Policy development and implementation in the Bretton Woods institutions: A consideration of the legality, human right impact and effectiveness of their programmes

Previous research investigating the legality of the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes has emphasised the need for additional conditionality to be imposed on the recipient nations to enhance their Human Rights performance. This paper, however, evaluates the legality of the conditionality terms imposed in many of the Structural Adjustment Programmes developed and imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on recipient nations from a different perspective; that of the impact and results of the programmes on Human Rights achievements by the recipient nations and also the legality of conditionality clauses within the terms of the charters of the Bretton Woods organisations about which there has been much scholastic debate. This is approached from the basis of the nature of the institutions and their governing Articles of Agreement together with the approach to interpretation of these Articles by the Legal Counsel; taking the works of Ibrahim Shihata (a Senior Vice-President and General Counsel to the World bank) as evidence of the institutional approach. This is contrasted with the works of one of the chief Economists of the World Bank, Prof. Joseph Stiglitz, which develops the economic framework for analysis of the impact. Research shows that many of the Bretton Woods institution purposes have not been achieved in many of the countries involved as recipients, as will be analysed later. Indeed there are many documented cases where the results are the direct opposite of these purposes, as will be further analysed. An external view of this is developed from the SAPRIN studies undertaken in conjunction with the World Bank between 1995 and 2001 which provides a basis for comparison to relevant International Human Rights Treaties as evidence. Specifically, the following are used as benchmarks for this analysis; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and ILO Convention No 87 treaties. It is concluded, on the basis of the impact of the Structural Adjustment programmes reviewed in the SAPRIN study, that the Structural Adjustment programmes failed both the test of economic efficiency and the test of legality in Human Rights terms. However, there are no courts of competent jurisdiction in which claims can be brought against the Bretton Woods organisations.

Previous research investigating the legality of the IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes has emphasised the need for additional conditionality to be imposed on the recipient nations to enhance their Human Rights performance. This paper, however, evaluates the legality of the conditionality terms imposed in many of the Structural Adjustment Programmes developed and imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on recipient nations from a different perspective; that of the impact and results of the programmes on Human Rights achievements by the recipient nations and also the legality of conditionality clauses within the terms of the charters of the Bretton Woods organisations about which there has been much scholastic debate. This is approached from the basis of the nature of the institutions and their governing Articles of Agreement together with the approach to interpretation of these Articles by the Legal Counsel; taking the works of Ibrahim Shihata (a Senior Vice-President and General Counsel to the World bank) as evidence of the institutional approach. This is contrasted with the works of one of the chief Economists of the World Bank, Prof. Joseph Stiglitz, which develops the economic framework for analysis of the impact. Research shows that many of the Bretton Woods institution purposes have not been achieved in many of the countries involved as recipients, as will be analysed later. Indeed there are many documented cases where the results are the direct opposite of these purposes, as will be further analysed. An external view of this is developed from the SAPRIN studies undertaken in conjunction with the World Bank between 1995 and 2001 which provides a basis for comparison to relevant International Human Rights Treaties as evidence. Specifically, the following are used as benchmarks for this analysis; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and ILO Convention No 87 treaties. It is concluded, on the basis of the impact of the Structural Adjustment programmes reviewed in the SAPRIN study, that the Structural Adjustment programmes failed both the test of economic efficiency and the test of legality in Human Rights terms. However, there are no courts of competent jurisdiction in which claims can be brought against the Bretton Woods organisations.