

Declaration

This is to certify that, the work presented in this thesis embodies my research, the works of other persons have been appropriately acknowledged: the thesis' originality rests exclusively on the author.

Beloveth Odochi Nwankwo

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to Jehovah God, the epitome of my research wisdom and knowledge and to my elder brother and wife, Mr and Mrs Chidi Nwankwo for their moral and financial support throughout my research work.

Acknowledgements

I am forever indebted to Jehovah God Almighty the originator of knowledge, who made my challenges within the period of this research a stepping-stone. I am overwhelmingly grateful to my director of studies, Professor Robert Hudson for his invaluable commitment and contribution to the success of this thesis. I see my research as a classical one to have your name associated with my thesis. I am proud to benefit from your invaluable experience and encouragements. I remember when I embarked on this research, you encouraged me to do my best and that my writing style would greatly improve over the research period. Thank you for teaching me critical thinking and writing. I dedicate my five journal articles, published during my research to you, for not only editing but ensuring that they were publishable. My conference papers and PowerPoint slides were never complete until you put your classical academic touch on them; hence, their subsequent success. Your unflinching support brought me this far, I cannot thank you enough.

My profound gratitude goes to my second supervisor Professor Sam Kasule, who not only believed in my capability to achieve this mighty task but went extra miles to bring the best out of my knowledge. Thank you for taking extra time to supervise me, I am forever grateful. I also wish to appreciate my senior colleague, Dr Godwin Oboh, for not only introducing me to the best supervisory team any research student could pray for but also assisted me in building a strong foundation in my research area while we shared the same office. I thank the Director of Research in the College, Professor Neil Campbell, for his interest in my research and his continuous support throughout my studies.

My thanks go to the management staff of Nigerian Maritime Administrative and Safety Agency (NIMASA) who made the completion of this research work possible. Dr. Patrick Akpobolokemi, the then Director General of NIMASA, and Mr Felix Bob-Nabena, the then

Director of Administration, thank you for your unreserved contribution, it made this research work possible. I wish to appreciate my amiable bosses, Mr Dikko T. Bala, Mrs Enemo Amaechi, Mr Jamoh, Mr Isichie, Mr Otonye, Dr Mrs Felicia Mogo, Mrs Rita Uruaekpa and a host of others, for their relentless, unflinching moral support and contribution to my research work. I pray that you have God's favour in all endeavours.

I wish to thank the members and staff of Shell, Chevron, and Agip Community and Public Relations Department who have contributed immensely to the success of my research by granting me interview sessions and by completing my questionnaires. Although reaching you posed a challenge, the wealth of information you provided, with respect to your corporate social responsibility (CRS) and community relations' engagements, was critical to the success of this research. My appreciation goes to members of the DPR Department, particularly Mr Boma, who took it upon himself to ensure that my application for a covering letter to visit the selected oil companies was granted. I thank the then Director General of NOSDRA, members of State and Federal Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, NDDC, selected members of the University of Port Harcourt scholars, the Center for Niger Delta Studies and the selected host communities for providing the needed information either in the form of an interview or by completing my questioner. I thank you all as my heavenly father provided you to offer me the needed assistance even when the journey became tougher.

James and Happiness mostly facilitated the coding and transcription of my interviews and questioners, I deeply appreciate you two for your outstanding contribution. My special thanks go to Professor Epelle, Professor Rose Ayuru and Professor Ettekpe for your timely contributions in ensuring that I remain focused in my research. Dr Ohio, Sampson Makinde and Shan Rambukwella, thank you for your inestimable technical and moral support, without

which the success of this research would have been strained. I wish to appreciate Professor Nna Johnson for his invaluable contribution to my study. My gratitude goes to Dr Felix Tuodulor, Patterson Ogunand Dr Tapiwa for their help in providing me with further research materials.

My special thanks goes to my immediate family, the best parents in the world; for not just giving birth to me, but bringing me up in the way of Jehovah. Leaning on Jehovah as you have always encouraged me has been beneficial. I say thank you to you and as always I promise not to depart from the ways of Jehovah. I also thank my siblings, Bethel Nwankwo, Chisom Nwankwo, my nephew, Brenton Nwankwo, and my nieces, Chizi and Shullamite Nwankwo for helping me out with the typing of my manuscript each time I penned it down on a paper. I appreciate the moral support of my special one and only sister, Barr. Mrs Patience Ejiogu and sister Chinyere Okafor (Mrs) for your encouragement, my father and mother in-law and sister's in-law and the entire Ikpi's family for your understanding and bearing my mood during the critical time of my research. I was born to the best family and married to the most special family, thank you all for enduring my excesses while I worked day and night.

Finally and most importantly my profound gratitude goes to my darling husband. You are the best of every good thing that has happened to me during this research work. Thank you for loving and supporting me, even when I had to ignore you and the family needs to focus on my research work. Thank you for the nights you had to stay up late with me while I was researching. Thank you for believing I can make it.

Abbreviations

List of abbreviations

ACF: Australian Conservation Foundations

ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution

BIPR: British Institute of Public Relations

BRACED States: Rivers, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River Edo and Delta States

CBMs: Confidence-Building Measures

CDC: Community Development Committee's

CNDS: Centre for Niger Delta Studies

CNL: Chevron Nigeria Limited

CNN: Cable News Network

COMA: Coalition for Militant Action

CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility

DJSGI: Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes

DPR: Department of Petroleum Resources

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ERA: Environmental Rights Action

FA: Frustration Aggression hypothesis

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FNDIC: Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities

FoE: Friends of the Earth

GDP: Gross Domestic Products

GMoU: Global Memorandum of Understanding

HSR: Human Security Report

IYC: Ijaw Youth Council

IYM: Ikwerre Youth Movement

JTF: Joint Task Force

KII: Key Informant Interview

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MNDA: Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs

MNOCs: Multi-National Oil Companies

MOPOL: Nigeria Mobile Police Force

MORETO: Movement for Reparation to Ogbia

MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

MOSIEND: Movement for the Survival of the Ijo in the Niger Delta

NAOC: Nigerian Agip Oil Company

NDDB: Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC: Niger Delta Development Commission
NDPI: Niger Delta Partnership Initiative Foundation
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force

NDRBDA: Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority

NDVF: Niger Delta Vigilante Force

NLNGC: Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company

NOSDRA: National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency

OMPADEC: Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPCs: Oil Producing Communities

OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPS: Oil Producing States

PIB: Petroleum Industry Bill

PIGB: Petroleum Industry Governance Bill

PR: Public Relations

PTF: Petroleum Trust Fund

RAF: Revenue Allocation Formula

RDC: Regional Development Councils

RNC: Royal Niger Company

SNEPCO: Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company

SPDC: Shell Petroleum Development Company

SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Sciences

UAC: United African Company

UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program UNDP:
United Nation Development Project UNEP: United
Nations Environmental Programme UNIPORT:
University of Port Harcourt

UYOMO: Urhobo Youth Movement

NNPC: Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development

WBCSD: World Business Council for Sustainable Development

WHO: World Health Organization

WICE: World Industry Council for the Environment

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ABSTRACT

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria contributes more than 95 percent of the country's export incomes and generates more than 40 percent of the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 85 percent of the nation's total revenue (Karl and Gray, 2003, p. 26). Although most multinational oil companies (MNOCs) have found the Niger Delta a fertile ground for business, the region remains backward, poor and underdeveloped. The host communities have been frustrated by the effects of oil production on the environment, which include oil spillages, the reduction of arable land, and the destruction of wild life and fish reserves. As a result of the oil bearing communities' angry sentiments towards the MNOCs and the Nigerian Government, incessant conflict, and violent crises have enveloped the region. To mitigate the anger, the MNOCs have engaged in some programs and projects intended to benefit the oil-bearing communities in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

This thesis is focused on how the CSR strategies of the MNOCs have contributed to the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The mixed methods descriptive design study employed involves the use of survey instruments and content analysis to interrogate the conflict situation. Findings indicate that the failure of MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region to provide concrete and sustainable CSR, and the government's inability to regulate the MNOCs and plough back the taxes paid by the latter to develop the region, has led to the current crises. These supported the thesis that the lack of concrete social responsibility contributes to conflicts in the Niger Delta. Building upon the stakeholders' theory, the theory of frustration and aggression, and conflict theory, this study discovered that the cause of the conflict in the Niger Delta is not solely an issue of corporate social responsibility and revenue allocation, but it largely depends on the divergences of the different stakeholders' interests. This study, therefore, recommends a revocation of the 60/40 ownership structure between the government and the oil companies. Instead, host communities should be considered part owners of the oil deposits in their land, which would give them a fair percentage in the ownership structure.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The negative consequences of oil abundance in developing countries are similar- weak institutions, impoverished states, poor economic performance, authoritarian regimes and unbalanced development (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 1). Notably, oil and its elements tend to frustrate most developing economies as they perform poorly with the presence of oil. For instance, the poverty rate in Nigeria increased from 36 per cent when the economy was based on agriculture to over 70 per cent when the economy became oil dependant. This is despite the huge amount of revenue accrued from oil resources (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013, p. 3).

Indeed, petroleum resources have been described as a curse as most oil resource rich developing countries are lacking both freedom and peace. To corroborate this fact, Freedman (2006, p. 31) argued that there is either a law or a force behind oil natural resources "whereby the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich countries". Ostensibly, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria typically exemplifies one of the oil-rich countries experiencing huge oil revenue on the one hand and a lack of freedom on the other. This is due to the on-going random kidnapping of its residents and inter and intra-community conflicts in the region (Kaldor, Mary, Karl, Terry and Said, 2015). The latter is largely caused by the divide and rule strategies employed by the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) as elaborated in section 2.4.11 of this study.

Conflict in the Niger Delta, which predates Nigerian colonialism, tends to have been exacerbated in the early 1990s when the people of the region became more aware of the environmental damage caused by oil exploration activities. As a result, Ken Saro-wiwa and

his eight compatriots along with their loyalist supporters carried out a peaceful protest against the Nigerian government and the MNOCs. Unfortunately, the then military regime led by Major General Sani Abacha responded to the peoples' peaceful protest with a reprisal measure, which culminated in the killing of Ken Saro-wiwa and eight others. The extra judicial killing of the "Ogoni nine" on November 10th 1995 (Ken Saro-wiwa and eight others) not only attracted international attention to the region's conflict but was also seen as the beginning of the oil resource conflict in the Niger Delta (Maier, 2001). This is because militant groups such as MEND, IYC and NDPVF emanated after the death of Ken Saro-wiwa and continued the protest against both the oil companies and the government. Among other causes of the protest by the "Ogoni Nine", Naanen (1995) believes that, the conflict which he referred to as the "The Ogoni Wars" was primarily the result of poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment as a result of environmental degradation brought about by the oil multinationals.

Shell-BP as it was known started its oil exploration in Nigeria in 1921. The search for oil (Black gold) ended in 1956 when oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, in the Brass Division of present day Bayelsa state. The presence of oil in Nigeria attracted more MNOCs, including Agip and Chevron. Residents of the Niger Delta region perceived the presence of the MNOCs as instruments of development. According to Seers (1973), development implies the eradication of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. Paradoxically, the inflow of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta does not imply development. Ironically, the MNOCs in the Niger Delta have indulged in activities that have resulted in environmental degradation due to gas flaring, unemployment, abject poverty and the destruction of flora and fauna. The increase in unemployment has been blamed on the destruction of the host communities' farmlands due to seismic exploration and drilling waste, thereby increasing poverty even further. It is therefore no wonder that Barnett and Muller

(1974) believe that the MNOCs contribute to the global exacerbation of unemployment, poverty and inequality in the world today. MNOCs tend to focus on profit making rather than offering a solution to its hosts' social problems. The aforementioned continued conditions of poverty and underdevelopment are responsible for youth agitation and the political conflict in the Niger Delta.

However, as expanded in chapter two of this study, the Marxists believe that conflict is inevitable in society. Apparently, they are of the view that conflict is a necessary condition not just for human survival but also for the growth of society. This is in consonance, with Otitte's (2007) postulation that conflict which normally springs from the variance in human interest, does not only end-up in negativity but can be helpful in the growth and development of society. Owing to human clashes of interest and goals, conflict is unavoidable in the human race but can be managed. Furthermore, Collier (2003, p. 5) defined, conflict as a situation where identifiable rebel organisations; wage war against the government. In most weak states, the rebels' clash of interests with the government often springs from greed or grievance as elaborated in chapter two of this study. Coser (1958, p. 8) defined conflict as a struggle over natural resources, power or value, thus conflict in this sense can be used to settle two opposing interests. Conflict assessment and management strategies can be used to determine what each conflict actor wants and how to achieve peace. After a review of the foregoing connotations of conflict, this study will adopt Cosers' perception of conflict. The justification being that, the Niger Delta conflict is mainly caused by oil natural resource abundance and the appropriation of its consequent monetary value. However, in this regard, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was established as an umbrella association for the Ogoni people that organised resistance to the unsustainable exploitation of crude oil. This research therefore seeks to ascertain the linkage between conflict and corporate social responsibility (CSR) of oil mining companies.

The CSR concept, which started as a philanthropic activity, dates back to the 1950s. This was a time when corporations made corporate giving to their communities at will and without an agreement or contract. However, in recent times CSR has become part of strategic activities of corporations. Kramer (2006) defined CSR as an organisation's obligation. This implies that CSR is no longer philanthropic but an organisation's legal requirement to be socially responsible within their host communities. The on-going momentum of CSR is based on the belief that CSR has the capacity of improving an organisation's profitability and performance (Jones et al., 2009). Idowu (2009) opposes the relatedness of CSR and an organisation's profitability. Despite Idowu's view on the weak correlations between CSR and an organisation's performance, the lack of an organisation's engagement in concrete CSR can be damaging to the organisation's corporate image. This is allegedly, the reason why MNOCs in the Niger Delta have experienced corporate scandals with poor environmental mining best practices.

1.2 Defining the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

The name, Niger Delta, was derived from its position at the mouth of the River Niger (Etekpe, 2009). The Niger Delta region was formed by 'the River Niger, West Africa's largest river, which flattens out in Nigeria's south-eastern coast into a tangle of creeks and mangrove swamps suffused with fresh and brackish water. It has abundant oil and gas deposits, both onshore and offshore, and includes those oil and gas deposits located at Agbami, Bonga, Usan and Amenam/Kpono field, a region occupied by over 20 million people. The uniqueness of Nigeria's Niger Delta region is not only due to its abundant oil deposits; it is also characterized by the existence of 'coastal low lands and waters – marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons (Osaghae et al, 2007, p.6).

The region, similar to various Delta regions across the world, for example, the Mississippi Delta in the United States, and Mekong Delta in China, has a warm humid sub-tropic climate with a long dry season and short rainy season. Notably, the region was expanded due to General Sani Abacha's concept of the South-South geopolitical-zone, which made the Niger Delta synonymous with oil producing states. For example, Abia, Imo and Ondo states, which, though historically outside the area now form part of the Niger Delta, do not possess the characteristics of a delta (Etekpe, 2009). According to Etekpe (2007, p. 2) "there is a historical distinction between the oil producing states (OPS), the South-South geopolitical zone and the Niger Delta ... As a result, they should all be referred to as oil producing states, and not Niger Delta States." Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's administration further confused the region's identity with its creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act in 2000, which redefined the Niger Delta region to be inclusive of the nine oil and gas producing states in Nigeria. Jaja (2008, p.140-1), commenting on the lack of unanimity among scholars and the indigenous people on the actual boundary of the Niger Delta suggests that:

[t]here are several views about the [Niger Delta]. The most popular ones refer to areas comprising the lower parts of the River Niger nearer the coastline.... another variant distinguishes the core Niger Delta from the new Niger Delta of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The latter covers the nine oil producing states, namely, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers State.

Furthermore, Mitee (2012, p.3) state that ‘when oil was discovered in commercial quantity in the Niger Delta, the region gradually became expressed in terms of an oil producing area of the country, not necessarily as an area geographically classified as delta’. According to Ukpong and Ikoh (2013, p.36), the region is:

...[p]redominantly coastal and open directly to the sea... This geographical location technically accords them the littoral status in relation to offshore oil wells and entitles them to lay claim to resources in their maritime territory up to 200-meter isobaths. The derivation principle on the other hand enables states endowed with crude oil to share 13% of the revenue derived from crude oil monthly. All the states in the region therefore depend on oil revenue to finance their socio-economic and political development.

Notwithstanding the foregoing description of the Niger Delta, Ako (2009) succinctly, maintains that the Niger Delta can be defined in three ways, thus; geographically, economically and politically. The map in figure 1:1 below demonstrates the geographical location of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Economically, the Niger Delta has been defined in terms of its resources, which marked the region as the economic hub of Nigeria in both the palm oil and the current crude oil eras. Politically, in consensus with the Niger Delta Development Commission Act (2000), the region is expressed as synonymous with oil production. The particular Nigerian states in the region include Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States.

1.3 Historical background of the conflict in the Niger Delta: The correlation between the palm oil and crude oil eras.

Ukeja (2005, p. 5) argued that the extant studies on the Niger Delta conflicts are mainly limited to the period of commercial exploitation of crude oil, which started in 1958. This view is limiting because, it fails to consider the historical ingredients of the Niger Delta conflict. Thus, the antique British merchants marginalisation of the Niger Delta traditional institutions, who were then famous for their trading business with the establishment of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) at Akassa in 1895 and the consequent war. It is therefore, necessary to examine this historical antecedent to avoid painting a partial picture of both the Niger Delta and the region's conflict; this section of the study will highlight the history of the Niger Delta so as to establish holistic view of the conflict. The two major economic yet conflict prone eras in the Niger Delta included are the palm and crude oil periods. It is significant to analyse both eras to amplify the parallels.

Prior to the era of crude oil exploitation the economic system of the Niger Delta region was sustained by revenue from oil palm produce. Ako and Okonmah (2009, p.55) noted that the palm oil era, which became significant in 1865 recorded annual export of 2500 tonnes of palm oil accounting for 87 per cent of regional national output, making the product as significant as oil is to the Nigeria economy today. In addition to the exportation of palm oil, the product has both domestic and traditional significance. Domestically, the product was used for cooking, to purchase essential items (such as salt, and gun power) and for social and traditional obligations (payment of dowry). Tamuno and Edoumiekumo (2012, p.115) added that the oil palm trunk was a necessary material for the construction of buildings; the fibre was used for fishnets after it had been restructured as a woven material. Brooms were made from oil palm veins, whereas, fronds were used for the construction of thatched-roofs and

buildings. The kernel after being cracked was used for family snacks after which the waste from the kernel after being chewed was reused for feeding goats and local fowls.

The oil palm was tapped for domestic and traditional ceremonial wine while the kernel was traditionally cooked with earthenware for the production of an all-purpose therapeutic pomade-oil. The fate of the region changed with introduction of the British administration and their accompanying palm oil mills and plantation scheme in 1932, which although was aimed at improved agricultural production, had negative impact on the people. It should be noted that for the Niger Delta people palm oil production was based on local farming implements and the farmers were not interested in the new implements. The British administration introduced a mechanised system of plants and harvesting oil palm for the purpose of increased productivity and indeed productivity was increased. Crowder (1968) contends that the exploitation of the local people's agricultural products was the topmost attraction of the British merchants working in the Niger Delta. However, the traditional leaders who originally controlled the trade viewed the change in the farming system and the control of the region's trade by the British merchants as an encouragement. The alleged encroachment degenerated to colonialism. This refers to a situation where an existing economy is overthrown, and controlled by another for the sole purpose of exploiting the colonised (Ako and Okomah, 2009, p. 54; Fidelis and Samuel, 2011, p.1).

The traditional institutions in the historical the Niger Delta region such as King Wlliam Dappa-Pepple of Bonny kingdom, King Jaja of Opobo and Prince Nana of Itsekiri Kingdom fought against colonialism (Etekpe, 2007, p. 1). They realised that when an existing culture is colonised there would normally be negative impacts on the newly transformed communities (Epelle 2010b, p.14-19). However, Rotimi and Ogen (2008, p.48) argued that the pre-colonial heroes of the Niger Delta have been wrongly depicted as proto-nationalists. They note that

the traditional institutions' resistance in the Niger Delta region was fought for their selfish gain. They believe that the traditional leaders were basically struggling for the protection of their personal economic interests, and thus, their narrow pursuit of profit cannot constitute an effectual foundation of nationalist ferment in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the traditional institutions' striking motivation for fighting against the presence of British merchants in the region, the subsequent colonialism and its negative impact on the environment is suggestive of their determination to protect both the people and probably their positions. Paradoxically, Alter (1994, p. 10) argues that nationalism "encompasses two opposing ideas: one seeks to liberate a common group from oppression and the other thrives on oppressing the people". Ostensibly, the British merchant's mode of operation may have appeared domineering, oppressive and unacceptable by the traditional institutions, this could have prompted their determination to fight the perceived encroachment as well as creating a medium of consolidating their position that were threatened by the British merchants.

The Niger Delta people were faced with the issue of resource allocation and control during the colonial period. They felt that the RNC interfered with their legitimate right to trade and fought to re-possess it. Etekpe (2007, p.1) traced the conflict in the region to the Akassa Raid of 1895, a protest against British policies and that of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) by the Niger Delta traditional institutions. The British/Akassa war in 1895 resulted from the failure of diplomacy and the colonial administration's adoption of punitive measures instituted by naval troops (Etekpe, 2007, p. 2). The Niger Delta communities' resistance to the British colonial administration tends to account for the custom-tailored federalism adopted by the British administration in Nigeria. This is not different from the present harsh response the people experience from the Nigerian government whenever they carry out peaceful protests. These colonial developments have been described as 'booby-traps' (Etekpe, 2007, p.2; Obi, 2011), which successive Nigerian administrations, since the country's political independence

in 1960, would have overcome. However, as Mabogunje (1992, p. 2) suggests, history, in this case underpinned by negative policies, has foreclosed the Niger Delta people's future.

Given the rich resources in the Niger Delta, particularly crude oil, most MNOCs found the Niger Delta region a fertile ground for business activities. Today, the region is one of the world's richest biodiversity centres, attracting scientists and tourists. It possesses diverse vegetation belts from the largest rain forests in Africa to mangrove swamps, mountains and waterfalls with rare animals, including uncommon species (Ojabor, 2009; and Enyinla and Ukpo, 2006). In describing the Niger Delta, Moff and Linden (1995) argue that the region is undoubtedly the richest part of Nigeria in terms of natural resources. In their view:

[t]he area has large oil and gas deposits, as well as extensive forests, good agricultural land and abundant fish resources. Despite the tremendous natural and human resources base, the region's potential for sustainable development remains unfulfilled and its future is being threatened by environmental degradation and deteriorating economic conditions which are not being addressed by past and present policies and actions. Twenty-five [now over fifty] years of oil development has not brought significant benefits to the region (Moff and Linden, 1995, p. 7-8).

The exploration of crude oil in Nigeria dates back to 1908. However, the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa State in commercial quantity in 1956 marked the beginning of the Niger Delta crude oil era. However the first oil exploration took place in 1958 when Shell exported 5100 barrels of crude oil to England (Ako and Okonmah 2009, p.55). Since 1958 the quantity of exported oil has been on the increase and it's currently at 2million barrels per

day (Tamuno and Edoumiekumo, 2012, p.117); with oil currently, contributing approximately 90% of Nigeria's gross domestic.

Ownership of oil in Nigeria has been a major course of the on-going conflict in the Niger Delta. A major reason for this conflict is that the Land Use Act of 1978 denied the local people who were recognized as landowners from the ownership of the oil. Also, by virtue of the Nigerian Constitution, the MNOC's and the Federal Government of Nigeria who have control over every resource in the country jointly operate the Nigerian oil industry. This means that the members of the host community that cultivate the land are excluded from partaking in petro-business (Ako and Okonmah 2009, p.57). Furthermore, the Act as implemented infringed on the communities right not only to participate in oil-business but denies the communities the right to compensation with regards to environmental degradation (Ako and Coker 2007, p.435).

It is possible that this type of denial contributed to the limited involvement of the host communities in MNOCs environmental unfriendly activities that affects the health and standard of living of the Niger Delta people. The host communities who frown at this state of affairs have protested to both the government and the oil companies in different ways including petitions, civil demonstration and litigation in courts although yet to be successful (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p.65). After various unsuccessful attempts, the Niger Delta people resorted to aggressive measures in the early 1990's. These aggressive measures included the kidnapping of MNOC's expert staff (particularly foreigners), pipeline vandalization, disruption of oil installation amongst others. Both the Government and the MNOC's have responded to the regional aggression with punitive measures. This is perceived as the same measure the British merchants employed in the pre-colonial era that culminated in the

“Akassa War” of 1895. Repressive measures employed have only exacerbated the level of the regions conflict.

From the foregoing, there exist parallels between the palm oil and crude oil eras. Both products were in high demands although at different times (palm oil 1865 while crude stated in 1958). Palm oil was an essential product during the European industrial revolution. It was used in processing lubricants for the maintenance of industrial machinery and domestically used in heating-up the house, production of margarine and soap. On the other hand, crude oil as a contemporary developmental component is likewise used domestically and industrially. It is used in fuelling individual cars, generators, motorcycles, aeroplane, industrial machines and cars. Both eras were characterized by resource conflict involving the local communities (traditional institutions), foreign experts and the government (Ako and Okonmah, 2009, p. 59). They further averred that, the palm oil and crude oil eras’ resource conflict suffered unison between the government and the exploiters against the host communities in a bid to protect resource revenue generated from the communities’ resources but controlled by the central government. The oneness between the government and the alleged foreign resource exploiters has been legalised with the 60/40 joint venture relationship between the oil companies and the Nigerian government, originally co-signed by the Nigerian government and Shell in 1938.

It is possible that the denial of the host communities right in controlling the oil palm trade which they were best known for was a major contributor to the Akassa War of 1895, just as the communities leaders struggle today to gain recognition and participation in the oil business. Okonta (2007) contained that there is a direct link between the host communities’ non-participation and the conflict in the Niger Delta, which is traceable to the regions historical underpinnings. He added that conflict in the region cannot be understood without

taking into account the historical international economic forces, which the host communities have, resisted (Okonta, 2007, p. 3). It is the resistance of superior powers that has attempted to deny the local Niger Delta residents means of livelihood that resulted to both the Akassa war and the ongoing oil conflict with the government responding with oppressive measures.

Paradoxically, Oyefusi (2007, p. 1) attributed the violence in the Niger Delta to weak institutions, a lack of law enforcement and a marriage between the MNOCs and the Nigerian state, which stimulate the Nigerian government to deploy repressive measures frequently against the local communities in times of crisis between the oil companies and the host. To corroborate the palm oil and crude oil parallel nature, Ako and Okonmah (2009, p. 59), argued that, the Nigerian state have repeatedly, adopted the repressive means of quelling conflict as was the case during the palm oil era that led to the Akassa war. A period when the government controlled the security forces to protect their economic interest. In order to ensure a monopoly of the oil palm trade by the RNC, which was the identity of the residents of the Niger Delta and they were celebrated for it, the government's military forces attacked and suppressed the residents in 1895. This is no different from the punitive measures that the Nigerian government has adopted more recently (in 1993 the oil conflict was exacerbated by the Ogoni nine protest that led to their subsequent killing by hanging in 1995) to repress the oil host communities in order to protect its economic interest. This study is therefore focused on ascertaining the role each actor (the government, communities and the oil companies) of the conflict has played in exacerbating the conflict and the possible ways of managing the conflict.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

Recurrent oil conflict has affected the Niger Delta region since the past five decades since the commercialisation oil exploration from the Niger Delta in 1958. The region's conflicts are

blamed on the negative effects of oil exploration activities, which have impacted negatively on the relations amongst MNOCs (Shell, Chevron and Agip), the Nigerian State, and oil producing communities. The problem in the Niger Delta stems from the alleged neglect; oppression, marginalization and environmental dilapidation occasioned by oil exploration and production activities (Ojakorotu, 2009; Olawuyi, 2015). After a long period of frustration over the appalling conditions created by the economic activities of the MNOCs, the communities of the region, according to Ibeanu (2000), took up arms against petrol-business and its political allies in order to draw attention to their situation. The resulting conflict, which has degenerated and defied several measures aimed at its resolution, could inherently be related to the failure of the MNOCs CSR projects and policies in the Niger Delta in general.

The contradiction that generates conflict in the Niger Delta could be traceable to the haphazard nature and failure of the various multinationals' corporate social responsibility projects and policies (Ako, 2014). In spite of the attempt by the trans-nationals and government at various levels to mediate the crisis through interventionist strategies and programmes as measures towards managing or addressing the issues, conflict in the region has remained unabated. The tension in the Niger Delta continues to pose serious challenges for good governance and livelihood for the people in the region. That the militarisation of the region has not helped in restoring the much-desired stability in this regard raises a question of the government's conflict management style. Key socio-economic indicators reveal that there will be further devastating consequences if the crisis is not managed through inclusive policies derived from democratic and participatory processes. Without doubt, restoring peace in the region would require political will (Epelle, 2010a, p. 34-5) and determined effort to bring about the physical development of the region. The formulation and implementation of CSR policies and the establishment of a new and positive culture of social, economic and

democracy can support this. In this regard, a multi-stakeholder joint problem solving approach is required for timely implementation of CSR.

In spite of the interventionist measures adopted, the aggrieved communities seem not to be appeased by the Nigerian oil industry. On the other hand, the MNOCs in a bid to rebrand their image with the international community spent millions of dollars investing in the Niger Delta as part of CSR. Thus, according to Okodudu (2008), Shell's annual expenditure increased from \$25m in 1994 to \$60m in 2000. Despite these concerted efforts, Shell has continued to be blamed by the host communities with consequences including insecurity and public safety breaches.

The MNOCs pattern of investing in the realm of CSR ends up triggering aggression, either by the choice of project or the process of CSR delivery within the local communities. Therefore, it is not surprising that the new community-based strategies adopted by the MNOCs are perceived by the host communities as a mere shift to rebrand their corporate image (Ibeanu, 2000). Ostensibly, these changes in attitude arose from a re-evaluation of the oil giants' activities in the developing world. This approach was geared towards maintaining a viable link with their host environment. People-oriented public relations, which aim at sustaining cordial relations with the communities, are one of the approaches in achieving this crucial task. Consequently, in its review in 2009, Shell claimed the disbursement of plethora of funds to the Nigerian state for the development of oil-bearing communities. The joint venture operated by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) contributed more than \$34 billion within the period 2005-2008. Similarly, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO), which manage offshore business in deep water, claimed to have paid nearly \$2 billion over the same period (Shell Review, 2009). Notwithstanding the corporate giving of the oil company, the

conflict, which escalated with the criminal hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots (Ogoni Nine), rather than managing the conflict, escalated the CSR related crisis in the region. Saro-wiwa and his compatriots championed a peaceful protest in the early 1990s based on the inadequate CSR implementation by MNOCs, which has remained unabated. According to Eze (2014, p. 1):

The people of Nembe Community in Nembe Local Government Area of Bayelsa State rejected a goat and 10 bags of rice presented to them as Christmas gifts by the management of Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NOAC)...Daily Trust gathered that the anger of the oil rich Nembe Kingdom which is host to Agip stemmed from the fact that the gift items were meant to be shared by over 500,000 people led by a one-time Minister of Power and the Amananyabo of Nembe Kingdom, King Edmund Dakoru..., Chairman of Nembe Oil and Gas Committee, Chief Nengi James Orioworio, described the gifts as a corporate embarrassment to the traditional institution and the good people of Nembe Kingdom which the people will never take.

While Agip has been involved in hundreds of community development projects ranging from energy, education, and infrastructure to health and social-economic programmes, the communities are unhappy with the projects. This is because either they want to be involved in the decision-making or project delivery process or the companies get involved in CSR from an ad-hoc perspective. CSR projects should normally be planned and be part of the company's internal process so as to preclude the possibility of the respective community's rejection of their corporate giving. One would therefore wonder how Agip reached the

decision to have over 500,000 members of Nembe community share one goat and 10 bags of rice, which generated animosity rather than appreciation.

Chevron, on the other hand, tends to take seriously its role in community engagement; therefore, the company is actively involved in many projects that promote health, economic development and education. In 2005, for example, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) adopted a new approach to community engagement in the Niger Delta by improving local participation in determining its needs. According to the Chevron (2013) CSR report, this model, called the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) empowers the communities with the desired role of managing their development. A new Regional Development Councils (RDC) was created with the objective of bringing peace and stability to the Chevron host communities. Consequently, the memoranda has produced approximately 258 projects in more than 400 communities, villages, and chiefdoms, and benefited some 600,000 people. Projects worth more than \$83 million have been completed, enhancing the quality of life in these communities. The report further provided that in 2011 the company joined the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in contributing \$50 million to the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation. This foundation was established by Chevron to address the socioeconomic challenges facing the area. Notwithstanding the effort and the amount invested, the effects of the initiatives on the on-going conflict in the region have been unnoticed, or at best, minimal, based on the local quest for involvement with regards to corporate giving's.

The Nigerian Government on its part has established specialized institutions to cater for the needs of the Niger Delta. These include the now defunct Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the current the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The basic mandate of the NDDC is to further pursue the aims and

objectives of the community development paradigm, which concentrates on the provision of social and economic infrastructure. By 2006 NDDC, had undertaken a total of 122 major projects in Rivers State. Out of these, there are 40 roads, 29 water projects, 11 electrification projects, and three canalization projects. Others include 85 blocks of classrooms, one bridge and three jetties (allAfrica.com <http://allafrica.com/headlines> accessed 27/01/2012). Unfortunately, the communities viewed these efforts as paltry gifts vis-à-vis the perceived value of resource exploitation by the MNOCs and the Nigerian Federal Government from their areas; thus, violent conflicts have continued unabated (Isola, 2015).

According to Nnoli (1998), CSR failures accounted for the inability of conflicting groups to accept the arrangements and procedures that has been adopted to resolve the conflict. Similarly, Onosode (2003) averred that the current top-down approach adopted to solve endemic problems has failed to deliver results that are simultaneously socially and economically sustainable. This can be attributed to the lack of a common developmental framework and focus on sustainable corporate social responsibility. This is evidenced by the state and multinationals' delay in implementing the recommendations of the Ledum Mittee technical committee on the Niger Delta developmental master plan, which sets out the road map of for the development the host communities.

There is an increasing consciousness of the exploitation and backwardness in the Niger Delta. In spite of the wealth produced in the region to benefit the Nigerian state and MNOCs, the host communities have been at the receiving end of oil spillages, gas flaring and other environmental hazards that results from oil mining waste. This has resulted in an increase in the demand by host communities for more CSR initiatives from the MNOCs operating in their localities. The CSR efforts of the MNOCs can therefore, be seen as contrasting attempts. Thus, while MNOCs endeavour to double their efforts for CSR in recent times, there is a rise

in agitations from the host communities for such programmes and initiatives. This is ironic, and a plausible indication that the MNOCs CSR strategies either needs to be tailored to the communities' needs or the host communities are being unreasonable in their demands. Previous studies on CSR and Community Development are inconformity regarding the fact that CSR is still at the growth stage in terms of its implementation and effectiveness, particularly in the Niger Delta.

Worse still, the implementers are accused of misappropriating funds meant for CSR, thus contributing to the ineffectiveness of the programmes (Watts, 2005). In this context, some of the reasons advanced to account for the low-level of commitment to CSR initiatives include: cosmetic projects that do not effectively stand the test of time (Osuntokun, 2008, Owolabi and Oluowolobi, 2009). In addition, pessimism, abysmal and ambivalent responses to CSR, corruption and faulty implementation of the programme, and negative impacts of the process of delivering the CSR programmes contribute to the dissatisfaction among the host communities with the efforts of the MNOCs (Okodudu, 2008; Frynas, 2005; Akpan, 2006; Watts, 2004, 2005; Newell, 2005; Eweje, 2007 and Tuodolo, 2007). In order to analyse and evaluate the root causes of the regions conflict and its management this study will critically explore the foregoing issues.

The dependency mentality within the host communities has been fostered by the failure of most CSR programmes, which does not involve the local people in the initiation, planning and implementation process. Since, the construction of buildings and other development projects do not genuinely involve the local people, these social initiatives are seen, as gifts from outsiders and the local people do not claim ownership of the projects. Schemes introduced in this way cannot remain functional without the continued support of the owners/users, and this contravenes a basic principle of development.

Thus, as stated earlier, while the MNOCs claim to be actively engaged in CSR and to have invested extensively (huge amount of money) towards the development of the oil producing communities, the latter contend that the MNOCs have not done enough. In this regards, this study is focused on evaluating the reasons why increases in CSR funding by the MNOCs, correspondingly produces intensive communal resistance.

1.5 Aim and objectives of the study

The general aim of this study is to critically investigate whether or not the absence of concrete CSR strategies of the MNOCs has contributed to the perennial conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. The specific objectives are:

- (i) to assess the key causes of the conflicts and its consequences on the host communities in the Niger Delta region,
- (ii) to evaluate the CSR program and projects of the MNOCs and their impacts on conflicts management; and
- (iii) to evaluate the efforts of the Federal Government towards conflict management in the Niger-Delta region.

1.4 Research Questions

Given the importance of oil in the Nigeria economy, and the need to get the MNOCs operating in the oil producing the Niger Delta region to take their CSR seriously, the proposed mixed-methods study will answer the following specific research questions:

- 1) What are the key causes and who are the key actors responsible for restiveness in the Niger Delta?
- 2) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta and how successful are they? And,

- 3) What role has the Federal government played in the conflict resolution and how successful are the strategies employed?

1.5 Assumptions of Study

In the course of the study, the following propositions were tested:

- H1. Increase in funding for corporate social responsibility leads to higher resistance from the host communities.
- H2. Haphazard implementation of CSR projects and policies by MNOs aggravates the social conflict in the region.
- H3. If CSR projects/programs implemented stimulate local economy, there will be lesser social conflict in the study area.
- H4. If CSR projects are based on community needs, grievance/social conflicts in the study area are likely to reduce in the near future.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study shall be discussed based on three perspectives: theoretical, methodological and practical perspectives, as elaborated below.

1.6.1 Theoretical Significance

The theories of conflict, frustration and aggression and the stakeholders' theory were significantly elucidated in this research. The three theories were significant in the research although the stakeholder's theory, mostly underpinned the themes under review hence; the stakeholder's theory was adopted. It's important to note that both the conflict theory and the frustration and aggression theory buttressed the essence of conflict in society and its possible

sources, the stakeholders' theory is adopted because it explicates the relationship between all those that has both direct and indirect stake in a business and mandates businesses to be corporate citizen.

Furthermore, with the explication of CSR and conflict management in oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta, the study is significantly expository as it reviews existing studies on conflict in, the Niger Delta. Scholarly works by Adeyemi (2005), Breane (2007), Okodudu (2008), Ejibunu (2008) and Branco (2006), amongst others, will be reviewed. Most of these works exhaustively deal with the issue of oil and violence, CSR, policy failure and crisis in the Niger Delta. In this context, oil itself does not produce conflict, but the way stakeholders address issues concerning human relations and their expected benefits from the resource is significant. Previous studies do not sufficiently capture the interplay between CSR practices of multinationals and conflict management in oil-bearing communities as a response strategy to the conflict. Therefore, this gap forms the point of departure from previous studies. It is theoretically significant as the study is a paradigm shift from other studies on conflict in host communities of MNOCs in the Niger Delta.

1.6.2 Methodological Significance

The adoption of a coherent methodology in a study of this nature is very important. Relevant existing literatures on CSR and conflict management are reviewed and thereafter the study adopts a mixed methods research design made up of field survey (questionnaires, interviews and focus Group Discussion, FGD) and a qualitative approach to generate data. At the end, the data collected is described in tabular form using simple percentages. Thereafter, SPSS is used to draw inference and establish relationships between variables. The study is therefore methodologically important, as it will contribute to the refinement of the methods used in studying corporate social responsibility and conflict management problems in the future.

1.6.3 Practical Significance

This research work will equally demonstrate the basic inherent contradictions in MNOCs CSR projects and policies, which impede the process of sustainable conflict management strategies, and policies in the Niger Delta .It will provide the framework for conflict management through the initiation of community-based sustainable socio-economic policies and programs by the Government and Multi-nationals that would reduce the vulnerability in the region. The findings of this research will provide the platform for the reorientation and revamping of policy for practitioners of conflict management. This will help to evolve a functional and sustainable CSR approach towards addressing the Niger Delta question in order to reduce the conflict that has ravaged the region.

1.7 Research Design and Rationale

Researches on the Niger Delta conflicts include Otite and Albert (2007), and Afinotan and Ojakorotu (2009), who examined the common factors responsible for oil-related revolutions in the rural areas of the Niger Delta region. Additionally, Afrin (2013) examined how ‘strategic corporate social responsibility supports sustainable development’. Afinotan and Ojakorotu (2009) went further to explore the link between domestic violence in the oil producing communities and the concern of members of the host communities regarding resource control as well as focusing on the use of ethnic militia in the depiction of the current conflict in the region. However, neither Otite and Albert (2007) nor Afinotan and Ojakorotu (2009) examined how the absence of concrete corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs has contributed to the Niger Delta crises and how it could be used by the MNOCs to resolve the conflict in the region.

Notwithstanding the numerous studies carried out on the Niger Delta conflicts, as well as the role of multinational businesses in the Niger Delta, the much-desired cordial relationship

between the MNOCs, communities and the Government is yet to be established. If there were a concrete CSR program, it would have otherwise massaged the host community's social needs. Thereby, providing for a peaceful coexistence among the various stakeholders and positive public relations as stipulated in the memorandum of understanding. Unfortunately, the breakdown in the social contract of the local people, which is significant to peaceful community relations, engenders the following consequences.

1. Frustration: society is always peaceful when all actors in a social contract hold firm their respective roles. Unfortunately, the host communities in the Niger Delta tend to be at the receiving end of the consequences of a broken social contract while the MNOCs together with the Government have, over the decade, have continued to dominate them. This, alongside the resultant frustration, has generated distrust between the host communities, on one hand, and the MNOCs and the Government on the other. The poor community-relations strategy of the MNOCs has generated a negative perception: a situation where the communities believe that the MNOCs are only interested in exploiting them by extracting oil from their environment thus despoiling the communities' ecosystem with no subsequent benefit on the part of the host communities. Ironically, any initiative in the realm of CSR is rather perceived to the host communities by way of crisis management instead of a genuine corporate developmental effort.

2. Aggression: The youths became aggressive after waiting for decades for promises made to them by the Nigerian government, which failed to materialize (Usang and Ikpeme, 2015). After becoming more conscious of their position as the engine of the Nigerian economy, the oil producing communities unanimously became confrontational. Consequently, some members (militant youths) of the communities attacked oil installations and MNOCs staff

members. This detrimental impact would have been avoided had the MNOCs provided concrete CSR with positive effects on community relations.

3. Economic Loss: at the peak of the Niger Delta when the communities were heated up and uninhabitable for the residents, owing to the clashes between the Nigerian military and the Niger Delta militants, accounting for the reduction in oil businesses (Ojakorotu, 2009). Both the government and the MNOCs recorded huge revenue loss at to the height of oil resource conflict in the Niger Delta. In 2007, for example, there were violent-related shutdowns of up to 800,000 barrels per day in some stations, which were recorded to translate to \$4.4billion losses per day. Large MNOCs like Shell downsized its human resources resulting to up to 5,000 job losses, smaller companies completely shut down¹ Ostensibly, the impact of the Niger Delta crisis was felt internationally, when, in 2007, world oil prices rose from \$55.00 to \$63.38 per barrel (Afinotan and Ojakorotu, 2009; Adams, 2014; (Okolie-Osemene, 2015); Nigeria could not supply its OPEC quota at the time.

From the foregoing, it becomes imperative to conduct a study that critically investigates whether or not the absence of concrete CSR strategies of the MNOCs have contributed to the perennial conflicts in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region and how CSR strategies employed by the MNOCs can strengthen their community relations and mitigate the conflict. This study aims to expand on the existing knowledge with regards to CSR strategies and provide a baseline for other researchers particularly, in community relations.

¹A situation where Shell considered divesting onshore, majority of the workers that were engaged in some projects was affected. Additionally, job loss is one of the consequences of instability caused by youth restiveness and CSR conflict.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The purpose of this section is to describe the scope as well as limitations of the mixed-methods descriptive design study. In every scholarly work, such as writing a thesis, the researcher is confined in certain ways, including, but not limited to, lack of funding, time constraints and scope of the study. All these are applicable to this study; but the researcher worked hard to limit the effect on this study.

The mixed-methods descriptive design that this study employs explores the historical Niger Delta environmental degradation crisis as opposed to political Niger Delta. The historical component of the Niger Delta comprised the BRACED States (Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River Edo and Delta States) that are reflected in the Henry Willink's Niger Delta Report of 1958. However, the political side of the Niger Delta was the creation of the Fourth Republic in 2000,² during former President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. It added Abia, Imo and Ondo states to the BRACED states as part of the oil producing states. The scope of this study is limited to the historical Niger Delta that has majorly felt the negative impact of oil mining activities.

Further limitation to this study is that, whereas there are 20 major MNOCs operating in the region, the study has selected three MNOCs, specifically, SPDC (Shell), NAOC (Agip), and Chevron. The choice of these companies is based on their roles and sizes as they are the pace setters in the petrochemical industry in the region. Thus, a good understanding of their CSR is adequate to explore in-depth, the activities of the remaining MNOCs in the region.

²This refers to the end of military rule in 1999 with the handing over of power to a democratically elected president.

1.9 Operational Definition of Terms

Niger Delta: The Niger Delta region was formed by ‘the River Niger, West Africa’s largest river, which flattens out in Nigeria’s south-eastern coast into a tangle of creeks and mangrove swamps, suffused with fresh and brackish water. Most of the inhabitants are [the] Ijaws, Urhobos, Ogonis, Itsekiris, Igbos and other indigenous groups’ (Shaxson, 2008, p.194). The states making up the Niger Delta region has been politicised. The region is now based on the Nigerian geopolitical zones rather than the historic Niger Delta region. However, this study uses the historical Niger Delta.

Oil Producing Communities (OPC): following the title of this study, the OPCs refer to all the communities in which oil is produced in Nigeria.

Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC): The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited produces oil and supplies gas to domestic customers through pipelines. The company was founded in 1937 and has its headquarters in is based in Lagos, Nigeria, with its major operations located in the Niger Delta. This company operates as a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell Plc, simply known as Shell Nigeria, and is in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other MNOCs.

Agip: Agip or “Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli”, which can be translated into English as General Italian Oil Agency. In 1976 it was incorporated by Eni to manage Nigerian deep offshore exploration and production assets under the name Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC). It operates a joint venture with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). It has a forty per cent share, while the NNPC have a larger share of sixty per cent.

Chevron: One of the major MNOCs in Nigeria, Chevron is of American origin. It is specifically the third-largest oil company in Nigeria and operates under a joint-venture

arrangement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, where the NNPC owns 60% share of its profit.

Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC): The Commission was established in 2000. Its major mission is to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta so that it becomes into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.

Public Relations: In the context of this study, public relations refer to a professional maintenance of a relationship between an organization and its communities. However, the British Institute of Public Relations' (BIPR) define it as the "deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organization and its publics," (Daramola, 2003, p. 3).

Community Relations: This is an aspect of public relations. It specializes on building cordial and commercial relationships involving organizations and their host communities.

Conflict: This concept means different things to different scholars but in the context of this study, it is a situation that springs up among people of divergent interest. This does not mean much. You need an academic definition. It occurs when the interest, goal or values of a group or individuals are said to have clashed. This is exemplified in the disagreement between the Niger Delta communities, the MNOCs and the Nigerian government. According to Otitte (2007) good can result from conflicts where the actors give room for a win-win situation.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), CSR is an environmental friendly management concept. CSR entails that businesses are expected to invest in continual commitment to behave ethically and contribute to communities' economic advancement. It can also mean

developing the standard of the workforce within local communities, and the entire society by extension (Ako, 2014).

Divide and Rule: This is a policy implemented with regards to a superior maintaining control over communities, subordinates or opponents by encouraging division and among them. Historically, this is a colonial government driven policy employed to instigate division amongst its colonies, particularly in Nigeria. This policy prevents the dominated individuals or groups from uniting in opposition against the colonial exploiter. In order to prevent any united opposition to its authority, the then British colonial administration adopted a divide-and-rule policy of keeping the Nigerian regions (even after the 1914 amalgamation) separate from one another as much as possible. Currently, the divide and rule strategy adopted by the MNOCs is aimed at not only disrupting the peace of the local communities but to encourage the communities distrusting one another. Consequently, the Niger Delta communities have been turned against one another hence, MNOCs could be blamed for the perpetual inter and intra community conflict.

Politics of Oil: Politics of oil in the Niger Delta brings to light more national challenges which the Nigerian state will have to contend with. These include: issues of fiscal federalism, resource allocation, poverty alleviation, minority rights and human right violation. Simply put, it is the policy of “who gets what, when and how” from national revenue generated from oil (Johnson, 2015).

1.10 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This work is divided into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study. It reviews the background of the study; states the problems encountered with the study; states the aims and objectives of the study; reiterates the importance of the work; sets the scope of the work and brings to limelight the key concepts used in the study.

Chapter two examines the research setting. It provides the Nigerian vegetation as well its political history. The chapter: establishes the reason why MNOCs situate their operational sites majorly in developing countries. The chapter further assesses both the implication of MNOCs double standards in developing countries and reason behind the double standards. It founded that in the case of Nigeria, MNOCs double standards are directly linked with 60/40 partnership with the Nigeria Nigerian that subsequently incapacitate the later from enforcing its mining laws. The key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta are explicated in chapter in two which culminated in establishes the gaps in existing literatures.

Chapter three provides the theoretical framework of the study and reviews related literature on the subject of the conflict and CSR regarding the MNOCs in the Niger Delta. The chapter further expanded on the mechanisms oil related conflicts as well as the connotations of conflicts by different scholars. The chapter established that there is a direct linkage between corporate social responsibility and conflict.

Chapter Four describes the method used for the study, the research design, data collection procedure and research setting. The mixed method descriptive design study is adopted. This method requires a rigorous pattern of data collection and analysis. The study used a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection.

Chapter five focused on data presentation and analysis. Here the data collected from the survey were analysed using bar charts, pie charts and tables and the results obtained used to test the study assumptions.

Chapter six presents the summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations and policy implications of findings. It also deals with the possible policies to be implemented by the government, the MNOCs and the host communities in line with the study's research questions.

1.11 SUMMARY

This chapter introduces the subject matter of the research, ranging from issues of resource conflict both in the colonial palm oil era, the modern crude oil era and the MNOCs inadequate CSR issues. It examined the background to the study and presented the statement of the problem, the aims and objectives of the research, the research assumptions, significance and purview of the study. The chapter also introduces the basic perception of MNOCs CSR in the Niger Delta and its consequent frustration and aggression effect on host communities; conflict management strategies; and how a purposeful and effective public relation approach by the MNOCs and the Nigerian government devoid of divide-and-rule tactics can douse the tendon in the study region. The next chapter will provide the political history of Nigeria and the characteristics of MNOCs in developing countries as well as the implication of these, to this study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA: THE NATURE AND KEY CAUSES OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is focused on the evaluation of relevant subjects in determining the key causes of the Niger Delta conflicts and the efforts of the Nigerian government in quelling the conflicts. To achieve its aim the chapter has been subdivided into eight sessions, thus: the Nigerian political history, nature and character of the Nigerian state, evolution of multinational oil companies in Nigeria, the nature and character of MNOCs in developing countries, the nature of the conflicts in Nigeria, the key causes of the Niger Delta conflicts, MNOCs CSR programs and projects, the Nigerian Governments efforts in resolving the conflicts and the gap in literature. The sessions are examined sequentially starting with a brief political history of Nigeria.

2.1.2 Nigeria: A Brief Political History

Assessing the political history of a country is daunting, as the political behaviour of a people is a reflection of their history, geography, ethnicity and values. Like most countries in the world, Nigeria is not a homogeneous geographical entity; and, like every other country, Nigeria has a history – a chronological record of significant events affecting the nation and its institutions (Fafunwa, 2002).

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. The country is situated on the west coast of Africa. Although the 2006 census put the population of Nigeria at 140 million (Daily Independent, January 10, 2007; Punch, January 11, 2007; Sanyaolu, 2007, currently the population is estimated at about 167 million. The economy of the country is tied to oil, which has brought unending conflicts and destruction in the Niger Delta region. However,

agriculture remains the major means of livelihood for about 70% of the population (Anya, 2011, National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

Nigeria is bounded by Niger Republic on North, Chad Republic on the North-East; Benin Republic on the West; and the Republic of Cameroon on the East and South-East. Nigeria is the creation of European imperialism –“a policy of extending the power and dominion of a nation (especially by direct territorial acquisitions), or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas” (Toyo, 1999, The Guardian, March 29).

Flora Shaw, African correspondent for the London Times, was said to have been the first person to propose the name “Nigeria,” in 1898, in an article where she noted that the name Nigeria referred collectively to several “British protectorates on the river Niger” (Wiseman, 1990). Another account has it that the name of “Nigeria” first appeared in the Times of London on January 8, 1897 in an article by the same Miss Flora Shaw (Omoruyi, 2002). Flora Shaw later became the wife of Lord Frederick Lugard, the colonial Governor of Nigeria (1914-1919).

The history of Nigeria extends back to some three millennia. The original archaeological discoveries were said to be of the Nok, who settled the central Jos Plateau (geographically located amid the Niger and Benue Rivers) between 300 BC and 200 AD. The Nok are the first known societies and the first known West African iron-smelting civilization. Contemporary ethnic groups existed before 1500 (Metz, 1998; Crowder, 1978; Fafunwa, 2002). Before the advent of the colonialists, the communities had kingdoms and they interacted with one another peacefully within their political systems and transacted businesses with one another. No sooner had the colonial masters arrived than they started gradually to gain stronghold on the land. To safeguard trade, Britain established a colony in Lagos as early as 1861, and the Royal Niger Company was chartered in 1886 for trading

purposes (Metz, 1998, June). The United African Company (UAC) succeeded Sir George Taubman Goldie's Royal Niger Company (Lawal, 1994, p.94).

By 1899, Britain had taken over the administration of Nigeria from the companies that ran it. At the turn of 1906, three countries had emerged, namely: the Colony of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Between 1906 and 1913, the three countries were reduced to two: the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, in 1900, Britain named Lord Frederick Lugard High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. He stressed indirect British control through local rulers. Britain did not have enough army to govern a culturally diverse and wide area; thus, it turned to indirect rule of the land. To avoid rebellion, Britain relied on local administrators (chiefs) to keep order and collect taxes. That worked in the northern part of Nigeria, because the traditional government in the North was said to be similar to the British style of government, but indirect rule did not work well in the eastern and south-western parts because they did not like the system (Crowder, 1978).

Lord Frederick Lugard amalgamated the protectorates on January 1, 1914, as the first Governor General of Nigeria. In the process of uniting the protectorates, Lord Lugard noted that it would be in the best interest of the countries then known as Southern and Northern Nigeria if they were amalgamated into one political entity mutually cooperating for their administrative and economic advantages (Ikime 1980).

Before political independence in 1960, some sections of what is now known as Cameroon were part of Nigeria. After the First World War (1914-1918), when the League of Nations' Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 (politically, the League of Nations' was founded to guarantee peace), the western part of Cameroon was given to Britain (Crowder, 1978). The territory was then ruled as part of Nigeria because, at that time, Britain was ruling Nigeria as

a territory and Western Cameroon as a Mandated Territory (an order or commission granted by the League of Nations to a member nation for the establishment of a responsible government over conquered territory) (Crowder, 1978; Ikime, 1980).

When Nigeria became independent in 1960, there was a plebiscite in 1961 for the people of South Western and North Western Cameroon to decide whether they would remain with Nigeria or to stay with their kith and kin in the East. The North Western Cameroon went with Nigeria, while the South Western Cameroon stayed with the other side of Cameroon (Crowder, 1978; Ikimi, 1980; Fafunwa, 2002).

In 1939, Nigeria was divided into three regions: Northern, Western and Eastern Regions for administrative convenience (Wiseman, 1990). Because the minorities in these regions felt that they were not fairly represented, they started agitating for inclusion in the main agenda of governance in the nation or having their own states to enable them to control their own destinies. In 1963, a fourth region (the Mid-Western Region) was created by a plebiscite to accommodate the agitation of the Edo and Western Igbo that wanted to get out of the Yoruba-dominated Western Region. Crowder (1978) criticizes the creation of the Mid-Western Region, arguing that the fourth regional creation was the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics.

The creation of the Mid-Western Region did not, however, end the agitation for creation of regions (Akinyele, 1996; Federal Government Paper, 1975, p.25). The Ijaw and Efik-Ibibio ethnic groups in the Niger Delta (the so-called COR = Calabar, Ogoja, Rivers) also wanted a new region to end Igbo dominance of the Eastern Region. This agitation had earlier led to the setting up of the Henry Willink Commission of Inquiry by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sir Allan Lennox Boyd) to determine the causes of the fears of the minorities and to recommend ways and means to allay their fears (Lewis, 1994). At a point, agitation for

creation of more states out of the regions erupted (Ikime, 1980). This agitation almost paralyzed the Constitutional Conference of 1957 that was to craft the 1960 Independence Constitution. The desire for ethnic self-determination and the power and financial wherewithal that go with statehood (in a purely federal system) constituted the basis for the agitation for states by the minorities (Ikime, 1980; Crowder, 1978).

In 1967 (at the beginning of the Civil War), the Yakubu Gowon's military regime erased the concept of regionalism and divided the country into 12 smaller states (Kirk-Green, 1971; Ajulo, 1995). Nigeria was further sub-divided into 19 states by the Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo military regime. Almost every military leader in Nigeria had demonstrated his power or authority by slicing Nigeria into more states: General Ibrahim Babangida created two states in 1987 and additional nine states in 1991. In his speech to the nation on October 1, 1995 General Sani Abacha hinted that he would create more states. In 1996, General Abacha created six additional states. As seen above, Nigeria's short life has been packed with succession of social changes: it has transformed from regions to states, yet the country is not developing, as it should. All these changes have involved some form of political activities or politics (West Africa [London] 1991; see 26 August and 1 September issues; Ajulo, 1995).

Currently, Nigeria is made up of 36 states (with a Federal Capital Territory –Abuja) that were created as the government caved in to sentimental demands for states by various ethnic groups. Most of the states are non-viable in terms of the ability to generate internal revenue. Thus, they depend on monthly federal allocation from oil revenue for their development programmes. At the moment, Nigeria has 774 local government areas; but the quality of life in the rural areas remains poor, as devolution of power and resources to the local areas

remains problematic (Dike, 2006). The federal government remains powerful yet corrupt (Diamond, 1984).

2.1.3 Geography of Nigeria

Most parts of northern Nigeria is made up of plateaux over 300m high rising to above 1,500m near Jos. Crowder (1966, p. 23) describes northern Nigeria as lying on the marches of the Sahara and stretching from Sokoto to Lake Chad in the west and Oyo in the South. It was this great expanse of flat plain, interspersed with some granite rocks that produced the groundnut and cotton, which the Northern Region was for in the early period of the country's political independence. Southern Nigeria is hot and humid all the year. Lagos has average monthly temperature of 27-28°C in March and 25°C in August. Adedeji (1987, p.37) observes that the climatic conditions of Nigeria are diverse. In his view, the Niger Delta region has the highest annual rainfall of over 300 mm, which is higher than that of Lagos estimated at 180mm. During the months of May to August, Nigeria usually experiences the highest rainfall, while the months of November to February are usually dry season. The northern part of the country has lesser rainfall to the extent that Kano, during the months of October to April, has longer dry season, with an average of 80 m of rainfall each year.

The Niger River and its tributaries, the Benue, Katsina and Kebbi Rivers drain most of the country. Nigeria has a 500 miles (800km) coast line for the uppermost part made up of sandy beaches behind which lies a belt of mangrove swamp and lagoon 800 m, that is an average of 10 ml (16km) in width, but increases to Circa 60ml (100km) in the Niger Delta in the South. The North of the coastal lowland is a broad, hilly region with rainforest in the South Savannah.

2.1.4 The Vegetation

Nigeria has three major zones of vegetation defined roughly by the northern limit of the 60-inch and 70-inch lines of annual rainfall. These three zones, progressively driven from the South to North, vary in width, but their border runs approximately parallel to the coastline. They include the coastal, the savannah and the Sahara zones. The mangrove vegetation as well as fresh water swamp vegetation is found in the Delta, characterized by a maze of effluent creeks and swamps crisscrossing the low-lying plains in varying dimension.

2.2 The Nature and Character of the Nigerian State

Understanding the nature and character of the state can only be meaningful if the concept of the state is understood; this effort will be of no avail too except the nature of man is known. Human beings are driven by the desire for survival and, therefore, material existence can only be reproduced through the creation of material wealth. This drags man into a social relation, which must be mediated by certain laws from the state. The state in this case is a repository of social organization. For Fredrick Engel (1978), the state is not a power forced on society from outside, but its product.

The Nigerian state is, therefore, a product of certain dialectical acts ranging from the pre-colonial to the postcolonial ages. The state is a major concern in this discourse owing to its central role in the production of violence and conflict. The Nigerian state is polarized among the elite who are corrupting it without a sense of nationhood in them. The elite who took over political power rely so much on the wealth of the state for their sustenance. According to Fadakin (2002, p.46), no sooner independence was got from Britain than the class character of the nationalists became very glaring, as they not only used their privileged political positions in the state to amass wealth, but they also cared very little about the appalling

existential conditions of the average, besides the inherent environmental, social and political injustice fostered on society by forces of colonialism and imperialism.

Today, the Nigerian state is a centre of crisis, as the elite embark on various methods to acquire power and at the same time retain it. The Nigerian state is hence so powerful, over-developed and interferes in all aspects of human endeavours. Aloysius (2005, p.7) notes that, unlike its counterpart in Western Europe, the Nigerian state interferes more intently, directly, pervasively and extensively in the socio-economic and political spheres of the citizens.

One of the most insidious aspects of the over-developed character of the postcolonial state is the economic centrality of the state. Public policies, especially in the area of economic policy, are basically the dictate of the state. The state itself regulates and controls the economy without any input from the private sector (civil society). Another character of the Nigerian state is the aggressive and coercive nature of the state, which is a hangover from colonialism. Alapiki (2004, p.84) asserts that the early nationalists did not fight the colonial masters because they were really interested in changing the exploitative system of the colonizers, but because they wanted to inherit the powerful instruments of state hitherto used to oppress the Nigerian masses. This is why all postcolonial Nigerian governments have been repressive, exploitative and anti-democratic.

The elite that took over power following the limited autonomization of the state could not develop any social class. Hence, the Nigerian social formation was then and now an amorphous formation and became polarized along factional lines that struggle for hegemony. This behaviour of the elite's has, made the Nigerian postcolonial state not to be able to imbue any appreciable degree of confidence among the citizens, nor has it been able to manage the economy in the best interest of the people. The state has also not been able to create an acceptable pattern of political inclusion, tolerance or culture (Julius, 2000, p. 76).

It is this character of the Nigerian state that marks the nature of politics as debased and in the form of warfare. Ake (cited in Alapiki Riot 4, p. 85) identifies the character of the Nigerian state as, one in which there is hardly any aspect of the citizen's life that she (the state) does not assert herself. This informs the morbid competition for control of its coercive instrument by the local elite. In sum, the character of her institutions coupled with the drive for materialism makes the Nigerian state a very uncaring institution and this has reduced her assertive ability over the MNOCs and even over her citizens.

2.2.2 Structure of the Nigerian Economy

The Nigerian economy is an underdeveloped and oil dependent economy. Before political independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy was purely an agrarian one (with a contribution of about 63.4 percent to the GDP); the employment in agriculture was above 80 percent, with over 85 percent of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings coming from the agricultural sector. The discovery and subsequent exploration of crude oil caused a dramatic structural change in the agricultural sector. Much emphasis was now given to oil, which consequently displaced the agricultural sector. Okowa (1997) lists the following as the current features of the Nigerian economy:

- Dependence on foreign technology
- Monoculture dependence on oil
- Dependence on the foreign sector for raw materials and spares
- Inadequate supply of skilled labour
- Low productivity and low per capita income
- Underdeveloped agricultural sector
- High rate of unemployment
- In-egalitarian distribution of income and wealth

- High rate of inflation and interest rate
- Excessive government involvement in the economy
- Heavy external debt burden
- Poor attitude to work, particularly in the public sector
- Systemic corruption

The discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity resulted in the mass movement from the rural to the urban area by able young men and women, but the industrial sector, which depends largely on the external sector for its growth, remained backward. Moro (1995, p.2) remarks that, despite this discovery of crude oil, with its seeming satisfactory impact on the nation's growth rate in the first half of the 1970s, the performance of the economy was, on a general note, not self-sustaining.

Ikein (1990, p.71) provides an excellent description of the impact of oil boom on the Nigeria agricultural sector. According to him, Nigeria was one of the leading exporters of cocoa, groundnut, palm oil and rubber during the Post-World War II period. But beginning from the 1970s, the country's agricultural export experienced a steady decline and its contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) fell from about 60% in 1960 to about 21% in 1977 and eventually to less than 10% in 1978. The agricultural sector dwindled as the crude oil sector attracted the highest labour. The massive drift to the urban area in search of jobs created a serious distortion in the peasant economy, which consequently affected the national economy. Unfortunately, unlike the agricultural sector, the petroleum sector employs a relatively small number of workers and accounts for just 1.3% of the employment in the modern sector.

2.3 Evolution of multinational companies in Nigeria

The operations of multinational companies in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial era, when the Royal Niger Company first appeared in Nigeria and started business with the traditional societies that existed in the era. Nigeria was and is still known for her rich oil deposits, ranging from palm oil to crude oil. The West had engaged Nigeria in various trades that revolved around oil to the extent of involving their home government. Calabar and Lagos were then the major trade centres of these business transactions. During the early nineteenth century, there were series of business contacts between British traders and the Nigerian indigenous or petty traders.

When oil was discovered in Nigeria, the first multinational company that came prospecting for it was Shell Petroleum D' Archy, a British and German consortium. The oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s attracted other companies, such as Chevron, Agip Oil Company, Mobil Producing Nigeria Ltd, Gulf Oil Company, and Texaco. Apart from those in the oil sector, there are lots of multinationals whose history dates back to colonialism, especially those in the banking sector. These include the Standard Bank, which later got renamed as First Bank of Nigeria, Barclays Bank (later Union Bank) and many others in the insurance sector. The implication of the heavy presence of these multinationals in an economy is that the fiscal and monetary policies of a developing country, like Nigeria, can be frustrated by the economic power which they wield (Kabiri, 1998, p. 296). This shows that the fiscal and monetary policies of successive Nigerian governments are, in most cases, a direct reflection and control of the multinationals in the financial sector. They have never lost grip of their control of the country's financial policies and repatriation of surplus.

2.4 The Nature and Character of Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries

Multinational corporations operate in the Third World countries with varied character and attitude distinct from their operational characteristics in developed countries. They are predominantly found in the oligopolistic markets with substantial barriers to entry. These barriers could be those created by economy of scale and scope; for instance, Shell, Agip, Mobil, Elf, and Texaco among others, operating in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region is predominantly in the oil sector. Kabiri (1998-285) observes that this duopolistic behaviour is aimed at profit maximization in the short run. Because of their desire to make or maximize profit, multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria engage in practices that will enable them to spend less even at the detriment of the host communities (failure in corporate responsibility practices). This, perhaps, explains why there are incessant problems and crises between the oil multinationals and the host communities in the Niger Delta.

Again, the multinational oil companies prefer strategic exploitation by directly siphoning the raw materials of their host communities to the metropolis. This has been the practice right from the colonial era of the Royal Niger Company till the present era of Shell and Agip among others (Kabiri, 1998, p. 293). Although multinational corporations are the vanguard of the most advanced technologies yet, they are also guilty of parading over-priced obsolete equipment in developing countries periphery. They not only rapaciously exploit labour and raw materials in the periphery, but they also, in alliance with the local bourgeoisies and engage in resource outflow to the detriment of their host country's economy (Kabiri, 1998).

These traits, as presented above, have specific impact on the economic development of the host communities in the Third World. In the case of Nigeria, the implications of these on the economy are many. They include the transfer of capital abroad, monopolization of technology, political control of the host countries to the extent that no policy, be it domestic

or foreign, is a direct reflection of the national interest of the host nation. Such policies are always teleguided. Worse still, the MNOCs have been fingered in many coups d'état in Africa, especially against popular governments whose pursuit may be detrimental to their interest. They also contribute to the cultural, social and economic disintegration of the host countries. The multinationals even dictate national development plans to ensure it is drawn up along the lines favourable to their interest (Kabiri, 1998 p. 293).

Another characteristic of the multinationals in developing countries is the promotion and perpetuation of poverty. Oil multinationals in Nigeria, like Shell, Agip, and Chevron, where they engage new staff who are residents of their host communities: ensure that such new staffs are employed as casuals. One negative implication of labour casualization is job insecurity, because, at any time, such staff can be laid off (Dike, 2015). Their complaints have been that the Nigerian labour market is saturated with unskilled labour incapable of operating some modern technology. So, they usually go back to their home countries to bring in their expatriates who are paid very highly and allowed to repatriate their salaries, thereby worsening the country's balance of payment problems. Apart from the case of unskilled labour and technology, the peasants in Nigeria are alienated from production as their lands are appropriated by force, while they are visited with oil spills and gas flaring, sometimes in very close proximity to where they live.

2.5 The Nature of the Conflicts in Nigeria

The conflicts in Nigeria tend to be characterised by ethnicity and religious prejudice, which can be considered as the fulcrum of the evolving forms of self-determination in the country. In the past, perceived marginalisation inspired various ethnic groups to embark on a self-determination mission that creates the unfortunate perception of an oppressor-saviour situation in a multicultural and multilingual nation called Nigeria. The outcome of such a

perception is the lack of cordial relationships, distrust and terror in Nigeria as well as an escalation into conflict (Salawu, 2010, p. 346-347). Furthermore, an ethno-religious crisis has manifested in different parts of Nigeria such as the Niger Delta region, the Kano, Bulumkutu Christian-Muslim riots, the Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna State and Kafanchan. The current Boko Haram crisis in the Northern part of Nigeria has also been categorised as ethno-religious conflict.

ACLED (2013, p. 1) has described Boko Haram as the largest violent Islamic group in the northern part of Nigeria. It is comparable to the Islamic militants in Mali and Algeria that are affiliated with the infamous terrorist group, Al Qaeda. However, Boko Haram has implicitly refused membership with Al Qaeda and the recently (2015) the Boko Haram insurgent group claimed allegiance with the Islamic State rebellious group. Unlike its violent counterpart in Mali, Boko Haram has rejected involvement with civilian kidnapping and foreign interests as prevalent in the other violent groups. According to Abakaliki (2012, p. 1) the mission of Boko Haram is the institution of God's dominion in Nigeria as they campaign against Western education.

Given the atrocities and crimes against humanity by Boko Haram in recent times, it is difficult to believe the realities of its proclaimed mission. The group, which started in 2009, when the Niger Delta militants had dropped their arms, has been involved in many bombing activities in its five years of existence. For instance, in July 2009, the group's activity in Bauchi and Meduguri resulted in the killing of 800 people. Their 2010 church bombings in central Nigeria killed 86 people; whilst, its 2011 bombing in Damaturu and Postiskum claimed 65 lives; and in 2012 January, its bomb attack in Kano took over 200 lives. In February 2013, the group kidnapped a French family in Cameroon (Murdock, 2013, p. 1). However, the bombing and kidnapping activities have increased at an alarming rate since 2014. The group has been kidnapping, killing and maiming innocent citizens since 2014. For

instance, The continued detention of the over 200 Nigerian girls abducted on April 14 by the Boko Haram insurgents in Chibok, Borno State as well as the continued bombing of public and private places. As recently as June 2014, Boko Haram reportedly abducted another 20 women near Chibok (Punch, 2014, June 10, para1).

Since Boko Haram's operations have been officially recognized by international organizations as an inhumane Islamic sect, one of the ways forward is for the international community to proscribe the group and label it as a terrorist organization in a bid to support Nigeria's efforts in tackling terrorism. Rhetoric is not enough to make changes happen. To be effective, spoken words must be followed by actions. This means, among other things, giving the people and organizations that are tackling the issue the tools and information they need to be successful in their efforts. The way forward must include economic development in the communities to tame the poverty and corruption that often lead to social conflicts and unending crises. For instance, enough funds and tools should be made available to the military, the police and other para-military agencies to effectively carry out their operations to tame the activities of the Islamic sect. Underfunding or delays in releasing allocations have often hampered the fight against terrorism in society.

The Nigerian government is currently deliberating on the solution to this insurgency. Constructive discussions that will lead to dialogue and thus a peaceful resolution tend to have been embarked on by the government. Murdock (2013, p. 1) reported that has been offered to the terrorist group, as it had been to their Niger Delta counterpart, although Boko Haram's interest in accepting amnesty is yet to be communicated. Nigerians currently see amnesty as a code of interest for a pot of gold that could attract large interest; the ex-militants (the MEND) still get about \$350 weekly after putting down their weapons (Eke, 2015; Murdock, 2013, p. 1).

As noted earlier, the activities, mission statement and aspiration of Boko Haram makes it difficult to determine if its members are interested in the proceeds from oil resources as was the case with the Niger Delta militants who finally gained amnesty when Boko Haram evolved (ACLED (2013, p. 1). An evaluation of the objectives of the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram members shows that their agendas are very divergent.

While the Niger Delta militants tend to be warring over environmental degradation by the activities of the MNOCs, its proceeds sharing and by extension separatism, the Boko Haram members appear to be trying to gain political power. ACLED (2013, p.4) reported that MEND has made some threats in recent times of targeting Islamic institutions and their members in the South-South in retaliation for the killing of Christians in northern Nigeria by the Boko Haram group. This is an indication that the upheaval in both the south-south and northern Nigeria might be interrelated in terms of regionalism, religion and identity power politics. This tends to imply a landscape of violent behaviour that is highly discriminated and concurrent, yet the actors in the conflict respond to one another and to the Nigerian government (ACLED, 2013, p. 4). According to Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 164), the perceived indifference in addressing the challenges facing the people by the MNOCs and the prolonged outcry of the host communities over environmental degradation in the late 1990s motivated an unstable environment that led to militarization. The agitation emanated from demonstrations by host communities against the complexes of the MNOCs, but quickly degenerated into the destruction of oil facilities and homicide (Azigbo, 2008, p. 18). Consequently, towards the end of the 1990s, the Niger Delta region had become an ungovernable zone, where many angry youths engaged in the disruption of oil-production activities with the communities' development committees frequently engaging in agitation that climaxed in intergroup violent conflicts (NDDC, 2004). Such oil-related conflicts manifested themselves between and within communities where the oil companies acted as

third parties (Okolie-Osemene, 2015). The Niger Delta crisis further manifested itself in other ways, including, militancy, and kidnapping, the hostage taking of oil workers, and pipeline vandalism, as well as the destruction of the installations of oil companies.

In the view of Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 165), these activities were masterminded by prominent militant groups, including the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo; The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), led by Henry Okah; and the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), led by Ateke Tom. It is important to mention that these militant groups created havoc in the region and were responsible for the kidnapping, hostage taking and various other forms of attacks on the Nigerian oil industry with the use of sophisticated weapons that far outweighed those of the Nigerian military. Duru and Ogbonnaya (2012, p. 166) provide the statistics of kidnapping and hostage taking in the region as follows:

[b]etween 1999 and 2007, a total of 308 hostage taking incidents occurred in the region... A breakdown of this record shows that Bayelsa State was on the lead with 131 incidents. Rivers State had 113; Delta State 45, while Akwa Ibom had the least record of 15. The record further shows that in 2003, 18 oil workers were taken hostage in Bayelsa, in 2004, 5 hostages, 39 in 2006 while between January and June, 2007 69 people were taken hostage, out of which 50 were soldiers... Rivers State recorded 2 incidents in 1999, one in 2005, 55 in 2006 and 60 as at June 2007, with 26 soldiers, 1 woman and a three year-old child involved. Unfortunately, the situation has since then deteriorated and the spate of militancy, hostage taking and

kidnapping incidents has increased in scope and tempo covering virtually all the oil producing states of Nigeria.

This can be described as the second phase of the Niger Delta crisis, as Ako, Okonmah & Ogunleye (2009, p. 111-112) maintain that there are two faces of violent conflict over resources in the Niger Delta: that is, the historical palm oil resource era and the modern crude oil resource era. They view both the palm oil resource and crude oil as critical resources for the progress of individual and global industries.

2.5.1 The Key Causes of the Conflict

The conflict in the Niger Delta has been attributed to different causes. As one of the objectives of this study, this section has been designated to examine the major sources of the conflict provided within relevant literatures. It includes; environmental degradation, legislation and empowerment, subjugation, colonial legacies, corruption, and poor leadership and governance. Others include a lack of sustainable development, environmental degradation pollution, resource control agitation, oil policies and regulation, poor government response to the issues, and mention human rights violations and social injustice as discussed below.

2.5.1.1 Environmental Degradation

Ojatorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 7) assert that these companies have become active players in oil exploration and exploitation between 1956 and the present time. For many decades of exploration and exploitation that have generated billions of dollars to both the Nigerian government and the MNOCs, the Niger Delta people have been at the receiving end of environmental despoliation, and outright wretchedness occasioned by oil-induced environmental degradation and sabotage in the form of youth restiveness (Ojatorotu and

Okeke-Uzodike, 2006, p. 96-97; Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014). Eyinla and Ukpo (2006, p. 4) present the following statistics of the oil spillages: between 1976-1996, there were approximately 60,000 oil spillages within the Niger Delta, with roughly 2,369,471 barrels of crude oil leaking into the ecosystem, with Shell alone spilling 106,000 barrels from its Jones creek flow station in 1997 and 1998.

The first decree to discourage gas flaring in Nigeria was attempted in 1979 in the form of Decree 99. The decree was aimed at eliminating gas flaring by 1985. The idea was defeated when Nigeria modified the decree with a proviso that the oil corporations could flare gas but would have to pay a fine; and most of the oil companies preferred paying the fine to stopping gas flaring (Ogunrin et al., 2005, p. 106; Ako, 2015). This activity by the oil multinationals is said to constitute a loss of potential economic resources to Nigeria (Epelle, 2004, p. 19). The pollution in the Niger Delta by the MNOCs is not limited to oil spillage but also extends to oil prospecting. Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 12) note that the environmental impact of oil production cannot be easily neglected when one considers the associated degradation. This has been the practice by MNOCs and their waste management companies who dump the wastes into rivers, seas and all the surrounding areas, whilst giving the impression that they were re-injected into old oil wells. The impact of this deliberate action is the high-level destruction of farmland and aquatic species, which also implies the destruction of the local communities' means of livelihood

2.5.1.2 Legislation, Disempowerment and Subjugation

As explained by Fidelis and Samuel (2011), the Nigerian state's consciousness on the veritable nature of oil as a source of massive wealth alongside the realisation that oil is only concentrated in the areas of the southern minority of the Niger Delta prompted the Nigerian leaders from the majority ethnic groups into the promulgation of some questionable

legislation. These regulations were unambiguously used for the exploitation and disempowerment of the Niger Delta minorities. However, other authors blame the obnoxious laws that denied the people of the Niger Delta their natural inheritance on colonial laws (Ako and Okomah, 2009, p. 54; Obi, 2010; Ako, 2010). By implication, the Nigerian government only modified the colonial Mineral Ordinances (Please, see the section on colonialism). Such post-colonial regulations include:

- Decree No. 51 of 1969, which was used to transfer the ownership of the totality of petroleum products in the delta region to the Federal Government of Nigeria
- The Land Use Decree of 1978, which also vested land ownership in Nigeria in the Federal Government and its accredited agents; thereby dispossessing the Niger Delta people of ownership and occupancy rights to their lands.
- The Offshore Oil Revenue Act of 1971, which vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria the exclusive rights over the continental shelf of the coastal areas.

Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 6) argue that these regulations usually become effective or operational whenever the companies and the government want to take advantage of the host communities as far as the natural resources in the region are concerned. The three major ethnic groups in Nigeria have been in firm control of these resources since political independence in 1960. Regrettably, these intolerable decrees are yet to be modified or even abolished despite the vociferous violent criticisms against their continued use by the Niger Delta environmental activists. The current view is that the northerners' claim of ownership of the region's oil is based on the American land law (Rivera, 2016).

2.5.1.3 State-imposed Poverty

State-imposed poverty is another major cause of the conflict. The Niger Delta region is seen as the powerhouse of the Nigerian economy, generating billions of dollars for the government since oil was first discovered in 1956. Nigeria is a member of the Organisation Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the sixth largest oil producer in the world. Oviasuyi and Uwadea (2010, p. 115) observe that, despite this huge amount of money, the local people in the Niger Delta live in abject poverty that expresses a state of deprivation, to the extent that the people have no access to basic social amenities, like good water and electricity. The majority of the Niger Delta people live in creeks where they watch daily the oil industries making a fortune from the petroleum deposits in the region. Similarly, Ejibunu (2007, p. 10) opines that the region tends to be a place: “where time seems to have stood still and where people live in poverty, leaving the residents of the region without any other option than to be bitter and angry over the neglect of the people by the federal government”. Ejibunu reflects on the comments made by Mukagbo, the CNN reporter on Inside Africa. He said: “In the Niger Delta, a scene of abject poverty pervades the area, which is very similar to what one is likely to find in a refugee camp notwithstanding the fact that the region fetches the government the money for running the affairs of the state” (Ejibunu, 2007, p. 10).

Research has revealed that poverty and deprivation are the two major factors behind the agitation of the people of the Niger Delta region. Corroborating this view, Oviasuyi and Uwadea (2010, p. 115) argue that, prior to the discovery of oil in 1956, agriculture was the mainstay of the people and the major source of revenue for both state and federal governments. The Government of the Western Region used the revenue from cocoa to develop the region, providing the people with basic social amenities from Cocoa House in Ibadan. The government constructed a good network of roads, with schools providing free

education at all levels. The Northern Region had good road networks as well and infrastructural facilities in Mina, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Sokoto. Paradoxically, in the case of the Niger Delta, government failed to re-invest the proceeds accruing from petroleum into other sectors of the local economy. This has accounted for the ongoing conflicts in many parts of the region today.

2.5.1.4 Failed Promises

The Federal Government has ignored public calls to compensate the people of the Niger Delta region for the negative impact of oil production on the environment in the form of oil spillage, the reduction of arable land, and the destruction of wildlife and fish reserves. Instead, the government has been making several unfulfilled promises, which probably accounts for the hostage-taking, hostage taking and kidnappings by some youths in the region. The youths also break oil pipelines in order to siphon crude oil (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009, p. 195). The government's reaction to these activities has rendered many communities homeless, women have been assaulted and others killed; this was the case in Odi, Choba, Umuechem and Ogoni communities. Ironically, the oil companies operating in the region seem to have abandoned the idea of genuine CSR and the basic concepts of the stakeholder theory.

2.5.1.5 Resource Allocation and Resource Control

The revenue allocation formula being adopted by the Nigerian government has been particularly criticized and roundly rejected for not reflecting the interests of the people in the Niger Delta region where over 80 per cent of the national resource is generated. The Federal Government attributes the restiveness in the Niger Delta region to the politics surrounding resource control. In the opinion of Ojakarotu (2009, p. 2), the Niger Delta upheaval has grown from bad to worse, assuming a debilitating pattern traceable to the formation of social

groups that sought to challenge the state and its policies. The Niger Delta conflict is triggered by oil revenue allocation and oil related decrees that the restive youths believe must be abrogated as they do not represent their interests: as the host communities (Nna and Ibaba, 2011). Closely related to this view is the argument by Watts, Okonta and Kemedi (2004) that the struggle for natural resources as a means of survival remains the driving force of agitation amongst groups in various communities. This is what Adunbi (2015) describes as the oil citizenship phenomenon. The Niger Delta conflict means different things to various ethnic nationalities in the area that view resource control as paramount to their sustainable livelihoods and need to be given much desired attention by policymakers if they mean well for the people and Nigerians at large (Ojalarotu, 2009, p.6). This does not require the politics of oil as far as the actualization of stability is concerned. The foregoing is reaffirmed by Obi (2001, p. 87), in his argument that the revenue sharing formula being adopted in Nigeria is the major cause of most of the conflicts in the area, and how well the government is able to resolve it would largely determine the peace and development of the region.

The objectivity and complexities of the situation in the region are crucial in helping people to comprehend the suffering of the residents whose children have grown up with the perception that, until the government and oil companies address the problem of resource control, there would be no peace in oil-producing areas (Ojalarotu, 2009, p. 6). The perception of the people within the host communities of the region is more negative than positive, as they feel the oil has brought more of a curse to them than a blessing, owing to associated lethal violence, insecurity, environmental crisis, and the loss of cultural values (Aghalino, 2011; Perouse, 2014; Okolie-Osemene, 2015). Oyefusi (2007) also note that the attitude of some stakeholders motivated the formation of restive groups. These grievances of the Niger Delta people over the revenue allocation mechanism in the country allegedly prompted the renowned environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, to embark on a peaceful struggle for the

emancipation of the Ogoni people from state-imposed poverty (Ako, 2015; Moro, 2009, p. 324).

According to Ejibunu (2007; p. 7), in 1990, the Ogoni evaluated their situation. They came to a conclusion that, despite the stupendous oil and gas wealth in their land that feeds the entire nation, they still unfortunately live in poverty and squalor; unemployment and underemployment were running high by the day; and worse still, their environment has been adversely affected by reckless oil exploitation, and ecological warfare sponsored by the transnational oil industries operating in the area. The Ogoni believe that their existence as a people was endangered by environmental degradation, political marginalization, economic strangulation and “slavery, which the people of the region were being subjected to every day”. Ojakuotu (2009, p. 5), suggests that it was their unprecedented response to the dangers to human existence that generated the emergence of environmental rights activism and civil society groups in the region. Some of the organisations fighting for the economic liberation of the Niger Delta people today include the Pan-Niger Delta Resistance Movement, the Environmental Rights Action (ERA); the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP); the Movement for Reparation to Ogbia (MORETO); and the Movement for the Survival of the Ijo in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND). Each group was formed with an inclination towards ethnic nationalism in order to liberate the people in the Niger Delta region. Obi (2001, p. 87) describes the evolution of the politics of oil in the Niger Delta as a gradual process, where ethnic identity was transformed into a mobilizing element, not only to interrogate resource control, but also as a channel for social mobilization and an alliance for resisting alienation, extraction and exclusion of the Niger Delta people from the proceeds meant to alleviate their suffering having been deprived of the use of their land and water to earn a living. Ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta has become one of the major problems in the region, as many people, under the guise of fighting for the

economic emancipation of the people, exploit the oil companies and the Federal Government by demanding money that never gets to the hands of the downtrodden citizens in the Niger Delta region.

2.5.2 Fiscal Federalism

To clearly understand the principles of fiscal federalism, the concept of federalism must be duly analysed. Economists sometimes appear to have a better understanding of the essence of government from the perspective of how a particular political system generates revenue and allocates resources to different communities and states that make up the country. For example, fiscal federalism is a politico-economic concept that places emphasis on how a country generates and allocates resources to the different estates of government (Rodden, 2001, p. 9).

According to Ajayi (1997), cited in Arowolo (2011, p. 4), federalism is a system of government that involves not less than two layers of government. In this system of government, power is decentralised into institutions called regions, states, cantons, republics and unions. Sagay (2008), as quoted in Arowolo (2011, p. 4) has defined federalism as follows:

As an arrangement whereby powers within a multi-national country are shared between a federal government and component units in such a way that each unit, including the central authority exists as a government separately and independently from others, operating directly on persons and properties within its territorial area and with a will of its own apparatus for the conduct of affairs and with an authority in some matters exclusive of others.

In this context, political power is usually distributed among the three layers of government. This explains why power is decentralised, with each layer acting independently from one another, but possessing the capacity to make its own decisions. Closely related to this view is the notion that "federalism is a system that is meant to integrate people in [a] society made up of diverse ethnic, cultural, geographical and religious backgrounds" (Uhunmwangho and Ekpu, 2012, P. 120). The concept of fiscal federalism is a part of the fundamental components of the principles of federalism. It is central to the technique of generating revenue among the three levels of government –federal, state and local (Tsegaw, 2009, p.4). Begg (2009, p.36) notes that fiscal federalism is a form of government where all the levels of government (the three-tier system) are responsible for generating national revenue for development programmes as well as for redistributing such revenues among the different levels of government based on the degree of their contributions. Some scholars have argued that fiscal federalism is a form of government that "involves intergovernmental fiscal relations" (Roden, 2001; Obi, 2010; Arowolo, 2011, p. 2).

Fiscal federalism is concerned with, but not limited to, the vertical structure of the public sector of the economy. This system of government enables the federating units of the nation to collectively support in financing the cost of governance (Oates, 1999, p. 1120). Intergovernmental relations are not limited to fiscal federalism since the elements underpinning fiscal federalism could also be found in a unitary system of government. The structure of generating revenue under a federal system of government may be similar to tax patterns in other forms of government. This is because government, no matter its form, generally relies on tax revenues to finance recurrent and capital expenditure. State governments levy taxes on goods and services within the state and, in return, pay taxes to the central government. The central government would redistribute the accruable revenue to the members of a federating unit based on the sharing formula agreed upon by the three estates of

government. Although government could sometimes get some grants from donor agencies, no responsible government will solely depend on foreign assistance to run its affairs.

Rugy and Haeffele-Balch (2010, p.3) describe “fiscal federalism” as involving the decentralization of decision-making that empowers independent nations to meet the demands of governance in all parts of the country, and formulate acceptable policies to all the units that make up the country. This makes the three tiers of government develop on their own while giving the central government the necessary support to finance the projects and policies contained in the exclusive list (Shima, 2014). Drawing upon the experience of the United States of America, one would tend to wonder why the Federal Government of Nigeria adopts a federal structure without “functional fiscal federalism” (Shima, 2014).

The basis of the argument against the extant revenue allocation formula adopted by the Nigerian government is the exclusion of fiscal federalism in the nation’s political system. Instead of the local and state governments generating their own revenue and pay taxes to the central government, the Federal Government of Nigeria collects the revenue generated from oil in the Niger Delta region, and gives a monthly allocation to the state and local governments. This could best be described as financial aid. This is, perhaps one of the reasons for Rodden (2001, p. 1) to argue that fiscal federalism in Nigeria will remain unattainable until the federal government allows the states and local governments to generate their revenue and to develop at their own paces. This means allowing them to manage their own resources and plough back whatever they generate into projects and services that would bring about further development in the community.

Tanz (1995, p. 295-298) avers that decentralisation has become a problem in most states that are practising fiscal federalism. This is particularly the case with the problem of a lack of homogeneity in an ethnic and linguistic format as is the case in Nigeria, Russia and Ethiopia.

In these countries, the natural resources that are deposited regionally have induced the central government to impose federalism upon the state. Under this condition, it is possible to think that fiscal federalism tends to contribute in the sustenance of social conflicts within a nation.

It is relatively difficult to adopt any revenue allocation formula that all the members of a federating unit would accept. Blöchlcher et al. (2007) asserts that getting a revenue-sharing formula for a country that will not be contested by the people can be likened to passing a bill in the house without any debate. The impact of revenue-allocation formula is enormous on the members of a federating unit, especially when the country concerned has a mono-cultural economic system, where all the levels of government depend on only one source for generating the revenue for governance.

The pattern of the revenue-allocation formula being adopted in Nigeria has the tendency of facilitating underdevelopment, as the non-oil producing states rely heavily on the revenue being generated from the oil-producing communities. The implementation of the Nigerian version of fiscal federalism tends to contradict every known conventional political system in the world (Sam, Eme and Emeh, 2012; Lamidi and Fagbohun, 2013).

For instance, in the United States, the federal government has relieved itself of some of the issues contained in the concurrent list, where both the state and the federal government have the jurisdiction to make and enforce laws on the items on the list. This concerns matters relating to job creation/training, welfare packages, health care delivery, housing and legal services to citizens, because state and local governments are closer to the people than the central government. The state and local governments are better able to meet the immediate needs of the citizens than the federal government would have done if health and other related issues were the sole responsibility of the federal government. The government of the United Kingdom under the leadership of Tony Blair, for example, decided to constitute another

parliament for Scotland and Wales (1997) because of the desire to bring the government closer to the people. The decentralisation of power in Italy has been pushed so far that the people are increasingly becoming very optimistic of the chances of having two nations in one country (Oates, 1999, p. 6).

2.5.3 Nigerian Federalism

Federalism in Nigeria can be traced back to British colonial rule. Prior to the emergence of the British government in the West African sub-region, the political entity now known as Nigeria was populated by people from diverse ethnic nationalities, kingdoms and communities governed by traditional institutions. Most of the people who lived in the Nigerian traditional society shared almost everything in common, and resolved every dispute that occurred within the community through the traditional judicial system. Nonetheless, there were some unacceptable practices in the traditional African societies, such as the killing of twins (1874), and human sacrifices to the gods. There was also a despised sect of living humans dedicated to the gods. These people were referred to as “outcasts,” locally known as *osu*. They were treated as aliens or exiles in their own community. The early missionaries in Nigeria fought and stopped the killing of twins along with these other barbaric acts. The threats to modern norms and values were, significantly reduced by the British colonialists in Nigeria (Etekpe, 2009). Federalism was found to be the most appropriate political system because of the pluralistic nature of the society in terms of ethnicity and religion.

The Nigerian federal system has been very problematic right from its inception. There has been a trend whereby the federal government tends to favour the section of Nigeria that produces the head of the government in every administration (this has been one of the sources of conflict in the region). It was towards solving the problem of ethnicity and religious intolerance that Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi introduced a unitary system of government in

Nigeria in May 1966. Unfortunately, General Aguiyi was killed in the July 1966 coup while implementing the principles and values of a unitary system of government. General Yakubu Gowon, who took over government from Aguiyi Ironsi, later returned the country to a federal system of government. It was the disagreement between the former Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu, and the former Head of State, General Gowon, coupled with issues surrounding the Kano riots that led to the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970.

2.5.4 Colonialism

The conflicts in the Niger Delta date back to colonial times (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011; p. 1). Not only is there a link between the conflicts in the colonial era and contemporary conflicts in the region (Ako and Okomah, 2009, p. 55), but also the later conflicts are, as a result of the colonially entrenched inequity that characterized the earlier ones. The division of the country into three regions in 1939 by the British Colonial government amplified the issue of ethnicity that has proved to be very divisive, as manifested in the ongoing struggle for resource control. In other words, ethnicity, that pervades politics and socio-economic competition for resources in Nigeria, is a consequence of the political division of the country into three regions.

As observed by Nnoli (1978), ethnicity is one of the major concerns in Nigerian politics. The three major ethnic groups in the country (Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani) are politically united when it comes to decisions regarding the exploitation of the Niger Delta oil resources. The people of the Niger Delta first manifested their fear of marginalization by the major ethnic groups in 1958 under the colonial government and, therefore, opted to separate from the rest of Nigeria. This request led to the formation of the Willink Commission, whose

report in 1958 held that the Niger Delta region should be treated as a special area for development (see Colonial Office of Nigeria, 1958, p.94).

The British Colonial government amalgamated the regions that now constitute Nigeria in 1914. It is posited that, without the amalgamation, there would be no country called Nigeria. The Niger Delta grievances and conflicts are deeply entrenched in colonialism. The people believe that the British colonial government enacted obnoxious laws that bestowed ownership and control of their oil to the Crown. For instance, the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907 provided that: “[i]t shall be lawful for the Governor to enter into an agreement with any Native Authority for the purchase of full and exclusive rights in and over all mineral oils within and under any lands which are the property of any Native Community” (Ako, 2010, p. 8). This implies that the land (beneath which the oil resources lay) ownership was vested on these communities prior to the Ordinance.

The colonial government promulgated the Mineral Oil Ordinance in 1914, with amendments in 1916, 1945, 1950 and 1959 (Ebeku, 1998). The Ordinance simply reaffirmed state ownership and control of the oil resources (exclusively deposited in the Niger Delta) by the central government (Ebeku, 1998, p.1). The Eastern Nigerian elite were uncomfortable with these laws; they felt that they had deprived the inhabitants of the oil-rich region the right to their natural property. Ironically, the same Nigerian elite who criticized the colonial Mineral Acts amended the laws to vest natural resources, hitherto vested in the Crown, on the president on behalf of the Federal Government (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011, p. 2). Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe made this amendment; he was the first Head of State of Nigeria. Ako (2010, p. 9) observes that the struggle over the ownership of oil was a cynical cause of the Biafra/ Nigerian war that took place between 1967 and 1970. The easterners attempted to secede from Nigeria because the Niger Delta was politically under the Eastern Region. While the

war was ongoing the then federal military government re-asserted the state ownership of the oil resources, which still stands till today (Ako, 2010, p. 8). Obviously, when an existing culture is transformed via colonialism, there would normally be a negative impact on the newly transformed communities as is the case in the Niger Delta region. The colonial transformation in Nigeria has only led to ethnic schism and sowed the seed of conflict.

It appears erroneous to blame the Niger Delta conflict on the colonialism, as other countries, such as Malaysia, Ghana and America, were all former British colonies. The Malaysian economy has continued to grow. The corruption in Nigeria cannot be compared to the level in Ghana; and America, through her technologies and industrial revolution, has transformed into a world power. All these are indications that the restiveness in Nigeria are as a result of corrupt governance. Obi (2010), however, insists that the current government policies and constitutions are benchmarked on the legacies of colonialism.

During the period of colonization, some of the early multi-national oil corporations (MNOCs) became more established in Africa, although those in the agricultural sector were more concerned with sourcing of raw materials for their parent companies in Europe. For instance, in West Africa, cocoa, groundnut, sorghum, and palm oil were exported to Europe, while those in the mining sector became major employers of labour, as exemplified in East and Southern Africa (Gartenstein-Ross, Willcoxon and Basuni; Kennedy 1998). The relationship between the African states and the MNOCs during this era of colonialism was based more on economic benefits, and with no direct attempt at CSR. During this period, while the MNOCs supplied materials to the local African communities, which were more of firearms and manufactured goods, neither the MNOCs nor their protectors (the colonial governments) tolerated obstructions to trade (Pakenham, 1991).

The modern MNOCs are sophisticated; influential, and large are also impacting considerably on Africa's culture, politics, security, environment, governance, development, regional integration and industrialization (Lall, 1996). These MNOCs are sources of employment, products, capital investment, skills and technology, infrastructure development, creation of industries, taxes and fees to government, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in many Africa states (Dietrich, 2000; Pedersen and Huniche, 2006). They have become relatively powerful, rendering the African states almost powerless and unable to control themselves. They have also been implicated in environmental degradation, socio-political crises, labour exploitation, and economic crises in Africa (Dietrich, 2000; Stern, 2005, Pedersen and Huniche, 2006).

2.5.5 Politics of Oil

Easton (1965, p. 21) defines politics as the authoritative allocation of values. In other words, politics has become the most reliable instrument for distributing national resources to the different federating units that make up a nation. Modebadze (2010, p. 40) describes politics as the exercise of power and authority in a decision-making process, which involves the allocation of scarce resources and the practice of deception and manipulation by some political leaders. This implies that politics could mean different things to different people, depending on the prevailing circumstances. There is a direct link between politics and the allocation of values. However, it is the nature of a political system that determines how national resources can be allocated to the different units of the country. Under a unitary system of government, national resources are evenly distributed to the various regions that make up the country, as is the case of the United Kingdom. But under a federal system of government, national resources are supposed to be distributed proportionately based on the level of contribution of each of the federating units, as in the case of the United States of America (Rivera, 2016). As a result, most people tend to wonder whether Nigeria is a federal

state with unitary structure, or a country practising a unitary system of government having a federal structure.

The revenue allocation formula adopted by the Nigerian government has been particularly criticized and rejected by scholars on the basis that it does not reflect the interests of the people in the Niger Delta region, where over 80 per cent of the national resource is generated. Indeed, a fundamental contributory cause of restiveness in the Niger Delta region is attributed to the politics of resource control. In the view of Ojekarotu (2008, p. 2), the Niger Delta upheaval in relation to revenue allocation has grown from bad to worse by assuming a dreadful pattern during the 1990s, especially the regimes of Babangida and Abacha, when the youths became restive through the social movements formed. The development became a source of worry to the government and oil companies. The Niger Delta conflict is premised on the laws regulating oil exploration and land ownership, which the Niger Delta militants believe must be abrogated, as it does not represent their interests as the host communities (Okonta, 2001; Giroux, 2008). Closely related to this view is the argument by Watts, Okonta and Kemedi (2004), that the desire to control natural resources is the driver of high passion about the issue of resource control by ethnic groups. It has been observed that, in the region, it is difficult to separate the people from the abundant natural resources, which they desire to benefit from. As far as the Niger Delta is concerned, resource control, which is the central idea in oil politics in Nigeria, is the sine qua non for sustainable peace and development in the country (Ojekarotu, 2008, p. 6).

2.5.6 Oil Companies' "Divide and Rule" Strategy: A Source of Conflict

For several years, oil companies in Nigeria have been involved in the strategy of divide and rule, which remains one of the challenges of peaceful co-existence in the Niger Delta region. As mentioned earlier, the divide and rule strategy is a strategy used in politics to destroy an

existing concentrated power, with the aim of infringement of strong power structures. This strategy breaks up existing relationship among groups and individuals. Oil companies in the Niger Delta region, in partnership with the Nigerian state, employ this strategy within the oil-producing communities (OPCs) (Faleti, 2009 p. 17). The oil companies, rather than carrying out international standard of oil mining practices, choose to concentrate on bribing the most vocal people in the communities to quell the pressures from the communities for the oil companies to be corporately responsible. The divide and rule strategy has been used to destroy the traditional institutions that were previously famous in community governance, such as the elites, chiefs, elders and age-grades (Faleti, 2009, p. 17).

These influential people, often said to hold the peace of the communities in pre-conflict era, became the powerless members of the communities as others now entertain the view that they are corrupt. The phases of power in the communities no longer trust each other, thereby giving rise to inter-communal conflicts, intra-communal conflict, and conflict with the oil companies as well as conflict with the Nigerian state. Pa Jim Beeson Saro-Wiwa, the father of Ken Saro-Wiwa, complained, thus:

We were living in peace before Shell came. We were sharing our forests with animals and monkeys, but when Shell came, they started setting one community against another... Before you knew it, they started killing our people (Social Action, 2009, p.11).

For instance, Shell's activities in Rumuekpe community resulted in leadership tussle that claimed many lives and property. It has been noted that Shell has always supported individuals who are connected with the company to become their liaison officer within the

community. This appears to have worked directly against the traditional institution of governance in the community, resulting in intra-communal conflict, as Shell's chosen community leaders may sometimes impose their will on the communities. In agreement with the observation of Ken Saro Wiwa's father, Umuechem, Ogoni, Odioma, Edagberi and Rumuekpe were very peaceful communities prior to the advent oil exploration (Remembering Saro-Wiwa, undated).

The oil companies that came in search of the “black gold” deposited in the Niger Delta stole the peace that existed in the region (Social Action, 2009; Morrow, 2009). Before the advent of oil, the youths in the region who would normally act on the instructions of the chiefs and elders have discovered that they have been deceived. The directions from the chiefs and elders were perverted through financial benefits from the political elites. Shell appears to be enjoying the communal conflicts, as the government supplies them with armed military troops to guard their oil facilities while the communities are allowed to kill one another (Idemudia, 2010). This shows that the Nigerian state appears to be more interested in the Niger Delta oil than in the welfare of the people, since the state has allowed the communities to destroy one another without interference from the government. Some of the group leaders that championed the conflict in the region are believed to be recognised by the Nigerian ruling political elite (Social Action, 2009, pp. 17-19).

Chevron has also adopted the “divide and rule” strategy at Ugborodo community of Delta State. The oil corporation had an agreement with the community to improve on its community projects as well as to ensure peaceful operational activities within the community as part of its crisis management. In the end, both parties freely signed the new MOU (Faleti, 2009, p.12). Rather than Chevron carrying out the agreed projects, she decided to bribe the most vocal people of the community with the sum of ₦25 000 000.00 (twenty five million

naira). Chevron enjoys this chaos because the company knows that unity in the host communities would amount to a collective strength to fight the company. Therefore, Chevron prefers to turn the community against one another (Faleti, 2009, p. 12).

The community, however, carried out a peace protest to remind the company of the earlier MOU agreed upon. The response from Chevron was brutal, and about 30 of the members who took part in the demonstration were injured, while one died as a result of the injury. Chevron repudiated the MOU with the reason that it was signed under duress (Faleti, 2009, p.19). This implies the oil companies in partnership with the Nigerian government prefer the oil in the Niger Delta to the people's well-being. According to Nwogwugwu et al. (2012), when the money meant for CSR to empower the people and transform communities is given to a few individuals or more influential groups, it becomes problematic because the neglected groups would definitely come to demand their own share. In that case, instead of being a source of inter-group harmony, planned CSR becomes a source of intra-communal or inter-communal conflict and an avenue for groups to show their will.

2.5.7 Corruption

Many high-level government officials are said to have participated in the stealing of the oil resources going on in the Niger Delta region; but, with the advent of the amnesty programme, the military is now in control of the area (Vidal, 2013, p.4). The implication is that that oil theft in the region will no longer be an issue of breaking up the oil pipeline, but collaboration between the pipeline vandals and the military. Vidal (2013) also observes that the rich are currently carrying out the oil theft in the region; the poor people of the Niger Delta, who would only normally take very small quantity of oil out of the vandalized pipeline, no longer do it. It now involves army officers, naval officers, big politicians, and so on. Since there is

plenty of money in it, all authorities (military, politicians, and even the oil companies) engage in it (Katsouris, Christianaa, Sayne and Aaron, 2015).

Oil theft has also become highly organized, as the thieves are not being protected; the illegal vessels carrying oil can be arrested but discharged without prosecution (Vidal, 2013). For instance, the MT African Pride a ship of Russian origin, carted away about 11,000 tons of crude oil from Nigeria. The Nigerian Navy for illegal bunkering arrested the tanker but it suddenly disappeared till today (IRIN, 2004, p.1; Adeniyi, 2013, p. 2). This implies that most of the oil stolen from Africa has support from the international community. It is, therefore, no wonder that President Goodluck Jonathan, in his open letter to former President Olusegun Obasanjo dated 2nd January, 2014, warned that the Western world should stay away from the purchase of stolen oil from Nigeria (Vanguard News, 2014; Information Nigeria, 2014).

The World Bank (2005) has revealed that the money from oil by top Nigerian politicians who have access to Nigeria's oil revenue is hidden in European banks, American banks and Swiss banks. Corruption, poor leadership and governance in Nigeria tend to have direct or indirect contributions from the developed world. The World Bank, for example, lends huge amounts of money to the Nigerian government, which is often embezzled by the governing elite (Obasanjo, 1993; Peel, 2006; Igwe, 2012).

Worse still, Britain and the United States of America train Nigerian soldiers and police in a bid to demonstrate their support for the Nigerian government in fighting the protesting Niger Delta people (Donwa and Jlius, 2015; Nilsson, 2010). For instance, in December 2005, the then American President, George W. Bush, was reported to have planned the deployment of US Marines to help crush the Niger Delta militants so that oil will continue to flow unhindered to America. In 2006, the media reported that the George Bush administration donated six (6) gunboats to the Nigerian government to help suppress the militants so that

America's energy needs would be met (Dagne, 2005). All these have made the oil-producing communities (OPCs) perceive oil as a curse rather than a blessing to them.

2.5.8 Government's Coercive Responses

Government's coercive response to the Niger Delta conflict did not start in 1999. The confrontation of the people rather took a more deadly dimension when the military embarked on a punitive expedition that climaxed in the mass murder of residents of Odi in Bayelsa State, after over 12 policemen were murdered (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Idu, 2011, p.123). The Obasanjo administration, in 1999, adopted the establishment of committees, setting up of a Joint Task Force, and arrest of militants and their leaders as response to the Niger Delta conflict. After the establishment of the JTF and military casualties, it was obvious that the solution to the crisis would not be achieved through militarisation and this made Obasanjo to establish the Council on Socioeconomic Development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta in April 2006 (Ojameruaye, 2007; Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011).

Through the use of security operatives at her disposal, the government demonstrated her total control of oil and mineral resources in the region (Obi, 2004). The impact of coercive response cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, the JTF established in August 2003 did not restore total order as expected. Rather, their roadblocks and multiple checkpoints in most parts of the Niger Delta ended up alienating them from the people (Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011).

Even though most responses from government were mainly focused on preventing the obstruction of oil production and distribution, such actions were at the expense of those in the host communities. According to Sawyer (2010, p.245), the military sent to quell the crisis in Bayelsa that led to Odi massacre became agents of human degradation that climaxed in a

high number of fatherless babies. This degradation was not only in the form of wanton destruction of lives but also a generational psychological trauma.

The disarmament programme of 2004 initiated by then President Obasanjo produced the expected result, when militant groups headed by Asari Dokubo and Ateke Tom participated in peace talks and thousands of weapons were later destroyed in public. Later at a church service, the repentant militants prayed God to forgive their sins (Obuoforibo, 2011). However, after this period, it was obvious that more armed groups needed to be disarmed before stability would be restored to the region.

2.5.9 Leadership and Governance

The Federal Government of Nigeria is a formidable stakeholder in the petroleum industry because it reserves the exclusive right to regulate the activities of multi-national oil corporations (MNOCs) as they carry out their business. Emoyan, Akpoborie and Akpohonor (2008, p.32) note that, as “a shareholder in the oil and gas industry, government’s oversight function has been characterised by legislative acts, regulations and decrees aimed at superseding many environmental problems.” However, this legislative intervention has not made any significant impact in the abatement of environmental degradation or abuse, including gas flaring. While writing on the lack of implementation of regulations on the Niger Delta-oil environment, Raji and Abejide (2013, p.52) state that, in spite of “government’s efforts to limit gas flaring through legislative intervention, the problem remains unabated because the government’s major goal is the continuous exploration of crude oil and the concomitant revenue generation without considering the implication of the activity on the environment and the health of the people. Luqman (2012, p.417) asserts that a rentier state is like Nigeria “characterised by fiscal reliance on petrodollars, which strengthens state

jurisdiction and weakens authority as other productive capabilities whither”. Udeke and Okolie-Osemene (2012, p.6-8) argue that:

[b]etween 1958 and 2012, the Niger Delta could be described as a victim of committees, commissions, reports and counter recommendations which are never implemented as recommended by members without alteration by government, partial implementation or even outright suspension of the reports; to the extent that much of the anger against the oil producing companies in host communities arose out of the way the indigenes lost their farmlands, crops, and economic trees with very little compensation.

According to Olumide (2011, p.99), “from 1960 to 1999, corporate politics intersected with successive dictatorships – military and civil government – which facilitated government’s signing of laws that appropriated oil resources and placed them under the control of multi nationals and the government.” In this case, host communities were neither involved nor considered.

2.6 Impact of the Niger Delta Conflict on the Communities

According to Adeola (2001, p. 40), the Niger Delta (oil resources) conflict has negatively impacted on the host communities. To ascertain the nature of this impact, this section of the study is designed to deliberate on the adverse effects of the conflict on host communities. The apparent ecological devastation of the environment has relieved the natural fishermen and farmers of their occupation with its resultant effect on poverty and unemployment, among others. Poverty in the oil-producing communities in the Nigeria's delta is no longer news. This can be perceived in the obvious manifestation of frustration and aggression of the local

people. The various oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta are of the view that oil exploration and exploitation have not contributed to their development when compared with the revenue accruable from oil. Nwankwo (2015) observes that the Ogoni, in 1990, summed up their oil revenue contribution to the Nigerian government to the tune of \$30 billion at the time but got nothing in return other than negative environmental externalities, which UNEP (2011) has noted will take up to 30 years for Shell to remediate.

The foregoing argument does not imply that oil exploration and exploitation have generated poverty to all actors of the conflict; oil has given the Nigerian economy both huge revenue and popularity but left the host communities impoverished. Thus, the host communities believe that there is traceable to ethnicity. This is based on the premise of sudden shift in the derivation policy of allocation in the country from what it used to be in the early 1960s. The host communities consider this shift as injustice, because the derivation principle was considered a policy of justice in the country at the time. The principle of derivation was created on equity grounds. Which implies that each region that contributes the bulk of the country's revenue receives an extra share above what other regions received (Okoko, Nna and Ibaba, 2006). This made the majority ethnic groups who were then in control of agriculture to be reimbursed 100% of the revenue they generated from agriculture. However, when the Niger Delta communities (minorities) came to the scene, through oil revenue, the principle of derivation was reduced from 100% to 1.5 % and now marginally increased to 13% (Ikporukpo, 2001). The local communities perceived this socio-economic manipulation as unjust and unacceptable. Consequently, the youths began to ask for a fair deal from both the oil companies and the government. In response, the government engaged several dastardly special police and military units to invade, occupy, harass, torment, suppress and outright destroy the Niger Delta communities. This is in order to make the people of the region stay clear of oil exploration, as the government prefers to have the oil flow to ensuring

the good health of the local people. Ojaborotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 5) summarise some of the various occurrences of the oil-bearing communities' militarisation below:

- The Nigeria Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) was used to brutally repress a non-violent youth protest against Shell at Umuechem in Rivers state. Consequently, the community was practically destroyed on 31 October 1990, resulting in the killing of 80 indigenes and hundreds of buildings destroyed with increase in the number of internal displacement (ICG, 2006A, p. 6-7)
- The Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, one of the best equipped military squads, was formed mainly for the purpose of repressing, suppressing, harassing, humiliating, arresting and unlawfully, detaining members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and its followers, who had moved against Shell and demanded self-determination in Ogoni land between 1993 and 1996).
- Apart from the unconstitutional execution of the Ogoni nine (Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight Ogoni compatriots), the Nigerian military engaged in wanton destruction of the Ogoni people; they virtually metamorphosed to an army of occupation involved in rape, torture, maiming, looting and summarily executing about 2000 people extra judicially (HRW, 1999, p. 9; Adeola, 2001, p. 40).
- A combined team of Nigerian state MOPOL and the Army were used for the invasion of Choba community to repress a peaceful protest against WILBROS (a foreign oil servicing firm) in 1999; 10 people were killed, 25 women raped and the community was temporarily deserted (CLO, 2002, p. 50-61).
- In January 1999, a state of emergency was declared by the Nigerian Federal Government, in Bayelsa State with heavily armed military men in armoured vehicles

deployed to battle against the Niger Delta ns, particularly the IYC and Egbesu Boys of Africa (Sesay et al., 2003).

- One of the most tragic and internationalised militarisation in the Niger Delta occurred in November 1999. The Nigerian state, through an operation tagged Hakuri 2, embarked on one of its most sordid genocide attacks in the Delta region by deploying the army to invade Odi community, the second largest town in Bayelsa state, after Amassoma. Consequentially, more than 1000 people were brutally murdered; several others were declared missing with their houses demolished, except three of the houses which were left standing; the community was deserted, and property worth of millions of naira destroyed (CLO, 2002, p. 67-74).
- In 2003, a set of the Nigeria military known as the Joint Task Force (JTF) and nicknamed “Operation Restore Hope” was formed. Mainly carved out for the consistent, persistent and aggressive suppression of all oil-related protests in the Niger Delta, the JTF is made up of about 4,000 troops (Ikelegbe, 2005).
- In October 2005, Odioma was also attacked by the JTF, resulting in at least 17 people losing their lives, including a two-year old child (ICG, 2006a, p. 7).

It was against this background of exploitive militarization of the Delta communities alongside the perpetration of repugnant human rights violation that numerous ethnic environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and armed state youth organizations emerged (Gear, Kotze, 2015). The groups were believed to have been formed to counter the Nigerian state and its collaborative oil-company partners in their constant harassment, terrorization, rape, subjugation and suppression of the Niger Delta people. The EMO formulated in this regard

include: MOSOP, Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Urhobo Youth Movement (UYOMO). In addition, Ojakorotu and Gilbert (2010, p. 6) list the non-state armed groups formulated to include:

[t]he Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC), the Membutu Boys, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Martyrs Brigade also sprouted in the region.

It might not be right to blame the government for the formation of these groups, but it would be apt to argue that the government contributed to their formation through her deployment of military troops to terrorise and traumatize the oil-bearing communities. No doubt, the state monopoly of the violent means of destruction was challenged by the pervasive deployment of arms locally by the non-state armed groups, who proliferated and wielded lethal violence (Watts, 2007, p. 642). It is germane to reiterate the fact that the militants, from the onset, did not acquire the guns they used on their own. They got them (their guns) from both the government and the oil companies prior to their transformation into militants. Most of the boys were used as thugs in election campaigns as well as for the rigging of elections and were thus fully armed. The arms were never returned at the end of the elections, but utilised to latter counter government repression.

Rather than engaging in concrete CSR, the oil companies, particularly Shell, embraced the local content of by-cutting processes. In addition, using the government troops, Shell employed the youths and equipped them with arms to guide their pipelines. Tuodulo (2009, p. 337) observes that “Shell sponsored some youth in Nembe community, purchased arms

and ammunition for them to fight whoever that is fighting them (Shell)". Consequently, in time, these ammunitions were reused to fight both the companies and the government but also contributed to community disorder as it generated inter- and intra-communal conflicts. Tuodulo summarises the impact of the Niger Delta resource conflicts on the communities as follows:

[T]hese oil or multinationals have thrust a knife in our midst and we have fallen apart. The love for money and our political selfishness have set us against each other and we no longer see ourselves as brothers, fathers, chiefs, sisters, we disregard ourselves for temporary and temporal things, which have led to the formation of nocturnal and clandestine groups which have transformed Nembe to Sicily (Italy). Groups that are sponsored by chiefs, elders, politicians, government agents and the multinationals have succeeded in causing our aged parents and children, while our young men die prematurely in arms struggle, our parents die of heart attack and the children are denied knowledge by preventing them from going to school (Tuodulo, 2009, p. 338).

While it might not be right to argue that the oil multinational companies have done nothing in the realm of CSR but bring the local communities a curse, it will be wrong to agree that the MNOCs have done enough. The basis for the above premise is that various CSR strategies have been adopted by the MNOCs over time. The changes in CSR adopted measure are suggestive of failures. Aaron (2012) categorises the strategies adopted as "old" and "new" CSR strategies. The old model of CSR in the Niger Delta took place in 1960-1997. During this period, the MNOCs resisted the oil-producing communities' call for developmental role

with the claim that it is the government's responsibility to develop the communities since they (the MNOCs) met their statutory obligations to the Nigerian government to operate in the land. It is, therefore, not surprising that the local environmental activists (Asaac Boro and Ken Saro-Wiwa) rose up against both the government and the oil companies. This uprising prompted the oil companies to kick-start the first phase of CSR in the local communities called "community assistant" projects (Ite, 2007). The oil companies gave the communities gifts, which, in their perception, constituted the needs of the communities. These community assistance programmes were not just one-off gifts but included provision of graduate employments, scholarships and apprenticeship. However the corporate gifts to the communities rather exacerbated the conflict. Okoko (1996) argues that there is a direct relationship between oil companies' provision of basic amenities and community conflicts, as the philanthropist system adopted by the oil companies amplified corrupt practices and accentuated a higher level of inter- and intra-communal conflicts. By all means, the local environmental activists continued to clamour for environmental justice and a change of CSR strategy by the MNOCs.

Furthermore, the dissatisfaction of the people as expressed in various protests necessitated the change from community assistance strategy to community development in 1998-2003 and sustainable community development in 2004. Many authors conclude that all three old CSR strategies are dissatisfactory, adding that the MNOCs, in their policies, express commitment to concrete environmental practices but in reality have failed the Niger Delta ns (Ibeanu, 1997; Nigeria Rights Watch, 1999; Frynas, 2005; Akpan, 2006; Ite, 2007). Okoko, Nna and Ibaba (2006, p. 187) argue that the oil companies only changed their CSR strategies to include people-oriented practices just to assuage the feelings of the local communities who have stepped up their protests against the exclusivist policies of the oil companies. However, the oil companies appear to have noble CSR policies which are not pragmatic in the Niger

Delta, prompting the oil companies to bribe the most vocal and the traditional institutions in the communities rather than engaging in concrete CSR delivery. This singular act has weakened the local traditional institutions, which wielded power in the era prior to the oil boom. Similarly, Nweke (2012, p. 204) notes that the traditional institutions meddled in the conflict with the aim of achieving peace but eventually became absorbed in it, probably because of the financial gains. This possibly accounts for why the traditional institutions could not manage the ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta.

2.6 MNOCs' CSR Programmes/Projects

As noted earlier, CSR is an integral part of community relations. Thus, corporations must think about taking responsibility for their actions if they want the communities in which they operate and make money to accept them. Daferighe and Adedeji (2010) raise two critical CSR issues that demand examination: “(1) that the pursuit of CSR projects by companies greatly depends on their definition of CSR as well as the value they place on it; (2) that issues of ethnicity, absence of efficient social, economic and political institution constitute challenges for CSR practice in Nigeria” (p.1-2).

Usually, organizations and individuals accept responsibility for the things that are working for them and repudiate those that are not working properly. In Nigeria, for instance, not all companies attach much importance to the execution of CSR programmes; and, expectedly, such companies will not be in the good books of their host communities. Again, lack of or weak institutional mechanisms to check lapses seem to aggravate CSR crisis in some parts of the country (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010; Ako, 2012). For instance, CSR programmes or projects pursued by MNOCs, especially Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC), do not seem to conform to international best practice in environmental protection (UNEP, 2011). The oil-mining giant does not appear to understand the meaning

and implication of adopting adequate CSR strategies; hence they do not consult or liaise with the host communities when carrying out any CSR-oriented project. For example, in Equatorial Guinea, ExxonMobil, as part of its footprint in the society, donated mosquito nets to the country's Ministry of Health to foster prevention of malaria; but the Ministry officials sold these mosquito preventive-aids to Cameroonians. Another incidence took place in Angola where BP distributed Asian condoms to the citizenry as part of its anti-AIDS campaign. The condoms, however, turned out to be undersized for an African man (Frynas, 2005, p. 587). Had the MNOCs liaised with their host communities, their corporate giving would have been recognised and appreciated rather than being faulted. This also explains the reason for white elephant projects or non-functioning CSR projects in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Some of these projects include finished or unfinished buildings without electricity, water projects or hospitals and schools.

Without any doubt, the MNOCs have been involved in corporate philanthropy. However, not all the CSR motives appear to have been genuine. This has resulted in the failure of these projects. The independent audit report of 2001 revealed that less than one-third of Shell's commissioned CSR projects are functional. Shell's interest was to buy off the oil communities rather than their development (The Economist, 12 May, 2001).

Bottom-top CSR is focused on carrying the local people along, which, by extension, makes them part of their own developmental strategy. This is described by Ellerman (2001) as helping people to help themselves. In other words, participatory CSR is perceived as the best route for development. The cardinal idea of the Central Bank's Comprehensive Developmental Framework suggests that the “doer” (which refers to a person or community) ought to be on the driver's seat and actively help him (Frynas, 2005, 589). In this sense, if the local OPCs in the Niger Delta region were helped to help themselves, the region would have

been developed. In the argument of Schumacher (1973, p. 204), it is not possible to achieve development in a local community through skilful grafting of activities carried out by foreign expatriates or an indigenous leader that has lost communication with ordinary members of the community. Ironically, this describes the situation in the Niger Delta. It is, perhaps, the reason the OPCs have been fighting against the MNOCs and the government. Foreign technicians carry out developmental projects in the Niger Delta without inculcating in the people the principles of development.

The Ogoni ethnic group in the Niger Delta region complained that their fertile and productive lands have been destroyed by SPDC's oil-mining activities. This resulted in peaceful protests by the people, under the auspice of Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Moro, 2009; Ako, 2015). Ken Saro-Wiwa brought the matter to the attention of the international community in the 1990s. Ken Saro-Wiwa was said to have continued from where Isaac Adaka Boro stopped, in 1966. However, unlike Isaac Adaka Boro, who was said to be violent in his approach, Ken Saro-Wiwa peacefully executed the struggle for the right of the Ogoni. Saro-Wiwa believed that the entire Ogoni land had been "degraded, devastated and poisoned," and that the oil companies and the Nigerian state were only interested in the revenue derived from Ogoniland without caring for the environmental effects of oil exploration on the people of the Niger Delta (Saro-Wiwa, 2009, p. 324). Since the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990, and the repulsive and negative attitude of SPDC and the Federal Government, SPDC has remained a "persona non grata" in the Ogoni community (Giroux, 2008). According to Social Action (2009, p. 7);

In 1990, the Ogoni took stock of their condition and concluded that in spite of the stupendous oil and gas wealth off their land, which has fed the Nigerian ruling elite; they were extremely

poor, and had no social amenities. Unemployment was running higher and worse still, their environment was severely devastated by three decades of reckless oil exploitation, by Shell's ecological warfare. The Ogonis felt that their existence as a nation was threatened by environmental degradation, political marginalization, economic strangulation and slavery and adopted the OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS, which was presented to the Government and people of Nigeria in October 1990. It is as a result of the Nigerian government's insensitivity to their demands that SPDC was sacked from Ogoniland on 4th January 1993.

As mentioned earlier, the protests were peaceful until on 21 November 1994, when four prominent sons of Ogoniland were executed. Those executed were Edward Kobain, Albert T. Badey, Samuel Orage, and Theophilus Orage. They were suspected to be brutally murdered by youths loyal to Ken Waro-Wiwa. It was further suspected that the youths acted on the instruction of Ken Saro-Wiwa (Etekpe, 2007). The government responded by arresting Ken Saro-Wiwa and 9 others and set up the Justice Ibrahim Auta Panel to investigate the incident. Ken Saro-Wiwa and his fellow eight activists were later sentenced to death by hanging by the military government of General Sani Abacha, on 10 November 1995 (Ejibunu, 2007). The alleged injustice was further made obvious by the government that killed them without allowing them the 30 days for appeal given by the panel. The people of Ogoni believed that SPDC was responsible for the death of the first "Ogoni 4" and, later "Ogoni 9" (Ako, 2015). This opened the vista for the people to interrogate Shell's corporate social programmes/projects that could have averted the crisis (Moro, 2009, p. 325). Shell

was, therefore, declared 'illegitimate' and 'forced' out of the Ogoniland since 1995 for their inability to execute concrete social development projects (Ejibunu, 2007).

The nonchalant attitude of Shell in relation to exploratory activities impacted negatively on the farming activities in Ogoniland. Technical researchers, such as the UNEP (2011) and United Nation Development Project (UNDP) (2006), as well as the Niger Delta Human Development Report of UNDP, reported that Shell's unfriendly environmental activities have prompted the farmers in the Niger Delta to sue Shell in Netherlands, the company's corporate headquarters, with the support of Friends of the Earth. In the legal suit, the farmers demanded that Shell should clean up the damage it has caused their environment and regularly maintain the pipelines to avoid further oil spillages. In addition, the farmers' demanded that Shell should pay financial compensation for destroying and dislocating their local economy. The case was related to the oil spillages in Goi (Ogoni, Rivers State), Oruma (Bayelsa State), and Ikot Ada Udo (Akwa Ibom State) (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p.1).

Shell, on the other hand, claimed that the damage was caused by sabotage, and that it has made several unsuccessful efforts to repair the pipelines. Etekpe (2007) disagrees with the position of SPDC and posits that studies have shown that SPDC, in its usual character, has delayed any efforts to clean up the environment. The company's lawyer, Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, further claimed that Shell had made several efforts to repair the pipeline but it was unsuccessful because of the region's insecurity and sabotage. However, Shell's claim, of not being culpable is questionable for the simple reason that the oil spillages were caused by her oil exploration activities. This is because, without Shell's oil exploration in the land the people, would not have suffered the brunt of oil spillages. The people noted that the farmers had no business with sabotage; rather the company was irresponsible not to guide its facilities (Ako, 2013).

Sabotage may have, however, contributed to the spillages, but Shell's activities played a greater part in the environmental damage. Shell's contractors have been repairing a section of the over 50 year's oil pipeline along Ogoniland and the Ogu-Bolo terminal in Bonny. The pipeline was said to have been rusty and eventually exploded. But an official investigation into the cause of this explosion reported that the accident followed a botched attempt by some people to steal thousands of barrels of crude oil. It was also observed that other groups of engineers were removing illegal taps on the same pipeline (Vidal, 2013). In addition, some engineers were installing equipment to allow huge amount of oil to be siphoned into barges that would be transported to the high sea where tankers bound for Europe and the United States were waiting (Pyne-Frank and Timberlake, 2013). Reverend Obi, a Catholic Priest who was appointed to be an official observer, argued that both Shell and the government must have been involved in the high-level oil theft.

Shell's resistance and delay to the hearing of this case that was registered in 2008 by Miliudensie and Associates suggested to the farmers a success in their mission. The farmers were further strengthened by the insistence of Shell to return the petition to a Nigerian court, thereby questioning the authority of The Hague Court in the matter. As the Nigerian court ruled against Ken Saro-wiwa, the people of the Niger Delta have always linked the Nigerian state and Shell as partners in the act and, therefore, would not expect any from a Nigerian court (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p.1; Ako, 2015; Ako, 2013). They further argued that Shell's tactics suggested, "Shell is acting in the knowledge that the Nigerian court has a poor justice system" (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p. 1). This is one of the examples of SPDC's poor CSR, which is applicable to the other 19 MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region.

According to Vidal (2013, p.1), "Shell scheduled resume talks in London by July 2013 with lawyers standing in for Ogonis demanding compensation from Shell as a result of ecological

damage by crude oil.” This tends to be evidence that the impoverished farmers in the Niger Delta have suffered damage from environmental degradation without the national government’s check on the environmental impact of oil, but concerned more about the economic benefits of oil. A situation where President Goodluck Jonathan worried about 400,000 barrels of oil lost daily to theft and its impact on the economy without addressing how the OPCs cope with the adversity of oil degradation gives a disturbing impression (Pyne-Frank and Timberlake, 2013).

The ethical standard of an MNOG like Shell appears different in Africa compared to the rest of the world, such as the Gulf of Mexico and United States of America. For instance, in 2012, the US government took up a matter with Shell on behalf of its victims for an estimated 4.1 million barrels of oil that was spilled in the Gulf. Shell, with speed, cleaned up the oil spillage and paid financial compensation of about USD3billion. This was regarded as one of the biggest settlements for causing the Deepwater Horizon disaster (Daily Star, 2012, p. 19). However, with over 50 years of oil exploration in Nigeria, SPDC or any other MNOG has not paid any reasonable amount for the oil spilled into the ecosystem nor made any major attempt of cleaning the environment. All the cleaning done in the environment has been labelled crisis management.

A critical analysis of the Shell spills in Ogoni and other parts of the Niger Delta region shows that the spills are incomparable to that of the North Sea spillage in United States. Shell's inability to plug a leak in the North Sea resulted in the company forcing its Chief Executive to resign (Aghalino, 2009; Steiner, 2010). This is a clear indication that the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have adopted a double standard. This is because, while, in reality, the environmental standards are strictly followed in Mexico and the United States, Shell has not done so in practice in Nigeria (Steiner, 2010, p. 17-18).

Another MNOC-OPC clash was that of Umuchem community located in Etche Local Government Area of Rivers State, in 1990 (Social Action, 2009). The people carried out a peaceful protest against Shell for the environmental degradation of their land, especially as SPDC did not respond to the demand for cleaning up and payment of compensation. The Nigerian government reacted on behalf of Shell by dispatching 1000 mobile policemen to “shoot-at sight” (Social Action, 2009) and in the process killed over 50 people and destroyed the community. This action also supports the thesis that CSR and/or standards in Nigeria are different from what is obtainable elsewhere probably because of their romance with the political leaders (Adelabu, 2015).

However, Tuodulo (2009) observes that the MNOCs have been involved in community development activities in the Niger Delta. A situation where the communities perceive the MNOCs as enemies or “strange bedfellows” (Yazji, 2006) handicaps the MNOCs’ efforts in carrying out positive community relations. This does not rule out the fact that many MNOCs have been more focused in their businesses, bringing returns to their shareholders rather than benefiting the society (Gilbert, 1999).

It will not be true to say that Shell has not invested anything towards the development of OPCs in the Niger Delta where she is operating. Shell is the major employer of labour among the other MNOCs in the region; the corporation has been involved in scholarship awards from primary level to university level. It has also contributed towards an improved transport system in the OPCs by donating buses, constructing roads and jetties in the region (Tuodulo, 2009, p. 536). It has also provided boreholes and electricity for most of the OPCs and micro finance for farmers.

Notwithstanding that most people in the region are of the opinion that the services provided by Shell are inadequate, others compliment SPDC for its benevolence. For instance, the

members of Nembe host community noted that Shell has built houses for the people in Nembe. Some members of the community benefitted from the microfinance services, scholarship awards and some classroom teachers benefited from the SPDC educational allowances. Nembe community is host where Shell's largest oil wells are located (Tuodulo, 2009). The Nembe community annual report for 2006 revealed that the people appreciated Shell's generosity:

Shell has done well for us. They have given us so many things classrooms, judges' quarters, scholarship, micro-credit, generators and speedboats. Without Shell, none of these facilities will come to Nembe. We enjoy these things because of Shell, they are our saviours for now but it is not enough, we want Shell to do more (Tuodulo, 2009).

The 2005 Nembe community annual reports noted that the communities believed that for Shell's efforts in comparison with that of government "you will think that Shell is a saint" (Aluko, 2015, p. 179). The question now is: has Shell been pragmatic in delivering its CSR programmes and ethical in its practices? Why are the communities still questioning Shell's corporate citizenship? Is it a case of dissatisfaction in the CSR delivery process? Could the MNOCs be involved in crisis management instead of a concrete CSR? With the nature of the CSR conflict in the Niger Delta, it is possible that Shell has been involved in CSR programmes, but the delivery process may be flawed resulting in the ongoing conflict. This is an indication that there is a direct relationship between CSR and conflict.

The MNOCs have management that are responsible for the sustenance of business ethics and effective service delivery to enhance job performance in the oil and gas sector. Akuma (2013,

p.31) outlines the three levels of management that multinationals, like Shell, Chevron and others, have, to include top management level, middle management level, and lower management level and well equipped to manage the community relations' conflict in the region.

In most MNOCs, the managerial functions of planning, organising and directing or commanding are determinant factors in actualising the companies' corporate goals and work objectives. In addition, when communities make demands or agitate over poor CSR implementation, the type of management put in place would determine the nature of response to the perceived negligence, especially through the community relations officer(s). However, most times, those that represent MNOCs are in the upper-middle management level, while the top members of management who make crucial decisions that affect policy changes or implementation are always absent in such meetings

2.7 The Nigerian Government's Efforts in Resolving the Conflict

The Federal Government has devised many ways to resolve the oil conflict in the Niger Delta region. The effort started in 1961, with the creation of agencies. In recognition of the recommendations of the Henry Willink Commission's report, the government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) to address the developmental needs of the region in order to "quench" their grievances (Enemugwem, 2009 p.167). Although this effort initially brought smiles on the faces of the people of the Niger Delta, it failed to develop the region.

The collapse of the Niger Delta Development Board did not mark the end of government's effort in developing the region. In 1976, the Federal Military Government created eleven River Basin Development Authorities along that of the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA) (Fidelis and Samuel, 2011 p.280). This was followed, in 1980, with the establishment of a committee to administer 1.5% special fund meant to develop the Niger

Delta. The amount was later increased to three percent, and the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), set up in 1993, to administer the fund. This notwithstanding, the situation in the Niger Delta appears to have remained the same. As noted earlier, the OMPADEC failed in its objectives, as it could not complete many of its numerous projects. The Commission was alleged to be "a jack of all trades and master of none," thereby, lacking proper planning (Iyoha, 2006, as cited in Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010, p.121). However, the host communities contended that the Commission failed as a result of lack of proper funding on the part of the Federal Government. This belief revived the protest for resource control (Tuschl and Ejibunu, 2007, p.19).

The failure of OMPADEC paved the way for the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), another developmental commission in the region, during the former President Obasanjo administration. The agency was said to have been, formed to bring development closer to the people. The major responsibilities of the agency are to improve education and transportation, as well as to bring industrialization, electricity, housing and agriculture to the region (Gilbert, 2010, p.19). Like the previous development agencies created by the successive administrations, the "mandate" of the NDDC has not been achieved after over 13 years of its existence (Etekpe, 2011). The host communities as another failed government intervention programmes perceive this; and that has aggravated the people's anger (Tuschl and Ejibunu, 2007, p.19). It is probably for this reason that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, in 2006, emphasized the need to promote peace as the "only underpinning guarantee in developing the region" (Gilbert, 2010, p.19).

Oviasuyi and Uwadiae (2010, p.121) observe that the leaders of the region have equally frustrated government's effort, especially concerning their alleged involvement in corrupt practices and the diversion of public funds for private use. This has remained a major

challenge to the region's development despite the setting up of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in 2009 by former President Umaru Yar'Adua.

Like the previous intervention agencies, the MNDA has not embarked on any meaningful programmes and projects. For instance, it has not been able to complete the East-West Road that cuts across the region. The ministry has suffered from insufficient funding and might eventually fail like its predecessors (Aghalino, 2012, p.148). The budget allocation made available for the ministry in the 2009 financial year was a clear evidence that the government has been "using the Ministry as purveyor of development in politics" rather than in reality (Obiyan, 2009; Aghalino, 2012, p.148). This may have been responsible for the diverse feeling of the members of the communities when the ministry was created. Some thought it was a new way of developing the region as well as creating job/employment for the youths, while others felt it was only a replication of inactive developmental agencies in the Niger Delta region. We will discuss the historical antecedents of the agencies in detail below.

2.7.1 NDDB

As Dike (2009, p.393) puts it, the Niger Delta region needs a special development programme to right the long-standing wrongs done to the communities by the multinational oil corporations and the Federal Government. The Sir Henry Willink Commission was set up in 1958 (even before Nigeria's independence in 1960) to study the Niger Delta crisis and recommend solution to the problem. After the commission had submitted its report, the Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961 – the first development programme for the Niger Delta region (Please, see the 1958 Sir Henry Willink Commission report, as cited in Dike, 2009, p.393). But the government of the time could not implement the objective of the Board; the purpose of the Board was neglected.

After NDDDB the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) was created in 1976, but the region continued to boil, as it remained backward.

2.7.2 OMPADEC

After the failure of the two previous development programmes, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established in 1993 by the General Ibrahim Babangida administration. Like the two previous intervention agencies, OMPADEC also failed in its objectives because of poor funding by the government and its attempt to do too many things at a time.

2.7.3 NDDC

Although the NDDC Bill was intended to replace the OMPADEC to offer a lasting solution to the Niger Delta crisis, it was not until December 21, 2000 that it was officially inaugurated (Dike, 2009, p.376). The NDDC Act provided for generous funding from various sources to tackle the Niger Delta crisis, but the Federal Government refused or failed to meet its own obligations to the Commission. Thus, like the other development programmes before it, the NDDC has not made any meaningful contribution to the development of the Niger Delta region (Ojameruaye, 2006). According to the UNDP 2006 Niger Delta Human Development Report, “The Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflicts” (Dike, 2009, p.377). Unfortunately, because of corruption, as well as poor leadership and governance, the region remains the same until today.

2.7.4 Niger Delta Ministry

Many people thought that the end of the Obasanjo era would bring some positive changes in the Niger Delta region. Still searching for a practical solution to the socio-economic problems

of environmental degradation caused by oil spillage and gas flaring in the Niger Delta region, the Umaru Musa Yar' Adua's administration established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) in 2009 (Vanguard, October 17, 2008; Vanguard, September 13, 2008; Dike, 2009, p.396; Obuoforibo, 2011). But like in the other agencies, nothing changed because the MNDA and the Yar'Adua administration were equally confused and thus dysfunctional. The Ministry has not embarked on any meaningful projects, including rehabilitating the East-West Road that cuts across the region. The Ministry has been hamstrung by lack of funding, and, thus, could collapse like its predecessors (Aghalino, 2012, p.148).

2.7.5 The Amnesty Programme

The conflict in the Niger Delta deepened as a result of the activities of the militant groups on oil installations and expatriates. This affected the nation's economy and generated serious security challenges in the region. The Federal Government, on June 25, 2009: kick-started the peace process through the granting of amnesty to the militants ("Will Amnesty Bring Peace," 2009). This was followed by Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). In return, the repentant militants were assured of empowerment programmes that would guarantee them sustainable livelihood for human resource development. The amnesty was aimed at facilitating post-peace building through all the programmes that make up the DDR for stability of the Niger Delta. The Federal Government had a targeted population of 20,192 ex-militants (Anugwom, 2015). By May 2011, a total population of 16,336 ex-militants had graduated from the demobilization course at the Amnesty Training Camp in Obubra, Cross River State.

Zimbio (2010) claims that, of the 16,336 ex-militants that had graduated from the demobilization programme, 2,618 were slated for training outside Nigeria, 4,759 were placed in 59 skills acquisition centres in 13 states of the country, while the remaining 8,959 are still

awaiting further directives. Over 600 ex-militants were undergoing degree and vocational training courses in Ghana, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa and United States.

According to Okoko (2009), the Amnesty Programme lacked transparency in its introduction and implementation. Equally, Zimbio (2010) avers that the so-called amnesty would fail if the task of prioritizing development needs of the region is relegated to the background even if some youths or individuals are offered monetary gains.

Similarly, Akinwale (2010) contends that one of the problems with the amnesty option is the poor human development by the government, which needs adequate consideration, to prevent crisis escalation (Okinono and Badariah, 2015). Richard Moncrieff, West Africa Project Director for the International Crisis Group, in his reaction, asserted that it was a timely idea and initiative for the government to consider adopting amnesty but it required a change of strategy in terms of collaborative participation of the stakeholder (The Guardian 6/8/2009). This means that youth empowerment is a task that must not be downplayed.

2.8 Gap in the Literature

The conflict in the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta has attracted both local and international scholars. Several researches have been carried out on the issue of conflict in the region, with major focus on the activities of the multinationals in the Niger Delta. Most of the works, which were reviewed, dwelt extensively on oil politics, degradation and disempowerment of the people of the Niger Delta (Watts, 2004; Ibaba, 2004; Etekpe, 2007; Aaron & Patrick, 2008; Edeogu, 2008; Slack, 2012). However, these studies did not adequately address the problem associated with the new community-based development strategies aimed at ensuring a viable link with host communities. These studies did not sufficiently capture the interplay between CSR practices of the MNOCs and conflict management in the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta.

In other words, there is a plethora of academic research and technical reports on the investments of the MNOCs in the realm of CSR in the Niger Delta as reviewed; however, there are scanty studies on the use of concrete CSR in managing the conflicts. The available literature appears to focus on CSR as a problem in the region, thereby lacking pragmatic suggestions to policy-makers on how the implementation of environmental-friendly strategies can be used to manage the conflict (Amadi and Roger, 2015).

The investments in CSR by the MNOCs, particularly Shell, Chevron and Agip, are currently on the increase but the more the investment in CSR, the more the communities' resistance is. For instance, in the early months of 2015, Shell started a 1-billion naira health project in the deserted Oloibiri (Nwankwo, 2015). Oloibiri is the community where oil was first discovered in commercial quantity in Nigeria. The oil was discovered and mined by Shell but the oil revenue did not benefit members of the community. Shell abandoned the community when the oil wells dried up. It is believed that the attitude of Shell in Oloibiri was the foundation of its problem in Ogoni land, which did not want to share the same experience with the Oloibiri; hence, the Ogoni cries over Shell's poor CSR strategies.

Shell has returned to Oloibiri but its return to Oloibiri in a bid to carry out CSR projects is perceived by the community as crisis management (repairing relationship) rather than a concrete CSR. It is crisis management in that both the community and the environmental activists in the region have been protesting for decades over Shells neglect of the community. Consequently, the communities have lost trust in the oil companies' CSR strategies; they believe that the oil companies cannot be relied on for the development of the Niger Delta's complex terrain. Aaron (2008) contends that, notwithstanding the huge amount alleged to have been invested by oil companies in their host communities, the standard of living, extent of underdevelopment within the communities and the upsurge of conflicts suggest that the

MNOCs CSR strategies are an apparent failure. The summary of Aaron's report is that it would result to a wishful thinking to expect MNOCs to significantly develop the Niger Delta region, given that they are profit-oriented organizations, whose major objective is to make more profit.

One wonders if the oil companies in reality invest the amount they proclaim to have sunk into community development projects in their host communities. If their claim is true, then it is more worrisome and an issue of serious concern as the communities have stayed the same after various developmental investments. One would want to ask: Was the amount entrusted with wrong persons or given out at all? Was the amount too small in comparison with the apparent developmental plans? The disbursement of millions of dollars in the region and the communities still complaining suggests that the money was spent on crisis management or the MNOCs need a change of CSR strategy. The available literature has not been able to distinguish between CSR and crisis management. On the other hand, the MNOCs are international organisations with an understanding of CSR, as stated on their profile and the signed memorandum of understanding.

This study, therefore, became imperative owing to the gap existing in the reviewed literature that has examined the issue of conflict in oil-producing areas. The study focused on the gap between the host communities and the MNOCs. Furthermore, the study explored the CSR strategies employed by the multinational oil companies in managing the conflicts and the differences between MNOCs and their host communities' perception of the conflicts. The study further explored what the host communities think would have been done differently. The existing divergent perceptions on the CSR strategies of the MNOCs, their alleged failures, the drive of their efforts in CSR or the possible lack of communities' involvement from planning to the execution of CSR projects made this study imperative.

The study seeks to provide a holistic perspective of the conflict in the Niger Delta so as to create synergy between the conflict major actors (the communities, MNOCs and the government). Not much research has focused on the MNOCs organisational culture as a contributor to the conflict. A study of this nature cannot overlook the obstacles within the corporation's frontiers on the potentiality of successful CSR. According to Frynas, (2005, p. 592), MNOCs, particularly Shell's projects, are often planned and managed by office managers, engineers and other professionals with very little or no experience in the local culture, developmental strategies and community concerns.

The corporate culture within MNOCs particularly focuses around the technical skill of resolving a particular hindrance that is usually quantifiable (Frynas, 2005, p. 592). This may have accounted for the increased dissatisfaction with MNOCs' community involvement and the lack of ownership of their projects by the host communities as well as the projects' lack of sustainability. Thus, some communities see these projects as a model of "buying support" and short-term "gifts" to communities as opposed to being long-term projects (Frynas, 2005, p. 589). Obviously, oil companies' community relations strategies employed in the Niger Delta have recorded a failure. The proactive public relations strategy is said to be most strategic. This model of public relations is preventive and involves taking action ahead of time (Igben, 2008). The strategy may have failed owing to its application procedure, since the oil companies are more involved in managing crisis than preventing it. It is in the light of these that this study is justifiable, as it filled these existing gaps in previous studies, focusing on determining the CSR strategies employed in executing the community relations procedures in the Niger Delta and why the more the oil companies' involvement in CSR, the more the conflicts

2.9 Conclusion

The chapter examined the Nigerian political system and its implication in this study. It started by analysing the Nigerian vegetation and characteristics (local content), which is believed to have contributed to both the CSR strategies of the MNOCs and the Nigerian Government's ineffective implementation of environmental friendly policies. The chapter established that, MNOCs alleged negligence in the realm of CSR is traceable to its union (60/40 partnership) with the Nigerian government (Annan, 2014). In determining the causes of the Niger Delta conflict, the chapter found that environmental degradation, Nigerian Government legislations, corruption and poor leadership and governance among others are major factors accountable for the ongoing conflict. Consequent upon the problems of environmental degradation and pollution, Adeola (2001), report has demonstrated that, the ecological devastation in the Niger Delta has relieved the fishermen and farmers of their occupation. Paradoxically, the presence of the MNOCs in the Niger Delta has caused the regions farmers their means of livelihood. Thereby: increasing both poverty and unemployment in the Niger Delta. By way of quelling the conflicts, the Nigerian Government has established a number of commissions charged with the responsibility of, the region's development, which would in turn eradicate poverty. Nonetheless, these commissions are purported unsuccessful either because of lack of funding or because of corruption. The next chapter will explicate the study theoretical framework and conceptualise the concept of conflict and corporate social responsibility.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

3.1 Introduction

Any attempt to undertake an analytic study of this nature and ensure an acceptable empirical result will involve the explication of various scholars' views on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and conflict management by MNOCs. The review of literature will be conducted on two major themes, namely: the theoretical framework and conceptual clarification. The chapter begins with exploring the theoretical framework of the study.

3.2 Theoretical framework

According to Anugwom (2009, p. 37), a theory is a valid statement presented to offer a comprehensive explanation of some observable uniformity and consistency in the social and the natural world. This implies that theories are empirical statements with a connection between phenomena and variables and are premised on cause and effect. Similarly, Kerlinger (1973) defines theories as “a set of interrelated constructs, definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of examining and predicting the phenomenon” (1973, p. 8). Naturally, theories share a relationship with research for they help in specifying relationships between the variables being studied. For this reason, theories are perceived as a tool for research, particularly for social scientists. Relevant theories enable scholars to hypothesize what will happen, even before they do happen. Put differently, theories are significant in providing focus for social research as well as in managing reality. Therefore, in order to provide a focus for this study, conflict theory, frustration and aggression theory, and stakeholders' theory will be discussed.

3.2.1 Social Conflict Theory

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is regarded as the father of modern social conflict theory. Marx was a revolutionary thinker who believed in the irrepressible unanimous power of the masses in redressing their social conditions of existence. According to Ollman (1976), Marx maintained that social classes identify a particular way of relating among themselves. Marx argued that social classes arise from the relations of production, in which case, "people come to reify classes and as a result these classes come to have a life of their own that constrains the actor" (Ritzer, 1996, p. 67). Marx tended not to have explicitly seen classes from a reified perspective but as a dynamic entity, oriented toward revolution. It is difficult from Marx's ambiguous pattern of writing to understand his usage of classes in the analysis, whether they were used as a framework or as a theory. In this respect, Anugwom (2009, p. 36) averred that Marx's concept of social conflict centres on the manifestation of social classes in his capitalist regime. On the other hand, Marx's social relations of production bred two distinctive capitalist classes: 'the haves and the have nots,' that is the bourgeoisie referred to as those with access to the means of production (for example, capital), and the proletariat, those that have nothing but access to labour. Similar to this notion is the argument of Okeibunor and Anugwom (2003, p.67), who state that:

[It] is the relations of production that produce the classes; hence the relations are defined by subjection and domination or exploitation. Marx clearly emphasised that these relations are independent of those who enter them because, following industrialisation, people could only provide their daily needs in cooperation with others.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the advent of capitalism demarcated not just the era of post industrial revolution, but also placed more emphasis on the Marxian notion of dominance. This is a period when power was bestowed not on the impeccability of character but on money. This brought to the limelight the class division of the society into the “haves” and the “have nots”. The capitalist, with grave implications, therefore, sowed the seed of division in society and the exploitation of the have-nots. In his discussion of the possibility of the capitalist destruction of the capitalist class, Anugwom (2009, p. 42) observes that the proletariat (the have-nots) will, at some point, muster the required courage and consciousness to violently challenge the status quo of the bourgeoisie in the form of revolution. Such a revolution could culminate in the emergence of socialism and eventually communism, which typifies an extreme counter-narration of the capitalist system. In essence, the Marxian conflict theory argues that such a revolution is inevitable and consequential for societal transformation. Ironically, that transformation is needed to bring about the change necessary to move the society forward. This view resonates with Ottite's (2007, p. 1) argument that conflict is not always negative oriented but can be used to induce the positive transformation of a society.

According to Wallace and Wolf (2006), conflict theory was advanced as a major substitute to the functionalist method of analysing a society's general structure. Similarly, Ritzer (2003) contends that, apart from the theory's initiation in response to structural functionalism, it also has other backgrounds that include mainstream Marxist theory. Georg Simmel's (1903) views on social conflict, which identifies the ‘sociological significance’ of conflicts, stipulates that despite the dangers of conflict, it offers an opportunity for socialization in communities and can serve a positive purpose when negative actions involved are eradicated or transformed. In other words, it will be appropriate to argue that conflict theory offers an alternative to the functionalist approach of the early 1950s and 60s. However, it was displaced by the

multiplicity of neo-Marxian theories at the end of the 1960s (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004), as systems in which equilibrium is generated by way of the mutual interdependence of all the parts of society.

The proponents of the functionalist framework acknowledge the existence of conflict although they accept that society also evolves the means by which it can be controlled. By implication to this study, it means that CSR-related conflicts are a part of human existence and that they can be resolved if every stakeholder carries out his/her obligations at the right time, while carrying everybody along with them. It is towards this premise that Wallace and Wolf (2006) argue that, for conflict to be controlled; one group must be able to provisionally subjugate its rivals. The apparent difference between the functionalist approach and conflict theory is that conflict theory focuses on the struggle for the balance of power between the capitalist and the proletariat, whereas the functionalist approach focuses on the establishment of equilibrium through mutual coexistence.

George Lukacs (1968, p. 46) explains Marx's conflict theory through the following propositions:

- Humans are naturally or fundamentally self-oriented and therefore inclined to pursue personal interests and are divergent at the expense of others;
- Humans and societies exist in a state of perpetual scarcity for most resources needed for the survival of themselves and that of their members;
- Humans are continually involved in an inherent confrontation within society as a germane condition for social change;
- Everyday life produces conflict as people with divergent interest relate with one another in pursuance of the capitalist resources and life opportunities;

- Conflict settles itself as people fight and negotiate for peaceful coexistence;
- Conflict experience helps in moulding individuals to maturity, helps groups move forward and creates an avenue for societal growth;
- Everyday life enriches conflict theory and deepens its analysis of groupings, social hierarchies and societal structuring;
- Societies consist of intrinsic unequal characteristics; the consequence of these inequalities is the involuntary social organization of society into classes: the haves and the have-nots, the desirous and the satisfied, minorities and majorities, the rich and the poor, and males and females.

The propositions of conflict theory suggest that a social structure is susceptible to constant erosion and change. What this means is that social change is pervasive as a result of the fundamental nature of conflicts built into society itself. As a result, conflict is inevitable between individuals and groups. Similarly, the inherent nature of conflict makes it possible that people must, at some point, disagree with one another. The differential distribution of social power appears to be a contributing factor to the inevitability of conflicts in societies, as people, especially the rich and the poor, struggle to acquire a larger share of the scarce resources selfishly.

The connection between the Marxist's views of inevitability of social conflict in this research cannot be undermined. The Marxist perspective of conflict has been particularly applied to multinational organizations, which is the focus of this research. The Gramscian Marxist and the traditional Marxist have two distinct notions of hegemony. While Gramscian Marxists assert that hegemony is in relation to consent to political and socio-political leadership, the traditional Marxists relate hegemony with economic dominance (Simon, 1982). According to

Pease (2003, p. 79), the answer is by way of aligning the values of the haves (bourgeoisie) with that of the proletariat (the have nots) class without subduing any of the classes. This necessarily encompasses the development of a rational set of values and principles that transcends both classes.

From the foregoing, one can infer that, on the one hand, Marx's social conflict theory is pivotal to this study given that MNOCs are agents of exploitation, domination and underdevelopment, especially in the area of sustainable development goals that affect the people. The latter is based on of Peace's (2003, p. 80) argument that MNOCs hunt for states with lax economic, political and environmental legislations and cheap labour under the guise of drives for market efficiency because laws are mainly not effectively implemented. This is why some of them locate in areas where labour is not organized into trade unions. Obviously the MNOCs in the Niger Delta are taking advantage of the irregularities of the Nigerian state's implementation of its environmental legislations to increase their profit. On the other hand, it can be argued that, with regards to natural resource industry, MNOCs locate their businesses where the resource exists.

The social conflict theory has facilitated the identification of sources of conflict and its ineluctability in society as a result of man's inherent inequality, thereby leading to class struggles. Indeed, it is applicable to the Niger Delta region. However, the theory does not provide for the dimensions of conflicts, specifically between communities and oil companies, and how local people could present their grievances when frustrated. Logically, after a long period of frustration, it is in human nature to become aggressive, but conflict theory fails to address this essential teleological part of conflict hence the inclusion of the frustration and aggression theory.

3.2.2 Frustration and Aggression Theory

The Frustration and aggression theory, as propounded by Dollard and his colleagues in a published monograph, explains the causes of conflict and why people exhibit aggressive behaviour (Green 1972; Zillmann, 1979, p. 1-37). The issue of aggression has attracted the attention of scholars in recent times, especially on the role it plays in generating and escalating conflicts. The theory posits that aggression is generally traceable to frustration usually caused by people's actions tend to be hinged on accumulated anger targeted at an individual or groups with the aim of inflicting pains on them (Dill and Anderson, 1995, p. 360). The model outlined by Berkowitz (1989) highlights the danger associated with justifying aggressive behaviour. This is comparable to the situation in the Niger Delta, where most people have justified youth restiveness with economic and environmental injustice to the extent that more social movements were formed with increased agitation. The revised frustration aggression (F-A) hypothesis maintains that:

- (a) Frustration instigates behaviour that may or may not be hostile or aggressive.
- (b) Any hostile or aggressive behaviour that occurs is caused by frustration (Miller, 1941; Dill and Anderson, 1995, p. 63).

In other words, aggressive behaviour is occasioned by frustration (Zillmann, 1979, p. 4) In spite of the seeming relevance of the frustration and aggression theory to the conflict in the Niger Delta, the hypothesis could not identify the rationale that informed the surplus accumulation of the multinationals to the perceived detriment of the host communities. Although it is not out of place that the skewed imbalance against the local community people could result in frustration and aggression, the theory could not explain the interplay between the activities of multinationals and the oil-bearing communities. The theory only identifies what could lead people to conflict, which is frustration, but this is not adequate in dealing

with the issue of conflict, especially in oil-bearing communities. Hence, the theory is not completely appropriate in explaining the conflictual social relations of production among the state, multinationals and the local communities. Therefore, the concept of the stakeholder's theory will be discussed next, as it is considered best suitable for this research since it covers the lapses of the conflict theory and the frustration and aggression theory.

3.2.3 Stakeholders Theory

In Freeman's view (1984, p.46), a stakeholder is "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives". Freeman (2004, p. 42) expanded on this definition of stakeholders by positing that stakeholders involve: "those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation...or individuals who can be affected or is affected by corporation's existence". Regarding the implication of stakeholders on the survival of business corporations in a community, Hatch (2013, p. 82) rightly argues that: "organizations that attend to the demands of all stakeholders will outperform organizations that ignore some of their stakeholders while privileging others". The high level of responsibility of a business organization in their environmental activities is necessary to a better understanding and to more effective management in turbulent times. This is a prototype of the dynamic characteristic of a corporation's environment in recent times (Freeman, 1984, p. 1). Hence, the stakeholder's theory has made provision for various ways of addressing the diverse demands of different individuals and groups that possess a legitimate stake in an organization. One of which is the concrete implementation of CSR.

The economic theory generally proposes two schools of thought regarding CSR. These are the shareholder's model and the stakeholder's model (Wisdom, 2012, p. 60). According to Wisdom, with the shareholders model, the only responsibility an organization has is profit

maximization for its owners, whereas the stakeholder's model focuses on the ability of a business to satisfy its stakeholders. In other words, organizations are expected to be corporate citizens (p. 63). In their purest forms, the two schools appear irreconcilable.

Capitalism, the foundation of the modern firm, implies that companies are set up with the 'sole' responsibility of making profits and maximizing those profits for their owners, the shareholders. This extreme view makes it clear that companies must be accountable to their owners. Anything that reduces opportunities to maximize profits can be considered as poor stewardship on the part of company management. Cynical views of this extreme school note that companies engaging in CSR programmes do so that they may appear good in the eyes of communities (thereby enhancing their corporate images) with the ultimate aim of enhancing sales through appearing to care for communities.

Related to this view is the thinking that governments collect taxes from both individuals and companies and hence are better placed to cater for community needs, such as schools, roads, electricity, hospitals and medicines. Accordingly, it is the duty of governments to provide these amenities; any CSR expenditure by firms is a form of 'double taxation'. Companies should, therefore, obey the laws and pay taxes (and that should be all), while governments must use these taxes from company profits to improve the lives of communities and taxpayers.

The stakeholder's theory of CSR is a concept employed in determining whom the organizations should be responsible to. A firm constitutes a sequence of links of stakeholders. Moir (2001, p. 8) has categorized stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders. The primary stakeholder refers to employees, customers and supplier, as well as investors, who are the main initiators and have the capacity to sustain corporate goals. The public stakeholders are the governments and communities that provide infrastructures and

legislations, which the business organizations adhere to. This sometimes involves the payment of taxes (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106). The secondary category is made up of those who are affected by business activities within the environment. This group does not form part of the day-to-day running of the business (Moir, 2001, p. 9).

According to Treviño and Weaver (1999), cited in Moir (2001, p. 9), the debate about the stakeholder's theory centres on whether it is a coherent set of theories or solitary set of theories. Hence, theories have to be coherent if they are to be accepted. Whilst solitary theories are perceived to be a self-set of theories and might not be a body of knowledge, coherent theories are consistent and are acceptable theories of truth. It is obvious that the stakeholder's theory is a coherent and acceptable theory. This is because, currently, there are various laws governing the existence of businesses in society and some corporations have received hostile behaviours and even been forced out of their operational locations by their primary stakeholders (Ako, Obokoh and Okonmah, 2009).

Furthermore, researchers have found that the stakeholder's theory is normative and is based on ethical and not empirical proposals but has, however, remained an area of debate in most of the CSR literature (Moir, 2001, p. 10). Proponents of the concept of CSR persuade businesses to be sensitive to the host communities' environmental needs. However, it appears difficult to satisfy all stakeholders. The stakeholders' analysis appears not to provide for the set of stakeholders to pay most attention to whether it is the primary or secondary stakeholders as they have been categorized, even though studies have shown that the satisfaction of both classes is crucial.

The stakeholder's view of CSR recognizes that companies do not operate in isolation. They operate in societies as corporate citizens, and must, therefore, be sensitive to the needs and wants of communities in which they operate. Freeman (2004, p. 10) established a positive

link between what is considered good corporate citizenship and profitability. Therefore, CSR in this sense is considered a good investment, as it promotes goodwill towards companies, their products and operations; while the stakeholders enjoy satisfaction from the organization's activities within their environment.

An extensive study of the positive view of researchers on the subject of corporate CSR makes it a necessity for oil companies that operate in various oil-producing communities to be good corporate citizens. In the Niger Delta, for example, CSR is a strategy that enables the oil companies to co-habit peacefully with the host communities; hence, irresponsible behaviour within the environment by the business organizations might be detrimental to their co-existence with host communities. In addition, CSR is a model that prompts business organizations to seek the interest of its physical environment.

There are various oil companies currently operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria – Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Agip, among others. The public relations departments of these multinational oil companies' claim to have done well in being socially responsible however, host communities do not trust their corporate citizenship and this might be the reason for the continuous conflict in the region (Alabi and Ntukekpo, 2012, p. 366). The understanding is that the companies are rather more involved in crisis management than CSR, which shows that there might be a gap in the companies' understanding of the concept of CSR. This is an expectation gap that could be considered as another cause of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The companies wait for CSR issues to arise. Thereafter, they manage the situation. Conversely, in the concept of CSR, this should be in the companies' operational ethics as part of on-going projects. Furthermore, most of the companies appear to have documented their ethics to include CSR but, in reality, they do not practise it. Shell, for example, has documented oil mining best practices, such as protecting the life and

environment where they carry out their operations. However, the current UNEP (2011, p. 10) report on Ogoniland asserts that Shell's oil-mining activities in Ogoniland have resulted in the severe contamination of the land and implicated in deaths of the members of the host communities. The report adds that Shell has not been able to maintain its internal oil-mining standards in Ogoniland and recommends a prompt cleaning action, which the company is yet to carry out.

On the contrary, Tuodulo (2009, p. 535) has argued that the oil companies, particularly Shell, have largely contributed to the development of the Nigerian economy and that of the local Niger Delta host communities. This is evident in Shell's participation in community development activities, such as educational programmes. Shell has awarded a good number of the Niger Delta residents, scholarships from primary level to university level. Others have benefited from Shell's skills development programmes, like craftsmanship, mechanics and tailoring. Shell has also been applauded for its provision of basic amenities within the local communities, such as the construction of water pipelines and good roads, the presentation of farming equipment to farmers and training them in its usage, and the provision of electricity within oil-producing communities (Tuodulo, 2009, p. 535).

The stakeholder's theory has been applied to a number of studies. Prominent among them includes Ullmans' (1985) research that focused on CSR. By implication, CSR is one area of study in which the stakeholder's theory is highly applicable (Roberts, 1992; Clarkson, 1995; Davenport, 2000). Given that CSR is the social attribute of the corporate entities, the major technique business institutions are expected to communicate with the people in areas of operation is to establish a rapport through the demonstration of concerns about the environmental and social needs of the people (Idowu, 2014, p.21; Ansah, 2015). It is capable of solving and reducing significant social nuisance, particularly those they have directly or

indirectly created. Following the argument of Eljido-Ten (2007), CSR generally encompasses, although it is not limited to, such variables as the businesses' "community involvement, acknowledgement of concern for employees, energy conservation, making products safer, pollution abatement and other environmentally related issues".

Furthermore, in a bid to apply the stakeholders theory, Ullmann identifies economic performance, the power of stakeholders influence and strategic posture are part of the main framework for discussing corporate practices (Ullmann, 1985). This is especially the case within their operational environments. Eljido-Ten (2007) applied Ullmann's framework to the 2002 ranking of 100 top companies' environmental performance by the Australian Conservation Foundation. The study notes that there is a positive relationship between CSR and a firm's financial performance. This accounted for the reason why most countries participated in the Earth Summit hosted by Rio de Janeiro (1992), which succeeded in enlightening global citizens on the relevance of sustainable development goals. Additionally, it also involved environmental issues as well as identified areas in which governments can intercede between businesses and their host ecosystem (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Apparently, the prelude to that summit was based on policies such as the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989, in Australia as well as the Clean Air Act of 1977, in the United States. The considerations for enacting these regulations must have been focused on the heightened environmental problems in the last couple of decades.

Following the success of the stakeholders theory and its application in studies such as the one analysed above, the stakeholders' theory is most suitable for this study, hence its adoption. The decision to adopt the stakeholders' theory was based on its administrative nature. The theory triggers MNOs to action by making them aware of a number of members of stakeholders that they ought to be responsible to. In the context of this study, the theory

enables MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta to become conscious of the evidence that there are numerous groups and persons that are directly or indirectly affected by their activities. Prominent among the people affected by the negative activities of the MNOCs are the Niger Delta host communities. The obvious reason being the physical closeness of the local people to the location of the oil companies, apparently they share an environmental space. According to Obi (2001), Watts (2004), Ojekarotu (2009), Obiyan (2009) Aghalino (2012 p.148), there is yet to exist a cordial relationship between the host communities and the oil companies in the region. However, this study attempted to discover to what extent the MNOCs have been corporately irresponsible as against the communities' perceptions of CSR, using the stakeholder theory.

3.3 Conceptual Clarification

3.3.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The business of social responsibility has gained attention in recent years, especially since the 1990s thereby demonstrating a nexus between businesses and society (Idemudia, 2007, p. 5). At the heart of every CSR programme is the need to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the community where the business is located (Ansah, 2015, p.4). Obi (2015a) asserts that CSR is effective when corporate behaviour is aligned to the needs and expectations of not only the organizations, but also the communities where the company is situated. By implication, the social and environmental welfare of the people must be considered as a responsibility of the company, even while making a profit (Obi, 2015b). The foregoing means that the companies are obliged to plan towards enhancing the human and environmental conditions of the communities where they carry out their businesses as friends of the people and not their foes. Such obligations are identified by Jones et al. (1998) as protection, improvement and consideration of the welfare of all the stakeholders in the communities.

There are different views on CSR. One of which is the classical perspective, which focuses on the economic benefits of business. Another one is the stakeholder view, which, in line with the stakeholder theory, states that corporations must live up to the expectations of being socially responsible to the people and the entire environment (Clarke, 1998; Lantos, 2001). In line with the “constrained profit-making view,” Manuel Castelo Branco, Lucia Lima Rodrigues (2007) averred that the profit making goal of companies overshadows some of their basic obligations owing to the fact that the ethics of business does not receive the desired attention, as earlier noted by Carr (1968). Also, Friedman (1998) maintains that the high level of honesty in their dealings with the people would enhance corporate image while generating and maximizing profit.

3.3.2 Spectrum of Viewpoints on the Role of Business in Society

View	The position of a Business' Role in Society
Classical	<p>The pure profit-making view; business has lower standards of ethics than society and no social responsibility other than obedience to the law.</p> <p>The constrained profit-making view: business should maximize shareholder wealth, obey the law, and be ethical</p>
Stakeholder view	<p>Business should be sensitive to potential harms of its actions on various stakeholder groups.</p> <p>Social activism: business must use its vast resources for social good.</p>

Source: Lantos (2001), cited in Manuel Castelo Branco et al., 2007

The stakeholder view emphasizes that corporations must prioritize the needs of people while implementing their corporate goals. It holds that “the goal of any company is or should be the

flourishing of the company and all its principal stakeholders” (Werhane and Freeman, 1999, cited in Manuel Castelo Branco et al., 2007, p. 1). Stakeholders include creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the communities at large.

3.3.3 The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility

Although the concept of CSR which refers to ‘the practice of a company taking responsibility for its corporate actions and any detrimental effects they may have’ (Thenasseril, June 6, 2014, p.1), has its origin from the 1930s, the modern perception of its meaning is taken from the 1950s (Carroll, 1999). As noted, from its foundation, the CSR emphasis on the role of businesses in a society (Sokolsky, 1937). Notwithstanding the early attempts to identify the definite role of businesses, Berete (2011) has argued that academic literatures lack a universal definition of the concept.

However, CSR has been linked to the decisions and actions of corporations that are interwoven with the goals and values of a society in which it operates (Okoye, 2009). Lindgreen and Swaen (2004) seem to perceive CRS as an unconditional necessity that organizations efficiently mainstream their societal responsibilities or roles with a focus on global ‘ethical and legal practices’ to the benefit of host communities/environment as their venture grows. CSR aims to enhance positive community relations and prevent community resistance, secure public acceptance and establish closer identity with host communities (Ogelenya and Ogelenya, 2009, p. 30). Positive social and community relations are crucial for organizations, because no company can comfortably operate in an environment of chaos. Thus, CSR is a form of community relations’ strategy that is used to address issues of corporate citizenship as well as to identify with communities in which an organisation performs its business and makes huge profits (Ogelenya and Ogelenya, 2009). In essence, CSR offers an opportunity for image making or re-branding, through well-coordinated CSR

projects. With this, companies earn trust, friendship and positive response to their activities from the host communities.

Frynas (2005) is of the view that a corporations' CSR involves the protection of stakeholders' interests, setting the rules of engagement that would curtail any form of abuse or economic injustice. Good examples of participation of Multi-national Oil Corporations (MNOCs) in community development programs that have global impact include the "United Nations' Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Sullivan Principle, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and the World Summits on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg" (Tudulo, 2009, p. 531). Put differently, they exemplify businesses that operate to meet set global standards.

As mentioned earlier, the concept of CSR has been viewed differently from various organisations and cultures. For instance, Lord Holme and Richard Watts have defined CSR as:

[T]he systematic obligation by business to perform ethically and add to economic and social development while recuperating the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large"(Baker, 2004, p. 1).

Social responsibility is, therefore, "a situation where firms, corporations and government establishments are committed to socially desirable interests, projects and the welfare of those within the areas they operate. It is perceived as a 'self-imposed' obligation in recognition of numerous services rendered to it, by such groups, as local communities, employers, governments, creditors, management, churches and others" (Akuma, 2013, p.309).

In addition, the issue of corporate reputation is valuable not only to companies but is also taken seriously by stakeholders who take note of CSR practices, design, implementation and beneficiaries (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010, p.4). While Fombrum (1996) has posited that: “the crucial principles which add value to the reputation of companies are credibility, responsibility to stakeholders, and reliability,” among others. Kapferer (1997) has maintained that a company’s behaviour that is observed by the public could ‘make or break’ its reputation (Daferighe and Adedeji, 2010, p.5). This is a pointer that a company’s corporate reputation is as critical as its corporate goals and profit maximisation.³ The social responsibility of business refers to: “a situation where business institutions function as social institutions through which the entire society fulfils its social and economic objectives, and ‘owe[s] certain moral duties and obligations to the society where they operate” (Akanwa and Agu, 2005, p.93).

Other definitions of CSR refer to the sequence of beneficial corporate partnerships between businesses and the environments in which they operate; there by providing a situation in which business organisation can gain a good reputation from all stakeholders (Ekeocha, 2001, p. 46). This implies that there is a direct relationship between the organisations and the communities where they are located. In the view of Onabanjo (2005), CSR is:

[C]oncerned solely with how to create an enabling environment in the host community so that the company can carry out its activities without any hindrance, but rather with the assistance and support of host inhabitants. Community Relations is a problem solving process

³Any company that does not give priority to ‘corporate reputation’ is as good as sitting on ‘gun powder’ or planting the seeds of hostility against its operations/economic interests. It would therefore become difficult for the company to mobilize local support or win cooperation of host communities especially youth associations.

and this involves strategic analysis of the problem, planning, taking action, and evaluating programme effectiveness, inadequacies, or outright failures” (Onabanjo, 2005, p. 44).

In other words, CSR involves a process of successful strategic planning of establishing good relationship in community, which further allows for determining the irresponsible activities of the oil companies that require subsequent corrective measures. Similarly, for Bahl (1994, p. 109) CSR is of the view that ‘Community Relations is an organization's well thought [out policy], designed to protect the business and community environment. This calls for businesses to regularly evaluate their impact on their operations or actions in society. However, businesses are only able to impact fully in a society in terms of CSR if it is profitable and efficient. Some scholars such as Wood (1991) and Cannon (1992) believe that the essence of CSR is the nexus between business and society. This is apt, because every business is located in a community where people live or interrelate. It has been noted that when businesses go beyond industrial impact assessment and consider community based impact assessment a lot more could be achieved in the area of CSR.

Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of CSR in exploring the stakeholders and corporate relationships, the necessity of the concept is still contested. It is on this premise that Windsor (2006) described CSR as an embryonic contested concept. One of the reasons put forth is that “advocates of the concept are not in consensus on functionality or implementation of CSR and at the same time have different views on the essence of businesses in every society” (Idemudia and Ite, 2006b). This is similar to the neo-classical view of CSR, which holds “that corporations should mainly be committed to the paying of taxes and creating employment or empowerment opportunities” (Moir, 2001, p. 2). In other

words, the only responsibilities that businesses ought to undertake are that of profit maximisation for its shareholders. This is well captured in Friedman (1962, p. 133) where it is posited that few tendencies would challenge the very principles of a free society hence, businesses acceptance of CSR will undermine its aim of making as much money as they can for their shareholders. It is towards this direction that most businesses view CSR concept as a waste of time (Frynas, 2005, p. 582).⁴

Conversely, advocates of the stakeholders' theory hold the CSR commitment of the MNOs in a high esteem. Governments and policy makers also view CSR programs of businesses as lawful by enshrining the ethical rules governing business activities in their constitutions. It is pertinent to note that even the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (Carroll, 1996) perceive CSR as a worthwhile undertaking. That is why the council has defined CSR as the ethical behaviour of corporations in society, where the management maintains a responsible relationship with all stakeholders. In this view of CSR, businesses are required to contribute to the development of Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) as well as to improve on their quality of life (Carroll, 1996; Business Impact, 2000; Steiner and Steiner, 2000).

For the purpose of this study, the CSR concept is viewed from the perspective of multinational businesses adopting environment friendly activities alongside genuine CSR projects that would add value and bring development to the host communities. However it should be emphasised that while host communities are adopting strategies on ways of protecting their image and environment, MNOs should also work to boost their corporate image through public relations units saddled with the responsibility of giving updates on CSR related projects.

⁴ Viewing CSR as 'a waste of time' gives company's bad image instead of enhancing their 'positive corporate reputation'.

Furthermore, the changing socio-economic development across the globe calls for a pragmatic approach to the issue of harmonious relationships amongst stakeholders in a business environment. “Three important international institutions have underlined the need for governments and companies to adhere to the principles of CSR. These are the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBGSD), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes (DJSGI)” OECD, 1990, p. 540). While explaining the roles of companies as part of CSR, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development notes that CSR is a vital link: “to the long-term prosperity of companies as it provides the opportunity to demonstrate the human face of business,” and underscores: “the value of creating practical partnerships and dialogue between business, government, and organizations” (OECD, 1990, p. 547).

WBCSD has acknowledged the following “core values” as fundamental to CSR: human rights, employee rights, environmental protection, community development, supplier relations, monitoring and stakeholders’ rights (OECD, 1997, p. 93).

As noted by Nature (2001), the rights of employees and stakeholders are critical issues in determining the level of responsibility of companies as far as the protection of environment and community development are concerned. They can also influence the relationship between the people and the corporations. Apparently, the role of the community as a major player in the social relations of production could not be ignored. Its status ought to be respected as a stakeholder in the project. Thus, the company, which is a “tenant” in this context, should establish a base for close partnership and discussions with the host communities, and ensure community-based development initiatives for developing cordial relationships with the people.

Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “has also been engaged in developing the concept of CSR. For instance: the OECD, at its Ministerial Meeting on June 27 2000 approved a set of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (OECD, 2000, p. 10). The guidelines included a set of “voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws” (p. 10), and the OECD stressed the need for both governments and companies to demonstrate their corporate responsibility by pursuing sound environmental and society-based policies. The guidelines were developed “to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate...and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational enterprises” (OECD, 2000, p. 12). They confront multinational businesses to implement environmental best practice that would promote sustainable development that would ensure coherence between social, economic and environmental objectives.

The General Policies of the Guidelines advise enterprises to:

- contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable development;
- respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments;
- encourage local capacity building through close co-operation with the local community, including business interests, as well as developing the enterprise’s activities in domestic and foreign markets, consistent with the need for sound commercial practice;
- encourage human capital formation, in particular by creating employment opportunities and facilitating training opportunities for employees;

- refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to environmental, health, safety, labour, taxation, financial incentives, or other issues;
- support and uphold good corporate governance principles and develop and apply good corporate governance practices;
- develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management systems that foster a relationship of confidence and mutual trust between enterprises and the societies in which they operate;
- promote employee awareness of, and compliance with, company policies through appropriate dissemination of these policies, including through training programmes;
- refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against employees who make bona fide reports to management or, as appropriate, to the competent public authorities, on practices that contravene the law, the Guidelines or the enterprise's policies;
- encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines;
- abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities (OECD, 2000, p. 13-15).

Although the OECD strategies are focused at multinational businesses, they also apply to domestic corporations. The need for the government and companies to incorporate the three major sustainable development strategies thus; economic, environmental and social best practices in their decision-making processes are critical in achieving a concrete CSR within a given environment. Most countries and companies seem to ignore or pay little attention to the social component of sustainable development (OECD, 1998, p. 40). This was apparent in a recent OECD study, in which member states were advised to formulate and adopt a more robust and balanced approach to sustainable development that would emphasize the three

outlined dimensions (OECD, 1998). The economic, social and environmental justices, if applied by the MNOCs in developing countries such as Nigeria could curb the anger of the host communities with respect to the cumulative brunt of oil production. In this study, environmental justice implies an objective treatment and involvement of the local communities in CSR process and implementation with the Government's enforcement of environmental policies (Ako, 2015).

3.3.5 The Concept of Conflict

The World Health Organization (WHO) has described conflict as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, leading to injury, death, physical harm or deprivation" (WHO, 2002, p.5). Prior to the existence of any conflict (violent and non-violent conflict) there are usually indicators or catastrophic signals exhibited by the factional leaders in the conflict. These signals include unpleasant utterances, unfriendly attitudes and non-compromising posture, which would normally be noticed among the persons in a conflict (Akpuru-Aja, 2009). When these warnings are ignored in their early stages, they would normally metamorphose into violent conflict and genocides (Akpuru-Aja, 2009).

Lewis Coser (1956) notes that the availability of resources, which individuals assume are scarce, puts them in opposition to one another in order to possess the resources they need, or attain a certain level of power at the expense of a rival group. This means that conflict creates room for unhealthy competition or intra-group/inter-group rivalry that often culminates in clannishness and other forms of divisive strategies aimed at downplaying the success of other groups. There is hardly any conflict scenario where belligerent parties are not concerned with better ways of winning or making the other party give up on assumed incompatible goals.

Conflict is an integral part of a modern society, and a necessity for social survival. What this means is that conflict does not always have a negative implication, although conflict can have both functional and dysfunctional connotations. In the view of Folarin (1998), there is a general consensus amongst intellectuals that there is hardly any development in the world without some elements of conflict. Developments are modernisation (changes) of existing infrastructures and cultures, which could be resisted. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1987), the tranquil state of nature was corrupted by human desire and greed. This implies that human selfish-interest and greed is tantamount to conflict. Additionally, Otite (2001) aver that conflict arises when persons or groups in a particular environment pursue divergent desires, interests, goals and aspirations. The occurrence of a change in the social environment, such as the discovery of new resources normally raises a fertile ground for conflict. The occurrence of conflict in any society makes it crucial for stakeholders to take conflict management as a necessary project. Through conflict management, stakeholders take steps towards enforcing a mechanism and strategic responses aimed at achieving goals of conflict resolution as an integral part of the agenda of peaceful coexistence. Such an initiative could involve confidence building and conflict-sensitive programmes at various levels.

Conflicts manifest themselves in various ways all over the world. While some groups struggle over resources, others struggle for power and other economic benefits either for self-actualisation or to meet their desire for basic human needs. Some conflicts are also occasioned by an endless drama of political domination and economic oppression, especially those involving majority and minority ethnic nationalities. There is conflict when two or more people/groups clash over issues. One thing that should be noted here is that the perception of parties to any conflict has the potential of escalating or de-escalating conflicts.

One feature of conflict is that it is seen as an inevitable aspect of human relationships in societies operating with social, economic and ideological differences. Globally, the origins

and nature of conflict are best described or explained within the framework of human nature and a human environment (Albert et al., 1995, p.2); even in organisations, conflict is not avoidable (Okojie, 1999; Okojie, 2000, p.177). In fact, it is described as a natural experience by the human relations school of thought. There is that natural tendency in every human to feel threatened by activities, actions and decisions of others, especially when differing perceptions exist. The world would not have experienced such turbulence in recent times if not for human brutish nature.

The positive aspect is that humans have the capacity to engage belligerent parties in peace-making, peace-building, conflict prevention, conflict management and long-term programmes that sustain peaceful coexistence in the world. This means that proper and timely communication; third-party intervention and effective mediation and negotiation are all effective conflict-management initiatives. A factor that makes some intra-state or inter-group conflicts remain intractable despite the need for peace is communication breakdown. Edgar Schein (1980, p. 127-176) observes that, when there is conflict between competing groups, hostility increases while communication decreases; each group perceives other groups as the enemy and not as a neutral group. According to the early scholars in the field of conflict and conflict resolution, there are a number of schemes and sources of conflicts. Generally, the major sources of conflict include economic, value, ineffective communication and power conflict (Mack & Snyder, 1958; Daniel Katz, 1965; Fink, 1968) as elaborated below.

Economic conflict: This type of conflict arises when individuals or groups compete over resources. The aim of conflict in this case is directed towards the "slicing of the national cake". Each conflict actor's aim here is to gain or even control economic resources.

Value conflict: In this case, conflict occurs over incompatibility in culture (the inclinations, main beliefs, customs and traditions that people that make up a particular society believe in)

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country where most activities, which should have been secularised, are dominated by ethnic and religious inclinations. The divergence in both ethnic and religious beliefs has always generated conflicts.

Ineffective communication: Another major source of conflict is miscommunication and misunderstanding. The inability of parties to communicate effectively often creates confusion and anger which would have been resolved amicably had the parties involved communicated the facts of the contended argument. Groups or individuals may have diverse perceptions regarding the actual fact of a specific situation, which could trigger animosities until the information is tactfully and skilfully clarified. A typical example of a consequential conflict as a result of ineffective communication is the killing of the Ogoni four (high-class chiefs) on 21 May 1999 by some infuriated youths who claimed that the chiefs had some form of communication with the management of the MNOCs, to the disadvantage of other members of the host community. This unconfirmed information generated a succession of militias and human rights violations that culminated in the execution of the “Ogoni nine” (Ken Sarawiva’s compatriots as explained in chapter one).

Power conflict: In this context, conflict arises from an individual’s or a group’s determination to maintain and maximize the level of influence possessed in the associations and particularly the social settings concerned. Paradoxically, in this regard, Fisher (2000, p.2) argues that one party is usually stronger than the other, especially with reference to direct exert influence over a weaker party. Accordingly, in the power tussle, the stronger party, this usually ends up victorious, defeats the weaker group. This is one source of conflict that is evident in all sources of conflict; all conflict actors directly or indirectly attempt to control each other.

3.3.6 Types of Conflict

There are different types and levels of conflict. However, Okojie (2000, p.172) views types of conflicts as hierarchies of conflict with a varying pattern of management, which could be inter and intra community, intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-disciplinary, intra-organizational, inter-organizational and even international. Conflicts assume an international dimension when they are between two or more nations or affect foreign nationals.

Inter and Intra Community Conflict

Inter-community conflict- is a type of conflict between host communities in the region, for instance the conflict between the Ogonies and Okirika communities. Inter-ethnic disputes, involves confrontation between two or more ethnic nationalities within any given region or state, which is caused by the lack of cordiality or geniality, distrust and terror. These types of conflicts would normally end up or climax in violent confrontation (Salawu, 2010, p. 346).⁵ On the other hand, intra-community conflict is a type of conflict that exist between groups within a community, such as one that occurs within social/militant groups in the community; and that could be among the elders, youths or the women.

Intra-personal Conflict

Intrapersonal conflict occurs when an individual no longer feels at peace with himself. Such a person is said to lose his comfort and peace, thereby making it almost impossible for him to be happy. Whatever issue is the source of such problem, his happiness sometimes depends on his ability to communicate to other people on the matter or possibly sort it out by himself (Omokhoa, 2015).

⁵ Mutual suspicion characterizes every intergroup or ethno-religious conflict especially in terms of relationship. This leads to loss of confidence in all the ability of groups to protect neighbors' interests and sustain economic, cultural and political relations.

Inter-personal Conflict

Interpersonal conflict involves two or more individuals who may have an incompatible goal or have a disagreement over an issue. This type of conflict usually has a source which may include: gossip, unsettled debt, feeding allowance, the failure of one person to return what he collected from the other, poor communication of ideas, a struggle for power at places of work or in political offices, and actions that portray hatred against the other. Managing such a conflict demands high-level tact from both parties who may decide to involve a third party in the resolution process. In fact, third-party intervention may manifest itself in the form of inviting both parties to the negotiation table either by an elder or by parents. When interpersonal conflict is not given the required response, it may escalate to intergroup conflict, involving the groups that support each of the individuals involved.

Intra-organisational Conflict

Intra-organizational conflict implies a disagreement between workers in a given institution or organisation. The sources of this type of conflict are numerous, such as matters of promotion; especially when there are grievances in some quarters within the organization; salary increases, which could lead to strike action and mass protests; the delivery of redundancy notices to some members of staff; and the failure of some workers to adhere strictly to official rules or keep confidential documents in order.

Inter-organisational Conflict

Inter-organisational conflict involves two or more organizations. This type of conflict assumes inter-organisational status when the management of two or more organizations are involved in any disagreement. It is possible for them to struggle for the control over a particular environment or sales.

International Conflict

International conflict involves two or more countries. This type of conflict requires high-powered diplomacy from both sides to be managed effectively. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has assumed an international dimension as a result of divergent interests from both sides. According to the Human Security Report (2013), armed conflicts are classified into state-based armed conflicts, international conflicts and civil wars, in which at least one of the warring parties is the government of a state (p. 12).

The major causes of international conflict include border disputes, historical animosities, economic disputes, differences in political systems, arms races and the influence of major powers (Grabendorff, 1982, p.269). It is during international armed conflicts that security forces exhibit some bizarre acts that relate to weariness, the fear of bombardment, and also the mistreatment of prisoners in a prisoner of war camp (Prestwich, 2003, p.250). An example of international conflict is presented in the 2011 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) list of 37 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths, indicating that international armed conflict heightens humanitarian crises and political consequences and instability (Themner and Wallenstee, 2012). This problem escalates when the nations involved fail to manage the situation well. Examples of international conflicts are: the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the conflict in Liberia, the conflict in Sierra Leone and, recently, the conflict in Mali, where the Economic Community of West African States had to intervene through its ECOMOG troops. The failure of states to reach an agreement on ceasefire or adopt a diplomatic approach has the capacity of making them violate human rights.

3.3.7 Conflict Resolution Strategies

There are different strategies adopted to resolve conflicts. While some people adopt a non-adversarial approach, others adopt confrontational strategies or even the total avoidance of the conflict. This section will discuss alternative dispute resolution, confrontation and arbitration as conflict resolution strategies that are adoptable in the Niger Delta.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

Miller (2005) argues that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) aims to address conflicts in such a way that the outcome would be mutually acceptable to the parties involved. ADR does not involve litigation (which lasts longer and seems to be a more complex method of conflict resolution). The nonviolent approaches or ADR approaches have been discussed by Hadi (2010) to include negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration. Ojiji (2006) adds that the joint-problem solving approach, which involves constructive listening by both parties in a conflict, so as to comprehend the elements in the conflict with the aim of addressing them. Ojiji (2006, p.125) asserts, that it takes two parties that are willing to actualize a win-win outcome for the joint problem solving approach to be successful. In addition, Albert (2010, 113) gives an example of joint-problem solving, with the argument that the best way to deal with the herdsmen and farmers conflict is by assisting both parties to appreciate the opportunities offered by joint problem solving. However, joint problem solving entails that parties collaborate to address their problems (Onyima and Iwuoha, 2015).

Confrontation

Confrontation could be a direct expression of a group or a person's view, thoughts or feelings regarding a conflict situation. Confrontation could be an invitation to actors in conflicts to

express their views on a particular conflict. Confrontation as a conflict resolution strategy is basically concerned with exploring and clarifying issues of conflict, but it can be aggressive. When it becomes aggressive, those involved in the conflict attack each other, either physically or emotionally, sometimes in verbal form (Ojiji, 2006, p.124). An example of confrontation is the Federal Government of Nigeria's approach to resolving the Niger Delta conflict. The Nigerian state adopted the option of the military intervention principle (Etekpe, 2011). This intervention strategy was utilised by the Obasanjo administration between 1999 and 2007. It deployed Nigerian soldiers to contain the restiveness of youth and criminal gangs that sought to hinder oil production and distribution without taking into consideration the reasons for their grievances (Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011; Etekpe, 2011, p. 2). Before the establishment of the Joint Task Force in 2003, the Federal Government had adopted the principle in Ogoni, in 1990; Umuechem, in 1990; and Odi, in 1999 (Etekpe, 2011, p. 3; Okolie-Osemene and Aghalino, 2011, p. 25). The confrontation strategy caused the Federal Government to spend billions of naira to sustain the presence of security forces in most Niger Delta communities to protect oil installations and oil workers (Okolie-Osemene and Tor, 2012, p.81).

Arbitration

Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution that requires third-party intervention in conflict situations. This requires disputants to appoint arbitrators to hear evidence and take a decision on the issue (Hadi, 2010, p.78). An arbitrator is a third party that seeks to address the source of the prevailing conflict. According to Lewu (2010, p.42): "third party decision-making methods occur when third parties acting on behalf of the larger society such as a court of law, pronounce mandatory judgments to resolve the conflict." The impact of

arbitration is felt when the decision of an arbitration tribunal is enforced, like the judgment of a court, and such an award is usually binding on all the parties involved (Hadi, 2010).

3.3.8 Conflict Management

Conflict management does not necessarily imply conflict resolution but implies designing effective macro-level strategies to reduce the dysfunctions of conflict. It also involves developing the constructive functions of a conflict in order to enhance learning and effectiveness in an organization (Rahim, 2002, p. 3). When the negative aspects of conflicts are downplayed in favour of positive peace, then conflict management is in progress. The term is concerned with the proper planning for actions that are required to prevent and mitigate conflicts so that they do not escalate to violence in a society where government and civil society are crucial stakeholders (Rahim, 2002).

Tanner (2000) argues that people manage conflict when the sources are limited without outright resolution. Wallensteen and Swanström (2002), cited in Swanstrom et al. (2005, p. 23) observed that the main task is to create a situation where conflict no longer has a destructive outlook leading to the effective management of the situation. A potential conflict requires the building of confidence of parties involved in every conflict to save the situation. Also, Zartman (1997, p. 195) notes that, when the violent aspect of conflict is eradicated from a conflict situation, that conflict is managed. This view has received criticisms from organizations that are involved in conflict transformation. According to Swanström et al. (2005, p. 24) conflict management sets the platform for the resolution of conflicts, which differs from conflict management in terms of the total eradication of the roots and factors responsible for generating the conflict.

3.3.9 The Mechanisms of Oil Conflict

Oil conflict has become one of the characteristics of conflict in nations that are endowed with the resource. These conflicts – also referred to as resource-based conflict, are a fundamental source of instability in many oil-rich states, particularly with emerging economies such as Nigeria. These contestations often start from the community level where the oil exploration and exploitation take place, either between communities, or between the communities and government agencies. It is usually violent when deprivation and confrontation become the order of the day.

In Nigeria, the main source of the conflict is what most people call the struggle for the “national cake,” which has caused youths in host communities to sabotage the interests of the Nigerian state in different ways, including the outright vandalisation of flow stations, the sabotage of oil installations/gas pipelines and the stealing of crude oil (Iduh, 2011, p. 124). Such actions and responses have made oil discovery a paradox to the people (Aghalino, 2009, p. 221), because it has brought misery, repression and unmitigated environmental devastation to oil-producing communities (Evoh, 2009, p. 40).

Greed and Grievance Concept

Conflict has varied dimensions and it is caused by human behaviour. Social scientists, in particular sociologists and psychologists, have studied this issue for decades. Humphreys (2005, p. 508) identifies two major elements that could trigger off conflict: the “rebel greed mechanism” and the “grievance mechanism”. The “rebel greed mechanism” describes the perpetration of violence by a group of people to compel the government and the operators of the oil industries to meet the needs of the members of the host community. This view corroborates the position of Brunschweiler and Bulte (2009, p. 652), who note that loot-seeking rebels usually exhibit a non-conformist approach, tending towards using any means

at their disposal to get whatever they want from the operators of the oil companies. Related to this are the findings of Murshed and Tadjoeeddin (2007, p. 5), which support the view that civil wars stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group that usually organizes an insurgency against the government in order to make demands on the government and the operators of the oil industries on issues not covered by the constitution.

The “grievance mechanism” is mostly based on the effects of extraction, such as the forced migration of fish, sea-bed destruction, environmental damage, relative deprivation, social exclusion, marginalisation, inequality and lack of job opportunities (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009, p. 652). Empirical researchers have further suggested that conflict could also stem from the grievance of the “rebels”, who believe that natural resources are unevenly distributed. This is a regular claim in Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Humphreys 2005, p. 512). It has, therefore, been asserted that dependence on natural resources has a link to conflict, which will most likely end up in military intervention (Ross, 2006, p. 266-283).

This study has evaluated other resource conflict mechanisms. Notable among them are resource curse hypothesis, the rentier state paradigm, the paradox of plenty and the Dutch disease.

The Dutch Disease

The Dutch Disease was said: to have been named in honour of the economic impacts of an oil boom in Holland first coined in 1977 (Dunning, 2008, p. 272). It has been argued that the impact of the Dutch disease includes an increase in the real exchange rate, reflecting how exports are being sold in the world markets. Dunning (2008, p. 272) claims that the Dutch Disease made other export products more expensive abroad, which, in turn, slowed down demands for those products abroad. This disease is perceived as providing significant

evidence of the resource curse that cripples other trade-able sectors of the economy, such as agriculture. Although this is largely dependent on the system of government in place, the presence of oil resources can contribute to the growth of other local services, particularly because of the cash inflows from the oil operatives.

John (2010, p. 2) defines the Dutch Disease model as: “the economic concept that refers to the potential negative effects that natural resource windfalls, and the accompanying appreciations of exchange rates, can have on the rest of the economy”. During this period, the Netherlands oil boom resulted in an increase in the country's exchange rate and a dramatic reduction in diversification into other sectors of the economy.

According to Giroux (2008, p.11), the coming of multinationals and state actors to African oil-producing states has contributed to increase of foreign direct investment and economic growth. The increase in Nigeria’s output of oil began from 1970, with the production of over one million barrels per day, and the country was able to join the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in this period (Edet, 2015; Frynas, 2000; Giroux, 2008, p.12). The oil boom of the 1970s, during the regimes of Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo, affected other sectors of the economy. The discovery of oil, and later the “oil boom of the 1970s”, accounted for the neglect of other sectors of the economy, which sustained the country before oil exploration and exploitation began. One of the worst hit sectors was agriculture. The mid-19th century antecedents to the 20th century developments in the oil palm industry contributed immensely to the development of Nigeria (Udeke and Okolie-Osemene, 2014). In the view of Udeke and Okolie-Osemene (2014, p. 1), the deplorable state of the nation’s agricultural sector and, indeed, the palm oil industry, could be as a result of the fact that those in position to give the much needed impetus to agriculture and even policy makers continued to neglect the lucrative and human development-oriented industry.

In Nigeria, even though the agricultural sector still accounts for over 26.8 per cent of GDP, and two-thirds of employment, it has suffered enormous mismanagement, poorly conceived government policies, and the lack of basic infrastructure (Osalar, 2012). Observations showed that agriculture is not the only victim of this mismanagement and gross neglect. Mining has also witnessed decline over the years (2007 & 2011) especially in the advent of the oil boom in the country. The implication is that Nigeria now imports almost everything, including refined petroleum.

The Rentier Economy Effect

The Rentier State Theory accounts for another plague of oil-rich natural resource countries. According to Gray (2011, p. 1) “The Rentier state theory is a political economy theory that seeks to explain state society relations in states that generate a large proportion of their income from rents, or externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments.” Although “rents are most commonly royalties or other payments for oil and gas exports, other income such as fees and aid typically are considered rents as well” (Gray, 2011, p. 1). The argument is that given that the government is saddled with the responsibility of revenue allocation, the issue of a tax imposition on the people would no longer be necessary.

However, Smith (2004, p. 232) avers that the “rentier state theory” suggests that nations rich in natural resources are inclined to economic stagnation, corruption, authoritarianism and civil war. This view is contestable because oil deposits have not been proven to be a symbol of war. It is arguably a blessing, although its mismanagement could turn this blessing into a curse (Duruigbo, 2004, p. 46; Stuva, 2013). John (2010, p. 4-5) argues that the rentier-state theory only considers the short run effect of oil on the rentier-states, without explaining the long-run economic transformation in oil-rich economies. This implies that there could be a positive result from oil resources, as noted in the analysis of Basedau and Lay (2009, p.761).

The concept of a rentier state paradigm was developed with respect to Middle Eastern oil-producing states, such as Iran and the Gulf Monarchies (Luciani, 1990, p. 65; Luciani, 2005; Basedau and Lacher, 2006; Gurses, 2009). The major characteristic of the rentier state is oil rent distribution. The distribution strategies tend to enrich the ruling elite and guarantee stability for the political ruling leaders. This indirect effect of rentierism appears to be a mechanism for repression by the government and triggers the feasibility of restiveness by members of society, particularly the youth (Gray, 2013).

But corruption is not the peculiarity of resource-rich countries alone. It is also a regular factor in resource-poor economies. To make this clearer, John (2010, p. 5) compares the economy of the mineral-rich countries with those without minerals. He notes that between “1965 and 1990 the median annual average growth of the non-mineral abundant developing economies was 5.4%, which did not out-space the mineral rich economies with 4.3%”. Furthermore, Gray (2011, p. 1) asserts that, “in the same period, the median corruption rate of the non-mineral dominant economies was slightly higher than the mineral-dominant economies.” However, the fact that the resource-rich countries tended to have grown faster with lesser corruption than the oil resource-poor economies in the early 2000s further opposes the rentier state theory. Findlay & Lundhal (1999), as cited in John (2010; p. 6), found that between the 1870s and 1914 most oil-rich economies started as rentier economies. For instance, the economies of the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and Malaysia started as rentier economies. Many of the oil-rich countries today were initially mono-culture economic states until they diversified their economies by ploughing back the earnings from petroleum to develop other segments of the individual country's economy.

Furthermore, the rentier state model is yet to evaluate the positive implication of oil wealth in the growth and development of a country's manufacturing sector. Write and Czeluster (2002,

p. 1) have evaluated how in the US: “mineral abundance was an endogenous historical phenomenon driven by collective learning, increasing returns, and an accommodating legal environment.” In other words, mineral abundance in the US played a strategic role in the technological development of the economy. A good case in point is: “the replacement of the cable drill by the rotary drill” (Write and Czeluster, 2002, p. 15). This implies that the process of extraction, transportation and the geological technologies involved in refining oil resource facilitated the development of the US economy (John, 2010, p. 6). Besides, the development of natural resources was found to be instrumental in the technological advancement of Sweden and Finland in the 19th and 20th centuries (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2007, as quoted in John, 2010, p. 6).

The findings of these researchers make it difficult to adopt the rentier state model, as the model failed to take into consideration the positive impact oil revenue as the researchers depicted above. Furthermore, the possibility of most oil-dependent economies to make a turnaround to an advanced and diversified economy with its oil rent appears a prediction that could be achieved in the long run, considering the level of corruption in the oil-dependent countries. With Indonesia’s turnaround from renterism to a diversified economy, it is believed that oil dependency is a permanent feature of any economy.

There is no doubt that natural resources have been a curse to some oil-bearing societies, as is the case in Iraq and Chad. However, the Iraqi invasion of neighbouring “Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent intentional: “protective” oil spillages may have been a curse to the land” (Sadiq and McCain, 1993, p.159). In the 1970s, Chad befitted a geo-political playground for the US and the French governments to articulate and express their views on resource control. This was evident in the overthrow, through a Coup d’état and the subsequent death of President Tombalbaye (Humphreys, 1995, p. 508-537). Not only did the Chadians lose a

president, but also the geopolitical manoeuvres and intrigues came at the cost of continued and sustained external involvement in Chad's national, political and economic affairs.

Natural resources, however, have been characterised as a “blessing” in some resource-endowed countries. Botswana, for example, had less than 100 kilometres of tarred roads in the 1960s. Since the discovery of diamonds, in the 1960s, and their exploitation through a joint and equal partnership between the government of Botswana and De Beers (through Debswana Diamond Company) the country now has thousands of kilometres of modern tarred roads. Diamonds contribute more than 33.3% to the country's US\$14.8 GDP in 2010 (US Department of State, 2011, p.1).

Oil Resources as a Curse

In addition to the foregoing resource conflict mechanisms, Basedau and Lay (2009, p. 757) propounded a “resource curse” hypothesis that suggests that natural resources, particularly oil, create war. Basedau and Lay (2009, p. 757) argue that: “the extraction of natural resources has a link to corruption, authoritarianism, economic decline and civil war”. This implies that oil natural resources, on their own, may not have any link to war; but the processes involved in its extraction and the administration of its revenue could lead to war. This could be one of the reasons why oil is said to provide its owners with finance and a drive for armed conflict as well as generating indirect economic and institutional causes of violence (Conroy, 2014). The debate over the brunt of oil natural resources looks at the context conditions and the particular causal mechanisms determining whether or not the resource cause strikes actions and in what ramification do resources generate strike actions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, p. 627).

Ross (2008, p. 4) contends that the gravest danger of oil resources is its capability to trigger conflict, particularly in developing countries. Such oil-rich countries as Iraq, Algeria, Colombia, Sudan and Nigeria are said to be twice as likely to undergo rebellion as non-oil-bearing countries. Rebellion in non-resource-rich countries might last for only a short while because of a lack of money to acquire ammunition, but it could last longer in resource-rich countries because the rebels would hardly run out of funds to finance war. In resource-rich countries, the instigators of conflict could break pipelines and steal oil, which they can sell in the black markets, as has been the case in Nigeria and Iraq (Ross, 2008, p. 4).

Oil alone cannot generate conflict, but it can exasperate latent tensions, specifically in countries that were relatively poor prior to the influx of massive oil revenue. Ross (2012, p. 5) refers to these consequences of the extraction of oil resources as the “oil curse”. According to Colgan (2010, p. 11), the negative impact of oil revenue on oil-producing states is not homogeneous, as the economic and political impact in a given state varies, depending mostly on the country’s political history and leadership. The components of the oil curse include violent conflict, slow economic growth, and lack of accountability, transparency: and press freedom (Colgan, 2010).

According to Ross (2012 p.5), the oil curse arises from the four S’s in the qualities of petroleum revenue; these are scale, source, stability and secrecy. The scale refers to the proportion of revenue accruable from oil; it could be massive in comparison with the country’s earnings from taxes and agriculture prior to the oil discovery or boom. Where the proportion of the revenue is high, the government tends to become authoritative and stifle opposing voices (Tsalik, 2003, p. 4). This may have been the case in oil-rich Niger Delta, where Ken Saro-Wiwa and his associates were imprisoned and finally executed in 1995 (Giroux, 2008, p.14). The explosion of money in the Nigerian economy also results in a situation where members of the host communities get aggressive and agitate for a larger share

of the huge oil revenues. However, the proportion of oil revenue to total government revenue alone does not explain the oil curse, because other larger countries in Europe without large oil revenue have experienced democracy and relative peace compared to the oil-rich developing countries.

The source of a country's revenue is important in terms of its effect on the economy and the welfare of the citizenry as well as government accountability. Most countries fund their economies through revenue realized from taxes (Kayaga, 2007). In oil-producing developing countries, the reverse appears to be the case. As countries are funded with oil revenues, their governments are less accountable to the tax-paying citizenry. Conversely, where countries are financed through taxes paid by citizens, their governments are more restricted and thus more accountable to the taxpayers (Hawke, 2007; Curristine, 2007; Barbiero and Cournede, 2013).

The instability of oil prices is another contributor to the oil resource curse (Ross, 2012 p.5). Fluctuations in world oil prices make government revenues somewhat unstable and difficult to predict accurately. The volatile nature of oil prices tends to expose oil-rich countries to cycles of oil boom and bust. Thus, the rise and fall of oil prices generates fluctuations in government finances and these impacts negatively on the health of the economy and the welfare of the people. The fluctuation, therefore, can tempt a government to squander revenue and the citizens would begin to agitate, thereby making it more difficult for the rebels to come to terms with the government. The problem, however, is that the rebels are not sure of the accuracy of the revenue oil generates in order to ascertain how well the state is managing oil wealth. For example, Tsalik (2003, p. 6) notes that oil revenue prices instability accounts for the unsteadiness of the budget of a rentier economy, since the revenue fluctuates. Thus, a decrease in petroleum revenue affects an oil-dependent state budget negatively. For instance, the establishment of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) has enabled a country like

Norway to reinvest the proceeds from petroleum into other sectors of its economy without compromising the interests of the host communities where the oil is being exploited. The Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) is a mechanism used for saving the oil revenue and restricts the national budget to the country's savings (Eriksen, 2007, p.7). Thus, by so doing, the Norwegian economy is said be unaffected by oil-price reduction or fluctuation.

Another major factor that aggravates conflict in oil-rich developing countries appears to be secrecy (the lack of transparency) in sharing the oil revenue. Ross (2012, p. 6) observes that: "governments often collude with international oil companies to conceal their transactions, and use their own national oil companies to hide both revenues and expenditures. When Saddam Hussein was Iraq's president (1979-2003), more than half of his government's expenditures were channelled through the Iraqi National Oil Company, whose budget was secret." This implies that the governments of naturally endowed developing countries appear to be collaborating with the oil mining multi-national organisations to hide the oil revenues as well as their expenditure. The oil revenue secrecy may have facilitated the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other oil-fuelled autocrats to squander the oil revenue and fuel their desire to remain in power so as to continue to mask their greed and activities. This lack of trust tends to contribute to the rebels' apparent reluctance to drop their arms against the government.

Is Lack of Oil a Source of Economic Success?

As noted above, not everything about oil is evil, as oil revenue has its benefits; oil resource gives some advantage to the oil-rich countries. Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1) assert that: "The lack of natural resources has not proven to be a fatal barrier to economic success." This means that the availability or unavailability of natural resources is not a guarantee for a country's socio-political and economic progress or stagnation. Some countries have remained

poor despite their rich oil deposits, while other countries without rich oil deposits seem to have been making steady economic progress. Furthermore, Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1) aver that most Asian countries with relatively little resources have made considerable success through innovation and technological advancement. These countries –notably Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, often referred to as Asia Tigers – show the extent of their economic success through technological innovation. The incredible success of the Asian Tiger economies, based on zero natural resources, may have been why researchers have concluded that oil-rich countries seem to be operating under a cursed economy (Reed, 2009, p.3).

Thus, it can be taken for granted that the governments of the resource-poor countries seem to be more prudent than those of the resource-rich countries on the premise that they could create and sustain progressive economies without natural resources, because: “men of fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant and industrious” (Humphreys et al., 2007, p.1) Therefore, there seems to be a gap in the argument that resource-poor countries are most likely to struggle to raise money for their economies as they compete with the resource-rich countries in the global market.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, many countries without valuable natural resources seem to be providing a leadership role for countries with abundant natural resources in the international market (Tapeh, Hasanzadeh and Feizi, 2014). It would make economic sense for countries with rich deposits of oil to always learn to plough back the revenue accruing from oil into the other sectors of their economies. Sachs and Warner (1995), as cited in Humphreys et al. (2007, p.1), argue that many developing countries with

rich deposits have struggled through one phase of development to another. And they are hardly able to meet the recurrent expenditure or the daily costs of running the state.

Often, if a nation, which is, endowed with abundant natural resources experiences a remarkable increase in the economic sector, “inequality becomes a rising plague”. This pattern is seen in countries such as Nigeria, Congo DR, and Venezuela where the massive resource wealth is shared among a minority, thus making these countries rich countries with poor people (Humphreys et al., 2007, p.2). This is not to say that the massive revenues from oil have not contributed to an improved standard of living in the oil-producing countries, for alongside the perceived improved standard of living, there is rampant corruption daily threatening the weak democracy (Schubert, 2010, p.3).

Schubert (2010, pp.11-12) asserts that the practice predominant in the oil-rich developed countries, such as Canada and Norway, is a diversification [of the economy]. The oil-rich developing countries tend to invest more in war than diversifying the oil revenue by investing in the other sectors of the economy, as in the developed oil-rich states (Lawan, 2008; Muhwezi, 2009). A high variation in the marginal growth and performance in the economies of the oil-rich countries might be predicated on the way in which oil revenue is being managed by states. For instance, Nigeria and Indonesia have had the same high dependence on oil revenue over a period of 30 years, though the: “per capita income of the Asian nation is four times higher than that of Nigeria, [an] ECOWAS member state” (Humphrey’s et al., 2007, p.1). The economic transformation was due to the ability of the Indonesian government to diversify its revenue source, thereby reducing the level of reliance on the revenue generated from oil. This, consequently, liberated the Indonesian state from being a monoculture, to a well-diversified, economy. Most state governments in Nigeria had advocated the need to develop other sectors of the Nigerian economy and reduce petro-

dependence, for the dependence on crude oil revenues and the monthly allocations from oil revenue have led to corruption in governance (Watts, 1999; Aghalino, 2009; Evoh, 2009; Idu, 2011).

Ross (2012, p.144) notes that those developing countries, which are endowed with crude oil, are twice as much prone to having a civil war compared with those countries without oil resources, as evidenced by oil-related conflict across the globe. Investment into wars is said to have a harmful effect on the seemingly evolving economies of the emerging democratic societies. Ross (2012, p.144) describes this phenomenon of misplaced priority as a paradigm of easy solutions to complex problems, accounting for the economic failure of some of the oil-rich less developed countries. The argument is that some violent conflicts in the resource-rich developing countries are facilitated by the revenue allocation formula that is usually adopted by their governments for sharing the revenue accruable from oil.

Oil resources appear to be the reason for the conflict in the Middle East and Africa. This has created the basis for the slow economic growth for the countries in these regions (Humphreys, 2007; Schubert, 2010; Ross, 2012). Colgan (2010, p.1) observes that, despite the huge revenue accruable from oil, it has also been noticed that a lot of the crises in the oil-rich nations are associated with the politics surrounding the oil. The incessant war in some of the oil-rich countries has created a breeding ground for poverty, as the oil money that would have been channelled into development projects is used in procuring arms by the government to fight members of insurgency groups that challenge the government over its reckless spending and corruption. Thus, civil wars and violent conflicts have the potential to weaken institutional mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the laws of the land (Ross, 2006, p. 266). This tends to slow down the pace of development in society as the citizens struggle in their efforts to earn a living.

3.3.10 Link between CSR and Conflict

Many studies have linked CSR with conflict (Berman, 2000; Haufler, 2004a; Idemudia, 2010). The environmental unfriendly activities of MNOCs are contributory to conflicts, whereas their genuine CSR involvement can prevent and quell conflicts. Banfield et al. (2005) observe that conflict-sensitive organisations and their managements symbolize a necessary part of a combined effort to achieve a more peaceful world. In other words, the CSR commitment of businesses would definitely influence changes or the outcome of conflicts within the local communities and society, at large. However, businesses cannot stay neutral in conflict situations, as the advocates of CSR suggest that organisations seem to have focused on the enhancement of a peaceful business environment in their host communities (Bennett, 2002; Idemudia, 2010).

Paradoxically, it is still disputable that CSR and conflict have a close nexus, especially in the context of conflict de-escalation. Haufler (2004b) argues that there is no adequate empirical evidence to decide whether or not the involvement of businesses in CSR could prevent or reduce conflict. However, recent studies have been directed towards this direction (Idemudia, 2008). The scientific community is hesitant in establishing the scope of sincere corporate citizenship on security and its contributions in either triggering or quelling intra-state conflict in particular (Worlf et al., 2007, p. 410). It is, therefore, possible to conclude that given the expected growing role of businesses in conflict mitigation, there appears to be a necessity to examine the situation and scope to which these roles can be fulfilled, hence businesses are perceived as effectual vehicles for conflict mitigation (Idemudia, 2010, p. 834).

Concrete CSR reduces the negative impact of business activities on the environment; society reserves the right to a healthy and clean environment irrespective of corporate practices. The theory of the right to a liveable environment was established in Blackstone (1988), who notes

that the right to a clean, safe environment is a human right. Therefore, MNOCs are expected to act responsibly to protect this human right. This is, particularly, important nowadays owing to the danger of the lack of a liveable ecosystem essential for human existence. Guerrette (1986) has also demonstrated the importance of this theory by arguing that it is not possible for humans to flourish in an environment that is chemically toxic while at the time experiencing freedom or being content with the quality of the air they breathe. Most importantly, the right to a liveable environment is enshrined in the constitutions of most countries; therefore, this is an inalienable right. In other words, a distortion of this right is capable of causing conflict.

In the Niger Delta region, for example, when building a pipeline, the MNOCs would engage the communities with another project, which ends as soon the pipeline is completed. This implies that projects in the realm of CSR in the region are only peace projects, because the oil companies have realized there would be conflict otherwise. On the problems with CSR projects in the Niger Delta, Idemudia (2010, p. 840) argues that the failure of MNOCs in CSR involvement was the major triggering factor for the Ken Saro-Wiwa-led protest that resulted in massive human rights violations in Nigeria in the 1990s. Frynas (2005) alleged that, most businesses get involved in CSR for selfish reasons; such as that of maintaining a stable working environment. Apparently MNOCs involvement in CSR with the Niger Delta has not been carried out as obligation but haphazardly. Put differently, as a measure of managing the regions conflict.

3.4 Summary

This chapter reviewed the relevant literatures on the subject matter of the study. It began with the theoretical framework, which provided the basis for analysing the corpus of the literature in the realm of CSR and conflict. In this regard, the Marxist social conflict theory, frustration-aggression theory, and the stakeholder theory were extensively examined. Other concepts analysed, were the evolution and dimensions of CSR; conflict and its dimensions, causes and strategies for its resolution; oil conflicts in the Niger Delta and the role of MNOCs managing the conflicts. In the next chapter, the study presents the method employed in carrying out this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

MIXED-METHODS DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH DESIGN STUDY AND RESEARCH SETTING

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research settings and the mixed-methods and descriptive design study. The study was designed in such a way as to serve as guide for answering the research questions. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Inc.), Version 17 was used in analysing the quantitative data, while the qualitative data were analysed using content analysis. As noted earlier, this study adopted a triangulation of data obtained from both interviews and questionnaires. This approach was adopted because of the need to have a balanced and complete opinion of the participants and thus make the findings more objective.

4.2 The Approach

Saunders et al. (2012, p. 143) identifies two major research approaches based on the reasoning the researcher adopts, namely: deductive and inductive. However, Ketokivi and Mantere (2010) add abductive research approach to these. Detailed analysis of these three research approaches and the justification for their choice for this study are presented below.

4.2.1 Deductive Reasoning

This type of research reasoning begins from a general premise to a specific conclusion (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 143). They further postulated “deductive reasoning progresses from a universal rule to a definite conclusion. In deductive reasoning, where the original claims are true, the conclusion must also be true”. A calculated specimen of deductive reasoning is this:

If $x = 5$

And $y = 3$

Then $2x + y = 13$

The example above implies a logical inevitability that $2x$ plus y must be equal to 13. Syllogism is a Greek word used to represent general proposition in reasoning. It means a logical argument that is normally applied in deductive reasoning to arrive at a conclusion based on two or more propositions that are presumed to be true (Thagard and Shelly, 1997). Put differently, premises lead to logical conclusions. A language form of exemplifying the deductive syllogism reasoning is as follows:

There is nothing like drought in East midlands.

Derby is located in East midlands.

Therefore, Derbyshire council need not plan for drought management.

Based on the above deductive syllogism, although the inferential process is valid, the conclusion is invalid, as Derby was declared a drought-prone area based on its 2011 driest record (Allen, 2011). A premise could be true or false based on the truthful nature of the original premises. Notwithstanding the truth or falsity of the syllogism inferential proposition, the deductive process could be valid or invalid. In some instances as above, the inferential process is valid even though the conclusion is false.

4.2.2 Inductive Reasoning

Inductive research approach starts its observation from specific and then begins to generalise conclusions that are believed to be true based on gathered evidence, but not certainly true (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 143). In the inductive approach to research reasoning, propositions attempts to provide strong evidence for the validity of a conclusion, which is not necessarily an absolute proof of validity or truth. The conclusions in inductive reasoning are not logical

necessities as in the deductive approach; hence, the conclusion is not always guaranteed. The reason is that there is no stipulated mechanism to ascertain that all evidence required to arrive at a particular conclusion has been supplied, assuring that there is no further unnoticed evidence that could crop up later to invalidate the conclusion (Thagard and Shelly, 1997). Inductive reasoning begins from a specific paradigm and ends up with broad conclusions, for example:

My tertiary institution supervisor is lenient.

My last tertiary institution supervisor is lenient.

Therefore, all tertiary institution supervisors are lenient.

Mathematically, a typical inductive reasoning approach can be represented logically from specific to general conclusion as follows:

5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30,

In the example above, an inductive way of reasoning would present the next figure as 35. This appears cogent enough following the line of argument but it does not necessarily mean that 35 must be the next figure. Inductive reasoning is believed to be simply true or false but it is not a logical necessity though the reasoning may be cogent. This implies that, although the available evidence is either convincing or relevant, the conclusions may not be necessarily true or false, but they appear complete (Thagard and Shelly, 1997).

4.2.3 Abductive Reasoning

The abductive reasoning approach to research, which is rarely adopted by researchers, begins with an incomplete premise and concludes with the most likely explanation of the premise (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010). In this type of reasoning, decision is based on the information

at hand, which is usually incomplete. This can best be exemplified in the medical sciences or the law court. In medical sciences, a doctor could start a malaria treatment based on the symptoms the patient's manifests which may not be complete; or a judge may give a court ruling based on the available evidence, which, in most times, is incomplete (Thagard and Shelly, 1997).

Most scholars have either carefully or unknowingly ignored the abductive reasoning approach to research, basically focusing on the relevance of inductive and deductive reasoning. It is, therefore, not surprising that Horn (2009) focused his research work on inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to “bottom-up” reasoning, where a pattern of behaviour is drawn from available instances, and a general theory developed to provide generalizations about the observed behaviour. But in the latter (deductive reasoning), often known as “top-down” reasoning, a theory is used as the starting point of the reasoning. This is later narrowed down to a hypothesis and observations used to test the hypothesis, from which it is confirmed or rejected (Horn, 2009, p. 108).

It is necessary for a researcher to decide and justify which research approach to adopt. This research adopted both the inductive and deductive approach. This was because the study combined qualitative and quantitative strategies. The quantitative strategy used the deductive approach, while the qualitative strategy adopted the inductive approach. Gill and Johnson (2002, p. 39) have found a bond between deductive reasoning and 'positivism' as well as the inductive approach and 'subjectivist' approach to research. The 'positivist' believes in universal truths. In this form of reasoning, the researcher is expected to generate research objectives that discover the laws concerning universal truths. The 'subjectivist' does not believe in universal truths but in a reality that whose construction humans generally

contribute to. The researchers' objective here is to ascertain the methods through which reality is constructed or to explore an established reality (Horn, 2009, p. 109).

4.3 The Strategy

As mentioned, the adoption of qualitative and quantitative strategies is a combination of two different methods of data collection and analysis (Lehner, 2011). According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) and Creswell (2011), a mixed methods research design is a rigorous pattern used in collecting, analysing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single study or a series of studies to resolve and cope with a research problem (Creswell, 2011, p. 535). Put differently, the mixed-methods approach is employed in any study that seeks to generate adequate data, especially when a particular methodology does not completely address all the research questions. In addition, each of them has a role to play in enhancing the objectivity and ethical considerations that the study seeks to uphold. For Tuckman (1994), the two methodological approaches are utilised in answering similar or related questions. However, Hammersley (1999) has disputed this with the assertion that the nature of the study and the need to address specific questions could make a researcher to focus on any of the approaches: qualitative or quantitative methodology. The approach chosen would determine the processes and instruments to be used in gathering data.

According to Jegede (2006, p. 113), qualitative studies are designed to enable both the researcher and readers to comprehend the context of various research questions that the study seeks to respond to; and these could be economic, psychological, social or political contexts. There are also some cases that demand consideration of other contexts, including cultural, and geographical. Qualitative data are generated through primary sources, including direct observations, interactions with participants, as well as other secondary sources, like books, policy papers, and journal articles (Ulin et al. 2002, p. 138, as cited in Jegede, 2006).

People also conduct key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions as part of qualitative studies. Qualitative studies have also benefited from computer revolution. For example, in the past, researchers conducted studies using their hands to write as interviews were going on, and later transcribed the text verbatim by hand. However, the advent of computer software programmes has enhanced qualitative analysis by performing many of the basic data manipulation procedures (Jegede, 2006, p.120).

Another position on data generation has stated that qualitative data gives an in-depth and workable (or adequate) data that would have been difficult when only quantitative data generation is adopted. The results are presented in words or pictures rather than numbers. Qualitative data does not seem to appreciate multiple participants when the quantitative methodology is in use (Henninger, 2009). The qualitative approach that is mixed in this study involved the use of in-depth interviews, observations, and archival materials. According to Robson and Foster (1989, p.10), to actualise the aims of interviews, the objectives discussed at the briefing need to be translated into interview guide that covers all the discussions. Also, the interviewer needs to decide the order in which tasks are given to respondents, arranges them in an orderly manner, and also provides a time plan/map. For this work, the researcher has succeeded in adopting the aforementioned factors that facilitated the success of interviews. The data gathered from the study are transcribed and analysed based on the content and context of the study. Data transcription and analysis offer researchers the opportunity to develop cutting-edge studies that would stand the test of time, especially in providing answers to scientific or scholarly questions about society, people, or events, as the case may be

For Henninger (2009), quantitative research is synonymous with quantities that target numbers. The results are usually based on numerical analysis and statistics. It is believed that the more the number of participants, the better the shape the analysis takes. Henninger further argued that a particular strength of quantitative research is that statistical analysis allows for generalization to others. It has the advantage of choosing quantitatively a “sample that closely resembles the population. Qualitative research does not seek to choose samples that are representative of populations. Quantitative analysis allows researchers to test specific hypotheses. Depending on research findings, hypotheses are either supported or not supported]” (Henninger, 2009, p. 1). Quantitative research has been enhanced by technological revolution, specifically with the emergence of computers across the world. These computers have software designed to make research a worthwhile exercise. The advantage is not only the speed; accuracy is also guaranteed as far as data analysis is concerned (Henninger, 2009).

4.3.1 The Rationale for the Adopting a Mixed-method Strategy

There are various reasons put forth by scholars as to why a certain research design is adopted. The rationale for adopting a mixed-method in this study is the nature of corporate practices, especially corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation in most host communities. Thus, it is adopted because it is an “approach utilizing multiple data sources, multiple participants or respondents, and multiple methods to gather multiple perspectives on the same topic” (Creswell, 2011, p. 534).

Blaikie (2003, p. 18) asserts that the adoption of “various means of data collection and the degree of an empirical phenomenon would facilitate researchers to overcome the problem of bias and validity issues”. For this study, the multiplicity of stakeholders demands that a combination of data gathering and analysis be adopted to get complete data. Given that

qualitative research is designed for explanatory purposes, its combination with quantitative method would enable researchers to secure complete and new ideas. In particular, more data would be generated to produce reliable information that will not only offer explanation of salient variables, but also explain new theories (Jegade, 2006, p. 114).

The multinational oil companies (MNOCs) located in the Niger Delta is shown in the diagram below.

Fig. 4:1 MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA SHOWING OIL FIELDS AND PIPELINES

Source (s):<http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/Oilfields.html>; accessed July 8, 2014.

The MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria include the Shell Group of Companies (Shell Petroleum Developing Company, SPDC), ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillip,

Statoil, Occidental, BP-AMOCO, the ENI group (Nigerian Agip Oil Company, NAOC), SAIPEM, CNL, Total and Elf, and Addax. Shell is reported to have the largest area of operation in Nigeria, which accounts for over half of the oil deposits in Nigeria. SPDC is a joint venture operation comprising NNPC (55%), SPDC (30%), Elf Petroleum (10%) and NAOC (5%), with SPDC as the operational partner of the joint venture (Shell, 2000; Aghalino, 2004). The second oil company, ENI's Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) produces about 180,000 barrels of oil per day (Eco, 2001).

4.3.2 The Rationale for the Choice of the Oil Companies

Many factors were considered in choosing the multinational oil companies for this mixed-methods descriptive study, the major ones being their level of involvement and stakeholders in the oil industry. According to Hantrais (2007), there are crucial considerations that must be made in selecting any sample size or population, including possibility of gaining access, raw and adequate data, as well as the quality of data sources. The objective of the research sample is critical to the completion and results of the study. To enable the scholar to address all the aims of the study, it is suggested that any research sample for a qualitative study is likely to be purposive (Stake, 1995; Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

The choice of MNOCs was inspired by their involvement in development as well as transformation of the oil industry and host communities, and the development discourse in theory and practice. Given that Shell is a leading member of the world business council for sustainable development (WBCSD) and that it co-chaired the working group that produced WBCSD's Corporate Social Responsibility Report (Natufe 2001), it cannot be neglected; Agip and Chevron occupy a similar status. These MNOCs operate in various Niger Delta communities, including Ogoni, Nembe, Odioma, Kula, Warri, Twon, and Oluashiri.

4.4 Defining the Study Sample

This mixed-method study sample was selected from multiple sources, including multinational oil companies and host communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This approach was motivated by the researcher's experience and background as an indigene of the Niger Delta region. A researcher's familiarity with the context of study enhances the research investigation and processes (Bereday, 1964). Although familiarity of the researcher with the region is unlikely to influence or skew the findings of the study, however, an unbalanced and poor choice of sample has negative impact on research discussions and findings (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). The three MNOCs selected for this study were Shell, Agip, and Chevron. Their profiles are presented in subsequent sections.

4.4.1 Shell

A review of the history of the oil industry in Nigeria shows that Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited is a product of the 1907 merger of the British Shell Trading and Transport Company and the Netherland's Royal Dutch Group of Companies. The company obtained its exploration concession from the British colonial administration in 1937, with exclusive rights over the whole area of the country, including the Southern Cameroons, which was then administered as part of Colonial Nigeria. Owerri, in the present Imo State, was its first headquarters. The company commenced the investigation of a totally unknown territory after merging with the D'Arcy Exploration activities in the country in the early 1930s (Udeke 1995).

With the merger of British Petroleum and Shell D'Arcy in 1946 at the end of the Second World War, the name of the company was changed to Shell BP. It continued its oil exploration under this new joint ownership of Netherland's Royal Dutch Group and British Petroleum Corporation. But when oil was found in commercial quantity in Oloibiri (in

present Bayelsa State) the company had to relocate its headquarters from Owerri to Port Harcourt. The movement, which started in 1957 with the construction of its office complex and residential area of 400 housing units, was completed in 1959. Port Harcourt's air link with Lagos (then Federal Capital) along with its superior telecommunication links was a better location than Owerri. By 1959 when her relocation to Port Harcourt was fully complete, she had also doubled her oil production figure to 8,000 barrels per day (Udeke, 1995, p. 21).

Frynas and Paulo (2007, p. 235) posit that, initially, "Shell BP was given an effective monopoly for oil exploration and production in Nigeria". Additionally, according to the Nigerian history, a 1914 colonial administration ordinance postulated that only British oil corporations were legitimate to obtain oil licenses in Nigeria. The decree bequeathed Shell BP the authority to dominate oil industry in Nigeria. "Shell has a 25.6 % production in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Company (NLNG) and at the same time works as the technical adviser to the NLNG; while the other partners are NNPC 49%, Elf 15 %, and Agip 10.4 %" (Shell, 2000, as cited in Aghalino, 2004, p.2).

4.4.2 Agip

The Nigeria Agip Oil Company (Agenzie Generale Italiana Petreliche –NAOC) was formed in Nigeria in 1962, following an oil-prospecting agreement between the Nigerian Government and Agip Mineraria SPA of Milan in Italy. Its Nigerian subsidiary is called the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC), which is a member of the Italian government-owned

E. N. I. group of companies.

Fig. 4.2: A Map of the Niger Delta Showing Swamps, Pipelines, Cities, Oil Fields and Terminals

According to Udeke (1995), this agreement was in tandem with Agip's global policy of encouraging its host country's government participation in the company's oil exploration and production. In 1963, the company was granted oil-prospecting licence (OPL) covering an area of 5,313.5 square kilometres in the Niger Delta swamp of Rivers and present Delta States. The drilling of its first two wells, Sangakubu 1 and Obama 1 were done also in 1962 (p. 22). According to Mr. Sam Amur, a pioneer staff of the company, the first two wells were exploratory failures. Though demoralised as a result of the initial exploration activities, the company finally struck oil on March 1, 1965, in its Ebocha 1 well, which was the third exploratory well drilled since its commencement of exploration. The Ebocha oil well

discovery boosted the need to explore for more petroleum in the country, as it was a watershed in the company's exploratory activities.

Following this first discovery, exploratory activities spread to neighbouring communities, such as Idu, Mbede, and Omoku, in former Ahoada Local Government Area, as well as parts of Egbema (Udeke, 1995). Between 1970 and 1977, the company's crude production increased from its twenty producing fields to 250,000 barrels per day. Furthermore, its operation on behalf of Agip-Philips-NNPC joint venture was supported by a large number of production facilities, which included an oil centre, two gas plants, nine flow stations and an oil export terminal (Udeke, 1995). The growth of Nigeria's oil industry cannot be complete without mentioning the role played by the Agip even though the company has been struggling to manage its broken relationship with some host communities as a result of its failed promises and poor implementation of its corporate social responsibility (CSR).

4.4.3 Chevron

Chevron Nigeria is a significant player in the petrochemical industry and a well-known stakeholder in oil production in the country. The company is involved in oil exploration and exploitation operations in the Niger Delta. Their other activities include blending, manufacturing and marketing across the country.

4.4.4 The Ogoni Community

Historically, the Ogoni community belongs to the Benue-Congo branch of Niger-Congo along with Efik-Ibibio. The complexity of the language and map of the Niger Delta region confirm the complexity of contact and movements of people within the area (Alagoa, 2005, p.16). The Ogoni community is located in the present-day Rivers State of Nigeria, and is one of the oil-producing communities that have witnessed series of violent and nonviolent protests in the past. Its anti-oil protests against government's lack of vision and functional

plans for equitable distribution of oil wealth in the 1980s (Frynas, 2001, p.29) culminated in the hanging of nine Ogoni sons, including the human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa, who was arrested by security forces several times (Ken Saro -Wiwa, 1992) before his death. On the Ogoni struggle, Ken Saro Wiwa (1992) states his feelings regarding how the Ogonis were ground to dust by the collective effort of MNOCs and the Nigerian military government, which he refers to as both murderous and dictatorial.

According to an organisation called Remember Saro Wiwa, when the Iko people (in present Akwa Ibom State) held a non-violent protest against Shell in 1987, the infamous Mobile Police Force (MPF), locally known as “kill-and-go” was deployed by the Nigerian government to repress them. Forty houses were destroyed, while 350 people were made homeless by the attack. It was not unexpected that the Ogoni leaders signed the Ogoni Bill of Rights, August 1990, which demanded for “political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, control and use of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as of right for Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation” (Social Action, 2009, p. 38). Thereafter, the people were inspired to form a non-aggressive social group called Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) (Ako, 2015). However, the non-radicalisation of the Ogoni was, unfortunately, greeted by government’s consistent clampdown on various sons and daughters of the community. Ken Saro Wiwa (1992) argues that the heightened attacks targeted at Shell and its oil-related activities in the Niger Delta were caused by the company’s inability to address the impasse peacefully.

Today, the people celebrate the Ogoni Day on 4th January annually. The self-determination agitations by the Ogoni seem to be hampered by government’s lack of interest in addressing their demands, especially in the area of abating ecological damage (Ojakorotu, 2009). Some

of the indigenes of Ogoniland seem to be concerned about government's lack of interest in considering demand for resource control by the oil-bearing states and communities. This problem appears to be aggravated by corporate practices that have directly affected the rural population. For instance, in December 2013, the people of Ogoni staged a protest in Port-Harcourt and environs to give the oil companies an ultimatum to implement the report by United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) on Ogoni. According to them, there was no going back on the 90-day ultimatum given to the MNOCs and the Nigerian government to implement the UNEP report on oil pollution in Ogoniland. They claimed that they were rallying for a sequence of non-violent direct actions that would cripple economic activities in the country

Fig. 4.3: Picture Showing Ken Saro-Wiwa Addressing a Community Rally

Source (s): Remember Saro Wiwa Coalition; available at

<http://remembersarowiwa.com/background/the-ogoni-struggle>; accessed July 8, 2014.

4.4.5 Nembe Community

Nembe is one of the Ijaw clans, including Ibani (Bonny), Okrika, Kalabari, Brass and Akassa (Ayomike, 1990, p.5). Other clans are the Apoi, Furupagha, Olodiana, Egbema, Gbaramatu, Gbaran, Tungbo, Zarama, Ekpetiama, Okodia, and TarakiriBoma, among others. Nembe is located in the Eastern Delta kingdom. It has been one of the Ijaw towns that can be said to have welcomed migrants from Igbematoru area (Alagoa, 1972). The central political problem within the Nembe area is the maintenance of balance in the internal affairs so that the two sections can combine to be effective in warding off external actions. The people made efforts to attract European traders to establish depots on the Brass River at the early years of the nineteenth century (Alagoa, 1972, p.128).

However, before the Atlantic trade, for instance, the political structure was basically focused on kinship and descent, while the basic ethnic unit was the ibe, also called clan. There were notable village gods, including Amaoruand Amakiri (god of the settled earth), and Amatemesuo (the spirit of the earth). There was, also, a highly organised trading corporation known as the canoe house (Etemike, et al. 1997, p.14). The 1895 Nembe-British War created the impetus or the trend of expansion, “as many chiefs of both Ogbolomabiri and Bassambri sought for refuge in the established Okoroma, Ogbia and Abureni communities or founded new communities to resettle their subjects” (Alagoa, 1999, p. 217). Moreover, mutual suspicion and contestations among different groups also characterised the era of Atlantic slave trade within the area (Alagoa, 1999).

As the city of Nembe grew in strength, it began to acquire leadership over a number of towns and villages in a widening neighbourhood. Two types of communities acceded to the leadership and control of the city (Alagoa, 1972, p.128). These were the settlements of identical language and culture, such as Okpoama, Twon, and Odioma. There were also the

mini communities, such as Okoroba and Idema, to the north; and the towns of Egwema, Liama, and others on the coastal island west of Twon with cultures and languages different from those of Nembe (Alagoa, 2005).

The Nembe people are well-known farmers and traders, as they have not only established salt industry and exchanged fish for other commodities; they are also instrumental to the introduction of new crops from other areas like Warri. The Nembe are known to have cordial relationship with other ethnic groups and their Ijaw neighbours. For instance, Okpoama traditions confirm of special relations between Mingi of Nembe and King Orukari of Okpoama (Alagoa, 1972, p. 128). When traditional rulers establish good relationship, their subjects will benefit from it, while the communities involved enjoy positive peace.

The Nembe-Ibe king, the Mingi or Amanyanabo of Nembe (Ogbolomabiri) was given adequate support by the war-canoe chiefs who control and take care of the members of their war-canoe-houses. Each house comprised a group of households or a large household headed by a chief. A canoe house was a compact and well-organised trading and fighting corporation, which made membership free, while the leaders of each house would meet together to form the governing council of the state (Etemike et al., 1997, p. 14-15). The fourteen main houses, known as war-canoe-houses in Nembeare Amain, Kulo/Koko, Igbeta/Ibuama, Ockiya, Ogbari, Ikata/Oruwari, Yekorogha, Yemainnain/ Karitongha, Amange/Ojoko, Gam-Dede, Oru-Bokolo, Peresuo, Bugo, and Iweka (Alagoa, 1972; 2005; Jones; 1963). The Ogbia have had very close historical links with the Nembe Ijo from ancient times. The tradition of linguistic evidence of Ogbia migration from the east that has similar historical links with Nembe Ijo is very strong (Alagoa, 2009, p.396). The oil exploration and exploitation activities in Nembe today made the people to demand for what they perceive as their right from the MNOCs that operate in their community.

4.4.6 Odimodi Community

Odimodi means “pond of fishes” in the Ijaw language. Odimodi is believed to originate from Idwuni clan, including the Ofogbene people. Like most oil-producing communities, Odimodi, which is in Burutu Local Government Area of Delta State, has a Community Development Committee. Odimodi has some neighbours, including Oghulagha community. The diagram below captures the geographical location of oil-producing communities in Delta State.

Fig 4.4: Map Showing the Location of Odimodi Community in the Niger Delta State

3.5 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

Ontology is the philosophy of seeing, while epistemology is the philosophy of the theory of knowledge. Furthermore, “ontology originates from the Greek words ontos which means being, and logos, that means study” (Sounders, et al., 2012). Ontology, therefore, is referred

to as the study of being. Thus, it is believed that a researcher's ontology is his or her answer to questions, especially when it involves the need to inquire, find out the reality, and the existence of issues and events (Chauncy, 2012). However, situational analysis or incidents requires ontological explanations to offer more insight to circumstances surrounding such development (Chauncy, 2012). As for epistemology, it originated from Greek words, episteme, which connotes knowledge, and logos, which means study. It is, therefore, known as the study of knowledge (Chauncy, 2012, p. 10).

Methodology, epistemology, and ontology have one thing in common: to advance knowledge and bring answers to questions through investigations. All these are utilized in responding to the issues that require attention in a scholarly manner. They are used not only to strengthen the facts on ground, but also to reshape them and promote the objectivity of the researcher. Scholars have argued that ontological and epistemological issues make it possible for a researcher to comprehend socio-economic reality as well as to adopt an achievable and objective approach with high ethical considerations for achieving them (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1995).

In terms of social reality, the people of the Niger Delta communities are aware of their rights and know the practices of MNOCs that affect their sources of livelihood and existence. As a result, they have increased their demand for more attention to be paid to corporate social responsibility issues. The model below demonstrates social reality in an organisation.

Fig 4.5: Figure Showing Social Reality in Organization

The social construction of reality in organizations (Gjersvik, 1993b, p.37); available at <http://www.idi.ntnu.no/grupper/su/publ/html/totland/ch032.htm>; accessed, 20, February 2014.

4.6 Research Methods

In a study such as this, just as in every other research, data collection is crucial. It enriches the work and adds value to the objectivity of the researcher. Interviews were conducted to gather data from three major multinational oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta region on how they formulate and execute their CSR and the outcomes. Questions regarding what the companies have done in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR) were asked, particularly their strategies. In addition, the study tried to know why, despite what the MNOCs have done to promote corporate citizenship, protests and conflicts litter the Niger Delta region. The researcher tried also to ascertain the expectations of the communities from the oil companies and what the MNOCs would have done differently. The respondents, including the leaders of the militants and the youths, were asked why they engage in violent conflicts and what they expect from both the government and MNOCs. Government officials

were also interviewed to know what has been done in the form of interventions to address the issues raised by the host communities over the decades.

There are different types of mixed-methods descriptive design studies, but the one employed for this study was the convergent similar design (Creswell, 2011, p.540), the reason being that, it enables the researcher to collect both qualitative and quantitative data and use the results to understand the research problem. One of the advantages of this method is that both types of information would acquire equal status in sampling, data collection, and analysis (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner, 2007).

There are criticisms against the adoption of only the qualitative method, especially in the area of validity. Quantitative researchers are of the view that it is too subjective and impressionistic, as the result is mostly dependent on the researcher's view of what is relevant to the study, which implies that the process is usually unstructured (Bryman, 2004, p.265). In addition, some scholars argue that qualitative researchers are usually enmeshed in "conspiracy in the relative demise of the techniques" required to make any study objective. In other words, it is believed that they seem to encourage the idea of buying respondents by the yard (Robson and Foster, 1989, p.50).⁶ This, if not taken seriously, would prevent a study from achieving the set objectives. That is why the adoption of the triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative methods in this study is pertinent. In Figure 3.6 below captures the research methods and why a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods is most suitable for this study.

⁶ The issue of objectivity is very critical in every research because it not only makes the study relevant, but also addresses the aim adequately; meeting the targets set, and communicates effectively to the audience / readers. Robson and Foster (1989, p.51) discuss a situation where 'deception is easier to interview one person, than to interview many; to the extent that the respondent may come along to the interview feeling happier to be alone than to be in a place full of strangers.'

Figure 4.6: The Difference between Quantitative and Qualitative Research

Components of research approaches	Quantitative	Qualitative
Philosophical assumptions	Positivist perspective, objective reality, researcher is independent of that which is researched	Postpositivist perspective, naturalistic, social, multiple & subjective reality where researcher interacts with that being researched
Method/Types of Research	Experimental, quasi-experimental, single subject and descriptive, comparative, correlational, ex post facto	Phenomenology, case study, ethnography, grounded theory, cultural studies
Purpose/Goal of Research	Generalizability, explanation, prediction	Understanding, insight, contextualization and interpretation
Questions or Hypothesis	Hypothesis is informed guess or prediction	Question is evolving, general and flexible
Those Being Researched	Randomly selected sample, proportionally representative of population	Usually a small number of non-representative cases
Those Conducting the Research	Etic (outsider's point of view): objective, neutral, detached and	Emic (insider's point of view): personal involvement and

	Impartial	partiality
Data	Questionnaires, survey, tests etc., in the form of numbers and statistics	Written documents from field work, interviews, pictures, observations, objects etc.
Data Analysis	Deductive process, statistical procedures	Inductive process: codes, themes, patterns to theory

Source: Castellan (2010, p.7).

Following the adoption of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, the tools with which the MNOCs level of CSR and its effect on the people and conflict in the Niger Delta region were assessed in the section below. The essence of this is to enhance an understanding of the existing phenomenon (Michael and Myers, 1997, p.5).

4.6.1 Mixed-methods Descriptive Design

In this type of study, data is collected in relation to human behaviour, attitudes and characteristics of a group of people or an individual. Descriptive design can be cross-sectional (interaction with a group or groups) or/and longitudinal (interaction with an individual) study. It can be used to find answers to the research “what is” and “what was” and is described as the best form of data collection that aids the explanation of human behaviour and existence (Bickman and Rog, 1998).

According to McMillan (1996), triangulation is the use of different methods of gathering data or relevant information from different sources (Ikpia, 2005, p.5). In the view of Saunders (2012, p.179), collection of data from multiple sources is a necessity in a case study strategy, as it helps the researcher in reporting what it is supposed to be reported. Jegede (2006, p.126)

asserts that triangulation of methods is usually utilised in generating data and, sometimes, seems better than using a single method, as such combined methods corroborate each other.

This mixed-methods approach gave the researcher the opportunity to investigate CSR and MNOCs in their natural settings (Miles and Huberman, 1994; as cited in Ikonia, 2005, p.4) for an in-depth understanding of the issues under interrogation.

Cohen et al. (2000) and Denzin and Lincoln (2003) argue that the robustness of the data made available through the use of multiple sources of data brings to the fore the complexity and reality associated with quality studies, especially when diverse approaches are employed (Stake, 2003). In this study, the instruments used were in-depth interviews and questionnaires as well as review of MNOCs' reports, policy papers, and published works, among others.

4.6.2 Interviews

Interview refers to a situation where a definite eyewitness or participants in an episode is quizzed (Ogundipe et al., 2006). It is one of the most reliable sources of data generation during research, especially when samples are chosen. According to Henerson, Moris and Fitz-Gibbon (1987, p.4), an interview can be unstructured, semi-structured or structured (Ikonia, 2005, p.5). The researcher lists questions to get responses from the target group. The flexibility of this method of data generation enhances the comprehensibility of opinions or perceptions expressed by the respondents. This is where the creativity of researchers or investigators really matters (Maxwell, 2005). Through interviews (whether an in-depth, semi-structured interview, which allows flexibility to ask questions as interviewee gives some adjustments to the content of interview, or key informants interview) respondents are given more time and space to explore issues than in a survey. However, what matters in interviews are analysis of the specifics, rather than mere generalisations of a large number of people (Fawole et al., 2006, p.9). For instance, this study is guided by the following research questions:

(i) What are the key causes of restiveness in the Niger Delta and how should these issues be managed?

(ii) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies in the Niger Delta and how successful are they?

(iii) What role has the Federal Government played in the conflict resolution and how successful are the strategies?

Thirty-four (34) respondents were interviewed in this study. Of this number, twelve (12) were chosen from four different host communities; twelve (12) were chosen from the public relations departments of the MNOCs; while 10 were chosen from government institutions. A breakdown of these figures is shown in chapter four of this work.

The interview responses were analysed using content analysis. It is one of the oldest approaches employed in analysing qualitative data although the particular application of content analysis differs depending on the nature of the research and the research objectives (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Principally, content analysis is a systematic research tool employed to ascertain the existence of words and concepts. Content analysis can be used for various materials, including texts and spoken words (both video and audio recordings), books, reports, emails and newspapers (Horn, 2009, p. 146-147). This study employed interview sessions that included the use of audio recordings as well as in-depth review of organisations reports and newspapers.

4.6.3 Questionnaires

Questionnaire simply means a data collection form containing a set of questions addressed to a particular population for which information is required (Osiki, 2006). The similarity between interview and questionnaire is that both of them have questions listed by the

researcher to get adequate information from the respondents with the aim of completing a study. Ogundipe et al. (2006, p.99) posit that questionnaires may contain open-ended or close-ended research questions. The subject in close-ended questionnaires does the ranking or choice of responses, while the subject is left to explain responses in his or her own words in open-ended questionnaires.

As Anon (1997) has noted, when items of questionnaires reflect the Likert-type scale, they show agreement or disagreement with the statements in the study (Ogundipe et al., 2006, p. 99). A Likert-type scale involves a series of items. A five-step option or number (1-5) is normally provided to enable the participants to express their opinions. The numbers (1-5) represent a range of options (agreement to disagreement): Strongly Agree is 5; Agree is 4; No Opinion is 3; Disagree is 2; and Strongly Disagree is 1 (Creswell, 2011).

Whether using an open- or close-ended questionnaire, it is the responsibility of the researcher to administer such questionnaires designed for respondents and for the latter to willingly respond to the research questions (Ikpia, 2005, p.4; Henerson et al., 1987). Osiki (2006) avers that a simple questionnaire may contain one or several purposes calibrated into its sub-themes for actual evaluation (p.133). When questionnaires are designed, they must be done in such a way that the questions would be easy for the respondents to understand. Using questionnaires involves quantitative study, which means that researchers gather information in the form of numerals. The outcome of the use of more structured research instruments would mean less detail on behaviour, attitudes, and motivation as well as the objectivity of the analysis (Fawole et al., 2006, p.11).

For this study, five hundred and fifty (550) copies of a questionnaire were distributed to indigenous people in the host communities, staff of multinational oil companies and officials in government ministries, departments and agencies. However, only five hundred (500)

copies were retrieved at the end of the exercise. A tabular breakdown of this is shown in chapter four of this study.

The following considerations must be made before adopting the use of questionnaire: the aim of the study or all the objectives that such investigation seeks to achieve; active search and review of the literature that relate to the area of focus; the gap that the study seeks to fill; current views on the problem of the study; comparative analysis of the available literature with the current opinions (Osiki, 2006, p.134). When all the stated factors are considered, the researcher is prepared to make use of questionnaires to complete the study.

In this study, analysis of the quantitative data involved the use of the questions generated from the research questions and administered to the respondents. Questionnaire on “Conflict and the politics of oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: a review of Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies of Multinational Oil Companies” was administered. The data were analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS Inc.), Version 17.

Variable Labels

Each of the categorical variables had a limited number of values, which represented a distinct label or category:

Gender:

Male	1
------	---

Female	2
--------	---

Age distribution:

10-17	1
-------	---

18 - 30	2
---------	---

31 and above 3

Educational level:

School certificate 1

Bachelor 2

Master's 3

Doctorate 4

Others 5

Other variables, like the place of residence in the Niger Delta senatorial zones, position in organization or current job title, position in the community, and years of experience in community service, are labelled according to the number of variables.

4.6.4 Frequencies

Results from the analysed data were presented in frequency tables, such as percentage, mean, bar chart, and pie chart. This will enable the readers to comprehend the nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta region as it concerns CSR delivery by the MNOCs.

4.6.5 Cross-tabulation

Cross-tabulation was used for categorical measurement in Section 2 of the questionnaire, which deals with the key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta region, its impact on the area and efforts by multinational oil companies (MNOCs) and the government to manage the conflict. Position in organization and in the community, years of experience in community service were cross-tabulated with the key causes of the conflict in the region, impacts and strategies adopted to manage the conflict in the Niger Delta. The results were presented in frequency tables and bar charts.

4.6.6 Measurement level

Numeric variables were nominal, ordinal or scale. They were defined using a simple rule based on the number of values. String variables were set to nominal and numeric variables.

4.6.7 Missing values

This line appeared only if any user-defined missing values are present. Missing variable was represented with 99.

4.6.8 Secondary Sources

The study also consulted exiting data in the form of research papers, books and journal articles that were written by scholars and analysts. It also utilized the works of human rights activists, staff and management of multinational oil companies (Shell, Chevron, Agip and NNPC), reports by government agencies (staff of the Department of Petroleum Resources, Federal Ministry of Environment, and research institutes), community leaders, and non-governmental organisations. Information from these sources were properly analysed and verified for their authenticity.

The youths and elders of the oil-producing communities utilize the power of the media as a channel of making press statements to inform the general public and the global community of what they refer to as obnoxious environmental practices of the MNOCs in their villages. Such press statements are highly relevant in discussing CSR and oil politics in the Niger Delta region. Similarly, in response to allegations against oil companies and their operations, these companies also organise media chats, which are documented by national dailies. Institutions sometimes require permissions in the form of letters before they could grant researchers access to the records of government parastatals, MNOCs and ministries and individuals.

4.6.9 Primary Sources

There are various methods of generating primary data, including semi-structured interviews, open-ended interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions, dyads and triads (Goss, 1996; Bryman, 2004; Fawole et al., 2006). While focus group involves small group, 'dyads' refers to in-depth interviews with two or three people that represent a member of a family or team that use same products (Fawole et al., 2006, p.10). Content analysis is one of the methods of analysing primary data, which focuses on evaluating and interpreting visual materials (Fawole et al., 2006, p. 17).

4.6.10 Limitations of Data Collection Method

The purpose of this section is to describe the limitation for this mixed-methods descriptive design study. There are limitations in every academic work and this study is not an exception. The researcher was limited in many ways, including limited funding, timeframe, and the scope of the study. The researcher needed a lot of stakeholders to balance the data analysis but the survey was restricted to only a few oil corporations in the region, instead of all of them. Survey was done in this research with the notion that the participants from the few oil corporations possess the knowledge to supply the required data. In addition, some respondents delayed in returning their copies of the questionnaire, while others did not completely answer the questions. Besides, some of the respondents needed more time to complete and return their copies of the questionnaire. Some of the respondents, particularly members of Shell, Agip and Chevron as well as government officials, saw the interview as an academic exercise and, therefore, did not want to have anything to do with it.

The study was further restricted by the magnitude of documents demanded by some of the oil companies before allowing the researcher access to their workers. Again, some of the officials of the corporations did not respond to the researcher's request promptly, and this

delayed the process. The oil companies' internal protocol took a lot of time, which affected scheduling of interview. Although bureaucratic settings, economic constraints as well as the goal of the institutions (government and the oil corporations) were strong challenges, the researcher worked very hard to limit the effects of these deficiencies on the result of the findings.

4.7 Ethical Considerations⁷

Ethical considerations are an integral part of any research process. For Polit and Beck (2004), ethical considerations denote the moral standards to be considered by researcher throughout the course or stages of research design and methods. This is because, in every study, the researcher is expected to protect and respect human rights and dignity, and fair treatment and privacy of the participants (Creswell, 2011). That is to say that the “researcher-participants relationship” (p.76) should not be taken for granted or exploited in any manner. Thus, in utilizing mixed-methods study design, data gathering process should be “ethical,” (Creswell, 2011, p. 169); this means respecting the rights of the respondents in the study.

The word “ethics” originated from the Greek words *ethikos* (moral) and *ethos* (character). It implies rules of conduct, customs, or values cherished by a group. Ethics represents a moral principle that involves the obligations and duties of members of any society (Igben, 2000, p.53). Obono et al. (2006) posit that ethics “focuses on the customary ways of acting and universal and relative judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of human conduct”. This affirms the assertion that ethical issues promote the principle of fairness, truth, objectivity and impartiality, thus raising the standard and discipline of scholars and professionals in their endeavours (Igben, 2000). The protection of human subjects and other pertinent considerations are associated with ethics in every study. For instance, the University of

⁷ Along with letter of introduction from her director of studies the student had to get letter officially to enable her visit MNOCs and other stakeholders before conducting interviews.

Minnesota's Centre for Bioethics presents the ethical principle that every research must observe, thus:

research participants must voluntarily consent to research participation, research aims should contribute to the good of society, research must be based on sound theory... ..the degree of risk taken with research participants cannot exceed anticipated benefits of results, proper environment and protection for participants is necessary, experiments can be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons." It is, therefore, necessary for the researcher to" avoid relationships that could reasonably impair their professional performance or could exploit or harm others, inform participants about the purpose of the research, expected duration and procedures, participants' rights to decline to participate and to withdraw from the research once it has started, as well as the anticipated consequences of doing so, reasonably foreseeable factors that may influence their willingness to participate, such as potential risks, discomfort or adverse effects, any prospective research benefits, limits of confidentiality, such as data coding, disposal, sharing and archiving, and when confidentiality must be broken, incentives for participation, who participants can contact with questions (Smith, 2003, p.56).

As we have seen, there are some unavoidable ethical issues involved in a mixed-methods design study, such as obtaining the required permission to gain access to corporate and

government offices. The correspondence sent to such offices must clearly state that the study is purely academic and that the privacy and rights of the participants would be protected. To foreclose any suspicion on the part of the participants and their employers, the letters must clearly state that the outcome of the study would not be utilized for political purposes, but for academic purposes only.

Thus, the essence of ethical consideration is, among others, to reduce possible human rights' or privacy violation in the process of conducting a study or preserving transcribed text from interviews. Marshall (1994, p. 157) argues that there is no clear consensus on ethical rules to be followed when conducting research involving human subjects; however, there are some generally agreed professional guidelines (Obono et al., 2006, p.281). According to Obono et al. (2006, p.284), ethics in research ensures that moral rules are applied in the collection, analysis, reporting and distribution of data and protects the individual's or group's right to privacy, confidentiality and informed consent.

This study observed all the significant ethical guidelines in the process of conducting this mixed-methods descriptive design study as well as transcribing, distributing, preserving and analyzing the text of the interviews and analyzing the results. The researcher sought the consent of respondents and informed the stakeholders of their rights. Those concerned about the anonymity of their responses and positions were assured of the confidentiality of their responses.

4.7 Validity

Validity has been described in different ways. Ravid (2011, p.203-204) claims, "it is the extent to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure and the appropriateness of the ways it is used and interpreted". The concept refers to that aspect of research that reflects that the research measures which it set out to measure, with a consequent accurate result. Put

differently, research validity is proven when the research is able to answer its research questions “and often look for the answers in the research of others” (Joppe, 2000, p.1). Scholars combine various methodological approaches to enhance the validity of their studies. It is proper to note that the issue of validity is a crucial matter as it enhances efficient research, especially when the scholars involved want to adopt a qualitative approach (Patton, 2001). It is also used in collecting and analysing quantitative data and “correlations of tests scores and their prediction of a criterion based on cumulative databases (called meta-analysis-validity generalization)” (Creswell, 2011, p.163). Thus, validity in this case has been taken as a crucial issue because when a study has valid findings, it is both rigorous and cogent.

There are several major types of validity, including content validity, criterion-related validity, construct validity and face validity (Ravid, 2011, p. 203). However, validity is described in some cases as an issue of degree instead of absolute one (Cohen et al., 2007).

4.13 Summary

This chapter described the research approaches and method, research design, and data collection procedures adopted by the study. The chapter also looked at the impact of adopting an appropriate methodology in any academic study, and did an extensive review of the research setting. As the chapter has noted, in every research: it is the responsibility of those who initiated such study to define the objectives, gather the necessary data to perform the analysis and reach plausible, valid findings and conclusions. This chapter has demonstrated that methodological approaches remain paramount to the actualization of study objectives. Securing the consent of the participants is also crucial if the researcher is to gather relevant data that would make the findings of the study valid. The next chapter presents the findings. It also captures the discussions and conclusions drawn from the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the qualitative and quantitative analysis of findings from the field survey carried out in the Niger Delta as part of the investigation to complete this thesis. As noted earlier, the qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis were adopted for this study because none of the methods on their own can completely address all the issues raised in the research questions. Again, both methods of analysis when used jointly, as was done here, help to reduce the issues of bias and validity, thereby enhancing objectivity and ethical considerations, which the study seeks to uphold.

In addition to the survey, the researcher's observations within the period of study further enhanced the objectivity of the work because it was found that the problem of gas flaring and oil spillages experienced by different communities are some of the sources of the broken relationship between the MNOCs and the people. Quantitative data were gathered from respondents in different agencies, companies, and communities, namely: NOSDRA, NDDC, DPR, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, University of Port Harcourt, Ogoni, Nembe, Odimodi communities, Center for the Niger Delta studies, NOAC, Chevron and Shell. They all represent stakeholders in the oil sector, civil society, government agencies and the host communities.

This study attempted to establish the extent of involvement of the respective oil companies in concrete CSR, and by extension, the implication of the prevalent strategy on contemporary Nigerian society where the majority of youths and elders are more interested in what they will personally benefit from the government and corporate practices than physical developmental projects. At the international level, the majority of institutions, especially the United Nations

agencies, are more interested in how the MNOCs can carry out their business activities in a humane manner in accordance with the global best practices. In this regard, there is a high interest and expectation for the MNOCs to adhere strictly to the stipulated global best practices of exploring and exploiting crude oil with an interest in environmental sustainability. This is believed to have the capacity to enhance the relationship between the host communities and the MNOCs. Prior to the presentation and analysis of the data being collected, the chapter begins with a graphic presentation of the interviews and questionnaires distribution and retrieval figures.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

S/No	Community	Fig.	Mnocs	Fig.	Government Institutions	Fig.
1	ZAAKPON	3	SHELL	4	MNDA	2
2	BOMU	3	AGIP	4	NDDC	2
3	NEMBE	3	CHEVRON	4	NOSDRA	2
4	ODIMODI	3			MoE	2
5					UNIPOINT	1
6					CENTRE FOR NDS	1
TOTAL		12		12		10

TABLE 5.1.2 BREAKTDOWN OF INTERVIEWEES

QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION AND RETRIEVAL

S/N	Comm unity	Distribut Ed	Retriev ed	MNOCs	Distribut ed	Retriev ed	Governm ent institutio ns	Distribut ed	Retriev ed
1	ZAA KPON	100	98	SHELL	30	25	MNDA	25	22
2	BOM U	100	90	AGIP	30	21	NDDC	25	24
3	NEM BE	100	95	CHEVR ON	20	12	NOSDR A	25	22
4	ODIM ODI	70	67				MoE	25	24
	TOTA L	370	350	TOTAL	80	58	TOTAL	92	92


Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.3 DISTRIBUTIONS AND RETRIEVAL RATE OF QUESTIONNAIRE

From the table above, five hundred and fifty (550) questionnaires were distributed to three different sets of sample (host communities, MNOCs and government institutions) used for the study. Of this figure, five hundred of the questionnaires were correctly filled and successfully retrieved from the samples.

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

From the available quantitative data, the tables and charts below present the demographic characteristics such as age, educational qualifications and place of residence of respondents. The others are positions in the organization and current job title, years of experience in the position, position in the community and years of experience in community service. Notably, to a great extent, demographic characteristics sometimes shape the patterns of the relationship between the oil companies and the indigenous people as it can explain how staff can take advantage of their positions in the companies to build mutually beneficial relationships. This study benefited from the diverse demographic characteristics of respondents in that it collected data from different age groups and genders as well as from different communities and oil companies to get an objective opinion of different inhabitants of the region on the rationale behind of the Niger Delta conflicts.




Years	Frequency	Percent
18-30 years	244	49
31-45 years	149	30
45 and above	107	21
Total	500	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.4 AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONDENTS

The age aspect of the demographic characteristics of the respondents shows that 49% were between 18-30 years of age, 30% represented those between 31-45 years of age and 21% from 45 years old and above. This means that those that are 18 – 30 years (49%) are more in number when compared with other age groups. Youths between the ages of 18-30 are more vulnerable and prone to conflict than others. They are easily recruited in times of violence particularly when they are unemployed. With particular reference to this research, the youths were readily available not only to provide information but to lead the researcher round to those people whom they think matter in the community. In most of these communities it was also observed that the youths served as a de facto executive arm of government and giving effect to Community Development Committee's (CDC) resolutions against the MNOCs in their area. Their high number in this research, it is hoped, will validate the result of the findings.

Educational Qualification




	Frequency	Percent
School certificate	137	27
Bachelor	222	44
Masters	93	19
Doctorate	17	4
Others	31	6
Total	500	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.5 EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF RESPONDENTS.

On the level of education, the data gathered shows that about 27% of the respondents had a school certificate, 44% a Bachelor's degree, 19% had a Master's Degree with 4% holding a

doctorate. Six (6) % represented others. Those that have Bachelor's degrees are more in number in this research than other levels of education. In other words, those with Bachelor's degrees and below are more likely to be affected by the conflict than those with Master's Degree and above. The reason why the respondent's educational background was explored is because people with different educational backgrounds have varied perceptions of the causes of the conflict and a sense of responsibility towards the MNOCs. This further demonstrates that the people's experience and level of awareness affects their level of understanding of social issues. It is obvious from the table that those with post-graduate degrees exhibit a high level of maturity and level-headedness in their relationship with concomitant high expectations from the MNOC separating in the Niger Delta region.




Place of residence in Niger Delta Senatorial Zones

	Frequency	Percent
Rivers East	120	24
Rivers West	160	32
Rivers South-East	54	11
Bayelsa Central	52	10
Bayelsa West	19	4
Bayelsa East	53	11
Delta East	42	8
Total	500	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

24 per cent of the total number of respondents interviewed were resident in Rivers east, Rivers west - 32%, Rivers southeast - 11%, Bayelsa central - 10%, Bayelsa west - 4%, Bayelsa east - 11% and Delta east - 8%. It is important to state here that the respondent's place of residence is instructive for this research as those within the Niger Delta region speak from their wealth of experience (and most times agony) about the impunity of the oil companies' towards the host communities. They are more aware of the impact of oil exploration activities, (particularly in relation to environmental degradation) than people leaving outside the region. This also explains why this study is concentrated on respondents living in the three core Niger Delta states of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta, rather than the other

six political Niger Delta states created by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act of 2000 which we exhaustively discussed in the chapter one (Background to study).



	Frequency	Percent
Public Relations Executive	20	34
Community Relations Manager	4	7
CSR Manager	6	11
Marketing Executive	2	3
Public and Corporate Affairs Manager	3	5
Community Liaison Officer/Manager	5	9
Social Welfare Officer/Manager	8	14
None	10	17


Total	58	100.0
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Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.6 RESPONDENTS POSITION IN MNOCs

A total of 34% of the respondents were public relations executives, 7% - community relations managers, 3% - marketing executives, 5% - public and corporate affairs managers, 9% - community liaison officers, 14% - social welfare officers and 17% indicated no position/job in any organization. As shown in the above table, companies having public relations executives in this study reveal that there are qualified workers in the oil sector who already have the knowledge of how to encourage the oil companies to act in ways that the rural people, whose communities are already at risk of oil induced environmental volatility, would understand their efforts rather than complicating matters. Their role is to serve as stabilisers in the communication process, ensuring that the people understand the issues at stake and work with the MNOCs to address possible areas of conflict. The public relations officers are supposed to collaborate with the welfare managers and community relations' managers in order to create a synergy that would climax in a cordial relationship between the people and the MNOCs.

Position in the Community




	Frequency	Percent
Traditional ruler	38	11
Opinion leader	100	29
Community development committee	87	25
Youths leader	13	4
Militant leader	4	1
Women/Women's leader	40	11
None	67	11
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.7 POSITIONS IN COMMUNITY

Out of 350 respondents from the host community, 11% were traditional rulers, 100% opinion leaders, 25% community development committee members, 13% youth leaders, 1% militant leaders, 11% women leaders, and 19% had no position. The inclusion of a relatively high number of traditional rulers here is due to a number of reasons: They are easily contactable and always welcome anyone that has an issue to discuss, especially in regard to solving the perennial conflict in the region. The elevated position of traditional rulers gives them the privilege of being able to handle issues between the people in their local communities and the MNOCs. Often, the traditional rulers want their voices to be heard and to have an input in every issue that concerns their people. The traditional rulers perceive this as a form of respect for the traditional institutions.




	Frequency	Percent
0-5 years	15	26
6-10 years	10	17
11-15 years	5	9
16-20 years	18	31
21 years and above	10	17
Total	58	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.8 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ON JOB WITHIN MNOCs

On their official positions, respondents of 0-5 years were 26%, 6-10 years were 17%, 11-15 years were 9%, 16-20 years were 31% and 21 years and above were 17% representing 7 people. The years of experience of the respondents are particularly important in this study because it is a good indicator of the type of relations that each of the MNOCs has been able to establish with a particular head of community development. Furthermore, in this regard, the researcher explored the issue of divide and rule to discover the head of public relations that had experienced the worst crises in the community. The number of years spent in a particular role also suggests the possibility of subjectivity and personal interest, whereas, if the managers are regularly alternated, the issue of personal interest can be eradicated.

Years of experience in the community service



Years of experience in the community service

	Frequency	Percent
0-5 years	28	49
6-10 years	16	28
11-15 years	6	10
16-20 years	5	9
21 years and above	3	4
Total	58	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.9 YAERS OF EXPERIENCE OF MNOCs STAFF IN COMMUNITY SERVICE

Respondents with 0-5 years of experience in community service were 49% (28); 6-10 years were 28% (11); 11-15 years were 48% (6); 16-20 years were 43% (5) and 21 years and above were 4% representing 3 people. It is imperative to highlight the fact that community services are evidently, service to humanity, and such services facilitate an efficient and cordial working relationship between the MNOCs and the host communities. The community service officers have been employed here to determine from their experience, what the communities' major problems are and what could be done to ameliorate them. They interface with the communities, governments and the NGOs; therefore, they have more experience regarding the major causes of conflict as the next section deliberates.

What are the key causes and actors of Conflict in the Niger Delta and how are the issues managed?

Ostensibly, oil is central to the conflict in the Niger Delta. To this end, the Nigeria Watch (2008, p.6) stated, "Oil is, by far, the most disputed resource, followed by land, market and cattle grazing."⁸ This is due to the way oil inspires different interest groups' struggle for the benefits attached to it even more than the people that not only own the resources but bear the environmental degradation accruable from oil mining.

At the initial stage of this study, assumptions were added to the research questions in order to authenticate the logical development of the study. The assumptions included: that an increase in funding for corporate social responsibility, leads to higher resistance from the communities; and the more corporate social responsibility projects are based on community

⁸Nigeria Watch is a database that analyses the patterns and trends of violent deaths in Nigeria; the project has been in existence since 2006, with focus on oil, witchcraft, land disputes, and car accidents among others.

needs, the more grievances and social conflicts are likely to be reduced in the near future. However, this was found not to be the case. The residents of the regions are resistant to both the MNOCs' CSR delivery and strategy. Findings from the interview with most of the respondents reveal that, the MNOCs have been involved in corporate philanthropy, as was the case prior to the global endorsement of CSR. What this implies is that the MNOCs in the Niger Delta do not consider CSR as an obligation (As discussed in chapter one and elaborated in chapter two of this study).

MNOC staffs usually reside in the cities while their drilling and seismic activities take place in the local host communities who feel the impact of oil drilling waste. The respondents argued that since the MNOCs do not experience the negative impact of oil drilling waste they are reluctant in responding to their calls for environmental friendly activities including waste clean-ups. The respondents further stated that the oil companies exaggerate their investments in CSR with the media. In cases where they carry members of the host communities along, the respondents lamented that they know how much the project is worth but what they hear from the media and the websites of the companies are higher. However, a respondent from Nembe in consonance with the literature review of this study believed that Shell has done well in their community engagements and CSR within Nembe community. In his words, Shell's micro-finance and the different trades provided have returned the lost means of livelihood to members of Nembe community. However, another respondent from Nembe community held a different view. The respondent angrily divulged that Shell has done nothing but give them guns to fight each other. According to the respondent, the company has sown seeds of discord among Nembe communities, just like the British merchants divided "our" forefathers. A possible reason why notwithstanding the MNOCs investments in CSR, the region's conflict is yet to be abated as host communities tend to link (MNOCs) activities to the activities of the historical RNC.

Furthermore, residents of the Nembe community noted that historically, the region has recorded a long history of conflicts dating back to 1895 when the community experienced the domination and eventual overthrow of British merchants. Additionally, the current dimension of the conflict has resulted in different forms of violence and deaths. This has the capacity of perpetrating negative perceptions of the oil companies and government officials by the communities. One of the effects of oil-related conflicts is militancy, which disrupted exploration in the region and subsequently necessitated the introduction of the government amnesty programme in 2009. Despite the amnesty initiative, the ‘violent feature’ of the oil resource conflict seems to be a recurring challenge confronting both the MNOCs and the government (KII, Nembe indigene, 2014). This implies that the conflict situation in the Niger Delta has degenerated and resulted in a number of avoidable fatalities due to the inability of stakeholders to play their expected roles or implement agreements reached with different groups which have some stakes in the oil wealth. The foregoing explains why it is apparent to assert that there is a linkage between oil, marginalization and deaths in the communities where oil is exploited. To corroborate this fact, Watts (2004, p.51) noted that the marginalization and deprivation of the people from oil benefits heightened the struggle for resource control, self-determination and the politics of oil. When people are conspicuously excluded from the economic benefits that accrue from resources within their environment, confrontation and resistance, more often than not, characterise the relationship between the resource owner and the exploiter.

In addition to the points analyzed above, Alfred (2013) noted that, of the issues that generate conflict in the region, “crude oil is still having a great effect on underdevelopment in the communities through the triggering of conflicts and other anti-development tendencies like elite-capturing of development projects and programs” (p.125). This is in tandem with the view of an Odimodi community leader who in a statement had posited that the oil companies

and the government are directly and indirectly involved in a matter that requires intervention. The community leader believes that the host communities' underdevelopment caused by crude oil exploitation needs urgent intervention by the MNOCs through timely public relations that must be characterized by friendly communication and the willingness to listen to one another (KII, Odimodi indigene in Warri, 2014). This underlines the need for communication among the three parties as noted in the stakeholder theory, in resolving the conflict. It also makes it obvious that one of the solutions to the key causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta lies with the residents, oil companies, and their workers because, the 60/40 relationship/partnership with the oil companies has weakened government's implementation of its existing environmental policies.

According to a resident of Ogoni, “Our forefathers were ignorant of oil politics, which made them allow companies to operate without proper CSR but Ken Saro-Wiwa later made us realise that we were losing our resources to the oil companies” (KII, Ogoni indigene in Bori, 2014). After realising the cost of environmental degradation and the dynamics of oil politics, the people became more agitated and began protesting for better CSR from the companies. A member of the Community Developments Department of the NDDC also spoke along these lines when he said that the source of the Niger Delta conflict is cumulative stemming from the effects of long years of oil exploration in the region; farmlands have been affected making it difficult for the communities to survive.⁹ Oil companies and government agencies are blamed for neglecting the environment and people, particularly the Ogoni communities, who designed a Bill of Rights and demanded for autonomy and self-determination before and after the killing of the Ogoni nine (Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight compatriots) by Abacha’s administration in 1995 (Watts, 2004, p.68; Aghalino, 2009, p.283). The incident exacerbated

⁹Interview with a staff of NDDC, May 2014.

an already strained relationship between the communities, the MNOCs and the government. The peak of the restiveness was experienced in 2006-2007 with the advent of politically and economically motivated kidnapping in the region (Akhigbe & Koleoso, 2013, p.2).

From a CSR perspective, the ongoing crises in the region have been linked to resource availability and the attendant feeling of exclusion, deprivation and grievance (Mähler, 2010; Watts, 2004, p.51). It is well established that stakeholders are crucial contributors and beneficiaries in every project or business endeavour, which makes it possible for them to identify areas of involvement, roles and expectations especially as far as CSR is concerned. This helps to evolve expected socially responsible behaviour from companies and managers saddled with the responsibility of regulating the affairs of staff. Additionally, in practice, this social responsibility also manifests in the public relations practice of the companies involved. However, from the interviews conducted, the majority of respondents felt that the MNOCs have not played their role as responsible stakeholders. Respondents listed among other things, the neglect of the host communities by both the government and oil companies; the failure of the oil companies to manage and minimise grievances through a timely response to environmentally related issues. These environmentally, related issues are the results from incessant gas flaring and fracking that causes both air and water pollution, poor or delayed CSR projects; and, a lack of employment due to the traditional lands appropriated by the oil companies. The foregoing has been described as critical to the conflict. Furthermore, Ugochukwu and Ertel (2008, p.144) noted that oil spillages are seen as routine occurrences in the Niger Delta. They outlined some of the prominent spillages recorded in the Niger Delta petroleum industry to include: “the Bomu II blowout, 1970; the Forcados terminal spillage, 1980; the Funiwa 5 oil well blowout, 1980; the Oyakana pipeline spillage, 1980; the Okoma pipeline spillage, 1985; the Oshika pipeline spillage, 1993; and the Goi Trans Niger pipeline

oil spill, 2004.” The Bonga oil spill of 2011 is just a recent incident, which has also affected negatively on the relationship between the MNOCs and the local communities.

Over 64 Itsekiri communities such as Ilesami 1 and 2, Madangh, Ajibeku, Ajimaki, Ubala-tie, Orere, Aje-Edede, Akpakpa-Eyitsede, Oguwan, Ogidigben, Oboro among others were in conflict with Shell over the Bonga oil spillage that caused a lot of environmental degradation. The same spill made some Ijaw indigenes in Ilaje part of Ondo state to petition against what they described as Shell’s insensitivity in May 2014, and made demands for compensation and relief materials from the company. The 2011 Bonga oil spill killed some children in the shoreline of coastal villages.¹⁰ The foregoing is perceived as the reason for civil society’s criticisms and argument that the environmental despoliation in the Niger Delta region within the five decades of Shell operations is so pronounced. This is why even neutral individuals and organisations, including Gerd Muller, Germany’s Development Minister, have observed that (after his recent trip to the region): “If you went to the Niger Delta and saw the standard of oil extraction, none of you would use the petrol stations of that oil firm. Apparently, Shell prioritised profit over concern for the environment” (Gbemre, 2014, p.9). It further shows that the problem that drives conflict in the region is not about natural resource endowment but poor abatement measures on environmental degradation usually adopted by the companies in response to gas flaring and fracking which results to contamination of water among other unfriendly practices (Ugochukwu and Ertel, 2008). The disconnect between MNOCs and the host communities has been the crux of the matter in the perennial confrontations that characterises their relationship.

Evoh (2009, p.50) noted that “oil pipeline explosions, and gas flaring are major environmental threats to the people.” Furthermore, these bright but ‘harsh gas-flares’ are what

¹⁰Akeredolu, Leke. 2014. Oil Spill: Ilaje People are dying. The Nation Thursday May 15.

Watts (2009, p.16) described as “the unforgiving, ruthless, and austere world of oil”. The foregoing demonstrates that the conflict in the region is essentially about the environmental and economic impact of oil exploration. This is because after production, water and oil waste have many toxins and are generally dumped in waste pits on people's lands with traces of radioactivity, which brings about health hazards and economic loss. For instance, about 2.5 billion standard cubic feet (scf) of natural gas is flared annually in Nigeria. This means a loss of over \$2.5 billion revenue annually. It is estimated that about 68% of all associated gas is flared, and this represents 12.5% of all globally flared gas. Furthermore, gas flaring by the MNOCs has been confirmed by the respondents to be dangerous to health and a major source of blindness¹¹ in the host communities. It was discovered during the interview that it has negative impact on health of residents. For example, a respondent stated that:

As I'm looking at you now I don't know your face, I cannot see you, as I was coming out somebody held me; although am still vibrant, unfortunately, I cannot even send my children to school again; in this community, you can hardly find someone that is between 60-80 years alive due to pollution; see how poor we are, despite having up to 6 oil wells, see what they (the companies) did to us; we plant but they do not germinate, we now buy almost everything including yam. Shell and the government do not even compensate us (IDI, Ogoni residents, 2014)¹².

¹¹The Researcher observed the state of health of one of the respondents from Ogoni who could neither see her nor observe his environment. He attributed the blindness to gas flaring and pollution as earlier confirmed by a medical doctor. However, he was able to trace the history of oil production to 1958 in Ogoniland.

¹² It is very difficult for people to identify and understand these problems without visiting the Niger Delta communities.

Both gas flaring and oil spillages are health hazards and sources of internal displacement in host communities, which aggravate the high cost of living. Similarly, the problem has also been one of an expectation gap which fuels agitations as the lopsided distribution of oil revenues further aggravates the conflict. This is because communities feel dissatisfied when they are neglected after oil spillage and waste from the MNOCs have destroyed their environments. A case in point that was repeatedly emphasised by respondents, including a member of staff of the Niger Delta Development Commission is the current state of Oloibiri; an oil producing community¹³ where commercial quantities of crude oil were first discovered in Nigeria. Today Oloibiri is desolate after oil exploration and exploitation activities by MNOCs. The argument is that after drilling and production of oil in most communities, especially onshore exploitation, the companies abandon such areas leaving behind a bleak picture of hopelessness, unproductively, an unsustainable environment, and mass poverty due to degradation caused by oil spillage and associated gas flaring. A respondent described this situation as a condition of communities becoming 'a waste land'.

A High Chief in the Niger Delta, with a good knowledge of CSR related conflict in the region argued that:

The whole thing in the Niger Delta is about negligence, the people were not interested in the oil issue until Ken Saro Wiwa became the harbinger of the oil related information, and enlightened the people on how they have been short-changed by the companies. When the boys who are unemployed heard this information, they took up arms against the state

and the companies, which yielded a result in the initial stages (IDI, High Chief in the Niger Delta, 2014).

When the involvement of Shell, Chevron and Agip in conflicts within the Niger Delta is compared, one observes that Shell has been more involved in violent conflicts and crises over poor CSR delivery than other MNOCs due to several reasons. Firstly, the company has been in the oil exploration business since the advent of the first oil production in Nigeria and has explored the resource across most parts of the Niger Delta region. Secondly, both Shell and Chevron are more vulnerable to attacks because of their active involvement in onshore oil fields than other major oil companies. Thirdly, both Shell and Chevron are branded infamous by the oil producing communities for greatly undermining global best practices in terms of CSR, as well as adherence to environmental laws. Various respondents identified this aspect of oversight as part of the problem that made peace elude the region. From NDDC to NGOs and even the rural people, the issue of poor environmental ethics remains the crux of the matter. Even the Nigeria Watch database 2007 and 2008 reports similarly identified this trend. These contributed to the formation of local social movements that culminated in government's repression and death of people such as Ken Saro Wiwa (Olubayo (2014).

Unlike Shell and Chevron, ExxonMobil CSR encouraged a sense of belonging for the local people in n their CSR program. This has been documented in Nigeria Watch (2007, p.10), where it was noted that: "ExxonMobil was more attentive, in terms of employing locals. About 45% of the senior staff and 60% of the junior staff are native to Akwa Ibom, as opposed to 20% in the early 1990s; and the geographic location of wells in deep offshore waters helps to secure their assets" (Nigeria Watch, 2007, p.10; Umar and Naibbi, 2015). The respondents provided that the sense of belongingness provided by ExxonMobil within its host communities is the reason why CSR conflict is not as heightened in other Niger Delta oil producing communities.

Generally, MNOCs have been tagged as sponsors of the gun running business that thrives in the region. Von Kemedi (2006, p.13) states that:


The oil companies have also contributed significantly to the buildup of armed groups in the delta. This is illustrated here by the cases of Nembe, Ogoni and Odioma where groups were either sponsored by Shell or arose out of discontent with the system that Shell uses to maintain control of communities. Examples like these abound all over the Niger Delta.... this is grave damage to community spirit and governance.

The government security forces taking sides with the oil companies have further worsened the breakdown of law and order through confrontational relationships between oil companies and the communities. There have been instances of extra-judicial killings in some communities by the security operatives. Also, the security agencies have on a number of occasions descended on communities protesting against the unsustainable environmental practices of the companies (IDI, Staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment, 2013). This type of behaviour raises concerns about the sincerity of the government to curb the causes of conflict in the region. According to Ogula (2012, p. 12), the lack of "transparency in community-company engagements [is] caused by dishonesty" which makes it difficult for stakeholders to manage MNOCs'-community relations as desired.

Based on the foregoing, it is crucial for the government and oil companies not only to make promises, but also to ensure timely fulfilment of promises made. Some of the failed promises to the local people include, provision of portable water, employment opportunities, good roads, scholarships and electricity and on the other hand, the government's eradication of corruption and reduction of clash of interest between the chiefs/elders and youths of host

communities. As the respondents stated, there are numerous causes of the conflict but the government can help reduce these by not taking sides with the companies as well as by addressing the host communities' problems rather than the opting for the security option of militarizing the communities. Again, it is not in the best interest of the country that the government establishes agencies to ameliorate the sufferings of the people and at the same time, fail to meet up with the demands of such positive interventions by not fulfilling such promises. The current practice is that the interventionist agencies are given mandates without the subsequent power to implement the policies on the environment and the different aspects they have been assigned to specialise in. It then becomes an issue of the Government's failure to empower the agencies and this is not surprising because given the 60/40 relationships; the government will find it difficult to sanction the MNOCs. Again, the sanctioning of culpable companies in the oil spill detection exercise needs adequate government enforcement of its environmental laws without injuring the contending groups' interests.

In Bayelsa state, most of the conflicts revolve around oil spillage and the clashes between the JTF (established in 2003) and militants, such attacks are also prevalent in Delta state with incidences of pipeline vandalism (Adams, 2014, p.22; Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014, p.41). Most social movements and community youths, capitalise on the poor state of their environment to plan attacks against oil companies (Aghalino and Okolie-Osemene, 2014, p.41). Incidentally, this is an area that has led to much trading of blame between oil companies and host communities. While the former sometimes alleges complicity on the part of the oil-bearing communities, the latter alleges negligence on the part of the government and the MNOCs for not attending to the demands of `pipeline repairs and late response to forestall oil spillages.



Are you aware of the conflict over oil in the Niger Delta?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	333	95
No	17	5
Total	350	100.0


TABLE 5.1.10 AWARENESS OF OIL CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the awareness of the people regarding oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta, 95% said they were well informed about the issues that generate conflicts, while only 5% said no.

Similar to the in-depth interviews conducted, findings revealed that the majority of the people in the region and all the stakeholders are well informed about the sources and evolution of the conflict. The confirmation of the awareness of the existence of a rancorous relationship between the host communities and the MNOCs makes the findings, which emerge, at the end of the study empirical. This is because, if the respondents were not aware of the existence of a ruptured and antagonistic relationship between the oil-bearing communities and the multinational oil companies, then the essence of the research would have been lost.

Nature of Conflict



If yes, how would you describe the situation?


	Frequency	Percent
Complex	300	73
Minimal	50	27
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.1.11 STAKEHOLDERS VIEW OF THE CONFLICT

Source: Field Survey, 2013

73 percent of respondents interviewed agreed that the nature of the Niger Delta conflict is complex, while 27% stated that it is minimal. This complex nature of the conflict is as a result of the involvement of different actors, and this has led to some observers seeing the relationship between the stakeholders as highly rancorous and must involve neutral actors in the international community. It equally shows that the first step necessary to de-escalate the situation is for the oil companies to work on their relationship with the aggrieved parties in host communities. Again, this can be achieved through a joint problem solving approach that

focuses on building communication channels to enhance people’s confidence in the companies and eradicate mutual suspicion. These channels must identify problem roots and deal with them.



Do you think the conflict origin can be traced to pre-colonial and colonial periods?

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	136	39
No	193	55
Indifferent	21	6
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.1.12 ORIGIN OF THE NIGER DETAL CONFLICT

Source: Field Survey, 2013

The table above shows that 39% traced the origins of the conflict to the pre-colonial and colonial era, while 55% said no and 6% were indifferent. This shows that CSR related conflicts between host communities and MNOCs is more of a post-colonial phenomenon. The study findings confirm this as an embodiment of truth as commercial oil production in the Niger Delta started in 1958, the threshold of Nigeria's independence. On the other hand, Shell (then Shell BP) was licensed to operate in Nigeria in 1937, hence, the interviewees referred to the company as a product of British colonialism. To this end, the respondents (39%) who alleged that oil-related conflicts started in the colonial era hinge their argument on the fact that their forefathers died in the British Akasa raid- (a resistance war fought in 1895 against British economic domination of the local people). This could be the reason Shell has recorded more conflict than other MNOCs. The host communities apparently disliked Shell from the onset. One of the Ogoni traditional rulers echoed that oil companies, particularly Shell; have not changed from the Royal Niger Company's (British colonial company) pattern of imperialist operation.

Furthermore, the interviewees made reference to the obnoxious laws enshrined in the colonial Nigerian constitution that denied them of the ownership of their natural resources. They further lamented that oil has become a curse to them, yet their demand for resource control has not been heard. If so, why then will Shell continue operating in their land, they ask? The implication of this finding is that, the oil producing communities' grievances are not limited to the current issue of environmental despoliation but extends to the impacts of colonialism in the Niger Delta. This same argument has also been canvassed in the background study of this thesis (Chapter one), where Etekpe (2007, P. 1-2) averred that the extant to which conflict in the Niger Delta region is traceable is due to the rapacious administrative style of the erstwhile colonial masters.




TABLE 5.1.13 Causes of Conflict in the Niger Delta


Causes	Frequency	Percent
Niger Delta is a minority ethnic group	84	24
They have no representation at the senate	73	21
Oil is a cause	175	50
The three major ethnic groups marginalize the Niger Delta people	18	5
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta, 21% attributed them to the region being populated by minority ethnic groups; 21% said poor representation at the senate is the cause;

50% attributed it to oil, 5% argued that the 3 major ethnic groups marginalize the people. It is obvious from the above that the majority of the respondents agree that the cause of the problem in the Niger Delta is centred on crude oil production in the region. The respondents do not particularly believe that the existence of oil in itself is problematic but rather its management. However, this study found that the local people attributed their problem to oil revenue sharing and its ownership. They believe that if they were allowed to own and control their resources or if the Nigerian government maintained the preceding derivation formula as it were when agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the region would not have been restive. Conversely, the majority ethnic groups who have become the major benefactors of the oil mined from the Niger Delta have remained united in the current oil revenue sharing formula. “The country will never experience peace, until our request is granted”, they lamented.

Environmental Impact of Oil Exploration and Exploitation



	Frequency	Percent
None	28	26
Enormous damages	322	74
Total	350	100.0


TABLE 5.1.14 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF OIL EXPLORATION

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the environmental impact of oil, 26 % indicated none as a response while 74% said enormous damages. The majority of the respondents (74%) accepted that the environmental impact of crude oil in the Niger Delta is enormous and devastating. In this regard, the finding of this research agrees with the conclusion of the UNEP (2011) report. The ecosystem has been destroyed by oil activities. Gas flaring and the oil mining waste products have been destructive to the local people's health. In consensus with the UNEP report, this provides that the Niger Delta region and particularly the Ogoniland have been grossly polluted. This study discovered that the hydrocarbon now available in the groundwater in over 98 oil-mining sites has exceeded the international standard as well as the Nigerian standard. The maximum evaluation of liquefied hydrocarbon, in the water line of host communities is over 7,420 µg/l in just one local government (Ataba-Otokroma). The respondents argued that, this severely depleted the aquatic ecosystem and caused a loss of sustenance to the farmers.

The petroleum hydrocarbons that the communities are exposed to (with regards to their drinking water and outdoor air as well as the presence OF benzene, to a level 1000 times above World Health Organization (WHO) parameter), has generated serious health issues within the local communities. According to one of the chiefs and as confirmed by the UNEP

report, life expectancy of the Niger Delta people has been reduced to the age of 50 as against the prevalent 70-80 years in other regions.



What are the Key Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict?


	Frequency	Percent
The Oil Mineral Ordinance	18	22
Revenue allocation formula	322	66
The brunt of oil (CSR)	10	12
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.1.15 KEY CAUSES OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

Source: Field Survey, 2013

The Table above shows that 22% saw the oil mineral ordinance as the main cause of conflicts in Niger Delta, 66% attributed it to revenue allocation formula, and 12% stated brunt of oil as the cause of the conflict. If the revenue allocation formula is the driver of the conflict, then the government and the multinational oil companies can work out the solution and the way

forward. The main conclusion derivable from the analysis above is that the disagreements over the oil revenue allocation are a significant contributor to the Niger Delta conflict. Members of the oil-bearing communities see the current revenue allocation formula as unjust and hence unacceptable to them. The position of the respondents in this section answers the first research question as to what are the key causes of restiveness in the Niger Delta; the answer apparently is the crude oil revenue allocation formula among others.



What is the oil producing communities asking for?

	Frequency	Percent
Resource control	175	50
Adequate derivation formula	59	17
Adequate corporate responsibilities	11	3
Adequate empowerment programmes	45	13

All	60	17
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.1.16 DEMANDS OF THE OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES

50 percent of the respondents saw resource control as the main demand of the people, 17% said the adequate derivation formula, only 3% stated adequate CSR, 13% indicated adequate empowerment programmes, and only 17% described all the demands in the table as things the people want. This study discovered that (notwithstanding the internationalised clamour for environmental justice by both the founder of the Niger Delta protest and the current environmental activists) environmental degradation, although among the key causes of the conflict, is not the major cause of the conflict. Owing to the degenerating environmental situation, the region in consonance with UNEP (2011) report is demanding environmental clean ups and are is also willing to accept a derivation principle which offers 50% of the state's revenue contribution back to the region. The respondents believe that, adoption of the foregoing principles will go a long way in quelling the conflict, without, which the conflicts will continue.

Most of the confrontations with the oil companies, which led to the involvement of state security forces, were by agitations for resource control and adequate CSR and empowerment programmes. The uncompromised participation of MNOCs in the infrastructural and human capital development of the oil producing communities has always been the desire of the majority of respondents. Ogula (2012, p.21) identified this as a common trend in communities where there are great expectations from the state and oil companies. However, if the people

were adequately empowered, the probability of being involved in acts of sabotage would normally be reduced.

5.2 The CSR programs and the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies in the Niger Delta: the effectiveness of these CSR strategies

“I accuse the oil companies of practising genocide against the Ogoni people” --- Ken Saro-Wiwa

One of the respondents quoted the late Niger Delta activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, in the above statement. The respondent further revealed that, Ken Saro Wiwa was killed in 1995 as a result of nonviolent protests but his spirit has been resurrected in Asari Dokubo and in fact all the Niger Delta people. “They (the government and the MNOCs) killed him so as to silence his goodwill for the Niger Delta people but the struggle can only get worse”. The statement was made because of what he and other respondents saw as poor CSR strategy as it concerns environmental ethics. The oil producing states in Nigeria produce more revenue for the federal government than many other states combined and that is why they have continued to demand for more CSR¹⁴ projects. The death of Saro Wiwa did not discourage this demand but rather escalated it.

Following these disturbances Shell agreed to pay £9.6m out of court settlement in 2009, in response to the legal action which accused it of collaborating in the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis. During this period, there were hundreds of other minor court cases instituted in Nigeria over oil spills and pollution. In 2010 for example, Shell admitted spilling 14,000 tonnes of crude oil in the creeks in 2009, double the year before and quadruple that of 2007 (Vaughan, 2011).

¹⁴This was also confirmed by an NDDC staff who stated that billions of Naira is required for development of the Niger Delta region.

Idowu (2014, pp.23-24) emphasised two notable CSR delivery modes in the country. They are: (i) internal (corporate philanthropy, direct implementation and use of community-based organizations or foundations) and (ii) external which includes intermediary organizations, strategic partnerships, foundations and multi-stakeholder schemes. Ogula (2012, p. 4), stated that over the years, internal (Philanthropic) projects like the award of scholarships, cash payments, agricultural projects, the provision of schools and healthcare centres, and road construction have undoubtedly characterised the CSR strategies of the companies, but the limitation has always been the inadequacy of such projects in the long term (Ogula, 2012, p.4).

The partnering aspect of CSR delivery has resulted in the signing of MOUs in the Niger Delta especially between the communities, their associations or development unions and the MNOCs. This is where companies like Shell and sometimes Chevron are sceptical about embarking on agreements with communities that are highly fragmented, because sometimes-different groups come forward to demand similar things from the companies in the name of the same community. It therefore, becomes more difficult to identify a genuine group that truly represents the entire community. These problems notwithstanding, among other MNOCs, Shell's strategy, has been to create strategic partnership with other stakeholders in the oil sector to construct and rehabilitate roads, provide water, healthcare and other needs of the communities (Ogula, 2012, p.5).

5.2.1 The effectiveness of the CSR strategies of the oil Companies

In Nigeria, Shell, Agip and Chevron as major operators in the petroleum industry are expected by both communities and government agencies to provide support in developing the communities in which they operate. However, the recipients of these projects in the local communities question the effectiveness of the MNOCs' CSR strategies. The stance of the

respondents can be ascertained by verifying the level of effectiveness of the MNOCs' CSR strategies. For instance, CSR is seen as successful when the target beneficiaries are well taken care of, while it is seen as sustainable and effective when the basic needs of communities are considered during the conceptualization, design and implementation of these projects. In addition, an effective CSR is expected to target those pressing needs of the people. On the other hand, the yardstick for measuring the success of the CSR projects of oil companies would not only be from the existing projects but from the level of development, observations of the people in host communities, and reports of MNOCs involved.

From the researcher's observations during the field survey and interviews with the communities, MNOCs and the government, all the major oil companies have executed different forms of CSR projects ranging from power supply to water supply, the training of young graduates in skills acquisition, and the rehabilitation of rural roads, which facilitate linkages between various communities and intergroup trade relations. However, what was lacking from the findings is the effectiveness of these CSR projects in transforming the lives of rural people. For instance, one of the respondents interviewed - a University of Port-Harcourt scholar - stated that, it is not disputable whether MNOCs are involved in CSR delivery but what requires critical investigation is to ascertain whether or not such projects are properly executed.

According to Watts (2009), corporate social responsibility projects designed and executed in most communities appeared "as a raft of unfinished community projects all of which have contributed to resentments among the youths" (p.20). To corroborate this claim, a recent report showed that in November 2014, over 100 aggrieved youths of the Ogboloma community in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, took over the town hall and prevented the earlier scheduled inauguration of the Shell Petroleum Development Company - funded projects that

were executed by the Gbarian – Ubie Cluster Development Board. They alleged that the projects were uncompleted, old and that the company's contribution to community development did not reflect the huge oil wealth accruing from the area (Idio, 2014, p.7). On the other hand, a staff member of the NDDC stated his believe thus: it is laudable for Shell to have initiated rural electrification, housing projects, internal link roads, and concrete walkways for the people. That is supposedly, based on the principles of concrete CSR delivery but noted that the problem here can be linked with elongated planning of projects. A situation, where CSR projects are implemented many years after their planning: when the people would have desired new projects to justify the huge profit that oil companies generate from their communities.

The research findings further demonstrate that, the public awareness of the CSR related conflict in the Niger Delta communities is not in doubt. The foregoing goes to answer the first part of the second research question on the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta – public awareness of CSR related conflict in the area confirms this. Nevertheless, these CSR strategies are unsuccessful and that explains the perpetual rumblings in the oil-bearing communities.

From the interviews conducted, respondents reaffirmed the disturbing nature of the conflicts, which has attracted media attention in recent times. There are arguments that some community projects and the Memorandum of Understanding are 'shrouded in secrecy and ambiguity; while the companies are alleged to be cutting deals with local chiefs, some of whom are neither resident in their communities nor accountable to host communities as required' (Watts, 2009, p.20). Also, a youth activist in the region maintained that:

Divide and rule has been identified as a major source of oil related conflict in most communities. The divide and rule practice of MNOCs manifests in

their manner of approaching or meeting the CDC chairmen of some communities, and psychologically attacking them with a question on why should they cry more than the bereaved and diplomatically convincing them to accept a certain amount of money in lieu of CSR projects (Respondent, Special Assistant to the Director of an NGO in Rivers State, 2014).

As observed earlier, in examining the success of the CSR projects and its delivery strategies, one must ascertain whether such projects are properly executed and if target communities benefit from them; and the capacity of such projects in abating oil related lethal violence.

According to Paul Arinze, General Manager of the Nigerian Corporate Affairs, British Gas (BG) Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited offered some Nigerians the opportunity to work overseas and also made great impact in the development of its employees.¹⁵ Just like BG, Shell has also gone beyond infrastructural development to mainstream human resource development into the company's CSR delivery initiatives. This aspect of Shell's CSR strategy has made the company outstanding in the oil and gas industry. For instance, in November 2014, Shell awarded about 20 Nigerians N15 million (75,000 dollars each) in its live wire programme, with the aim of enhancing young people's potentials in the establishment of their own businesses.¹⁶ When such businesses are developed, the beneficiaries' self-reliance would be guaranteed. On the other hand, in analyzing Shell's relationship with the people and their CSR in Ogoniland, one respondent had this to say:

¹⁵ Compassnews, November 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.oilandgaspress.com/wp/?p=4765#XiaXcmTSfSufuDgv.99>

¹⁶Obasi, Sebastine. 2014. 20 Nigerians benefit from Shell's N15m livewire.

[o]ur oil has been tapped by Shell, but we do not benefit from the oil, and that is why the people desire more from the companies. The general MoU states that Shell has not implemented any part of the GMoU, especially in Ogoni (KII, Ogoni indigene in Bori, 2014).

On Shell's role in Ogoni land, another resident had this to say:

There has not been proper development of the Ogoni, and unemployment has not been given the required attention to ameliorate the sufferings of the masses; even power is supplied by the government and not Shell; Ogoni people are not those that break oil pipelines (KII, Ogoni indigene in Bori, 2014).

The problems, which Shell has with some communities, are particularly caused by the destruction of their farmlands through oil spillage and this in recent times has forced the company to restrict its operations to safer sites, especially offshore.¹⁷

On the government's intervention, it is believed that they have been "striving to meet the basic human needs but most people are never satisfied" (Staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment, KII, 2014). It is also important to note that the aim of the amnesty programme (a programme charged with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of various militant groups in the Niger Delta) is said to have been achieved to an extent, given that the Niger Delta was a no-go-area prior to the amnesty in 2009. Some respondents cited Warri and other towns as safer areas now, although the government is yet to really fulfil its pre-amnesty promises to the communities especially to those youths that were disgruntled.

¹⁷Interview with a staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment, Abuja.


During the fieldwork an environmental rights activist disputed the Ministry of Environment's average rating of companies' performance with the following argument:

Doing well by the companies is not a way to look at the issues at stake; the fact of the matter is that there are laid down rules and regulations that guide the operations of the oil companies for them to work with. Why the companies have tended to enjoy the laxity in their operations is the joint venture they enjoy with the federal government; and why the government is willing to defend the companies at all cost is to ensure that revenue is not affected: to keep the oil flowing with the aim of raising the revenue profile of the government without concern for the communities, given that they are not part of the existing joint venture partnership. The fundamental thing is that Nigeria is a mono economy as revenue generated from oil is the main source of income. When the issue of development is raised, the companies quickly respond that the money goes back to the government in the form of tax (IDI, 2013).

In summary, even though the communities are aware of the CSR projects of the MNOCs, the findings of this research shows that as far as CSR is concerned, none of the communities are satisfied with the efforts so far, especially in the areas of economic empowerment and environmental sustainability.

5.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR) programmes /projects by Multi-national Oil Companies (MNCs) and its impact on conflict resolution in the Niger Delta

Awareness of corporate social responsibility policy



	Frequency	Percent
Yes	50	81
No	8	19
Total	58	100.0

TABLE 4:16 HOST COMMUNITIES AWARENESS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICY BY MNOCs


Source; (Field Survey, 2014)

Sometimes, the level of awareness about certain programmes depends largely on the value placed on the issues at stake by individuals on the one hand, and the role of the stakeholders involved in the planning of the programmes on the other. On the awareness of CSR of

companies, the table above shows that 50 respondents representing 81% answered yes to the questions to indicate their awareness of the CSR, while about 8 (19%) said no. Since most of the respondents are aware of CSR programs within their companies, it was easy to access such organizations' activities and engagements in CRS related programmes, policies and membership of international bodies that promote CSR.

TABLE 5.16

Membership of organizations that promote good governance, standard operation and policy options with respect to CSR



Source: Field Survey, 2013

From the bar chart above, it was observed concerning the questions on organizations that in promoting good governance and the standard of operation and policy options, that 45%


responded yes, while 4% said no, whereas 36% are indifferent to question on the membership of organizations that promote good governance. 23% said yes, 26% said no while 34% were indifferent on meeting UN standard of CSR. 20% said yes and 32% responded no, to the question on whether the company they work with is meeting the global mining standard in line with the UNEP report. 12% said yes, 38% said no while 30% remained indifferent on their awareness of GMoU between the companies and the communities.

The quantitative responses above demonstrates that it is necessary to identify some of the issues that have a nexus with CSR management as far as public relations are concerned; they are, health and safety, energy conservation, public policy, environmental pollution, involvement in public, social donations and community relations (Ndu & Agbonifoh, 2014). All these cannot be enhanced by mere public declarations of MNOCs on being actively involved in CSR delivery in their host communities. And it is condemnable when the companies pay little or no attention to issues arising from their public relations style or the channels of communication that facilitate corporate activities.

It is argued that the extra-judicial killing of renowned environmental rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, led to the introduction of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) in Nigeria to regulate the relationship between the MNOCs and the host communities and to enable both partner in accelerating development of the region. This made CSR project delivery by Shell, Chevron, and Agip among other MNOCS to be executed utilising a community-friendly form of GMoUs (Alfred, 2013, p.124). This does not mean the development initiatives of the MNOCs stops at the CSR projects. In fact, there are also other supports that they give to the communities outside the GMoUs.

MoUs are expected to address issues of relevance, namely: social amenities and infrastructure; skills acquisition by host communities, portable drinking water, electricity,

good and durable roads and bridges; the development and improvement of schools, universities, hospitals and suitable health care centres, the donation of books and money to schools and health centres; prevention of pollution of the air, water and land in the communities among other environmental and development issues (Nwaeke, 2015). The extent to which MNOs have faithfully implemented these various components of typical MoUs was tested in the next question and the result that emerged was quite revealing.



CSR Programmes/projects by MNCs

	Frequency	Percent
Infrastructural development	21	6
Provision of health facilities	14	4
Employment and empowerment	24	7
Provision of scholarships and other educational development	77	22

Peace building and conflict awareness programmes	56	16
Philanthropy and charity	18	5
All	63	18
None	77	22
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.17 HOST COMMUNITIES PERCEPTION OF THE FOCUS OF MNOCs
CSR PROJECTS

Source: Field Survey, 2013

In the above table concerning host communities' awareness of CSR projects and programs of the MNOCs, 21 (6%) responded that the companies have been focusing on infrastructural development, 21 (4%) represents the provision of health facilities, 24 (7%) supported employment and empowerment, 77 (22%) represent the company's capacity in the provision of scholarships and other educational development, 56 (16%) peace building and conflict awareness programmes, 18 (5%) philanthropy and charity. 63 (18%) identified all the project, as being executed by the companies, while 77 (22%) responded none to the question. Having outlined in the preceding section what the components of a typical MNOC's CSR programme should encompass, the table above sought to know from respondents whether the MNOCs have truly engaged in providing these benefits to their host communities. The result as we can see from the table shows that the companies have engaged in different forms of CSR projects, (as only 22% denied knowledge of any CSR project in their community); however as argued in the opening paragraphs of this section, the problem with these projects is that they are perceived as ineffective and hence of no relevance to the local people.

Beneficiaries of MNOCs CSR

Benefactors	Frequency	Percent
Youths	130	37
Women	67	19
Men	39	18
Traditional rulers	39	11
All	21	6
Indifferent	30	9
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.18 PRIME BENEFICIARIES OF CSR PROJECTS


Source: Field Survey, 2013

The majority of the respondents numbering 130 (37%) agreed that the Niger Delta youths have been the highest beneficiaries of the MNOCs' CSR, 67 (19%) said women, 63 (18%) said men, 39 (11%) said traditional rulers have been benefiting more, 21 people (6%) responded that all categories have been benefiting from the CSR packages, only 30 people representing 9% were indifferent.

This means that most of the CSR projects have been focused more on the younger generation. Emphasis on youth development projects by MNOCs is expected to have reduced tension in the host communities because, youths being the most volatile group in any community, any

concentration on their area of need is expected to have doused tension in the oil bearing communities. Nevertheless, in spite of this widespread distribution of the beneficiaries of MNOCs CSR programme, the rumblings from host communities have not abated.

Assessment of CSR Development Impact



Programme Assessment	Frequency	Percent
Satisfactory	123	35
Moderate	35	10
not satisfactory	192	55
Total	192	100

TABLE 5.19 ASSESSMENT OF CSR IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITIES

Source (Field Survey, 2013)

In the field survey on the assessment of CSR development impact, about 123 people representing 35 % of the respondents stated that it is satisfactory, while 35 (10%) described it

as moderate. 192 people representing 55% described it as not satisfactory. This finding that the CSR projects are not satisfactory is in tandem with the laws that govern the relationship between oil producing communities, MNOCs and the federal government as outlined by the Niger Delta Technical Committee (2008). The finding from this question also goes to reinforce the second hypothesis that the more CSR projects are haphazardly implemented the more social conflict will continue to aggravate in the region as the host communities will see such projects as unsatisfactory.





TABLE 5.20 MNOCs PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR HOST COMMUNITIES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

The above chart shows the MNOCs public relations for the host communities. A total of 40% agreed on the provision of social amenities, while 59% disagreed. Only 1% was missing. Also only a total of 49% agreed on the creation of employment while 59% disagreed. 48% agreed on financial assistance aspect of public relations for host communities while 52% disagreed.

The apparently higher number of respondents who disagreed with the three categories where the MNOCs have expectedly been engaged in CSR demonstrates that the MNOCs operating in the Niger-Delta have not been able to build a better image as responsible corporate citizens in the eyes of the average oil company staff. As stake holders in the oil exploration and exploitation project, there is need to build bridges of mutual trust and empathy for maximum attainment of their common goal.



Source: Field Survey, 2013

The community relations of the companies showed that only 37% were in agreement that the companies educate the host communities on company policies; 63% disagreed. 46% agreed that MNOCs usually ascertain the opinion of communities on the Niger Delta conflict, while 64% disagreed. 41 percent agreed that the companies usually identify areas of need and 54%

maintained that the companies do not find out areas of need before embarking on CSR projects.

During the field research, it was apparent that this lack of consultation before embarking on CSR projects delivery fuelled resentments and contributed to the many issues which led to conflict in the Niger Delta.

MNOCs Conflict Resolution Approaches




TABLE 5.22 HOST COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTION OF MNOCs CONFLICT

RESOLUTION APPROACHES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

Results from the field investigation indicate that, 37% of the total respondents are in support of a conventional approach in resolving conflicts. Regarding the use of a community forum,

32% mostly agreed, 60% agreed while only 8% disagreed on the use of rural community forum in managing conflicts. Again, while 61% disagreed on the need to combine both conventional and arbitration system only 39% agreed on such initiative. The conventional approach to conflict resolution refers to the use of the formal court system; while the arbitration system, as noted earlier in chapter two of this work (Section 2.3:7 of the literature review) refers to the use of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to resolve the Niger Delta conflict. From table 4.22 above, it is obvious that many respondents (63%) do not favour the use of the conventional court system to resolve injustice meted out on the Niger Delta people by the duo of MNOCs and the Nigerian government.

This may not be unconnected with the slow and sometime ineffective nature of the Nigerian court system. Not surprisingly, a total of 92% would rather prefer the rural community forum for oil conflict resolution; at least at the town centre (and most probably before the traditional chief priests) it would be impossible to compromise justice. Going further, 61% of the respondents disagreed on a combination of the conventional court system and the arbitration system, ostensibly due to its perceived inefficacious nature as MNOCs with their global power and influence can circumvent or manipulate the process. The apparent lack of faith in the conventional approach and the arbitration system, and the expected reluctance of the MNOCs to subject themselves to the rural-community forum, may explain the resort by host communities to aggressive behaviour to drive home their frustration from the activities of the former (MNOCs).

Press Coverage on the Niger Delta Crisis





TABLE 5.23 HOST COMMUNITIES PERCEPTION OF PRESS COVERAGE OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the adequacy of press coverage of the Niger Delta crisis, about 55% disagreed that there is adequate newspaper coverage, 20% agreed, while only 25% most agreed on the adequacy of newspaper coverage in the Niger Delta. 57% disagreed on radio and television reports of the conflicts, 34% agreed while 9% most agreed. 29% agreed that the people of the Niger Delta have a medium for expressing their views, while 20% most agree. 51% did not agree that there is a medium to express them-selves. This belief by 51% of the respondents that there is no medium for expressing their grievances against the MNOCs may explain the resort by some members of the host communities to the use of violence to draw oil companies' attention to perceived shortcomings in their relationship. When people who are marginalized feel that the avenue for expressing their displeasure over their problem has been blocked by

the oppressor, the result has always been violence because there is no feeling more difficult to suppress than a feeling of frustration; needless to say that this feeling of frustration by the host communities goes to fuel the restiveness in the region.



Do You Think Your Company Has Been More Involved in CSR or Crisis Management?


	Frequency	Percent
More In CRS	38	65
More In Crisis Management	15	26
Indifferent	5	9
Total	350	100

TABLE 5.24 STAFF PERCEPTION OF CSR PROJECT

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On whether the MNOCs have been more involved in the delivery of CSR projects or crisis management, 38 staff representing 65% of the respondents saw the MNOCs as more involved

in CSR delivery. 15 (26%) believed the company has been more focused on crisis management, while 5 (9%) were indifferent. This further confirms on face value how much the companies have been involved in CSR projects, and that the welfare of their host communities has been part of their goals. Interestingly, just like the response in our Table 4.17 shows, involvement in CSR projects by MNOs does not convert to commitment to the realization of its positive effects on host communities. This is because some of these CSR projects are either left uncompleted or abandoned soon after delivery; some are not even the people's immediate need, while some are constructed to buy time from the host community. In the face of all these, even the most genuine CSR project converts more or less to a crisis management project.



Challenges of CRS

	Frequency	Percent
Poor budget	7	12
Youth restiveness	26	45
Communal conflict	14	24
Traditional belief	6	10
All	5	9
Total	58	100.0

TABLE 5.25 CHALLENGES OF SUCCESSFUL CSR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION BY MNOCs

Source: Field Survey, 2013


From the table and chart above, it is obvious from the perception of the staff of MNOCs that youth restiveness is a major challenge facing the CSR initiatives of the MNOCs. This represents (45%) 26 of the respondents. Similarly, 14 (24%) respondents believe that communal conflict is the problem and explain the reason for this in the delay in CSR delivery. Also, 7 (12%) of the people argued that poor budget is the challenge facing CSR. 6 (10%) identified traditional belief, while only 5 (9%) maintained that all factors are responsible for the perennial challenges experienced in the process of implementing CSR. From our analysis above, youth restiveness and communal conflict have combined to pose the greatest challenge to a successful delivery of CSR projects by the MNOCs in the Niger Delta region. This situation will come as a surprise to no one, because as the earlier analysis has shown, most of

these CSR projects are either too little, left uncompleted, ill-maintained or out rightly executed in bad faith. In this kind of context restive youths or community members acting collectively may resist any attempt to be foisted with inept CSR projects or programmes. Again, it is also obvious that traditional believe shave some kind of nexus with the issue of oil and cultural crisis as studies by Aghalino had shown:

The link between unsustainable petroleum exploitation in the Niger Delta and the destruction of the indigenous homeland and culture of the people is undeniable. Traditional lands have been sacrificed on the altar of irresponsible oil policies. The point of interest is that the environmental degradation occasioned by oil pollution and gas flaring is instrumental to the cultural crisis in the region (2011, p.5).

This cultural crisis has aggravated the problem of economic dependence in various families.

How effective are the Oil Companies CSR strategies?



Effectiveness of CSR

	Frequency	Percent
Effective	106	30.2
Ineffective	126	36.2
Moderate	84	24.4
Indifferent	34	9.2
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.26

On the effectiveness of CSR, a total of 106 out of the respondents (30.2%) found CSR to be effective; 126 (36.2%) found it to be ineffective; 122 (24.4%) found it to be moderate; while 34 (9.2%) were indifferent. This finding makes it pertinent for the oil companies to still contribute to the special Niger Delta Infrastructural Intervention Fund, increase their commitment to the cleaning up of polluted communities and pay, without delay, compensations for the lands degraded by oil spills as earlier recommended by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (2008, p.74). This also relates to what Udeke (1995), described as an urgent need, to address the economic implication of the petroleum pollution of farmlands as it does not end with just damage to crops alone but further affects soil fertility and crop yields. The respondents further lamented that the destruction of land affects

indigenous economic, social, religious, cultural and political ways of life of the communities. “Oil spillage has eroded our traditional form of worship. It has washed off "our gods" and their prosperous harvest placed in our farmlands without replacement”.

These findings support the assertions of scholars who argue that environmental degradation caused by oil spills and flaring of gas leads to forced migration of game animals and destruction of farmlands culminating in the unemployment and cultural crises in the region (Udeke, 1995; Aghalino, 2011; Aghalino 2009, Oseloka, 2010; Report on the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008).

5.3 The Role of the Federal Government in the CSR Related Conflict and the Success of the Strategies

The government’s involvement in oil exploration and exploitation makes it necessary for it to be actively involved in the resolution and management of oil related conflicts between different stakeholders. To this end, the Federal Government of Nigeria has played a number of roles in both the resolution and management of oil related conflicts in the Niger Delta. It has achieved these by strengthening the legal framework needed to regulate the activities of the MNOCs, through third party intervention, the establishment of committees and the creation of commissions to accelerate the development of the area.

Specifically, several meetings have been held between government officials and representatives of militant groups and sometimes directly with the militants themselves. A case in point is the series of meetings held with the militants (sometimes referred to as ‘the boys in the creeks’ meeting with stakeholders) in July and August 2007. The meeting was attended by the then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, Senator David Brigidi, key actors in the Warri creeks, and some representatives of the oil states’ Peace and Rehabilitation Committees (Watts, 2009, p.21). The meetings offered the opportunity for them to discuss possible ways of brokering peace, the demilitarization of the Niger Delta and as a corollary, a

truce between the Joint Task Force and the militants. The National Assembly's (Nigeria's central legislature) House Committee on Environment also provides a platform for mediating between stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry. This can be achieved by organizing public hearings on oil and environmental related matters.

Other efforts by the government to resolve conflicts between the host communities and the MNOCs include the establishment of the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) in 2004. The Federal Ministry of Environment in compliance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Cooperation (OPPRC) initiated NOSDRA (Ugochukwu & Ertel, 2008, p.145). This intervention by the Federal Government, which has enormous legislative significance, is intended to help in regulating the activities of the international oil companies in the country.¹⁸ NOSDRA evaluates and determines the causes of spills and respond appropriately; it also allows NGOs, CBOs and communities to send representatives to ensure transparency during oil spill investigations. Further, on the issue of oil spillage, a staff member of NOSDRA stated that:

We criminalise negative actions of operators in the oil industry, and possibly sanction companies found culpable in oil spills, just like we recommended Shell to be sanctioned with five billion dollars in December 2011 for the Bonga oil spillage of over 40,000 barrels of crude oil into the Atlantic Ocean due to equipment failure of loading vessel. However, our laws do not give us the power to enforce the recommendation, which we

¹⁸ One notable problem with such laws is that some of them have not guaranteed strict enforcement and sanctions. A staff of Environmental Rights Action in an interview with the researcher also noted this.

sent to the Federal Government. We are doing the right thing to accommodate the needs of the people. The Federal Government also did the right to set up these agencies. The federal legislature has to review our laws and make changes for the laws to be effective (IDI, 2013).

Furthermore, on the issue of gas flaring, a Department in the Federal Ministry of the Environment addresses the issue of gas flaring.¹⁹

It is however, highly conspicuous that the enforcement of laws is always an issue in Nigeria, especially in the oil and gas sector and that is why the issues of oil spill, environmental degradation and gas flaring have not been nipped in the bud as expected. This is where constitutional review and strengthening of the criminal justice system is pertinent to accommodate any lapses in environmental laws, because one thing is to criminalize certain unethical practices, another is to enforce the laws by ensuring compliance by the sanctioned companies.

From the above elucidations, it is clear that there are legal mechanisms in place to regulate the relationship between MNOCs and the host communities. However, the implementation of the laws is the problem. For instance, in the investigation of the incidents of oil spills of the MNOCs, it is interesting to point out that the Nigerian government largely depends on MNOCs such as Shell to provide the technical expertise and/or to authenticate issues of spills (IDI, Environmental Rights Action, 2013). How then do you enforce sanctions on a company that provides you with the requisite technical expertise to investigate an oil spill? This

¹⁹Senior officer in the Environmental Impact Assessment Department of the FME, 2014.

demonstrates a conflict of interest and it is a limitation on the part of government to effectively represent the interests of the host communities (Hutchful, 1983; Epelle 2004, p.19).

The effectiveness of the federal Government's intervention strategies in the oil industry would have been strengthened within the framework of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) (now Petroleum Industry Bill Governance (PIBG)) if it had been passed into law as the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA). The PIB aims to increase local content in the oil sector; introduce a participatory approach of the people in the industry and; give indigenous people more sense of belonging. The PIB, which is about 223 pages long, has as one of its objectives to develop indigenous manpower and encourage the use of local resources and services, thus contributing to economic empowerment. It would also address what Evoh (2009, p.48) calls 'unsustainable patterns of resource exploitation and community relations that contributed to the destruction of the foundations of traditional economy in the Niger-Delta, as well as end decades of lethal ecological war'.

Most peace-building workers in NGOs believe that the Federal Government has indirectly fuelled the conflict by not attending to the people's immediate needs. Such needs include the passage of the PIB, which they believe would have helped to economically empower the indigenous people, and hence reduce the problem of unemployment. For them, the non-passage of this bill explains why there is a high rate of anti-social activities in most oil producing communities. According to a respondent, "Etche is a major contributor to the global economy, but nothing is happening there, the oil companies come and go without developing the community. The oil companies are not respecting us, they tap our resources and go; there is no recognition of the landlords" (IDI, Comrade in the Niger Delta, 2014).

From the above statement by an interviewee it is no surprise that joblessness has heightened the host communities' frustration especially amongst graduates. The majority of able bodied young men are seen all over the Niger Delta cities riding 'keke napep' (a tricycle transport vehicle) in order to raise money needed to meet some of their basic human needs. This trend further discourages most youths from acquiring higher education. The crisis in the Niger Delta is worsened by the failure of the Federal Government to directly empower the people.


However, the believe of some residents of the host communities have been countered by a staff member of NDDC who when interviewed maintained that:

The satisfaction of basic human needs has not been achieved as expected, because the NDDC budget is over 200 billion in a year, but the development needs of the communities are far beyond the contribution of the FG and the oil companies. Thus satisfying the basic needs of the people becomes a problem. Comparative analysis of all agencies that existed before now shows that NDDC has done very well, having focused on manpower development. There is hardly any community you will visit today and see pipe-borne water, good roads and electricity without mentioning NDDC. Many businesses would collapse if NDDC stops operating in the Niger Delta (IDI, NDDC Staff, 2014).

Most youths in the region hold an opposite view. They believe that government officials do not get to the grassroots to identify the basic needs of the people. They also believe there is corruption and impunity in the NDDC and the duplication of the NDDC roles by the Ministry of Niger Delta reduces each agency's responsibility, and therefore should be able to undertake

the needs of the region.²⁰ From the interviews conducted, it was observed that employment generation and everything that gives priority to empowerment of the youths and women are the main basic needs that should never be downplayed by the government and MNOCs. The implication of this finding validates the third hypothesis that if MNOCs and government embark on programmes and projects that stimulate the local economy (like employment generation and youth empowerment), then incidences of social conflicts in oil bearing communities will lessen.

5.3.1 The Extent of the Federal Government's Efforts in Resolving Conflicts in the Niger-Delta



What Programmes have Been Implemented by the Federal Government to Manage the Conflict in the Region?

	Frequency	Per cent
Indifferent	13	14
Some	70	77

²⁰Interview with the Niger Delta youths, 2014.


A lot	9	9
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.27 EFFORTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RESOLVING THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

The aim of this section is to assess Federal Government's efforts in resolving the conflicts in the Niger Delta. From the data gathered, 14% of the respondents were indifferent to the questions raised on this issue while 77% disclosed that the government made some efforts to manage the conflicts in the region. Only 9% stated that the government has made a lot of efforts to address the region's perennial conflicts, thereby promoting development. Some of the programs designed and implemented by government to manage the conflict include: the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board, OMPADEC, NDDC, the National Directorate of Employment, Amnesty and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs among others. With exception of the amnesty initiative of 2009, most of the programs introduced by the government have been largely unsuccessful. The amnesty initiative recorded some measure of success because most of the militants after disarmament have been empowered with paid jobs, contracts or prevocational jobs.

Government role in resolving Niger Delta conflict




What Role do You Think the Government has Played so far in Resolving the Conflict?

	Frequency	Per cent
Local dialogue	7	8
Policy, legal and regulatory framework such as NDDC, PTF, etc	21	23
Participatory planning	12	13
Infrastructural development	24	26
Capacity building	9	10
All	16	17
None	3	3
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

Table 5.28 VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE SPECIFIC ROLE TO BE ADOPTED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN MNOCs AND HOST COMMUNITIES.

8 per cent of the respondent's interviewed indicated that government should adopt local dialogue as a strategy for resolving conflicts between MNOCs and host communities. (Ugochukwu & Ertel, 2008, p.145) 23 per cent of the respondents were of the view that government should facilitate the relationship between MNOCs and host communities through policy and institutional initiatives such as the NDDC and the Petroleum Trust Fund. About 13% indicated that the government should utilise participatory planning strategies, 26 per cent felt that government should focus on infrastructural development, 10 per cent indicated that the government's role should be on facilitating capacity building for the host communities, and only 17% stated that government should play all the roles. Data gathered showed that 3% indicated none as a response to the question; however, since this number of respondents is negligible, the import of their opinion is empirically insignificant.



	Frequency	Per cent


Yes	55	61
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No	34	37
Indifferent	2	2
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.29 GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENTS IN THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

On the government’s involvement in escalating the Niger Delta conflict, 61 per cent of the respondents said that the government is responsible for the conflict, 37 per cent respondents said no, while 2 per cent were indifferent. The findings indicate that the perception among the host communities is that the government is culpable in escalating the conflict in the region and as such, this makes the Government’s role in resolving the conflict in the region even more difficult. The fact that the Federal Government collaborates with Shell as joint-venture partners undermines its role as peace broker in the conflict.



ARE PROMISES TURNED INTO FORMAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND RESOLUTIONS REQUIRING TIME-BOUND DELIVERY AND ACTION?


	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	126	36
No	179	51
Indifferent	45	13
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.30 HOST COMMUNITIES PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROMISES AND DELIVERY

On government's commitment to the implementation of policies, 36% of respondents from host communities stated that the government delivers at the right time, while 51% argued that she does not, only 13% were indifferent. Again, the majority of the people interviewed on this important issue in the area perceived some shortcomings in the government's role; somehow, the government must find a way of showing or convincing the concerned communities of its seriousness and goodwill, noted a respondent.

Outstanding Promises



Are there any outstanding promises to the people of the Niger Delta region that have not been delivered?

	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	238	68
No	74	21
Indifferent	38	11
Total	350	100.0


TABLE 5.31 HOST COMMUNITIES PERCEPTION OF OUTSTANDING GOVERNMENT PROMISES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the perception of the respondents on the commitment of government to make good on promises it has made, 68 per cent stated that government had outstanding promises yet to be fulfilled, while 21 per cent said that government did not have any outstanding promises. 11

per cent were indifferent. The responses here are in tandem with the responses in the last question where 51 per cent of the respondents said government has not been forth right in converting its promised policies into tangible programmes and projects that will better their lot. It also goes to answer the third research question on what role the government has played in resolving the oil conflict in the Niger Delta and how successful the strategies employed have been. The answer is obvious: though government has enunciated regulatory legislation and established interventionist agencies to mediate in and resolve the conflict, yet the result has been quite appalling.

Federal Government Efforts to Implement Policies



What action is the Federal Government taking to ensure that these outstanding deliverables are implemented?


	Frequency	Per cent
A lot	23	25
Few	49	53
None	20	22

Total	92	100.0
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TABLE 4.32 GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS TO DELIVER ON PROMISES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the present efforts by government to fulfil its promises, about 25 per cent of respondents from government agencies said a lot is being done, 53 per cent said little, while 22 per cent said nothing. This perception explains the impatience of the local communities with government and their resort to kidnapping and other anti-social means to voice their frustration.



Why is it that the conflict and kidnapping has continued after amnesty?

	Frequency	Per cent
Poor planning and implementation of	67	19

Policies		
Misunderstandings among key players	70	20
Sabotage	39	11
Illiteracy	35	10
Low awareness	59	17
Not keeping to promises	80	22.8
Total	350	100.0


TABLE 5.33 REASONS FOR KIDNAPPING IN THE REGION

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the reasons that made conflicts persist in the region, 19% of respondents from host communities felt poor planning and implementation of policies was to blame, 20% said misunderstandings among key players was the reason, 11% indicated sabotage, 10% said illiteracy, 17% identified low awareness and 22.8% identified failure to keep to promises. This means that not keeping to promises is regarded as a significant cause of conflict in the region, and this position is in tandem with analysis in the preceding table.

Consequences of the conflict on host communities in the Niger Delta

Overall Consequences of Conflict in Niger Delta



Consequences

	Frequency	Per cent
Destruction of properties	53	15
Oil spillage	28	8
More poverty	30	9
Unemployment	77	22
Corruption	42	12


Source: Field Survey, 2013

Environmental degradation	42	12
Displacement	25	7
All	53	15
Total	350	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2013

TABLE 5.34 CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT ON HOST COMMUNITIES

The data generated showed that about 15% saw the destruction of properties as the consequences of the Niger Delta conflicts on host communities, 8% indicated oil spillage, while 9% said increasing poverty. Also, unemployment recorded 22% of the response, 12% for corruption, and 12% for environmental degradation, 7% displacement and 15% saw all the listed problems as the consequences of conflict on the people. This means that host communities have been affected in various negative ways by the endemic conflict in the Niger Delta region.




Do you think any member of the host community has died in the cause of the conflict?

	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	336	96
Indifferent	14	4
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.35 CONFLICT RELATED DETAILS IN HOST COMMUNITIES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the rate of conflict-induced deaths, about 96% of respondents from the host communities agreed that there have been oil-related fatalities in the region, meaning that many people have died as a result of oil/CSR related conflicts. It was observed during the interviews with residents of Ogoni land that they identified the oil companies and security operatives as actors that cause the death of those that protested against their unhealthy practices in their land.




Does the conflict in any way affect the traditional institution and culture in the region?

	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	235	67
No	84	24
Indifferent	31	9
Total	350	100.0

Table 5.36 EFFECT OF CONFLICT ON TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Source Field Survey, 2014

On the effects of the conflict on traditional institutions, 67 per cent agreed it has negative effects, 24 per cent said it had no effect, while 9% were indifferent. The result of the analysis here is in line with the findings in Table 4.36 where respondents confirmed the assertion of Aghalino (2011, p. 5) that the oil-related problems in the Niger Delta have taken their toll on traditional institutions in the region as some traditional lands have been desecrated by the cavalier activities of the MNOCs while some traditional rulers have also lost the respect and loyalty of their subjects due to their inordinate romance with the oil companies.



How would you describe the supply of electricity in your area?


	Frequency	Per cent
Stable	147	42
Erratic	182	52
Indifferent	21	6
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.37 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN HOST COMMUNITIES

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the availability of electricity, 42% of those interviewed described it as stable, 52% stated that it is erratic, and 6% were indifferent. Most of the Niger Delta communities were promised a stable power supply by the state governments, oil companies and the NDDC but many of these promises are yet to materialise. Even those that claimed to have installed gas turbines to generate electricity could not sustain such projects due to managerial issues including corruption, which the respondents described as a regular part of revenues set aside for public utilities in Nigeria. Another notable problem is that some youths and community leaders are engulfed in disputes over royalties and project monitoring contracts awarded by the oil companies in the host communities, and this has most time torn the communities apart leading to a vicious circle of conflicts.

Good transport, health, education, housing and employment



Do you think the host communities have good transport, health, education, housing and employment facilities?

	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	144	41
No	178	51
Indifferent	28	8
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.38 AVAILABILITY OF SOCIAL AMENITIES IN HOST COMMUNITIES


Source: Field Survey, 2013

The above table shows that only 41 per cent agreed that the Government gave the communities good transport, health, education, housing and employment, 51 per cent indicated no, while 8 per cent were indifferent.

The respondents argued that gaining good employment is more relevant than other basic needs in the long run because when people have well-paid jobs, they can easily take care of

family members without having to live at the mercy of oil companies or government. With well-paid jobs, such people can also provide for their other needs like health care, education, transport and water. The implication of all these is that it confirms this study fourth hypothesis that the more CSR projects are based on community needs like gainful employment opportunities, educational, health and other social infrastructure, the more grievance/social conflicts are likely to reduce in the near future.

Fund mismanagement by the liaison officers, leaders and traditional rulers?



On the part of the host communities, has there been any case of fund mismanagement by the liaison officers, leaders and traditional rulers?

	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	224	64

No	108	31
Indifferent	18	5
Total	350	100.0

TABLE 5.39

Source: Field Survey, 2013

On the issue of funds mismanagement by the liaison officers, 64 per cent responded that some officials mismanaged funds, 31% said no and 5% were indifferent. The issue of indifference has to do with respondents being unsure about situations or events in communities. It also played out during an interview with a resident and elder in Odimodi in Delta State who declined to comment on whether some traditional leaders collected bribes from the oil companies or not.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the sources and evolution of the Niger Delta conflict are known to the extent that, the majority of the people who are well informed about the conflict’s major drivers blame it on the MNOCs CSR programmes. In pursuance of the promotion of peace in the region the CSR strategy of the MNOC’s can escalate and deescalate conflicts. The respondents believe that an effective CSR strategy can reduce the Niger Delta restiveness in the following ways: it promotes the feeling of belongingness and discourage youths from restiveness and anti-social behaviours; creates cordial relationship between community unions and oil companies; and creating a platform for the companies and the community leaders to discuss and identify areas of human needs and possible projects for effective impacts.

The study discovered that there are some limitations in the peace-building process in the region and these include:

- (i) Most CSR programmes of the MNOCs, especially youth development and scholarship offers, have not contributed to reducing youth restiveness and insecurity in benefiting communities. This is due to the ineffective nature of such CSR projects. Other sources of threats to peaceful coexistence in the region include disputes over the location of projects and delays in the completion of projects and improper representation of communities by some of the community representatives. This is a situation where community leaders/youth leaders side-line their people in signing of deals with companies means that such CSR projects would not gain the required acceptance and/or recognition amongst the people. It was also discovered from primary data generated that the quest for “actualisation of the Niger Delta goals” did not relax even with the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan, an indigenous person of the Niger Delta, as the president of Nigeria.
- (ii) Since the inception of oil exploration and exploitation, the people of the Niger Delta have sought to relate with the oil companies and government based on direct ownership of the wealth however, various MoUs signed between the communities and the MNOCs have shown that the principle of collective bargaining has not been given required consideration before and after agreements with the companies. Most times the problem is that MNOCs prefer signing secret agreement with a few selected chiefs or elders who they think will protect their interest.
- (iii) This occasional secrecy in signing of MoUs between the companies and communities makes accountability very difficult and less significant; the MoUs can only be effective when there is a cordial and open relationship between the people and the oil companies;
- (iv) After sanctioning offending oil companies, there are legal limitations for government agencies to enforce their recommendations and being a stakeholder in the joint

venture with the MNOCs, government's intervention in instances like this is usually slow.

- (v) While the militant youths in the oil bearing communities believe the MNOCs and the Nigerian state has been paying lip service to their demand for resource control and environmental justice. The oil companies feel they have done enough as corporate citizens to their host communities, and that having paid taxes to the government, the latter should use the taxes to provide socio-economic amenities to their citizens. .
- (vi) The government believes it is doing their best for the oil bearing communities and that with the setting up of such interventionist agencies like the NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, NOSDRA and the amnesty programme the issue of the long standing neglect of the region will be addressed.
- (vii) The government's joint-venture partnership with the MNOCs and, worse still, its rentier status, has hamstrung its ability to rein in the latter in cases of brazen faulting of Nigerian environmental laws.

5.4 Summary

This chapter dealt with the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data collected from the field survey. The data generated were presented in tables, percentages, bar charts and pie charts and the conclusion reached used to answer the research questions and test hypotheses. The next chapter will summarise the findings of the thesis, present recommendations that will be used to improve MNOCs' CSR delivery in oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This study has critically investigated whether or not the current CSR strategies of the MNOCs operating in the Niger Delta have contributed to the perennial conflicts in the region. Chapter one provides the background information on the perceived exploitation of the Niger Delta people from the pre-colonial palm oil period to the current era of oil exploration as well as the attendant resistance by both the pre-colonial traditional institution heroes and modern militants in the region. The conflict in the region became aggravated in the 1990s when the host communities, became more conscious of the wealth accruable from the oil beneath their land, and felt deprived of their resources largely due to the previous colonial laws and ordinances. The inability of the MNOCs, operating in the Niger Delta region, to stick to MoUs signed with host communities, and the government's inability to discipline the MNOCs on their environmental abuses, contributed to the escalation of the conflicts. All these factors are underlined by the Government's failure to reinvest the tax paid by the MNOCs into the region: together they exacerbate the host communities' current impoverishment and underdevelopment.

Chapter two provided the political history of Nigeria and its implications in this study. It analysed the impact of the then British administration on ethnicity. The study discovered that the 1939 division of Nigeria into Northern, Western and Eastern regions by the then British administration triggered an ethnic conflict. As a result, minority groups started seeking for belongingness into governance cum ruling class and a state of their own, where they couldn't fit into any of the three major tribes, in Nigeria. Consequently, the Mid-Western region was created in 1963 to accommodate minority agitation. However, this was found in the course of

this research as the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics. The chapter culminates with an attempt to fill the gaps in literature: this forms the basis for this study.

Chapter three examined the relevant literatures relating to oil conflict and the MNOCs' CSR approach in the region. Based on the evaluation of the social conflict theory, frustration and aggression theory, and stakeholder's theory, the study adopts the stakeholder's theory as its framework of analysis. This chapter conceptualised the term "conflict" by analysing its different connotations, management, and resolution as well as arguments for and against it. The conflictual relationship between the communities, the MNOCs and the Government, was examined to establish the major causes of the conflict. The relationship between ineffective CSR and conflicts in the Niger Delta region was also investigated.

Chapter four discussed the mixed-methods descriptive design study or triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study adopted questionnaires and interviews as its primary data gathering techniques. The research sample consisted of the public relations departments of the selected oil companies (Shell, Chevron and Agip), selected host communities in the Niger Delta (Ogoni, Nembe and Odimodi), and the Government parastatal bodies and regulatory agencies. The latter include: NOSDRA, NDDC, DPR, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, University of Port Harcourt scholars and Centre for Niger Delta studies. Data collected was analysed in chapter five of this study.

Chapter five analysed the mixed methodology employed in this research. SPSS was used to analyse the quantitative data gathered in order to demonstrate the degree of agreement and disagreement. Tables and figures were used to tabulate these patterns whilst content analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data. The study finds the method adopted particularly significant and unique because, the study used interviews, and questionnaires. In this case,

the researcher allowed the triangulation of both interviews and questionnaires, which was used in exploring the links between CSR and conflict in the region from an empirical perspective to provide the study final outcome. Additionally, the findings of the empirical study were used to confirm or dispel the common assumptions about the persistence of conflicts in the Niger Delta, despite CSR efforts of the MNOCs. This approach exposed issues from the perspective of the stakeholders, focusing on whether or not there are CSR initiatives being carried out by MNOCs in the region, which ordinarily would not have been possible.

Chapter six is the final chapter of this study. It contains the summary as well as the conclusion of the whole thesis. In addition, chapter six presents the study recommendations and opportunities for further studies in line with the findings as provided by the mixed method descriptive research study.

6.2 Study Summary of Findings

Following the research questions and hypotheses advanced at the beginning of the study, below are the summaries of the thesis findings:

1. The continuing conflict in the Niger Delta region, in spite of attempts by the government and the MNOCs to mediate and pacify the people, is caused not only by a lack of concrete CSR projects by the latter but by the environmentally unfriendly means employed by the MNOCs in their exploration and exploitation of crude oil. Consequently, if the MNOCs are to have a mutually beneficial relationship with oil-bearing communities, they should begin to re-think their CSR strategies, public relations and community relations practices in the region.
2. The majority of the respondents (75%) are well aware of the perennial conflicts and their key causes in the Niger Delta. Although a number of the respondents maintained

that the conflict situation is minimal, the findings of the study demonstrate the complex nature of the Niger Delta conflicts. Thus: while, many protests and confrontations in the region are centered on environmental degradation, marginalization and deprivation, the major cause of the conflicts is primarily, the resource allocation problem.

The study further reveals that the cavalier exploration and exploitation activities of oil companies have made the land and rivers lose their resources: thus rendering the oil-bearing communities predominantly jobless and poor. Although the MNOCs mostly blame the oil spillage on sabotage, their collective activities, which include gas flaring, have resulted in environmental pollution. The soils are polluted with hydrocarbons up to a depth of 5 meters in 49 observed places in the Niger Delta. The view held by most host community chieftains and environmental rights activists, is that where people remain adequately empowered, there is a high probability of being involved in acts of sabotage.

3. The study also discovered that three key actors are involved in the oil conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: (i) members of host communities (youths, militants and traditional institutions); (ii) multinational oil companies and their staff; and (iii) government ministries, departments, agencies and their officials.
4. Regarding CSR programs and projects, the public relations department of the selected oil companies maintained that they have been engaged in CSR delivery and community development. Towards, this direction, the staff of the Federal Ministry of Environment was in agreement with the MNOCs involvement in CSR projects although they could not statistically confirm the degree of the oil companies' involvement. Contrary to this view, however, the respondents from Ogoni, reports

that even though the oil companies may have been involved in some CSR oriented projects, these cannot be considered concrete because, their delivery process are flawed: hence, they are not sustainable.

The study further found that, members of the Nembe and Odimodi communities are also in agreement that the major CSR strategy of the MNOCs is one of 'divide and rule'. The Nembe youths reported that Shell particularly has turned members of the community against each other: that the MNOCs secretly reward the militants and most outspoken individuals in order to create in-fighting's amongst the communities. The companies prefer this system to the implementation of best (international) mining practices or implementation of the memorandum of understanding, signed with members of host communities. Moreover, this select group is armed in order to protect the pipelines and suppress community members who resist company policies. As demonstrated in Chapter five, the respondents state that when the companies have repair jobs to do on their pipelines, the CSR projects are quickly manned under the state of crisis management to distract or engage the host communities. The respondents stated that this type of strategy accounts for the wide range of uncompleted projects in the host communities. Members of the oil-bearing communities further reported that in order to avoid CSR involvement, some oil companies have decided to go offshore to reduce contacts with the people.

5. The research findings demonstrate that the Federal Government of Nigeria has played a number of roles in the resolution and management of the ongoing conflict. As shown in Chapter five, the respondents identify the Government's amnesty program as the only initiative, which has had a substantial detonating effect on the conflict. However, the sustainability of this strategy is questionable as the amnesty program is

expected to end in December 2015. One would wonder what would happen to its benefactors (ex-militants). In addition, they highlight that although the Government's conciliatory committees, interventionist agencies, and commissions such as the NDDC and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs were set up to accelerate the development of the area, the respondents protest that because of corruption nothing substantial has been achieved. However, the Federal Government of Nigeria must begin to adjust the obsolete laws and strengthen its regulatory agencies within the oil industry in order to checkmate the negative practices of the MNOCs – though the rentier nature of the Nigerian state may make this a herculean task.

6. The study has established that the government's apparent initiatives in controlling the MNOCs has failed based on, the rentier status of the Nigerian state that makes it mandatory for the state to be dependent on oil revenue. Another reason for the failed initiatives is the joint-venture partnership between the Nigerian Government and the MNOCs, which, stipulates that the Government bear 60% of whatever cost or benefit that, emerges from oil exploitation in the country.

To avert, or at best abate, the oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta, the Government must adjust its revenue allocation formula to the 1963 level when it was based on 100% derivation. The oil-bearing communities feel that the present 13% derivation formula is slammed on them because they are a minority ethnic group.

7. Finally, the study has been able to establish a linkage between concrete implementation of GMoUs entered into with host communities and the resultant cordial relationship with the MNOCs. This is believed, to a great extent will go a long way in making the MNOCs good corporate citizens in their areas of operation.

6.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the foregoing conclusions:

- i. MNOCs should be sensitized with regards to the importance of adhering to the signed General Memorandum of Understandings (GMOUs) with host communities since deviation from this is normally what triggers most of the CSR conflicts in the Niger Delta region. They must also ensure that their CSR projects are timely, relevant and aimed at meeting the genuine socio-economic needs of the local people.
- ii. MNOCs should embark on environmentally friendly processes of oil exploration and maintenance as well as replacement of antiquated oil pipelines, some of which have not been changed since oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 1958. They should as a matter of obligation guard against staff negligence and equipment failures that result to oil spillage.
- iii. The host communities should be included in the joint venture agreement with the MNOCs rather than the existing 60/40 partnership between the government and the oil companies. A percentage should be set aside for the host communities. It is believed that the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) now Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB), which was not passed by the last National Assembly (2011-2015), would have addressed this problem. The PIB was said to have reserved 10% share of the oil business for the host communities. If this is done however, the latter will now see themselves as stakeholders in the oil exploration and exploitation process and will play their part in protecting and preserving the mutually beneficial oil business. It will also help in reducing their demands for resource control.

- iv. Attempts should be made to identify the traditional economy of the oil producing communities and revive them; they should be arranged in clusters depending on what they produce. These cluster communities should then be provided with agro-allied cottage industries with funds and technical supports provided by the government and the oil companies whilst the communities themselves would manage its funds. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, review upwardly its revenue allocation formula from the present 13% to the 1963 (50%) derivation formula level.
- v. The Government and the MNOCs should employ a sustainable development model that will examine the local people's needs for not just electricity but constant electricity, the provision of accessible healthcare, the construction of good road networks and the availability of drinking water.
- vi. Instead of gas flaring that is dangerous to both human health and the ecosystem, the Government should remove its proviso that allows MNOCs to flare gas with a fine. In place of gas flaring, the gas, which is now being flared with all its attendant negative effects on the Niger Delta environment, should be conserved. In this way, the flared gas could be converted into a liquefied form and sold for domestic use and export.
- vii. Most respondents were bothered about what they called "the reformation of the Nigerian national question". This implies reinstating Nigeria to true fiscal federalism. The country's federating states will have the alleged long awaited autonomy. The respondents believe that true fiscal federalism will offer both the local and state governments' autonomy including the right to control their oil mineral resources and its accruing revenue and then pay taxes to the central government. Members of the three selected communities are unanimous in their belief that true fiscal federalism

will proffer a solution to the Niger Delta conflicts and resource allocation will no longer pose any threat to the Nigerian state.

- ix. The Government may want to separate the responsibilities of the Niger Delta developmental commissions with that of the state government. This will prevent the duplication of duties as well as monitor both the state government and the developmental commissions. The constitutional division between the Nigerian Federal Government roads and State Government roads exemplifies this. The practical implication is a sense of responsibility. For instance, when a particular road is bad, the residents are able to tell whose responsibility it is to repair the road. It also helps in proper planning and the awarding of projects, thereby, avoiding a situation where one project will be awarded by the state and a developmental commission at the same time.

6.4 Opportunities for further studies

Owing to the complex nature of the conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the findings of this study revealed the importance of further research. Prominent among such areas is the dwindling nature of the amnesty program that is in effect expected to come to a close by the end of 2015. Whereas the current study focused on the implications of the CSR strategies adopted by the MNOCs in the ongoing conflict, further studies can be focused on the importance of the continuation of the amnesty programme by evaluating its utility in resolving the oil conflict in the Niger Delta.

Further studies can also be conducted on the impact of religion and ethnicity on the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta. This is because within the historical Niger Delta there are incidences of inter-community conflicts, where tribes fight each other for selfish gain. At the

federal level, there have been opposition to resource control agitation from the major ethnic groups in the country against the will of the minority groups.

The findings of this research revealed that on different occasions, a number of the region's leaders, both politicians and the traditional institutions, have focused on enriching themselves to the detriment of the communities. A future study can examine the implication of the region's corrupt leaders on the local economies and its consequent underdevelopment.

6.5 Conclusion

From the foregoing, this study concludes that the CSR strategies adopted by the selected MNOCs are not adequate in managing and resolving the ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta. This can be linked to the double standard strategy applied by the MNOCs, which is not an effectual drive for a sustainable CSR commitment. The study contends that; Shell's CSR strategy in developed countries such as the United Kingdom is different from its strategy in developing countries. A typical example is the North Sea leakage where, Shell's inability to plug a leak in the North Sea resulted in the resignation of its station Chief Executive. In comparism with the Niger Delta oil spillages, the leak in the North Sea was measured at 200 tonnes per day whereas; that of Ogoni (not the entire Niger Delta) was measured at 1400 tonnes per day. The North Sea was quickly cleaned up whereas, notwithstanding UNEPs (2011) report on the need to clean up Ogoniland, Shell is yet to carry out the recommended clean up of Ogoniland. The North Sea example is a definite demonstration of commitment to CSR and sustainable development in developed countries, which is unavailable in the Niger Delta and developing countries in general. Shell's double standards in the Niger Delta were found to be contributory to the region's youth's anger as most respondents narrated during the study primary data collection.

Residents of the Niger Delta who responded to the questionnaires and those that granted the researcher interview sessions demonstrated concerns over the MNOCs fracking activities. The seismic (oil company's geological survey activities carried out in the process of oil deposit's search) activity known, as fracking is another means of pollution in the Niger Delta that cannot be ignored, a respondent insisted. Fracking involves the heavy use of ground water in combination of chemicals in prompting gas to travel through fractures. This process results in scarcity of water for other uses such as agriculture and for drinking. If any leakage occurs in the process of fracking, the molten that emerge are toxic, corrosive and radioactive therefore, contaminates both the ground water and the entire environment. Consequently, respondents from the host communities employed the MNOCs to adopt other processes of seismic activities that are less harmful to humans and the environment.

The study further concludes that the more the increase in funding of CSR projects, the higher the resistance from host communities. This is in line with the first hypothesis outlined in Chapter one: the study gathered from the respondents that most CSR projects of MNOCs are haphazardly implemented and not directed towards empowering the people or stimulating the local economy. For instance, the host communities were being given Christmas gifts that they consider paltry, vis-à-vis the revenue the region generates. These gifts in the form of perishable goods are not sustainable nor do they replace the loss of arable lands due to MNOCs' gas flaring, fracking and mining waste.

The lessons drawn from this research could serve as a model for other countries either in their initial stage of oil production or if they harbour the intention to mine oil resources. Developing countries, particularly African countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Ghana where oil has been discovered in commercial quantities may, unlike their Nigerian

counterparts, want to implement oil-mining policies that will not anger the oil producing communities.

The 60/40 partnership between the Nigerian government and the MNCOs with no percentage share left for the oil bearing communities was found to be a source of conflict as the communities felt neglected. The perception is that despite their importance and huge contributions to the Nigerian economy. This architect of the Nigerian resource conflicts: can be avoided by other countries intending to mine oil. Additionally, the 60/40 sharing formula makes it difficult for the government to implement its environmental policies as the oil companies recommends, the Nigerian Government takes the lead in the cleaning up process since the Government takes the lion share of the oil business profit. Thus, developing countries intending to go into oil production may want to adopt the Indonesian model of diversification. Indonesia and Nigeria had the same per capita income in the 1970s but Indonesia applied good management of oil revenue and diversified its economy by investing in other sectors of their economy. This accounts for its level of development in comparison with Nigeria. A shift from oil and, an implementation of different form of tax systems can be contributory to Nigerian economic growth. Agriculture, maritime and other sectors of the Nigerian economy can be developed to reduce Nigerian rentirism or even abate it.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1

SEME-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW LEAD QUESTIONS WITH NOSDRA, NDDC, DPR, MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF NIGER DELTA AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT, Ogoni, Nembe, Odimodi Communities, CENTER FOR NIGER DELTA STUDIES, NOAC, CHEVRON AND SHELL

INTRODUCTION:

Date -----

Name of Interviewer -----

Name of Interviewee-----

Position in the community-----

Position in MNOC/Govt Agency-----

Years of Experience-----

Interview with prominent community members-----

Interview Lead Questions:

(i) What are the key causes and actors of restiveness in the Niger Delta and how should these issues be managed?

(ii) What are the prevailing CSR strategies of the oil companies in the Niger Delta and how successful are they?

(iii) What role has the Federal Government played in the conflict resolution and how successful are the strategies?

Appendix 2

CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES: AN ASSESSMENT

University of Derby

The questionnaire below contributes to a research work at the University of Derby leading to a PhD by Beloveth O. Nwankwo.

All answers will be treated in strict confidence and responses will be aggregated for analysis so that individual responses are not traceable to particular respondents.

Research Questions

1. Bio Data

Please tick (×) in the options below as appropriate;

- a. Gender; Male Female
- b. Age distribution; 10 – 17 years 18 - 30 years 31 and above
- c. Educational qualification; School certificate Bachelor , Masters , Doctorate , other s
- d. Place of resident in the Niger Delta Senatorial zones; (1)Rivers East Rivers West Rivers South-East(2) Bayelsa Central Bayelsa West Bayelsa East (3) Delta East Delta Central Delta West
- d. (i) Name of Community (in Rivers State, Bayelsa or Delta State)
- e. Position in organization/ Current job title
 - a. Public Relations Executive
 - b. Community Relations Manager
 - c. CSR Manager
 - d. Marketing Executive
 - e. Public and Corporate Affairs Manager
 - f. Community Liaison Officer/Manager
 - g. Social Welfare Officer/Manager
- f. Position In The Community
 - h. Traditional ruler
 - i. Opinion Leader
 - j. Community development committee (CDC) (specify position)
 - k. Youths Leader (Specify)
 - l. Militant (specify rank/position)
 - m. Women/women's leader (specify position)
- g. Number of years of experience in the position
 - a. 0 -5 years
 - b. 6 – 10 years
 - c. 11 – 15 years
 - d. 16 – 20 years
 - e. 21 years plus
- h. Number of years experience in community service

- a. 0 -5 years
- b. 6 – 10 years
- c. 11 – 15 years
- d. 16 – 20 years
- e. 21 years plus

2. Causes of Conflict

Questionnaire

- (1) What are the key causes of the oil conflict in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria?
- a. Why was the Nigerian revenue sharing system changed from derivation principle to the principle of need and even development since the discovery of oil in commercial quantity the Niger Delta?
 - i. Because the Niger Delta is a minority ethnic group
 - ii. Had no representation at the senate
 - iii. Oil is a cause
 - iv. The three major ethnic groups marginalise the Niger Delta people
 - b. What is the key cause of the conflict?
 - (i) The oil mineral ordinance
 - (ii) Revenue allocation formula
 - (iii) The brunt of oil (CSR)
 - c. What major environmental impact has oil exploration and exploitation had in Niger Delta region since 1958 to this current period (2013)?
 - i. None
 - ii. enormous damages
 - iii. Fair
 - d. Does the on-going conflict have any link to environmental degradation of Niger Delta region by the oil companies?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Indifferent
 - e. Has economic development in the region changed since the discovery, exploration and exploitation of oil?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Indifferent
- (2) What are the public relations strategies employed by the oil companies in managing and resolving the conflicts?
- a. Have the oil companies implemented any public relations campaigns in the local and national media, both print and electronic, aimed at addressing the conflict in the region?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Indifferent
 - b. What has been the impact of the public relations strategies in mitigating the conflict in the region?
 - i. Low
 - ii. Medium
 - iii. High
 - c. What is the perception of the local people regarding the public relations campaigns of the oil companies?
 - i. Poor
 - ii. Good
 - iii. Excellent
 - d. Is there more that could be done in terms of public relations in the region by the oil companies in order to improve the conflict situation?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No

- iii. Indifferent
- (3) What is the environmental Impact of oil exploration and exploitation by the companies
- i. Destruction of the ecosystem
 - ii. Water contamination
 - iii. Air pollution

(4) What is the role played Federal Government in the resolution of the conflicts in the Niger-Delta?

- a. What programmes has the federal government implemented to manage the conflict in the region?
 - i. None
 - ii. Some
 - iii. A lot (please specify)
- b. Are promises turned into formal government policies and resolutions requiring time-bound delivery and action?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Indifferent
- c. Are there any outstanding 'promises' to the people of the Niger Delta region that have not been delivered?
 - i. Yes
 - ii. No
 - iii. Indifferent
- d. What action is the Federal government taking to ensure that these outstanding deliverables are implemented?
 - i. A lot
 - ii. None
 - iii. Not none

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5. Multinational oil company (MNOc)

a. What CSR programmes /projects are executed by SPDC, Chevron, NAOC and what conflict resolution impacts do they make?

Are you aware of any corporate social responsibility policy in your company? If yes, can you kindly give examples of these?

- i. In your opinion, how effective would you rate these policies
- ii. Would you repeat some of these policies in any other organisation faced with similar circumstances?
- iii. Would you avoid implementing some of the policies? If so, why?
- iv. What are these projects?
- v. What is your assessment of their developmental impact?
- vi. Are the projects what the communities demand or what your company think they deserve?
- vii. What is your host community's perception of your CSR strategy?
- viii. In the case of double standards, would you think your company adopts the CSR strategy internationally? Given the case of the North Sea oil and the Niger Delta CSR issues, do you think the standards are the same?
- ix. Is your organisation a member of any group that attempts to promote good corporate governance (e.g. the United Nations Environmental Management Group)? If yes, has your organisation met the standard of the United Nations in terms of corporate social responsibility policy?
- x. What do you expect your organisation would have done differently to quell the conflict?

b. What is the impact of efficient/inefficient corporate citizenship of MNOcs on the oil conflict in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria?

- 1) How long has your organisation been in existence within the Niger Delta region?
- i. In your opinion, is your organisation now a corporate citizen of the Niger Delta? How have your organisation demonstrated its corporate citizenship?
 - ii. In accordance with the latest UNEP report, do you think your company has met the global mining standard for oil transnational companies?
 - iii. Would you say your company is aware of the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) for transnational companies?
 - iv. If yes, using the GMOU as a benchmark, do you think your company has adopted both the GMOU and the host community MOU?
 - v. Do you think your company has been more involved in CSR or crises management? If yes, why has the CSR conflict continued?
 - vi. How would you describe CSR? Who are the benefactors?
 - vii. What is the link between the conflict and CSR?

c. What is the role played by the Federal Government in the resolution of the conflicts in the Niger-Delta?

- i. Are you aware of the conflict over oil in the Niger Delta?
 - ii. If yes, how would you describe the situation? Do you think the conflict origin can be traced to pre-colonial and colonial period?
 - iii. Do you agree that the Nigerian federal government has a contribution in fuelling the conflict?
 - iv. In your opinion what is the oil producing communities asking for?
 - v. Why is it that the conflict and kidnapping has continued after amnesty?
 - vi. What role do you think the government has played so far in resolving it? How would you describe the extent the government has gone in resolving the conflict?
 - vii. Do you think the conflict may have been aggravated by any government's oil related policies?
 - viii. What is the most recent conflict resolution strategy that the government has adopted? And has the policy affected the conflict dimension?
 - ix. What would you have suggested they do differently to quell the conflict?
 - x. Do you think the Niger Delta host communities/militants are interested in the derivation principle? Has there been any other approach to this principle from the time when agriculture was the main stay of the economy? If yes why?

d. What are the consequences of the conflict on host communities in the Niger Delta?

- i. Has the host communities economy been affected by the restiveness in the region? Do you think any member of the host communities has died in the cause of the conflict? If yes, please give examples on how they died and name the communities
Has the host communities suffered neglect from the oil companies and the government?
- ii. Do you think there has been human right violation? If yes, please give examples
- iii. Does the conflict in any way affect the traditional institution and culture in the region?
- iv. Has there been portable drinking water for the host communities?
- v. How would you describe the electricity system? Epileptic or stable? Please give examples.
- vi. Do you think the host communities have good transport, health, education, housing and employment?
- vii. On the part of the host communities has there been any case of fund mismanagement by the liaison officers, leaders and traditional leaders?
- viii. What role has women played in the conflict so far?
- ix. Looking at the issue on hand, what would you expect from the communities?

e. The company's public relations policy for the host community;
Public relations:

	Most agree	Agree	Disagree
To provide social amenities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To create employment	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To give financial assistance to a self-employed person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Community relations:

	Most agree	Agree	Disagree
To educate the host community on the company's policies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To ascertain the view of the community regarding the conflict in the Niger Delta	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To find out the areas of needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Conflict resolution:

	Most agree	Agree	Disagree
Conventional approach (court system)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rural community forum (town center)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A merger of the conventional and court system	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Press coverage on the Niger Delta crisis:

	Most agree	Agree	Disagree
Is there adequate newspaper coverage on Niger conflict?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Do radio and television report the views of the Niger Delta people on the conflict?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Do the Niger Delta people have a medium for expressing their view	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

