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Losing the discursive battle but winning the ideological war: who holds Thatcherite values now?

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Abstract:	<p>In what ways, if at all, do past ideologies shape the values of subsequent generations of citizens? Are public attitudes in one period shaped by the discourses and constructions of an earlier generation of political leaders? Using Thatcherism – one variant of the political New Right of the 1980s – as the object of our enquiries, this paper explores the extent to which an attitudinal legacy is detectable amongst the citizens of the UK some 40 years after Margaret Thatcher first became Prime Minister. Our paper, drawing on survey data collected in early 2019 (n = 5,781), finds that younger generations express and seemingly embrace key tenets of her and her governments' philosophies. Yet at the same time, they are keen to describe her government's policies as having 'gone too far'. Our contribution throws further light on the complex and often covert character of attitudinal legacies. One reading of the data suggests that younger generations do not attribute the broadly Thatcherite values that they hold to Thatcher or Thatcherism since they were socialised politically after such values had become normalised.</p>

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Losing the discursive battle but winning the ideological war: who holds Thatcherite values now?

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1: Past Studies of Thatcherite Values: What Do We Know?

One of the questions to which political scientists devoted considerable attention during the period from the late-1980s was the extent to which the governments led by Margaret Thatcher contributed to a 'Thatcherite' attitudinal shift. In this paper we reassess the relationship between 'Thatcherism' as an ideology and the values and attitudes on key topics and issues held by members of the British public in the 21st Century. We start by discussing the attitudes which have come to represent 'Thatcherism', before addressing how dominant ideologies of the past continue to resonate in subsequent decades. We then explore the impact of Thatcherism on citizens' attitudes, noting that as time has passed and as better data sets have become available, so the evidence for a Thatcherite attitudinal legacy has mounted. This fresh data suggests that the answer to the question 'Did Thatcher alter attitudes?' is time-variant – in all likelihood because it is linked to questions of political socialisation exhibiting a cohort-like temporality (Grasso et al 2019a and b). The second half of the paper explores which social groups hold what may be thought of as 'Thatcherite' attitudes, values and desires forty years after she was first elected.¹ This section outlines the methodology we deploy and presents the core findings. Above all, it discusses the implications of the reputational legacies we reveal for our understanding of Thatcherism in the 2020s. We conclude with a broader reflection of the ways in which political leadership can, in some cases, shape popular attitudes decades later (see also Farrall et al 2020c).

We hold the view that Thatcherism remains important given its enduring policy legacy and the profound influence of the changes it initiated on UK society, institutions (social, economic and political), political discourse and voting patterns (Albertson and Stepney, 2019). Thatcher's legacies would appear to be stubborn, emotive and agenda-setting in both the normative and discursive senses. Moreover, the policies and normative positions attributed to her and her governments on a

¹ Given the place of Thatcherism in the wider 1980s New Right movement (and which encompassed the USA, Australia and New Zealand amongst other countries) a discussion of 'Thatcherite values' inevitably invokes a discussion of the extent to which these were similar to those attitudes and values in those countries. At present there is insufficient data to make assessments of the attitudinal change in many of these countries. Accordingly, we focus herein on Britain and Thatcherism, but accept that similar findings, albeit with some variations, may hold in those other countries which embraced the New Right during the 1980s.

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3 series of key decisions are frequently invoked in popular and media debates. Unlike, arguably, earlier
4 or more recent Prime Ministers, Thatcher still haunts contemporary British politics, lying behind
5 many of the events of the years since she left office in 1990.
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7 This paper seeks both to review and reassess what is known about Thatcherite attitudes. Above all,
8 we seek to establish whether and to what extent the British electorate can be seen to have become
9 Thatcherite over time (section 1). Our review of the literature (section 2) suggests that the initial
10 dismissal of Thatcher's influence has, over time, and as data sets and analyses have become more
11 sophisticated, increasingly been questioned. On the basis of this review, we turn to questions of
12 methodology, describing the survey we commissioned to mark the 40th anniversary of Thatcher's
13 first general election victory which was undertaken in early 2019 (section 3). We then present the
14 findings from this survey, showing in the process that Thatcherite values have become deeply
15 embedded in British value structures (section 4). In section 5 we deal with reputational legacies,
16 before providing a discussion and conclusion in section 6. Our contribution to these previous studies
17 is to explore the extent to which British citizens have come to hold aspirations and desires consistent
18 with key elements of a Thatcherite instinct or disposition.
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24 **1.1: What are Thatcherite Attitudes?**

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26 Before one can establish whether or not Thatcherism changed social attitudes, one has to establish
27 *why* (in and through what mechanisms) this political doctrine may have served to change social
28 attitudes. Next one has to have some idea about the *sorts of attitudes* which it may have changed,
29 and the *direction* of these changes. One also has to establish some sort of *temporal dimension* too;
30 the attitudes of adults do not change easily. Let us consider each of these in turn.
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33 We think that there are good reasons to assume that political leadership, especially if maintained
34 over a reasonably long period of time, can and does effect social and political attitudes (see Grasso
35 et al 2019a, 2019b, Gray et al 2019). One strand of research has argued that political elites influence
36 each other. As such, even if Thatcherism did not affect the views of the electorate during the 1980s
37 (Crewe, 1989, McAllister and Mughan, 1987), her position did influence thinking within the Labour
38 Party, which, over a long period shifted to the right in response to her electoral success, the changes
39 she made to the economic and social contexts, and the threat posed by the creation of the Social
40 Democratic Party (Hay 1999; Heffernan, 2000). In a similar vein, Curtice (2009) argued that Thatcher
41 influenced the Labour Party, but that the wider shift in public values which she sought was actually
42 achieved by Blair.
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45 Gamble (1988) summarises the tenets of the New Right (of which Thatcherism is one variant) as
46 being that state intervention did not work, alternatives to the market were flawed, government
47 failure was more common than market failure and lastly that individual citizens' rights were violated
48 by anything other than the most minimal of states. The New Right was a flexible combination and
49 synthesis of two strands of rightwing philosophy, which emphasized authority and control on the
50 one hand, and liberty and individual choice on the other (see Gamble 1988, Ch 2, Hay, 1996, Ch 7 on
51 the origins of these strands of thought). It is beyond dispute that the Thatcher administrations
52 aimed their policies at re-drawing the public-private boundary and reducing the role of the state via
53 the privatization of a range of key services that had been taken into state-ownership since the late
54 1940s (Gamble, 1988:7). Gamble goes on to recount the principal objectives of privatization as
55 portrayed by Thatcher: greater freedom of choice; greater efficiency; the reduction of the Public
56 Sector Borrowing Requirement; reduction in the costs of public sector pay; the removal of key
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3 decisions from the political arena altogether; increased share ownership amongst the citizenry; the
4 promotion of liberalization and competition; an increase in active citizenry and a reduction of state
5 dependency (1988:11). To this Leys (2001:3) adds the desire to make the state serve business
6 interests, remodel the formers' internal operations to become more like the latter's and to reduce
7 the government's exposure to political pressure from the electorate. Marwick (2003:241) notes also
8 that Thatcherism expressed overt hostility toward 1960s style 'permissiveness'.
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11 Culled from a range of sources (see *inter alia* Levitas, 1986, Hay, 1996, Hayes, 1994, Gamble 1988,
12 Crewe, 1988, Crewe and Searing, 1988, Russell et al, 1992), the following, have all been cited to be
13 some of the values which distinguished Thatcherism from the stances taken by both Conservative
14 and Labour politicians who came before her:
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- 16 • *Governmental Role in Society*: including a distrust of government, anti-welfare state, local
17 government and anti-comprehensive education sentiments, anti-wealth redistribution and
18 (associated with this) anti-taxation.
- 19 • *Social and Moral Conservatism*: including support of 'traditional' values, pro-family values
20 (especially towards the concept of 'traditional' nuclear families and pro-physical discipline),
21 the fostering of obedience and respect (which was associated with being 'tough-minded' on
22 wrong-doing and crime), being anti-immigration, holding 'nationalistic' values, being anti-gay
23 rights, sexual permissiveness, pornography, and against freely-available abortions.
- 24 • *Economic Outlook*: including being anti-trade unions, anti-nationalisation, pro-free trade,
25 pro-enterprise and in favour of self-reliance.
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32 Some of these elements may also attract support from the left (few politicians are pro-pornography,
33 for example), and there have arguably been elements of overlap and convergence between them on
34 many issues (Hay, 1999). Thatcherism's success, as many have pointed to, was to be able to manage
35 at a narrative and policy level, a flexible synthesis of these 'instincts' (Hay, 1996). In which direction
36 and at what sorts of speeds ought we to expect to see attitudinal change? If Thatcherism were to
37 have been broadly accepted by the electorate, one would have expected to see, over time, attitudes
38 move towards increased levels of agreement with the Thatcherite position. In other cases, one might
39 have expected to see little change, since Thatcher was articulating values which had seen her
40 elected in the first place. Similarly, one might expect to see Thatcher's period in office being
41 associated with 'halting' or slowing some of the attitudes she opposed (for example, pro-gay rights
42 sentiments). Relatedly, there will have been long-term attitudinal shifts which neither she nor
43 anyone else would have been able to halt; attitudes towards women working in the economy, equal
44 rights for those members of society previously discriminated against and the increasing social
45 acceptance of divorce, for example. Therefore, the speeds at which such changes occurred might
46 differ and fluctuate for a number of reasons. First of all, as some have noted before (Green, 1999,
47 Fieldhouse, 1995), the attitudes which Thatcher articulated can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s
48 and were already held by a reasonably large proportion of the electorate. In addition, it must be
49 remembered that Thatcher only polled around 40% of the votes in the General Elections between
50 1979 and 1987 (43.9% in 1979, 42.4% in 1983 and 42.2% in 1987), and one ought not to expect huge
51 levels of support for any specific value she promoted. Finally, given that the formation of attitudes
52 takes place early in an individual's life, (Mannheim, 1928) processes of inter-generational
53 replacement may mean that considerable periods of time may pass before attitudinal shifts start to
54 appear in surveys. Thus social attitudes which might be thought of as 'Thatcherite' would take time
55 to filter through, either because Thatcherism was a response to these pre-existing shifts, or because
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3 her message and some of the values it contained took time to become embedded in wider social and
4 political cultures.
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8 **2: How and Why Might Past Ideologies Shape Subsequent Attitudes?** 9

10 Studies of the continued relevance of past ideologies are interesting since attitudinal shifts in the
11 general population (regardless of how these are initiated) may have consequences for the policies
12 which *subsequent* governments and political parties feel they can legitimately pursue (and also
13 'need' to pursue if they are to curry favour with the electorate, Downs, 1957). A 'hardening' of
14 popular attitudes towards crime may result in governments and political parties trying to produce
15 'tougher' policies both rhetorically and in actual application to demonstrate that they are responding
16 to public concerns. Similarly, attitudes on one topic may, over time, produce changes in feelings
17 about *other* topics. For example, a hardening of attitudes towards 'offenders' may pave the way for
18 a later hardening of attitudes towards other rule-breakers (such as excluded school children or
19 people who are perceived to be exploiting welfare payments). If media and popular discourses
20 conceptually link or draw connections between groups of people, then this pattern may be
21 consolidated further. In this respect it is important to recognise the important role attitudes can play
22 in the establishing of a political legacy. As we shall see below, age-period-cohort analysts (Grasso et
23 al, 2019a, 2019b, Gray et al 2019) have been suggesting that long-term shifts in attitudes can indeed
24 be a long-term consequence of political leadership.
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31 **2.1: Did Thatcherism Alter Attitudes?** 32

33 One of the earliest surveys of attitudes towards Thatcherism was conducted in Manchester by
34 researchers at the University of Salford (Edgell and Duke, 1991). These surveys ran in late-1980 to
35 early-1981 and again in late-1983 to early-1984, and found little by way of support for Thatcherite
36 values. The surveys suggested that respondents wanted *increases* in spending and taxation (*not*
37 decreases) with an attendant drop in support for spending on the armed services. The surveys also
38 found large levels of support for local government (1991:81) although they did find some support for
39 the idea that the power of trade unions needed to be curbed (however, trade unions were still seen
40 as being needed, 1991:83).
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43 Some of the earliest forays into this topic conducted by political scientists were conducted by Crewe
44 (see Crewe 1988, 1989). Crewe (1988) posed the question 'has the electorate become Thatcherite?',
45 to which he answered 'no', pointing out that by some analyses the population was taking a 'hard
46 line' on some issues before 1979 and that by 1987 was actually showing quite 'anti'-Thatcherite
47 sentiments. Crewe subsequently (1989) used data from a 1988 MORI poll and focused on the topic
48 of self-reliance. This again suggested that not only was there little enthusiasm for this, if anything
49 respondents were moving away from support for this idea (1989:247). Crewe and Searing (1988)
50 further argued that there was little evidence that her ideology had gained much by way of popular
51 support, and, in fact, the electorate had become *less* Thatcherite (1988:376). McAllister and Mughan
52 (1987), using data from the British Election Studies for 1974-1983, found that an analysis of the
53 October 1974, 1979 and 1983 general elections suggested there had been "little fundamental
54 change in the electorate's overall attitudinal structure" (1987:47). Studlar and McAllister (1992)
55 extended these analyses to include the 1987 general election and came to very similar conclusions.
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3 From this point onwards the data analyses started to become more sophisticated, with analysts
4 tackling regional shifts, the notion of 'political generations' and examining longitudinal patterns from
5 the British Election Studies dating back to 1963. Johnston and Pattie (1990), for example,
6 demonstrated regional variations in public Thatcherite attitudes, but nevertheless concluded that
7 "the Thatcherite project has failed, in that the majority of the electorate ... did not embrace its core
8 values to any significant extent" (1990:492). Summarising this body of work, it appears that UK
9 political scientists believed that Thatcher had had little impact on attitudes. Their collective
10 endeavours had suggested that the electorate had remained resolutely unimpressed by much of her
11 approach to the challenges which the country faced, and in many respects had started to lean away
12 from her policies.
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16 However, a number of observations of these studies can be made. Crewe's contributions were
17 criticised by Hetzner (1999), who argued that Crewe's key studies (1988 and 1989) did not include
18 reference to periods before Thatcher's time in office (thus failing to establish an adequate 'base
19 line'). Of more concern was the fact that many of the assessments were taken whilst Thatcher was
20 still in office and hence needed to be seen as interim findings, rather than providing a definitive
21 account. This observation is important in two respects. First, adults do not often dramatically change
22 their values 'overnight', and as such long term trends need to be considered. Second, attitudinal
23 change may be subject to 'intergenerational replacement' – i.e. that older generations (who may
24 hold different values from younger generations) are more likely to die, and as such, leave the
25 population or electorate. Such changes, however, may emerge slowly. These issues come to the fore
26 when one considers that in the UK under eighteen year olds are not routinely surveyed in attitudinal
27 surveys. For example, it was not until 1997 that those born in 1979 were eligible for inclusion in
28 surveys. Similarly, those perhaps most affected by Thatcherite social attitudes and the new
29 structures of institutions and thought which her governments brought about (born between, say the
30 mid-1970s and mid-1990s) would not be eighteen until the very late 1980s and late 2010s.
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35 Hetzner (1999) also noted that just because there was a *decline* in support for various Thatcherite
36 social and economic policies (Crewe, 1988, 1989) does not mean that respondents did not support
37 her agenda; it might simply have been that they felt that enough had been done on that topic, a
38 point which Crewe hints at too (1989:247). Hetzner points to the fact that decline in the popularity
39 of privatisation came after the bulk of the sales had taken place (and there were, therefore, fewer
40 entities which could be sold off, 1999:122-123). In this respect, whilst many analysts may have
41 expected the surveys they used to show attitudinal changes in line with Thatcherite values, given
42 that Thatcherism was (in part) a response to post-war social and economic changes (Dorling, 2014,
43 Green 1999), an additional approach may have been to look for a Thatcherite impact in terms of
44 *slowing* or *halting* of those attitudes and beliefs not in keeping with her philosophy. In short, it
45 might simply have been that Thatcherism arrested other long term trends (Tilley and Heath, 2007).
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51 **2.2: Political Generations; Longer Time Series; New Data Sets**

52 Russell et al (1992) extended the work by Johnston and Pattie (1990) and explored the possibility
53 that Thatcherite values had effected first-time voters to a greater extent than other voters. This
54 hypothesis was partially supported, although the results did not suggest any especially
55 straightforward trends. For example, first time voters in 1983 were more left-wing in their attitudes
56 towards law and order than either the 1979 or the 1987 first-time voters. Similar trends were
57 observed for beliefs about private or public schools (with first-time voters being more left-wing).
58 Attitudes towards egalitarianism (that is, pro-nationalisation, pro-trade unions and pro-
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3 redistribution) showed a complex change, however. Whilst the first-time voters in the 1983 general
4 election were still more left-wing than others in that election, they appeared to be less left-wing
5 than first-time voters in 1974, 1979 and 1987 (p749-50). This 'Thatcher effect' Russell et al
6 (1992:749) observed for unemployment, with the 1987 first-time voters being more right-wing than
7 those in 1983 (p752). The same trend could also be seen for attitudes towards taxation (p753) and
8 self-reliance (p753). Russell et al concluded that previous assessments failed to explore the role of
9 political socialisation, which may produce what one might think of as intergenerational replacement
10 (1992:754-55).
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13 The next key development coincided with the fall of the Conservative Party at the 1997 General
14 Election. By this point the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) had been running for almost 15
15 years, and afforded a new opportunity to assess of the extent to which the population had become
16 'Thatcherite'. The BSAS provided data which was used to question the dominant view that
17 Thatcher's impact on attitudes was an extremely limited one. For example, Heath and Park (1997:6)
18 found that the *fall* in identification with the Conservative Party was *lowest* for the youngest cohort
19 (raising the question as to whether Thatcherism had appealed more to the younger, '1980s'
20 generation). They also found that those who grew up in the 1980s were more materialistic than their
21 predecessors (Heath and Park, 1997:9). This same cohort (born after 1960, and socialised in the late-
22 1970s and 1980s) also thought inequality was 'too big' (Heath and Park, 1997:10), but possibly only
23 because they were at that stage amongst the poorest in the labour market. Heath and Park
24 concluded that the 1980s/Thatcher's generation did *not* identify with the Tories (indeed they were
25 less likely to identify with them, 1997:18), however there were signs of a shift towards materialism
26 and a growing sense of disenchantment amongst this generation (1997:19). Curtice and Jowell
27 (1997) found that between 1985 and 1996, fewer people in the BSAS agreed that governments
28 ought to provide healthcare, provide a decent standard of living for the old, keep prices under
29 control, help industry to grow, help low income families send their children to university, provide
30 accommodation for the poor, reduce economic inequalities, help the unemployed maintain a decent
31 standard of living, or provide jobs for people (p97); all of which suggest deeper shifts in public
32 attitudes.
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38 One of the benefits of the BSAS series is its ability to track change over decades. Rowlingson et al
39 (2010:10) show that the percentage agreeing that "governments ought to redistribute income"
40 stood at 45% in 1987, rose slightly to 48% in 1991 and then fell to 36% in 2009. The percentage of
41 people agreeing that the "government ought to spend more on benefits" fell from 55% in 1987 to
42 27% in 2009. In this light, it appears that Thatcherite attitudes – which New Labour had ceased to
43 contest - have asserted themselves in the decades since 1990.
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46 More recent studies have become more sophisticated still. The data sets used are more varied, the
47 time frames longer and the idea of there being 'political generations' has become more thoroughly
48 embedded in this approach. Tilley (2002), for example, has shown that younger generations tended
49 to disassociate with the Conservative Party, but that this trend stopped and went into reverse in the
50 1980s and 1990s (p129-30). Further work suggests that whilst feelings of national pride have
51 declined, Thatcher was able to arrest some of this (Tilley and Heath, 2007:669). Compounding this,
52 Tilley and Evans show that the generations which came of age during the 1930s, 1950s and 1980s (all
53 period of conservative dominance) were all more conservative ones, even if these differences are
54 only slight (2014:25).
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57 Building on the work of Sowell (2012), Grasso and colleagues (2019a, 2019b) test the 'trickle-down'
58 theory of social change. They argue that during the initial period of Thatcher's rule, there was deep
59 ideological contestation. Following this, political opponents and rival partisans internalised market
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3 liberalism as these became the new 'rules of the game'. For the UK (alongside the USA, and Australia
4 to a lesser extent), the 1980s were marked by a concentrated shift towards neo-liberal economic
5 thinking. The term 'trickle-down' was employed in popular discussions of President Reagan's
6 administration and other laissez-fair capitalist economies. (Although the concept had originally first
7 been used by US Democratic presidential candidate, William Bryan 1896, Sowell 2012). Essentially,
8 the idea is that political discourse and ideas, as well as shaping organisations and institutional
9 norms, will shape popular attitudes. They report that it indeed was the case that:
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12 "across eight of nine indicators, Thatcher's Children are more right wing and authoritarian
13 than the generation preceding them (Wilson/Callaghan's Children). [...] Blair's Babies are
14 also more right wing and authoritarian than this political generation, confirming that
15 Thatcherite values were reproduced under New Labour, and become stronger and
16 embedded in the generation that came of age after Thatcher's time in office." (Grasso, et al
17 2019:14).
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20 They go on to conclude that:

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22 "there is an upward swing in right-authoritarian values from around the start of the years of
23 birth of the Thatcherite political generation (that is, those born in 1959) at least up until the
24 end of it (those born in 1976), and in several cases lasting well beyond. This suggests
25 Thatcherite values were growing in strength among the cohort that became political adults
26 during the Thatcher years." (p14).
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29 The authors argue that the results provide strong evidence of cohort effects. The data which they
30 use (drawn from the BSAS) suggest that those cohorts growing up during prolonged periods of
31 Conservative Party rule would appear to 'absorb' the values which these administrations promote.
32 What is especially striking about these findings is that they suggest that these governments were
33 able to 'off-set' the more socially liberal tendency often found amongst younger citizens. As such,
34 they were able to show that the generation which grew up during Thatcher and Major's time in
35 office became a particularly conservative one.
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38 What we take from this more recent work is that with the emergence of longer time-series data it is
39 clear that we need to revisit and, indeed, to reject that idea of earlier scholars that Thatcher and
40 Thatcherism were unlikely to have any enduring attitudinal impact. This is not of course necessarily
41 to suggest that Thatcher or Thatcherism 'created' these attitudes, but rather that her
42 administrations (and perhaps those that followed, too) re-articulated them, gave an ideological
43 coherence to them and helped to embed them into political discourse. Certainly this occurred at a
44 specific moment in time and space that permitted these values to slowly, but surely percolate into
45 the national consciousness and thinking. In this sense, 'Thatcherite values' are not simply a new or
46 novel set of mores, but rather a (re)configuration of existing values supported by a unifying narrative
47 embedded in the heart of a critique and prognosis of British society in the 1970s, and which was
48 promoted in an unprecedented manner. As data sets with longer time series have started to be
49 more rigorously analysed, so we have seen the emergence of the idea that the impact which she had
50 was on the generation of people born in the 1960s though to the late-1970s and who grew up during
51 the 1980s and 1990s.
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3: Measuring, Exploring and Assessing Thatcherism in 2019

Against this backdrop, which suggests that there is considerable – even growing - support for Thatcherite attitudes in the years since her time in office, we designed and undertook a survey aimed at assessing and identifying who held Thatcherite values in early 2019, some 40 years after the Winter of Discontent, the vote of no confidence in the Callaghan government and the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979. Following a series of survey experiments and cognitive interviews to assess question-wording (see Farrall et al, 2020b), we commissioned an online stratified random sample survey on the contemporary relevance of Thatcherite values.² The vast majority of interviews (n=5,581) were conducted online, with a further 200 face-to-face interviews with respondents identified as being low internet users. Fieldwork was conducted between mid-January and mid-February 2019. The sample drawn was representative of Britain.

3.1 Operationalising Thatcherite Values and Thatcherite Desires

We developed a model based on the two key streams of 1980s New Right thinking (Hayes, 1994, Hay, 1996) – namely neoliberalism (Figure One) and neo-conservatism (Figure Two). Following Gamble (1988), Hay (1996), Levitas (1986) and Hayes (1994), we see these two strands of thinking as representing the two key ‘fault lines’ in Thatcherism, and indeed the 1980s New Right more generally. Both sets of items were asked as part of the same battery of questions, and all questions shared the same set of response codes.³

FIGURE ONE: NEO-LIBERAL ‘THATCHERITE’ VALUES

Item Wording	Loadings
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	
<i>Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.</i>	.599
<i>There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and wages.</i>	.667
<i>Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems.</i>	.644
<i>Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.</i>	-.322
<i>It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax.</i>	.356
<i>Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy.</i>	.418

² Online Invites were sent to members of four online panels. This spreads the fieldwork across panels to ensure a more presentative sample is drawn. In addition to BMG’s own panel, invitations were sent via panels organised by Respondi, Cint and Panelbase.

³ Which were Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree, and used for all questions discussed herein unless otherwise noted.

These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items measuring neo-liberal values. The KMO was .757, and the eigenvalue was 2.288.⁴ The factor loadings ranged from -.322⁵ to .667 and were all in the anticipated direction.

FIGURE TWO: NEO-CONSERVATIVE 'THATCHERITE' VALUES

Item Wording	Loadings
<i>Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values.</i>	.666
<i>For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence.</i>	.604
<i>People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.</i>	.753
<i>Schools should teach children to obey authority</i>	.681

The items in Figure Two were factor analysed to form one battery of neo-conservative items. The KMO was .760, and the eigenvalue was 2.369. The factor loadings ranged from .604 to .753. In addition to these two indices, we measured what might be termed 'Thatcherite Desires'; aspirations held by individual respondents which chimed with the ideals which the Thatcher governments promoted. We focused on three of these (owning one's own business, owning one's own home⁶ and sending one's children to private schools), see Figure Three.

FIGURE THREE: 'THATCHERITE' DESIRES

Item Wording
<i>One day, I would like to own my own business.</i> [NOT asked of those who already owned their own businesses].
<i>One day, I would like to buy my own home.</i> [Asked of those who did not already own their own homes or who had shared ownership].
<i>One day, I would like to send my children to a private school.</i> [Asked of those who a had children and b) who were not already at private schools].

These three items, because of their different sample sizes (a consequence of some people already owning houses etc.), were not factor analysed, and are examined herein individually. The above three batteries are our dependent variables in regression analyses. Our modelling also included four other factors (Beliefs about Thatcherism; Social Nostalgia, Economic Nostalgia and Political Nostalgia), all of which are outlined below.

The Beliefs about Thatcherism battery (Figure Four) assessed respondents' beliefs about the immediate and long-term effects of her government's policies. These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items. The KMO was .890, and the eigenvalue was 4.465. The magnitude of factor loadings ranged from -.467⁷ to .894.

⁴ The KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) Test is a measure of how suited the data is for Factor Analysis. The test measures sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. KMO values range between 0 and 1. A rule of thumb for interpreting the statistic is that KMO values between 0.8 and 1 indicate the sampling is adequate, whilst those below 0.6 indicate the sampling is not adequate and that remedial action should be taken.

⁵ This item was reverse coded, hence the negative value.

⁶ Though easily forgotten, the promotion of home ownership was a core Thatcherite value and one that both chimed with and proved particularly appealing to certain sections of what might be termed the aspirant working class (see Hay 1992).

⁷ Again, negatively loading items were reverse coded.

FIGURE FOUR: BELIEFS ABOUT THATCHERISM

Item Wording	Loadings
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Margaret Thatcher's time as Prime Minister?	
<i>Margaret Thatcher made Britain Great again.</i>	.869
<i>Margaret Thatcher was right to sell council houses to tenants.</i>	.576
<i>Private companies run utilities like gas, electricity and water better than the government ever could.</i>	.481
<i>The social and economic changes since the 1980s have ensured a brighter future for all.</i>	.715
<i>Although there were some losers, overall the changes Margaret Thatcher's governments made were necessary.</i>	.894
<i>Margaret Thatcher was right to take on trade unions.</i>	.805
<i>Margaret Thatcher only looked after the interests of the rich.</i>	-.716
<i>Today's housing crisis is a result of selling off so many council homes in the 1980s.</i>	-.467

We fielded a further set of questions which gauged respondents' feelings of nostalgia (differentiating between social, economic and political forms of nostalgia, see Figures Five to Seven).

FIGURE FIVE: SOCIAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY

Item Wording	Loadings
<i>The country's best days are behind it.</i>	.466
<i>I would like my country to be the way it used to be.</i>	.711
<i>More and more, I don't like with what my country has become.</i>	.609
<i>These days I feel like a stranger in my own country.</i>	.704
<i>I feel sad when I think about how areas like the ... one I grew up in have changed.</i>	.837
<i>... one I now live in have changed.</i>	.813

The Social Nostalgia battery was factor analysed; the KMO was .837, and the eigenvalue was 3.450. The Economic Nostalgia battery had a KMO of .722, with an eigenvalue of 2.105, whilst the KMO for the Political Nostalgia battery was .765, and the eigenvalue 2.612.

FIGURE SIX: ECONOMIC NOSTALGIA BATTERY

Item Wording	Loadings
<i>The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society.</i>	.607
<i>The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor.</i>	.632
<i>It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards closed.</i>	.585
<i>I feel that there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s.</i>	.609

FIGURE SEVEN: POLITICAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY

Item Wording	Loadings
<i>Margaret Thatcher's governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary people.</i>	.908
<i>Margaret Thatcher's governments did a lot of damage to communities around here.</i>	.889
<i>Many of the problems we now face started in the 1980s with Margaret Thatcher.</i>	.897

3.2: Operationalising Key Socio-Demographic Variables

In order to assess which social groups expressed the highest levels of Thatcherite Values and Desires, we asked our respondents a series of questions aimed at assessing their age, gender, past voting patterns, parental voting and so on. These are listed here (along with their recoding, when appropriate, Figure Eight).

3.3: Analytic Strategy

Our analytic strategy was to undertake multiple linear regressions in order to build models to explain the three Thatcherite desires and the Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative measures of Thatcherism. The Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative values are used as independent variables in the modelling of the desire to own a business, privately educate one's children and own one's home.

FIGURE EIGHT: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS

Item Wording	Notes
<i>Please can you tell me your age at your last birthday?</i>	Recoded into 10 year intervals 16-25 to +75.
<i>What is your gender?</i>	Male/Female
<i>Which of these best describes the ownership of your home?</i>	A range of tenures were offered. Those with mortgages and those who owned outright were treated as home owners.
<i>Did you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, buy your <u>present home</u> from the local authority as a tenant?</i> and <i>Have you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, ever bought any <u>previous home</u> from the local authority as a tenant?</i>	Those who said 'Yes' to either one of these were counted as council house buyers.
<i>How did you vote at the EU Referendum?</i>	Leave or remain (DK and can't recall were excluded from the analyses).
<i>You indicated that you voted at the previous General Election held in June 2017. How did you vote at the election?</i>	Coded as Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, Plaid Cymru, UKIP, Green Party, Other with DK and can't recall offer as options.
<i>Can you remember which party your <u>father</u> voted for when you were growing up?</i>	Respondents were offered the following: Conservative, Labour,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	and <i>Can you remember which party your <u>mother</u> voted for when you were growing up?</i>	Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, UKIP, British National Party, National Front, Other, Varied, Not brought up in Britain, Did not vote, Can't remember, DK, refused. These were recoded into: Conservative; Labour; Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP/Green Party; SNP/Plaid Cymru; UKIP/British National Party/National Front; Other/Varied/Not brought up in Britain/Did not vote/Can't remember/DK/refused.
20 21 22 23 24	<i>When you were growing up, would you say your family was middle class or working class?</i>	Respondents were offered Middle Class, Working Class, Other and DK (the last two of which are dropped from analyses).
25 26 27 28 29	<i>Would you describe yourself as extremely religious or extremely non-religious?</i>	Respondents were offered the following: Extremely, Very, Somewhat, Neither Somewhat non, Very non-, Extremely non-, Can't choose.
30 31 32 33 34	<i>Which of all of the following income brackets, best represents your household income, before deductions for income tax, National Insurance etc.</i>	Respondents were offered £5,000 bands ranging from Less than £5,000 to More than £100,000 with an option to select Prefer not to say.
35 36 37 38	<i>Do you have a Bachelor's degree or higher (e.g. BSc, BA, MA, MSc, PhD etc)?</i>	Respondents could select Yes or No.

4: Regression Modelling

The data relating to Thatcherite desires (home ownership etc.) were used as dependent variables in their raw form (a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strong Agree). In order to retain as many cases as possible for analyses, we recoded those people who already owned their own businesses, wanted to educate their children privately or to own their own homes as '6' (with the exception of those without children aged over 19, who were dropped from the analyses for the education question). Our logic being that ownership of a home was the realisation of the desire to own a home, and as such scored higher (6) than the highest level of desire to own (5). These models are reported in Table One). This exercise was repeated for the Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative values (outlined in Figures One and Two). All of the models start with socio-demographic variables, before introducing variables relating to values and beliefs.⁸

⁸ We ought to note that none of the variables appeared to suffer from multi-collinearity.

4.1: Modelling Thatcherite Desires

We find, for example, that males are more likely than females to want to own their own business, but females are more likely to want to own their own homes (Table One). Older age groups are less likely to want to own their own business or to educate their children privately than younger age groups, who, in turn are less likely to want to own their own homes. There are either no statistically significant findings or no clear trends in the data for urban/rural dwellers (rural dwellers want to own their own businesses more than urban dwellers, however), religiosity, being the chief income earner (CIE, who are less likely to want to their own homes), or household income (although higher earning households are more likely to want to own their own homes). Those who had bought their local authority homes wanted to privately educate their children, whilst the reverse was true for those who described themselves as middle class whilst growing up. Those people with degrees were more likely than those without to want to own their own business and to educate their children privately. Home ownership was not associated with any of the Thatcherite desires.

[TABLE ONE]

The variables relating to past voting patterns (either by the respondent or their parents) showed inconsistent patterns. None were statistically significant when it came to the model of desires to own a business. Those whose mothers had voted Conservative were more likely to want to privately educate their children, whilst those who fathers had voted Labour were less likely to want to buy their own homes. Of particular significance here is the finding that few of the variables appear to help explain the desires to own one's own home. This was a core Thatcherite aspiration in the 1980s. However, over time it has become a much more commonly-held and normalised aspiration. The power of explanatory variables to account for it is, as a consequence, all the weaker.

Moving on to political values and beliefs, the measure of Neo-Liberalism (outlined in Figure One above) was positively associated with the desire to own one's own business and to educate one's children privately (as one might imagine, as were Thatcherite Beliefs). It was not, however, associated with wanting to own one's home as this was so prevalent (see above). Neo-Conservative values (outlined in Figure Two above) were negatively associated with wanting to own one's own business. Of the nostalgia batteries, only that relating to Political Nostalgia (Figure Seven) was related to any of the Thatcherite desires (being positively associated with wanting to own one's own business and educate one's children privately).

What lessons can we draw from the multiple linear regressions in Table One? Let us start with the socio-demographic variables. Rural dwellers association with desires to own their own businesses could represent a middle class 'flight' to rural homes. In terms of gender, it would appear that males have bought the Thatcherite desire of 'being one's own boss' (separate analyses found that men were more likely than females to own their own businesses), whilst females were more likely to want to own their own homes. Perhaps more the most interesting findings again relate to younger people. We find younger people wanting to own their own businesses, to educate their children privately, and to own their own homes. Those educated to degree level held consistently pro-Thatcherite desires. Turning now to the theoretical variables, one sees that none of these predict desires to own one's home; indicating both the prevalence of such desires. Owning one's own business is positively associated with higher levels of Neo-Liberalism, higher levels of Thatcherite Beliefs and higher levels of Political Nostalgia for the Thatcher period (as one might imagine). Neo-

Conservative values are negatively associated with wanting to own one's own home. This picture is largely replicated (without the Neo-Conservative values) when we look at the desire to educate one's children privately.

In terms of the models of Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative values (Table Two), we find quite contrasting models. In terms of explaining Neo-Liberalism, being younger, less religious, the Chief income earner in a household, and a local authority home buyer were all associated with having higher Neo-Liberal values. Voting for a left-leaning party was negatively associated with Neo-Liberal values (as one would expect).⁹ Whilst feelings of Social Nostalgia, Political Nostalgia and Thatcherite Beliefs were all positively associated with Neo-Liberalism, Economic Nostalgia was negatively associated with Neo-Liberalism (neo-liberals are less economically nostalgic, but more socially, politically nostalgic and hold Thatcherite Beliefs). In terms of explaining Neo-Conservatism, those in households with higher incomes were more likely to hold Neo-Conservative values, whilst those with degree were less likely to hold Neo-Conservative Values. Having voted to leave the EU was associated with Neo-Conservatism, whilst voting for a left-leaning political party was not. Feelings of both Social and Economic Nostalgia were associated with Neo-Conservatism.

[TABLE TWO]

5: Reputational Legacies?

One of the things which we also wished to establish was the extent to which popular opinion was supportive of Margaret Thatcher's period in office in terms of her reputation. When she left office in November 1990, MORI asked people if, on balance, they thought that Thatcher's governments had been a 'good' or a 'bad' thing. We repeated this question in our survey in January/February 2019. The data for both are presented in Table Three.

TABLE THREE: THE REPUTATIONAL LEGACY OF THATCHER/ISM

	November 1990	January-February 2019	Difference
Good	52	24	-28
Bad	40	37	-3
No Opinion	8	38	+30
Good-Bad Difference	+12	-13	-

All figures are column percentages.

In November 1990, some 52% of the MORI survey felt that Thatcher's governments had been a good thing (a +12% Good/Bad rating). This had dropped by some 28 percentage points at the point of our survey to 24% (a -13% Good/Bad rating). On the other hand, those thinking that her governments had been a bad thing had dropped by only three percentage points to 37%. Understandably, the percentage of those with no opinion had risen more than fourfold to 38%.

⁹ Left-leaning parties were defined as Labour, The Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Greens. The opposite (right-leaning parties) were defined as the Conservative Party and UKIP.

TABLE FOUR: REPUTATIONAL LEGACY OF THATCHER/ISM BY AGE

	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	+75
Good	15	21	27	32	38	49	52
Bad	39	37	41	47	46	36	33
No Opinion	46	42	32	22	16	15	15

All figures are column percentages.

As can be seen (Table Four), the percentage of people reporting Thatcher's governments as being 'good' increases with age from a low of 15% for those aged 16-24, to 52% for those aged over 75. The 'bad' ratings do not vary much, ranging from 33% to 47%. This is a fairly linear increase of about six percentage points for ages 16-64, thereafter jumping to 11 percentage points. Notably, the highest levels of 'bad' assessments come from those aged 45 to 64 (born 1955 to 1974, and aged 16 to 35 when she left office). This group would have been amongst those whose life-courses would have been most affected by her government's policies (see Farrall et al, 2019a, b and 2020a, for example). Those with the most positive assessments are those aged over 65 (so born before 1955, and hence aged at least 24 when Thatcher was elected in 1979). This group is the age cohort most likely to have gained from policies such as the right to buy one's council home and lower taxes on salaries for those in work). As one might expect the 'no opinion' assessment decreases with age.

Another way of assessing what people feel about Thatcherism today is to ask if the changes her government initiated 'went too far', 'were about right' or 'did not go far enough'. Table Five summarises this data. What we see is that the 45-64-year-old groups again stand out as least supportive of her governments' policies; they alone reach 60% for the 'went too far' response (shaded cells), and they score the lowest on the 'did not go far enough' response (lighter shaded cells). Interestingly, 'about right' was most popular with those over 65.

TABLE FIVE: DID THATCHER 'GO TOO FAR?' BY AGE

	16-24	24-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-75	Over 75
Went too far	52	55	57	62	60	47	46
About right	36	36	36	32	35	46	48
Did not go far enough	12	10	7	6	5	7	7

All figures are %

6: Discussion and Conclusions

Where does this leave us? Who holds Thatcherite Values in the early 2020s, forty years after Thatcher won her first General Election? And who promotes these values today? Age is negatively related to all three of the desires, and Neo-Liberal Values, suggesting that (contrary to some expectations) younger people are more Thatcherite than older people in the values they express. Similarly, religiosity is also negatively related to wanting to run (or already running) one's own business and to privately educate one's children (or to do so already), and with Neo-Liberal Values too. Those with higher household incomes are more likely already to own or to want to own their own businesses, to want to or already to own their own home, and to report Neo-Conservative

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3 Values. Those with degrees are more likely than those without already to run their own business (or
4 to want to), to privately educate their children (or to already do so) and they are more likely to hold
5 Neo-Conservative Values. Those who bought their local authority homes either want to (or already)
6 privately educate their children; they tend also to express Neo-Liberal Values. People who voted for
7 left-leaning parties in 2017 score lower, as one might imagine than those who voted for right-leaning
8 parties on both the measures of Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Conservatism. Both Thatcherite Beliefs
9 and holding Neo-Liberal Values are associated with desires to run one's own business and to educate
10 one's children privately (or already doing so). The nostalgia batteries predict (in various pairings)
11 support for all of the measures of Thatcherite Desires and Values, with the exception of home
12 ownership.
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16 The variables which do not feature prominently in the five regression models (appearing only once
17 or twice if at all) relate to gender, area of dwelling (urban or rural), being the chief income earner,
18 being a home owner, being middle class when a child, reported parental voting behaviour and EU
19 Referendum voting. It is these last sets of variables (unassociated with Thatcherism) which, we
20 contend, offer some intriguing clues when it comes to answering the question of who holds
21 Thatcherite values today. Home ownership in the UK has reached such high rates of saturation that
22 very few of the variables we used were are associated with it, and when used as an independent
23 variable, it fails to predict either Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Conservatism. This suggests, in keeping
24 with our argument, that some Thatcherite values and desires have become embedded in UK society
25 (Farrall et al, forthcoming). Although home ownership was once a core part of that Thatcherite
26 dream for the aspiration working class, it is now a much more commonly held and normalised desire
27 (a routine expectation). In part this suggests the value structures Thatcherism promoted were the
28 'right' ones – which appealed to people's desires. However, in another way it also reflects the fact
29 that many of our local authority owned housing estates are no longer places many people would
30 'aspire' to reside in for the long-term (Farrall et al 2016). Moreover, that parental voting is unrelated
31 to Thatcherism suggests that any intergenerational voting bloc has been eroded. In general, younger
32 people, in households with higher incomes, who have degrees and report lower levels of religious
33 belief are likely to hold Thatcherite Values. Local Authority home purchasers want to privately
34 educate their children (or have already done so) and to hold Neo-Liberal Values.
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40 In some cases, however, the data in Tables Three to Five suggest a dislike for Thatcher and her
41 governments' time in office. However, Thatcher and Thatcherism are different beasts, and whilst the
42 terms 'Thatcher' and 'Thatcherism' have become unpopular, negatively connoted, and associated
43 with a turbulent period in the UK's recent history, the *actual* values and desires which Thatcher
44 promoted have become embedded in British society, especially so amongst younger members of
45 society. In this way, one could see Thatcher has having 'lost the (discursive) battle, but won the
46 (ideological) war'.
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49 Our study is not a study of political discourses, and as such we are unable to reflect on which
50 sections of society or systems of political thought and control 'advance' the sorts of arguments
51 which underpin and buttress 'Thatcherite' attitudes. However, the recent work of French scholars
52 Dardot and Laval (2013) gives some clues. Their work attempts to understand the ways in which 'the
53 neoliberal project' (and hence for us a key part of the Thatcherite project) has shaped both society
54 and the key social actors within it. They argue that neoliberalism is:
55

56 *"productive of certain kinds of social relations, certain ways of living, certain subjectivities. In*
57 *other words, at stake in neo-liberalism is nothing more, nor less, than the form of our*
58 *existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and*
59 *ourselves"* (2013:3).
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3 The principal characteristic of neo-liberalism is what they term 'competitive behaviouralism' (p4).
4 Drawing on Foucault they claim that neoliberalism is a form of 'government of life' (p4-5), and as
5 such not simply as a set of prescriptions about economics or economic policy, but also a societal
6 form (p11). Their insights into politically-induced attitudinal behavioural change suggests that this
7 project has produced a new human condition (p255), and the attitudes and values needed to survive
8 in it. In that sense, all social actors are involved in the reproduction of these values which over time,
9 become norm (such as the desire to own one's own home, above). Some (such as politicians, for
10 example) will have louder voices which reach further and who are able to establish and promote
11 particular agendas. As such, individuals, organisations and institutions will work consciously or
12 unconsciously to reproduce and promote the values associated with Thatcherism and neo-liberalism
13 more generally. Alongside this, argue Dardot and Laval, private insurance replaces socialised health
14 care, pension and welfare schemes – as the field of action of the 'responsible', 'choosing' neoliberal
15 subject grows and competitive individualism becomes institutionally embedded (p277). US political
16 scientist Pierson argues in a similar vein that:
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21 "Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of
22 investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain kinds of
23 organizations" (1993:609).
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25 He notes that "public policies also provide resources and create incentives for mass publics"
26 (1993:605). In keeping with Dardot and Laval, Pierson highlights the ways in which social and
27 economic policies shape what people want and are capable of achieving. As such, these attitudes
28 emerge from the contexts in which individuals live and orientate their lives and goals (Emirbayer and
29 Mische, 1998).
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32 One of the limitations of our study is that it is based on cross-sectional data. However, what we
33 know from the work of Grasso et al (2019a and b) and Gray et al (2019) is that those people who
34 grew up under the Thatcher and Major governments, and subsequently the Blair government, do
35 appear to hold values which are in keeping with Thatcherite ideology and discourse, and more so
36 than earlier generations. However, when asked about their feelings toward Thatcher, we find that
37 they are much less keen to embrace ideas that might be seen to bear her name and, by extension,
38 less keen to identify themselves with her or Thatcherism (Table Four). This, we surmise, is because
39 these individuals hold values which they developed whilst they were growing up (during the Blair
40 era, when such values had become more normalised and relatively unchallenged [an empirical
41 confirmation, in effect, of the argument advanced in Hay 2004]). As such, they appear to embrace
42 ideas whose origins seem to lie in the Thatcher years, without thinking of them in such terms. In
43 some respects, then, these individuals hold 'Thatcherite' values (as we have demonstrated
44 empirically) but do not to think of themselves as Thatcherite (exhibiting a form of what might be
45 termed political cognitive dissonance). There are, nevertheless, a small percent of younger
46 respondents who felt that the changes her government brought in did not go far enough (around 10-
47 12% for those aged 16-34, Table Five). Those aged 45-64 (and arguably those whose life-courses
48 would have been most dramatically altered by Thatcherite policies) consistently appear to be the
49 least positive about her time in office. This, perhaps, shows the importance and slow-burning nature
50 of political socialisation. For those aged under 45, neo-liberalism was already the norm when they
51 were being socialised (between 1975 and 2003). For them, expressing neo-liberal values is to express
52 or take a position on questions that had become depoliticised and less contested than previously so.
53 So, in effect, these are Blair's babies as much as they are Thatcher's children.
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Biographies

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Table One: Multiple Linear Regression Models of Thatcherite Desires

Variable	Modelling Business Ownership Desire				Modelling Desire to Privately Educate Kids				Modelling Home Ownership Desire			
	Unstandardised B	Std. Err	Standardised B	Stat. Sig.	Unstandardised B	Std. Err	Standardised B	Stat. Sig.	Unstandardised B	Std. Err	Standardised B	Stat. Sig.
Constant	5.272	.276	-	.000	5.579	.458	-	.000	5.441	.321	-	.000
Female	-.290	.059	-.094	.000	-.087	.098	-.028	.374	.052	.069	.020	.456
Age	-.035	.002	-.378	.000	-.016	.003	-.179	.000	-.039	.002	-.502	.000
Rural Dweller	.201	.071	.051	.005	-.016	.118	-.004	.893	-.026	.084	-.008	.756
Religiosity	-.075	.019	-.071	.000	-.140	.032	-.133	.000	-.029	.023	-.033	.195
Chief Earner	.046	.063	.014	.470	.204	.105	.064	.052	-.096	.074	-.035	.197
Household income	.024	.009	.055	.008	-.010	.015	.022	.526	.055	.010	.147	.000
Degree educated	.152	.062	.468	.014	.562	.103	.179	.000	.101	.073	-.038	.164
Home Owners	-.060	.065	-.019	.355	.101	.107	.032	.349	-	-	-	.*
LA home buyer	.129	.093	.025	.166	.912	.154	.180	.000	-.045	.108	-.010	.677
Middle class as child	-.027	.041	-.012	.509	-.185	.068	-.084	.007	-.024	.048	-.013	.613
Father voted Con	-.076	.103	-.021	.457	-.313	.170	-.085	.066	-.025	.120	-.008	.838
Father voted Lab	-.022	.088	-.007	.801	-.103	.146	-.033	.481	-.262	.104	-.097	.012
Mother voted Con	.170	.102	.046	.094	.361	.169	.099	.032	.037	.119	.012	.757
Mother voted Lab	-.008	.088	-.003	.925	.084	.146	.026	.566	.157	.104	.058	.130
Voted Left-leaning	.007	.075	.002	.928	-.016	.125	-.005	.897	-.066	.088	-.025	.458
Voted to leave EU	.011	.065	.003	.871	.129	.107	.042	.228	.110	.076	.042	.147
Neo-Liberal Values	.136	.045	.075	.002	.234	.074	.129	.002	-.102	.052	-.066	.052
Neo-Con Values	-.181	.041	-.104	.000	-.127	.068	-.074	.062	.020	.048	.013	.681
Thatcherite Beliefs	.143	.055	.089	.009	.753	.091	.473	.000	.114	.064	.084	.076
Social Nostalgia	.080	.039	.049	.040	-.007	.064	-.004	.917	-.036	.046	-.026	.426
Economic Nostalgia	.033	.046	.018	.473	.108	.077	.059	.161	.102	.054	.066	.061
Political Nostalgia	.128	.053	.080	.016	.448	.088	.282	.000	-.074	.062	-.055	.235
Adj. R-Sq	.191				.304				.315			

Shaded cells are statistically significant and only included to aid readability. *Tenure was not included in the model for Home Ownership.

Table Two: Multiple Linear Regression Models of Thatcherite Values

Variable	Modelling Neo-Liberal Values				Modelling Neo-Conservative Values			
	Unstandardised B	Std. Err	Standardised B	Stat. Sig.	Unstandardised B	Std. Err	Standardised B	Stat. Sig.
Constant	.725	.124	-	.000	.031	.135	-	.816
Female	-.045	.027	-.026	.093	.026	.029	.015	.367
Age	-.002	.001	-.042	.016	.001	.001	.028	.127
Rural Dweller	.003	.032	.001	.936	.026	.035	.011	.460
Religiosity	-.036	.009	-.062	.000	.007	.009	.012	.457
Chief Earner	.060	.029	.034	.037	.056	.031	.030	.074
Household income	.005	.004	.021	.211	.011	.004	.042	.018
Degree educated	.014	.028	.008	.615	-.189	.030	-.104	.000
Home Owners	.014	.029	-.008	.643	.059	.032	.033	.063
LA home buyer	.134	.042	.048	.001	.022	.046	.007	.633
Middle class as child	-.010	.019	-.009	.575	.008	.020	.007	.679
Father voted Con	.007	.046	.003	.880	.014	.051	.006	.787
Father voted Lab	.008	.040	.004	.849	.068	.043	.037	.119
Mother voted Con	-.002	.046	-.001	.973	-.040	.050	-.019	.419
Mother voted Lab	.045	.040	.026	.261	-.011	.043	-.006	.802
Voted Left-leaning	-.231	.034	-.136	.000	-.191	.037	-.108	.000
Voted to leave EU	-.015	.029	-.009	.614	-.225	.032	-.127	.000
Thatcherite Beliefs	.559	.022	.634	.000	.221	.024	.241	.000
Social Nostalgia	.149	.016	.165	.000	.360	.018	.382	.000
Economic Nostalgia	-.226	.020	-.224	.000	.137	.022	.130	.000
Political Nostalgia	.206	.024	.234	.000	.020	.026	.022	.439
Adj. R-Sq	.453				.405			

Shaded cells are statistically significant and only included to aid readability. *These variables were not included in these models.