Colony and therefore subject to the different rules, regulations and bylaws of the colony. An imported and identifiable tradition of the Krios and other European inhabitants was the custom of living in single huts that attracted a lower urban alternative to the 'Hut Tax'. In contrast, the tradition of the indigenous people resident in the Protectorate was to live in compounds having multiple huts that attracted huge 'Hut Tax' bills. The offence of refusing to pay imposed taxes was punished by public flogging. Krios, by virtue of classification as subjects rather than protected persons, avoided the huge 'Hut Tax' bills. This reinforced their communal identification with the European colonialist with whom they shared the imported traditions, and indeed the invention of the recently imposed 'Hut Tax' An indigenous African head-of-household that resided in a

compound of huts could not comprehend why a Krio African that lived in single hut in the Colony was liable for only a fifth of an indigenous African's bill.

The imbalanced foundation of a Sierra Leone national-identity was jolted into the first 'mini' civil war, only supressed by brutal force and violent overpowering of the indigenous communities. In a way, violence rather than empathetic communal resolution to community disagreements has never been far from both pre and post-independence Sierra Leone identity-management ecosystems. This is in resonance with what Eriksen (1995), Bechhofer and McCrone (2009), similar to Eriksen (1995), views discussed earlier in Chapter 1, state when they warn against the danger of allowing conflicts that divide communities into "us and them".

> "National-identity also involves political and economic issues such as the legitimacy of public policies, matters of social inclusion and exclusion, prejudice and discrimination, whether we judge the actions of organisations to be in the 'national' interest, that is, the interest of the collective 'we', and whether we are willing or not to move away from 'us' and live among 'them'. In other words, we see identity as helping to organise social action in different ways" (p.15).

As with all pre-colonial African ethnic communities, the traditional rulers, in matters of community administration, considered themselves sovereign and legitimate rulers over their ethno-lingua communities. They were nevertheless being discriminated against by a colonial government that they considered had no legitimacy over them. The residents of the Protectorate lived under the indigenous chiefdoms and used indigenous identity management systems that were not responsible for the imposition

of this inequitable tax. The effects of the 'Hut Tax' consolidated the indigenous against the Krio and white colonist both of whom they regarded as invaders of their land. The imposition therefore of the Hut Tax on 'their clan members in a Protectorate' that they neither understood nor could challenge, aggravated an already precarious co-habitation of separate nation communities of 'colony' and 'protectorate' within the territory.

Although widely used, the legal definition of Subject, Protected Person or Protectorate has been shrouded in misinterpretations, deliberate confusion and convenient cut-off dates of colonial administration of territory from one status to the other (Hargreaves, 1956). Status, privilege, and the very essence of belonging were tied into this colonial identity-management classification. Whereas the descendants of the victims of the Atlantic slave trade were 'British subjects' by virtue of their origins from Britain, they became 'Krios' after they docked on African soil, 'Liberated Africans' and eventually relegated to British overseas citizen in an attempt to distinguish them from the superior 'white colonists' who remained British subjects throughout their sojourn on African soil. The Yale Law Report (1939) in an attempt to define these multiple national-identity management classifications when there was an explosion of national-identity privileges accruing to different communities in North America, neighbouring Liberia and emancipated slaves with American Freedom papers explained; "British subject' is an inclusive term, denoting all subjects of His Britannic Majesty, to whatever part of the Commonwealth they may belong. The term 'citizen' Is applied to a person in respect of whom a particular member of the Commonwealth claims jurisdiction". *Treaty Relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations The Yale Law Journal* (384). The distinction between 'British Overseas Citizen' and 'British Overseas Territory Citizen'

is a nuance of legalistic entanglements. Amidst these unstable national-identity classifications, positions and subordinate national-identity classifications, the indigenous clan chiefs led by Bai Bureh[28], attempted to negotiate with Governor Cardew and the colonial administration in Freetown, a reduction in the 'Hut Tax' burden on the grounds of ethnic sovereignty and the responsibility of the chiefs to their subjects. The negotiations met with an obstinate Governor Cardew keen to demonstrate his colonial administration's ability to efficiently manage an identity eco-system that could successfully raise taxes from inhabitants, subjects, protected persons, liberated African, native clansmen or indeed colonial masters in a show of financial self-sufficiency. It is instructive that the although Sierra Leone colonial administration contained 6 nation-identity classifications with six levels of nation-identity entitlements, the Hut Tax was a uniform tax irrespective levied on every household irrespective of the nation-identity entitlement of the household.

The events surrounding the 'Hut Tax' War and their unforeseen consequences on the national-identity management for law-enforcement in Sierra Leonean should have been anticipated by Governor Cardew. Although the British colonial sanction for non-payment taxes in other colonies was a term of imprisonment or forfeiture of property in Sierra Leone, Cardew could neither imprison the non-payers as there were no prisons, nor could he confiscate their property for resale. The Krios who initially supported the protests had long disappeared from public gatherings against the tax. As 'Liberated Africans', they had been cajoled into accepting the colonial imposition. The Cardew's frustration was his inability to quell the growing demonstrations of the

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[28] Bai Burei was a clan chief of Mandingo (Loko) origin who had unique leadership qualities and although of maternal Temne descent had forged sufficient influence as an Islamic Marabout with the competing ethnic communities to lead the joint resistance to the Hut Tax.

indigenous people. The punishment for non-payment had escalated to public hangings, simultaneously imposed on indigenous protestors who the British accused of guerrilla warfare. By refusing to find a negotiated solution to the communal obligation of taxation, and the particular handling of the 'Hut Tax' War, the colonial government had exposed the inadequacy of the colonial identity management system.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the components of any effective national identity-management eco-system involve both cultural and residential elements. A compound of huts was headed by a patriarch but individual huts were owned by several matriarchs in a traditional polygamous arrangement. Such fundamental aspects of indigenous cultural identity were misunderstood and sharply disparaged in the pursuit of hut-tax payers. Lord Hailey in 1951 confirmed that his periodic reports were vital for colonial administration in Sierra Leone since "It gives detailed information, regarding the procedure for the administration of justice through the native tribunals, and examines the evidence available for changes in African law and custom which regulates the system of landholding" (p.i). Lord Hailey in one phrase exposed the administrative dichotomy of identity management of British justice and communal obligations through indigenous courts, an impossibility as the tenets of fairness were routed in different often opposing cultures. Eventually, after ninety-eight (98) activists had been executed by Cardew, Bai Bureh along with Kpana, Sherbro clan head, and Nyagua a Mende clan head, accepted the responsibility of leadership of their ethnic nations and surrendered willingly to Governor Cardew. All three were sentenced to exile in the Gold Coast. Only Bureh survived the period of exile and was returned in 1908 after consolidation of power by the British in Sierra Leone (Jenkins Jnr., 1998).

The prosecution of the 'Hut Tax' war, the defeat of Bai Bureh and the ethnic communities that resisted the tax was significant to the formation of strong clans of fraternal, ideological association and political resistance against the governing establishment. Crucially, the failure by the British colonialist to manage the different communities of Sierra Leone, with varying identities sensitively, particularly demonstrated by the problematic introduction of taxes in exchange for privileges of identification led to a disjointed nation and a breakdown in the identification management of the nation-community. It must be noted inter-alia, that within this brewing cauldron of nationalism, the imposition of the 'Hut Tax' encouraged the neighbouring French imperial march from their colonial bases in Guinea and Ivory Coast to leverage the colonial disaffection of the British to encourage indigenous cross-border communities to depart the British orbit of control into the French sphere of influence, which further distorted allegiance to alternate colonial systems of colonial assimilation practiced by the French or the British segregated development.

4.9. Discriminatory National-Identity management and Cosmopolitan Migration

The Sierra Leone nation formation and its identity management structures was further interposed with other migrant communities also with strong cultures and traditions – The Syrians and Lebanese. As noted earlier in this chapter, the migration of the Syrians and Lebanese into Sierra Leone followed the events after the WW1, the collapse of The Ottoman Empire, and the migration of oppressed Lebanese communities. Sillah (2016) recounts how "The first immigrants who arrived in the various seaports of Sierra Leone identified their nationality as Syrians because they came from the Province of Syria [formerly] of the Ottoman Empire" (p.9). For the

purpose of this research, and academic narration only, I shall use their nationality designation interchangeably as it mattered little to the Sierra Leonean indigenous people what their actual nationality designation was, it was obvious that they were a different people. They are still colloquially referred to in modern Sierra Leone interchangeably as Syrian or Lebanese to mean the same designation. Ostensibly, the Syrian / Lebanese immigrants came as economic refugees fleeing a declining Ottoman Empire, the effects of WW1, and the 'Great Famine of Mount Lebanon[29]. Their arrival created another pivot in the Sierra Leone nation-formation process of the 1920s and provided another angle to the disjointed Sierra Leone nation-identity. The Syrian / Lebanese community negotiated for recognition in the nation-formation process by actively participating in the local economy. They began by hawking coral jewellery and trinkets but within two decades they had built substantial business enterprises that operated within all the quartered communities of Freetown and its surroundings. The Syrian / Lebanese business model was to offer credit to the indigenous people of the Protectorate. In contrast, the Krio traders would neither visit the hinterlands of the Protectorate nor offer credit to the indigenous communities. This demonstrable Lebanese solidarity with the indigenous communities displaced the Krio traders whose customers remained in the quartered Colony communities of Freetown (Wyse, 1991).

In demonstrating their integration in the indigenous communities, the Syrian /Lebanese married into the indigenous communities. The Krios, the Liberated

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[29] Over two-hundred thousand people died as a result of food shortages, the immediate causes being a blockade of Beirut and its surroundings. In addition, a cessation of exports from Mount Lebanon caused a lot of local hardship. The Lebanese dispersed to several parts of the world including West Africa.

Africans, the traders and occupants of the civil service, implementing colonial administration, saw the influx of Syrian Lebanese traders as threatening to their middle-class status in the nation-community. Notwithstanding their limited numbers, the history of the Lebanese/Syrian arrival in Sierra Leone, successful trading activities and non-threatening integration with the indigenous communities gave them a disproportionally distinct affection amongst the indigenous communities and conflicting position to the Krios (Fyfe, 1993). Sections of the Krio community disparagingly remind the Lebanese of their humble arrival in the territory as coral and trinket hawkers (Alldridge, 1910). Conversely, the early heroic nation-building exploits and sacrifices of the Krio are publicised as determinants of modern Sierra Leone national-identity (Wyse, 1991). This research argues that a negotiated national-identity of Sierra Leone made up of very different but culturally strong communities vying for fraternal relationship with or colonial authority over the indigenous people was a picture-perfect recipe for national-identity breakdown.

The cosmopolitan appeal of a negotiated Sierra Leonean national-identity was threatened by not only the misdirected blame of the Lebanese for the outbreak of the Spanish Flu in Freetown between 1918 – 1919, but also the influx of large communities of Indians, Greeks and Cypriots immigrants. The apprehension of the Krios at the presence of the immigrants, particularly arising from the status proffered on them by British geopolitical position forced the local colonial administration to introduce the 'Immigration Restriction Ordinance' of 1 July 1947. The purpose was to prevent 'non-Africa ethnic communities from increasing their numbers in the colony-protectorate by giving their family members automatic right of abode in the territory. The sensationalist anecdote that the Immigration Ordinance would prevent carriers of the Spanish flu

from entering Sierra Leone, averted sufficient scrutiny. The logic of the Ordinance was debatable but crucially procedures for its enforceability was reckless and vindictive. It was considered as a political appeasement to the Krio community. In an attempt to target only the Syrian / Lebanese immigrants, Section 2 of the 1947 Ordinance states "person shall be deemed to be a native of Sierra Leone if he is a British subject or a British protected person" This did not require any documentary proof, but was determined by the sole discretion of the Immigration Officer. Over eighty percent (80%) of the Sierra Leone population, particularly those of the indigenous Protectorate lived under indigenous ethnic administrations that spanned the colonial frontiers. The members of the indigenous communities were neither literate nor had need to carry around identification papers. Had the Ordinance needed an actual identity management paper for the migration of indigenous communities across their ancestral territory, it would have turned the whole Colony-Protectorate into an atrocity of monumental proportions. The so-called international colonial borders and frontiers were vague and unpoliced. Sections of the Ordinance further read; "classes of prohibited immigrants [into Sierra Leone] shall be, any idiot or insane person, any prostitute", and finally, "in his absolute discretion prohibit the entry into Sierra Leone of any person not being a native of Sierra Leone." This attempt at excluding legitimate Sierra Leoneans disregarded the fact that the Colony-Protectorate shared indigenous ethnic groups such as the Koranko, Kono, Kissi, Vai, and Gola with neighbouring Liberia. Indeed, the Krios themselves were spread from The Gambia through Gold Coast and Liberia. There were other indigenous communities such as the Mandinga spread across West Africa including Guinea that shared a frontier with Sierra Leone. The colonial identity management of structures of the Sierra Leone communities was

capricious and potentially vindictive, it relied on the mood of the immigration officer and his or perception of the person he is interacting with.

The Ordinance further aimed to distinguish the indigenous ethnic communities of Sierra Leone from those of the neighbouring colonies and territories. Regardless of the connotations of the description "native foreigner", the Ordinance defined this to mean

> "any person, other than a native of Sierra Leone, whose parents were members of a tribe or tribes indigenous to British West Africa, French West Africa, the Republic of Guinea, Spanish West Africa, Portuguese West Africa, the Belgian Congo, the mandated territories in West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Portuguese Guinea, Principe, Spanish Guinea, Annobon, Liberia, Fernando Po or San Thome, and the descendants of such persons, and shall include any person one of whose parents was a member of such tribe" (p.979).

The absurdity of this definition within the Ordinance demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the identity management of the indigenous ethnic communities or deliberate malicious intent to segregate ancestral families and communities along bizarre identity management principles unknown to over ninety-five percent (95%) of Sierra Leoneans. The obvious exclusion of nomadic Mandinkas, Fulani and Hausas of Sierra Leone from Sierra Leonean identity did not dawn on the framers of the Ordinance. Secondly, there were "natives" of other parts of the British Empire such as the Indians, Pakistanis, Burmese and indeed Lebanese as The League of Nations mandate given to Britain to administer Syria and Lebanon, their exclusion from the

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definition was ambiguous. The entire Ordinance of exclusions and inclusions was farcical as an identity management mechanism.

Even for the purpose of appeasing the Krio community that lobbied for a restraint on the migration of non-black British subjects into the territory, the Ordinance had anomalies. Whereas the Krio community were prepared to accept further immigrants and distant relatives from Nova Scotia in Canada to migrate and evolve to British Subjects, they did not want immigration from the other reaches of the British Empire. They sought to exclude other non-white non-Sierra Leone immigrants from entering Sierra Leone. The Ordinance attempted to rationalise unsuccessfully a classification of either being a British Subject of British Protected Person to the extent that the Sierra Leone territory had both Subjects and Protected Persons as national-identities, and no physical border. The difference was obtained from a subjective discriminatory judgement of the colonial authority. Ferme (2004) in her research '*Deterritorialized Citizenship'* on Sierra Leonean Statutes and laws remarked "the [Sierra Leonean] state can arbitrate, decide, or create situations in which competing interests or interpretations of common good obscure the threshold between legality and illegality." (p.83). Thus, the Ordinance obscured the threshold once more;

> "For the purposes of this Ordinance a person shall be deemed to be a native
>
> of Sierra Leone if he is a British subject or a British protected person and-
>
> (a)　　was born in or out of Sierra Leone of parents at least one of whom
>
> at the time of his birth was domiciled or ordinarily resident in Sierra Leone"

As earlier noted, over eighty percent (80%) of Sierra Leone residents particularly living in the hinterland under the Chiefdoms had no birth certificates. Therefore, the documentary proof of Sierra Leonean precision was impossible. National-identity

documents for rural folk living in the protectorate was thus considered as by the British colonist as unimportant for the identity management of Sierra Leone nation formation.

According to Hastings' (1999), a shared ethnicity means a shared culture and traditions for "a group of people that share the basics of life – their cloth and clothes, the style of houses, the way they work which shapes the functioning of a society" (p.167). Dieckhoff's (2001) view resonates with Hastings in the observation that culture and traditions "constitute organic totalities with impermeable frontiers but are constantly wrought, shaped, and recomposed by a constant process of borrowing and exchange." (p.279). In the context of Sierra Leone, that the Lebanese borrowed exchanged and adopted closer social bonds with the indigenous ethnic communities to affirm their willingness to assimilate with the ethnic communities. When the Lebanese migrated to Sierra Leone they lived in the protectorate rather than the colony, in those conditions, they courted the patronage of the indigenous communities and extended credit to them. Some even took indigenous tribal wives with resultant '*mixed-race*' children, a famous one being the fifth Sierra Leone Ambassador to the US John Joseph Akar. John Akar composed the Sierra Leone national anthem at independence but ended up taking the new government to court over citizenship and winning (Tucker, 2015). The Indians, Cypriots and non- European British subjects had less interaction with the indigenous Africans. Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961 with the standard ex-colony citizen clause in the first constitution by which all ex-British colonies got on the granting of independence. Unavoidably, Britain bequeathed a constitution that reflected the cultural heritage of what the British regarded as fair, and equitable and would usher a newly independent Sierra Leone into the world community of nations. The evolution of international law, the nationality status of

individuals and inter nation-state interactions was an understanding that dual or multiple nationality was undesirable and problematic (Pilgram, 2011). The ultimate utopian arrangement would be a single nationality and citizenship for every individual, however, African continental history, slave trade and its abolition, the return to Africa of a reshaped clan, colonisation and abrupt independence had eroded any possibility of Utopia.

That the 'Immigration Ordinance of 1947' introduced by the Colonialist entangled empire building, colonial administration, and the challenges of internal ethnic diversities with international economic migration meant that each of these issues would erupt after independence. All people born within the geographical confines of the territory who may have been British subjects, citizens or with a parent born in the territory, belonging to a particular tribe were automatically Sierra Leonean. The nationality rights and the privileges of citizenship were anchored on the colour of the skin or the race of the individual. The descendants of Syrian, Lebanese, Burmese and Indian migrants were all in a similar situation. The insufficient contemplation and the repercussions of Krio colonists transitioning into Sierra Leone citizens overnight unlike white-skinned colonists who remained British would be a jolt to the national-identity administration of Sierra Leone. The nation formation process of Sierra Leone never recovered from this jolt. Questions of national-identity, citizenship of the descendants of the Nova Scotia arrivals, the Maroons from the West Indies or the Syrians and Lebanese were circumvented.

As discussed earlier, John Joseph Akar commenced a civil action in Freetown essentially to challenge the entire constitution of Sierra Leone based on the Milton

Margai[30] government amendment demoting his citizenship rights retrospectively. The amendment meant that the national-identity and Sierra Leonean citizenship of Akar obtained at independence had been rescinded. Miller D. (2005), in 'Citizenship and Nation-identity' contends that in addition to geographical borders, the formation of a nation community with a national-identity within a viable nation-state requires the erection of three pillars:

- Firstly, that the 'Nation' can be properly claimed as part of one's personal identity.

- Secondly, that an ethical pillar of responsibility towards one another exists between claimants of the same nationality.

- Thirdly, that people who form part of that nationality have the right and possibility of political self-determination.

Had these issues been considered and reflected in the Independence constitution, John Joseph Akar v. Attorney-General would have never reached the Court of Appeal in London 1967 (Thompson, 1997). This research argues that national-identity management is reciprocal towards all members of the nation-community. Whereas Akar could have exercised his obvious right to nationality self-determination, the removal of his citizenship rights for him to pursue the case in court meant that other Sierra Leoneans no longer owed him any obligations as a member of the nation-community of Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the discretionary power to refuse citizenship by the Minister without the need to give reason (The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 2008) is still preserved in today's Constitution in other guises.

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[30] Sir Milton Augustus Strieby Margai was the first Prime Minister of an independent Sierra Leone.

4.10. Conflicting Constitutional Challenges and Discriminatory Laws

The Krios that became Sierra Leoneans overnight at independence, were arguably the most penalized. The white colonist forced them to forfeit their privileged position in society as civil, public servants and administrators of colonial power and they became a vulnerable minority community in Sierra Leone. Since their ancestors were British subjects descended from *'The Book of Negroes'*, they were not given the choice of a return to Britain as British citizens but instead were abandoned to a nation community and constitution that placed the people of the Protectorate as their superiors. The British Government bequeathed an 'Independence Constitution' that gave considerable executive powers to the paramount chiefdoms in the colony. The Mende and the Temne people jointly made up about sixty percent (60%), of the newly independent country. British supervised elections in preparation of independence delivered two successive Mende Prime Ministers Milton Margai and his brother Albert. The status-quo of identity management and social structure was overturned overnight. Reprisals by the indigenous community on the Krios who no longer had real power bubbled in community interactions.

Milton Margai acknowledged the executive powers within the constitution given to the traditional rulers and skilfully built a national-identity coalition with the traditional rulers and the abandoned Krios. According to Sillinger (2003), when on becoming Prime Minister, the younger Albert Margai re-balanced the privileges of national-identity recognition, he immediately clashed with indigenous traditional rulers in and that way set up a context that reversed the entrenched constitutional definition of Sierra Leonean nation-identity. In practice he simultaneously and autocratically victimized

the Krio community, most of whom had been removed from senior civil service positions, replacing them with his Mende clansmen.

The modern national-identity management of Sierra Leone irrespective of the 'fair' constitution had prejudiced customs and traditions against the indigenous communities. Now in control of the reins of power, the indigenous community using national-identity laws, customs and traditions revisited old prejudices against the Krio community. The canons and legal provisions of the constitution of Sierra Leone were challenged by the tyranny of a modern national-identity administration under Albert Margai. Albert Margai's government "strongly favoured the Mende at the expense of other groups. Ethnic and regional tensions seethed beneath the calm exterior." (Woods and Colonel Resse, 2002, p. 12). The Sierra Leonean nation-community, the national-identity consensus of vociferous Krios, indigenous populous tribal folk and prominent Lebanese economic community, "united on the question of independence, began to fragment as competition for the political spoils intensified after sovereignty was attained." (CIA - Sierra Leone Handbook - April 1972, 2001, p.1).

The rights and privileges of Sierra Leonean nation-identity were now defined by the constitution of Sierra Leone replacing the un-written British Constitution with its fluid interpretation of British citizen, subject, and protected person. Given the euphoria of self-governance, the government of Milton Margai, known for moderation and inclusiveness, appeared out of character by introducing a retrospective amendment to the constitution on national-identity and citizenship. The amendment would force all Sierra Leoneans not born to an African negro father but wishing to maintain their Sierra Leonean citizenship to apply for citizenship by registration. The case of the Lebanese

and other post World War 1 immigrants is worth noting because most non-black immigrant communities that arrived from outside the African continent to make a better life for themselves and their descendants, they were indeed economic migrants. To Beydoun (2013), the British colonialists had been influenced to retrospectively penalise the Lebanese immigrant community over the Nova Scotia immigrants

> "British favoritism contributed to the denial of full citizenship to non-Blacks during the construction of a postcolonial state. Non-Blacks who were citizens of the British Empire became defined as "noncitizens" under a 1962 (amended) Sierra Leonean constitution, which excluded persons of "non-Negro African descent" from their right to citizenship by birth."

Indeed, Beydon (2013) further argues that the only distinction between the economic migrant communities is the colour of their skin. Nevertheless, in demonstrating White British prejudice against the Syrian /Lebanese community, Beydon fails to apply his findings to the effect that this prejudice had on future national-identity management. Hence, this research contends that the bias that favoured the 'Liberated Africans' over other economic migrants and the lopsided sudden inheritance of executive and legislative power of the chiefs from the protectorate to the colony would eventually destabilize the national-identity management of Sierra Leone. The already unsatisfactory identity management eco-system was bequeathed to the indigenous community who exploited the acquisition of power to breaking point – the identity management eco-system of Sierra Leone under such strains was bound to fail.

4.11. The Military Era and the Effect on National-Identity Management

The Constitution of Sierra Leone and its political institutions, as with all legitimate nations, exist to govern the interaction between its citizens, residents and interface with international institutions and countries (Patty and Penn, 2014). Siaka Stevens an opportunist politician, benefited from the "growing popular resentment against the Mende-dominated SLPP, an ethnic Temne, was thus scheduled to become the new Prime Minister of Sierra Leone." (Woods and Colonel Resse, 2002, p.11). Amidst the competing ethnic interests in the formation of a negotiated nation-identity, the constitutional spotlight thrown on an ethnic group as unqualified to participate in the political self-determination of the nation's affairs de-legitimises the governance process and ferments conditions for civil war. Since the attainment of independence, the multidimensional rancour of Sierra Leonean national-identity has been battered by the instability of multiple clan-based coup d'états and counter *coup d'états*. Some of the military governments lasting days. Other than the two Presidents, Andrew Juxon-Smith and Valentine Strasser, there has not been a Krio as head of government other than by military putsch. Since independence, the two largest ethnic groups Mende and Temne have retained alternate control of political power of modern Sierra Leone (Fyle, 2006).

The Temne, Siaka Stevens from Port Loko as President, dominated the political landscape for the best part of 18 years beginning in 1967 when his party narrowly won the general elections. A sequence of 3 coups d'états kept him from consummating the electoral victory. One of the military coups led by Sargent Bangura, also a Temne, early in 1968 is rumoured to have been orchestrated by Stevens himself from his political exile in neighbouring Guinea (Roessler, 2016). The interim Bangura military

government negotiated a return of Stevens to power six weeks after the overthrow of Juxon-Smith's military government. Although Siaka Stevens was in power the Cold-war geopolitics meant that his "constant battle to retain control and enhance his powers has left little time to build a durable national political system or an ideology to unite the country." (CIA - Sierra Leone Handbook - April 1972, 2001, p.4). The USA and Great Britain ignored the continued decline of the quartered Sierra Leone in favour of a divisive African Leader they could control (Roessler, 2016). By 1970, Bangura and Stevens had fallen out. Stevens accused Bangura of another *coup d'état*, after the trial that found Bangura guilty he was hanged. Within months of his ignominious death, other soldiers purported to be supporters of Bangura were accused, convicted, and incarcerated for mutiny. Three (3) years later in 1974, a further fifteen (15) senior army and government officials were subjected to a firing squad after another conviction for mutiny (Forna, 2002). Stevens's Government cascaded from crisis to crisis, attacking all sides, maintaining power through corrupt nepotism, demonstrable of a weak government unable to develop statecraft and an inclusive national-identity (Taras and Ganguly, 2010).

Siaka Stevens had hand-picked Joseph Saidu Momoh his successor in a one-party discredited election in 1985. The Temne dominated government of President Saidu Momoh showed all the apt urgency of an unconcerned Commander-in-Chief that had lost the Mende dominated provinces of his country to a band of raiding marauders. Saidu Momoh's government officials were suspected of smuggling the country's diamonds out of the country for their personal benefit (Woods and Colonel Reese, 2002). Meanwhile, Charles Taylor's rebel militia NPFL, supported by Libya's pariah government and Muammar Gaddafi required financing by any means to continue his

putsch for Liberian power. The abundance of diamonds from Sierra Leone was a temptation too close to ignore. Taylor was only too pleased to encourage Foday Sankoh, both *protégées* of Gaddafi to annex the diamond mining districts neighbouring Liberia to finance them both. The riches of Sierra Leone diamonds and the prospects of endless proceeds from unaccountable diamond pits laundered through the Libya's banking system, rearranged any national or ethnic allegiance these war lords and their bands of cohorts owed to their nations.

Valentine Strasser, a young and charismatic Krio in the army captain was disillusioned with the lack of equipment and support from the oblivious Saidu Momoh government. Strasser, with the support of some front-line soldiers staged a successful *coup détat* in 1992. The Sierra Leone army, evidenced by the success of Strasser's coup, was riddled with ethnic factionalism and the selfish interest of some officials benefiting from the smuggling of diamonds. Despite the ethnic factionalism, the initial euphoria of Strasser's *coup d'état* by front-line soldiers galvanised the repelling of the RUF back into Liberia. The memory of Bangura's hanging nevertheless and the execution of fifteen (15), soldiers by Siaka Stevens, Momoh's benefactor, was close to the minds of some soldiers. Sierra Leonean soldiers began defecting from the front-line to join the marauding RUF, tempted away by the ease of certain wealth through 'blood diamonds'[31] (Campbell, 2012). Indigenous youth from the mining areas preferred

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[31] Blood diamonds is a euphemism for mined diamonds and other precious minerals in conflict and war zones used by the combatants to finance the conflict. The term gained popularity to describe the murky sources of finance of the numerous sub-Sahara civil wars, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Republic, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau.

instant riches offered by the rebels than the utopian promise riches from the education offered by the Krio Strasser.

Faced with the contaminant of ethnic division in the army, a reflection of the ethnically quartered Sierra Leone, Strasser abandoned any possibility of the national army fighting to preserve the integrity of Sierra Leone. The legitimate government of Sierra Leone admitted defeat and employed the mercenaries Executive Outcomes to fight the RUF on its behalf (Woods and Colonel Reese, 2002). Whereas the stated objective of the RUF was to overthrow the Sierra Leone government in Freetown, their entry from Liberia got anchored into the diamond rich Kalahum, Kono and Kenama of the Eastern and Sothern provinces (Gberie, 2015).

The 1792 quartered foundations of dissimilar communities that established the Port of Freedom which became modern Sierra Leone, has persisted throughout its colonial period through to independence. The communities of Sierra Leone never had a singular national-identity but rather an intricate accommodation of diverse peoples, it was a fertile and combustive environment for the destructive spark of Charles Taylor's civil war from neighbouring Liberia in 1991. While Le Billion (2008), estimates the cost of the Sierra Leone civil war that lasted nine (9), years till 2000 in excess of USD 460m and The United Nations estimates over seventy thousand (70,000), combatants and civilians to have lost their lives, this study proposes that the real cost to the nation-state of Sierra Leone was the complete loss of a national-identity. The nation-state of Sierra Leone was incapable of identifying, recognising and protecting the national-identities of Sierra Leone; the people themselves. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission states that a band of disaffected guerrilla rebels, the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with a desire to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone and redistribute wealth, allotted to themselves 'the governing of communities and villages the country' (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilation Commission, 2004). The seemingly generous source of US dollars organised by Charles Taylor from Liberia, himself fighting in a civil war, and the control of the diamonds in the provincial eastern and southern parts of Sierra Leone was far more rewarding for the RUF than beating a guerrilla path to Freetown and taking over the administration of the country, if genuinely the RUF wanted to preserve the nation-state and its national-identity. Charles Taylor, had the convenience of the American Dollar banking industry in Liberia[32], unlike that of Sierra Leone. Converting and the smuggled laundered proceeds of the illicit diamonds into the 'street cash' of Liberia was easy. The fiendish alliance of 'blood diamonds' from the Mende of Sierra Leone in return for 'greenbacks' from the Loma and Vai of Liberia, transcended all minor generational differences that colonisation had imposed on this ethno-lingua community, they did not have to learn each other's language nor use a translator to interpret their reciprocal benefit to each other (Campbell, 2012). This was a regressive ethnic-nation and alliance of economic survival, unhindered by national-identities, colonisation, nor national borders created by a 120-year-old Berlin Conference.

4.12. Conclusion - Chapter 4

The British settlers that arrived from 1787 onwards to form Granville Town, and other subsequent quartered settlements carried out a multi-layered identity management project, conscious not to mix the North Americans with either the Maroons, Lebanese,

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[32] The legal tender in Liberia is the freely covetable and exchange American Dollar.

Liberated Africans or indeed the indigenous communities. The colonial British administration had separate legislative, executive and judicial systems without any logic to the governed communities. The overriding consideration for the inhabitants of the nation community as they developed and expanded only seeking belonging within the narrow confines of the cultural community they were born into or knew. The complete collapse of Sierra Leone nation-identity can be observed through the combined grievance-based motivation for all emigration to the territory. The only communities that demonstrated patriotism were the indigenous communities exhibiting ethnic rather than national *patria potestas*. Primarily each community arrived and lived in the territory as an insular community, the British colonial administration exasperated the conditions by dividing the already detached communities into two unidentifiable but interlinked territories of Colony and Protectorate. The inequalities and discrimination of the inherited colonial administration was continued by a post-colonial government ill-equipped to appreciate the nature of the pitfalls that the departing colonial administration had bequeathed them.

This study proposes that neither the 'primordial nationalist' view nor the modernist interpretation of 'imagined communities' can effortlessly knit and rationalise the history and evolution of modern Sierra Leonean and the various communities into a negotiated nation-state with a cohesive national-identity. Hence either of the extreme national-identity management structures is incapable of supporting the development of the modern nation-state of Sierra Leone, hence its nation-identity collapse.

5. Zambia National-Identity

5.1. Introduction

Modern Zambia is a land-locked country bordered by eight countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Angola. Although modern cadastral Africa illustrates the Democratic of Republic Congo as the most central country on the African continent, Zambian territory uniquely occupies the central point of pre-colonial sub-Saharan migration of the Bantu people[33] as they criss-crossed and competed with each other for territorial domination. Similar to Sierra Leone and Liberia, modern Zambian national-identity is formed from a myriad of ethnic nations and communities that have competed amongst themselves. The nomadic hunter gatherers of the Kalahari, the Khoisan and the Sans from the south-western tip of Africa are known to be the first inhabitants of the territory. Nevertheless, pre-colonial migration and settlement of the Bantu across that region of Africa has meant that Zambia today has seventy-three, distinct lingua-ethnic communities. In addition, there are Indo-Asian ethnic groups from across the Indian ocean, proxies from early British colonisation of the Indian continent. The establishment of the Zambian nation after European settlements in Africa and like other colonial endeavours is derived from the evolution of the institutions of the nation-state that created rivalries between the colonial identities that competed with the ethnic identity structures on the late 19th century. Notable in the discussion of Zambia is the use and interchange of the names 'Zambia' and 'Northern Rhodesia'. The choice and usage of

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[33] The Bantu people who are not classified as an ethic community but rather as an ethnic gene-pool today amount to over 90 million people spread over 225 ethnic groups in Sub-Sahara Africa, from the West Coast of Africa covering Central African and the Great Lakes Region of Southern Africa (Lockard, 2011).

either does not signify any discriminatory intent or preference, but the use of either name during in the discussion is dependent on the specific historic context.

Admittedly the choice, and interchangeable usage of either Northern Rhodesia or Zambia in this study is specific and only to the historical context, nevertheless it is significant that this is the only occasion when the name of a living man has been acceded to as the official name of an African country. The influence of Cecil Rhodes was so dominant amongst the European settlers that 'The Rhodesia Herald' a newspaper operating from Harare, then Salisbury, began in 1892 to denote the region 'Rhodesia', contrary to the name '*Zambesia'* as it was then known by the British and European explorers of Africa. The tradition amongst European settlers was to use renamed geographical features, to refer to territories; "*Zambesia* includes the vast region, within the British sphere of influence extending from Bechuanaland to Lake Tanganyika, and divided by the Zambesi into two great sections, Southern Zambesia and Northern Zambesia (Hughes and Williams, 1892 p.490). As Tägil (1995), explains; 'the fundamental principle underlying naming of territories, is that conceptual structures exist that link and influence the spatial-social identity of individuals of the region, consequently understood by the contemporary world, that focuses and binds a view of the formation the nation-state'. The attempt then to identify the African people of the territory as mere chattels of Cecil Rhodes was an attempt to super-impose the large image of Rhodes over the African ethnic identities that the settlers met but considered irrelevant to the formation of any recognisable community.

To understand Zambian national-identity, its evolution and administration requires an analysis of historical events relating to its colonisation, the providence of indigenous inter-ethnic relationships and the detached interactions afforded to the settlers. In the broader view of African history, the experience of varying European interactions with the indigenous communities of countries like Zambia, like the Arabs, was human-trade, commercial goods, resource exploitation and in addition for the Europeans, imperialistic objectives. Similar to the identity anchors of indigenous people, for instance, communal interactions, greetings and gestures, made redundant through military conquest and domination by Europeans in North America, colonisation of indigenous communities in Zambia, was a revaluation of their identity anchors brought about as a natural consequence of their defeat. British pre-occupation with early twentieth century geopolitics, territorial imperialism, World War I and the industrial revolution shaped its disinterest of indigenous Zambian identities at the expense of the mineral wealth available from the territories that would strengthen its geopolitical position. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it was the recognition of ex-combatants and the resettlement of American soldiers liberated from slavery between 1780 – 1800 that led to the colonisation of Sierra Leone and Liberia, unlike the 1890s discovery of the mineral wealth which was the motivation that provoked Zambian colonisation. The expansion of the Empire in Africa would provide the raw materials and precious minerals for British Imperial aggrandisement and the industrial revolution. These two distinct motives, identity management and imperial wealth creation, would have different effects on the indigenous communities, inter-community conflicts and settler identities.

The British South African Company (BSAC) a British Chartered company head by Cecil Rhodes who was originally from England but settled in the Cape Colony, a mining magnate and politician. BSAC had obtained a charter in 1889 from the British government to prospect for minerals north of the Cape Colony, in what is today Zimbabwe and Zambia and beyond. As a politician from Cape Colony, Rhodes was involved in the multiple wars between the Boers, indigenous people and the British. His personal mining activities, interventions and dominance of politics of the region led to him lending his name to the colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, later to achieve independence as Zambia and Zimbabwe. The prime interest of the BSAC was in the mineral wealth that could be mined. The exclusion of the indigenous people of Zambia in the immediate equity of the mined mineral wealth would define the type of colonial interactions that would shape Zambian national-identity (Ilife, 2007). According to Frederiksen (2010), "the BSAC were unwilling to invest in the people of the territory". Nevertheless, it went to great lengths to "develop the extractive industry", he continues, "rather than civilian police, the BSAC established military to control [and] provide security for investments" and protect their commercial ventures from the perceived indigenous and foreign threats (p.102). In this context, the ancestral and ethnic identities of the communities of Zambia were irrelevant to the BSAC.

The socio-cultural patterns and ethnic identification of Zambian national-identity was shaped principally through organic Bantu nomadic migration patterns and the occasional intra-Bantu conflict over resources and clan superiority (Roberts, 1976). Whereas anthropologically, today's Bantu of Zambia are descended from the Niger-Kordofanian of the Congo Basin, most of the Niger-Kordofanian branch migrated westwards from the Congo Basin into modern Cameroon, Nigeria and modern

Senegal. The root Bantu migrated southwards into the modern nations of Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique Zambia and Zimbabwe (Fourshey, et al., 2018). For whatever evolutionary experiences that the migration southwards occasioned, the Bantu root brought with them distinctive languages that developed into distinctive tribal kingdoms and ethnic nations (Ilife, 2007). With a rich tradition of ethno-lingua communities, and the extensive geographical dimensions of Zambian territory, very few people in modern Zambia are fluent in more than two indigenous Zambian languages. A sizable number of Zambians descended from Tanzanian or Kenyan parentage confirms the ancestral migratory customs of the peoples of the region. Nonetheless, apart from colonisation, the evolution of indigenous ethnic identities and nations of the peoples of Zambia was spared from external European slave culture that plagued both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The Arab slave trade from the Maghreb did however descend south, Arab Muslims from North and East Africa had settled in Zanzibar as a base to hold and transport captured Africans from the Congo Basin into slavery. Indeed, the Bemba of Zambia who migrated from the Congo Basin and the Lozi further south all kept slaves obtained from neighbouring ethnic nations they had captured in earlier battles. All indigenous African nations were sporadically involved in the slave trade. The Arab settlement and dominance in the slave trade in the Great Lakes region of Africa saw the development of the Swahili language in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and parts of Uganda. Unlike the Great Lakes region, where the Arabic effect is dominant, their contact with the indigenous peoples Zambia was sporadic and non-influential, hence Kiswahili and its ethnic influence in the identities of Zambians is rare. (Torrend, 2008). In this context,

while Kiswahili is the modern-day language of the Bantus north of Zambia, Pokomo[34], one of the Bantu source languages from which Kiswahili is derived, is not spoken in Zambia (Nurse and Philippson, 2013). Therefore, the Arabic influence on the indigenous people, unlike the white European settlers, during colonisation and post-independence, did not have the same impact on the indigenous culture and the evolution of identity as much as they did in the nation-formation process of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In investigating the conflicted inter-ethnic relationships between the ethnic nations and the colonial government, the research will reveal how the experience of colonial mining concessions extracted by a divisive and exploitative chartered company, The British South Africa Chartered Company (BSAC), rather propagated a post-colonial unification of the ethnic communities into a viable nation-identity. Instead of creating tensions of inter-ethnic rivalry, the various Zambian ethnic nations that became involved in the mining industry produced multiple hierarchies of intertwined cultural communities able to find accommodation amongst each other. The managed coalitions of political identities created new Zambian philosophies that would contest and wrestle the nation formation process from the invading colonialist community bent on forming a colonial federation of nations and territories solely for the unmitigated commercial profit from mining activities. The chapter investigates how the philosophy of Zambian Humanism and its verbalized doctrine of loyalty to African values, the

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[34] The Pokomo and Kiswahili are Bantu ethno-lingua people dominant in what is modern Kenya and Tanzania. Although Bantu migration is widespread in that region of Africa, there is no evidence that the Pokomo-Bantu branch migrated further south into Zambia.

community, and central control of the administrative levers of governance prevented damaging alternatives to a unified national-identity.

5.2.   Background to the Creation of Zambian National-Identity

Of the seventy-three (73) distinct ethnic communities[35] that make up modern day Zambia, the six main ethnic distinctions are the Lozi, the Bemba, the Ngoni, the Tonga, the Luvale, and the Kaonde. Although the Lozi are assessed as around six percent (6%), of Zambian population, their exploits and history are comparatively better recorded than the other ethnic nations.

Just as the formation of modern Zambian national-identity is as complex as the previous study-nations of Sierra Leone and Liberia, its national-identity structures are similar to the hierarchically created structures of colonisation discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. However, unlike either Liberia or Sierra Leone, under the gravitas of Kenneth Kaunda's leadership, his philosophy of Zambian Humanism, although contested as utopian, had established lasting post-colonial identity-management structures into the national-identity eco-system that even under the stress of personal attack Zambia avoided the breakdown of the nation-state. According to the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities' study of the seventy-two ethnic nations that share a single Zambian nation-identity,

> "Zambia has been considered a model of peace and stability in the East and
>
> Southern Africa region. Unlike many other countries in the region, Zambia

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[35] Africanist academics and historians such as Simpson (2008) and Gewald (2007) agree that modern Zambia has 73 ethnic nations and 72 indigenous ethnic nations. The difference is caused by the early economic / colonial migration of European settlers that originated from South Africa that consider themselves not from Europe but migrated as other Bantu communities from elsewhere on the continent.

has not been under military government despite three coup attempts and has not experienced internal strives that could destabilize the country. In fact, before 1990, a period characterized by one party rule, internal conflicts were non-existent." (2000, p. 4).

Because ethnic nations of Zambia while still observing exacting cultural practices of their ancestral roots, united under the foundation of "One Zambia, One nation" national motto. The national-identity management process developed during the nation-formation process accommodated established ancestral ethnic identities. Zambian Humanism helped to combat colonial impositions of damaging aggressive identity management structures and shaped inspirational indigenous cultural identity as a rationale for Zambian nation-identity.

Whereas some leaders of the indigenous ethnic nations, for instance, The Phiri ethnic community recognise their heads of clans as both community and religious leaders, also functioned as spiritual heads, providing the community with generational and religious identity structures, the unbounded scope of the British capitalist driven encounters aimed at mineral extraction were intensely disruptive to these identity structures and led to generational ethnic identity modifications. The ancestral ethnic nations had separately encountered different intensities of colonial experiences that included British missionary encounters endeavouring to change the religious identity of the Lozi, but which led into disputed commercial treaties with the settlers. The Bemba leaders, known as the '*Chitimukulu'*, were incited and pitched against each other by the BSAC, engaged in intra-ethnic wars that ruined pre-colonial identity-management structures and saw the decline of the Bemba ethnic nation. Unsurprisingly, similar to what ensued during the British colonial governance of Sierra

Leone, the Colonial Government in Zambia gave better recognition to chiefs and traditional leaders that least resisted British authority. While in the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, for example, Lozi ethnic nationals enjoyed better treatment by the BSAC than the Bemba communities, ironically the sense of Lozi identity within modern Zambia achieved little distinction other than its association with the British Crown who afforded the leaders a privileged status. Lancaster's study of the ethnic communities of the Zambezi Valley revealed not only these dissimilar levels of intensities of interactions between the ethnic communities and the Europeans but also stark distinctions and delineations of identities given to indigenous communities by European explorers, depending on collaborative or combative interactions with the indigenous community. He notes that:

> "what was written records a common sense of overriding ethnic identity may assume the dominant structural role in place of permanent political centrality, symbolising the people's collective world view, sense of relevant history, and relations with the world around them. As all these factors are likely to change through time, the collective identity holding sway in stateless areas is likely to be as evanescent, subject to reinterpretation" (Lancaster, 1974, p. 707).

In the context of Zambia, what was considered a stateless collection of people in some cases was an umbrella of loosely federated ethnic communities cooperating to share the natural resources of the fresh-water of Victoria Falls rather than an ethnic nation responding to a central authority of power. For instance, through oral tradition the ethnic communities of pre-colonial Zambia, groups such as the Tonga established amongst themselves a recognition of either a shared nation, or lose federated

interactions nations that collaborated with each other but they did not necessarily share the same identity as an ethnic nation.

Lancaster (1974) partially reveals the effect of long-term trading and interaction between neighbouring communities that overtime create a trading language and a cordial entente between ethnic nations such as the Tonga and Bemba. He states,

> "The changing ethnic labels they have applied to themselves and to others at varying times have been symbolic statements relating to empirically verifiable facts of history, habitat, social structure, and politics, and they have carried a broad range of additional connotations derived from an eventful past in which valley people have been influenced by the Mwene Mutapa and Changamire confederacies of Shona-speaking peoples, long distance trade in gold, ivory and slaves, Portuguese activities, Ndebele raids, and European rule (1974, p.709)".

Unlike the Arab in the development of the Swahili language further north, the commonality of language amongst neighbouring communities did not represent much more than migratory influences, rather than the cohesion of an ethnic nation as the situation was with the Bemba. The more impactful multiple causes of people-movement such as the annual flooding of the Zambezi plains, the fluidity of Bantu migratory customs and the inter-tribal wars that lead to a homogeneity of language, should not be mistaken for a homogeneous ethnic identity of the dwellers of the geographical area. Equally impactful is the preservation of ethnic identity through the

preservation of pre-colonial customs and traditions such as the *Kuomboka*[36] pilgrimage of the Lozi of people. The enactment of the *Kuomboka* by the Litunga, is seen as the unifying symbol of the Lozi ethnic nation that maintains the homogeneity of the Barotse Kingdom. The Litunga, through the precarious rotation of the royal palace from the flood plains to higher grounds to His summer palace, identifies and unites generations Barotse people either displaced temporarily by the flooding or part of the cyclical rotation of palaces. In similar contexts, ethnic communities, nations and identities such as Makololo, Silozi and Sotho-Tswana, communities of modern-day Angola, Namibia and Botswana, who consciously settled along the cyclical route of the rotating Lozi-Barotse palace all consider themselves as Lozi-Barotse people with the Litunga as their single monarch. However, because the colonial settlers' written record given to people were sometimes at odds with the actuality of indigenous oral history, the British, Portuguese, and German settlers misallocated and mal-prescribed labels and identities to suite the colonisation agenda. This damaged the possible creation of nation-states with a homogenous nation-identity.

One of the consequences of the 1894 Berlin Conference, was to bond the wider Bemba nation with the Lungu, the Mambwe and Bisa ethnic nations whose warring relationship had been exasperated by the colonial supply of ammunition by the BSAC to all fighting factions in exchange for mining territory. The BSAC's colonial commercial objective damaged ethnic identity and national solidarity by fuelling continuous intra-ethnic disagreement. While the BSAC continued the analogous extraction and

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[36] '*Kuomboka*' is a Lozi word that means get out of water. The '*Kuomboka*' ceremony refers to the temporary relocation of the Lozi palace from the flood plains to higher ground. A re-enactment of ancestral Lozi lifestyle.

exportation of precious minerals from the ancestral land, the sovereignty of the ethnic monarchs and identity structures of the indigenous nations, could not be maintained to manage the ethnic nations until the retreat of the colonial administration; albeit with markedly different territorial frontiers pre-colonisation.

5.3. Colonisation and the Development of Identity Structures in Zambia – The Lozi

The route and determinant to the colonial Empire of the 1612 era when India was colonised by Britain was an appreciation for diversity of culture and the need for international allies. The geopolitical achievements of the British Empire would be measured in the preservation of Indian rituals and honour, an appreciation of a distinct culture and identity that Britain would be partnered and allied to. Ranger (1983), in his study, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', contrasts the survival of Indian ethnic identity discernible in its traditions during colonial governance to diminished African ethnic identities and the absence of enduring African identity customs during colonial governance. While he asserts that "Africa did not offer to its conquerors the framework of an indigenous imperial state nor existing centralised rituals of honour and degree" (p.31) in managing identities and by inference non-enduring African ethnic identities. This research departs from that perspective and argues that contrary to a lack of discernible rituals and honours in African ethnic nations, it is rather in the different eras of colonisation that the rituals and honours are of influence in the identity management of the ethnic nationals. In the era of the industrial revolution, over two hundred (200), years later, the success of European colonisation of Africa, including British endeavours would be measured by the territorial control of commercial wealth, such as the ivory of Ivory Coast, the diamonds of Namibia, the gold of Gold Coast and

the extractive industries of South Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia. The 'Scramble for Africa' was not for the acquisition and appreciation of 1800 African culture, indeed it was to emphasise the cultural superiority of European traditions over African culture and extract wealth. The British colonists although aware of African rituals and traditions, were not prepared to recognise their diverse cultures and identities but encouraged Christian missionary endeavours in order to establish British administration over colonised territories, the minerals, and identity of the people. They aimed to eradicate African indigenous identity markers, 'civilise', and Christianise the pagan animist peoples while extracting their wealth.

Whereas in Southern Africa the extremely violent encounters left indelible scars of loathing on some ethnic nation identities, the ethnic nations of (Northern Rhodesia) Zambia were the exception since they escaped extreme violent conquests. It lacked the extreme violence of other African colonisation processes such as the wars that led to the colonisation of the Xhosa nation, the Zulu nation in 1879, the assassination and subjugation of King Sekhukhune I, and the Bapedi nation in 1881. Notably all the violent encounters between the British and neighbouring South /Central African ethnic nations were simultaneous and concurrent with the encounters between the ethnic nations of Zambia. The colonisation of Northern Rhodesia was motivated by European industrialisation, the global demand for cooper and the need for migrant workers from seventy-two (72), ethnic nations to converge and offer their labour in the copper mines was paramount (Gann, 1969). Between 1911 and 1923, Northern Rhodesia ruled under the Rhodes BSAC administration had a rigid system of race identification between white and black and not a rigid separation of indigenous ethnic groups (Sardanis, 2016).

5.4. Organisation of Ethnic Identity Structures Pre-Colonisation of (Northern Rhodesia) Zambia

An analysis of Barotse culture, and ethnic identity management institutions demonstrates strong and centralised state-craft management traditions. King Lewanika's Lozi Kingdom was a highly structured society. The organisation of the Lozi people was a hierarchal semi-federated structure, unlike most African communities that lived in autonomous clan structures (Negash, 2008). King Lewanika occupied the most powerful position irrespective of the clan of the local Lozi community. There was an influential council of elders consisting of both royal and non-royal members but other decision-making and conflict resolution positions of power were conferred on non-family persons that ruled the federated villages or communities. Although the Lozi had a history of accommodating other migratory ethnic groups and welcoming settlers, there was a traditional and accepted mode of hierarchical interaction and ethnic identification within the Lozi Kingdom (Caplan, 1970). The contested history and vagueness of the number of Lozi groups is due to the history of the far-flung communities of the Barotse kingdom, overlapping large expanses of land inhabited by other ethnic nations that failed to recognise a metamorphosed Litunga. (See Flint 2006)

Lozi indigeneity is the recognition of Lozi heritage, values and the recognition of the Litunga as the first man of the Lozi nation irrespective of which remote corner you reside in and which other indigenous community you live amongst. In these terms Lozi ethnic identity irrespective of location is durable and resistant to the influence of other ethnic neighbours. Indeed, the only substantial influence on Lozi ethnic identity has been the influence of the colonising British settler community. The inverted

consequence of this resilience to other indigenous ethnic influences and a desire to remain autonomous amidst other ethnic communities resulted in the 18 May 'Barotseland Agreement' with Kaunda's newly independent Zambia. In the end, Kaunda accepted that should Barotseland remain autonomous within the modern nation of Zambia amidst other ethnic communities, this would disrupt the eventual national-identity of Zambia. He never honoured the Agreement.

5.5. The Shifting Identity of the Lozi

The difference in circumstance between the Lozi Litunga and the people, specifically provoked by the presence of new white settlers, inevitably brought tension between the king King and his subjects that generated the fragmentation of indigenous identity structures. The BSAC appointed Councillor to Lewanika, Francois Coillard, corrupted the indigenous Barotse ancestral identity when he replaced the leopard skin cape regalia of the Barotse monarchy with European symbolism of monarchy. while the mimicking of European identity apparel gave superficial protection to the Lozi's against competitor nations - they were perceived to be allies to the powerful British army of invaders -it undermined the understanding of Lozi traditional ethnic identity. As Flint (2006) observes, indigenous Lozi communities were "a heterogenous amalgam of between 25 – 40 groups welded together by a shared although not uncontested history" (p. 702). The contested history and vagueness of the number of Lozi groups is due to the history of the far-flung communities of the Barotse kingdom failing to recognise a metamorphosed Litunga. The communities developed an identity dysphoria, especially when the post-Berlin Conference colonially imposed frontiers created Namibia, Angola and Botswana and re-demarcated the frontiers of pre-colonial ethnic African nations. Firstly, the identities of the far-flung communities lost

physical interaction with their Litunga as the cyclical migratory routes were modified to reflect Berlin Conference frontiers. Secondly, the disconnected Lozi were now obligated to a powerful colonising settler community which they did not share a heritage with. Most importantly, however, when they went on the *'Litooma-mundi-wa-Nyambe'*[37], a pilgrimage that to reinforce Lozi heritage and regain the sense of belonging, they could no longer recognise the British clad Litunga in his British military hackle and feathered bonnet which was unknown to Lozi royalty.

In effect, the identity management mechanism of a mythological *'Nyambe'*[38] the Lozi accolade given to a reigning Litunga, unifying all members of the Lozi ethnic nation was lost. The annual *ceremony* of temporary relocation of the Lozi palace from the flood plains to higher ground, or *'Kuomboka'*, which joins the remote communities of Barotse people across the vast expanse of the Zambezi plains to *'Litooma-mundi-wa-Nyambe'* would no longer be performed to welcome a returning Litunga in his cyclical relocation of the Lozi Palace. Moreover, the encounter with the BSAC brought with it a contraction to the cyclical migratory route in response to the temporary environmental flooding of the Zambezi plains and dislocation of the Lozi palace. In discouraging the cyclical interaction between a unifying Litunga monarch and his people Coillard curtailed the traditional bonds of heritage that united all the Lozi communities. The identities of the Barotse people on the periphery of hitherto Lozi territory gave way to new colonial territorial frontiers of Namibia Angola and Botswana

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[37] *Litooma-mundi-wa-Nyambe* literally means the house of '*Nyambe'*. It isthe cyclically located palace –where ever the Litunga settles. It is either his regular summer abode on the plains or on higher ground during the rainy season to avoid the Zambezi floods.

[38] *'Nyambe'* is the Lozi title given to a reigning Litunga. According to the Lozi myth, of Lozi origin, the Litunga was the 'first-man' and all-encompassing singular monarch of all Lozis people who are spread cross the flood plains.

that prioritised commercial mining over their legitimate ethnic identity as a Barotse nation. While the colonial system was irreverent to indigenous ethnic communities, it inadvertently avoided rivalry between the indigenous communities that helped to consolidate what was left of into a Zambian nation-identity. This repugnance to identity segregation and hierarchies of the colonial administration was consolidated by Zambian Humanism at independence.

5.6. Colonisation and the Development of Identity Structures in Zambia – The Bemba Speaking People

The Bemba speaking people of the higher plateau, who have less reverence for language as a means of organising identity and kinship, did not have a unifying paramount king until colonial times. Significantly, although the indigenous identity systems were not joined up into an ecosystem, the Bemba, who reject language as an identity anchor, derived their identity from the oral history and mythology of their migration from Katanga in the present day Democratic Republic of Congo, which is characterised by violent intrafamily and interethnic wars. Thus, the basis of this ethnic-nation identity system comes from the nature of their migration, which separated them from the Luba and Lunda peoples of the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo and the Congo Basin that migrated southbound to the plateaus of present-day north east Zambia.

Bemba involvement with both the Arab and European Slave trades commenced from well-documented African raiding parties of the Congo basin. Early Bemba-Arab contact involving slave trade fuelled intra-tribal conflicts because of the supply of arms to all warring parties, a practice that early European settlers continued in order to gain

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leverage over the indigenous Bemba. Nevertheless, the curious refusal to extend Bemba belonging to all Bemba-speaking people may have its origins in the method of slave raids and trades with the Arab and European slave-trading caravans and the East India Company (EIC) that traded in slaves across the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Lozi, the Bemba did not assimilate other ethnic groups, hence, unsold slaves from the Arab and European slave-trading caravans remained either in the Bemba villages or surrounding villages and were permitted to establish Bemba-speaking tribal communities but not Bemba identity. Simultaneously ethnic identity interactions and development within the Lozi kingdom with all its ills of 'internal slavery' encouraged by the administrators because it mirrored the stratified communities of South Africa from whence the administrators came was allowed to continue.

Cancel's (2013) research into Zambian ethnic identities found that the Bemba,

> "dominated the region in a powerful and militaristic manner, known more for their raiding of neighbours and hegemonic assertion than for any particular economic pursuit, such as farming, hunting, or fishing" (p.75).

Nevertheless, during colonial period, British posture against slavery was duplicitous, harsher on the Bemba than on the Lozi. Although there was a declared British position against the slave-trade, the Colonial Government gave preferential treatment to the Litunga of the Lozi and turned a blind eye to Lozi slave running. A single powerful monarch that would represent Bemba interest seemed ideal to obtain for the Bemba the same level of relationship the Lozi had with the Colonial Government. The gradual elevation of the *Chitimukulu* as the single overall monarch of Bemba identity was the eventual outcome. Bemba identity heritage recognised different clans mainly named

after animals, the paramountcy of an overall monarch became important during colonisation. The elevation of the *Chitimukulu* as an identity anchor rather than the ancestral clans, and the analogous Bemba dichotomy of rejecting linguistic anchor as an identity mechanism would lead to curious criteria for defining Bemba belonging and identity during the colonial period. Indeed, within the Zambian identity ecosystem, depending on the situational privilege that Bemba identity would offer, curious contemporaneous criteria such as burial customs signifying Bemba identity would develop and disappear from the Bemba customs as quickly as they became unfashionable. Much like the episodes of Liberian and Sierra Leonean national-identity development, this research argues that oral traditions of unpleasant historic episodes such as Bemba slave raids on neighbouring ethnic nations would have torn Zambian national-identity apart. The imposition of Zambian Humanism that levelled all ethnic identities, particularly the dominance of the Bemba-nation over Bemba-speaking people was vital for the success of Zambian nation-identity.

5.7. Various Transitions in Zambian National-Identity

In 1924 the chartered BSAC handed over the administration of Zambia to the direct administration of Britain. Rotberg (1972), describes the direct British administration as a "wholly unsatisfactory" way of governing Zambian communities. To Rotberg, this was "largely negative and disruptive; it took little or no account of indigenous political requirements and hastened de-tribalisation" (p.49). Critically, even though the Lochner Agreement gave explicit responsibility to the BSAC to,

> "aid and assist in the education and civilization of the native subjects of the
>
> King', establishing schools, communications and transport, and to appoint

a 'British Resident, with a suitable suite and escort, to reside permanently with the King."

The identity expression of the Lozi and other indigenous communities was significantly affected by a disinterested BSAC colonial government. The disinterested BSAC, negligent of its contractual duty of care to the indigenous communities produced an inversed but eventual positive outcome of an absence of inter-ethnic discord, preservation and solidifying of ethnic Lozi customs and identities. Instead, the 'suitable British escort' to King Lewanika moulded a confused unique imitation of British royalty later seen as a caricature and thus unable to inspire its people to seek autonomy and break-up of Zambian nation-identity.

The formation of the Central Africa Federation (CAF) that included Zambia was meant to stave off the clamour for self-government, by imposing a punitive Southern Rhodesian administration structure on all the indigenous African people of the Federation, particularly Northern Rhodesia, that Zambia that had hitherto enjoyed solitude in developing their ethnic nations and relationships. The short-lived CAF equally galvanised the various ethnic communities of Zambia to forge a national-identity distinct of the Southern Rhodesians and Nyasaland, modern day Zimbabwe and Malawi. According to Pettman's (1974) writing in Zambia Security and Conflict, the preamble to the CAF's constitution that aimed to "foster partnership and cooperation between the inhabitants" (pp. 12 -13) was seen by the indigenous Zambian community as a dilution of Zambian identity and retrograde step towards the paramountcy of their identities. The expansion therefore, of British imperial acquisition and various governing philosophies from Rhodes' 'Cape to Cairo' through direct colonial administration, although discriminatory and bigoted was a tepid extension of

a profit focused capitalist administration. The negligent stance of the colonial administration towards indigenous communities interpreted as 'segregation of races' would be to the advantage of modern Zambia's nation-identity eco-system of the modern-nation state.

5.8.   The Arrival of the European Settlers and their Effect on Identity Relationships

All of today's African countries endured a certain level of colonisation as a commencement to nation formation and national-identity management, with the 1894 Berlin Conference pivotal to the advent of modern national borders. However, it would be incomplete not to examine the effect of the extinct Southern African and Boer Republics had on Zambia nation formation. It is from this tumultuous period of and rampant wars inter-European powers and ethnic nations that arose Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company that governed the early part of Zambian administration. With a fair degree of international legitimacy although with unfair national-identity management systems, this research recognises that no country in the world including these early republics in the era pre-1900 had equitable national-identity management institutions. The discussions here are not about the equity of national-identity in the Boer, South African, Natalia Republics, and the Orange Free State and their influence on Zambia, but rather on the effect of the regional geopolitics on Zambian nation-formation.

The British Empire after its defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo was eager to acquire territory and demonstrate a philosophically different domination of their territories from that of the French colonial administration of African territory. Robert Jenkinson, the

Earl of Liverpool, had served in various positions since 1801 as Foreign, War and The Colonies Secretary before becoming Prime Minister in 1812. Further, the cost of the various wars to the British economy had focused Jenkinson's government's interest in the diamond and goldfields of the Boer Republics of South Africa. The South African wars of 1806 had not only seen the Boer and Transvaal Republics defeated in a series of violent battles but also the transfer of the mineral wealth to British control (Rotberg, 1988). Further British territorial expansion northwards championed by Rhodes and his BSAC from South Africa was purely to maximise revenue and balance the coffers of the British Empire. In the period that the British were consolidating their financial standing after an expensive series of wars, the riches from the mines in Africa through the Rhodes project of territorial expansion were attractive to Jenkinson's government. However, actual governance which involves the management of the indigenous identities and communities was reactive only in as much as it affected the commercial objective.

At the centre of the government responsible for Zambia were the imported British and South African minority colonial enforcers who had 'unrecognised identities'. As Kumar (2006) notes; "In some of the African states such as South Africa, and Rhodesia[39], the British legacy was that of entrenched white minorities who were given a free hand to exploit the native black population" (p.420). That these minority enforcers had neither cultural, ethnic nor ancestral empathy with the indigenous communities led to the colonial violent and duteous administration of a non-British, non-white and culturally

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[39] The 'Rhodesias', Southern Rhodesia which is modern Zimbabwe, and Northern Rhodesia, which is modern Zambia, were part of colonial Central African Federation which also included Nyasaland or modern-day Malawi.

distinct community of what the British considered as 'inferior identities'. Significantly, the 'superior' governing community of colonial settlers that emigrated from South Africa conveniently emphasised differences between European and indigenous culture and adopted segregation and apartheid as identity management philosophies. So, when in 1880 the businessman and politician Cecil Rhodes entered the Cape Colony Parliament, the dynamics of Southern African politics and the appetite for British Empire expansion was intoxicating (Rotberg, 1988). In this era of expansionism, between 1886 and 1887, Cecil Rhodes' chartered BSAC controlled an estimated quarter of the world's gold available on the international market and ninety percent (90%) the world's diamonds (Turrell, 1987). Neither BSAC, unable to dissociate commercial profit from governance, nor the Colonial Office that inherited BSAC's governance institutions in Zambia would allow themselves to be distracted by 'pesky natives' who did not know the value of the mined minerals. After steering his BSAC into controlling the mining of precious mineral exploration in Southern Africa, the northbound commercial imperialist ambitions could now be funded (Packenham, 1992). Rhodes would send the few British South African administrators the BSAC could spare from South Africa with commercial responsibility for ensuring the mined minerals get to the market. Interestingly, the most efficient way the administrators could achieve commercial success was in their duplicitous sightlessness of indigenous identities and interactions.

The trade in ivory between the indigenous communities and Europeans, which preceded Zambian mining industry was conducted by the leaders of the ethnic nations including the Litunga. The elephant hunting parties, mainly mono-ethnic, also doubled up as the ethnic-nation's warriors; they would return their ivory collections to the rulers

for onward trade with the Europeans or Arabs. As ethnic warriors, the very violent nature of the hunts and value of the ivory to the Europeans created pockets of both physical and economic competition between the different hunting parties. However, the introduction of mining changed the nature of the economy, for violent competition between inter-ethnic hunting parties subsided, instead, replacing them with inter-ethnic collaboration. The new and buoyant extraction industry converted the identity of the huntsmen from combative hunting rivals into a collaborative community. With time, the shared exertion of extracting minerals and the mutual danger faced in the mines created adoptive mutual identities with new community leaders from the mines and shedding old competitive hunting party identities. Crucially, this was an important identity layer based on an evolving regional economy which was created. The mining community from various ethnicities came together under organised labour leaders to fight the mine owners. Inadvertently, the basis for the future national-identity of modern Zambian was partly forged in the mines as co-operative cross-ethnic identity relationships in BSCA mines steered indigenous inhabitants to discover an appreciation of each other's cultures.

5.9.   The Lochner Concession and Perceptions of Identity

What was conceded to Frank Lochner, Cecil Rhodes employee at the BSAC, was in reality the independent identity of the Lozi people. His arrival coincided with a time that an anxious Litunga Lewanika was concerned about preserving his nation's identity from Arab, Belgian and Portuguese incursions into Barotseland making slaves of Lozi people living on the periphery of Barotseland. Lochner, prospecting for minerals in Barotseland skilfully employed the influence of Francois Coillard a missionary who had earlier been introduced to Lewanika by Kgama, the Ngwato Chief of the Sotho-

Makololo nation. By signing the Lochner Concession in June 1890, the BSAC obtained chartered instructions to govern north and west of Nyasaland (present day Malawi) in 1891 and delineate British territory from Portuguese-Angola, which had come about as a result of the 1884 Berlin Conference. Lewanika was also under both internal threat from another division of the royal household and external incursions from the Ndebele. Although not homogenous groups, the Lozi of Barotseland shared Bantu ancestry with the Ngwato of Sotho-Makololo, the ethnic nation of Bechuanaland, further south of Barotseland. The territory of the ethnic Ndebele nation, rival to both the Lozi and the Ngwato, divided the two ancestral Bantu ethnic nations of Barotseland and Bechuanaland (Fourshey, et al., 2018). The two nations Lozi and Sotho-Makololo did not see themselves as two ethnic nations but the BSAC by singing two separate agreements, separated the people into two; Northern Rhodesia Protectorate which became Zambia, and Botswana. This segregation of the ancestral twin Kingdoms without so much as consideration of the Lozi Kingdom's the ethno-lingua union and identity heritage with the Sotho-Makololo, is an obvious disregard for the identity and ethnic (mis)management of a people sacrificed for commercial and mineral wealth. In the Bechuanaland Protectorate Agreement with the British, the ethnic descendants of the Lozi, the BamaNgwato nation of Bechuanaland, enjoyed autonomy over their cultural identity. Other than the provision of security for the Bechuanaland territorial frontier against Boer and German aggression, indigenous cultural development remained intact. The BSAC commercial ambition, rather than syndicate and extend the existing Bechuanaland Agreement to the Lozi, as preferred by Lewanika, the BSAC preferred to use the supplication of Lewanika as leverage to maintain absolute domination over the ethnic Lozi nation.

BSAC management knew and used the bond of trust and kinship between the Lozi and the Twana to influence Lewanika into singing the Lochner Treaty but were unwilling to consider the two peoples deserving of a single Protectorate status. Milner-Thornton's (2012) research 'The Long Shadow of the British Empire: The Ongoing Legacies of Race and Class' comments on the extent of trickery required by Lochner and Francis Coillard to get Lewanika to agree to the Concession. The Lochner Agreement explicitly stated the institution of a permanent and ever-present 'British Councillor' to Lewanika and all future of the Lozi Kings. In addition to the mining concessions, the intention was to annex the cultural development of the Lozi ethnic nation through the instruction of Missionary Francis Coillard and ensure that the Agreement arrived at through trickery would not unravel. The Lozi leadership forfeited the timeless traditional appreciation and handed-down customary practices of their ethnic identity for the singular and immediate recognition by the BSAC. This commenced the wedge of differences to the cultural evolution and identity diversions between to the Lozi and the other Zambian ethnic nations which they had lived peaceably with on the flood plains.

The ancient alliances forged through timeless Bantu migratory routes were exploited and extenuated by BSAC to produce distinctions in ethnic communities that threatened Zambian nation-identity. Indeed, had the Bechuanaland Protectorate Agreement been extended to Barotseland, the territorial nation of modern-day Zambia may have been vastly different to what it is today. Irrespective of the peaceful inter-ethnic interactions with other Zambian ethnic nations, the provocation resisted by the Lozi-nation to secede from the Zambian nation must be understated. The two main causes of the provocation are directly attributable to the legacy of colonisation. Firstly,

the relegation from the privileged inter-ethnic rank enjoyed during the colonial period. Secondly an enforced detachment from the ethnic alliance with the BamaNgwato of Bechuanaland. Crucially unlike the Sierra Leonean and Liberian experience, the hierarchical ethnic relational adjustments and detachment from ancestral ethnic neighbours pre and post-independence that brought about modern civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone was not violently pursued by the Lozi and did not lead to a collapsed nation.

Tordoff and Molteno (1974, p. 2) acknowledge that the imposition of BSAC "colonial rule did not involve prolonged and destructive wars [and] traditional authority systems survived [and] albeit in a modified way". As a result of the devious scheming, traditional identity ethnic interactions were destroyed by stealth. The role of Coillard, the 'Councillor' in unsettling the structured Lozi council of elders and destabilising the traditional federated hierarchy of governance and identity management cannot be understated. The circumstances of Coillard's arrival in Barotseland and his shrouded relationship with King Kgama Tswana of the BamaNgwato nation, all played into the intrigue of a powerful councillor to the Lozi King devoid of any ethnic appreciation or ancestral relationship. Coillard had been bribed by Rhodes to disguise all the duplicitous claims, obligations of the BSAC and legal imperfections in the Lochner Agreement and steer Lewanika's governance and identity management of the people to avoid any hinderance to BSAC mining (Sampson, 1972). Sardanis (2016, p.110), describes this incident as the "…first recorded bribe in Northern Rhodesia". Rhodes encouraged Coillard who had no appreciation of either BamaNgwato or Lozi culture, tradition and values to become friendly with Lewanika through King Kgama in order to influence Lozi intra-ethnic relationships. The structured federated governance that

gave recognition to Lozi Princes governing the communities along the migratory routes were severed. Coillard's presence in Barotseland during the reorganisation of the Lozi kingdom by Lewanika meant that Coillard easily influenced the removal of traditions of governance and inherited pointers to primordial culture and Lozi identity.

The effect of the Lochner Treaty on the reverence of the Lozi ethnic people was to disorganise ancestral ethnic administrative systems that generations of Lozi Kings had governed with. Real power was transferred from the Litunga to the BSAC officials living amongst the Lozi (Gluckman, 1973). The inability of Lewanika to enforce generational loyalty levies imposed on the community, coupled with the direct generosity of the BSAC towards miners of both Lozi and migrant ethnic groups brought Lewanika into ridicule since Lewanika's council of elders had been bribed by the BSAC into an impertinent observance of his position. In fact, he could no longer call on the traditional devotion of his people. He had been reduced to a mere conduit of BSAC orders that was required for mining activity (Caplan, 1970). Although there was a Governor for the whole of Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, the BSAC governed Barotseland on behalf of the British Government as a nation-state from the Cape Colony with all its complications and racial and identity prejudices (Tordoff and Molteno, 1974). In a short time, Coillard's missionary undertaking had produced a class of semi-educated 'second rate' noble men of an imported religion competing with the Lewanika. Extended members of the Royal family were happy to ditch their traditional systems of interaction and social hierarchy and observe 'new standards of social interaction' in opposition to Lewanika. Their sense of identity had been corrupted; Lozi noble men and leaders had been indulged into believing that the imported British customs and traditions of Rhodes' capitalist BSAC empire were superior (Caplan, 1970). As Caplan

(1968) notes, the pact between ethnic leaders such as King Lewanika I with the BSCA, in his case to his detriment, shaped pre-colonial and colonial period of identity management of Zambia.

The Lochner Concession, with all its economic, financial flaws and a provenance from the boardroom of BSAC rather than Britain, was the least of the identity evils that Lewanika and his nation were contending with. The certainty of the indigenous people of their ethnic Lozi identity and status, had overnight become an uncertain classification of 'British Protected Persons' under the governance of a British chartered company unconcerned with the ethnic nation, their identity or their development. Over-zealous BSAC officers signed dubious treaties with the Lunge, and Mambe ethnic communities and by 1899, fraudulently they had obtained signatures of the leaders of the Bemba and the Ngoni (Langworthy, 1972). "The treaties and British promises were hollow beyond the goods given in exchange" (Gann, 1969, p.63). Documented identity classification of indigenous communities to their leaders was arbitrary, haphazard to the reality of ancestral cultural identification but was re-interpreted along BSAC commercially expedient frontiers.

As a result of the political turbulence created by a combination of regional and external political events: the BSAC accepted the legality of Leopold's Berlin Conference, and a limitation of Rhodes original imperial intentions (Cape House of Assembly, 1890) and Leopold's sovereignty over neighbouring territories was recognised. Hence, Rhodes frantically dispatched officers of BSAC to sign treaties with as many as possible tribe and clan leaders within the Chartered territory especially along the newly created Berlin Conference border areas. The aim was to prevent competing imperial

ambitions in the region, and facilitate the exploitation of minerals, the principal goal of BSAC. The unwritten, but moral obligation to respect the oral traditions and heritage of the territories inhabitants and indigenous people was a superficial aspiration overlooked by the BSAC colonial government.

When a year later, following the signing of the Treaty, the Tabwa king, Nsama, was involved in an unrelated tribal battle with the Alungwana tribe, part of the larger Zanzibari /Swahili ethno-lingua group. BSAC officials stationed in the North of modern-day Zambia were aware of Nsama's military difficulty. What later became the communities of Zambia were left to engage in their own violent local disputes provided they did not interfere with the singular objective of BSAC extraction of minerals to market.

5.10. Misinterpretation of Oral Tradition and Exploitative Concessions

The survival of colonially documented ethnic allegiances and identities is often contested by the oral tradition of the communities. According to Colson (1971) in her study 'Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga', the label Tonga is a Bantu reference to 'independence' it is interpreted depending on either Tonga or Bemba tradition as an independent singular person of identity without a recognised ruler, perhaps a 'nomad', or an independent people not ruled by the Bemba sovereign. Colson continues

> "According to tradition the Tonga and IIa arrived in their present area about 400 years ago, one cannot rule out the possibility that the Tonga are the direct descendants of the Kalama people."

The contradictions in oral tradition and fluid demarcations of territory as a result of the ethnic conflicts have created mixed, overlapping and interrelated identities at odds with the colonially ascribed identities. This is not an attempt to wade into the description of the Tonga as one identity or the other but rather to demonstrate the consequence of mis-interpretation of oral tradition that ends up being a mis-identification of a community of people.

Although the British Colonial Office's division of Division or Northern Rhodesia into nine territorially based administrations in 1924, indigenous allegiance to pre-colonial identity management was preserved and reinforced by the appointment of ancestrally recognised indigenous chiefs as District Administrators under instruction from the government. This was an unusual practice for British colonial rule, as in other African territories, the colonial policy of divide and rule pitched non-indigenous colonially appointed administrators against the indigenous pre-colonial administration (Binsbergen, 1987). Whereas the purpose was to ease interaction between the British colonial administration and the indigenous communities, it had an unexpected positive effect on the evolution of modern Zambia. Colonial territorial demarcation was at odds with the oral tradition demarcations and ancestral pre-colonial charges of the indigenous chiefs. The legitimate identities of some indigenous people within the District Territory thus shifted from inherited ethnic clan identities to convenient colonially allocated of allegiance.

Zambian identity management history, cultural identification customs and interactions between the 72 ethnic communities criss-crossed the nine administrative provinces within indigenous structured parameters. The administrative provinces inherited from

the colonial era created post-colonial demarcations unknown to indigenous Zambian oral traditions such as Luapula and Muchinga. In pre-colonial times, the people of the Luapula Province were part of the Lunda-Mwata-Kazembe kingdom, which territorially extended into parts of the modern Democratic Republic of Congo. Western Province was predominantly Barotseland, and although there are reported incidents of dissatisfaction with national Zambian policy on ethnic identity recognition, they have mainly accepted the unitary state administration, the effects on identity cannot be dismissed.

The 1884 Berlin Conference's division of Africa and subsequent colonisation of African ethnic nations destroyed the historic identities of the ethnic nations because of the derision given to oral tradition, impossible to retain after generations of non-use. In that way, ancestral identity management traditions of the indigenous communities and cultural hierarchical practices of the indigenous people were overlooked, a cultural *laissez faire* (Siegel, 1983). In Northern Rhodesia, for example, the BSAC erroneously recognised the legitimacy of "imagined static kingdoms with… a Chief powerful enough to conclude binding agreements over his country" (Gann, 1969, p.62). Lonsdale (1981) and Meebelo (1971) both successfully argue that the cultural identity and geographical occupation of the inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia was typical Bantu they led a nomadic lifestyle of enduring and dynamic circumstances responding to the absolute need for survival.

The genesis of commercial copper mining in Zambia's The Copperbelt from 1930 onwards, introduced a different dynamic into the indigenous ethnic population spread. The copper and subsequent mining had been discovered in the territory that was

designated as a British Protectorate of Barotseland (Caplan, 1970). Indeed, the contents of the first ever mining concession, although nebulous in the territorial designation of what was Barotse territory by the BSAC administration, was never contested by the Bankoya people who had actual territorial ownership of the land that was mined. The Bankoya ignored this irritation and rather joined forces with Barotse to combat both colonial discrimination and relegation of indigenous identities under subsequent CAF administrations (Sardanis, 2016). Similarly, Bemba ancestral land was distributed across several provinces including Northern Province, Copperbelt Province with pre-colonial treaties with many ethnic nations such as the Lamba. They all presently share modern Zambia territory despite the disparities with oral traditional certitudes of identity and territory.

5.11. Commercial Agreements and the Chartered Administration of Protected Persons

As noted previously, Rhodes, supported by the British government, expanded his influence to acquire chartered governing rights over the territories that became the Rhodesians; North-Western Rhodesia, North-Eastern Rhodesia, and eventually Northern Rhodesia. The only territories and communities that retained any semblance of an independent identity from unmitigated Rhodesian capitalism was Mashonaland, Matabeleland, Barotseland. Unsurprisingly, the disparity of agreements between the indigenous people and British settlers in Zambia to that of Sierra Leone was stark. These differences would shape post-colonial identity management in both countries.

The distinctive difference between the welcome of Zambia settlers, and the settlers in Liberia and Sierra Leone was in the level of interactions with indigenous communities.

The Zambian indigenous people had close interactions with the large number of settling community members. Whereas the white BSAC executives who migrated to Zambia were of a different culture, they had come from the South Africa mining industry where they had previously lived with indigenous ethnic Africans communities. Their declared motivation for settlement on Zambian territory was purely for commercial purposes. The leadership of this community recognised the integrity of the individual ethnic nations within Zambia, therefore, they signed inter-nation concessions to obtain mining rights with the Bemba, Matabele, and Lozi. By signing these inter-nation concessions, the settlers recognised a nation-state, even if considered rudimentary. The settlers from South Africa took advantage of the weaknesses in the Zambian ethnic-nation-states to impose the process of modernity through colonisation. By contrast, the settler community from North America to the West coast of Africa did not acknowledge the existence of any nation-state in the territories. They arrived as a large ancestral settler community on ships from overseas, previously divorced from their roots, but with a vision to 'civilise the indigenous heathen community' which they had left behind. The Sierra Leone Company used the chartered vehicle ostensibly for their humanitarian objective, resettling aggrieved soldiers with unsuited identity management tools that evolved into the collapsed national-identity management ecosystem.

That the SLC and BSAC were chartered companies underlines the unsuitable nature of a 'one-size-fits-all' colonial vehicle used by the British government to administer identity management. In Sierra Leone, the prospectus presented by the promoters of the chartered company, the SLC, was indirectly in the form of an identity management project which they used for the purpose of the resettlement of British citizens from

Canada and the British Isles in Africa. However, in Zambia, the BSAC, yet another colonial chartered vehicle was used to deconstruct indigenous identities and, in the process, the indigenous identities coalesced to form a new unified identity. Neither of the settler communities in their initial interactions in Zambia and Sierra Leone considered that either territory would in the future be an independent nation-state with a government that would manage its own communities. Whereas in Sierra Leone the enforcers of Empire, mainly a religious community of settlers were concentrated on 'civilising' the people which was a way of shaping the cultural identity, in Zambia specifically, the white farmers and mine owners were resolute on the extraction industry to the exclusion of all other considerations but not shaping identities of the people. To achieve the evangelical and missionary undertaking of Christianising the indigenous communities, the settlers of SLC used identity management tools and mechanisms that distorted the indigenous ethnic nations and their interactions. Similar to SLC, the BSAC 'chartered vehicle' circumvented interactions with the ethnic community, which worked to the advantage the future Zambian nation and its identity management ecosystem. The chartered BSAC was oblivious to any other motive than their commercial intent. In this context, therefore, the underdeveloped identity management practices of Zambian colonial administration gave way to post-independence indigenous Zambian national-identity structures. Since the Zambian national-identity eco-system was established without the undue influence of interfering settlers, Zambian national-identity created by the indigenous community after the attainment of self-rule, would be durable with a better chance of longevity unplagued by a meddling settler community that created quartered settlements and the eventual collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone nations and nation-identity.

5.12. The Geopolitics of the Colonising Nations and Identity Dysphoria Policies

Inter-ethnic rivalry that does not end up in violent clashes is often a necessary process of nation-formation and a greater nation-identity. The BSAC however was unconcerned with the ethnic rivalries unless those rivalries were funded by a competing European power seeking to control the ethnic territory's minerals. Since the BSAC were involved in the geopolitics of the larger region, and the process of colonizing the territory into modern-day Zambia occurred during a period of intense geopolitical competition and upheaval, the motivation for signing treaties with the leaders of the indigenous ethnic nations was not to prevent inter-ethnic rivalry but to make effective the British Crown Charter. It was to demonstrate to rival European interests in the region particularly Belgium in neighbouring Congo that the BSAC relationship with the indigenous people had a legal basis and their ethnic identities had been converted to British protected Persons (Martin, 1983).

The BSAC understood the geographical range limitations and ethnic alliances within the territorial protectorates they administered on behalf of the British Government; hence, they leveraged on these ethnic alliances to influence and sign new mining concessions when it suited them (Rotberg, 1965). In most cases, however, apart from the pockets of the populated habitations, the indigenous communities were spread very thinly across Zambian territory that it would not have mattered. Between 1895 to 1945 Zambia, overseen by the BSAC themselves, surrounded by and at war with the Dutch Boer republic of South Africa, German, Portuguese, and Belgian colonies. Boer Wars between the British and the South African republics had ravaged all identity allegiances between the indigenous communities and the European warring factions as with the ebb and flow of warfare.

As discussed earlier, through the turbulent intra-communal conflicts, identity dysphoria was a constant menace, communities would shift their political and identity allegiance to the faction with sufficient ammunition to protect them from other opposing warring factions. Since the pre-colonial wars between ethnic proxies on behalf of the European colonisers would bring conflict between ethnic nations, identity allegiance, prior to colonisation was based solely on belonging to the ethnic nation. For this reason, the presence of the settlers living in the community, meant the identity allegiances of the communities would be polarised, to the extent that indigenous ethnic nations demonstrably confirmed their allegiance to the settler community by signing treaties and concessions, pledging their allegiance and identities to the British BSAC. The Portuguese and Germans did likewise in opposition to all the other European warring factions in the region. To the indigenous ethnic nation leaders, the financial returns given away in the mining concessions were an irrelevance compared to the identity affiliation to be co-joined and identified with a strong faction with arms and ammunition to protect the community. This led many indigenous communities to learn the rudiments of the conquers' language and adopt foreign practices even if it was to feign an association with the conquering community as happened with the Bemba speaking community that spoke Bemba denied ethnic Bemba belonging.

Brelsford (1964, p.17) in his study, *'The Tribes of Zambia'*, describes the mutable identities:

> "The Kwangwa, Kwangwa-Lima, Lima, Totela and Mambowela, [and] most of whom were forced to change their domicile several times during the 19th century. The Totela of Sesheke were under Lozi sovereignty [till] 1830 when the Kololo invasion occurred and Sebitwane ruled from

Sesheke they fled [to] Lukwakwa, Luena and Dongwe south of Kabompo.

So that when the Kololo were defeated in 1864 there was a general return

[and mix] of many tribes to the area. Sipopa the new Paramount fought

and defeated [the rival claimant] and many of the Kwangwa-Lima fled back

to Lukwakwa".

Such was the 'ebb and flow' of migration, typical of the ever-present creation of new communities with imported identities and fluid movements of refugees that would have formed the identities in Zambia. Nevertheless, the arrested development of nation formation, interrupted by colonisation required the intervention of a strong philosophy such as Zambian Humanism to build an equitable nation-identity.

5.13. The Impact of Refugees Migration and Exiled Resettlement on Indigenous Identities

Lying along the ancient Bantu migratory route, the location of Zambian territory provided a natural haven for Bantu people fleeing physical and cultural domination from adversaries seeking to either enslave them or already driven out of their lands for the minerals by Europeans. While the Portuguese colonised Mozambique and Angola on either side of Zambian territory, Germany colonised neighbouring Tanzanian and Namibia, and to the north, Leopold II captured Congo. Significantly and coincidentally, Leopold's administration and heinous activities in the Congo Free State involved American Colonisation Society (ACS), renegades from Liberia bent on continuing slave-running. The Congo Free State unravelled soon after the Berlin Conference propelled refugees into Zambian territory. Ewans' (2002) study; '*European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and its Aftermath'* sequels the mayhem of ACS, Bangala, and Zappo-Zaps slave runners, cutting of limbs

in a bid to identify subdued ethnic communities. Communities fleeing the Congo Basin settled into Zambian territory, the later settlers, arriving as refugees, are differentiated from the earlier settlers as Bemba speakers rather than Bemba people. The consequences and impact of the Leopold's administration of the Congo Free State, and the ensuiung migration of its indigenous inhabitants into modern Zambian territory re-shaped the ethnic dynamics of the indigenous people of Zambia. This research agrees with Hochschild's (1998) study *'King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*' and further broadens Hochschild's assertion that Leopold's ethnic terrorism that forced the migration of the Baluba people and other tormented ethnic populations into the less brutal neighbouring North Rhodesia initiated the future national-identity Zambian Humanism, that would be interpreted as a dignified acceptance of all ethnicities.

5.14. The Hut Tax, the Origins of Zambian Nationalism and Zambian National-Identity

Colonial Administration throughout Africa particularly using chartered companies involved the imposition of a Hut Tax. As discussed in Chapter 3, in Sierra Leone, the Hut Tax was designed to raise income for community infrastructure but had the effect of unifying indigenous communities in a show of solidarity against an identification obligation that they did not identify with. In the case of Zambia, the colonial BSAC administration's adoption of a Hut Tax was to discourage the indigenous communities from subsistence farming and usher them into the mines to earn wages which in turn would be collected as a Hut Tax. Subsistence farming and the barter trade of surplus produce practiced by the indigenous communities meant the chartered BSAC interested in minerals extraction could not otherwise attract the indigenous people off

their farms into the mines. The concept of taxation as examined in Sierra Leone and similar to Zambia is the imposition of an onerous duty that binds a legitimate identity into an economic community of shared infrastructural assets. The effect of the Hut Tax in Northern Rhodesia rather than the wholesale revolt as with the Sierra Leone indigenous communities, was accepted by the indigenous communities of Zambia. The similarity between the two situations is in not in the revolt or acceptance, but in the definition and redefinition of legitimate identities in the respective communities. Irrespective of their different indigenous ethnic origins, the Zambian community of miners bonded together into a community that accepted the onerous obligation of the Hut Tax firstly to avoid their kin in the villages being harassed and secondly to build community assets. The creation of an economy of inter-dependence meant that people recognised, empathised and identified with each other; hence and inadvertently, the Europeans formalised an economic identity overlay that submerged the ethnic identity of the indigenous communities. They became a 'ragtag' but resilient community united against future and increasingly oppressive and dangerous working conditions, that was at the core of the struggle for self-governance and dissolution of the Central African Federation and the foundation of Zambian nationalism.

5.15. The Central African Federation and its Effect on Zambian National-Identity

"Political rights, after all, mean very little to a man with an empty stomach.

If we are genuinely concerned about the Africans let us give them economic development and political rights can come later"

(Roy Welensky, 1964 p. 35).

As Prime Minister for the nation-state of the Central African Federation (CAF), this was what Roy Welensky thought of the entitlement and privileges of a national-identity for

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the seven and a half million (7.5m) people of the nation-community. In Gutteridge's (1956) book, *The Debate On Central African Federation In Retrospect*, he highlights the economic advantages of the CAF, quotes and agrees with Prime Minister Welensky's view above that political rights are irrelevant if there is a guarantee of alimentary survival. Contrary to Welensky and Gutteridge, however, this study argues that if political rights and participation in the governance of the polity, which are inextricably linked to the recognition by the ethnic-nation or nation-state of a legitimate identity are not equitably administered nor guaranteed, the relevance of alimentary survival is inconsequential. In other words, political rights is the reciprocity of a deep affinity to a nation that recognises their legitimate identity. Anderson (2016) states that this reciprocity is so deep that "people are willing to die for". The British Colonial Government was bounced into submerging the national and ethnic identities of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (modern day Malawi), based on an 'economic interdependence' if the three territories would combine into a federation. In arguing for the elimination of the nation's 'vulnerability if autonomous', Gutteridge (1956) does not rationalise what those vulnerabilities are to the indigenous identities of the combined territories. Rather, he defends the creation of the CAF with an economy that could withstand indigenous nationalism. Gutteridge does not evaluate evidentiary identity, community belonging, recognition and the privileges entwined in the rationality of a modern functioning polity. Political rights are accrued when there is a recognised and legitimate identity, ethnic or national, to impart those rights to, the CAF refused to legitimise the identities of the indigenous people.

The foundation of Welensky's statement is further flawed on two main counts. First, the most obvious and least contested is the national-identity management structure of

the CAF of which Welensky was the leader did not recognise themselves, the 'governing class' as part of the African community. Welensky, a second-generation Afrikaans, clearly states his identity as not African, the clear self-alienation of communal belonging between himself and the 'Africans' removes any legitimacy of governance over the governed. The CAF would obviously fail for lack of legitimacy. The clamour for the legitimacy of governments, universality of human rights was enshrined in the creation of the United Nations (UN), which awakened nationalism in colonial Africa and eventually led to the dismantling of colonisation. Whereas the legitimacy of the individual colonial governments of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was debatable depending on the fidelity given to the chartered treaties signed, the indigenous African ethnic identities coalesced and withdrew the dubious consent to be governed by a CAF government. In reality, the government of CAF did not have an iota of even a dubious consent, a complete lack of CAF government legitimacy to be able to administer any form of national-identity.

Second, and most importantly, the question of a national legitimate identity for all the inhabitants of the federation was not considered. Welensky and his governing class did not contemplate a parity of identity with the 'Africans' who were without a legitimate record of any national-identity such as records of national records of birth, passports or recognised citizenship. The only recorded and visible identities within the CAF polity were 'the white governing class', who exercised their identities through their pollical and suffrage rights. The invisible Africans, just had to be fed for possible future recognition of suffrage rights. The entwined privileges of a national legitimate identity, deserving recognition through suffrage rights privileges with the polity was absent. Instead, at the expense of the indigenous culture of the inhabitants, the British

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Government's economic synergy experiment, the creation of the Central African Federation, de-legitimised the indigenous identities of each of the colonial territories further.

The creation of the CAF was a deliberate and unrestrained disregard for the ethnic nations and communities of Northern Rhodesia - Zambia (Rotberg, 1988). This is confirmed by Rab Butler, the British Home Secretary when in 1962, he confessed to The House of Commons "I would remind the House that the British Government have had very little say in, or control over, Southern Rhodesian affairs since 1923". The important revelation in this statement is that according to the Global Change Data Laboratory (2020) between 1930 and 1950, the combined population of Europeans in the CAF 'nations' was less than twenty thousand (20,000). This contrasts to the excess of seven and a half million (7.5m) migration of indigenous Africans of various ethnic nationalities that converged in the mines of the CAF. (Larmer, 2010). Yet neither CAF government nor the individual governments of the CAF nations had a record of these indigenous African identities. In proposing a revised constitution for the CAF in 1962 with Southern Rhodesia as the key pillar the 'self-governing colonial' status of Southern Rhodesia extended to the entire CAF was attractive and provided a misconceived route for the British Government to extricate itself from colonial responsibility of the seven and a half million (7.5m) invisible African identities of the CAF nations. Butler exposes the imbalance in the identity management structures that was being created with the formation of the CAF.

> "This new Constitution not only guarantees immediate and substantial
> African representation in the legislature—at least 15 seats out of 65—
> where none at present exists, but will allow Africans, by weight of

numbers, to assume political responsibility as more and more of them

qualify for the franchise" (House of Commons Hansard, 1962).

How seven and a half million (7.5m) indigenous Africans of CAF can be represented by fifteen (15) members of a sixty-five (65) seat legislature, while two-hundred thousand (200,000) European settlers be represented by the fifty (50) seats is a travesty of any national-identity management structure. The Colonial British government did not consider that indigenous belonging and participation in the enlarged territorial CAF community, were sufficient qualifications to qualify to vote for representation in the legislature.

During the negotiations for Southern Rhodesian Responsible Government[40], in 1920, before the CAF was established, the BSAC retained its commercial mining and land interests in Northern Rhodesian but detangled itself of the expensive governance and identity management structures. Nevertheless, identity acculturation, social nurturing and collective empathy has always been a stronger motivation for the desire to form a nation than pure economic arguments (Kanneh, 1998). The BSAC government who were the mine owners, compelled by the perceived threat to their business and their irreverent consideration for the identity management of the indigenous mine workers, proposed a federation that reawakened the doubts of the indigenous communities of Northern Rhodesia, dormant during the colonial direct-rule era between 1923 – 1953 (Frederiksen, 2010). The creation of the federation amidst the suspicion and antagonism between the indigenous and settler communities led to a further decline

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[40] The Southern Rhodesian Responsible Government campaigned to form a semi-autonomous government for Southern Rhodesia which would be within the British Empire but outside the supervisory governance of British South Africa that BSAC found stifling.

in the already malfunctioning colonial identity structures. Territory wide civil disobedience that led to the eventual break-up of the CAF was predictable. The minority Southern Rhodesian Government of BSAC that provided the leadership of the CAF, between 1920 and 1950 imposed some of the most draconian governance and identity management restrictions on the ingenuous CAF population which focused the civil defiance against CAF authority as a struggle for administrative visibility of indigenous identity being part of the polity. Although of modest appreciation in modern discourse, the peaceful but intense civil disobedience of the Northern Rhodesian people is part of the identity make-up that collapsed seventy-two different ethnic nations into a single 'One Zambia' nation and the inspiration for similar adoption and overthrow of minority rule in Botswana, Malawi and the conversion of Southern Rhodesia into modern Zimbabwe.

The collapse of the CAF came at the juncture of geopolitical events stimulated by WWII, and the recognition of an identity given to returnee soldiers. Much like the sequence of events in Sierra Leone, loyalist soldiers left to fight without legitimate identities but obtained legitimate identities on their return from service that needed to be recognised and their sacrifice of service compensated for. Much as Anderson (2016), argues, all identities, even within a colonial administration, once enlisted and returned from a war irrespective of previously indiscernible identity status within the polity, earn a nationalist embrace deserving recognition. The ex-service men insisted on the recognition of their indigenous identities from the colonial government. The CAF government founded on Southern Rhodesia's supressed indigenous identities of the Welensky government was ill-suited to accept and manage the appreciation of the status of these identities for compensation. The result; a two-decade long geopolitical

clash of national-identity management ideologies played out in the House of Commons, the Congress of USA, The Security Council of the UN, the capitals of the newly independent front-line African nations that eventually collapsed the CAF, Southern Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa. The conception and formation of the Central African Federation was malevolent, the realisation duplicitous and the collapse predictable, it exposed the uniform disregard for indigenous ethnic identity, to which Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the colonies under Atlee's Labour government confirmed in the House of Commons

> "I opposed the federation, because I thought it wrong, at the behest of a clamorous minority, to impose a system of government to which the majority of inhabitants were manifestly opposed to" Jones, (2005, p.73)

Equitable identity management in any nation does not happen by chance but should have been a deliberate policy to avoid the break-down of the polity.

5.16.   One Zambia, One National-Identity, the origins of 'One Kaunda'

Marten and Kula's (2008) study *'One Zambia, One Nation, Many Languages'* stress that "Kaunda tried to build a large, non-racial, non-ethnic platform" (p.305) that is modern Zambia based on the Bantu origin of most Zambian languages. They suggest that Zambian national-identity is based fundamentally on the Bantu language relationships which were forged pre-colonisation. "Virtually all languages spoken in Zambia today belong to the Bantu family, except, of course, the more recent European and Indian languages and the small number of Khoisan languages" (p.299). Whereas language and reciprocal group communication are incontestable in the formation of community identities, the foundations of Zambian polity and national-identity that is based on Bantu languages could not have been formed but for colonisation that

brought equal identity management adversity, although in different measures to all seventy-two ethnic nations. This argument would have been equally true if modern Zambian territory was fragmented into seventy-two (72) micro states, each with its own Bantu language. Indeed, although the ethnic Bantu nations that were the pre-colonial polities may have had similar colonial experiences, they did not recognise themselves as sharing mutual ethnic identity; consequently, they could not have formed 'One Polity' that is modern Zambia voluntarily. In fact, the various Bantu ethnic nations competed with each other over the geographic resources to promulgate the ethnic identities and polities of the ethnic nations that they belonged to. The Bemba ethnic nation for instance notorious for slave raiding and unpopular with its neighbours, still distinguishes between real Bemba and Bemba speaking people ignoring pre-colonial language as an identity anchor. This research proposes that the Bantu source language would not have guaranteed a single nation-identity, rather similar to the outcome of Indo-European source languages Romance, Germanic or Slavic, Central Europe is spilt into a myriad of national polities, identities and micro-states (Kapović, 2017). The perceived drawback that was colonisation of a number of Bantu nations under a singular Northern Rhodesia umbrella became the catalyst and interlinking overlay that led to the success of Zambian nation-identity.

Kenneth Kaunda's father and mother, from Nyasaland and Senga respectively, migrated into Bembaland, his experiences of Tanganyika (modern Tanzania), yet another ethnic nation and colonisation experience to shaped his political identity. Kaunda's complex multi-ethnic, multi-philosophical political identity by 1949 when he had joined Northern Rhodesia Africa National Congress (NRANC), under the CAF as General Secretary motivated his Zambian Humanism view-point. Along with Harry

Nkumbula, and Kalonga Gawa Undi X in the early years, they were to become the agitators-in-chief of Zambian Nationalism with collective ambition for self-governance. The moulding of Zambian national-identity through the co-existence of the ethnic nations was achieved through a mutual resistance to both colonial manipulation of the BSAC administration and the enforced CAF identities.

Nevertheless, there was a disruption to national patria in the territory during the evolution from Northern Rhodesia's to Zambia. The strain on a cohesive national-identity by the simultaneous but arbitrary dissection and merging of ethnic communities, and the subsequent compromise of strategy were not fully considered in the leadership relationships. The provocation for the 1962 civil disobedience organized by the UNIP stemmed mainly from the discriminatory treatment of the 'subordinate indigenous ethnic' communities of the Federation, typically the communities of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Rotberg, 1972). What began as an agitation against discriminatory identity-management policies within the CAF polity, pivoted into an anti-federation and nationalistic dimensions along the lines of the pre-CAF territorial administration. Kaunda the UNIP leader of the non-violent demonstrations saw himself as a Pan-Africanist (Kaunda, 1971) unable to detach the struggle for universal black-appreciation from the narrower national-identity objectives of Zambia. Kaunda's Pan-Africanist ideals, he realised was unsynchronised to the Pan-Africanist movement further north of Zambia, specifically in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Tanzania that had achieved independence and were at different stages Pan-Africanist evolution. But ultimately, despite Kaunda's deep desire for Pan-Africanism as an Africa wide identity management solution, the reality of the different stages of ethnic nations and new post-colonial nations meant that Zambian Humanism

would suffice as a national-identity mechanism compromise , which could be practised closer to home amongst the seventy-two (72) indigenous nations.

> "There were many questions about 'Cha-cha-cha' at Mulungushi. Someone asked Kaunda whether there was a book in which he had read about it, but he replied that 'it was written in his head".
>
> (Macpherson, 1977 p.48).

Despite Kaunda's declared identity preference for parity of recognition and equity in privilege in the identity for all ethnic nations, it is obvious that he recognised the value of particular ethnic characteristics in the formation of the national-identity of Zambia. Kaunda deliberately launched the *'Cha cha cha'* civil disobedience movement specifically in Mulungushi, Bembaland knowing that the ethnic characteristics of the Bemba, known for the warlike, boisterous and aggressive underpinning of the Bemba would not have fizzled out like the advances made by the Lozi who had been in support of the CAF. The contribution of an ethnic character to a national-identity was not lost on the UNIP nationalist leaders who seized their opportunity to mount more pressure on the CAF government to meet their demands. As a solution UNIP agreed to partake in elections under a new constitution that eventually culminated in Northern Rhodesia becoming independent as Zambia (Molteno, 1974). The elections of 20 and 21 January, 1964 was the first time the governance structures and identity management of Northern Rhodesia recognised the privileges of national identification parity. The elections were conducted under Universal Adult suffrage. The CAF was dissolved in the preceding year in 1963 and on October 24th 1964, the country became the independent Republic of Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda as Executive President.

As discussed previously in Chapters 3 and 4, the use of combative ethnic assets and identities, legitimate or not, in the struggle for national self-governance and parity of national-identity privileges results in the consequent rewarding of the individuals or communities. Kaunda's Zambian Humanism inclination, to the contrary, led to the appointment of a Lozi rather than rewarding a Bemba as the chief secretary to the cabinet. Tordoff and Molteno (1974) state that "President Kaunda remained anxious to project a government and party with a national image" (p.248). The leaders of the new UNIP government fight for Zambian self-rule, agitated and grumbled that the Bemba sacrifices that brought about Zambia national-identity was not being recognised. This research argues that the administration of an equitable national-identity administration must be apparent and transparent, thus Kaunda's rewarding of Bemba speakers with a disproportionate number of cabinet positions would lead to tensions in nation formation. Tordoff and Molteno (1974) state that in trying to correct this imbalance the national-identity administration was put at risk: "By this time the balance of power inside the Bemba speaking faction had swung so heavily away from the Northern Province Bemba speaking faction that its disgruntled leaders indulged in bitter attacks on President Kaunda's government." (p. 249)

The risk of administering equitable identity management in the post-conflict government of Zambia was the criticisms that Kaunda faced; a failure to reward the sacrifice of the deserving. Eventually the Bemba of Mulungushi disowned Kaunda as a Bemba and his eventual successor Frederick Chiluba[41] attempted to strip Kaunda of Zambian nation-identity. A descendant of Lewanika the Lozi Litunga defended

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[41] Fredrick Chiluba a trade Union leader, imprisoned by Kenneth Kaunda, but eventually succeeded Kaunda to become the second President of Zambia.

Kaunda's *'Zambianess'* All this while Chiluba himself faced a court case challenging his Zambian national-identity based on ambiguous identity documents suggesting Congolese nation-identity. Equitable national-identity management in Zambia has thus not been uncontested even at the presidential level, given the complexity of finding the equitable national-identity administration amongst seventy-two ethnic nations. Guy Scott, (2019), the only Vice President of Zambia with European ancestry, attributes the fortuitous political evolution that ignored the superiority of any one ethnic community over the other in the struggle for self-rule as Zambia's saving grace of Zambian nation-identity. Albeit that the leaders of Zambian nationalism were from different indigenous social and nurtured backgrounds, the movement benefited from the non-violent and multi-ethnic composition of the leadership (Rotberg, 1972). The progression from a territory managed by the BSAC, to a British Protectorate was a commercial necessity, self-rule was a historical inevitability. Zambian national-identity and unity that would submerge indigenous ethnic rivalry was achieved during the civil demonstrations and the endurance of stoic a Zambian Humanism in the face of multiple ethnic and competing heritages.

While the motivation for Zambian Humanism as a national-identity was an attempt to restore pre-colonial values and traditions and reconcile government policy with indigenous values, the difficulty for Kaunda and the UNIP government was that there were seventy-two (72) indigenous ethnic traditions in the nation-state. There could thus be potentially seventy-two (72) different ethno-centric philosophical opposition to a shared national-identity. In this context of this research, argues that Kaunda's Humanism, a constant refrain for national unity, a variety of socialist ideology rooted in African religion and culture combined with Western Existential Humanism, radical

Christianity and his personal convictions formed the basis for Zambian national-identity. Chiluba, Kaunda's rival and charismatic 'born again' Christian amended the Zambian constitution to include the phrase "the Republic is a Christian nation"[42]. Although over eighty percent of Zambians describe themselves as Christians, Zambians still embrace inherited African traditional religions and values which form the foundations of their indigenous identities. Chiluba's amendment is seen as a challenge to this heritage and identity anchors imbedded in Zambian Humanism that embraced African identity management mechanisms but not religion. Whilst there remains a rich oral history, there is a dearth of written historic literature to interrogate in order to support sustained policy formation and national-identity based on African traditional heritage. Regardless of the widespread acceptance of Christianity to Zambians, Chiluba's populist constitutional amendment was an attempt undermine the identity anchor within Zambian Humanism and this was unpopular.

The educationist and historian P.P.W Achola (1990), in his report to the World Bank cites the newly independent Zambia as having less than one-hundred university graduates capable of governing the country at independence. Achola's contention is that independent Zambia had a vacuum of governing capacity, a hindrance to the development of the institutions of governance, one of which is national-identity administration. On the contrary, the absence of divergent European philosophical dogma, does not equate to an absence of traditional African values that interpreted and contained within the tolerance that united seventy-two ethnic nations under one successful polity. Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, the first post-colonial

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[42] The constitution of Zambia - As amended by Act No. 18 of 1996

political leaders of Northern Rhodesia, changed the name of the territory to Zambia, invented and instituted ethnic Zambian national symbols and adopted an embracing Zambian Humanism as the national-identity intended as a contrast to the Apartheid South Africa 'Bantustans Homelands'[43] that were evidence of the apartheid classification of ethnicity, designating geographical territories with ethnic allocation and strict enforcement of residential According to Posner (2005) the idealist leadership of the young Zambia overlooked the divergence of traditional African heritage and adopted a political coalition in nation-building and nation-identity. Sack (1986) observed that, any undertaking to unify disparate ethnic groups into one nation under the customs and morals of a single but dominant subgroup, is a misconstruction of 'positive nationalist homogeny', conclusively proven in 'orderly Europe', as foolhardy. This study finds to the contrary, that where the morals of the dominant sub-group, the leadership, is aimed at an inclusive equitable national-identity, disparate ethnic communities can be peacefully cajoled into a single national-identity.

As recently as 2010, the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), an offspring of Lozi patria, continues to advocate for the recognition of an ethnic-nation within the modern nation-state of Zambia. The BRE argues that Lozi-land, its governing structures, and internationally recognised ethnicity preceded the birth of Northern Rhodesia and Zambia, therefore, the various incarnations of the Constitution of Zambia, should at the very least recognise Lozi-land's unique place in the unitary nation-state of Zambia and be accorded the right to a separate identity management even if not actually

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[43] One of the central pillars of Apartheid South Africa was the creation of 'Bantustan Homelands', the apartheid classification of ethnicity that designated geographical territories with ethnic allocation and strict enforcement of residential laws.

exercised (Lusaka Times, 2010). Given the acceptance of a unitary nation-state constitution, the very foundation of a nation-identity, this research maintains that there is no appetite to disrupt Zambian national-identity and Lozi separatist agitation is little more than historic nostalgia, a desire to enrich the historic appreciation of Lozi contribution to Zambian nation-identity.

While Posner (2003) argued earlier that Zambian ethnic cleaves were primordial, in a later study he contends how colonial linguistic and identity cleavages were "once taken as primordial ethnic groups" only because of the available colonial literature that classified ethnic groups as such. A modern sub-Saharan polity has the ability to unite seventy-three (73), different ethnic groups under a single nation-identity, enhancing national-identity institutions over and above contemporary ethnic nation tensions, even in situations of strong hereditary traditions. Indeed, oral tradition may not have ascribed seventy-two (72) indigenous ethnic nations that in turn would have found a possible seventy-two (72) different opportunities to reject Kaunda's early national-identity underpinning – 'Zambian Humanism'.

The success of Zambian Humanism as a nation-formation philosophy produced some negative outcomes on the national-identity of Zambia. The veneration of its proponent, as with all major African political figures was interspersed with heavy doses of personality veneration. The danger and effect of this type of politics on national-identity management is a superficial superiority afforded to the leader's clan or ethnic group as having sacrificed a son for the national cause. Kaunda's colleagues attempted to persuade him to return to the presidency, not because they agreed with his policy stance, but rather because the colleagues were horrified that a difference of opinion

could precipitate a slide into civil anarchy because of the fear that some people would return to the past to disentangle Zambian ethnic- identity from a national identity defined by his Zambian Humanism. The anxiety that the resignation of one man, although President, would lead to national instability and anarchy was testament enough to the vulnerability of 'Zambian Humanism' conceived in 1964 as the new and comprehensive nation-formation philosophy, replacing the colonial identities ascribed since 1904.

Although there were substantial factions within the Zambian provincial polity such as the local government structures that competed with indigenous ethnic structures, the maintenance of a single central patronage backed by the central government in Lusaka prevented local pockets of power from developing. Zambian indigenous monarchies that all indigenous identities responded to, were allowed to evolve into the local centres of infrastructural administration and patronage. What these ethnic monarchies could not do, was to assign Zambian national-identity necessary for any statutory interactions. Tribal and ethnic interactions are the preserve of the indigenous monarchs and that is carefully balanced. Whereas in traditional structures, land which forms part of an individual's identity was controlled by the chiefs, post-independence they retained limited authority over its allocation. Other than subsistence farming, the purchase and cultivation of land commercial even though within particular ethnic boundaries, which have never been mapped or demarcated, chiefs could not without Central Government consent the allocation of land for commercial farming (DiJohn, 2010). In practice this means that although indigenous traditional leaders could engage in cultural ceremonies that enriched the heritage of their people and bestow

ethnic privileges, national-identity was the sole preserve of Central Government in Lusaka.

Indeed, to forge a cohesive and unified national-identity the inexperienced UNIP leadership's, in the early years of independence, used western colonial ethnic segregator models, which failed to officially recognise ten (10), of the colonially ascribed Bantu ethnic languages (Ohannessian and Kashoki, 2017). Other than the Lozi or Bemba languages, none of the other official languages are spoken by more than eight percent (8%) of the overall population. The impracticality of accrediting every language as official reflects the absence of a logical explanation of how the choices and omissions were made. Critically, the clarity and logic of inclusion of identity representations in the national-identity culture of a modern polity is essential for the maintenance of an equitable national-identity administration.

5.17. Post-colonial Refugees and their Impact on Zambian National-Identity

In the earlier 5.12, section we noted how the location of Zambian territory at the juncture of Bantu migration made it appealing for people seeking refuge from persecution. As a post-colonial state Zambian territory still became a space, or what came to be known as front-line states, for people from Southern African countries who were still fighting for freedom. Being one of the front-line states came with significant episodes that shaped the national-identity and identity management of Zambia. Zambia got independence in 1964, the first in the Southern region of Africa to do so. Both colonised neighbouring countries, Angola and Mozambique, have pre-colonial ethnic communities inhabiting pre-Berlin Conference cross-boundary frontiers. In addition to the allure of being part of an independent Zambia that attracted many

members of cross border ethnic nations into Zambia, there were sporadic war-refuges from Portuguese Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe into Zambian territory (Wilson, 1994). Conflicts in the region were increasingly seen in both racial terms, 'white versus black', while local interactions for sanctuary and escape from the war continued to be framed in linguistic black / African ethnic terms. Both Angola and Mozambique had violent and bloody civil wars in their fight for freedom from colonial domination, which lasted a combined twenty (20) years in the early seventies. Angola's war of independence was between 1961 – 1974, Mozambique's between 1964 – 1974. Whilst welcoming fellow strugglers for self-rule, the leadership of demarcated modern Zambia was reluctant to dilute its embryonic focus by fighting multiple colonial governments which had different philosophies about colonisation. Yet the Zambian Government under Kaunda wanted to provide human sanctuary to neighbours afflicted by civil war. The extended welcome given to waves of refugees, some of whom shared an ethnic identity but not a national-identity with the Zambian communities along the frontier exerted tensions and complications for the interpretation of Zambian nation-identity.

The Zambian government went ahead to formalise the rights of refugees and the restrictions imposed on them from the 1971 Refugee Control Act which expressed the government's desire to shore up its control over refugee arrivals. A key element of this act was the government's designation of specific settlements for refugees to live, in contrast to the practice of refugees self-settling in border villages. The 1971 Act, in addition, restricted the movement of refugees, and their ability to accept formal labour opportunities in Zambia thereby increasing the economic dependence on food donations by the refugee agencies. Exclusive settlements were created in North-

Western province, funnelling refugees into specific areas where they were provided with the opportunity to farm and engage in limited forms of economic activities. Self-settled refugees were technically in violation of the Refugee Control Act, so authorities will occasionally organize drives to round up such refugees and move them to designated camps and settlements. These clashes were unheard of during the pre-colonial era when the refuges would just move to a safer environment where previous Bantu settlers had migrated to without trouble.

The attainment of independence by Zambia's neighbours, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique sparked off civil wars, that sporadically spilled into Zambia. These insurgencies and cross-border conflicts between 1975 – 2002, were spurred by complexity of identities and cross border ethnic nations that span the modern frontiers of Zambia. The displaced, dislodged, and injured people of the warring ethnic nations saw the 'Humanism of Zambia' as the sanctuary. The identity management structures given of the ethnic Bantu nations in the region were attractive as an attractive interpretation for the recognition of legitimate identities. (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1988). In contrast to Kaunda's Pan-Africanist view, proud and willing to accept all refugees in Zambia, the Zambian officials contrarily, put considerable emphasis on the fact that Zambia had accepted more than its fair share of African refugees who may simultaneously become citizens of Zambia, and other African states as far away as Rwanda and Burundi, Cameroon, Sudan and Somalia (UNHCR, 2019) as and when they attained self-rule, whilst the model of dual nationality was still unresolved and that may destabilise the national-identity of Zambia. An added concern for the Lusaka government was that the refugees, some of them fighters might import war into Zambia, and the very safety

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of refugees and Zambian nationals was at risk. The sudden increase of refugee camps and settlements without the accompanying environmental sanitary infrastructure led to a keen awareness of 'strangers amongst us', and a possibility of a xenophobic response to the disruption. The capacity of frontier villages to support refugees in large numbers was tested, increased pollution and rapid depletion of local resources were two sides of the same coin. (Kambela, 2016). Though there existed ancestral kinship ties between indigenous Zambians and the refugees from other countries in their region, their colonial past had cultivated changes in attitudes towards each other and reshaped certain aspects of interaction. Disadvantaged Zambians from rural frontier communities who had moved into urban areas had lost their ethnic ancestral roots and were becoming more nationalistic, more 'Zambia-centric'. The arrival of new waves of refugees from Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo hardened Zambian attitudes towards refugees, specifically, with stricter restrictions on movement, employment, and the mandatory settlement in camps (Donger, et al., 2017).

As discussed earlier in subsection 5.12., the historical patterns of migration, meant that many refugees shared bonds of kinship and ethnicity with their Zambian counterparts depending on which side of the border they may have sought refuge in and integrated easily into local villages, whose leaders did not see such new arrivals as refugees or strangers but instead as members of one and the same community. Some, moreover, managed to get identity cards, and no longer considered themselves refugees, nor could they be easily distinguished from the local Zambian population, unless reported by fellow villagers. The difficulties that the Zambian government come across in their handling of the refugees created tensions between the objectives of the

Zambian government attempts to lead Southern Africa's humanitarian struggles and the administrative complications presented by unruly refugees that wanted instant recognition as Zambians (Freedom House, 2012).

More significantly though, Zambian national-identity gained a reputation for introversion in opposition to the large quantity of refugees that used ancestral tribal relationships to seek refuge in modern Zambia. Indeed, an up-to-date historic assessment of Zambian national-identity is that, it is an oasis of tranquil national-identity administration in a region of turmoil. Under the successive presidencies of Kenneth Kaunda, Frederick Chiluba, Levy Mwanawasa, Rupiah Banda, Michael Sata, Guy Scott and, Edgar Lungu, Zambian-Humanism although silent in the national discourse has tempered internal ethnic discord, and assuaged any damaging nationalisms that have extended the turmoil of wars in Southern Africa. Unwittingly, Zambian national-identity is seen as a cohesive counter-balance to the proxy fuelled nationalist wars of the region.

6. Study Population, Sampling Method and Preliminary Findings

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the Study Population, selection, framing mechanism and methods used for assembling the data. This covers the research approach and design, population, sample and sampling procedure. This chapter explains the rationale behind the study-design choices, the research instrument, and data collection analysis procedure. It examines some unexpected statistical discoveries which help in the understanding of national-identity administration. Further, it examines he relationship between number of identity management professionals working in the nationality and citizenship departments and the volume of grievances recorded by citizens of the country.

6.2. Research Approach

I adopted the qualitative approach for the study to elicit information from respondents on the relevance of identity management and its effect on development in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. This research approach lays emphasis on making meaning through inductive logic, interaction and verbal narratives rather than interpreting quantitative statistical question and answer responses. The aim was to pursue responses to established academic assumptions and philosophies underpinning individual identity, nation-identity, nationalism, and national-identity management in the three study countries. I sought to uncover how the individual circumstances of nation-formation and the ethnic composition of each study country (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia) affected the national-identity management of the polity. Other than Liberia, every Saharan country in Africa became a recognised polity only after WWII. The study nations have both aligning and diverging identity management events in

their histories. All the national-identity management ecosystems and structures used in sub-Saharan Africa are obtained from European nations that have been established as polities long before WWII, thus the approach used considered contemporary insight of the nation-formation process of each of the study nation's given the circumstances of WWII.

Given that the circumstances of sub-Saharan nation-state formation deviated from the trends in Europe, positive mechanisms and negative obstructions to equitable national-identity administration is probed. In particularly the study pursued possible links between nationalism with regards to the respondents opinions on identity management. The research was aimed at an understanding of underlying reasons by way of chronicling incidents and impact of events, why they happened and their effects in the respondents own narration (Given, 2008). According to Plana, Clark and Ivankova (2015), qualitative research is a means of exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to social or human issues. The use of qualitative approach enabled the researcher to convey the views of participants, ask broad questions and collect data consisting largely of words from respondents and analysed to achieve the objectives of the study.

To avoid introducing into the research biased views from the respondents based on irregular sampling, the researcher chose an equal number of respondents from each study country, ten (10) respondents per country. The researcher consciously spread the choices of interviewees from an equal mix of organisational seniority in each of the study nation-state's identity management organisation, two from each seniority grade. According to Berman's study (1998) *'Ethnicity, Patronage And The African State: The*

Politics Of Uncivil Nationalism' and the environment of patronage in sub-Saharan *Africa*: "The colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client relations, and a complex ethnic dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and competition has persisted in post-colonial societies" (p.305). The researcher was thus wary that the interviewees who work predominantly in an environment of patronage might not volunteer for fear of being seen as critical to the governing administration, fearful of recriminatory repercussion for expressing their real views or as Bryman (2003) warns, there was the risk of heeding to 'loud voices over loud minds' (p.73) and over-rely on volunteers who may benefit from the patronage by giving glowing responses.

6.3. Research Design

The research design adopted for the study was a Narrative Study Model. The Narrative Model is explained as 'giving a descriptive account to the experience of situations which may seem superficially similar but have distinctive consequences' (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 357). As a result of the 1884 Berlin Conference and abrupt creation of national frontiers in Africa, and subsequent colonisation, and formation of modern nation-states, state-craft, and identity management administration of sub-Saharan nation-states is sometimes viewed inaccurately through a rigorous time-machine commencing with the arrival of Europeans on the continent. Legitimate identities began in Africa with ethnic nations long before the disruption of the 1884 Berlin Conference and its effect on ethnic nations. According to Davidson (1995), subtle socio-economic realities overlapping with violent conflicts, the clash of cultures and the compromise of evolving communities with modernity means that the narrative approach is best suited the study. Collectively, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia have

a history of colonisation, intra-continental and extra-continental migration. Primarily, through the narration of the sequence of events and circumstances one can uniformly recount the period from pre-nationhood to nation-states, primarily, especially underlining the significance and importance of events captured as signposts to the present-day outcome of the national-identity ecosystems in use.

All the study countries have experienced clashes of ethnic communities and territorial nationalism, with a declared political intention of fulfilling national development as a goal. However, similar experiences in different communities often lead to different outcomes with varying degrees of impact, social change and national-identity management ecosystems. It is therefore important in social science research to keep observations within the perspectives of the cultural context (Porta and Keating, 2008). It is these comparable human consequences overtime in communities that exposes the distinctions that requires analysis (Clandinin and Connelly, 2004). Narrative Study model is an appropriate design when among other things researchers want to 'cover contextual conditions because they believe they are relevant to the phenomenon and context' (Polkinghorne, 1998, p. 360). This research utilized the narrative model to obtain an in-depth understanding that will facilitate recounting similarities in observations and contrasts in episodes. The narrative model maintains that the research question, the relevance of identity management and its effect on development, can be explored in each study nation-state in the appropriate circumstances as multiple case studies. The narrative model used for this study explores the aligning associations and describes the diverging events leading to the present-day outcomes.

6.4.   Study Population

A modern polity's nation-identity-management eco-system is made up of various government organisations. In the study countries the study population was taken from the government organisations responsible for identity-management ecosystem. Although there were slight differences between the operations of equivalent organisations in the study countries, the functions were near-enough identical. The study found the following organisations within the identity management eco-system in each study country.

1. National-identity Authority Registry

2. Births and Deaths Department

3. Passport Office

4. Electoral Management Authority

5. Social Security and Tax Identification

Countries, and Organisations	National-identity Management Personnel	
Liberia		
Identity Management Organisation	**Identity Management Professionals of Organisation**	**Total National-identity Management Professionals**
National ID	645	
Births and Deaths	52	
Electoral management Body	922	1,942
Passport Office	245	
Social Security and Tax Identification	78	
Sierra Leone		
Identity Management Organisation	**Identity Management Professionals of Organisation**	**Total National-identity Management Professionals**
National ID	536	
Births and Deaths	218	
Electoral Management Body	1,024	2,035
Passport Office	136	
Social Security and Tax Identification	121	
Zambia		
Identity Management Organisation	**Identity Management Professionals of Organisation**	**Total National-identity Management Professionals**
National ID	2,412	
Civil Register - Births and Death		
Electoral Management Body	1,107	3,680
Passport Office	68	
Social Security and Tax Identification	93	
Totals		**7,657**

Table 1: Summary of Study Population

Given that the national organisations within the identity management eco-system are reflected in each study country, an analysis of the number of active identity management professionals in each country *vis-à-vis* the country's population was examined to explore the influence of active number of identity management professionals on the efficacy of the national-identity management of each the study country. The ratio of active identity management professionals to the general population is found in Table 1. An interesting statistic in terms of professional-to-population was observed in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Both countries had experienced civil wars, and established Reconciliation Commissions that pointed in part to ethnic prejudices that fermented imbalanced identity-management structures that eventually led to the wars. Therefore, it would be expected that government policies would be directed into improving national-identity management structures.

The ratio of identity management professionals to population size (1:N), is higher in both Liberia and Sierra Leone to that of Zambia (1:2,523.17), (1:3,734.64) respectively. Zambia's ratio of identity management professional to population size is lower, (1:4,646.74) as shown in Table 2. Zambia, nevertheless has never experienced a civil war.

Country	National Population[44]	Number of Identity Management Professionals	Ratio of Identity Management Professionals to population
Liberia	4.9m	1,942	1: 2,523.17
Sierra Leone	7.6m	2,035	1: 3,734.64
Zambia	17.1m	3,680	1: 4,646.74
Totals		**7,657**	

Table 2: Ratio of Identity Management Professional to Population Size

As demonstrated in Table 3, the researcher grouped all identity management professionals, which is the study population under the identity management organisation in the study countries. This compared the nation's allocation of professionals to the identity management specialty. Zambia crucially combines National Identification Registrar with the Births and Deaths Registry as a single speciality. Although all the study countries seek to resolve questions of national-identity and citizenship at some point, the Zambian eco-system by combining the Birth and Death speciality with National-identity , acknowledges at birth the belonging a legitimate identity to the Zambian nation, irrespective of the ethnic and cultural identity of the birth. The essential lesson is that in young and colonially created polities such as found in sub-Saharan Africa, questions of identification, privileges and responsibilities of identity and citizenship should be resolved at birth.

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[44] Latest UN estimates of 2019

Category		Number of Personnel
■	National ID Exclusive Functions – Liberia and Sierra Leone	1,181
■	National ID, Combined Functions with Births and Deaths - Zambia	2,412
■	Births and Deaths Exclusive Functions – Liberia and Sierra Leone	270
■	Electoral Management Body	3,053
■	Passport Office	449
■	Social Security and Tax Identification	292
Study Population Identity Management Professionals in study countries		**7,657**

Table 3: Identity Management Professional in the Different Specialities

As demonstrated in Table 3, the overwhelming statistics and allocation of professionals to Election Management Bodies in all the study nations demonstrates a preoccupation in all the study nations with the management of identities for the purposes of conducting elections. The combined analysis of Table 3 and Chart 1 shows for all the study nations, Electoral Management Bodies account for forty percent (40%), of all identity management professionals in the study countries.

Chart 1: Identity Management Professionals Within the Identity Management Eco-system

In the Liberian statistics, as shown in Chart 2, identity management professionals involved in Election Management account for forty-seven percent (47%), of the nation's identity management professionals.

	Category	Number of Personnel
	National ID	645
	Births and Deaths	52
	Electoral Management Body	922
	Passport Office	245
	Social Security and Tax Identification	78
	Total in Identity Management	1,942

Chart 2: Summary of Identity Management Professionals in Liberia

The Sierra Leone the allocation of identity management professionals to Election Management as shown in Chart 3 is even higher at fifty percent (50%). The implication is that successive the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone are comparatively more concerned with legitimacy of identities for electoral purposes than other functions of nation-identity.

	Category	Number of Personnel
	National ID	536
	Births and Deaths	218
	Electoral Management Body	1,024
	Passport Office	136
	Social Security and Tax Identification	121
	Total in Identity Management	2,035

Chart 3: Summary of Identity Management Professionals in Sierra Leone

What is noteworthy in the Zambian national-identity management eco-system observed from Chart 4 is that, the Zambian structure commits sixty-six percent (66%), of Zambia's identity management professionals into resolving questions of nation-identity, citizenship, privileges and responsibilities at birth discussed further in Chapter 7, Zambia also commits the lowest number of professionals to the Social Security and Taxation speciality of identity Management. A comparison of each study nation's allocation of professionals to Social Security and Taxation is still low, demonstrating that the economy of all the study nations cannot be efficiently identifying and collecting national taxes, indeed none of the countries have a Social security safety net for the unemployed.

	Category	Number of Personnel
	National ID	2,412
	Births and Deaths	
	Electoral Management Body	1,107
	Passport Office	68
	Social Security and Tax Identification	93
	Total in Identity Management	3,680

Chart 4: Summary of Identity Management Professionals in Zambia

Zambia has seventy-two indigenous ethnic nations within its modern polity, treble the number of different ethnic nations of Liberia or Sierra Leone, with sixteen each. Of the three thousand six-hundred and eighty (3,680) identity management professionals, Zambia allocates 66% of them to resolving national-identity at birth. By resolving national-identity at birth, the Zambia has not experienced a confrontation between ethnic communities strong enough to cause a civil war. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 6 it was a member of the Lozi royal clan that took up the legal defence on behalf of Kaunda against Chiluba's attempt to de-nationalise him. Privileges such as free education and health access are received at birth and the state-protection from child trafficking is also resolved at birth.

6.5. Sample Population

The sample population consists of thirty (30) identity management professionals taken from the study population. They are the respondents to the questionnaire and interview posed by the researcher. The sample population is comprised of identity management professionals from each organisation in each study country. As shown in Table 4, the sample population is made up of two (2), particular professionals from each nations identity management organisation. The following five category of roles amounted to ten (10) respondents per country:

    i.   Registration and Data collection

    ii.   Authentication, Investigation and Validation

    iii.   Legal representation

    iv.   Purchasing and Administration of the national-identity document

    v.   System technology and engineering

Roles of Interviewees Identity National-identity Management	Study Country	Number of Interviewees	Total Interviewees
Registration/ Data Collection	Liberia	2	10
Authentication / Investigation / Validation		2	
Legal Representation		2	
Purchasing/Administration of the document / system		2	
Technology / Engineering		2	
Registration/ Data Collection	Sierra Leone	2	10
Authentication / Investigation / Validation		2	
Legal Representation		2	
Purchasing/Administration of the document / system		2	
Technology / Engineering		2	
Registration/ Data Collection	Zambia	2	10
Authentication / Investigation / Validation		2	
Legal Representation		2	
Purchasing/Administration of the document / system		2	
Technology / Engineering		2	
		Sample Population	30

Table 4: Identity Summary of roles and strata of Respondents

6.6. Characteristics of Sample Population

Given that all the Respondents are civil or public servants, experienced in implementing rather than formulating policy, the study recognised the possibility of obtaining functional operational responses to the questionnaire based on the operations of their national-identity organisation. The study recognised that all the Respondents would have varying degrees of influence from indigenous ethnic backgrounds that defined their identities, yet in parallel would have the legal identity of the study nation. In focusing on obtaining undiluted and uncompromised views and

opinions, administrators with under five years length in their identity management roles were considered insufficiently experienced and thus avoided. Nevertheless, as all the Respondents were volunteers there was a conscious effort to avoid a bias in generation and include age ranges between 30 to 60 years. The study population of both Sierra Leone and Zambia, had national-identity management professionals that were born during the British colonial administration and would have therefore experienced the transition from colonial identity administration into independent Sierra Leone. Liberia however, has had self-governance since 1847, and none of the study population have memory of colonial, pre-declaration of independence administration. The sample population of volunteers and Respondents in the three study countries all required tertiary education to be employed in their roles. The study thus benefited from interviewing respondents that had a minimum of a first degree.

Country	Total Sample Population	Male Sample Population	Female Sample Population
Liberia	10	10	0
Sierra Leone	10	8	2
Zambia	10	7	3
Totals	30	25	5

Table 5 – Breakdown of Male and Female respondents

As shown in Table 5, twenty-five of the thirty respondents that volunteered to be interviewed were male. The Liberian study population had no female Director, the study was thus unable to interview any female from Liberia.

The entire number of identity management professionals working in these five (5) organisations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia amounted to seven thousand, six-hundred and fifty-seven (7,657). The study population is taken from the workers of these identity management organisations in the study countries. It does not include temporary contractors not involved in the core activity of the organisation found in Table 1. It was from this seven thousand six-hundred and fifty-seven (7,657), sample population that the sample population was obtained.

6.7.   Sample and Sampling Technique

The purposive sampling technique was used to select three countries namely Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia as the study area. These three countries were purposively selected because the respondents from these countries could provide the needed information for the successful conduct of the study. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, (2009) assert that purposive sampling is fundamental for the collection of data from respondents who are in the best position to offer valuable information for the study. In recognition of the five main departments within each identity management organisation in the study nations, the stratified sampling technique was then used to put the respondents in five (5) strata namely:

i. Directors and Heads Organisations,

ii. Heads of Departments,

iii. Middle Management,

iv. Supervisors and Sectional Heads,

v. Operators

The simple random sampling was used to select two (2) respondents from each strata in each country as shown in Table 4. This gave a total sample of ten (10) from each country. The sampled size of the study from the three countries consisted of thirty (30). The use of the simple random sampling technique offered all participants with an equal opportunity to be selected for the study (Kumekpor, 2002). The respondents selected had varying levels of work experience but all had a minimum of 5 years' experience in their roles, some with as much as 18 years. This was to enable the researcher obtain fresh angles of approach about the relevance of identity management and its effect on development in the study countries. A summary of the categories of respondents that made up the sample size hence interviewed is presented in Table 3.

6.8. Instrument

The data collection tool was a semi structured interview guide, specifically in-person interviews. Johnson and Christensen (2016) define in-person interviews as "interviews that are done face-to-face" (p. 231). They assert that 'the interviewer enters the interview session with a plan to explore specific topics and to ask specific open-ended questions of the interviewee" (p. 236). This offers the respondents the opportunity to speak out on the issues that concern them and to construct an agenda on matters of importance rather than the researcher imposing their own views (Merriam,1998). The interview guide was divided into two sections A and B. Section A consisted of questions on Bio-graphic data of respondents which would remain confidential to the Researcher and Supervisor(s) only, as the agreement to participate in the study. Section B asked questions that sought to answer questions raised by the study.

The use of this approach enabled the researcher to have a predetermined set of interview questions while having the flexibility of asking the questions in any order and the ability to change the wording. Johnson and Christensen (2016) noted: "strength of interviews is that a researcher can freely probe to obtain response, clarity or additional information" (p. 231). Interviews were used in this study since they generally yielded the most cooperative respondents, offered high quality responses and took advantage of interviewer presence. Interview enabled multi-method data collection in that they combined questioning, cross-examination, and probing techniques (Berg, 2007). The research instrument was reviewed by University of Derby to ascertain its reliability and validity. Ethical clearance was also sought and approval obtained from University of Derby.

6.9. Data Collection Procedure

Each country was visited and permission was sought from the head of management of the various organisations involved in the study which includes, National Identification Authority, Passport Office, Registrar of Birth and Deaths, and Electoral Management Bodies to do a face to face interview with some of the staff based on the objectives of the study. Written permission was granted and dates and times were scheduled with the staff of each organisation in each department in each country. The first interview was conducted in Liberia followed by Sierra Leone then Zambia. In each organization, employees from five different departments namely, registration/ data collection, authentication/ certification/ investigation/ validation, legal representation, purchasing/administration of the identity document / system and technology / engineering were interviewed. Data was thus collected using tape recorder and note-taking.

Each interview with each respondent was scheduled over two (2), days. The subject of National-identity Management in countries that had previously experienced civil wars and turbulent election cycles was sensitive. The respondents were working in government departments, some reputed to have nepotistic employment and promotion opportunities. The subject matter involved both professional and personal reflections, it was vital to get the respondents relaxed so that the researcher could get over the initial mechanical answers to questions (Patton, 2002). Although all respondents volunteered willingly to be interviewed, some displayed initial signs of anxiety. The researcher had to reassure those respondents that notwithstanding their information being part of the research findings, links to their identity would be anonymised. The first day was used to plan the purpose of the interview with the involvement of the respondent. The researcher framed the interactive question and answer process with the respondent. This gave respondents the opportunity to get use to the use of the tape-recorder (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). On the second day of the interviews all the respondents were more relaxed especially when the interviews were scheduled outside the office premises.

6.10. Informed consent of the respondents

According to Plano, Clark and Creswell (2015) researchers are expected to obtain consent from all those who are directly involved in the research before collecting data. The aim of the informed consent is to show respect to the respondents and make them feel free to make independent decisions without fear of negative consequences. The respondents were asked to sign consent forms for the interview and for tape recording of the interview. The researcher ensured that the respondents had access to relevant information prior to signing the consent form. This was to ensure that the respondents

understood what was involved and willingly agree to participant in the study. By this, the respondents were also given the ultimate right to halt or walk out of the interview section at any time should they want to. (please find attached as appendix a sample of the consent forms signed by the respondents)

6.11. Confidentiality and Anonymity

Participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. All the respondents were informed that only the researcher and the supervisors will have access to the recordings and the transcript. Anonymity was ensured so that respondents could not be identified with the responses. Some of the respondents wanted to understand how their identities would be anonymised to avoid detection and unwarranted discrimination. The researcher explained in detail that no names would be used. Randomised numbers would replace the respondents' names. The respondents were also informed that in addition to the elimination of their names, nether their organisation nor department in which they worked would be mentioned in the research report. This is to protect their reputation as individuals and their organizations as a whole.

6.12. Data Analysis.

The researcher employed thematic analysis to analyse the interview data. The key points emerging from the interviews were reported in narrative form based on the aims of the study. Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 79) define thematic analysis as "a method of identifying, analyzing and reporting themes or patterns within data". The purpose of thematic analysis is to search through data to identify any recurrent patterns. This process involved familiarization with the data, identifying a thematic framework for the

data and indexing or coding of data. The interview data was recorded and transcribed before analysing.

6.13. Attribution of Narrative Quotes

The respondents were interviewed from all the three study countries. For the purpose of narration, respondents from Liberia are prefixed A, those from Sierra Leone are prefixed B and finally respondents from Zambia are prefixed C. For greater anonymity, the numbers following the prefix are not researcher allocated. The respondents balloted from a sealed box for the number to be used for quotation attribution. Thus, the balloted non-sequential numbers 1 - 60 are used to anonymise respondents' identity and avoid identification as per the agreement for their contribution of views to the study. Thirty (30) of the sixty (60), numbers remain unassigned.

6.14. Introduction to Preliminary Findings

The preliminary findings of the Study varied between the study-countries depending on the obvious visibility of central government authority from district to district throughout the country. Additionally, some of the central government structures in Liberia and Sierra Leone such as passport application offices was not replicated at the local administrative level. Zambia's central government structures were replicated at every administrative level, nevertheless the effectiveness each locality's management of national-identity varied between districts. Additionally, in Liberia and Sierra the concept nationalism and national-identity exhibited by the presence of central governance structures particularly in the areas where the civil war was at its fiercest, such national-identity structures like Births and Deaths and Passport Offices was completely absent. In these frontier-straddling ethnic communities, the efficiency of

central government identification systems was nearly non-existent rather ethnic identity allegiance to the ethnic overlord of the community was apparent. Zambia, that has never experienced a civil war, the authority and structures of the central government was more visible and national-identity administration such as the application for passports could commence from the far-flung ends of the country.

The preliminary findings are categorised according to the penetration, efficiency, challenges and effects of central government's identity management policies and processes on all communities of the nation. These may be used in the future to formulate identity management systems, tools and assessments by governments in sub-Saharan Africa.

6.15. Penetration of Identity Management Tools

Mandatory registration is neither enforced nor strictly necessary

In each study country, the importance of national-identity registration or a 'National-identity Register' was not appreciated by the entire nation-community until the lack of an official national-identity token impacted their daily lives. As the normal daily lives of rural communities involved less contact with the institutions of the nation-state, the penetration of national identification registration was reduced in the rural communities. Most of the people in the rural communities of the study countries do not have proof of a legal/ national-identity because they do not register their births, rather the first contact with an institution of the nation-state in the form of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education is when their child requires healthcare or is attending school for the first time. Penetration was however higher in urban communities where most births occurred in hospitals and interaction with nation-state institutions was more prevalent.

The attainment of a personal identity, ethnic or community identity obtained by the recognition of the immediate community was sufficient for their daily lives in the rural communities and often substituted for national-identity registration.

The study discovered that the density of populations and the proximity of the different ethnic communities that congregate in the cities encouraged a higher penetration of national identification registration in the form of birth certificates and national ID cards. Ethnic identity that may have prevented national registration had less impact in urban communities than in the rural areas where stereotypical ethnic caricatures had more meaning and ancestry could be used as a means of delineation from the nation-community. There is also a predominance of hospital births in organized urban communities, birth registration and contact with institutions of the nation-state was consistent and methodical, the penetration was thus higher.

Registration linked to politics, governance and community affiliations

The study uncovered that where ethnic communities in rural or urban areas had been segregated because of a national border the penetration fluctuated between election cycles. The registration and therefore penetration was linked to electoral candidates encouraging national registration for a greater number of community inhabitants to exercise suffrage recognition. As a result of the link to powerful political positions and nepotistic benefits in these communities, legal nationality infractions were ignored and evidence of ethnic and community identity, mostly informal was substituted for nation-identity. It is these infractions that germinate future hostility between national and ethnic identities. The study also found an additional effect from political influence. Political representation in the institutions of state encourages national-identity

registration. The penetration of national-identity registration was low within communities that had lost confidence or did not have a close enough association with the national ruling elite. The predominance of ethnic and religious subjectivity also affected the penetration. In communities that have had historic destructive encounters with the governing elite of have alternative faith such as Christian versus Muslim or minority communities in a predominantly different faith environment to the governing elite do not register for nation-identity. The confidence in the national government institutions to look after the interest of the community's inhabitants even in innocuous communities such as Jehovah Witness that forbids political activity of the faithful affects the penetration of nation-identity. Indeed, the penetration was even lower when the cultural leadership such as a traditional chief is deemed as hostile to the political administration.

6.16. Efficiency of Identity Management Tools

A consistent, efficient and integrated identity management eco-system maintained by a national organization was non-existent in each study country. Registration data and details obtained by one agency and relevant to the operations of another nation-state agency or organization was neither consistently nor regularly shared. In their operational duties an individual identity management institution or organization relied on the registrant or applicant to provide breeder documents to qualify for registration into the database of the its own realm of identity management. Election Management Authorities in Liberia and Sierra Leone could accept a national passport as proof of identity sufficient to be registered as a voter. However, the EMA is not in receipt of the data on passports issued by the Passport Authority. The EMA further refuse to accept passports are no longer valid for travel because its validity period for travel is expired.

The efficiency of the identity management eco-system of the nation-state is thus disputed. Should the travel privilege of the passport holder that is expired because the holder had no need to travel, concurrent the expiration of the identity of the passport holder attested by the historic issuance of the passport? An efficiently integrated national-identity eco-system would have made this a mute issue. The confirmation of a valid national-identity conferred on a person, for which the privilege to travel has been dispensed in the form of a passport cannot expire other than through the death of the identity. The interrogation of the identity prior to the issuance of the privilege by Passport Authority should be the issue of interest to the EMA and not the validity of the privilege which can expire. Similarly, it was discovered that the efficiency of identity documents with a finite period of validity was inefficient. As identities are unique an identity represented by a valid identity document such as a birth certificate continues to be valid even in death as it describes the identity which is no longer mortal but ceases to be mortal with a death certificate. A national-identity card that expires has ambiguous efficiency with a start date a validity period and an expiry date.

Additional evidence of inefficient national-identity management eco-system was exhibited in the inability of some sectional identity management organisations to probe historic national-identity documents. The issued documents to registrants and applicants either because of archival or communication challenges between the organisations is unable to be authenticated. In some instances, the veracity of the breeder document could not be verified. Governments have cyclically changed and modified nationality laws so often that the change has occasioned modifications in the actual national-identity document. The organisation either is unable to retrospectively interpret the change of legislation or proactively accept the validity of the older

document. The efficiency of an identity management systems is in doubt when the decisions on granting of privileges of identification is based on the discretionary whim of officers. The demander of the privilege to participate in a particular activity must be given the privilege immediately the identification process is complete.

All the study countries had recorded various degrees of technology failure in particular with the biometric finger print scanners, unable to function properly when used in a rural area with a dominance of menial farm workers. The study found that some grantors of privileges of identification, such as Driver's Licence Authorities could not complete the identification process because of inappropriate and technology. In Zambia the validity of a 'smart' Driver's Licence required that the police access the database electronically. Not all rural areas had internet connectivity. The granting of the privilege to drive was thus discretionary at the point of inspection. The holder may have been disqualified without the knowledge of the policeman inspecting the driving licence. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, a blockchain issued identity card has the identification (components of identity) data, and capacity to drive (testing components) data of the bearer stored by different government departments. A policeman performing a spot-check and decoding the authenticity of this type of privilege card does not possess the technology to simultaneously check with both government departments that the driver is either a legal identity or has passed the requisite competence tests. The capacity and efficiency to use blockchain technology is dependent on governments installing extensive networks constantly that are ever-functioning. In Liberia that uses a lower grade, single department contact for electronic validation, at the office of the National Identification, can only do so between 08:00hrs to 17:00hrs on weekdays. Banks that are required to give service to people based on

electronic cards do so without electronic validation at the discretion of the teller having only visually inspected the card presented.

6.17. Challenges of Identity Management Tools

Recurrent tension between ethnic communities.

Irrespective of either colonization or the introduction of an alien ethnic community, each of the study countries has experienced tension between the indigenous ethnic communities within the nation-state. In Liberia the tension between the Krahn and Gio people was a component in the instability of the Samuel Doe government that eventually spilled into twenty-two years of civil war and complete breakdown of national-identity management. Prince Johnson a Gio, had personally benefited under the government of Samuel Doe a Krahn. After the coup-d'état that overthrew the oppression of the Americo-Liberian dominated government, ethnic community that had never experienced any of their kin amongst the political elite nor governing class of the nation-state since 1820 now shared the reigns of national government after the coup-d'état that overthrew the oppression of the Americo-Liberian dominated government. No sooner had both indigenous communities shared political power than ethnic fuelled accusations of a counter-coup to overthrow Samuel Doe surfaced. Prince Johnson was the causality of the accusations and was expelled from the army. Subsequent investigations revealed encouragement for the counter-coup came from the American Secret Service, aghast at the loss of control over Liberia. Nevertheless, notorious old rivalries between the Krahn and Gio both minority ethnic communities, was exploited by the American Secret Service. The two ethnic communities of modern Liberia still overwhelmingly identify with their ethnic nationalities over their national identities. In

Zambia, there continues to be rivalry between the Bemba and the Lozi communities for domination.

In Sierra Leone, the rivalry between the Mende, Temne and Limba exploded following the attainment of independence from the British. The indigenous power bases had been sustained separately as 'Protectorates', whereas the British kept the Krios they had were chaperoned into the territory under a different administration – the Colony. There was no geographical delineation between various British categorized identities, whereas the indigenous people were British Protected Persons within the ill-defined rural Protectorate the Krios remained in the superior British subject category within the same geographical confines. During the colonial period, the external influence of the British presence prevented overt rivalry. Indeed, the collective repugnance by all inhabitants of Sierras Leone for the colonial Hut Tax galvanized and forged a unity of rebellion. This unity was lost on the assumption of the second President of the newly independent Sierra Leone, Albert Margai's Mende clan dominated all the positions of political power. Identity as an ethnic national or identity a national of Sierra Leone continued to be tense.

Recurrent tension between ethnic nationality and national identities

Although the nation-state of Zambia has not experienced a successful coup d'état, the situation was no less ethnic tension free. Since the rejection of Kaunda's Zambian Humanism, the Lozi have been advocating for ethnic recognition as 'a nation within a nation'. The preferential treatment given to Lozi royalty over rival indigenous communities by the governments of BSAC and subsequently by the British colonial government developed into a cultural discord of loyalties between ethnic or national

allegiances of the Lozi ethnic community. This brings to fore the use of oral tradition versus written accounts as a means of keeping record. One of the collateral effects of the close association between the colonial governments and the Lozi was the Lozi community acquisition of written records of their cultural practices very early in their interactions. The lack of written evidence of the cultural practices of the other ethnic communities, shored up by oral tradition, should in no way suggest the absence of any culture or at worst an inferior cultural heritage. In modern Zambia Lozi nationalism advocates for autonomy from Zambia.

Anxiety during elections

The study found increased levels of anxiety during election cycles. All governments of modern nation-states require legitimacy. In all the study countries this legitimacy is supported by cycles of elections. The turnout during these election cycles commence with registration unto the Voter's Register leading up the election day itself. The study found that most of the rhetoric used by politicians during election cycles were as mechanisms to build networks of patronage based on ethnicity. Late in 2015 the run-up to the bye-elections in Kono, a constituency in Sierra Leone, witnessed ethnic clashes within the mixed community sufficiently violent to necessitate the national army drafted in to support the local police. In Liberia, since the end of the civil war, the elections have been marred by ethnic violence. Various communities across the nation-state, particularly the youth, are energised by politicians to get registered and vote for the candidates they support and intimidate opposition party supporters. This has led to recurring registration and re-registration exercises by incumbent governments as they distrust the Voter's Register that brought them power, and attempt to re-register new voters based on the attainment of voting age, thus

supressing the registration in communities that are unlikely to support their candidacy. The study found that tensions leading to violence around the electoral cycles stemmed from ethnic rivalry, a desire to by the politicians to unfairly stimulate new voters into fanatical support, and supress opposing support from the rival competing political camps. The eventual outcome is a distrust of the results by the losing candidate.

The study found that one of the consequences of urbanisation, was the abandonment by the youth of their indigenous identity anchors. Senior political office holders, having been elected to office in the 2016 Zambia electoral cycle used the youth to foster electoral violence based on perceived ethnic divisions but abandoned them after the elections. The allegiance of the migrated youth into the cities had neither the ethnic identity anchors of their origins nor the philosophy of Zambian Humanism to moderate their interactions with other Zambians. The accusations of national-identity dishonesty levelled at two of Zambia's recent national presidents, Kaunda and Chiluba, one being the first president precipitated a period of identity instability. The sense of belonging of the urban youth to the ethnic indigenous communities had been severed and the national-identity management eco-system no longer had the national patria of Zambian Humanism as its foundation. The Zambian nation made up of seventy-three (73), ethnic nations had alienated the urbanised youth. The current generation of youth in Zambia demonstrated little understanding of Zambian Humanism, as the first generation of youth that matured into the national leaders of Zambia. Given the use of inappropriate identity management tools that ignored patria, nation-community nurturing, and lacked cultural ethnic identity values the youth community in the cities of Zambia were easily provoked into electoral violence by unscrupulous politicians using aggressive ethnic rhetoric.

Outdated technology and African unmodified biometric classification

The study found that the challenges encountered by the use of outdated technology was not alleviated by the use of modern technology. Rather the ease of discrimination offered by the use colonial identity-management tools had been replaced by European based biometric tools that offered another set of discriminatory segregation of menial workers from office and city communities. In all the study countries there was a use of fingerprint biometric technology. The capturing of fingerprints in rural communities that had a predominance of farming and menial labourer was always problematic as the biometric capture equipment did not always work reliably in those communities. Not only were officers reluctant to be posted to these communities for data collection but the data obtained from these communities was less accurate than the city dwellers and could be manipulated subsequently.

Lack of clarity of nationals living abroad – dual nationality etc.

None of the study countries had a comprehensive national-identity plan for nationals living abroad. The reverse challenges of colonisation and post-colonisation was being faced by these modern nation-states. What was the category of nationals of people willingly identifying as nationals of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Zambia but living abroad? The collection of data itself in the Missions abroad was the first challenge, but more poignantly what was the category of national were they? The study found that the concept of dual-nationality, participation and inclusion had been ignored.

6.18. Effects of Identity Management Tools

Uniformity of National Identification

Whereas the study found inherent tensions caused by ethnic differences, colonial antecedent and other historic reasons, by the development and cohesion of a national-identity in all the study countries, the study similarly found that there was unanimity in the illustration of a national-identity token. Once a national identification project had been accepted and steered through the institutions of governance such as Parliament, in all the study countries, the national-identity token was identical irrespective of the social position of the holder. The effect is a classless recognition and association of the token when in use.

Confirmation of identity data

The use of a national-identity token also had the effect of confirming the data of the holder for the purpose of granting a privilege such as a passport for travel or a building permit to construct a dwelling. Irrespective of the length of time it took to confirm the data of the holder, such as date of birth or address, once confirmed there was no longer a doubt about the veracity of the data and thus the qualification for the privilege requested. This is because there is a central database that stores the information of each entry and thus each individual identity in the same format. The process for the retrieval of information for identification and recognition is also the same for each entry. The study found that a national-identity management project stimulated patria amongst the nationals of the nation-state.

Accessibility of social services e.g. health

The study found that the access to state services such as health and social security was also improved with the use of a national-identity token. There was less effort and resources used in identifying the demander and thus a concentration of effort on delivery of the service by the nation-state. This effect was better management of the nation-state's resources.

7. Discussions and Analysis

7.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the findings from the qualitative research carried out in Liberia Sierra Leone, and Zambia as part of the research to complete the study. As noted in Chapter 6, the qualitative method of analysis was adopted for this research because it would help the research to avoid bias and address the issue of validity, therefore, underlining objectivity and ethical factors that this thesis aims to maintain. The Respondents are all professionals and operational specialists working within the identity management intuitions and ecosystems in the study countries. The institutions of the national-identity eco-system include Births and Deaths, National Identification Authorities, Passport Offices and Social Security and National Taxation Offices. The aim is to obtain the Respondents' understanding of identity management and how functional the identity management eco-system is in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

As stated in Chapter 1 there are challenges in transforming the component identities within the colonial boundaries with the use of unsuitable European identity management structures in the nation-states selected for this study. Moreover, the fundamental impediment to their development is their inability to transform these component ethnic identities and colonial identity structures into national-identities. (Also see Deng et al.) The inherited colonial identity management structures and ecosystems were focused on differences used to isolate individuals from their communities, emphasising the disparities in the component identities and communities within the colonial territories, whereas the indigenous identity systems were based on the notion of the ethnic-nation as a community and the recognition parity of privilege.

The chapter will present the in-depth views in thematic clusters against the backdrop of the aims and objectives of the study. These thematic clusters are:

i.   The development of identity management tools for the nation-state.

ii.   The efficiency of imported national-identity structures for national development.

iii.   The challenges faced by the people of the nation-state and the administrators of the structures of the nation-identity.

iv.   The effect of unsuited national-identity management systems on the development in these countries.

The themes directly address the nature of the relevance of the identity management eco-system in the development of the respective countries of the respondents. The identification eco-system in each study country manages multiple ethno-lingua communities with dissimilar traditions and divergent cultures. The identity management regimes of each of the study countries is within the static geographic borders of their nation-states. The governance objectives that the national-identity management eco-system operates is analysed against the backprop of the aims and objectives of the study. The thematic clusters highlight areas of achievement, and of concern, that can contribute to future policy formulation and choice of identity management systems in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter however begins with a broad-spectrum of views from the professionals and their understanding of identity-management and its effect on the development of their countries.

7.2.   General views and understanding of Identity Management

Respondent C11 of Zambia insisted that the existence and development of their country is inseparable from the identities of communities within the geographically defined Zambia nation-state. Respondent C11 vacillated between the importance of national-identity data as

an instrument for assembling a talent-pool for nation-building and the statistical function to provide community growth data to govern the nation community, maintain the nation-state and administer social order. Respondent C11 asserted that the most important function of the administrative data was to inform the political leaders of the nation-state on the impact of infrastructure, education and health policy on the nation community. In this discussion, Respondent C11 situated the statistical value of identity management as vital.

> "I understand identity and my national-identity to mean my individuality among the combination of tribes and languages that come together under one umbrella as Zambia"
>
> (Respondent C11, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

The discussion led to the importance of the national-identity eco-system data to national policy formation, implementation and evaluation. Irrespective of the political inclination of the government, the governance structures of the nation-state have to track the social footsteps of each citizen and inhabitant of the nation-community. According to Respondent C11 (Lusaka 2019), "it is the people of the nation-state that make it possible for the nation-state to exist." This has been observed by scholars including Honneth (1992) who states that the institutions of the nation-state like all organised societies must recognise every member of the community that they govern since "denying recognition poses the risk of an injury that can cause the identity of the entire person to collapse" (p.189). The national-identity management structures of the nation-state must capture and recognise everyone with equal visibility, inclusivity and benevolence. Anderson (2016) in 'Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism', noted that marginalised communities invisible within the nation's governance structure will purposefully defy government policies

and fuse with other invisible individuals in a merged hostility to defy both the state and national governance.

In Zambia, there is an acknowledged appreciation of the diversity of language, tradition and culture. According to the Zambian Respondent C11 the relationship between the visibility of the individual to the nation-state is underlined by the view that the individual is part of an ethno-lingua culture that is recognised and integral to Zambia:

> "my understanding of national-identity management is the process of providing accurate visibility for every citizen of Zambia irrespective of where they live or community they come from to inform the leaders of our nation on what the developmental needs are for the whole of Zambia."
>
> (Respondent C11, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C11's response equates the importance of unique data identifiers such as name, date and place of birth with an appreciation for the cultural and ethno-lingua diversity of his fellow Zambian citizens. Although Bebbington et al. (2008) challenge the view that in diverse societies, meaningful identities are formed based on the experience and consequential interactions of exclusion, inclusion and marginalization, the study provides information from selected communities, which demonstrates how the formation of hybrids is not eschewed but considered as a natural progression of the nation community (Gilroy, 1997). This is exemplified by the acknowledgement of the seventy-two (72) different indigenous languages that form the nation of Zambia. As if to underline this point, Respondent C11's statement offers the argument that the practical issues of Zambian nation-building supersede any philosophical argument. The response neither defends a strong primordial ethnic expression of nationhood such as the constituent Lozi, and Bemba, nor the other extreme of 'imagined communities' such as the collective solidarity of copper mining communities. Rather,

determined to construct an inclusive national-identity for the future, the Respondent, answered that the national-identity institutions have to recognise the historically weakened nation-state . As earlier noted, other than organising 'worker-brigades' necessary for cooper mining activity, the colonial BSAC Administration did not interfere excessively in the lives and interrelations of the indigenous ethnic communities. The indigenous communities were allowed to continue their pre-colonial inter-relational deference of one another. The symbolic representations of discourse used by the community over time contributes to the national fabric.

Whereas both Liberia and Sierra Leone have had recent violent and protracted civil wars, respondents from both countries make an obvious effort to strictly separate cultural identity from national-identity. According to Respondent B6:

> "My national-identity is **me** as an individual person and how I categorize **me** in interacting with fellow citizens and foreigners, my culture has nothing to do with it. The different cultures and different religions belong to the different ethnic groups in the different provinces and chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. Culture and customs that responsibility is with the Ministry of Youth and culture"
>
> (Respondent B6, Freetown, Sierra Leone 2018)

Similar to Respondent C11, Respondent B6 underscores the importance of unique identifiers to the nation-state. However, the cultural identity of the nationals and inhabitants is seen as an issue to be administered outside the realm of national-identity. In the performance of official duties, state operators are hypersensitive to accusations of ethnic prejudice especially where cultural values such as salutations are linked to specific ethnic cultures. While these values may be varied, the most significant ones in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia relate to the acknowledgment of levels of seniority in society and secondly to the instinctive urge to

avoid discussions on ethnicity. For example, salutations which precede every interaction are exchanged within cultural parameters that signify some of the nuanced indigenous identification processes, which inform present day identity management structures. Equally an unguarded remark by a national-identity officer may be misinterpreted for ethnic bias towards a registrant.

Respondent B6's statement above when he says, "My national-identity is **me** as an individual person and how I categorize **me** in interacting with fellow citizens and foreigners, my culture has nothing to do with it", demonstrates his reluctance to engage in an in-depth discussion with the Researcher on the ethnicity of registrants of national-identity documents. This can be interpreted as either the unavailability of the appropriate tools to accommodate ethnic cultural differences within the national-identity eco-system or a personal unwillingness to tackle a potential minefield. One notes that if built into the national-identity registration process, there was the acknowledgment of the different ethnicities within the nation-state, Respondent B6 would have been capable of a discussing the tensions between ethnic and national identities.

The historical formation of identities, ethnic friction and poor acculturation experience of Sierra Leone culminating in the 1991 to 2002 civil war testifies that there has not been a negotiated national-identity. The generation of people working in the national-identity institutions of both Liberia and Sierra Leone have lived through traumatic civil wars for the best part of their lives, therefore they react sensitively towards discussions on the ethnic diversity of the country. Respondent B15 states:

"In Sierra Leone, we have a hundred and ninety (190), chiefdoms, although most

of the recent chiefdoms were created recently out of political motivation, the older

more established ones from our colonial past are the real custodians of our cultural heritage, they are the closest to people living in the established old communities, they were instrumental in stopping the war, yet they have no official role in the current national identification exercise, nor are they under the administration the Ministry of Youth and Culture"

(Respondent B15, Freetown, Sierra Leone 2018)

Most of the respondents in Sierra Leone, such as B15, recognise the reality of their ethnic diversity, but believe that the responsibility of a resolved national accommodation of their diversity lies with an underutilised and poorly integrated nation-state institution – The Ministry of Youth and Culture, mandated to promote the culture, integration and harmony amongst all ethnic communities. The Ministry of Youth and Culture is not however part of the formal national-identity management eco-system. B15's views were repeated several times by other respondents with varying emphasis.

Although there are seventeen indigenous ethnic groups in Liberia, the ethnic culture that forms part of the identification process is expressed mainly in bipolar terms for purposes of national-identity, one is either Americo-Liberian (Kongo), or Native-Liberian (Murray, 2013). Respondent A52 was resolute in categorising the Liberian identities:

"There are two actual identities in Liberia, Kongo and Native. The Kongo pretend that all Liberians are united under one national-identity, the natives don't have access to any of the benefits of the Kongo"

(Respondent A52, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

During the interview, the Researcher discovered that Respondent A52 directed his irritation at the historical circumstances and the regretful state of Liberia's national-identity structures. This was mainly caused by the fact that the multiple and varied ethnic cultural heritage of the indigenous communities had been submerged into one homogenous 'Native Identity'. Further still, this 'Native Identity' was regarded as inferior to the imported identity of the settler Kongo community. The situation is similar in Sierra Leone because although numerically in the minority, the imported culture of North America and European Black Loyalists into Sierra Leone dominate the national-identity representation and interactions over the indigenous culture. The lack of deference for, and reactions to, representations of indigenous cultural identity demonstrated by the Krio and Kongo in the Sierra Leone and Liberia nation-states respectively, exasperate feelings of disparage. These findings resonate with Anderson's (2016) observations where he states that the marginalisation of communities within polities becomes evident when negative inferences are attributed to a recognised group. Further examples can be found where Respondent B60 from Sierra Leone who had this to say:

> "Our national-identity is really difficult to define, there are those that see Sierra Leone as an African nation, they are the rural tribal folk from the hinterland, they see themselves as Africans and have respect for our traditional chiefs. Then there are the Krios, some see themselves as descendant of Yoruba and others still see themselves as descendants of Europeans, they have disrespect for our traditional culture"
>
> (Respondent B60, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

In Sierra Leone and Liberia perceptions of discrimination and missteps of acculturation fuelled the civil wars (Byron and van de Vijver, 2017). Respondent A52 and B60's responses, echoes Murray's (2013) research findings, the Liberian settler community regarded themselves as

Black-Whites. Dunn and Tarr (1998) affirm that the settler community made no attempt to assimilate with the indigenous communities. They arrived as colonisers intending to impose their ideological social practices by domination and will of force (Doyle, 1986). The evolution of the nation-states of Liberia and Sierra Leone that led to civil wars in each of these countries further reflects Anderson's (2016), position that marginalised communities made up of indigenous people will coagulate and risk peaceful governance in any nation. After the rupture, tremors in national cohesion that begun with the revelations of the 1929 Harvard Research Report (Harvard University, 1929) and the subsequent Doe coup d'état early in 1989, the political leadership did nothing to avert the start of a prophesied civil war only a few months later (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009).

Rodney (2018) articulates historical instances where community customs and traditions were used by colonisers to identify and disproportionally discriminate against certain communities. These easily discernible and marginalised communities were recognised through unique data identifiers, such as names and place of birth. They did not enjoy the same benefits as other sections of the nation-community. In support of both A52 and B60's responses, Liberian Respondent A48 comments that in Liberia, marginalised natives had to ditch their culturally symbolic names to avoid being readily identified as 'inferior natives'. They adopted Americanised names in order to avoid discrimination and enjoy parity of national-identity:

"Truly, until recently if you had a native name you would not be accepted to the Liberian University, even though you are a Liberia citizen, most of the natives that attended University of Liberia before 1980, adopted the Kongo names of the families that they or their parents worked for, Kongo culture is American culture, they don't appreciate even our native names"

(Respondent A48, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

To administer parity to all citizens within any modern nation-state, national-identity management must respect and recognise all legitimate identity cultures and ethnic communities equally. The attempt to acknowledge only numerable data weighted towards or against some sections of the community and divorce cultural identity from national-identity is a fractious exercise in nation-building (Ross, 2001).

Arguably, it is generous to trace the root of black settler culture in both Liberia and Sierra Leone to their celebrated return on ships dubbed the 'Mayflower' and the romanticised pioneering spirit of 'Wilberforce's men' returning to Africa. In reality, these maiden return voyages to Africa were a mish-mash of confused collective and personal objectives, unlike the single-minded objective of their removal as slaves from Africa. The would-be settlers, en-route to the Liberian territory had already fragmented into disagreements about ranks and internal positions aboard The Elizabeth. Soon after their arrival on the Liberian territory the anti-imperial Congress that set up the American Colonisation Society, in a fit of geopolitical correctness, distanced itself from the returnees (Ashmun, 1826). The objectives of the ACS settlers now lacked clarity and was caught between the three extremes of:

  i.   bringing civilisation to the heathen - an imperial objective

  ii.   establishing a 'heathen-free' independent city-state – a colonisation objective or

  iii. escaping the slavery and oppression of American society to achieve actual emancipation – refuge objective (David, 2014).

There was an even less publicised motive of securing an alternative source of more docile slaves, which could not be described as seeking refuge, colonisation, nor imperialistic intentions. The motive had commercial human exploitative objectives (Cropper, 1832). Other colonisation societies, for example, The Maryland Colonisation Society that established the

Republic of Maryland, Kentucky and Mississippi Colonisation societies in Africa, all sprouted up in America with the aim of achieving at least one of the motives of a return to Africa. In Liberia, Respondent A52 states:

> "But they are actually Americans, they practice American culture, they have all their children and family in America and hold American Passports. The Liberia constitution does not recognise dual citizenship, but this does not apply to Kongotown people. They travel with their America passports, they break their journey in Accra then continue the following day with their Liberian passport to Liberia, as if we don't know."
>
> (Respondent A52, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The discussion with Respondent A52 echo Murray's (2013), research findings where the latter suggests that the deliberate formation of 'whiteness' as an ethno-lingua community of Americo-Liberians determined to be segregated from the 'Native community. The ACS promotion of the voyage to Africa and the objectives of the passengers were inconsistent. Some arrived as colonist pseudo-white-Americans who did not accept the permanence of their relocation and the opportunity of establishing a new national culture, but rather perceived it as an African-safari adventure where they could return to their 'home culture' in America should the adventure get sour. The unresolved issue of Liberian national-identity highlighted by Respondent A52 is that the organised ACS returnees and their descendants continue to view themselves as American colonists. When, why and how were these colonists deprived of their source culture and national-identity? Did the founding of the modern nation of Liberia automate a loss of their original national-identity developed in America's slave culture? Could the concept and idea of a dual but evolved national-identity or an accepted process ever have been considered? The formation of a harmonious Liberian nation-state with a national-identity under such unresolved conditions was bound to collapse.

This unresolved primordial versus modern instrumentalist approach to national-identity management bedevils both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other than the indigenous ethnic nations of Sierra Leone and Liberia nation-states, every immigrant since the days of the ACS and SLC was on the quest to find their identity with a nation-state that would accept parity with them. To re-catalogue whole mono-ethnic communities without consultation nor choice that deprived them of their accultured nationality was a reckless undertaking by the nation-states identity management eco-system that was formulated for both modern Sierra Leone and Liberia . Respondent B40 recognises this and responds that:

> "There is definitely a tension between ethnic identity and national-identity, for most Sierra Leoneans their ethnic identity serves them better in their communities. In their villages, they receive better respect from their neighbours and clans' people than they do from people in Freetown where the Krio show respect only to Krio people more than they do to the Fulah or Mende. People see themselves first as Mende, Mandingo, Fula or Krio. They only recognise themselves as Sierra Leoneans when they travel abroad"
>
> (Respondent B40, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

The original voyagers from North America, The British Isles, The Caribbean and other freed slaves from the high seas, met with robust indigenous communities. The colonial government fertilised the formation of quartered townships, segregated colonies and non-descript protectorates (Banton, 1957). Even more peculiar, the national-identity institutions that were formed by the Sierra Leone Company and the subsequent colonial government contrived to place neighbours living in a single hut-compound under different legal-identity systems. The colonialist British subject irrespective of colour, would be bound to British law whilst the British protected person from the hinterland was subject to the laws of the ethnic chiefdom to which

he identified himself with (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilation Commission, 2004). The Krios that settled in the environs of Freetown, were British Subjects. Unlike the Slave Trade period, they arrived in Sierra Leone willingly, leaving behind a co-existence, although unequal, in Europe and North America for the promise of a better life in Africa. The historic conflicts of ethnicity, nationalism and national-loyalty that had been formed by the institutions left unresolved nation- state and nation community. The evolution of the British Colonial territory of Sierra Leone into an independent modern nation-state did not consider the conflicts of perpetuity of allegiance as pointed out by Sipro, (1997). European antipathy for dual nationality with the associated difficulties of a Sierra Leonean polity formed a wedge that prevented a cohesive national-identity. The consensus and formation of a harmonised Sierra Leonean national-identity with a united development agenda was totally imaginary.

Respondent A23 from Liberia states:

> "Since you cannot choose your parents, you cannot choose your identity either,
> to my understanding it is the nationality of your parents that you inherit, yes I
> accept that others change their nationality as they grow, but that is rare, where
> you were born, when you were born, who your parents are and the background,
> this data is the determinant of your national-identity"
>
> (Respondent A23, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A23's comments suggest that national-identity of the inhabitants of modern Liberian territory was pre-determined by the generational nurturing, belonging and allegiance structures. The indigenous identities were thus more enduring than the identities of the voyagers off The Elizabeth, who had their generational development and nurturing process arrested and disrupted by the events of both the Atlantic slave trade and the return of the descendants of the slave victims. Respondent A23's response outlines the statutory and mechanical data used as a qualification for Liberian national-identity, but omits the non-

statutory cultural heritage of the registrant. Statutory national-identity administration thus becomes culturally distant to the people being administered and the nation community being built (Miller, 2005). Critically, as Edensor (2016) states the collective history and culture of the inhabitants of nation-territories is vital to nation building and development. The danger of prejudice against some sections of the nation-community becomes possible if registration is sectional, unequal, the process blind and opaque to the culture of the nation-community (Balibar, 2002). The purpose of national identification should be the deliberate creation of visibility for all communities, clarity of recognition and the privileges that accrue to recognition. Successful national development which requires a unison of aspiration and ideals of all the nation's communities is lost in the disharmony of dispersed and ethnic goals. The competition and pursuit of resources within Liberia and Sierra Leone frontiers, territories created by the 1885 Berlin Conference, led to ugly territoriality and subsequently civil wars in the neighbouring two countries, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire (Ruggie, 1993).

Block-chain technology is the recent use of the processing power of super computers in the compilation of a digital ledger of data or transactions in such infinitesimal detail across multiple networks and servers that it makes the extraction and use of identification data hugely expensive in both processing and use of generated electrical power. The technology is used widely in financial transactions where a single value could refer to several data points. In the case of identity data, the data-set of an individual's identity is already unique as a result of nurture and nature elements, the use of block-chain technology in identity-management is thus an excess of expensive technology for very little social reward. In Sierra Leone, Respondent B21 considered the inclusion of 'block-chain' technology in the national identification process as excessive and drew attention to anxiety in some sections of the

nation-community. The balance of purpose for an efficient national identification eco-system was tilted towards technology:

> "This exercise is really just to make sure that the government can trace and track everyone and ensure that we are all law abiding. I know that some people think its sinister to have block-chain technology in national-identity management, but its security and investigative capacity is good and it increases the chances of identifying criminals "
>
> (Respondent B21, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

The discussion with Respondent B21 highlights the ethics, obligation and difficulty of giving visibility and recognition of parity by a mechanism in a nation-state with communities that do not acknowledge themselves as a people. On achieving international recognition as nation-states with boundaries, the nation communities of Sierra Leone did not acknowledge themselves as one people or peoples of equal status within the same territory. There is an obligation on the institutions of the nations-state to equitably deliver developmental to all the communities. The use of block-chain technology in the national-identity management of the Sierra Leone nation-state will however obscure any audit attempts on transparency and biased use of identity data from the ethnic communities.

The appreciation of ethnic identity in the administration of the national identification eco-system is well-established within Zambian national-identity management structures as evidenced by discussion with C6:

> "We accept our duty to administer the entire nations human wealth. We endeavour to communicate and treat everyone with cultural respect. In every Government Ministry or building, particularly at the Department of National

Registration, Passports and Citizenship, we ensure that all government notices and directives are printed in all the seven written Zambian languages…"

(Respondent C6, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

As noted in Chapter 5, the deliberate obstacles put in-place between 1996 - 1999 by the detractors of Kenneth Kaunda to deny him Zambian nationality came up in every discussion on Zambian national-identity. None of the Zambian Respondents agreed with the retrospective use of a law purposely to disenfranchise Kenneth Kaunda, they all expressed gratitude to intervention of composed reasoning that overcame the danger of extreme political intransigent. The possibility that Zambia could descend into acute and violent ethnic politics as neighbouring Zimbabwe, Angola, was observed by the Zambian Respondents. On the one hand, the respondents highlighted with pride that a nation-state with seventy-two (72), different ethnic-nationalities had successfully navigated the unpopular Central African Federation and subsequently achieved self-rule, noting that the lessons learnt from that period insulated present-day Zambia national-identity against micro-ethnic political divisions.

On the other hand, Respondent C47 states:

"KK's [Kenneth Kaunda's] case we all thought was funny because there are documents going back to his childhood that confirms his Zambian identity and Bemba tradition, the question of his nationality issues was all politics, it was going to get resolved sooner or later. The people who have a harder time are those who cannot prove their births and ancestry on Zambian soil, it was only in 1988 that every district administration had a Birth and Death Registry. What about the sixty percent of the living Zambians born before 1988?"

(Respondent C47, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C47 bemoans the imperfection of the administrative legacy of the switching colonial governments. The denial of nationality rights to Kaunda, although political at the time, could be solved by the search for documentation because Kaunda is an ex-President and senior citizen for whom exceptions were made. A similar situation is faced by a lot more Zambians because of administrative confusion over the ethnicity of their parents and a misunderstanding over how to interpret nationality laws post the CAF.

The administration of national-identity and the privileges of identification in Sierra Leone from the period of colonial government was devoid of reasoned cultural nurturing and communal bonding similar to those of Zambians. There was the purely mechanical gathering and interpretation of segregated data divorced from the multiple legal jurisdictions in a beleaguered Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconcilation Commission, 2004). To explain the relevance of cultural and communal bonding as relevant to people's perception of their identity the researcher asked the respondents whether there was a conflict between ethnic and national-identities in their countries particularly with communities that spanned the national frontiers.

According to Respondent B40:

> "The problem is that during the colonial period, no one cared about which side of the border you were born on, we were one with our cousins, whether or not they were born in present day Guinea, Sierra Leona and even Cote d'Ivoire, today we are required to use word of mouth, sworn affidavits, to decide if a brother is truly Sierra Leonean even if his sister, mother or father was born on the other side of the border, really these nationality laws are too complex."
>
> (Respondent B47, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

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Respondent A23 in Liberia stated:

> "These nationality borders that institute both national-identity and functional identity had nothing to do with the reality of living in Liberia".
>
> (Respondent A23, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Such views were echoed by The Truth and Reconciliation, Commission of Liberia report "the indigenous African communities thus followed their separate traditional patterns of life while also attempting to adapt to settler dominance". (2010, p. 54).

To Caplan and Torpey (2001), the statutory establishment of a 'National-identity Authority' and in relation to schemes for a national identification card is the monopolisation by the state of a valid means of recognition for a people that ascribe to a legal classification of existence within the nation-state. The toxic historical interaction between the different ethnic cultures over the years and enforced occupation with the arrival of the ACS returnees in Liberia has obliged a culture-sterile national-identity administration that attempts to segregate and select uniqueness of identity rather than involvement and membership of the nation-community.

Respondent B55 from Sierra Leone makes the same point:

> "In Sierra Leone, there is a lack of sensitivity, imported British laws, regulations and systems, unrecognisable in the reality of typical rural communities were imposed on them from the colonial days. As these regulations have no cultural grounding they become ineffective and their interpreted and enforcement by officials is discriminatory".
>
> (Respondent B55, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

Respondent B55 makes the point that the enforcement of inappropriate identity statutes and laws become blunt colonial clubs used for the whipping of one ethnic community by another, such as the historical prevention of Lebanese and Syrian Sierra Leoneans inviting their family

from overseas. Krio families arrived in Sierra Leone under the similar circumstances but had no such restriction placed on them. Conciliatory accommodation of the customs of the indigenous communities who regularly had family members enter Sierra Leone indiscriminately was ignored and lost in the toxic atmosphere of colonial domination (Alldridge, 1910).

Ethnic communities and cultures that overlap the nation-state's frontiers presented conflictual views on national-identity based on the assured conviction of who was a national and who wasn't, irrespective of how close to the borders they lived. In response to the same question about ethnic communities that spanned the nation-states frontier's Respondent A35 responded by saying:

> "If you are Liberian, you are Liberian, the fact that a Guinean shares the same Golan culture as a Liberian doesn't make him a Liberian. Yes, I know there are Madingos, in both Guinea and Liberia, in fact also in Sierra Leone, I also accept that there are Golas in both Ivory Coast and Liberia, but if you live on this side of the border you are Liberian, on the other side you are Madingo-Guinean if or a Golan-Ivorian if your home is not in River Gee or Maryland but on the other side" (Respondent A35, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

However, in Zambia the respondents were confident of the mechanism that assigns national-identity irrespective of the ethnic overlaps across national borders, typified by Respondents C2's response:

> "Of course, the Lozi, the Chewa Kingdoms and other tribes span across our national borders, but we have a constitution that spells out who is Zambian,

Angola has a constitution that defines who is an Angolan, so also Zimbabwean

and Mozambican"

(Respondent C2, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C2's strong convictions on who has Zambian national-identity would become inscrutable when further probed. As noted in Chapter 4, in Sierra Leone since independence, there has been 6 separate modifications of the law on citizenship and nationality in addition to the Political impulse that further drove the Sierra Leonean leadership to impose a discriminatory process for naturalisation for one category of people (Thompson, 1997).

National-identity and the accompanying privileges of nationality, such as adult suffrage have been severely tested in all three study countries. Nationality laws have been modified in all of the study countries often to exclude candidates from participating in electoral contests irrespective of their place of birth or habitation. They are prevented from serving the nation-state to which they swear allegiance. Respondent B55 states:

"It is really difficult to deny the Kissi from Liberia, or the Mende from Guinea Sierra

Leonean citizenship, once a year Kissi women in the villages and even some

form the cities…, either side of the border gather for their annual ceremonies in

the bush…, they stay sometimes for six weeks…, when they come out there is

always an exchange of people who go to other homes…, how can we tell if they

are not related…?"

(Respondent B55, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

Respondent B55 typifies Manby's (2016) conclusion of the unsuitability of 'colonial identity administration that has had a dominant and negative impact on the rules of national-identity'. A subject that repeated itself several times within the interviews was the difficulty of tracking and managing nationals that live along the frontiers with other countries. In all the study

countries, there are ethno-lingua communities that overlap the modern national boundaries. In fact, the communities that live along the national frontiers disinterestedly criss-cross the national borders in pursuit of their everyday normal economic and family activities with neither need to identify nor the record of crossing of frontiers. In Zambia this manifests' along the national border with the other eight (8), countries that share a land border with them. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, in addition to the land borders, this difficulty extends to fisher folk that live along the coast, there are no physical barriers or immigration crossings in the sea. This is confirmed by Respondent C8:

> "Generally, in the major cities like Lusaka, Kabwe and Mingu we are able to adequately obtain sufficient data to issue national identification documents, even social security cards for education and health care. In some cities there are inadequate identity management offices and hospitals are far away from the farms, given the high number of home births, we can never be sure of the exact details of the birth of a child to issue the accurate documents. Some parents don't interact with government offices until the child is between 7 – 10 years when the child is entering school, a birth certificate issued at that stage cannot be perfect"
> (Respondent C8, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Although modern Zambia shares a border of over 2000 kilometres with modern Zimbabwe and Malawi, ex-British colonies that they shared a federation with, there is very little attrition when ethnic nationalities also overlap with national polities and drift into Zambian nationality representations. Conversely the ethnic communities from competing geopolitical colonists such as Portugal and Belgium, that overlap modern Zambian borders, such as Angola, Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo have seen some of the most attritional interpretation of nationality and blockades to integration.

Respondent C2 of Zambia states:

> "Actually, the Lozi can sometimes be difficult to categorize as they sometimes take additional Lozi wives from Angola or Democratic Republic of Congo in their cultural ceremonies during their annual migratory season, the wives automatically obtain the privileges of Zambian citizenship even before they come and register."
>
> (Respondent C2, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C2's answer reverts to ambivalence and accepts that the Lozi are accepted as an indivisible ethnic group spread across national frontiers and can at will vary their national-identity. When the Researcher asked the logic of the legal parameters on the definition of all Lozis having Zambian identity, Respondent C2 response meandered, but sought to rationalise Zambian Humanism as the tolerance for regional ethnic communities that had a claim to Zambian national-identity as acceptable. Childe (2004, p.28), contends that successful populations and communities have a common thread - culture, "it is a social heritage, it corresponds to a community sharing common traditions, common institutions and a common way of life, it is then a people to which culture can respond, a racial one [categorisation] seems hopelessly remote". Territorial imposition of frontiers that became national borders and the antecedent colonial administration in Africa was imposed suddenly, within a single generation and the civil administration and by extension, the identity management of the inhabitants within these Colonies, Protectorates and Territories was without consideration to the ethnic nations that were within or spanned the territories. The essential obligation of a civil administration to a people commences with the obligation of accentuating the similarities and sharing a parity within the nation community.

In the Sierra Leonean example, the assumption is that the representations of nationhood, such as a 'biometric national-identity card' accentuates similarities or demonstrates the

visibility of each identity in the use of a tangible object and measurable data. Granted that the biometric national-identity card' is tangible and at a stretch, all racial classification is measurable, as it involves the isolation of particular genes. However, social heritage, common traditions and a common way of life that identifies 'a people', is neither enumerable nor are they contained in tangible objects, yet they are powerful enough to unite distinct individuals into a nation community (Hobsbawm, 1983). Zambia tempers the enthusiasm for a tangible representation of nationhood by accommodating the ethnic cultures within the administration of the national-identity (Scott, 2019). The realisation of a white Vice President, Guy Scott and the misadventure and reversal of Kenneth Kaunda's Zambian citizenship, although at opposite ends of the scale, attest to Hobsbawn's (1983), observations. Respondent C10 observes:

> "We must have the belief that we can do it. Do we need foreigners to recognise each other? Let us do without politicians who believe that only technology from Europe is good technology. Zambians are not dull, I know they are good and serious Zambians who are willing to do much for this country, let ideas flow, the Japanese, Malaysians, Singapore have all done it, let us emulate them"
>
> (Respondent C10, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

British motivation in Africa was unclear, wavering between economic colonisation and imperialistic supremacy. For instance, Hobson (1902) pointed out the confused manner of British occupation of territories particularly in Africa was likely to bring about future social disorder for the inhabitants of the territory. Hobson's views and philosophy were sympathetic to the Conservative Party's imperialist policy that a successful British nation ought to have a robust superior ethical motivation for colonisation. He drew a distinction between the two stimuli for territorial occupation, colonisation for economic reasons and colonisation for

imperialistic expansion, the later which would involve a consideration for the civilising of inferior communities. The lack of clear objectives exposed opportunities for other European power-centres such Leopold II, of Belgium and the French to conspire and create territorial barriers between people that should have been administered within single ethnic frontiers (Ewans, 2002). When asked about the impact on Zambian national-identity from refugees that integrate into Zambia Respondent C13 states:

> "Unfortunately, Zambia has received refugees from all over, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, all these countries surround us. They arrive by just crossing the bush to be with their extended family members who live on this side of the border. We can never prove they were born outside Zambian territory if they tell us otherwise, so we are obliged to give them national-identity documents and not refugee documents…"
>
> (Respondent C13, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Both modern nation-states of Liberia and Sierra Leone's re-settlement origins had imperialistic underpinnings. In Liberia, the confusion of settler-purpose drifted between the declared territorial refuge seeking commitment, which would be an appreciation of the indigenous culture, thus a negotiated national-identity to the extremity of colonisation which is the imposition of a foreign culture. The development of Sierra Leone would have been superior had a structured economic colonisation rather than an imperialistic identity-management project been executed. Respondent B36 states:

> Had Sierra Leone been colonised like the Gold Coast or like the French did with Ivory Coast, the economic objectives would have had clear, with an early end once the economic objectives had been achieved.
>
> (Respondent B36, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

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The short-term identity aims of obtaining a territory for a community of African ex-slaves that would have political self-determination was accomplished by the SLC promoters. The medium and long-term development goals of a nation-state, civil administration development and identity management, may not have been a consideration for colonial administrators. Hence, they bequeathed an amalgamation of communities, some indigenous, others from North America and Europe with identity management challenges that did not congeal sufficiently rapidly into cohesive nation-states to undertake successful development (Gberie, 2015). The confused state of national-identity is repeated by Liberian Respondent A16 that could not properly interpret identity laws of neighbouring states that selectively denied people Liberian identity based on subjective interpretations. Respondent A16 states:

> "The challenge is that some of my colleagues neither understand nor apply nationality laws properly. They cannot distinguish between foreigners and citizens, I don't want a Guinean, Sierra Leonean, or Ivorian calling themselves Liberians because of loopholes in our system. This is very troubling, at the same time genuine Liberians are refused registration because they are tagged as foreigners"

> (Respondent A16, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A16's concern of a national-identity system that may be discretionarily interpreted by professionals, to include dishonestly and exclude unfairly brings into focus Said (1994), contentions on the need to critically manage cultural discriminations in institutions of state, it can easily snowball into tribalism.

The development of an economy was a societal necessity in all circumstances. The historical overspill from an ambiguous and multi-focused American Colonisation Society that lost the support of Congress amidst the formation of the Confederacy or Federation, and the

compromise of joining states with contradictory values on abolition was still driving national policy agendas. In Sierra Leone, the fabled martyrdom and triumphant crusade of Wilberforce's men to an African homeland for a victimised community, concealed the reality of future fractures in the nation-community. The Secessionist government that sought independence and the flawed colonisation administration prior to self-rule in Sierra Leone by an unsatisfactory identity management eco-system eventually led to a civil-war. Liberia experienced a similar sequence of events leading to civil war, only delayed by a fabricated independent nation-state status granted by the USA.

Modern Zambia by contrast was colonised with a commercial mining motivation from the start and also stimulated the formation of the CAF. Other than isolated instances, the approach of the BSAC, the CAF and eventually the Colonial government was a non-interventionalist position on indigenous ethnic interactions. Respondent C19 makes the point:

> "Why should new ID cards include the educational qualifications and skills of the holder? That worries me. I have recommended that this aspect be reviewed, some ethnic groups are predominantly traders, whilst others are predominately menial artisans, are we expecting citizens to renew their national every time they add new skills or complete a degree programme or marry into another ethnic group? Why not just stick with the basics, who is Zambian and compliment the data with biometrics to prevent fraudulent abuse?"
>
> (Respondent C19, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

In publishing its blueprint for development, the World Bank and UN confirm legitimate national-identity as the, "recognition and authentication of an individual's identity including birth registration, together with the associated rights of religion, culture and development of

the communities is a priority, therefore, free and universal legal identity is a Sustainable Development Goal for governments around the world and is included as 16.9" (The World Bank, 2017, p.2).

7.3.   The Penetration of Identity Management Systems and Tools

This subsection examines the comments made by the respondents particularly in connection with the penetration of identity management tools in the selected countries. The penetration of identity management tools and systems is the ease of accessibility of the identity tools and mechanism that record and tabulate the identity management data required for governance within the nation-state.

It is estimated that 41% of Africa's population (circa 502 million), have no proof of legal identity (The World Bank, 2017). Africa accounts for 15% of the world's population, and yet, 502 million accounts for almost half of the estimated worldwide population of persons without legal identity, 1.12 billion (The World Bank, 2017). At the same time, Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rate (43%) of unregistered (and therefore undocumented), childbirths, making the ability to prove one's identity (which is essential in enrolling on most identity management registers) difficult (The World Bank, 2017). It is all-together reasonable to assume then that most of the identity management mechanisms and systems in Sub-Saharan Africa will not cover the total population of the nations they are designed for as they will be based on the flawed assumption that every member of the population has one form of documented identity to use as a breeder document for a national-identity card or recognition.

Respondent C08 testifies that:

"It has not really penetrated. I think you are aware that we have had a specific department for this over the last twenty years. In the 80's we started, and it died

down. The decentralisation of the system I don't think is effective enough. Because in some communities our Registration Centres are always empty".

(Respondent C08, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent A11 expressed exasperation at the failure of nationals to accept the importance of registration and subsequent national-identity cards and comments:

"You ask someone do you have your national-identity card they go like "oh no". They don't see the need unless for a national ID card if they do not have a need for it… like collecting money from the bank".

(Respondent A11, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A28 also made this comment with regards to penetration:

"Most of our people that live in the hinterlands don't have birth certificates, in the rural communities, it is not well explained on radio or by the chiefs in the community that there is the need to register, even if you do not have a birth certificate, community leaders can come and attest for those who qualify to apply. Some people assume that as they don't have a birth certificate, they cannot register for the national ID card, they are by default denied Liberian citizenship"

(Respondent A28, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The penetration of certain identity documents such voter's identity cards, has also been low due to beliefs and personal convictions. In Zambia Respondent C11 comments:

"Whenever we open the voter's register, we often find that in the religious communities that have a predominance of Jehovah's Witnesses, they don't present themselves for inclusion on the Voters Register. I understand that they

may not find a candidate attractive enough to vote for, but then we cannot get

them to appreciate that the being on the Voter's Register is as civic duty, actual

voting is choice they may wish not to exercise"

(Respondent C11, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

In some of the study countries the respondents mentioned a direct coloration between the

confidence the people have of the government and the need to register to vote. Respondent

B36 mentions:

"in some areas the people feel that the government belongs to certain tribes only,

they thus feel that the election process is neither credible nor warranted, they just

don't turn up to register"

(Respondent B36, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

In Liberia Respondent A09 remarks:

"In the rural areas, the natives that live there see governance as distant to their

every lives, they don't believe the participation in voting ever changes the nation-

state, they still believe that governance is for Kongo people."

(Respondent A09, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The comments by the various respondents affirms the lack of penetration observed by the

World Bank findings (2017). The identity management eco-systems in the study countries

fails to distinguish between a national obligation to register, either birth certificates, national

identification or registration as an eligible voter, and the privileges that accrue to each

identification after subsequent to registration (Caplan, 2001).

7.4. The Efficiency of Identity Management Systems and Tools

The sub-section will recount the views of the respondents in relation to the efficiency of the identity management systems and tools used in their nation-states. The efficiency of identity management systems and tools is the ease of individual recognition and therefore providing the privileges that go along with identification. The ability to engage in the identification transaction and rapidly interpret the data and results held within the identity token speaks to the efficiency of the identity management system and tools (Caplan and Torpey, 2001).

The respondents expressed varying opinion with regards to the efficiency of identity management documents, Respondent A47 expressed concern about the uncertainty of the validity of identity documents that expire, he narrates:

> "The two-year validity period of the national ID card is nonsensical, it is not a privilege to be a citizen, it is right of birth. Registration is for those that naturalise, although all documents must have a validity period, citizenship cannot. To remain a citizen of his own country, one must repurchase a national ID card every two years? What answer do I give to citizens that repeatedly ask me this question? Is it not a form of corruption in the highest degree?
> (Respondent A47, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Birth and death certificates that confirm the social foot-print of the individual do not expire. In practise, all the study countries limit the validity period of national-identity cards. This practice is without concrete justification and affects the efficacy of use.

This practice becomes absurd if at a particular time the opening of a bank account requires a national-identity card, but should the validity period of the card expire, the

question then, is the bank's obligation of service to the individual co-terminus with the validity of card? A validity period for national ID cards poses two obvious questions

i.   Does the identity, the person no longer exist at the expiry of the card?

ii.   Does the nationality of the identity, the person expire with the expiration of the card?

Respondent A47 expressed such concern:

"Is this government seeking the interest of the masses? You cannot even withdraw $25.00 of your own money from a bank without the ID card? When I was depositing the money, no one asked for my ID card, but I need the ID card to withdraw"

(Respondent A47, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Insufficiently thought-out validity periods in addition ill-defined purpose of validity periods on the identity cards give rise to inefficient identity transactions. Respondent B34 makes a similar point.

"When receiving extra money from relatives sent through Western Union in Sierra Leone you cannot use your passport that has expired, I understand that I cannot use the passport to travel because my privilege to travel on that passport has expired, but my identity has not expired and it is a photo ID ensuring that I have a valid identity not a valid privilege to travel. My birth certificate which is a non-photo ID does not expire."

(Respondent B34, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

Some respondents express concern about the belief that biometric technology is infallible, yet the very mischief that biometric technology was meant to cure is still happening as explained by Respondent A56:

> "Technology is a good way to mitigate cheating and corruption in Liberia. If you want to clean-up government payroll, you should know the real people on the payroll, the biometric technology should give an accurate headcount, one individual cannot get paid from 2 or 3 different agencies, believe me this goes on, so tell me how efficient is this technology?"
>
> (Respondent A56, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The technology itself was developed in Europe, tested in Europe, and tested on Europeans. In all the study countries, over fifty percent (50%), of the economically active workforce are artisans engaged in menial jobs such as carpentry, bricklaying and actual manual labour, employment that involves the heavy use of their fingers. This heavy use of fingers distorts the fingerprints thereby giving inaccurate results from inappropriate technology. In addition, the users of the technology do not understand the mechanism of the biometric technology. The finger print scanners and interpretations do not recognise each fingerprint, rather a value judgment is made on the similarity of fingerprint comparisons. This is the concern raised by Respondent A56.

Respondent C42 expressed the concern with identity systems and technology that cannot be maintained and supported in Africa. After the break down of certain components of the issuing system, the operators have to revert to the use of typewriters to personalise blank ID cards. The European engineers would take over three weeks to enter Zambia and repair or maintain non-functioning components. This is brought to light by Respondent C42:

"Undoubtedly, Zambia is the only country that still uses obsolete typewriters" to process National-identity Cards".

(Respondent C42, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent B24 was very complimentary about the how efficient hospital identity management systems are and bemoaned the inefficient examples of identification interactions with other state agencies and institutions. Politicians were seen as the main instigator encouraging dubious voter registrations in order to obtain large votes.

"What I can't understand is that when a sick person attends the hospital they never lie about their name and age, however when they are required to give identity details for voter's card, some citizens lie about their age and address in an attempt to participate in the elections. I am convinced that the politicians are behind all this fraud".

(Respondent B24, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

In Zambia the granting of voting privileges by EMA officials to demanders was with less rancour. The same opinion was expressed but for what seemed like a position of compromise. The privilege to participate in the elections was seen as a civic responsibility and thus grantors of the privilege recognised the living conditions of the locals in the region.

"In the border towns, families live on both sides of the national border so they feel that they have the civic right to participate in the elections as perhaps half of their family either live or were born on this side of the border. It is difficult to refuse them registration as they often do qualify to be Zambians, even if not registered"

(Respondent C17, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

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In Sierra Leone, the introduction of block-chain technology, which is mainly used in international financial transactions for crypto-currency, has left some officials of the National-identity Authority baffled. Respondents B03, B41, and B14 express their difficulties with this.

"As with many Blockchain stories, it is not clear what role blockchain technology plays. It would be great if this could be clarified by the government, what has blockchain got to do with national identification?"

(Respondent B03, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

"The local Lebanese village lender is able to separate the verification of the identity of the lender from the risk of non-payment, technology should enhance this process, not prevent banks from opening simple savings accounts."

(Respondent B41, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

"without doubt the advanced countries take time to change their technology that's why it works, why do we change ours at the entrance of a government, is it not better to spend our resources to improve infrastructure like roads, hospitals, schools, housing, water reticulations, improve agriculture methods,"

(Respondent B14, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

How efficient is a system with a technology that is neither understood or considered relevant? In all the study countries, unfamiliarity of the technology and its usage led to identified inefficiencies of the national identification system and tools:

"In one district the system shut down completely because officers regularly shared their passwords with one another, there were physically impossible inputs from different data-entry points, conflicts in audit trails required for analysis"

(Respondent C09, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

"We had several incidents of operators introducing viruses into the system, putting unauthorised pen-drives into the work-station, in Africa we have inconsistent internet networks so we need to have the ability to physically transfer data. The office in Zwedru was out of commission for two months"
(Respondent A11, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

"There have been too many data breaches, the main reasons are, the contracts that government has with vendors, our IT specialist can neither intervene nor solve the problems, the systems are proprietary. Government doesn't purchase support and maintenance, systems become outdated"
(Respondent B22, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

"We don't have sufficient finger-print experts who understand fingerprint minutiae, there is a huge backlog of fingerprint adjudication, it will 9 years at this rate of adjudication. This inability to adjudicate rapidly means we have to accept a certain level of inaccurate hits, false-positives, and bias"
(Respondent C12, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

7.5. The Challenges in the use of Identity Management Systems and Tools

This sub-section will report the challenges faced with the identity management system and tools in the study nation-states as expressed by the respondents. These challenges range from the interactive conduct of national leaders, the political elite organisational structure and technology.

In all the study countries, there was a recurrent identified tension between ethnic identities and national identities. The respondents intimated varying degrees of anxiety, most evident during the lead up to general elections, when political campaigns would stoke-up ethnic sentiment in a bid to harness votes. Responding to the question: Is there a tension between ethnic identity and national-identity in your country Respondent A04, from Liberia responds:

> "Ethnic identity has been one of the main problems in the country vis a vis national-identity particularly during our voter registration exercise. Politicians' campaign in places where the people grew up, and denigrate opponents that don't share the same ethnicity as being from another country. That's where all of the conflict has come from, people feel themselves ethnically more Liberian than others. People from certain ethnic backgrounds think that they are the rightful owners of Liberian territory, they don't even consider naturalised Liberians as Liberians. So, they protest that we give naturalised Liberians voting rights. This is where we have most of the conflict coming from. I'm Liberian because I grew up here, I'm associated with this tribe and you are not real Liberians because your ancestors are not indigenous"
>
> (Respondent A04, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

It is all too easy to relate the havoc of the civil war in Liberia to ethnic rivalry between the indigenous communities versus the returning Kongo community. However, successful nation-states have been built with very diverse ethnic communities tolerating the background and culture of the diverse peoples they share the territory with. Respondent A04 succinctly explains that the issues of a single national-identity for all Liberians is a matter of tolerance, ethics and political leadership and not technology. Respondent A38 expresses exasperation at the culture of cohesion that Liberia lacks amongst its indigenous inhabitants. Respondent A38 traces the lack of a cohesive national-identity from the formation of the nation-state.

> "A true modern nation can never truly endure, if the leadership do not instil the fundamentals of fairness in nation-building. These fundamentals should be developed from the beginning. The origins of Liberia was not as a nation, but rather a temporary settlement that could only exist under the mighty USA!"
>
> (Respondent A38, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A38 goes further to diffuse the blame for the current sorry state of Liberian national-identity from the recent civil war and proposes that the civil war was a consequence of a generational lack of cohesive national-identity policies and not the cause of today's lack of national-identity cohesion.

> "The disrespect for sections of our community is linked to the indoctrination of young people to foreign cultural. We must adopt how our elders dealt with each other. The nation was divided before the civil war, a consequence not the cause of today's disrespect for each other. To continuously blame the civil war when government and parents are not held responsible is an argument Liberians should not continue to make."
>
> (Respondent A38, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent B51 warns of impending recurrent civil strife if the political elite do not focus on the perception of fairness that is often levelled against governments that use their power of patronage to appoint officials to compile national-identity registers, especially in locations that offer privileges of residence to the officials.

> "The Government and the NCRA have not clarified who qualifies for Diaspora
> Registration? Is it so that Sierra Leoneans living abroad are not disenfranchised,
> will the political parties send representatives during elections, or will they rely on
> the friends of the government appointed as diplomatic staff?"
>
> (Respondent B51, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

Although communicated in the negative, Respondent A38's comments reverberate those made by Respondent B51, who sees the possibility of forging a cohesive national-identity if the political elite were to be more focused on cohesion.

In a response to how Zambians living in the diaspora, ought to be identified and consideration and not prevented from obtaining full Zambian national-identity, Respondent C44 stated:

> "The system is unclear how do we accept applications and issue new ID cards to
> Zambians living abroad, Zambia exports a lot of labour to RSA… there are a lot
> of Zambians living in RSA…, the upgraded system should have considered this."
>
> (Respondent C44, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C44 invokes a collective understanding and precaution not to disregard Zambians living abroad. This lesson, Zambia obtained as a frontier country with close ties to South Africa. South Africa has recently successfully managed to forge a cohesive national-identity although they have very diverse cultures. This respondent expresses a concern for Zambians temporarily relocated to RSA losing out on their nationality, should the national-

identity registration process be solely reliant on Zambians resident with the territorial frontiers of Zambia.

Respondent A18 expresses the concern that an identification transaction which involves national-identity for which one does not consciously choose, but an occurrence of fate, should not be a financial burden to demonstrate. The nation-state that wishes to use a chosen token as a form of identification Jones (1997) and Castels (2006) remind us that this is legitimising identities, and in these study countries, the identities already exist. The executive branch would be wise not to burden the cost of the national-identity token on the nationals.

> "The National-identity Register (NIR), is an autonomous agency of government, established to register Liberians and foreign residents, why should the government's decision to register me cost me money? I know I am a Liberian, in addition, why should we reject applicants from a national ID card for not taking an Oath of Allegiance, what if the person has a non-Liberian parent, and has dual nationality? The law does not force anyone to be a soldier, I can understand that certain positions of state like President or legislator, unless there is a war these obligations are wrong in our environment."
>
> (Respondent A18, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A09 points out the inappropriateness of the National Identification System. In purchasing a national identification system for Liberia, the consideration of great numbers of both internally and externally displaced persons was not considered. The gleaming technology was seen as a golden-bullet that would solve the need to acquire and national identification system used for governance and development.

"The new ID system initially looks good, because of the war we have a lot of refugees returning, we have not been trained on all aspects of the system, I hope there is a provision for people who may have just re-entered Liberia not have their refugee ID from the country of sanctuary nor previous Liberia ID. We lost most of our archived identity records during the war, the system doesn't pay particular attention to our specific challenges"

(Respondent A09, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The challenge pointed out by Respondent A17 within the current National Identification System, is the NRIS, reliance on breeder documents from other national agencies that have lost archival material for verification. Respondent A17 remarks on the disjointed establishment of the Liberian identity ecosystem, the point is directed at aspects of tourism industry development that would be hampered because the commercial considerations were ignored.

"We are encouraging visitors to come to Liberia, as the ID is required for registering a working cell-phone. How do people register and get an ID to get a cellular phone if they are not Liberians or they are Liberians but do not live here permanently? I believe they may like to own a phone while they are here"

(Respondent A17, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

Respondent A38 agrees with Respondent A17's proposed proliferation component of registration centres for visitors to Liberia and highlights the challenges also faced by indigenous residents in the rural areas. The consequent repercussions on disenfranchising nationals participating in important elections is obvious – the restricted availability of national-identity documents that are subsequently used as breeder documents for privilege documents become rare, this exposes the governing political elite to accusations gerrymandering.

"Even an old lady living in Bahn, Nimba county must have national ID card in order to get a voting card, but there are no national identification registration centres in the rural areas, this makes things harder for the common people's especially those that in the rural areas?"

(Respondent A38, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

At the time of the research (April 2020), passports issued to Zambian nationals were the earlier non-automated manual passports. The Zambian government was yet to migrate the application process unto a digitized platform and issue ICAO recommended electronic biometric passports. Respondent C01 comments on the outdated passport application process and highlights the inefficient bottlenecks. These bottlenecks encourage nepotistic and corrupt practices that speed-up the applications process for some applicants.

"The technology at the NRC is outdated, it's good that Zambia gets a new system. Now the passport application process should also be digitized, the government should adopt an effective service that reduces corruption."

(Respondent C01, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Additionally, Zambian travellers faced longer and more vigorous interrogation at international border crossings because the older manual passports were more vulnerable to possible fraudulent identity substitution. Digitisation accelerates all application and investigative operation. Respondent C31 also expresses a concern with the disjoined, and unconnected identity management eco-system in Zambia. This means that advantages of an improved digitised identity management eco-system was not shared by all agencies.

"The idea is a good idea, we need to digitize our NRC, police records, agriculture records, and pension records."

(Respondent C31, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

On the other hand, Respondent C10 reminds us about the variation in technology ability that is found across Zambia. Those in the rural areas responsible for the administration of either identity documents or administering resources using national-identity documents are unable to understand or use the new digital technology in administering their responsibilities.

> "The worry will be the chiefs and royal household members who lack the requisite technical knowledge to administer up-to-date electronic register of their subjects and the land quotas allocated to them, especially those in the Southern Province. Can you imagine the chaos if these chiefs are made to use a technology they don't understand for local land allocation?"
>
> (Respondent C10, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

There is always a resource allocation debate to be had. Respondent C49 comments on the recent experience of Zambians being required to vote in emergency elections because the incumbent president has died in office. Such emergencies require preparation. Preparation that obliges funding from the executive branch of government. In sub-Saharan Africa, most government administrations see the provision of infrastructure projects as more worthy of both regular and emergency funding rather than identity management projects.

> "We have had presidents die in office and each time there is the issue of eligibility of voter's cards when electing a replacement president. If you think the upgrading of the NRC is a waste of resources try being less sophisticated in the future that could easily tip Zambia into anarchy"
>
> (Respondent C49, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondents C53 and B60 make the same point reference to funding for scheduled elections and maintenance of the National-identity Register. Assurances by incumbent governments to upgrade National-identity Registers are rarely fulfilled.

> "We will also soon phase out the 'manual' NRCs and introduce 'computerized' and more portable ATM card-like style cards for NRCs, I hope the other relevant offices that use national IDs like the Electoral Authority take note of this improvement so that they are able to read the data contained, this I think will go far to removing political bickering before elections about the voter's register"
>
> (Respondent C53, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

National organisations are challenged to operate credibly without the appropriate funding, the resultant effect is the organisation being exposed accusations of charges bias or incompetence. Because politics is polarised and ethnically divided, new governments that were in opposition recommence parallel identity management solutions and offices in a bid to either control the funding to the new agency or cripple the existing agency that it considers as biased towards the out-going government. Respondent B60 states:

> "The National Civil Registration Authority (NCRA) should have been given the resources and opportunity to expand its work, it has been doing a good job. NCRA has the responsibility for the continuous, permanent and compulsory recording of occurrences and characteristics of vital events including births, deaths, marriages, divorces, nullities, adoptions of all the people in the country, rather than create a new agency for national identification, the money should have been given to them."
>
> (Respondent B60, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

7.6. The Effects of Identity Management Systems and Tools on Development

This sub-section will narrate in the words of the respondents the effects that the use of the current identity management tools and systems have had in the study nations. Some of the effects have been positively narrated and others have had the effect of either poor utilisation. The effects recounted have been on the organisational structure and technology involving the nation community, the officials and national leaders, particularly the political elite.

Some respondents like Respondent C29 were very happy that the old manual system of identity management was migrating to an IT based system, the ease and convivence of use was preferred.

> "Zambia is now working towards smart NRCs! Crossing over to digital ID makes everything easier"
>
> (Respondent C29, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C29, C55 and A11 all agreed that the resultant data obtained from an identity management eco-system is vital to governance thus the effect of modernising from manual system to IT tools and systems would be advantageous and relevant to the national development of each of their nation-states:

> "A national-identity serves a lot of functions, you need an ID to enter higher education and even to get married, also all these unsolved identity fraud cases will be solved"
>
> (Respondent C55, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

Respondent C55 sees the effect of the new IT based system as capable of facilitating ordinary lifecycle interactions and crime solving. Respondent A11 in addition welcomes the unintended but classless practical effect of carrying the same card as the President of the country:

"This new system should be one of the common denominators between all Liberians, we will all have the same national-identity card as a citizen of Liberia"

(Respondent A38, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

As the possession of the ID card entitles the holder to certain privileges of identification, Respondent C12 links the urgency to register for the recently introduced ID format as providing the ability to obtain the privileges of identifying with the ruling political party:

"Some real Zambian nationals obtain our stone age NRC and it still works for identification purposes. The problem in Zambia right now is that everything is about politics, my advice to my fellow Zambians is that lets keep politics out of national-identity out of this office"

(Respondent C12, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

The urgency and increased number of registrants that crowd the registration centres also mean that Respondent C12 links the urgency to register for the new ID format to those who either use their political or nepotistic relationships to obtain improved registration services at the centres:

"My concern is that we should not be charging people to register as a national, the government does not adequately fund our office, so some officers prioritise bellicose registrants as more important than those who need ID cards for bank transactions, those applicants find ways of appreciating the officers. This is a poor reflection of our service".

(Respondent B30, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

The effect and convenience of technology is not lost on the officers. Whereas the replaced manual system required the officers to physical search and exam the breeder documents for authenticity, the digitised process using technology, had eradicated these outdated manual mechanisms. Respondents A12, C53, C07 and C20 remark:

"Liberia is getting there, now most things are done on the phone, what we have been asking for is to link-up with the confirmed GSM network providers. When a subscriber loses their device or changes their telephone, they can confirm the identity through a secure mechanism so that users can easily get back their mobile number or retrieve all their data and telephone numbers on the device"

(Respondent A12, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

"It's a nightmare trying to get confirmed data at NRC in Zambia. For many years we accepted photocopied source documents, we could not spend the whole day trying to confirm details, now it's easier"

(Respondent C53, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

"One of the benefits of the smart ID would be access to medical services, at public hospitals, the future would be the ability to obtain your health records quickly for and be seen to, now at hospitals, they have to open books with dirty pages to refer to the details of your last visit, some people die before they get attend to with a smart ID the future is just a swipe and voila your details come up"

(Respondent C07, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

"This shouldn't be that hard to do drivers licenses are already digital and biometric there is need to modernize those colonial or should I say medieval application

forms for government documents. Going digital with application forms will add to the government coffers this would save people from all the wasteful practices of printed forms and those government employees who are permanently at lunch when you need things done"

(Respondent C20, Lusaka, Zambia, 2019)

The remarks of Respondent B36, A27, and A09 point to an arousal of national patria for their nation-states. Whereas there was no easily identifiable token used to demonstrate Liberian, Sierra Leonean or Zambian national-identity, the outdated and manual token had now been replaced with an easier token that would include dishonestly and exclude unfairly:

"One of the weakest parts of every Sierra Leonean government since independence is the failure to identify the citizens of the nation with authentic National ID Cards. Such a failure has not only made Sierra Leone lawless but has plunged us into to a demographic shift of many foreigners acquiring Sierra Leonean nationality, this will be irreparable in the future."

(Respondent B36, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2018)

"The effect of requiring ID for all aspects of life is a good move, it will reduce the number of foreigners without resident and work permits. They are all around our country, with some causing serious crime, ranging from sale of illegal drugs, we can easily deport all of them now"

(Respondent A27, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

"it is about time Liberians come together and weed out all the irregularities and fraud in electoral process. That is a serious challenge facing all of us now, The national ID will do that."

(Respondent A09, Monrovia, Liberia 2018)

The Sierra Leonean ethnic conflict was bitter and prolonged, the overriding administrative categorization of identity in both Liberia and Sierra Leone is so cautious of possible reprisals of their recent civil wars their response are "concerned with group judgments and judgments about groups and their motives. (Ross, 2001, p. 157). The attempt in Liberia and Sierra Leone is to impose a 'golden bullet' national card scheme that biometrically and uniquely identifies each resident within the territory completely ignoring unresolved ethnic and national-identity tensions. The imposition of neither of these systems has a cultural component.

Nevertheless, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the promoters of the novel IT identification system in the guise of the Director of National Identification in Liberia and the President of Sierra Leone himself comments that effects of an erstwhile inefficient identity eco-system had detrimental consequence on development. These negative effects had been mitigated against with the use of new IT technology. These new technologies maybe then further be adapted to suit each countries development voyage and effectiveness.

"The biometric national-identity card is setting the stage for a transformative program that will change the way we do government and private businesses, we shall only require your finger prints to determine your identity in Liberia."

(Nagbe, 2017)

The President of Sierra Leone emphasised:

> "First, we will digitise identities, second, we will use that digital identity as the unique nationally recognised identifier called the National Identification Number that is non-duplicating and non-reusable, as a unique source of reference for every service delivery in the country"
>
> (President Dr. Bio, 2019)

The use of European systems and tools in the study countries to ascertain the nationality, citizenship rights and privileges of recognition, fails to make adjustments that recognize the historical cultural bonds that are collectively accepted within the community and the social mechanisms of interaction that already exists. "Modification of the European framework or developing a new framework that considers sub-Sahara Africa's complex history and identity management trajectory would be better suited to this part of the world." (UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018). The significant advances and better understanding of the technology of identity-management in addition to recent world-wide availability of cutting-edge technologies like cloud computing has a transformational potential to cover the most pressing developmental challenges experienced in sub-Sahara Africa…. by incorporating these technologies to improve enrolment speeds and yet mitigating privacy and security concerns, would be a massive improvement of current systems.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1. Identity in ethnic nations, colonised territories and modern nation-states

As colonised countries in sub-Saharan began to attain independence, the fulfilment of national self-determination for the newly formed nation-states was in the realisation of their identities. The identity structures in precolonial sub-Saharan ethnic nations were based on indigenous familiarity and belonging to a heritage of customary traditions that evolved into the symbolic representations of the ethnic nation. In Ghana, for example, this compromise with modernity has seen the strictly matrilineal ethnic nation such as the Asante evolve the inclusiveness of the descendants of male children into the family structure, a move that affords them equal privileges to the descendants of female children with proven bloodlines. Similarly, in Ethiopia (formerly Abyssinia), the endurance of Ethiopian Tewahedo heritage dating back to the 4th century, with its ethical reverence to environmental conservation and regular pilgrimage to nature reserves, is now adopted across nearly all Ethiopian communities irrespective of religion and is considered as a successful identity anchor that should signify Ethiopian identity. Do such compromises to modernity devalue the indigenous identity structures? Or do the disruptions, which account for the evolution of identity in ethnic nations into the national-identity of nation-states equate to acceptable innovations of the settler community? The identities within the ethnic communities contained in the nation-states had lost privileges and rights as a result of the evolving nature of the nation itself, from an autonomous ethnic-nation into one of many ethnic communities contained in the nation-state.

The recognition, privileges and rights enjoyed within the newly demarcated colonial and modern nation-states was dissimilar to what they were familiar with under the structures of the ethic nations. The ethnic nations that had indigenous ethnic identities gave way to dependant colonies with categorised identities, that eventually incarnated into modern-nation-states. At each stage of incarnation, the nation community's identity structures within the demarcated colonial frontiers were flawed with tensions. The settler communities that colonised the ethnic identities were determined to preserve the identity structures imported with them into the unfamiliar African environment. The unfamiliar African landscape contained not only minerals and opportunities that were exploited, but also robust identities that were also exploited. The motivation for this study was to uncover the causes for the tensions in the identity structures of sub-Saharan nation-states and how the suppressive authority of unfamiliar imported identity management tools and systems disrupted the orderly development of the ethnic communities into nation-states. The scope of the study set out to research the relevance of identity management and its effect on development in the selected sub-Sahara African countries of Liberia Sierra Leone and Zambia. The study of the penetration, efficiency, challenges and effects of the identity management ecosystems has recognised how they have all had different experiences of nation-formation affected by ethnic nationalism.

Did Africans lose their indigenous identity or was the second phase of the European missions in Africa, colonisation, following the slave trade an attempt to eliminate the identities of the survivors and convert all identity structures into a European mono-cultural structure? On one hand, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the exploitation of indigenous identities and identity structures was the extension of a slave-culture and identity management structures that failed to recognise the parity of privileges for all identities within each polity. On the other hand, the

Zambian polity was derived from a settler community focused on the commercial exploitation of minerals available from the unfamiliar landscape. The indigenous culture and ethnic identity structures would be allowed to evolve without disruption until their evolution clashed with the commercial exploitative venture. In other African environments, such as Botswana the commercial exploitation of minerals in 1967 coincided with self-determination and the evolution of the polity in 1968, thus the incarnation into a modern nation-state did not adversely affect the national-identity management institutions and structures. This chapter will make conclusions based on the scope of the study, the findings, the evolution of national-identity management in the study countries and how the development of institutions in these nation-states, have been affected by colonisation, ethnicity, and ethnic nationalism.

The research assumed that each study nation is comprised of various primordial ethnic communities and administered as a single nation-state with a recognised nation-identity. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia, the study established this assumption. Whereas the study found literature on Zambian national history acknowledging 72 different indigenous ethno-lingua communities, Liberia and Sierra Leone each contains 16 ethno-lingua communities. Indeed, the research went further to confirm that other than the settlers of North America descent in both West African nation-states, both nations have 5 ethno-lingua communities that span the territorial borders of their nation-states. It is noteworthy that Africa linguistic anthropologists and historians such as Freund (1984), and Adu Boahene (1985) amongst others trace most of the indigenous communities in west /central Africa as of Bantu origin, nevertheless the Bantu cannot be classified as either an ethnic community or nation since their migratory history has occasioned varying cultures and traditions that have evolved into different identity anchors for each migratory or static community.

The study assumed that the governing institutions of the national-identity eco-system of each of the study nations would be equitable to all ethnic communities, and identity structures within the nation-state. This assumption was contradicted in all the nation-states to various degrees. Whereas in Liberia and Sierra Leone the absence of equitable governing institutions of nation-identity led to the extreme consequence of a collapse of both nation-states, Zambia's national-identity foundation, coined as 'Zambian Humanism' promoted an equitable identity-eco-system while moderating the tensions of competing ethnic communities and identity anchors. Although both Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered a collapse in the nation-state evidenced by the civil wars in both countries, the assumption of perpetuity, that all the study nations would endure beyond the lives of the individual identities of the nation-state was wholly proven. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone there is the concerted governance effort to replace the inequitable colonial nation-identity structures with identity ecosystems that gives visibility to all communities.

The study assumed that the study nation-states in managing the nation's identity structures within the identity eco-system could accommodate the differences, and overlap between identity documents and entitlement documents. What the study revealed was that, in managing national-identity, the three categories of documents within the identity ecosystem, breeder, identity and entitlement documents were often misunderstood and perilously interchanged. In Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Birth Certificates, a document certifying the occurrence of a birth was often confused with a Certificate of entry into the nation-state's register of Births and Deaths. Although the two can happen simultaneously, it is only in the '*entry*', the second instance, that the acknowledgment of the birth is embraced into the nation-community. Specifically, the individual only by entry into the nation-states Register of Births and Deaths do they become '*entitled*' to a national passport or at age 18 years obtain a

'Voters ID Card' to participate in the nation's suffrage exercises. By virtue of the identity component that overlaps and is contained within entitlement documents, such as passports, the study found that in all the study countries, the expiry date of the passport, removing the entitlement to international travel was misinterpreted as the expiry of the identity of the holder, that is the identity component of passport had expired concurrently with the entitlement to travel internationally. Exegetically and absurdly, the death of the passport-holder should by that logic entitle the identity to international travel when in actuality this could never happen other than to travel as cargo after the death of the person.

In Chapter 2, I examined established concepts of nationhood and nationalism that gave legitimacy to identities in their interactions with the institutions of the nation-state, the national-identity ecosystem. Available academic studies on the formation of sub-Saharan nation-states fall into two extremes: whereas Davis and Huttenback (1986) take the ultimate view that imported colonial governance to Africa and its identity structures was an improvement to the otherwise uncultured indigenous ethnic traditions and identities, Basil Davidson (1995) and Walter Rodney (2018) argue that the colonial imported identity structures that disrupted indigenous identity management structures in Africa was a curse. The research has shown that neither the association between the management of ethnic identities within the colonial nation-state nor the conversion of these identities into the legitimacy of national identities proposed by such scholars is accurate. In Chapter 2 the study has demonstrated that whereas sub-Saharan states would have had to borrow from tried and tested international best practice identity management structures in the creation of modern nation-states as proposed by Anderson (2016), and Castells and Bernard (2021), wholesale adoption that collapsed various ethnic identities into a single black cultural identity of Pan-Africanism attempted by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sékou Touré of Guinea was

unrealistic. In the extreme, the practice that lumped all black people into one ethnic culture, one which led to the collapse of nation-states, was not dissimilar to Pan-Africanism. The difference lies in the definition of ethnic identity as a component of nation-identity.

The study has demonstrated in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 the damage that ethnic nationalism has inflicted on nation-formation and national-identity. Ethnic and cultural differences have incited conflict within the nation communities in all three study countries, but in Liberia and Sierra Leone they have led to destructive civil wars. However what previous Africa researchers such as Manby, Cooper and Brubaker fail to elaborate is the positivity concealed in various forms of nationalism that can be harnessed in the administration of national-identity administration. In spite of the civil conflicts, the desire to obtain ethnic and cultural recognition is significant and it enables the construction of the sovereignty of a negotiated nation-state. The pride of belonging to any nation-community is not ignorant of "…the inequality or exploitation that may prevail in" the community, however, the embrace of the community, nation-state and its institutions is sufficient to commit people to the heritage of a national-identity, and the ultimate sacrifice of taxation and military service. (also see Anderson 2016). The aspiration of the individuals to seek legitimate recognition and consideration as part of the nation-state is crucial in nation-state formation. In designing identity management eco-systems, nation-states should embrace cultural symbols and values as inclusive recognition rather than its use as a tool to demonstrate uniqueness that may lead to segregation and parochial superiority. This could promote *patria potestas* for the nation-state above whatever ethnic tensions that may have existed prior to the formation of the modern state. In Zambia, the agitation of the Lozi is not focused on reversing the historical demarcation of the Zambian nation-state to secede and obtain territorially autonomous Lozi nation, but rather for greater

provincial independence within the confines of the Zambian nation-state to observe their culture and practice their traditions with pride.

From the point of view of Zambian Respondents, both national and ethnic identity derive their membership from the embrace of the community. Zambian identity structures and institutions exhibited the inclusivity of both ethnic and the nation-states' culture, traditions, and identity anchors, ethnic cultural identity is not stifled within national-identity nor is national-identity subjugated by unfamiliar imported identity structures. In Chapter 5, the study shows that policies of inclusiveness of all ethnic communities in national-identity management, the embrace and visibility of all ethnic communities by the nation-states' institutions similar to Zambian Humanism is a workable formula for development for multi ethnic nation-states.

8.2.   General Conclusions

In the study countries, the research was able to conclude that the foundations of primordial ethnic nations within the nation-state's frontiers were still very dominant. Nevertheless, particularly in Zambia and its institutions, there was the conscious attempt towards the instrumental multi-ethnic appreciation of a single functional nation-identity. The migration of large ethnic communities from America introduced an infinitely unfamiliar culture within the Liberia and Sierra Leone, national frontiers, whose effect was to exacerbate the clash of ethnic nations, which in turn provoked damaging ethnic nationalism. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone experienced two decades of civil war, a symptom of a complete collapse of a shared nation-identity. In contrast, in Zambia, despite the integration of primordial ethnic nations into the frontiers of a modern nation-state, the different amalgamating cultures were not completely new to one another, there were enduring existing inter-ethnic relationships - ethnic alliances and marriages. Crucial to Zambian national-identity management, colonialism had

inadvertently reassembled the Bantu migratory dispersal into the sovereignty of a nation-state. In this way, the pursuit of a negotiated national-identity although potholed with unsavoury incidents was achieved without civil war.

In Chapters 3 and 4, the study concludes that although the appreciation of intrinsic ethnic culture was a deeply held value amongst people of the same heritage in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was nevertheless parochial and limited to territorial quarters rather than the ethnic nation. As noted in the discussion in these chapters, Liberia and Sierra Leone recognize a combined total of 33 ethnic communities spread across a population of twelve million (12m) nationals while Zambia has seventy-two (72) ethnic ethnics across 17 million (17m), nationals. In their effort to amalgamate these dispersed ethnic states into single nations, the colonialists created the hard borders and national frontiers that located residual cultures in minuscule ethnic nations, which would struggle to develop into viable sovereign and legitimate modern nation-states. The development of ethnic nations into nation-states based on an oral tradition and traditional heritage would of course have restricted these nations to their ethnic spheres of influence. In Chapters 3 and 4, the study demonstrated that rather than the compromise of a greater national culture spanning parochial interests, the parochial belief in the superiority of one ethnic culture over another drives a domination agenda of one community over others. As discussed in Chapter 7, while the Respondents observe that the ethnic communities that make-up Liberia and Sierra Leone accept that there cannot be a return to segregated ethnic nations, the national-identity institutions, nevertheless, are unable to provide an obvious negotiated route to the parity of a national-identity.

The contest for political power supported through Western systems of democracy aggravated the parochial ethnic divisions to the extent that political leaders were prepared to sacrifice long-term national cohesion for short-term attainment of political power based on ethnic cleavages. In organising legitimate identities to participate in elections, the Election Management Bodies in the study countries responsible for the election exercises were regularly hollowed-out and rebuilt to satisfy personal political ambitions of the political party in power, with no opportunity to build institutional experience. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 7, the same triggers were found in Zambia where, as the Respondents claimed, the failed experiment of the Central Africa Federation, the personality attributes of Kenneth Kaunda and his group of political leaders as well as the unexpected defenders of the nation-states' identity averted more extreme ethnic identity clashes and complete the collapse of the nation-state.

8.3. Logistic, Infrastructure and Technology conclusions

As discussed in Chapter 7, there are multiple issues with the logistics and infrastructures of offices of registration departments and agencies, particularly since the operations of the national registration offices lack the discipline of private sector organisations. Many of the departments for identity registration did not open at the appointed times, and closed before the end of the working day. People living in rural areas were the most disadvantaged with national-identity registration centres in district capitals sometimes over hundred kilometres from their villages of abode making them inaccessible to register and obtain a functional national-identity. Some of the people living in the rural areas were excluded from national-identity registration by default.

Does living within the territorial confines of a nation-state with inefficient national-identity institutions affect the acquisition of a functioning national-identity? Whereas the formation of viable nation-states is reliant on the observance of a freewill and liberty within the legal structure and territorial confines of the nation community, as Caplan and Torpey (2001) point out, the liberty to select a national-identity at birth is not, it is pre-destined. Generally, in the three countries studied, both the freewill of the individual within the nation-state and the pre-destined functional national-identity was further curbed by the institutional inefficiencies caused by inadequate logistics, poor infrastructure and the ill-discipline of nation-identity-management officials. Some of the Respondents in Zambia claimed that the unavailability of registration centres within the national frontiers sometimes forced individuals living near the borders to register births in the neighbouring countries, such as Botswana, Namibia and Angola, that had easier access to registration centres. Respondents from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia stated that the governments periodically revise nationality and identity laws without sufficient consultation with the nationals that make-up the nation. That said, within Sierra Leone and Zambia where national-identity cannot be modified other than by attainment of adulthood or deed poll, several choices of a national-identity exist after the attainment of the age of adulthood, which is 18 and 21 in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively.

In the additional findings of Chapter 7, the study uncovered that the three study countries use IT systems did not take into consideration the historical evolution of ethnic nations into nation-states. The use of 'big-brother-like' IT equipment that tracks the national-identity of persons within the nation-state is unavoidable in any modern national-identity ecosystem. Thus, the ubiquitous tracking and modification of the parameters to nationality, in principle is obtained with little knowledge nor the consent of persons in the geographic territory. In the example of

Sierra Leone, that modified hereditary nationality from parents to grand-parents granting Sierra Leonean nationality to a whole community of persons that may have wanted to maintain residence in Sierra Leone, but not nationality. It is for this reason that the Researcher uncovered pushback to the evasive nature and use of big-brother IT equipment such as Block-chain in national-identity management "liberty has been subverted by the avalanche of privacy invasions that have followed in the wake of the computers', an invention as a means of turning the (endless permanent) census into a goldmine of detailed information" (Sherrer, 2004 p.242). This study however found no formidable resistance in any of the study countries to the use of IT equipment itself, but rather the unethical or non-consulted use of the data was highlighted as a concern by some respondents. This unethical or non-consulted discriminatory use of identity data could have been possible without the use of modern IT equipment albeit more laborious and less effective.

8.4. Penetration of functional national-identity documents

As discussed in Chapter 7, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the regular and uncoordinated national-identity registration for electoral purposes, without reference to other institutions within the identity eco-system or to inherited legacy data meant that at any one time, up to forty percent (40%) of the population of Liberia and Sierra Leone were left without a suitable functional national-identity document, even though legitimate for the purpose of voting. Here, it is useful to make a comparison with Zambia where it is estimated that only 20% of the nationals have unsuitable or no national-identity documents. From the research, the study was able to conclude that other than the suffrage rights contained within national-identity management there were no immediate tangible benefits to national-identity registration for minority ethnic communities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Indeed, the penetration of national-identity documents evidenced through the registration of individuals into the national-identity

eco-system superimposed over the ethnic identity structures was dependant on the institutions of the nation-state first demonstrating to the individuals the embrace of the nation-state in addition to the embrace of the ethnic community. Tangible links, must be drawn between national-identity and the benefits that would otherwise not be granted such as access to education and health cover.

8.5. Efficiency of Identity Management tools and systems

The efficiency of the Identity Management systems and tools is often called into doubt. People lack confidence in the usage of the identification tokens, such as cards because the veracity of the information contained cannot be confirmed when needed. Operators of the systems and tools themselves are not given sufficient training on the systems and tools acquired by the nation-state. Biometric systems fail to accommodate local sub-Saharan rural conditions. The study countries have a large section of their population and constituent ethnic communities living in rural and largely inaccessible parts of the country. Uniquely, in this context, most of the people do menial work which leads to sweaty fingers prints and by the nature of the work, fingerprints are worn out and do not respond to the biometric equipment. Notably, an inefficiency level of fifteen percent (15%) in the accuracy of captured and retained data can potentially affect an entire ethnic community and cause their exclusion from the national-identity management records. The study was able to conclude that these inefficient systems have weakened governance, government institutions and public administration.

8.6.   Challenges in the use of unsuitable equipment and systems

In Chapter 7, the study noted that the operational challenges faced in implementing or upgrading procured identity-management systems in the study countries was hardly dealt with. According Respondents from the study countries, the performance of the Identity Management systems and tools in all the study countries face numerable challenges, some operational, design administration and sometimes even in concept. Respondents claimed that the fundamental challenges to the system are not evaluated and addressed, rather 'work-arounds' that disregard the causes of the underlying dysfunctional systems and tools. The term, 'work-arounds', was used by Respondents in Liberia and Sierra Leone to failing sections of the identity management systems. The identity management system and tools, therefore, are unable to deliver the services and entitlements of identification expected of them contextualized within the boundaries of the study territories. The discussion in Chapter 7 shows that from the data collected, the study was able to conclude that these unresolved challenges fermented accusations of nepotism, ethnic governance and mistrust of politics and leaders. Additionally, when the challenges were recognised and attempts were made to resolve them, national resources were misused to procure complete systems rather than the revision of the offending sections of the national-identity system and structures.

8.7.   Effects of unsuitable national-identity systems

The study revealed several positive effects of the use of identity management systems and tools in the development of the study countries. In spite of the inadequate penetration of national-identity registration systems and unsatisfactory levels of efficiency, the identity management systems inherited by Sierra Leone and Zambia have held both nation-state's territorial integrity constant since their founding. In contrast, Liberia having formulated a unique hybrid national-identity management eco-system that failed because the ethnic

nations that bordered it opted to align with competing colonial powers. Liberia lost people and territory to Ivory Coast and Guinea during the years of consolidation between 1840 – 1930. Although there were civil wars in three of the countries neighbouring Zambia that engulfed the ethnic nations that spanned Zambian frontiers, the Zambian nation-state has been able to avoid an overspill of hostilities unto Zambian territory. Conversely both Sierra Leone and Liberia have however experienced civil wars that span the ethnic nations on both sides of their borders and consequently spread into each other's territories and other neighbouring countries such as Guinea, and Ivory Coast, because of a lack of an adequate identity management eco-system that values and makes use of the national frontiers. The study highlights the effects of formulating, implementing and monitoring national policies and that unify the constituent members of the nation-community into a cohesive nation-state. The study concludes that because of an intrinsic understanding of colonisation, there is an untapped capacity to improve of governance and efficient delivery of government services when identity management structures properly adopted to suit sub-Saharan Africa countries.

8.8. The Way Forward

The aim of this study was to research the evolution of national-identity management in sub-Saharan African countries and how the institutions and development of these nation-states, have been affected by colonisation, ethnicity, and nationalism. This is why Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zambia were the central case studies. Liberia, although a settled state, was colonised mainly by descendants of black slaves from the USA who could not obtain a negotiated functional national identification from the USA's national-identity institutions. Sierra Leone, was likewise colonised by Britain as a national-identity project using black ex-slaves who arrived with recognised but disparaged identities after fighting on the British side of the American wars. Zambia on the other hand, was colonised by the British as a purely commercial venture that ignored the evolution of ethnic identity and national-identity institutions. As case studies, they allow us to see in one study issues that appear fragmented/disjointed elsewhere in Africa South of the Sahara/post-colonial Africa. What political/cultural/social forces can link the descendants of indigenous and settler communities? What national-identity structures can link the urban and rural communities? What national-identity policies, instruments, implementation systems, and implementation process may mitigate the challenges and negative effects identified in the three study countries?

8.8.1. If an inherited identity-management eco-system fails to establish a cohesive national-identity in the nation-state, the wholesale and complete rejection of the failed system in the country is unwise, therefore, components of the system that are widely accepted and which foster national accord should be retained. But if aspects of the identity structures, nationalistic symbols and practices - for example the usage of common local languages for official communication - examined in this study are to be followed,

the emphasise on the continuum of a legitimate nation-state and its constituent components would have to come up with meaningful symbols that combine the inevitability of an inherited nationality with regard to the nation-state's embrace of the individual. This would lead to conscientious participatory citizenship.

8.8.2. The point is to design national-identity systems that link intangible benefits to nationality and citizenship. Often people recognise the intangible pride of belonging to an ethnic group to which they do not have any financial obligation other than an individual obligation to relatives. When, for instance, an indigene of Kwahu in Ghana is invited to contribute towards the development of a Kwahu project in the rural community, this obligation is readily accepted along the lines of an inherent pride of belonging. This is not fundamentally dissimilar to the modern activity of crowd-funding that gives recognition to each participant and contributor via the use of modern IT infrastructure to a community that voluntarily ascribes to an identity and the embrace of the community project. In the context of this study, at the national level, the pride of belonging to a national-community should be inherent in the formulation of the national-identity ecosystems targeted at taxation and the pride of belonging to national projects funded by visible financial participation.

8.8.3. If the nationality and citizenship of a nation-state involves the privilege of contributing financially to the sustenance of the nation-state and its institutions, even as silently as the payment of indirect taxes and invisible taxes, the point is to design of national-identity ecosystems that link tangible benefits to nationality and citizenship. If people recognise the intangible pride of belonging to an ethnic group to which they do not have any financial obligation other than a personal obligation to relatives. Efficient and

robust national identification systems that cover the entire population of a country can be transformational to the country's development by contributing to the achievement of set goals through. Often people recognise the intangible pride of belonging to an ethnic group to which they do not have any financial obligation other than a personal obligation to relatives. The lack of penetration in sub-Sahara African nation-states would be vastly improved if registration of nationals had tangible benefits of identification creating a link with nationality and a tangible recognition, such as the provision of free pre-tertiary education and the provision of free primary healthcare. These fundamental privileges of identity recognition are the support structure in the formation of viable and enduring communities. The eco-system should improve individual livelihoods through equal and enhanced access to services that caters to social safety nets, health services, gender equality and financial inclusion that might be caused through the disadvantage of belonging to particular ethnic and inter-nation communities (The World Bank, 2017)

8.8.4. A national-identity management eco-system should ultimately be aimed at identifying every member of the nation-community and sequencing the persons activity from birth till death. As discussed in the findings, the confirmation of a birth is not equivalent to an entry into the nation-state's Register of Births and Deaths. A nation-state may record on behalf of another nation-state the occurrence of a birth, but not necessarily sequence the subsequent activity of the person as the person may obtain the national-identity of an alternative nation-state. As discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5, each study country is composed of smaller communities, thus an effective national-identity eco-system should increase individual visibility yet reduce ethnic community competition. Communities welcome newcomers and new births by recognised naming conventions,

giving them education on community values, protecting them in times of conflict and providing care and well-being in times of peace. The nation-state's acknowledgment of the entry into the nation-state's Register of Births and Deaths should be accompanied by financial vouchers or redeemable entitlement certificates automatically on attainment of a certain age. Britain, practiced the issuance of milk vouchers and 'Child Benefit' payments to new members of the nation community signifying the acquisition of the nation-identity of Britain. Similarly, voter registration unto the nation-state's 'Electoral Roll' the USA and UK is automated on the attainment of 18 years by the person. Similar automated acknowledgement of national-identity entitlements would nurture equitable of national-identity management and moderate ethnic tensions within sub-Sahara nation-states.

8.8.5. In sub-Sahara Africa, environmental factors have produced variations in the human body such as nose geometry that become common amongst a community living in a particular vicinity. If the use of biometrics in identification means the capture and recording of characteristics and variations of the body, that are then digitised for automated identification, the purchase of automated biometric technology developed and not home tested in Africa with similar environmental conditions should be avoided. The performance of modern IT technology in Africa has produced unforeseen problems resulting from harsh climatic conditions and fluctuation electrical-power sources unknown in Europe. Technology that is similarly untested in Africa has caused most biometric identity management programmes in Africa to be abandoned. Projects with a substantial technology portion should have proven efficiency in Africa. Identity-management projects with a proliferation of untested technological wizardry should be tested and adapted to the African communities and in the environment that they intend

to be used for, this will increase the accuracy of the systems and tools. The scale and complexity of study nation-states was often cited as a defence of the ecosystem's inability to generate real-time reporting. The use of appropriate talking-drum technology was sufficient in announcing the arrival of a new-born into the community. With the appropriate technological solutions, national-identity ecosystems should be designed to generate continuous and reliable data to measure progress and inform policy construction, strengthening governance and the effectiveness of public administration. Thus, the use of specifically adapted IT equipment within a deliberately cultivated culture of trust in all the nation's communities may not receive pushback as observed in Europe.

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Appendices
Appendix A: Consent Form

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting a research on the relevance of identity management and its effect on national development, economic growth and standards of living in sub-Sahara Africa. The information that would be gathered would be used for academic purposes only and would be treated with the strictest confidentiality.

The decision to participate in this study is entirely up to you. You may refuse to take part in the study at any time without affecting your relationship with the investigator of this study. Your decision will not result in any loss or benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. You have the right to answer any single question, as well as to withdraw completely from the interview at any point during the process. Additionally, you have the right to request that the interviewer not use any of your interview material. Again, you have the right to ask questions about this research study and to have those questions answered by me before, during or after the research.

By appending your signature below, it indicates that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant for this study, and that you have read and understood the information provided above. You will be given a signed and dated copy of this form to keep, along with any other printed materials deemed necessary by the study investigator.
Thank You

Name:……………………………………………………………………………
Signature:………………………………………………………………………….
Date:…………………………………………………………………………….

Appendix B: Interview Guide

This study aims at exploring "The Relevance of Identity Management and its effect on Development in Selected sub-Saharan Africa Countries".

You are kindly requested to respond to questions in this interview as candidly as you can. Be assured that this interview is purely for academic purpose and your confidentiality is assured. Please feel free to halt or stop the interview if you wish to.

Thank you for consenting to be part of this research.

Section A	
1. Name	
a. Age	
b. Occupation / Profession / Organisation	
c. How long you have been involved with Identification / National Identification	
2. What specific duties or role do you play in the National Identification process?	
Duty / Role	**Commentary**
Registration/ Data Collection	
Authentication / Certification / Investigation / Validation	
Legal Representation	
Purchasing/Administration of the document / system	
Technology / Engineering	

Section B

3. What do you understand as national-identity within the territory that is your country?

4. What do you understand as ethnic identity and is there is a conflict between ethnic identity and national-identity in your country?

5. Which documents do you consider to represent National Identification and how easy is it to obtain these documents within territory that is your country?		
Document	**Y/N**	**Comments**
Birth Certificate		
National ID card		
Naturalisation card / Certificate		
National Passport		
Family /Clan card		
Voter's ID card		
National Health card		
Social Security / Tax ID card		
Drivers Licence		
Any Other		

6. What do you think is the penetration of identity management tools in your country?

7. How efficient are the identity management tools in your country?

8. Can you comment on the relevance of identity management in your country, what in your view is the effect of identity management systems on the development in your country?

Birth Certificate

National ID card

Naturalisation card / Certificate

National Passport

Voter's ID card

National Health card

Social Security / Tax identification card

Drivers Licence

Family /Clan card

Any other

9. What do you think are the challenges of identity management systems in your country

10. Do you think these challenges can be overcome and how?

11. What other observations or comments would you like to make on identification.

Thank you for your cooperation and support.

Appendix C: Development and Social Progress Index 2019

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
Source: Social Progress Imperative, 2019

Appendix D: Disruptions to the Administration of Nation-Identity Eco-system and Nation-States in Africa, Coups d'états, and cessations to national governments in sub-Sahara Africa 1946 – 2004

Pages 440 – 452
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Notes to Appendix D:
- Successful coup d'états are those that seized and held central authority for at least one week.
- Attempted coup d'états are those that were executed but central authority could not be retained by the plotters and eventually power reverted to the incumbent authority.
- Plotted or alleged coup d'états are those that were planned but could not be executed and there was no discernible loss of power or control of central authority the incumbent government.

Source:
- Conflict trends in Africa 1946-2004: A Macro-comparative perspective, Department for International Development, 2000